Thursday, November 14, 2024

akeidas Yitzchak - all a big misunderstanding?

A hypothetical question: If I think that there is a mitzvah to walk barefoot to shul every day, and I fulfill that mitzvah with great mesirus nefesh, with blisters on my feet in the summer, and even at the cost of getting frostbite in the winter, do I get schar for a kiyum mitzvah?

This should not require much thought to answer.  How can I get schar for a mitzvah that's not a mitzvah?  Yes, there is schar for good intentions: אפילו חשב אדם לעשות מצוה, ונאנס ולא עשאה, מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו עשאה (Kid 40a), but that's where the good intentions were to do a mitzvah.  In this case, there is no mitzvah!  

Seems like an obvious point, but it also seems to fly in the face of our tefilos and our understanding of this week's parsha.  We call upon Hashem to remember the zechus of akeidas Yitzchak.  We view akeidas Yitzchak as the greatest act of mesirus nefesh and ahavas Hashem; it was the greatest test Avraham was called upon to pass, and which he did with flying colors.  Yet Rashi comments on G-d's command וְהַעֲלֵהוּ שָׁם לְעֹלָה עַל אַחַד הֶהָרִים אֲשֶׁר אֹמַר אֵלֶיך that:

 לא אמר לו: שחטהו, לפי שלא היה חפץ הקב״ה לשחטו, אלא יעלהו להר לעשותו עולה, ומשהעלהו, אמר לו: הורידהו

G-d told Avraham to bring Yitzchak up to the mountain, but not to actually sacrifice him. There was never such a mitzvah!  

Does this mean that Avraham chopping wood, taking a knife, preparing to sacrifice his son, was all a big mistake and misunderstanding?  Did Avraham misinterpret the dvar Hashem?  

If there was never such a mitzvah, why do invoke the schar Avraham's deed forever after?  It's not schar for just carrying Yitzchak up and down the mountain, but schar for the willingness to sacrifice Yitzchak that we are asking Hashem to remember.  If that was never a mitzvah, why should it be worth any more reward any more than my walking to shul barefoot?  

R' Shmuel Birnbaum (in Tiferes Shmuel on the parsha) answers this question with a yesod developed by the Ketzos in his introduction.  The gemara (BM 86a) writes that there was a machlokes in heaven about a din in hil negaim:

 קָא מִיפַּלְגִי בִּמְתִיבְתָּא דִרְקִיעָא: אִם בַּהֶרֶת קוֹדֶמֶת לְשֵׂעָר לָבָן – טָמֵא, וְאִם שֵׂעָר לָבָן קוֹדֵם לַבַּהֶרֶת – טָהוֹר.

סָפֵק – הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא אוֹמֵר: טָהוֹר, וְכוּלְּהוּ מְתִיבְתָּא דִרְקִיעָא אָמְרִי: טָמֵא. וְאָמְרִי: מַאן נוֹכַח? נוֹכַח רַבָּה בַּר נַחְמָנִי. דְּאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר נַחְמָנִי: אֲנִי יָחִיד בִּנְגָעִים, אֲנִי יָחִיד בְּאֹהָלוֹת

כִּי הֲוָה קָא נָיְחָא נַפְשֵׁיהּ, אֲמַר: טָהוֹר, טָהוֹר. יָצָאת בַּת קוֹל וְאָמְרָה: אַשְׁרֶיךָ רַבָּה בַּר נַחְמָנִי שֶׁגּוּפְךָ טָהוֹר, וְיָצָאתָה נִשְׁמָתְךָ בְּטָהוֹר

How could Rabbah bar Nachmaini resolve a machlokes between G-d himself and the mesivra d'rekiya!?  Isn't it obvious that G-d knows the right answer?

