R' Yochanan's bittersweet tears

The Chofetz Chaim, whose yahrtzeit is 24 Elul, writes that the mitzvah of  וְעַתָּה כִּתְבוּ לָכֶם אֶת⁠ הַשִּׁירָה הַזֹּאת, which appears immediately after וְאָנֹכִי הַסְתֵּר אַסְתִּיר פָּנַי בַּיּוֹם הַהוּא, is a response to hester panim.  Even amidst the darkness, Hashem's presence and light can be found in Torah.

The gemara (Chagiga 5a) writes:

 רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן כִּי מָטֵי לְהַאי קְרָא, בָּכֵי: ״וְהָיָה כִּי תִמְצֶאןָ אוֹתוֹ רָעוֹת רַבּוֹת וְצָרוֹת״. עֶבֶד שֶׁרַבּוֹ מַמְצִיא לוֹ רָעוֹת וְצָרוֹת, תַּקָּנָה יֵשׁ לוֹ?!

 מַאי ״רָעוֹת וְצָרוֹת״? אָמַר רַב: רָעוֹת שֶׁנַּעֲשׂוֹת צָרוֹת זוֹ לָזוֹ — כְּגוֹן זִיבּוּרָא וְעַקְרַבָּא.

Rashi explains that the sting of עַקְרַבָּא needs to be treated with warmth, but the sting of the  זִיבּוּרָא is treated with cold.  If you are stung with both at the same time, there is no way to have any comfort from both.

Why was it davka this pasuk (31:21) that brought R' Yochanan to tears?  Why did he not come to tears when he read earlier in the same parsha (31:17) וְחָרָה אַפִּי בוֹ בַיּוֹם⁠ הַהוּא וַעֲזַבְתִּים וְהִסְתַּרְתִּי פָנַי מֵהֶם וְהָיָה לֶאֱכֹל וּמְצָאֻהוּ רָעוֹת רַבּוֹת וְצָרוֹת?  Why did he not cry when he read (31:18) וְאָנֹכִי הַסְתֵּר אַסְתִּיר פָּנַי בַּיּוֹם הַהוּא עַל כׇּל⁠ הָרָעָה אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה?   

Furthermore, if this pasuk is indeed the climax of the tragedies which will befall Bn"Y, why does it begin with the word וְהָיָה?  Chazal tell us אין ״והיה״ אלא שמחה!  

Two years ago I quoted the following yesod from R' Yehonasan Eibschitz: there are two type of punishment, namely punishment through hester panim, where Hashem turns a blind eye to what happens and let's things play out as b'derech ha'teva dictates, and punishment b'yad Hashem, where Hashem metes out the punishment that needs to be delivered.  The difference between the two is that only the latter type of punishment brings kapara, not the former.

This yesod explains the gemara in Brachos (7b):

מזמור לדוד בברחו מפני אבשלום בנו מזמור לדוד קינה לדוד מיבעי ליה אמר ר' שמעון בן אבישלום משל למה הדבר דומה לאדם שיצא עליו שטר חוב קודם שפרעו היה עצב לאחר שפרעו שמח אף כן דוד כיון שאמר לו הקב"ה הנני מקים עליך רעה מביתך היה עצב אמר שמא עבד או ממזר הוא דלא חייס עלי כיון דחזא דאבשלום הוא שמח משום הכי אמר מזמור

First the gemara gives a mashal to explain why David said a mizmor of celebration in response to his punishment,  משל למה הדבר דומה לאדם שיצא עליו שטר חוב קודם שפרעו היה עצב לאחר שפרעו שמח, and then, as if explaining the nimshal, tells us that David was happy because his suffering came at the hands of his own son, Avshalom.  These are two different explanations entirely.  Why does the gemara lump them together as one?  (Maharasha) 

Based on RYE's yesod, the gemara makes perfect sense.  Had David's punishment consisted of Hashem removing His hashgacha and leaving David to whatever fate decreed, it would not be a kapparah.  The shtar chov would still be hanging over his head awaiting payment.  It's only because David's punishment came at the hands of his own son, Avshalom, something so extraordinary and incredible that it could only be yad Hashem, that David felt a degree of relief and sang a mizmor, as punishment b'yad Hashem brings kaparah and would wipe his slate clean.  

