connection between bikurim and the 13 midos ha'rachamim

Fascinating Meshech Chochma points out that there are 13 times that the shem Havaya is mentioned in the parsha of bikurim, and he suggests that these correspond to the 13 midos ha'rachamim which Ashkenazim will start saying in slichos this motzei shabbos.  Interestingly, in Ki Tisa, the very last pasuk of the aliya in which the midos are mentioned is  רֵאשִׁ֗ית בִּכּוּרֵי֙ אַדְמָ֣תְךָ֔ תָּבִ֕יא בֵּ֖ית ה׳ אלקיך.  

Here are his words:

בפ׳ בכורים נזכר י״ג פעמים שם הוי׳, לנגד שלשה עשר מדות של רחמנים, ובפרשה דויעבור ה׳ על פניו ויקרא כו׳ הי״ג מדות הזהיר על ראשית בכורי כו׳ תביא בית ה׳ כו׳. ודו״ק.

The root of sin is to be kafuy tovah.  The 13 midos are all about recognizing the chasdei Hashem, that he is rachum v'chanun, and without that we are nothing.  Bikurim is the same idea -- to be makir tovah to Hashem for bringing us into Eretz Yisrael and giving us its peiros. 

asher lo yakim -- do things lishma!

1) Many meforshim talk about why the particular 11 arurim mentioned in the parsha are singled out more than any other aveiros.  You can find this idea in the Sefas Emes, but it really goes back to R' Bachyei: the gemara (Makos 24a) writes that David haMelech took all 613 mitzvos and boiled them down to 11 principles that are mentioned in Tehillim ch 15.  Not that you don't have to keep all 613 mitzvos -- what it means is that a m'eiyn of the level of dveikus that you can achieve by doing all 613 mitzvos can be captured by living these 11 principles (see Maharal in Ch Aggados).  The gemara at the beginning of Sukkah that daf yomi learners hopefully still remember tells us that the Shechina never came down lower than 10 tefachim, and no one ever went up more than 10 tefachim.  There is a boundary between shamayim and aretz.  David haMelech gives us 11 principles to live by, 1 more than 10, so we can break through that boundary.  11 spices are in the ketores -- same idea.  R' Bachyei writes that the 11 arurim are the flipside to these 11 principles.  I didn't try to do a one to one comparison to see how they line up, but it would be an interesting project.

The last one of the arurim on the list is אָר֗וּר אֲשֶׁ֧ר לֹא־יָקִ֛ים אֶת־דִּבְרֵ֥י הַתּוֹרָֽה־הַזֹּ֖את לַעֲשׂ֣וֹת אוֹתָ֑ם.  What does "asher lo yakim" mean?  If, for example, you don't fulfill the mitzvah of not eating neveilah, then you are over the lav of neveilah.  What does "asher lo yakim" add?  We've discussed the Ramban and Chasam Sofer on this in the past.  Abarbanel suggests that the pasuk is talking about someone who does fulfill everything, aleph through taf.  The problem is the motivation.  Sometimes a person does the mitzvos because that's the key to getting the kavod they need, maybe getting $$$, or getting the social recognition and prestige.  A person has to be "yakim," to fulfill the Torah, "...LA'ASOS OSAM," because he wants to do what Hashem told him to do, not as a means to some other end.  It very much sounds like the Abarbanel is bashing she'lo lishma here.  What about l’olam yaasok adam baTorah u’mitzvot af al pi shelo lishmah?  I assume Abarbanel would differentiate between degrees of she'lo lishma, but be that as it may, it is still a very striking statement.

2) We have earlier in the parsha by bringing bikurim  וּבָאתָ֙ אֶל־הַכֹּהֵ֔ן אֲשֶׁ֥ר יִהְיֶ֖ה בַּיָּמִ֣ים הָהֵ֑ם.  Rashi comments אשר יהיה בימים ההם – אין לך אלא כהןא בימיך, כמות שהוא.  Ramban asks:  b'shlama in parshas shoftim where we are speaking about zakein mamrei, I understand why the Torah has to say וּבָאתָ֗ אֶל־הַכֹּהֲנִים֙ הַלְוִיִּ֔ם וְאֶ֨ל־הַשֹּׁפֵ֔ט אֲשֶׁ֥ר יִהְיֶ֖ה בַּיָּמִ֣ים הָהֵ֑ם meaning, as Rashi comments ואפילו אינו כשאר שופטים שהיו לפניו, because otherwise I might have thought that the mitzvah of listening to B"D only applies when the members of BD are talmidei chachamim of stature, but when they are not such brilliant leaders, maybe there is no problem taking issue with their psak, kah mashma lan that it doesn't work that way.   אין לך אלא שופט שבימיך - you have to listen to the B"D in your time even if they are not all Einsteins.  However, what's the hava amina to think that you would not have to bring bikurim to a kohen who is not on such a high level?  Does it take an Einstein to eat a basket of fruit?

R' Baruch Sorotzkin explains that the idea of bringing bikurim is that when you come in contact with a kohen who is oveid in beis ha'mikdash, it makes an impression.  Tos in Baba Basra (21) writes with respect to maaser sheni כדדרשי' בספרי למען תלמד ליראה וגו' גדול מעשר שני שמביא לידי תלמוד לפי שהיה עומד בירושלים עד שיאכל מעשר שני שלו והיה רואה שכולם עוסקים במלאכת שמים ובעבודה היה גם הוא מכוון ליראת שמים ועוסק בתורה: that when you spend time in Yerushalayim to eat maaser sheni and you witness the kohanim doing avodah and engaged in mileches shamayim, it brings you to greater yirah and great closeness to Torah.  You're not just a messenger to drop off a fruit basket.  One might have thought that this is well and good if the kohanim in your time are people from whom there is something to learn and something to gain from being in contact with, but let's be real -- not every kohen in history is like that.  Kah mashma lan Rashi that you still have to go and bring your bikurim to fulfill the mitzvah.