The Ketzos quotes the Derashos haRan as explaining that built into the Torah is the allowance for different possible interpretations.  "Eilu v'eilu divrei Elokim chaim."  In an absolute sense there is no one "right" answer.  So how do we figure our what to do?  The Torah resolves the problem with the principle of "lo ba'shamayim hi" - the final arbiter of what is "correct" is whatever the chachmei ha'dor think is correct.  It's in our hands to determine the "right" answer.  Therefore, the heavens had to turn to Rabbah bar Nachmeini, the posek ha'dor in hil negaim, to determine exactly what the psak should be.  It's not what's "right" in heaven that matters, but rather what we think is "right" on earth.

The Midrash (B"R 8:5) writes that there was a debate among the angels as to whether or not it was worth it to create man:

אָמַר רַבִּי סִימוֹן, בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁבָּא הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא לִבְרֹאת אֶת אָדָם הָרִאשׁוֹן, נַעֲשׂוּ מַלְאֲכֵי הַשָּׁרֵת כִּתִּים כִּתִּים, וַחֲבוּרוֹת חֲבוּרוֹת, מֵהֶם אוֹמְרִים אַל יִבָּרֵא, וּמֵהֶם אוֹמְרִים יִבָּרֵא, הֲדָא הוּא דִכְתִיב (תהלים פה, יא): חֶסֶד וֶאֱמֶת נִפְגָּשׁוּ צֶדֶק וְשָׁלוֹם נָשָׁקוּ. חֶסֶד אוֹמֵר יִבָּרֵא, שֶׁהוּא גּוֹמֵל חֲסָדִים. וֶאֱמֶת אוֹמֵר אַל יִבָּרֵא, שֶׁכֻּלּוֹ שְׁקָרִים. צֶדֶק אוֹמֵר יִבָּרֵא, שֶׁהוּא עוֹשֶׂה צְדָקוֹת. שָׁלוֹם אוֹמֵר אַל יִבָּרֵא, דְּכוּלֵיהּ קְטָטָה. מֶה עָשָׂה הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא נָטַל אֱמֶת וְהִשְׁלִיכוֹ לָאָרֶץ, הֲדָא הוּא דִכְתִיב (דניאל ח, יב): וְתַשְׁלֵךְ אֱמֶת אַרְצָה,

What does it mean that G-d threw emes down to earth?  How does silencing truth's voice, removing his platform, address the issue raised?  

R' Yaakov Kaminetzki (in Emes l'Yaakov) explains that there are two different levels or standards of truth: there is absolute truth, and then there is the relative truth that we humans are used to dealing with.  When you sing "kallah na'ah v'chasudah" at a wedding (Kesubos 17), it doesn't matter whether or not the kallah is really beautiful as measured on some absolute scale of beauty.  All that matters is that in her chosson's eyes she is beautiful.  As far as he is concerned, relative to his frame of reference, it's the truth.  When the Midrash says that Hashem kicked the midah of emes down to earth, it doesn't mean that Hashem chose to disregard truth.  What it means is that the standard of truth for mankind is not absolute truth as it exists in heaven, but is relative truth as it exists for us on earth.  

"Lo ba'shamayim hi" means the same is true of halacha.  The "right" answer is the one that appears correct to us, not what is "right" in some absolute sense.

R' Shmuel Birnbaum is mechadesh that the same principle applies to nevuah.  What the prophet sees or hears is subject to his interpretation, and that is what determines the meaning of the nevuah.  When Avraham was commanded הַעֲלֵהוּ שָׁם לְעֹלָה, since Avraham interpreted that to mean that Hashem was asking him to sacrifice Yitzchak, the act of literal sacrifice became a mitzvah.  It doesn't matter in an absolute sense what Hashem meant or didn't mean, because that is not the standard by which we determine what halacha or nevuah means.  The standard of truth is our perception (by "our" I mean the chachmei ha'mesorah or the navi) of what is meant. 

We say in the bracha before the haftarah אֲשֶׁר בָּחַר בִּנְבִיאִים טוֹבִים, וְרָצָה בְדִבְרֵיהֶם הַנֶאֱמָרִים בֶּאֱמֶת.  R'SB explains that when we say the words הַנֶאֱמָרִים בֶּאֱמֶת, we are not thanking Hashem for giving us prophets that don't c"v lie -- that should go without saying.  What we are affirming in our bracha is this principle that the navi's interpretation of the dvar Hashem -- his perception of what Hashem meant -- is true, נֶאֱמָרִים בֶּאֱמֶת, because that is the only truth that is relevant and that counts. 