In a similar vein, the gemara (Kesubos 66) writes that after the churban Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai came across the daughter of Nakdimon ben Gurion, who had been one of the richest men in the world, picking through animal dung looking for food. Recalling that he had been at her wedding and signed her kesubah worth a fortune, he exclaimed, “Ashrecha Yisrael! – When the Jewish people do G-d’s will, there is no one who can surpass them, but when they fall, they fall to the lowest depths of animal dung.” 

Maharal asks: It’s understandable why R’ Yochanan ben Zakai would say, “Ashrecha Yisrael!” on the ability of Klal Yisrael to rise to the greatest heights, but why say such words now, when he is witness to the depths to which Bn"Y had fallen?  

Maharal answers (see here) that the fact that when we fall, we fall to the lowest depths, proves that our fall is not just some turn of history, some accident of fate.  A great downfall such as ours cannot be explained b'derech ha'teva alone.  It can only reflect the yad Hashem.  So long as we remain under Hashem's watch, we can rest assured that just as He caused us to fall, the yad Hashem can and will raise us back to the greatest heights once we mend our ways.  

The Yismach Moshe uses this same idea to explain why R' Yochanan reacted davka to the pasuk of וְהָיָה כִּי תִמְצֶאןָ אוֹתוֹ רָעוֹת רַבּוֹת וְצָרוֹת.  Had Hashem punished us by simply withdrawing his hashgacha, as the previous pesukim in our parsha describe, וַעֲזַבְתִּים וְהִסְתַּרְתִּי פָנַי מֵהֶם, or וְאָנֹכִי הַסְתֵּר אַסְתִּיר פָּנַי בַּיּוֹם הַהוּא, it would mean that our suffering would be meaningless, as it would not bring us the needed kaparah to wash away our sins.  However, Hashem did not abandon us to fate and derech ha'teva.  Our suffering, as bitter as it is, is directed b'hashgacha, by yad Hashem.

This is the meaning of the mashal כְּגוֹן זִיבּוּרָא וְעַקְרַבָּא - these are two mutually exclusive forces, with mutually exclusive results, and mutually exclusive remedies.  Nature cannot abide A and not-A simultaneously.  Nature demands either/or.  The fact that we suffer under mutually exclusive forces proves that it is yad Hashem which is directing things. 

If so, וְהָיָה כִּי תִמְצֶאןָ אוֹתוֹ רָעוֹת רַבּוֹת וְצָרוֹת -- אין ״והיה״ אלא שמחה because our punishment, punishment b'yad Hashem, comes with the promise of kaparah and tikun.

 עֶבֶד שֶׁרַבּוֹ מַמְצִיא לוֹ רָעוֹת וְצָרוֹת, תַּקָּנָה יֵשׁ לוֹ is not a rhetorical question, but is a statement of fact.  When it is רַבּוֹ who is directing the punishment and not chance, fate, nature, circumstance, then indeed, תַּקָּנָה יֵשׁ לוֹ.  

R' Yochanan cried that we had to come to this point, but those tears were bittersweet.  You don't need Viktor Frankl to tell you that if experiences like those we have suffered this past year carry no meaning and do not lead to kaparah, to tikun, to greater heights, how much more painful and tragic they are.  We trust, however, that עֶבֶד שֶׁרַבּוֹ מַמְצִיא לוֹ רָעוֹת וְצָרוֹת, תַּקָּנָה יֵשׁ לוֹ.  

get divreichaim in your email -- widget fixed

I should have taken care of this a long time ago, but thanks to a little push from a reader I updated the widget on the site so there is once again the possibility of getting these posts emailed to you if you so desire.

when the big test comes, there are no hints

R' Shteinman records that R' Moshe Landinski, RY in the yeshiva in Radin, once told the Chofetz Chaim that he was reviewing mishnayos by heart while travelling and got stuck on a certain mishna that he could not remember exactly.  When the wagon stopped by an inn between villages (I imagine this was the 19th century equivalent of rest stops on the NJ or NY Turnpike), R' Moshe asked the Jewish innkeeper for mishnayos, refreshed his memory, and was able to continue learning.

The Chofetz Chaim remarked that this works on olam ha'zeh, but when we get the big test in olam ha'ba there will be no rest stops to pull into to take a break and refresh your memory!

simple and obvious

From here:

The reasons for this are so obvious it’s almost embarrassing to have to explain them once again. But it all began during the administration of Barack H. Obama, the man who ignored the brave freedom demonstrators in the streets of Tehran and other Iranian cities in favor of negotiating a useless nuclear deal with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Obama, as an inducement, lifted sanctions on Iran, even added a small fortune—$400 million— under the radar in cash. Two days later he sweetened the deal with another $1.3 billion.

