Basar b'chalav and Kilayim: Why can't I add a drop of milk to my cholent?

In addition to athe nnouncement that it was the season to donate shekalim, rosh chodesh adar was the time bais din had to send out warnings about kilayim. The Bartenura explains that seed can contain a certain percentage of mixture, e.g. if one has wheat to plant and there is a few kernels of barley seed mixed in, that would not be a problem, provided it is below the threshold of 1/24. (The Yerushalmi yomi we just past this exact sugya.) The issur here is not planting kilayim, because one wishes to plant a wheat field and does not want the barley; however, to avoid mar'is ayin of any mixture, the chachamim set a cap on the impurity of the seed.
If one actually planted a field mixing different seed and violated the issur of kilayim, then it is not sufficient to pluck out a few of the mixed plants below a certain threshold, but the entire field becomes assur.
The Rishonim ask: why by the mixture of seed do I assume if the seed is below a certain percentage it is bateil, but if I intentionally create a mixture of seed and plant it in my field, the entire field becomes assur and we do not say the minority crop is bateil to the majority of the field?
The answer is that by other issurim, e.g. chazir, the Torah prohibited a k'zayis of the item; by definition, once that item is in a ta'aroves and is bateil, it not longer exists. By kilayim, by definition the issur is the mixture, not each individual item. In normal cases, bittul is a matir; by kilayim, bittul is the oseir.
If that is so, then it follows that bittul should never work by basar b'chalav, because there too, the issur is not the individual meat or milk, but the ta'aroves itself is the oseir. Why then is there a halacha of bittul b'rov by basar b'chalav?
The Ran answers that "derech bishul asra Torah". The reason that basar b'chalav is permitted if the % in a ta'aroves is negligable is not because of the normal din of bittul b'rov, but because cooking such a small amount is not called bishul.
My question: if so, why can't I intentionally put a drop of milk in my cholent? By other issurim, I would say "ain mevatlin issur l'chatchila", that bittul can only be used ex post facto after the ta'aroves happens, but by basar b'chalav, there is no halacha of bittul - there is just a din that defines the parameters of bishul and teaches me that cooking a little drop is not called cooking?!

4 amos and techum shabbos

The Mishnayos in the beginning of the 4th perek of Eiruvin discuss the halacha if one left the area of his/her techum on Shabbos b'ones (e.g. one is kidnapped and dragged outside the techum) - the person can then only walk 4 amos, unless he/she is in an enclosed area. Later in the perek (mishna 5,) the Mishna discusses a case of one who fell asleep on Erev Shabbos and had no da'as to be koneh shevisa - the Chachamim hold here as well that one can move around only within 4 amos. The Mishna then has a machlokes whether those 4 amos are calculated in each direction, or is it 4 amos total, meaning 2 in each direction. My son Eliezer asked: why does the Mishna wait until 4:5 to discuss the details of how to calculate the area of 4 amos? Why not discuss this earlier in the perek when the din of 4 amos was first mentioned?
I could not find an answer, so his reward for such a kashe is the fame of being mentioned here ; )

mimetic tradition

R' Haym Soloveitchik made the whole notion of "mimetic tradition" popular in certain circles, yet mimeticism for its own sake becomes absurd, as illustrated by the joke here: http://kallahmagazine.com/WordPress/
My feelings on this are split. I do not come from a background with strong particular minhagim passed down to me, so I feel like I don't lose much by adopting for example, a minhag or nusach haGR"A. My wife is descendent from a chain of yekkes, so if I were her, I would probably feel more guilt at not adhering strictly to those minhagim and the psak of the Rama. I do not understand how people who do not come from strong backgrounds come to adopt mimetic minhagim even when it leads to kulos. For example, if you read the gemara straight, there is no excuse not to eat in sukkah on Shmini Atzeres. If someone who has grown up his entire life in a chassidic community with those minhagim, I can understand learning the gemara in a way that is dochak to preserve the received mimetic tradition. However, if an outsider decides to join such a community, how can they intellectually justify abandoning the gemara to preserve a tradition they do not have? In other words, if one is born into a received tradition, then I can appreciate that outweighing a text, but if one is left to one's own devices to choose, why should one choose a mimetic tradition over a received text?

