tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20173285.post115747000170730121..comments2024-03-25T09:43:27.402-04:00Comments on Divrei Chaim: halachic ethics - the akeidah, hutra vs. dechuya, mitzvos the avos did not keepChaim B.http://www.blogger.com/profile/02231811394447584320noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20173285.post-1157509462036658372006-09-05T22:24:00.000-04:002006-09-05T22:24:00.000-04:00Point one: the Doctor is the King! That is, He "Wh...Point one: the Doctor is the King! That is, He "Who wounds and heals" is also He "who commanded us to perform". The natural order and the mitzvot both have the same Source. <BR/>Point two: as for the Akedah, doesn't Rashi point out that Abraham was actually ordered only to offer Yitzchak as a sacrifice, but not actually commanded to carry out it all the way to actually killing? Although contrary to that, Avraham and Sarah both seem to act in the run up as if they assumed Yitzchak's death was involved.<BR/>Point three: the ultimate end of Kierkegaard's proposition is suicide bombings and gulags. Perhaps the S.D. would put it differently, but need I say more?<BR/>Point four, regarding Bill S.'s comment. Maybe my memory is at fault, but I don't seem to remember the commandment against murder being issued to Adam or Cain. But Cain is still warned beforehand about sinning, and punished afterwards. Which would suggest that murder was wrong before it became a mitzvah not to murder.<BR/>Point five: with a human ruler, one seeks an audience to present one's requests, but must have the permission of the ruler (or his staff, at least) to be admitted. Otherwise, one can not be sure that the request will be listened to, or that even possibly one might be punished for the presumption of asking without permission. The mitzvot of tefilah is thus the permission given us to be received in audience and to have our requests heard--which would conform to the Rav's point. Moreover, while everyone has the basic urge to pray, it is the halacha of tefilah that informs us of the acceptable manner and content.<BR/><BR/>I will still stick to the position I outlined in my comment to the earlier post: Torah being Torah, what is ethical can be found in the Torah, and what is found in the Torah is ethical; but human reason can figure out ethics on its own, but we benefit from the guidance of the Torah in avoiding errors that human reasoning might lead to--errors such as the Kierkegaard proposition.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20173285.post-1157475079008959302006-09-05T12:51:00.000-04:002006-09-05T12:51:00.000-04:00Telzers are happy to derive something from sevara;...Telzers are happy to derive something from sevara; Brisk sees everything purely as a function of halachic categories. Another example might be tefila: the Rav in lomdus assumed that tefilah needs a 'matir'; however, one could reasonably argue that the natural desire of the neshoma to daven validates itself without a precise halachic matir. <BR/>See GRI'Z al haTorah quoting R' Chaim in the akeida - there is not even a kashe of shnei kesuvim until there is a kasuv hashlishi.Chaim B.https://www.blogger.com/profile/02231811394447584320noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20173285.post-1157471740753332942006-09-05T11:55:00.000-04:002006-09-05T11:55:00.000-04:00I believe that R. Chaim Brisker has a unique shitt...I believe that R. Chaim Brisker has a unique shitta relating to ethics and mitzvos. Basically, he holds that mitzvos create the ethic. If, for example, Hashem never outlawed murder, then murder would be an ethical action. 'Histakel b'oraysa' - the world operates based on the laws of the Torah. Wild stuff. I think it's brought down in the Brisker Hagadda.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com