The mullahs were supposed to use this money to help their impoverished people. Obama, who is not an idiot, could not have possibly believed that, but for reasons too depressing to write about went ahead.

Fortunately, Trump was elected in 2016 and reimposed sanctions on Iran and pulled out of the nuclear deal. We all know what happened. No war in the Middle East. Four years of peace. (No Ukraine War either.).

Then, Joe Biden comes in, lifts the sanctions, the mullahs make untold billions on oil and ship the spoils to Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and all those ever-changing terror outfits scattered across Iraq and Syria and we have years of carnage with rapes, kidnappings, endless deaths with no end in sight.

Does that sound too simple, even stupid?

That’s because it is.

What’s not simple is why our administration actually gave the Iranians the money to do this.

For that matter, why did we, the Europeans and a world of NGOs, not to mention the UN almost most of all, ship billions to Hamas so they could build the Gaza Metro under the homes, schools and hospitals of their impoverished citizens in order to destroy Israel and kill all Jews as required in their original charter?

But leave all that alone for the moment. Why do so-called “liberal” Jews still vote for this nonsense?

Sometimes people insist on overcomplicating what should be simple.  Yesterday I walked past a house that had a Stand with Israel sign on their lawn right next to a Harris-Walz sign.  Square peg, meet round hole.  

hakaras ha'tov for the bad as well

 אֲרַמִּי אֹבֵד אָבִי וַיֵּרֶד מִצְרַיְמָה וַיָּגׇר שָׁם בִּמְתֵי מְעָט וַיְהִי⁠ שָׁם לְגוֹי גָּדוֹל עָצוּם וָרָב

One of the lessons of the mitzvah of bikkurim is the need for hakaras ha'tov.  According to Rashi, this pasuk is referring to two separate, unrelated events: 1) Yaakov and family being spared from Lavan, the Arami, who sought our destruction, and 2) in addition -- as Rashi writes, ועוד אחרים באו עלינו לכלותינו -- we were also saved from the Egyptians.

According to Netziv these are not two ideas, but one.  It was decreed in the bris bein ha'besarim that Avraham's descendents would be in galus for four generations, but where that galus would be was not specified.  In theory, Yaakov and his family might have spent the entire galus in Aram.  In reality, because Lavan was was merciless in his treatment of Yaakov and was bent on the destruction of Yaakov's family, Hashem arranged events so that Yaakov would leave Aram and go down to Mitzrayim, and that became our home of the rest of the duration of the exile.

Based on the Netziv's interpretation, we are not thanking Hashem for delivering us from Egypt.  We are thanking Hashem for bringing us to Egypt!  As bad as conditions were there, the alternative was far worse. 

This is a new dimension to hakaras ha'tov.  It's not enough to say thanks for all the obviously good things that Hashem gives us.  We also have to thank Him for what sometimes seems like bad things as well, because there are alternatives that are far worse, alternatives we may not even be able to imagine, that we are being spared from.  

הַשְׁקִיפָה מִמְּעוֹן קׇדְשְׁךָ מִן⁠ הַשָּׁמַיִם וּבָרֵךְ אֶת⁠ עַמְּךָ אֶת⁠ יִשְׂרָאֵל (26:15)

The Midrash observes that the term הַשְׁקִיפָה is always used in reference to seeing something bad, never something good.  For example,  וַיַּשְׁקֵף עַל⁠ פְּנֵי סְדֹם וַעֲמֹרָה וְעַל⁠ כׇּל⁠ פְּנֵי אֶרֶץ הַכִּכָּר (Braishis 19:28)  Our pasuk is the exception to the rule, because גדול כוחן של מוציאי מעשרות שמהפכין לשון רעה לטובה, in the merit of offering maasros what ordinarily has a bad connotation is transformed to good.

The Torah has different words for seeing things: ראיה, הבּטה, השׁקפה  We need an expended vocabulary for the act of seeing because there are so many different ways of looking at things.  We can look at things from a distance and we can examine things up close; we can take things in in a general way with a glance and we can minutely examine something. השׁקפה is when we put something under a microscope and take a careful look at it.  This is why the term generally has a negative connotation.  Nothing is perfect, and the more carefully one examines something, the more likely one is to find its flaws and defects.