Matzah lishma - omeid al gabav

Matzas mitzvah must have "shimur l'shem matzah", with various opnions in rishonim from when that shimur must be done. If matzah is baked by an aku"m who is supervised by a yisrael omeid al gabav, most rishonim hold that this is invalid, with the notable exception of Rav Hai Gaon. What is the issue here? There are actually two possible ways to approach the machlokes. By get, aku"m with yisrael omeid al gabav does not work because we assume that the aku"m will break off concentration before finishing the writing of the toreif. However, the Rambam and Rosh argue about whether this would work for the process of tanning hides for tefillin where the extent of lishma is placing the raw hide in the tanning vat. We might argue that baking matzah is parallel to tanning the hides. However, this is not such a simple statement to make - the Noda B'Yehudah notes that lishma is required for the duration of the kneading process, which is far longer than the tanning process (see Minchas Chinuch). The Netziv in his commentary to the She'iltos (P' Tzav) takes a completely different approach. Instead of assuming a constant bar for lishma and questioning whether omeid al gabav meets that criteria, he suggests that the issue at hand is the nature of shimur itself - is shimur a chovas hagavra of the baker, or is shimur a din in the cheftza shel matzah, i.e. the dough must have the potential to become chameitz and therefore require some supervision to obviate that danger. (This requires some twists in learning pesachim 38 which you have to have a look at in inside for).

Why a woman is pasul to be a dayan

Tosfos in Bava Kamma 15 raises the question of why a woman is pasul to be a dayan, as there is no explicit miyut anyway that disqualifies her. Tosfos ends up using a bit of roundabout logic: since a woman is pasul l'eidus, and we have a principle that anyone who is pasul for eidus is also pasul for din, m'meila a woman must also be pasul l'din. The Yerushalmi (Brachos 7 halacha 1) debates whether there is the possibility of zimun for 2 people, or can zimun only be zone by 3. The sugya draws a parallel between the halacha of zimun and the mechlokes R' Yochanan and Reish Lakish whether 2 people are called a Bais Din, or is a Bais Din no less than three. How are these two halachos connected? The Ohr Samaich in Hil Brachos writes that the underlying issue in both cases is one of minyan - at what point do indivuduals count together to form the "multiplicity" of minyan required for din or for zimun. The gemara in a number of places tells is that "trei nashi k'meah gavri" - women even in a large number do not count as a collective unit. Based on this, the Ohr Sameiach ingeniously suggests that since we know that 3 women cannot join together to form a "multiplicity" when a group or minyan must be formed, it follows that even if three women sat together they would count as individuals and not as a group of 3 required to constitute a Bais Din.

V'Yikchu li Terumah

My friend Chaim Markowitz beat me to posting this Shev Shamytza on parshas Terumah -
http://nefeshchaim.blogspot.com/2006/02/teruma-i-vayikchu-li-teruma.html

Deriving benefit from melacha done on Shabbos

One of my daughters mentioned on Shabbos that she learned in school that if one does melacha on Shabbos one cannot have benefit from that work, e.g. (her example) if you turn on a light, you would not be allowed to sit and read by that light. But is this correct? (I admit: I am naturally suspicious of anything my kids learn in school : ) The gemara's discussion of this halacha uses the example of violating the issur of bishul. The Chayei Adam has a safeik whether the rule would be the same for a melacha where the object has not changed - e.g. if one violated the melacha of carrying in a reshus harabim, would one be prohibited from having benefit from the object? When one turns on a light, the wiring of one's home has not changed - it has simply started carrying a current. On the other hand, the bulb that was dark has now become illuminated. Is this comparable to ma'avir or bishul??
Another interesting safeik is whether this halacha applies to issurei derabbanan as well as issurei d'oraysa. One could debate whether tuning on a light in indeed an issur d'oraysa (too lengthy a discussion for now).
I don't know how much of these details my daughter absorbed in our few minute discussion, but then again, I wonder if her teacher thought through them when presenting the case (yes, I should give her the benefit of the doubt).

The burrow of Brooklyn

When explaining to my daughter (age 8) that people in Brooklyn reside in a borough, not a city, she said, "Just like rabbits live in". Yes, the good ol' burrow of Brooklyn.

chiyuv mezomos for wife of an eved

"Im ba'al isha hu v'yatza'ah ishto imo". Rashi asks the obvious question of what the eved's wife should have to do with his and quotes from Chazal that the owner of the eved was chayav to pay mezonos support to the wife of the eved. Once the eved was freed, that obligation is severed. Question: can the eved be mocheil (forgive the obligation) on the chiyuv mezonos to his wife? In other words, is the chiyuv of the owner to the eved to provide food for him to use as mezonos, or is there a chiyuv from the owner directly to Mrs. Eved? I don't have an answer for this one.