4 comments:

  1. It’s a nice piece. Let me suggest another answer to the question.
    Rambam Yesodiei ha Torah 5:3
    וְכָל מִי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בּוֹ יֵהָרֵג וְאַל יַעֲבֹר וְנֶהֱרַג וְלֹא עָבַר הֲרֵי זֶה קִדֵּשׁ אֶת הַשֵּׁם. וְאִם הָיָה בַּעֲשָׂרָה מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל הֲרֵי זֶה קִדֵּשׁ אֶת הַשֵּׁם בָּרַבִּים כְּדָנִיֵּאל חֲנַנְיָה מִישָׁאֵל וַעֲזַרְיָה וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וַחֲבֵרָיו
    One problem – Danel, Hananiyah, Mishael and Azaryah were not killed. They were miraculously saved.
    Rambam in Sefer ha Mitsvos, Mitzvah 9, writes:
    היא שצונו לקדש את שמו והוא אמרו ונקדשתי בתוך בני ישראל. וענין זאת המצוה אשר אנחנו מצווים לפרסם האמונה הזאת האמתית בעולם ושלא נפחד בהיזק שום מזיק ואע"פ שבא עלינו מכריח לבקש ממנו לכפותנו שלא נשמע אליו אבל נמסור עצמנו למיתה ולא נתעהו לחשוב שכפרנו אע"פ שלבותינו מאמינים בו יתעלה. וזאת היא מצות קדוש השם המצווים בה בני ישראל בכללם, רוצה לומר התרת עצמנו למות ביד האנס בעבור אהבתו יתעלה וההאמנה באחדותו כמו שעשו חנניה מישאל ועזריה בזמן נבוכדנצר הרשע כשצוה להשתחות לצלם והשתחוו לו כל ההמון וישראל בכלל ולא היה שם מקדש שם שמים אבל פחדו הכל והיתה בזה חרפה לכל ישראל על אשר אבדה זאת המצוה מכללם.
    The mitzvah of Kiddush Hashem is not to die per se, but to give oneself over for death. נמסור עצמנו למיתה
    And this is already apparent in the pesukim :
    עֲנ֗וֹ שַׁדְרַ֤ךְ מֵישַׁךְ֙ וַעֲבֵ֣ד נְג֔וֹ וְאָמְרִ֖ין לְמַלְכָּ֑א נְבֽוּכַדְנֶצַּ֔ר לָֽא־חַשְׁחִ֨ין אֲנַ֧חְנָא עַל־דְּנָ֛ה פִּתְגָ֖ם לַהֲתָבוּתָֽךְ׃
    הֵ֣ן אִיתַ֗י אֱלָהַ֙נָא֙ דִּֽי־אֲנַ֣חְנָא פָֽלְחִ֔ין יָכִ֖ל לְשֵׁיזָבוּתַ֑נָא מִן־אַתּ֨וּן נוּרָ֧א יָקִֽדְתָּ֛א וּמִן־יְדָ֥ךְ מַלְכָּ֖א יְשֵׁיזִֽב׃
    וְהֵ֣ן לָ֔א יְדִ֥יעַ לֶהֱוֵא־לָ֖ךְ מַלְכָּ֑א דִּ֤י (לאלהיך) [לֵֽאלָהָךְ֙] לָא־[אִיתַ֣נָא] (איתינא) פָֽלְחִ֔ין וּלְצֶ֧לֶם דַּהֲבָ֛א דִּ֥י הֲקֵ֖ימְתָּ לָ֥א נִסְגֻּֽד
    Shadrach, Meshach, and Abed-nego said in reply to the king, “O Nebuchadnezzar, we have no need to answer you in this matter, for if so it must be, our God whom we serve is able to save us from the burning fiery furnace, and He will save us from your power, O king. But even if He does not, be it known to you, O king, that we will not serve your god or worship the statue of gold that you have set up.” (Daniel 3:16-18)
    The mitzvah is to be moser nefesh – if Hashem decides to make a miracle and save you, that’s His business. You still fulfilled the mitzvah by being moser nefesh.