The term הַשְׁקִיפָה in our parsha refers to that same type of examination -- it's not an exception to that meaning -- but in this case the outcome in different  The more carefully one examines the actions of those who are mafrish maasros (Ksav v'ha'Kabbalah), even observing those actions for the extended period of three whole years up to the point of biur (RCK in Divrei Siach), the more perfect and laudatory their behavior seems.  Unlike other things which reveal their flaws under careful inspection, here, careful inspection only highlights the exceptional qualities.      

no hishtadlus required

 וְהָיָה אִם⁠ שָׁמוֹעַ תִּשְׁמַע בְּקוֹל ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ לִשְׁמֹר לַעֲשׂוֹת אֶת⁠ כׇּל⁠ מִצְוֺתָיו אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוְּךָ הַיּוֹם וּנְתָנְךָ ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ עֶלְיוֹן עַל כׇּל⁠גּוֹיֵי הָאָרֶץ. וּבָאוּ עָלֶיךָ כׇּל⁠ הַבְּרָכוֹת הָאֵלֶּה וְהִשִּׂיגֻךָ כִּי תִשְׁמַע בְּקוֹל ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ (28:1-2) 

Why do the brachos have to catch up to you, הִשִּׂיגֻךָ?  Would a person run away from bracha so that it has to chase after him?

There is a machkokes Ramban and other Rishonim whether bitachon requires hishtadlus or whether one can just trust in Hashem and that alone is enough, if done properly, to see that one's needs are met.  One can reconcile the two views by positing that the need for hishtadlus is inversely proportional to the degree of bitachon.  Someone who is a bona fide tzadik can sit back and trust that G-d will provide all their needs without their having to lift a finger.  Most of us are not on that level and feel that we must do something active to get results in olam ha'zeh, so Hashem responds in kind by giving us what we need only if we put in hishtadlus.  

Seforno explains our pasuk:  והשיגך – אף על פי שלא תשתדל אתה להשיגם.  Even though normally you make hishtadlus for your needs, the Torah here is promising bracha even where you make no effort and not hishtadlus to attain it.  The bracha will come to you; you don't have to make an effort to acquire it (see Divrei Siach of RCK).

2) Netziv notes that the parsha starts with the condition הָיָה אִם⁠ שָׁמוֹעַ תִּשְׁמַע בְּקוֹל ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ.  Why does the second pasuk reiterate that this blessing is only  כִּי תִשְׁמַע בְּקוֹל ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ?  

For some people getting a luxury car, going on a cruise, going out to eat in a fancy restaurant, etc. are things that get their heart pumping.  This is what they consider bracha.  For a person whose life is the 4 amos of halacha, these are little, meaningless things.  Can you imagine a gadol -- choose whichever one you like -- having a taavah for such things?  There was a restaurant review of a new place that opened in our neighborhood that touted the five types of cocktails that the reviewer ordered.  What a bracha!  Not one, but five options, and that did not exhaust the menu.  I don't think a cocktail menu would (or should) make a roshem on someone steeped in learning.

That being said, sometimes the olam ha'zeh bracha is so great that even someone who is immersed completely in learning will lift their head and take note.  That, says the Netziv, is the type bracha the pasuk is talking about. וְהִשִּׂיגֻךָ כִּי תִשְׁמַע בְּקוֹל ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ : even if you are immersed completely in the dvar Hashem, כִּי תִשְׁמַע בְּקוֹל ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ , and you take no note of such petty things as the cocktail menu or the new car or the new restaurant, והשיגך, there will be bracha so big that it will even grab your attention. 

it all depends on context - the ptur of chaburah shel mitzvah for ben sorer u'moreh

  כִּי⁠ יִהְיֶה לְאִישׁ בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה אֵינֶנּוּ שֹׁמֵעַ בְּקוֹל אָבִיו וּבְקוֹל אִמּוֹ וְיִסְּרוּ אֹתוֹ וְלֹא יִשְׁמַע אֲלֵיהֶם (22:18)

1) The Tiferes Banim (son of the Bnei Yisaschar) writes that it's what a parent does which matters more than what a parent says.  The ben sorer u'moreh ignores his parents, וְיִסְּרוּ אֹתוֹ וְלֹא יִשְׁמַע אֲלֵיהֶם, when they tell him to daven or tell him to learn.  Why?  Because his parents talk the talk but don't walk the walk. אֵינֶנּוּ שֹׁמֵעַ בְּקוֹל אָבִיו וּבְקוֹל אִמּוֹ, he doesn't hear the kol of his parents learning or the kol of their davening.  Their lecture is not reflected in their own behavior.