Preparation for Shabbos - Bais Shamai vs. Bais Hillel

Beitzah 16 has a machlokes Bais Shamai and Bais Hillel regarding preparing for Shabbos. When Shamai would shop during the week, if he found a delicacy in the market, he would put it aside for Shabbos. Hillel, however, practiced the middah of "Baruch Hashem Yom Yom", eating what he found during the week and assuming that on erev Shabbos when he went shopping he would find what he needed for Shabbos. R' Tzadok haKohein explains that this reflected their philosophical outlook. Shamai assumed the ultimate tikkun can only be in the future world of Shabbos, and any good that we achieve in this world needs to be stored for that day. Hillel, however, assumed that the good of this world has a place during our mundane day to day existance as well. My wife suggested that this relates to the idea found in chassidishe seforim that we pasken like Bais Hillel now, but when Mashiach and the day of ultimate Shabbos comes then the halacha will be like Bais Shamai. Lulei d'mistafina I would add to her thought that one of the reasons we pasken like Bais Hillel is because of the "bas kol" which endorsed their opinion (see Eiruvin 13). There are different madreigos of nevuah and ruach hakodesh - see Ramban Baba Basra 13. Perhaps the halacha is like Bais Hillel pre-geulah precisely because the endorsement of Hillel's views was revealed on the madreiga of "bas kol" - l'asid lavo, when we will one again live in a time with there is a hisgalus of nevuah, the halacha itself may be in accordance with that higher madreiga.

davar sh'aino mitkavain and tiltul min hatzad

Today's daf in Yerushalmi (Kilayim 4) seems to draw a parallel between the halacha of tiltul min hatzad, indirectly moving a muktzeh object, and the halacha of davar she'aino mitkavain, unintentional melacha, e.g. on shabbos it is permitted to drag a chair across a lawn because the intention is to move the chair, not to plough the lawn (provided that the ploughing is not inevitable). This seems a bit difficult. Tiltul min hatzad does not focus on intent, but on the manner of moving the object in question - in the Yerushalmi's case, a vegetable is being removed from the ground in a way that indirectly causes the surrounding earth to be dug up. The concept of tiltul min hatzad is that only directly moving the muktzah object itself is prohibited. Davar she'aino mitkavain is a halacha that focusses on intent. Tzarich iyun for me.

Shiur hafrasha and nesina - pesachim 32

Tosfos Pesachim32b asks why 1 stalk of wheat is sufficient to fulfill terumah on an entire haystalk when the Torah uses the term "nesina" by terumah which entails a shiur of at least a perutah? Tosfos limits the application of shiur to "nesina" used in the context of tashlumin. One could answer the kashe of Tosfos by distinguishing 2 dinim in the mitzva of terumah: 1) the hafrasha, which removes the issur tevel from the haystack, for which a single stalk of wheat is sufficient; 2) the mitzva of nesina to the kohein, which should be fulfilled with a chashuv shiur. See the Mishne l'Melech in Hil Matnos Aniyim 6:7 who discusses this issue.

The "Western idolatry" of free press

I would never run out of subject matter if I simply devoted this entire blog to refuting the spurious reasoning of certain writers, the title of one of whose editorials gave rise to this post. Certain schools of thought have commented on the cartoon controversy that of course there should be offense taken at the desecration of religious symbols; the press is simply only interested in its own "western idolotry" of free expression which yahadut rejects. With chodesh Adar fast approaching I cannot believe these writers would forget the gemara in Megillah 25b "kol letzeinusa asura l'bar m'letzanusa d'avodah zarah" - in short, making fun of avodah zarah is not only permitted, but encouraged! Whether Islam is technically avodah zarah is not the point. The point is that the fact that ovdei avodah zarah hold their beliefs sacrosanct does not at all bother the halacha - take a good vicious verbal insult whack at your local idolatry! So much for limiting free speech to protect what others hold dear and sacred.

Did the earth have free choice?