3) The Midrash writes that when Moshe foresaw that the mitzvah of bikurim would end, he instituted davening 3x a day (see this post, and here, here, and here).  The gemara in Brachos tells us that tefilah corresponds to the daily korbanos.  In other words, prayer, coming close to G-d, demands sacrifice.  According to another view, tefilah was instituted by the Avos.  In other words, we do it because it is part of our tradition, because our parents and grandparents prayed.  Our Midrash gives us a different perspective.   וְהָיָה֙ כִּֽי־תָב֣וֹא אֶל־הָאָ֔רֶץ -- the word "haya" is always an indicator of happiness and joy, as Ohr haChaim explains אמר והיה לשון שמחה, להעיר שאין לשמוח אלא בישיבת הארץ על דרך אומרו (תהלים קכ״ו) אז ימלא שחוק פינו.  ב .  Similarly, וְשָׂמַחְתָּ֣ בְכׇל־הַטּ֗וֹ the halacha is that אין קורין מקרא בכורים אלא בזמן שמחה, מעצרת ועד החג, שאדם מלקט תבואתו ופירותיו ויינו ושמנו you can only bring bikurim during the harvest months when the farmer has the most joy from seeing the fruits (no pun intended) of his labor.  When the farmer comes to the beis ha'mikdash with his bikurim, he is not coming with a sense of sacrifice, he is not coming because his parents and grandparents came, as this parsha is speaking וְהָיָה֙ כִּֽי־תָב֣וֹא אֶל־הָאָ֔רֶץ to the future generation that will be the first ones in Eretz Yisrael who can fulfill this mitzvah. The farmer is coming to express his joy.  That's what the takanah of tefilah is a substitute for -- the joy we lack because we don't have a beis ha'mikdash and we don't have bikurim.   "ר אין עומדין להתפלל לא מתוך עצבות ולא מתוך עצלות ולא מתוך שחוק ולא מתוך שיחה ולא מתוך קלות ראש ולא מתוך דברים בטלים אלא מתוך שמחה של מצוה (Brachos 31)  I would venture to guess that many people can relate to prayer as an act of sacrifice, a sacrifice of their time, their energy, it's yet another commitment to attend to, and many people can relate to prayer as a continuation of the legacy of the Avos, they think back to parents or grandparents, etc. but the challenge is to be able to come to tefilah with simcha, as an expression of simcha in avodas Hashem.

mei Noach

 You have in this week's haftarah

 כִּֽי־מֵ֥י נֹ֙חַ֙ זֹ֣את לִ֔י אֲשֶׁ֣ר נִשְׁבַּ֗עְתִּי מֵעֲבֹ֥ר מֵי־נֹ֛חַ ע֖וֹד עַל־הָאָ֑רֶץ כֵּ֥ן נִשְׁבַּ֛עְתִּי מִקְּצֹ֥ף עָלַ֖יִךְ וּמִגְּעׇר־בָּֽךְ׃

Hashem tells us that the churban ha'bayis was like the Noach's flood.  Hashem promises that He will never again bring upon Bnei Yisrael such an act of destruction.

1) What's the comparison?  The flood destroyed the entire world.  The churban and ensuing galus is our problem, not the whole world's problem?  

When you lose someone dear to you and close to you, it's like your whole world is gone.  Hashem is telling us that when he has to give such a big punishment to us, for whom He created the whole world, it's like that whole world is gone.

2) Everybody knows the derasha that it's called מֵ֥י נֹ֙חַ֙ because Noach is held responsible for the flood.  He could have davened and done something to avert the disaster, and is assigned blame for not having done so.  

If Chazal want to teach us who is to blame for the flood, why here?  Why stick this in a pasuk in the middle of Yeshayahu and not somewhere in parshas Noach or elsewhere?

R' Tzadok haKohen (Pri Tzadik 12) quotes the gemara (Yoma 86) תניא היה ר"מ אומר גדולה תשובה שבשביל יחיד שעשה תשובה מוחלין לכל העולם כולו שנא' ארפא משובתם אוהבם נדבה כי שב אפי ממנו מהם לא נאמר אלא ממנו .  All it takes is one person doing teshuvah and the whole world can be uplifted and be granted mechila and kapara. 

Chazal are telling us about the flood because it's a lesson for us.  We had a churban ha'bayis and we are sitting in galus for 2000 years already and Hashem comes and tells us that it's like מֵ֥י נֹ֙חַ֙ because all it takes is one person to do teshuvah, all it takes is one Noach willing to beg Hashem to forgive Klal Yisrael, and the whole world changes, everything can be different.

3) There is a machlokes whether מֵ֥י נֹ֙חַ֙  is one word or two (see Radak).  If you read it as two words, it means "the waters of Noach," like I explained above.  If it is one word, then it means "like the days of Noach," k=like+ y'mei=days.  

Abarbanel explains:

שכמו מה שקרה לישראל בחטאתיהם וגאולתם ותשועתם כן קרה לדור המבול שנתרבו על פני כל הארץ והשחית כל בשר את דרכו ונתן השם להם זמן לשוב בתשובה ולא שבו ונתחייבו כליה ונשארו מהם מעט מהרבה נח ובניו והם נעשו לגוי גדול ומאלה נפצה כל הארץ ונשבע ה׳ בזרוע קדשו שלא להביא עוד מבול לשחת כל בשר כן ישראל פרו ורבו ותמלא הארץ אותם ומלאה הארץ חמס מפניהם ונתן השם להם מקום לשוב בתשובה ולא שבו עדין, ומפני זה שבלת מים שטפתם זרם מים רבים שהוא הגלות האמנם ישארו מהם אחד מעיר ושנים ממשפחה כאותם שניצולו בתיבה והם יהיו לראש פנה וירבו ויעצמו בארץ וישבע השם שלא להביא עוד עליהם גלות 

Just like in the days of the flood there was a long window of opportunity of teshuvah that no one took advantage of, and then Hashem finally brought the flood to wipe out the world and only Noach and his small family was spared, so too, before the churban Hashem sent warnings, there was a window of opportunity for teshuvah, but once that passed Hashem brought us into galus, which, like the flood, wiped out everyone except for small pockets here and there.  