2) The Mishna in Sanhedrin (70) writes that a ben sorer u'moreh who eats in a chaburas mitzvah is ineligible to become chayav because this type of eating does not draw a person to become zolel v'sovei and rebel.  The gemara (70b) writes that even eating a meal of tanchumei aveilim, which is only a chiyuv derabbanan, is included in this ptur.  Rashi explains the chiddush as follows:

דאע"ג דתקנתא דרבנן בעלמא הוא דאי מרישא הוה אמינא חבורת מצוה היינו כהנים שאוכלין קדשים או פסחים

The Rogatchover asks how Rashi can possibly suggest that there is a hava amina that eating korban pesach is the pradigmatic case of chaburah shel mitzvah.  The gemara on the previous amud has a din that a person can become a ben soreh u'moreh only if he eats underdone, only partially cooked meat, like you would grab off the grill if you were in a hurry and had no time to wait:  

אמר רבינא יין חי מזיג ולא מזיג בשר חי בשיל ולא בשיל כבשר כיבא דאכלי גנבי

By the korban pesach there is an issur d'oraysa of אל תאכלו ממנו נא.  One is not allowed the eat the korban unless it is fully roasted.  Forget the ptur of chaburas mitzvah -- eating the meat of korban pesach cannot make one a ben sorer u'moreh because it is too well done!

Probably the simplest answer to the Rogatchover's question is that if meat is cooked kmaachal Ben Derusa'i, either 1/3 or 1/2 cooked, it is cooked enough to avoid the issur of  נא but rare enough to still make one eligible to become a ben sorer u'moreh (Divrei Yechezkel end of #15).  

R' Shmuel Rozovsky suggested a different yesod: the ptur of chaburas mitzvah does not depend on what is being eaten, but rather depends on the context in which the eating occurs.  If you read the Mishna in Sanhedrin carefully

אכל בחבורת מצוה אכל בעיבור החדש אכל מעשר שני בירושלים אכל נבילות וטריפות שקצים ורמשים... אכל דבר שהוא מצוה ודבר שהוא עבירה

There are two separate exclusions mentioned: אכל בחבורת מצוה and אכל דבר שהוא מצוה.  The latter case is speaking about where consuming the food is the mitzvah.  The former case, חבורת מצוה, is where the ben sorer u'moreh is eating whatever he is eating, nearly raw meat and underaged wine, not a cheftza shel mitzvah, but the chevra he is eating with are engaged in a meal that is a mitzvah, like eating korban pesach. In this case the food he is eating makes him eligible to become a ben sorer u'moreh, but the context he is eating in in precludes that possibility.

This yesod helps resolve another difficulty with Rashi. Aside from the case of eating korban pesach, Rashi gave another example of chaburah shel mitzvah: היינו כהנים שאוכלין קדשים.  Why does Rashi say *kohanim* eating kodshim?  Kodshim like a korban shelamim can be eaten by the person who brings the korban, even a yisrael; it doesn't have to be eaten only by a kohen?!  

Pshat in Rashi is that we are not speaking here about a ben sorer eating kodshim, which is an achila shel mitzvah.  The case Rashi is speaking about is where the ben sorer u'moreh goes out and steals his underdone steak of chulin but joins in with a chevra of kohanim who are eating their own kodshim steaks.  Even though the cheftza of food the ben sorer u'moreh is eating makes him eligible to be chayav, Rashi tells us that if you are eating that meal alongside those who serve in the Mikdash, kohanim who are eating kodshim l'shem mitzvah, you can't be a ben sorer u'moreh.  The context, the environment, keeps you on the straight and narrow.

The flipside of this yesod is the Ramban we discussed 10 years ago which explains that the reason why the ben sorer u'moreh is chayav is כי לא הומת בגודל חטאו, אלא לייסר בו את הרבים ושלא יהיה תקלה לאחרים.  As R' Leib Chasman explains, the din of the prat, the individual, is influenced by the tzibur, by the klal.  Even though the ben sorer's actions taken on their own are not necessarily so bad, since they can have a negative influence on the community and lead others astray, they therefore must be nipped in the bud.  Where the ben sorer finds himself in a chaburah shel mitzvah, the tables are turned and it is he who falls under the influence of the community, his environment, and therefore the danger is averted.