For those learning Yerushalmi yomi, we just crossed the sugya in Kilayim of why the earth was punished for Adam's sin. One opinion says the earth was punished because the taste of trees (i.e. the bark) should have matched the fruit, but the trees did not do that. Another opinion says the earth did nothing wrong in growing trees, but was cursed as a function of its nurturing man who was now a sinner.
How could the earth choose to disobey G-d's command to taste like its fruit? The MaHaRi"L Diskin in his commentary on chumash is the only one I have found to ask this question. He answers that the tree was given a limited sense of bechira just for this event. (The simplest approach is to just take the idea allegorically. The concept here is that the ability to choose to disobey G-d's was already inherent in the beriya - see Maor v'Shemesh).

Can there be ethics without Torah?

Is there an ethical norm that exists independent of Torah, or is ethical behavior just a side-product of proper observance of the mitzvos? There is a machlokes in Zevachim whether Yisro came before mattan Torah or after mattan Torah. R' Kook explains (I forget where I saw this) that the machlokes is not just historical, but philosophical. Yisro was a man of ethics, a man searching for truth and goodness. Can the ethical man symbolized by the personality of Yisro precede the Torah, perhaps as a prerequisite for Torah (the Sefas Emes writes that the opnion that Yisro preceded mattan Torah is based on the idea of "derech eretz kadma l'Torah), or is ethics only possible a a result of the religious experience?
The Netziv has an interesting comment on the Torah's promise of long life in Eretz Yisrael for proper observance of kibbud av v'eim. Explains the Netziv, the ideal fulfillment of Torah is only in Eretz Yisrael. However, one might have the mistaken notion that this is true of the ritual of Torah, but not ethical mitzvos. In truth, however, ethicals and ritual are one and the same; we observe kibbud av v'eim not because it is morally correct, but simply because the Torah commands such. Even ethical mitzvos should be viewed only as gezeiros of Hashem. The Torah underscores this by emphasizing that ethics too can only be fully fulfilled in Eretz Yisrael.

The chinuch danger of the anti-evolution crowd

My son has come home from school a few times telling me that his classmates believe evolution is a big hoax and the world cannot be older than 5766, etc. That simplistic thinking spills over to other areas, whether intended or not by his esteemed Rebbeim. I try to learn mishnayos with him semi-regularly - we recently learned a Mishna in Eiruvin which says the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter is 3. I asked my son, "But didn't you learn in math that the ratio is pi, which is 3.14..."? He promptly came to the only logical conclusion possible, namely that pi is a hoax and the Mishna must be correct. I wish I were making this up!!!!

Na'aseh v"nishma - kol and dibbur

Chazal darshen on "Borachu Hashem Mal'achav Giburei Cho'ach Osei Devaro Lishmo'a b'Kol Devaro", that this is a reference to Bnei Yisrael saying na'aseh v'nishma and putting the asiya, the doing, before the understanding of mitzvos. The simple understanding is that Bnei Yisrael are creditied with accepting the Torah unconditionally without first asking to hear what that entailed. Yet, is that what is really going on? By analogy: imagine the King tells you that you were just selected to receive his most precious prize - are you willing to take it? Do you need to really ask what the prize is before saying yes? Kal v'chomer if the King is Hashem, who would obviously not command a Torah that was not for the good of mankind.
Explains the Sefas Emes: there are different paths to attain knowledge. We can come to knowledge purely as an intellectual endeavor, or we can come to knowledge through experience and action. Na'aseh v'nishma means knowledge springs from actions and experience, through hearing the kol of Hashem not just in the blatt gemara, but in asiyas hamitzvos as well. The Sefas Emes continues: The pasuk does not say "lishmo'a... b'devaro", but "lishmo'a b'kol devaro". The Zohar writes that kol is a higher, more pnimi experience than dibbur - kol is communication without words which transcends the limitations of language and its barriers. The intellectual experience of just learning Torah is listening to the words of the dvar Hashem, but the drawing the wisdom of Torah from the experience of life is to listen to the kol. "Hakol kol Ya'akov" - its is not the content of our words, but the sound of our voice, the essence of who we are, that is significant.
I would just add that the experience of mattan Torah is viewed by Chazal as a tikkun for the cheit of Adam haRishon. Adam's cheit is "ki shamata b'kol ishtecha" - the Ohr haChaim explains that it was not the reasoning and words of Chavah which convinced Adam to sin, but the tone and expression of her voice, the kol. (Perhaps this is why there is an issur of kol isha). Mattan Torah was the restoration of the kol to its rightful purpose in life.