If you live in the 5T like I do, or some other frum neighborhood, you live in a little bubble and you think the Jewish world is booming.  The latest census data shows that the fastest growing neighborhoods in NY/NJ are those areas where Orthodox Jews live -- we have lots of kids and so the population grows.  In my area we have kosher restaurants aplenty, we have multiple yeshivos to choose from, plenty of minyanim to choose where you want to daven and where you won't step foot.  But all this is an illusion.  Your little island may have gotten a little bigger in the last census count, it may have better restaurants and more schools than the next little island, but sach ha'kol, it's still just a little island surrounded by the vast ocean of the flood, and those waters and closing in more rapidly than you think.  The vast majority of American Jews are underwater already or barely holding their head above water Jewishly, as intermarriage, assimilation, ignorance, and apathy take their toll.  These is מים רבים שהוא הגלות that the Abarbanel is referring to.  We can only hope that we are among the אמנם ישארו מהם אחד מעיר ושנים ממשפחה כאותם שניצולו בתיבה those who can make it to the finish line and witness Hashem's promise that days like those of Noach, whether the flood of rain or the flood of galus, never repeat themselves again.

teshuvah that is transformative

עַל־דְּבַ֞ר אֲשֶׁ֨ר לֹא־קִדְּמ֤וּ אֶתְכֶם֙ בַּלֶּ֣חֶם וּבַמַּ֔יִם בַּדֶּ֖רֶךְ בְּצֵאתְכֶ֣ם מִמִּצְרָ֑יִם וַאֲשֶׁר֩ שָׂכַ֨ר עָלֶ֜יךָ אֶת־בִּלְעָ֣ם בֶּן־בְּע֗וֹר מִפְּת֛וֹר אֲרַ֥ם נַהֲרַ֖יִם לְקַֽלְלֶֽךָּ׃

וְלֹֽא־אָבָ֞ה ה׳ אלקיך לִשְׁמֹ֣עַ אֶל־בִּלְעָ֔ם... כִּ֥י אֲהֵֽבְךָ֖ ה׳ אלקיך

How can the pasuk juxtapose and equate something so trivial like not serving food with the sin of hiring Bilam to destroy Klal Yisrael? Not only does it put the two together, but it puts the not bringing out the food first!   R' Baruch Mordechai Ezrachi suggests a thought experiment: if you wanted to get a Bilam to do teshuvah, what would you have him do?  Keep shabbos?  Eat kosher?  Daven?  R' Ezrachi says that even if he did all that, all you would have is a Bilam who davens, eats kosher, and keeps Shabbos -- the same rotten person, just one who does a few mitzvos.  The way to change the core of the person and make Bilam not Bilam anymore is to have him do chessed like serving food to a stranger, something that will change his midos.  The אֲשֶׁ֨ר לֹא־קִדְּמ֤וּ אֶתְכֶם֙ בַּלֶּ֣חֶם וּבַמַּ֔יִם is the siman that at core, Amon and Moav were rotten people.  What starts with a trivial slight ends up with  אֲשֶׁר֩ שָׂכַ֨ר עָלֶ֜יךָ אֶת־בִּלְעָ֣ם בֶּן־בְּע֗וֹר .  It's just a matter of degree, not a qualitatively different sin.

We're supposed to be doing teshuvah during Elul.  The Chayei Adam (143) writes at length about how during this time of year a person is supposed to add time to his learning, add to the $ he gives to tzedaka, adds to his zehirus in shemiras ha'mitzvos.  I think what you learn from R' BM"E is that Reb Ploni can do all that -- he can learn an extra hour, he can wake up at dawn for slichos, he can write checks to a dozen different charities -- and yet he can still be the same Reb Ploni, just with a few extra mitzvos under his belt.  The goal of teshuvah has to be to not be the same Reb Ploni.  

Taz explains that the two different reasons given for our rejecting Amoni and Moavi, 1) עַל־דְּבַ֞ר אֲשֶׁ֨ר לֹא־קִדְּמ֤וּ אֶתְכֶם֙ בַּלֶּ֣חֶם וּבַמַּ֔יִם  and 2) אֲשֶׁר֩ שָׂכַ֨ר עָלֶ֜יךָ אֶת־בִּלְעָ֣ם בֶּן־בְּע֗וֹר are hah b'hah talya.  Why should Amon and Moav be held accountable for not offering food and drink more than any other nation?  (see Ramban!)  Taz quotes the pasuk in Mishlei 25:21 אִם־רָעֵ֣ב שׂ֖נַאֲךָ הַאֲכִלֵ֣הוּ לָ֑חֶם וְאִם־צָ֜מֵ֗א הַשְׁקֵ֥הוּ מָֽיִם, that there is a mitzvah to extend hospitality davka to your enemy, the person who you like least, because that's how to overcome your yetzer ha'ra.  Similarly, the gemara (BM 32) writes that even though unloading a burden from an animal is a bigger mitzvah than loading, if the person who needs help loading is your enemy, then that mitzvah comes first.  And we learned from the Netziv earlier this year, the way to solve a dispute is to do something good davka for the person who has harmed you.  If it would have been anyone else, any other nation, the fact that we were not greeted with a welcome parade and a tray of cake and cookies would not have been that big a deal.  But since שָׂכַ֨ר עָלֶ֜יךָ אֶת־בִּלְעָ֣ם בֶּן־בְּע֗וֹר, proving their hate, Amon and Moav had an even greater obligation to try to do good.  (Amazing that this obligation to break one's yetzer extends even to a ben Noach. )  Doing what we like least, or doing something good for someone we like least, is transformative in a way that just doing more of what we are already good at is not.

The argument against Amon and Moav is m'mah nafshach: if you hate Bnei Yisrael, all the more reason you owe them the favor of a proper greeting with food and drink.  And if you don't really hate them because you know that G-d loves them, כִּ֥י אֲהֵֽבְךָ֖ ה׳ אלקיך, and it would be wrong to hate that which G-d loves, then why did you go  out and hire Bilam to curse them?  

yarei v'rach ha'leivav (II)

 ר׳ עקיבא אומר: כשמועו, שאינו יכול לעמוד בקשרי המלחמה ולראות חרב שלופה.

ר׳ יוסי הגלילי אומר: הירא מעבירות שבידו. 