how quickly people forget 9/11

On 9/11 I was working for a company in lower Manhattan, on Broad Street, and had the unfortunate privileges of having front row seats for the day's events.  I remember in the years that followed, both at that company and a different company I worked for, the day of 9/11 was marked by a moment of silence at the time which corresponded to when the first airplane struck the Twin Towers.  That momentary pause grew shorter and shorter as the years passed, as people were in a rush to resume their work.  I can't recall when, but at some point in the intervening years (and I am at a different company now, so maybe this was always the way they did it here) that moment of silence got replaced with an email.  After all, people are so busy, who can spare even a moment to reflect?  Maybe those who had time t some point might read that email, but who are we kidding?  This year 9/11 came an went and there was not even that email. 

Am I surprised?  Not at all.  We are so busy moving from one task to the next, from gobbling up one bit of information and moving on to the next, that there is no time to reflect on or remember the past, nor do we want to.  America would prefer to think of the world as benign and to deny that there is unredeemable evil which must be eradicated.  I also realize that I am getting older, and some of the people around me at work were in diapers when these events occurred.  They have no personal recollection of what happened, and doubt any lesson they may have had in school truly impressed upon them the significance of what happened that day.

matzeivah vs mizbeiach -- the value of individualism

 וְלֹֽא⁠־תָקִ֥ים לְךָ֖ מַצֵּבָ֑ה אֲשֶׁ֥ר שָׂנֵ֖א ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ׃

Why do we find this expression אֲשֶׁ֥ר שָׂנֵ֖א ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ davka here by the issur of matzeivah?  The Torah doesn't say not to be mechalel Shabbos because it is something that Hashem hates, or not to engage in arayos because it is hated.  Why here?

Rashi writes that worship at a matzeivah was acceptable during the time of the Avos but no longer since it is used for avodah zarah.  Why then is worship at a mizbeiach acceptable?  That too is used by ovdei avodah zarah?

The difference between a matzeivah and a mizbeiach is that a matzeivah is made of one stone, while a mizbeiach is made from many.  

A matzeivah represents avodas Hashem through one, singular path.  It's one size fits all.  That worked well when dealing with the Avos, who were individuals.  It does not work well when dealing with a plurality, with a nation.  For the nation, only worship on a mizbeiach, composed of multiple stones, each representing a different path, a different steam of avodah, can succeed.

The first commandment of the aseres ha'dibros is not "Anochi Hashem Elokeichem," but rather "Anochi Hashem Elokecha" -- Hashem addressed himself to each individual, acknowledging that each person has their own way of relating to Him.

Building a matzeivah, turning Judaism into a one size fits all religion, is a direct contradiction to that message of "...Hashem Elokecha," which affirms the value of individualism.

a cause worthy of your support

I rarely advertise causes to support here, and in this case I am a noge'a ba'davar since my son learns in this kollel, but at the same time, as a noge'a ba'davar I can tell you that from what I see the kollel does amazing work.  They provide shiurim for adults, the bnei kollel learn b'chavrusa with adults as well as kids, they check and keep up the eiruv, and the kollel is an important Torah presence in a small out of town community.

If you can lend a hand and donate something to the Somerton Community Kollel, please pitch in here:

https://thechesedfund.com/sck/somerton-community-kollel-2024/teams/philadelphiabrowns

I know they will appreciate the support.

l'vaker b'heichalo

לַחֲז֥וֹת בְּנֹעַם⁠ ה׳ וּלְבַקֵּ֥ר בְּהֵֽיכָלֽוֹ׃

Rav Tamir Granot, R"Y of Orot Shaul, explains that the term לְבַקֵּ֥ר here has a similar meaning to the way it is used in the context of bikur cholim. The mitzvah of bikur cholim is not just to stop in and say hello to the choleh. Bikur cholim means to investigate what the choleh needs or wants and to try to help.

We want to experience נֹעַם⁠ ה׳, the pleasure and enjoyment of closeness to Hashem. But we also have to remember that we have a responsibility וּלְבַקֵּ֥ר בְּהֵֽיכָלֽוֹ׃. We have to ask ourselves what kavyachol the Shechina needs from us; what can we do to help Hashem make His presence felt in the world to a greater degree?

  

malchus - Divine right or by consent of the people?