Boil, don't simmer

VaYishma Yisro. 1) Chazal and the meforshei chumash debate what drew Yisro to klal Yisrael, but whatever the answer, it is clear from the text that just having a son-in-law who was Moshe Rabeinu was not sufficient impetus. We sometimes mistakingly think that gadol X's son or relative must be a tzadik and gaon just by virtue of being raised as a karov to an adam gadol, yet we see from Yisro that such is not the case. 2) A second point in that regard is that Chazal seem to be searching for a trigger that drove Yisro's behavior. It is not enough to say that he came to a general gradual awareness and then decided to come to klal Yisrael - there had to have been a makkeh b'patish that drove the nail home. Many people who are "traditional" will kind of hover around attending shule once in awhile, learning a bit, for some it is being a little bit shomeir shabbos and/or kashrus, etc. It's like having a pot on the stove that just sits and simmers - the makeh b'patish is missing. Eliyahu by the episode of Har HaKarmel challenges the Ba'al worshipers and demands of Bnei Yisrael, "Ad masai atem poshchim al shnei ha'sifim - im la'ba'al lechu acharav, im l'Hashem lechu acharav" - How long are you going to straddle the fence? If you want to worship Ba'al, follow him, if you want to worship Hashem, then follow him! Sometimes it takes an event or challenege to motivate a person to make a choice: stop the simmer - either shut the flame, or get things boiling. Someone in shule once remarked how wonderful the US kehillah was (they had spent time in Israel) because in the same shule you can have people with "black hats", knit kippot, etc., and everyone just gets along. I disagreed with him. The reason they get along (this may be generalizing too much, but for this particular shule it was very true) is because everyone has a pareve attitude - if I hold X and you hold Y, so what, lets not get so worked up about it otherwise we both might miss the cholent. There is no milchamta shel Torah! That is not to say we should not love each and every Jew; what it means is that we should love each other despite our differences, not because we ignore differences and are not really committed to anything. We should have a passion for our committement to yahadus - a boiling fervor, not a slow simmer!

Yehudah vs. Yosef and ay Tam Suf

In the next issue of Kallah Magazine (kallahmagazine.com on the web) I hope to have an article that relates to the personalities of Yosef and Yehudah based on torah of the Ishbitzer. My wife pointed out a parallel that had not crossed my mind before. The brothers were split in what action to take against Yosef until Yehudah swayed them to his plan of selling him. We find by Yam Suf that Bnei Yisrael were split into camps differing in what action to take (see Ramban, Mesech Chochma, P' Beshalach) until Nachshon, the leader of Yehudah, jumped into the Sea. At this point, just an observation for further food for thought....

Kiddushin, arvus, shlichus - Yerushalmi Dmai 29

In yesterday's daf yomi in Yerushalmi (see the link to my BIL's website on the side for more info on Yerushalmi yomi) the gemara cites a braysa that if a manager tells his worker to collect food from the store and the manager will pay, then the manager is responsible to insure ma'aser has been taken from the food purchased. The gemara debates the reason why: a) because the store owner is the manager's shliach, or b) the worker is the manager's shliach to make the purchase, and then is immediatly zocheh from the manager on his own behalf all in one transaction. The difference between the opinions would play out if the store owner is someone who is pasul for shlichus, in which case only option (b) works.
The gilyon sends you to a sugya in bavli kiddushin and a machne efrayim that I happen to be learning with my shabbos chavrusa. If a women says to a man "give money to ploni and I will be mekudesht to you", the kiddushin is valid. Just as an areiv, one who guarantees repayment of a loan, assumes an obligation with no benefit received, the women can assume the obligation of marriage on the basis of someone else receiving payment. The Rishonim debate how this halacha works: is the women mekudeshet because paying the third party is the equivalent as paying her and her transferring the money to the third party, or has the mekadesh paid the third-party directly with no need for the woman to be a middleman (or woman, as the case may be ; )
It seems the Gilyon intended to draw a parallel between the cases. Option (b) above assumes that the store owner just delivers the goods, and the only relationship that exists is manager to worker. In the kiddushin case, the only relationship would be the mekadeish and the third party recipeient. However, according to option (a) the store owner is part of the equationm just like the women who has funds pass through her to a third party.
To me these cases o not quite seem parallel - maybe someone else learned the gilyon differently here. Any ideas?