    That was the mitzvah here – Avraham had to show that he was willing to sacrifice everything by slaughtering Yitzchak. That Hashem sent a message at the last minute and saved Yitzchak does not take away from the mitzvah.

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    Replies
    1. It seems to me that you could equally use the Rambam to strengthen the question- from יסודי התורה ה:ד.
      כל מי שנאמר בו יעבר ואל יהרג ונהרג ולא עבר הרי זה מתחיב בנפשו
      The point of the question is that if in truth the mitzva does not create the obligation of mesirus nefesh, being moser nefesh is not meaningful.

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    2. You took the words out of my mouth. There is no point to showing a willingness to give up your life when giving up your life was not asked for. If I sit down in the middle of the street just to show that I am willing to give up my life for G-d there is no reward in that.

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  2. Not sure why the two of you are having a hard time with this. The Rambam I quoted proves that the mitzvah of kiddush Hashem is not to die for God but to demonstrate your are willing to give up your life for God, if called upon. Otherwise, Daniel, Hananiyah, Mishael and Azaryah did not fulfill the mitzvah, which they clearly did. They demonstrated a willingness to give up their life, even though they knew (and three of them said so!) that Hashem had the power to save them.
    Similarly, the mitzvah Avraham was given was to demonstrate that he was willing to sacrifice Yitzchak at God's command. That he did. That Hashem clarified matters does not detract from the fact that Avraham did so.
    The two examples you gave -- someone who gives up his life when the halakha does not demand it -- are not proofs of anything. In both cases, there is no requirement in halakha to give up one's life. Hashem is not demanding your life, so you are not demonstrating anything. And, acc. to the Rambam, you are doing an aveirah, tantamount to suicide.
    I should add here the Brisker Rov's explanation of the Akeida as שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַמַּכְחִישִׁים זֶה אֶת זֶה. עַד שֶׁיָּבוא הַכָּתוּב הַשְּׁלִישִׁי וְיַכְרִיעַ בֵּינֵיהֶם:
    Avraham was told that Yitzchak would be his lineage -- וְקָרָ֥אתָ אֶת־שְׁמ֖וֹ יִצְחָ֑ק וַֽהֲקִֽמֹתִ֨י אֶת־בְּרִיתִ֥י אִתּ֛וֹ לִבְרִ֥ית עוֹלָ֖ם לְזַרְע֥וֹ אַֽחֲרָֽיו:
    And כִּ֣י בְיִצְחָ֔ק יִקָּרֵ֥א לְךָ֖ זָֽרַע
    Then Hashem commands him to bring up Yitzchak as an Olah.
    יֹּ֡אמֶר קַח־נָ֠א אֶת־בִּנְךָ֨ אֶת־יְחִֽידְךָ֤ אֲשֶׁר־אָהַ֨בְתָּ֙ אֶת־יִצְחָ֔ק וְלֶ֨ךְ־לְךָ֔ אֶל־אֶ֖רֶץ הַמֹּֽרִיָּ֑ה וְהַֽעֲלֵ֤הוּ שָׁם֙ לְעֹלָ֔ה עַ֚ל אַחַ֣ד הֶֽהָרִ֔ים אֲשֶׁ֖ר אֹמַ֥ר אֵלֶֽיךָ:
    Avraham did not argue or despair, he went ahead with the commandment until he got the third possuk, when Hashem told him not to touch Yitzchak and that clarified that all he had been called upon to do was bind Yitzchak on the Mizbeach.
    Also see the Chizkuni, who explains that עַתָּ֣ה יָדַ֗עְתִּי כִּֽי־יְרֵ֤א אֱלֹהִים֙ אַ֔תָּה
    means now Hashem has demonstrated to the world that Avraham was God-fearing.

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