Yesterday I posted one approach to understand the nekudas ha'machlokes; today I want to offer another.  

The Chovos haLevavos writes that someone who is a true baal bitachon has no worry.  If you trust that G-d is in complete control and will do what is best for you, then what is there to be worried about?  However, a long time ago we discussed an amazing Abarbanel, who comments on "Va'yira Yaakov va'yetzer lo" that Yaakov's fear of Eisav does not mean Yaakov lacked bitachon.  Worrying about the future is a normal human reaction to stress.  Bitachon means that by putting one's trust in G-d one is able to overcome that worry and lead a normal life.

חֶרְדַּ֣ת אָ֭דָם יִתֵּ֣ן מוֹקֵ֑שׁ וּבוֹטֵ֖חַ בּה׳ יְשֻׂגָּֽב (Mishlei 29:25)  The Shem m'Shmuel (Zechor Bris [section on Slichos] 5675) explains the beginning of the pasuk to mean that fear itself is the מוֹקֵ֑שׁ which can ensnare a person (see Rashi who explains that aveiros which are a מוֹקֵ֑שׁ give rise to fear).  The end of the pasuk, בוֹטֵ֖חַ בּה׳ יְשֻׂגָּֽב, he writes, does not simply mean to tell us that a baal bitachon will not have those same fears.  Peshita, mai ka mashma lan that a person like that has nothing to worry about?  Rather, what it means is:  אך ובוטח בה' ישוגב היינו שאין הפירוש שאיננו חרד אלא בוטח בה', זה לא נצרך להאמר דפשיטא דמהיכא תיתי לחשוב שח"ו יצמח לו ממה שבוטח בה' רע ח"ו, אלא הפי' אף שהוא חרד מ"מ אם עם חרדתו הוא בוטח בה' הוא ישוגב כי מאחר שהוא בוטח בה' דבקה בו השמירה מהש"י וישגב בו מפני האויב הם כחות החיצונים כנ"ל:  Even though the baal bitachon is also afraid, is also worried, nonetheless, because he has bitachon he can move forward and Hashem will help him out.  

R' Akiva maybe held like the Chovos haLevavos, and therefore if someone was afraid of the enemy, he should return home, as his bitachon is lacking.  R' Yosi on the other hand, held that fear of the enemy was a normal reaction to war, and is not a contradiction to being a baal bitachon.  The only reason for such a person to go home is if his fear was caused by aveiros.  

ish ha'yarei v'rach ha'leivav

Among the people who are sent home and do not participate in war is מִי־הָאִ֤ישׁ הַיָּרֵא֙ וְרַ֣ךְ הַלֵּבָ֔ב יֵלֵ֖ךְ וְיָשֹׁ֣ב לְבֵית֑וֹ  (20:8)  Rashi quotes 2 shitos as to what the pasuk is referring to: 

ר׳ עקיבא אומר: כשמועו, שאינו יכול לעמוד בקשרי המלחמה ולראות חרב שלופה.

ר׳ יוסי הגלילי אומר: הירא מעבירות שבידו. 

What's the nekudas ha'machlokes?  Why does R' Yosi reject the simple "mashma'o" reading of the pasuk?

Maybe this came to mind because a week or two ago I quoted the Ohr haChaim/Zohar's view that a baal bechira can override hashgacha on an individual.  That is why there was more danger to Yosef from the Midyanim or Egyptians than from the snakes and scorpions in the pit he was thrown into.  The latter are under Hashem's total control; the former can exercise free will and cause harm "outside" Hashem's plan.

R' Akiva perhaps holds like the O.C. and the Zohar, and therefore, when going to battle against a baal bechira, even a tzadik gamur has reason to be scared.  R' Yosi maybe does not agree with that view and holds that if a person is truly a tzadik, then hashgacha will protect him even against a baal bechira.  The only one who has a need for fear is a person who has "aveiros b'yado."

the sin of indifference

The end of the parsha deals with the sugya of a dead body found between cities and the offering of eglah arufah by the B"D as a kaparah.  The leaders of the closest city must declare יָדֵ֗ינוּ לֹ֤א שָֽׁפְכוּ֙ אֶת־הַדָּ֣ם הַזֶּ֔ה וְעֵינֵ֖ינוּ לֹ֥א רָאֽוּ, that they are not guilty of spilling the blood of the victim.  Do we really suspect the leaders of the city or the B"D of committing the crime?  

Three approaches:

1) Rashi comments: וכי עלתא על לב שזקני בית דין שופכי דמים הם? אלא, לא ראינוהו ופטרנוהו בלא מזונות ולוייה.  Of course we do not suspect that the leaders of the city are literally guilty of murder.  However, they are perhaps guilty of letting someone pass through their city and not be given a welcome, not be offered any accomodation, not be given a proper escort upon departure, and as a result of their indifference, that lonely individual fell prey to criminals.  

Chasam Sofer writes that in this context וְעֵינֵ֖ינוּ לֹ֥א רָאֽוּ is not meant as an excuse -- we didn't see anything, so we cannot be held accountable.  Aderaba, it is part of what the leaders are asking kapara for.  וְעֵינֵ֖ינוּ לֹ֥א רָאֽוּ, we were blind to what which we should have been attentive to!

2) The Yerushalmi (Sota 43), however, explains that the B"D is not suspect of indifference towards the victim, but rather of indifference towards the criminal.  רבנין דהכא פתרין קרייא בהורג שלא בא על ידינו ופטרנוהו ולא הרגנוהו ולא ראינוהו והנחנוהו ועימעמנו על דינו.  The leaders of the city must declare that they have not been lax in meting out justice; they did not catch the criminal and then let him go because they supported bail reform.  Seforno comments:   שלא הנחנו שום נודע לרוצח בארץ.  

According to Ylmi, the responsibility placed upon the kohanim b'nei levi to carry out the eglah arufah because וְעַל־פִּיהֶ֥ם יִהְיֶ֖ה כׇּל־רִ֥יב וְכׇל־נָֽגַע is meduyak -- since they were responsibile for enforcing the law and failed, they are at fault.  According to the other meforshim, it is harder to make sense of this phrase.