Why is it that מלך שמחל על כבודו אין כבודו מחול (Kes 17a)?  Rashi explains:

שום תשים עליך מלך. ישראל הוזהרו שישימו עליהם שימות הרבה כלומר שתהא אימתו עליהם הלכך אין כבודו מחול שלפיכך ריבה הכתוב שימות הרבה:

In other words, the Torah demands that we give respect to the king; it has nothing to do with his wishes, and so he cannot choose to demur.

Rabeinu Yonah (San 21), however, offers a different explanation. He writes that the honor due to a king is not because of his person, but rather is because he is representative of the nation.   As Tos in Zevachim (16a d"h meyushav) puts it, אין זה שלו אלא של אחרים. Therefore, the honor is not his to dispense with.

These two views may reflect a larger issue, namely, from where does a king derive his authority -- is it a Divine right, or a reflection of the will of the people?  

Radbaz comments on the halacha of moreid b'malchus (Melachim 3:8) that this din applies to 

 והאי מלך היינו שהומלך על פי נביא או שהסכימו עליו כל ישראל

We see two distinct tracks: authority based on appointment by a navi and authority that is vested in the office by the people.

This dichotomy is reflected in different halachos in the Rambam.  In Hil Melachim 1:3 Rambam writes:

אין מעמידין מלך בתחילה אלא על פי בית דין של שבעים זקנים ועל פי נביא. כיהושע שמינהו משה רבינו ובית דינו. וכשאול ודוד שמינם שמואל הרמתי ובית דינו:

You need a prophet and a beis din to appoint a king, which seems to reflect authority being bestowed by G-d.  Yet the Rambam writes with respect to dina d'malchusa (Gezeila 5:18):

במה דברים אמורים במלך שמטבעו יוצא באותן הארצות שהרי הסכימו עליו בני אותה הארץ וסמכה דעתן שהוא אדוניהם והם לו עבדים. אבל אם אין מטבעו יוצא הרי הוא כגזלן בעל זרוע וכמו חבורת ליסטים המזויינין שאין דיניהם דין וכן מלך זה וכל עבדיו גזלנין לכל דבר:

Here the Rambam indicates that it is the consent of the governed which is the ultimate source of authority.

In fact, the Brisker Rav points out that the Mishna in Sanhedrin which lists off the functions of Sanhedrin:

אֵין דָּנִין לֹא אֶת הַשֵּׁבֶט וְלֹא אֶת נְבִיא הַשֶּׁקֶר וְלֹא אֶת כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל, אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. וְאֵין מוֹצִיאִין לְמִלְחֶמֶת הָרְשׁוּת, אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. אֵין מוֹסִיפִין עַל הָעִיר וְעַל הָעֲזָרוֹת, אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. אֵין עוֹשִׂין סַנְהֶדְרִיּוֹת לַשְּׁבָטִים, אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. אֵין עוֹשִׂין עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת, אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. וְאֵין עוֹשִׂין עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת בַּסְּפָר, וְלֹא שְׁלֹשָׁה, אֲבָל עוֹשִׂין אַחַת אוֹ שְׁתָּיִם

omits any mention of their role in appointing a king. GRI"Z explains (the Rav developed this idea as well) that Sanhedrin served a dual role: as the executive branch, and as representatives of the people.  The Mishna in Sanhedrin is an enumeration of the executive branch roles of Sanhedrin.  Appointing a king is a function of their role as representatives of the people, and therefore does not belong on this list.  This is perhaps not just a procedural issue, but is reflective of the source of the king's authority.

This question may underpin a machlokes Rav and Shmuel regarding the scope of a king's power.  When Bn"Y demanded that Shmuel haNavi appoint a king, he warned them of the consequences (Sh I:8):

יאוַיֹּ֕אמֶר זֶ֗ה יִֽהְיֶה֙ מִשְׁפַּ֣ט הַמֶּ֔לֶךְ אֲשֶׁ֥ר יִמְלֹ֖ךְ עֲלֵיכֶ֑ם אֶת־בְּנֵיכֶ֣ם יִקָּ֗ח וְשָֹ֥ם לוֹ֙ בְּמֶרְכַּבְתּ֣וֹ וּבְפָרָשָׁ֔יו וְרָצ֖וּ לִפְנֵ֥י מֶרְכַּבְתּֽוֹ:

יבוְלָשֹ֣וּם ל֔וֹ שָׂרֵ֥י אֲלָפִ֖ים וְשָׂרֵ֣י חֲמִשִּׁ֑ים וְלַחֲר֚שׁ חֲרִישׁוֹ֙ וְלִקְצֹ֣ר קְצִיר֔וֹ וְלַעֲשֹ֥וֹת כְּלֵֽי־מִלְחַמְתּ֖וֹ וּכְלֵ֥י רִכְבּֽוֹ:

יגוְאֶת־בְּנוֹתֵיכֶ֖ם יִקָּ֑ח לְרַקָּח֥וֹת וּלְטַבָּח֖וֹת וּלְאֹפֽוֹת:

ידוְאֶת־שְֹ֠דֽוֹתֵיכֶם וְאֶת־כַּרְמֵיכֶ֧ם וְזֵיתֵיכֶ֛ם הַטּוֹבִ֖ים יִקָּ֑ח וְנָתַ֖ן לַעֲבָדָֽיו:

טווְזַרְעֵיכֶ֥ם וְכַרְמֵיכֶ֖ם יַעְשֹ֑ר וְנָתַ֥ן לְסָרִיסָ֖יו וְלַעֲבָדָֽיו:

טזוְאֶת־עַבְדֵיכֶם֩ וְֽאֶת־שִׁפְח֨וֹתֵיכֶ֜ם וְאֶת־בַּחוּרֵיכֶ֧ם הַטּוֹבִ֛ים וְאֶת־חֲמוֹרֵיכֶ֖ם יִקָּ֑ח וְעָשָֹ֖ה לִמְלַאכְתּֽוֹ:

יזצֹאנְכֶ֖ם יַעְשֹ֑ר וְאַתֶּ֖ם תִּֽהְיוּ־ל֥וֹ לַעֲבָדִֽים:

יחוּזְעַקְתֶּם֙ בַּיּ֣וֹם הַה֔וּא מִלִּפְנֵ֣י מַלְכְּכֶ֔ם אֲשֶׁ֥ר בְּחַרְתֶּ֖ם לָכֶ֑ם וְלֹֽא־יַעֲנֶ֧ה יְהֹוָ֛ה אֶתְכֶ֖ם בַּיּ֥וֹם הַהֽוּא:

Was Shmuel haNavi just making a threat as to what might happen should the king abuse his power, or does this list accurately reflect what a king is empowered to do?  The gemara (San 20b) writes:

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל כל האמור בפרשת מלך מלך מותר בו רב אמר לא נאמרה פרשה זו אלא לאיים עליהם שנאמר שום תשים עליך מלך שתהא אימתו עליך

Rav Yaakov Ariel suggests that Rav does not necessarily hold that a king is just a figurehead with no real power.  That would not seem to fit with many examples in Tanach.  Rather, the machlokes Rav and Shmuel revolves around this question of whether power is Divinely granted to the king and therefore there is little limit on its scope, or whether it depends on the consent of the goverened, and therefore has a more narrow scope and can be reined in.  

This whole discussion brought to my mind a famous vort of the Gaon m'Vilna on the pasuk in Teh (22:29)  כִּי לַה׳ הַמְּלוּכָה וּמֹשֵׁל בַּגּוֹיִם.  The Gaon explains (see Ibn Erza to Braishis 37:8) that there is a difference between a malchus and memshala.  Memshala means ruling by coercion; malchus is with the consent of those ruled.  When it comes to Bn"Y, כִּי לַה׳ הַמְּלוּכָה because we willingly accept Hashem as our king.  When it comes to the other nations, וּמֹשֵׁל בַּגּוֹיִם, they willy-nilly accept Hashem as king, only against their will.

I think there is a parallel between the malchusa d'arah and the malchusa d'rekiya, and these two terms reflect the issue we have been discussing.  Memshala is not just malchus with an arm twist.  It's a different animal entirely, both in the scope and source of the authority it defines.  It is authority that is imposed form without, as opposed to authority that is a reflection of the will of the people.  The idea of tekiyas shofar, of malchiyos on Rosh haShana, of our acceptance of Hashem as our ruler, is what differentiates us from the aku"m in that it reflects a relationship of malchus and not memshala, authority that comes from isarusa d'litata, bottom up, from the people, as opposed to one of isarusa d'leila, top down, imposed from without, based in fear instead of love.

The truth is that these two tracks, malchus as a function of tzav Hashem and malchus as a  function of consent of the people, are intertwined, as the Shem m'Shmuel points out.  How can you ever arrive at consent of the masses when every person has their own agenda, their own ideas about what should be done and who should do it?  The path to common consensus is only through the common denominator of acceptance of ratzon Hashem.