Netziv points out a nafka minah between these views.  It's the closest city that has a B"D who must bring the eglah arufah.  What kind of B"D must the city have?  Rashi, l'shitaso of the Bavli, learns a B"D of 3 is sufficient.  The Rambam, however, follows the Ylmi and learns that we measure to the closest city with a B"D of 23, because it takes 23 to judge dinei nefashos.  Only that type of B"D can be held accontable for letting the killer off the hook.

Sadly in our society we all know of cases where Rabbis have not taking certain accusations as seriously as they should have, or have directed the accused to seek therapy instead of turning them over to the police to face the jail time they deserve, etc.  But without going that far, there is indifference to murder of a different sort, that may not call for a B"D of 23 to judge, but nonetheless falls under the umbrella of the moral teaching not to turn a blind eye to crime.  Rabeinu Yonah (S.T. 3:139) calls being malbin pnei chaveiro b'rabim "avak shefichus damim," murder with a lowecase m instead of a capital M, if you will.  This is the lesson of Kamtza and Bar Kamtza, where the Rabbis who were sitting at that celebrating ducked for cover rather than stand up for Bar Kamtza.  

According to the Ylmi, the close of the parsha makes a nice bookend to its opening.  Shoftim v'shotrim -- we must establish a working justice system.  And if we fail and let criminals off the hook, the end result is eglah arufah.

3) Lastly, Ibn Ezra suggests that ועינינו לא ראו – ויתכן, שהשם צוה לעשות כן העיר הקרובה, כי לולי שעשו עבירה כדומה לה, לא נזדמן אדם שיהרג קרוב מהם. ומחשבות השם עמקו וגבהו לאין קץ אצלנו.  Those who live in the closest city must be guilty of some similar crime otherwise this type of outrage would not happen on their doorstep.

At the end of the eglah arufah ceremony, the kohanim declare  כַּפֵּר֩ לְעַמְּךָ֨ יִשְׂרָאֵ֤ל אֲשֶׁר־פָּדִ֙יתָ֙ ה׳ וְאַל־תִּתֵּן֙ דָּ֣ם נָקִ֔י בְּקֶ֖רֶב עַמְּךָ֣ יִשְׂרָאֵ֑ל וְנִכַּפֵּ֥ר לָהֶ֖ם הַדָּֽם׃.  Chazal darshen כפר לעמך – אלו החיים, אשר פדית – אלו המתים, מלמד שהמתים צריכים כפרה, נמצינו למדין, ששופך דמים חוטא עד יציאת מצרי.  This unsolved murder requires kaparah not just from those currently living in the cities, but kaparah is required for generations past as well.

R' Leib Chasam points out that we don't find a similar statement in Chazal or a similar pasuk regarding an actual murder.  You would think that if a whole ceremony is required to ask kaparah for generations and generations of Klal Yisrael when a body is found and we don't know the facts of the case -- we don't know who the victim is, we don't know if anyone who lived close by is really at fault in a direct way, we don't even know if the victim or criminal was Jewish -- kal v'chomer if we catch an actual murdered in our midst, how much more of a kaparah is required!  How much more should be concerned that if such a thing happens on our doorstep, as Ibn Ezra writes, it must reveal that there is something rotten in our midst.  So why does the Torah never say such a thing?

The answer he gives fits perfectly with the lesson of eglah arufah.  It's not the crime per se that the the B"D comes to ask kaparah for, but it's their indifference which led to the crime, either indifference to the victim, indifference to the criminal, indifference towards other crimes in the midst of their city.  When an actual murder takes place and it makes the front page news (though these days it's so common it doesn't even make the front page anymore), people take notice.  People wonder what's going on, what do we need to do to stop the crime wave, people ask how such a thing could happen.  When it's a no name victim somewhere on the outskirts of town, when it's easy to dismiss what happened as not our problem, not directly related to us, then we ignore it.  The indifference is perpetuated.  Therefore, the Torah requires an eglah arufah to make us take notice.

not fully functional

 I) With respect to the mitzvah of appointing judges, The Rambam distinguishes between Eretz Yisrael and ch"ul:

אין אנו חייבין להעמיד בתי דינים בכל פלך ופלך ובכל עיר ועיר אלא בארץ ישראל בלבד. אבל בחוצה לארץ אינן חייבין להעמיד בית דין בכל פלך ופלך שנאמר תתן לך בכל שעריך אשר ה' אלהיך נותן לך לשבטיך:

Why should that be so?  Are we less in need of courts and police in chu"l than in Eretz Yisrael?

R' Gifter suggests that the establishment of courts is not just a means of meting out justice, but is indicative of an organized social structure.  The Torah here is telling us that Eretz Yisrael is the only place where such a fully functioning Jewish society can be created. 

II) The parsha warns not to learn from what the aku"m do (18:9) לֹֽא־תִלְמַ֣ד לַעֲשׂ֔וֹת כְּתוֹעֲבֹ֖ת הַגּוֹיִ֥ם הָהֵֽם׃ and then follows up לֹֽא־יִמָּצֵ֣א בְךָ֔ מַעֲבִ֥יר בְּנֽוֹ־וּבִתּ֖וֹ בָּאֵ֑שׁ קֹסֵ֣ם קְסָמִ֔ים מְעוֹנֵ֥ן וּמְנַחֵ֖שׁ וּמְכַשֵּֽׁף.  Shem m'Shmuel (5675) reads this second pasuk as not just an additional lav, but as a consequence.  If you don't engage in the study of sorcery and avodah zarah, then the Torah promises לֹֽא־יִמָּצֵ֣א בְךָ֔ , you won't end up getting involved in doing it.  

 Zeh l'umas zeh, if that study is the slippery slope to consequential wrongdoing, then studying the right things is necessary to lead to a consequential kedusha of the chagim:

 כן להבדיל בקדושה כל המצות ועניני ירחא שביעאה הכל נכלל בהלימוד של מסכתות הללו ר"ה יומא סוכה, וע"כ כל בעל נפש מחויב לגזול מעתותיו הספורות ולקבוע לימוד מסכתות הללו בימי אלול שהוא הכנה לירחא שביעאה הגדול לפי גדלו והקטון לפי קטנו:

The clock is ticking -- what are you waiting for?

tefillin with only 2 parshiyos?

The gemara in R"H tells us that R' Abahu made a takana to blow teruah, shevarim, and shevarim-teruah to cover all the bases of the different minhagim that had been in practice.  The Rishonim quote R' Hai Gaon as having asked how something as basic as shofar blowing that we do every year and is such an important mitzvah could have been forgotten.  How could there have been different minhagim -- everyone should have had the same mesorah of how to do the mitzvah.  

Achronim ask the same question about tefillin of Rashi/R"T.  People put on tefillin every day.  How could the correct way to do the mitzvah have been forgotten?

R' Yosef Messas offers an interesting answer: the parshiyos of shema and v'haya im shamo'a were not given until the 40th year in the midbar, as we only find them in sefer Devarim.  For the duration of the time in the midbr, the tefillin must have had only 2 parshiyos.  We also know that when Moshe died thousands of halachos were forgotten.  It could be that there was never a strong mesorah established as to how the last 2 parshiyos should be added.

This chiddush gadol, that the nature of the mitzvah changed from what was given at Sinai (which seems to fly in the face of the first Rashi in Behar), is entertained by the Kli Chemdah, who rejects it.  The Mishna writes that the 4 parshiyos of tefillin are m'akeiv each other -- it's all or nothing.  Asks the gemara (Men 34): peshita -- isn't this obvious?  If the mitzvah originally required only 2 parshiyos, why does the gemara think this is such a davar pashut?  Perhaps if one cannot fulfill the mitzvah as it ultimately was performed from year 40 in the midbar onward, one should still fulfill the mitzvah with 2 parshiyos as it was given at Sinai?  See R' Kasher in Torah Shleima here, and R' Ovadya's teshuvah in Yabia Omer I:3 footnote 10.

"this is still the best route"

1) Sefer Devarim is the mussar talk Moshe gave to Klal Yisrael before his death.  "R'ei anochi nosein lifneichem bracha u'klalah" is not something to cheer about; it's part of the mussar.  A little kid needs a lollipop as a motivation to do something he may not like.  He doesn't need the lollipop to go and play because that's something he enjoys.  If we loved avodas Hashem, why would we need brachos and klalos to motivate us to do the right thing?

2) Yesterday I was on the highway and was using Google Maps for directions and it unfortunately multiple times gave me messages like "30 minute delay ahead, but this is still the best route."  (I used Waze to check if it really was the best route -- am I paranoid for thinking that the machine just keeps saying "this is still the best route" because it wants to preserve its own credibility even when there is a better way to go?)  

My wife said that we were getting this message in Elul because it is telling us mussar.  So many times in life you hit slowdowns, bumps in the road, and you think that maybe if you change course and veer off in one direction or the other things will be better, but it's usually not true.  Despite the slowdowns, Hashem put us on what is "still the best route" to get us where we need to go. 

looking for something authentic

From today's WSJ, in an article on Chabad campus outreach:

Rabbi Seligson agrees with progressives that the less involved “want something different.” But they aren’t looking for a watered-down Judaism. “They’re looking for something authentic,” he says. “The minute you have to go outside of Judaism to answer their questions, you’ve lost them. They don’t need a rabbi for something that’s not Jewish.”

That’s how I felt at Stanford, when on Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the year, a campus rabbi sermonized in support of Black Lives Matter. Everywhere at university, one could find opportunities for political commitment and therapeutic affirmation. But Chabad seemed like it might have wisdom.

navi sheker -- issur gavra or cheftza

There is a din that a navi cannot add any mitzvos to the Torah.  Therefore, if a navi tells us that G-d commanded a new mitzvah, we know he is lying and we should not believe him. Ramban has a safeik whether such a navi would be chayav misah as a navi sheker or not (13:4):

ונראה, שאם מתנבא בשם י״י לצוות מצוה שיחדש, כגון שהיה במקרא מגלה (בבלי מגילה י״ד.) שאינו חייב מיתה, אלא שאין לנו לשמוע אליו, דכתיב: אלה המצות (ויקרא כ״ז:ל״ד) – אין נביא רשאי לחדש בהן דבר מעתה. ואולי כיון שלא נאמין לו, הנה הוא נביא השקר ומיתתו בחנק.

What's the safeik?  If the navi is telling us nevuah that cannot possibly be the dvar Hashem, why would he not be chayav as a navi sheker?

In next week's parsha, where the Torah spells out the onesh misah for the navi sheker, the Torah tells us (18:21-22):

וְכִ֥י תֹאמַ֖ר בִּלְבָבֶ֑ךָ אֵיכָה֙ נֵדַ֣ע אֶת־הַדָּבָ֔ר אֲשֶׁ֥ר לֹא־דִבְּר֖וֹ ה׳

 אֲשֶׁר֩ יְדַבֵּ֨ר הַנָּבִ֜יא בְּשֵׁ֣ם ה׳  וְלֹֽא־יִהְיֶ֤ה הַדָּבָר֙ וְלֹ֣א יָבֹ֔א ה֣וּא הַדָּבָ֔ר אֲשֶׁ֥ר לֹא־דִבְּר֖וֹ ה׳ בְּזָדוֹן֙ דִּבְּר֣וֹ הַנָּבִ֔יא לֹ֥א תָג֖וּר מִמֶּֽנּוּ׃

How do we know whether the navi is a liar or not?  The Torah tells us that the navi will give a sign or a prophecy that will fail to come true and that will give the game away.

R' Gifter quotes R' Ahron Shechter, R"Y of Chaim Berlin, as explaining that this is the Ramban's safeik.  Maybe the navi is chayav misah only where you can point to empirical evidence that proves he is a liar -- the sign he promised failed to materialize; the miracle he promised failed to happen.  But maybe in a case where the navi invents a mitzvah, where it's only because we have a din that tells us that this is something a navi cannot do that we know he is lying, he would not be chayav.

I would like to suggest another sevara.  Minchas Chinuch asks why any time a person transgresses any issur he/she is not also liable for the issur of violating the words of a navi, given that Moshe Rabeinu was a navi.  R' Soloveitchik answered that there is a difference between the cheftzah of nevuah and the cheftza of Torah.  Moshe the gavra was a navi, but the commands he gave (or at least 613 of them) have the status of Torah, not nevuah; they are qualitatively in a different, unique category unlike other prophecies (see this post.)

When a navi tries to introduce a new mitzvah, he altering the cheftza shel Torah, not just saying false words of prophecy.  Perhaps the safeik of Ramban is whether the issur of navi sheker is an issur on the gavra, in which case no matter what the prophecy is, the navi is chayav, or whether the issur navi sheker is one of presenting a false cheftza shel nevuah, in which case changing the cheftza shel Torah is a different matter entirely.

why mourning for a parent extends beyond shloshim

1)Hard to believe that Elul is upon us already!  The Targum on the pasuk שְׁלַח־לְךָ֣ אֲנָשִׁ֗ים וְיָתֻ֙רוּ֙ אֶת־אֶ֣רֶץ explains the word וְיָתֻ֙רוּ֙ as וִיאַלְּלוּן -- the same letters as Elul.  The spies were sent to investigate the land and see what's what.  R' Schwadron in Techeiles Mordechai quotes from the Belzer Rebbe that this is our mission in Elul -- to investigate ourselves and see where we are holding.   The L Rebbe in HaYom Yom for 27 Av calls Elul   חדש החשבון. Just like a businessman needs to take stock and asses the the direction of the business, what is working and what is not working, so too in avodah and person has to do the same  דעל ידי הכנה טובה זו.. זוכים לשנה טובה ומתוקה בגשמיות ורוחניות.

2)  בָּנִ֣ים אַתֶּ֔ם לה׳ אלקיכם לֹ֣א תִתְגֹּֽדְד֗וּ וְלֹֽא־תָשִׂ֧ימוּ קׇרְחָ֛ה בֵּ֥ין עֵינֵיכֶ֖ם לָמֵֽת׃

כִּ֣י עַ֤ם קָדוֹשׁ֙ אַתָּ֔ה  לה׳ אלקיך

Is the reason for the issur of lo tisgodidu because בָּנִ֣ים אַתֶּ֔ם לה׳ אלקיכם or because כִּ֣י עַ֤ם קָדוֹשׁ֙ אַתָּ֔ה?

Simple pshat in the pasuk is that lo tisgodidu is an issur of cutting oneself out of grief while in mourning, but Chazal derive a secondary meaning and explain that it prohibits having different minhagim in the same community.  Maharal, as we once discussed, shows how these two issurim are related.  

Most of the meforshim explain that בָּנִ֣ים אַתֶּ֔ם לה׳ אלקיכם is the reason the  issur of cutting oneself, either as Rashi explains לפי שאתם בניו של מקום, ואתם ראויים להיות נאים ולא גדודים ומקורחים, or like Seforno explains  שאין ראוי להראות תכלית הדאגה והצער על הקרוב המת, כשנשאר קרוב נכבד ממנו במעלה ובתקות טוב. לפיכך ״אתם״ ״בנים לה׳⁠ ⁠״, שהוא אביכם קיים, but that begs the question what's כִּ֣י עַ֤ם קָדוֹשׁ֙ אַתָּ֔ה doing here.  See Ramban, Ibn Ezra.

Netziv suggests that the two reasons parallel the two issurim.   בָּנִ֣ים אַתֶּ֔ם לה׳ אלקיכם is why we should avoid having different minhagim in one community.  Because we are all "banim" and children of Hashem, we should behave harmoniously and each person not follow a different path (see Ksav Sofer as well).   כִּ֣י עַ֤ם קָדוֹשׁ֙ אַתָּ֔ה  לה׳ אלקיך is the reason to not harm onself in an outburst of grief like the anccient pagans used to do.  

In the sefer Meged Yesharim, R' Sorotzkin relates that he heard that when RYBS was sitting shiva for his wife, R' Hutner and R' Pinchas Teitz came to be menachem avel and the three began to discuss why it is that when a father or mother r"l passes a way, there is a full year of aveilus, but for other relatives the aveilus is limited to 30 days.  Shouldn't you expect the opposite?  Usually a parent is elderly, and so it's not such a shock when their time comes, but for other relatives, the same is not true.  Therefore, wouldn't it make more sense to allow for a more extended period of grief/mourning for the younger relative and less time for the elderly parent?

R' Hutner answered when one loses a parent, one has lost a generation that was closer to Sinai, and that is cause for greater aveilus. Rav Teitz answered that other relatives are replaceable -- one can have another child, find another spouse, one's parents can have more children.  A parent, however, can never be replaced.  R' Soloveitchik himself answered that davka because the death of a parent is the more natural occurrence, Chazal allow mourning for a year.  When death strikes a younger person, there is greater likelihood of the relatives being overcome by grief -- exactly what our pasuk warns against -- and so Chazal curtailed the aveilus to avoid that danger.  By a parent, where the death is expected, there is no such danger.  R' Sorotzkin suggests his own sevara as well, ayen sham.   

better to face off against a baal bechira than a wild animal?

We've discussed many times before (e.g. see here, here, here, and here) the following famous Ohr haChaim, based on Zohar: Chazal tell us that the pit that Yosef was thrown into was filled with snakes and scorpions.  Why then does the Torah credit Reuvain for saving Yosef?  All he did was take him out of the frypan, out of the brothers’ hands, and toss him into the fire, into the scorpion pit?  O.C. answers that Hashem has complete control over animals and everything else in the natural world, and therefore if Yosef didn’t deserve to die, the snakes and scorpions would not be able to harm him.  However, a human being is different because he/she is a “ba’al bechira,” and Hashem does not interfere with free choice.  Had Yosef been turned over to the brothers or other people, even if he didn’t deserve to die, they would still have been able to harm him had they chosen to do so. 

If the O.C. is correct, what's pshat in 7:22 that Hashem will not allow us to conquer the goyim in Eretz Yisrael too quickly  לֹ֤א תוּכַל֙ כַּלֹּתָ֣ם מַהֵ֔ר פֶּן־תִּרְבֶּ֥ה עָלֶ֖יךָ חַיַּ֥ת הַשָּׂדֶֽה׃ , lest the empty land be overrun with wild animals?  Sounds like it is better to have to deal with the goyim who are baalei bechira, than with the wild animals, who are not, exactly the opposite of the O.C.!?  (See Taz in Divrei David, Targum Yonasan)

another interrupted narrative

I want to return to my post at the end of last week and add two points before moving on to something new.  Last week we discussed why perek 9 jumps around -- it opens with Moshe telling us that he davened for the cheit ha'eigel to be forgiven, but then the chapter moves on to other rebellions in the desert before coming back to Moshe's tefilah and telling us what he said.  Shouldn't the words of Moshe's tefilah come earlier in the perek, when the fact that he prayed is first mentioned?

The truth is that this type of structure is not so uncommon (R' Reuvain Klein's comment to the post brought out this idea).  For example, we have in chapter 1 of Braishis זָכָ֥ר וּנְקֵבָ֖ה בָּרָ֥א אֹתָֽם׃ (1:27), but the details of how Chavah was created, the fact that Hashem put Adam to sleep and took out his side, is elaborated on only later in chapter 2, as Rashi there notes.  Even though all those details could have been spelled out earlier, the Torah holds off and recapitulates later after first giving us the broad strokes and outline.  

In a shiur I once heard from R' Menachem Leibtag he made a parenthetical observation that we sometimes see endnotes to a perek or parsha.  For example (this was the example he gave), Beshalach 16:16 speaks about gathering an omer of mon, but what's an omer?  We have to wait until the last pasuk of the perek for the definition -- an endnote, if you will --  וְהָעֹ֕מֶר עֲשִׂרִ֥ית הָאֵיפָ֖ה הֽוּא.  Or, to come back to Braishis (my example), it's only after we get through the whole story of the creation of woman, her (and man's) sin of eating the eitz ha'daas, and the banishment from Eden that the Torah tacks on at the end of perek 3 וַיִּקְרָ֧א הָֽאָדָ֛ם שֵׁ֥ם אִשְׁתּ֖וֹ חַוָּ֑ה כִּ֛י הִ֥וא הָֽיְתָ֖ה אֵ֥ם כׇּל־חָֽי.  Here too, in our perek, maybe the words of Moshe's tefilah are like an endnote to the perek.

Turning to perek 10, here we again have an interruption that breaks up the narrative.  The perek starts with Moshe being given second luchos as a result of his prayers on behalf of Bnei Yisrael.  Then the perek shifts to the death of Aharon, which took place in the 40th year of the travels through the desert:

וּבְנֵ֣י יִשְׂרָאֵ֗ל נָ֥סְע֛וּ מִבְּאֵרֹ֥ת בְּנֵי־יַעֲקָ֖ן מוֹסֵרָ֑ה שָׁ֣ם מֵ֤ת אַהֲרֹן֙ וַיִּקָּבֵ֣ר שָׁ֔ם וַיְכַהֵ֛ן אֶלְעָזָ֥ר בְּנ֖וֹ תַּחְתָּֽיו׃

 מִשָּׁ֥ם נָסְע֖וּ הַגֻּדְגֹּ֑דָה וּמִן־הַגֻּדְגֹּ֣דָה יׇטְבָ֔תָה אֶ֖רֶץ נַ֥חֲלֵי מָֽיִם

and then once again returns to the topic of Sinai to discuss the election of the Leviim in place of bechorm and the additional 40 days Moshe spent on the mountain (10:11):

בָּעֵ֣ת הַהִ֗וא הִבְדִּ֤יל ה׳ אֶת־שֵׁ֣בֶט הַלֵּוִ֔י   Rashi comments  בעת ההיא הבדיל וגומ׳ – מוסב לעיניין ראשון.

Why break up the narrative?

Rashi and Ramban offer their own answers, but I want to focus on Ibn Ezra and Seforno.  The previous chapter ended with Moshe's tefilah not only for Bnei Yisrael, but specifically for Aharon as well. Ibn Ezra explains that our chapter spells out Hashem's answer to those prayers.  The response to Moshe's breaking the luchos was the giving of the second luchos, mentioned at the start of our chapter; the response to his prayer for Aharon was Aharon being given a reprieve and living for another 40 years until his death. 

Seforno also sees the description of what happened to Aharon as a follow up to Moshe's tefilah, but with an entirely different message.  Bnei Yisrael saw just how powerful the tefilah of a tzadik is, as through his prayers Moshe was able to avert Hashem's punishment of the people, and yet when Aharon passed, rather than accord him the honor that was due a tzadik, they were more interested in looking for pasture land for their sheep, מִשָּׁ֥ם נָסְע֖וּ הַגֻּדְגֹּ֑דָה וּמִן־הַגֻּדְגֹּ֣דָה יׇטְבָ֔תָה אֶ֖רֶץ נַ֥חֲלֵי מָֽיִם.  Seforno writes:

 אף על פי שראו שתפלת הצדיק מגינה על דורו, ושראוי להתאונן על מיתתו, הנה קצתם או רובם שהיו רועים במדבר נסעו למוסרה, למצוא מים ומרעה לצאן. ובעודם שם, מת אהרן ויקבר... ויכהן אלעזר – ולא באו להתאונן על המיתה ולא להתאבל על הקבורה, ולא חששו לכבד אלעזר שכהן תחתיו  

Seforno fits nicely with the idea that Sefer Devarim is a mussar talk.  Moshe is holding the people accountable here for taking Aharon's death too lightly.

I would like to suggest the flip side of the Seforno/Ibn Ezra as an explanation to the perek's structure.  Moshe is not touting the effectiveness of his tefilah on behalf of Aharon (or the tefilah of a tzadik in general), but to the contrary, he is emphasizing its limits (which fits with the message Rashbam read into the previous perek).  Moshe places Aharon's death in year 40 in the context of what happened at Sinai to convey the message that Aharon's death in year 40 was a result of the cheit ha'eigel in year 1.  Although Moshe davened directly on his behalf, and Aharom had his own many other acts of tzidkus to his credit, he still was held accountable and paid a price for his wrongdoing.