VaYikra: Why "divrei kevushim" were needed for BN"Y to accept korbanos

"VaYikra el Moshe Leimor... " Rashi explains that Hashem told Moshe to speak to Bnei Yisrael with "divrei kevushim", words of supplication to win over their hearts. " Hashem speaks to me only because of you", Moshe told Bnei Yisrael. Moshe is told to respond to Hashem if Bnei Yisrael agree to accept these mitzvos of korbanos.
Why davka by the mitzvos of korbanos was Moshe told to preface the commands with "divrei kevushim"? And why do these mitzvos in particular require explicit acceptance by Bnei Yisrael?
If one is chotei b'mazid, the halacha is that through tshuvah m'ahavah the aveira can turn into a zechus. However, if one is chotei b'shogeg,the aveira even through tshuvah m'ahavah still obligates bringing a korban. How can that be true if shogeg is a lesser crime than mazid? The Imrei Elimelech explains that precisely because the crime is lesser, the deterrent must be stronger. A person who does a cheit b'mazid eventually realizes the enormity of the sin and returns to Hashem b'lev shaleim. A person who is chotei b'shogeg might tend to minimize the cheit as just a mistake - not so bad. Therefore, even after tshuvah, a korban is required.
The dor de'ah, the generation who received the Torah, was fully aware of the significance of shogeg as a cheit. They did not need the reminder of korbanos. Therefore, Hashem instructed Moshe to approach them with "divrei kevushim". Moshe was on even a higher madreiga than the dor de'ah and did not need Hashem's explicit "dibbur" for him to intuit the razton Hashem. "But", said Moshe to Bnei Yisrael, "For 40 years I listened to the "dibbur" of Hashem on your behalf, so you could listen in as well, even though this was beneath my madreiga. So too, I ask that even if it is below your madreiga, for the future doros who need it, accept upon yourselves the parsha of korbanos."

VaYikra

VaYikra el Moshe VaYidaber Hashem eilav...
Why does Hashem's name appear only in the middle of the pasuk, after vaYidaber, and not at the pasuk's opening? - i.e. the pasuk could have said VaYikra Hashem el Moshe vaYidaber... The Noam Elimelech makes this diyuk, along with noticing the little "aleph" in Vayikra that every darshen comments on. This may be derush, but I think lots of times a person feels a calling to engage in a project l'shem shamayim but it thenhas trouble getting off the ground. There is a VaYikra, but the aleph that represents the Shechina is small and hiding, and Hashem's name is not mentioned because his presence is still hidden. Is it worth going forward and continuing? Will this project bear fruit? Sometimes it is only after you decide to jump in and risk going forward, then VaYidaber Hashem.

Eating before "kiddusha rabbah" - Rambam vs. Ra'avad

The Rambam (Shabbos ch 29) paskens that it is forbidden to eat before kiddush during the day ("kiddusha rabbah") just like at night. The Ra'avad disagrees, arguing that since one can say kiddush over bread, and kiddusha rabbah is no more than a birchas hane'henin, there can be no issur of eating before kiddush because the bracha on the seudah IS kiddush. The simple approach to understanding the Rambam is that he holds one may not say kiddush over bread during the day. The seudah requires some way to demarcate it as a seudas shabbos beyond saying hamotzi. I am more concerned with the Ra'avad's objection. Why did the Ra'avad not think there can be an issur of eating before kiddush? Even if you assume you can say kiddush on bread, what if I wanted to eat an apple before kiddush - that is certainly not a seudah which qualifies as seudas shabbos, so according to the Ra'avad, how was I yotzei kiddush before eating?
It seems to me that the dispute between the Rambam and Ra'avad is how to understand the issur of eating before kiddush. According the the Rambam, it is an issur gavra independent of what one is saying kiddush on. According to the Ra'avad, it is a din in seudas shabbos, i.e. that seudas Shabbos must be preceded by kiddush. Therefore, there is no kashe from eating an apple - since by definition that is not a seudas Shabbos, there is not halacha (acc. to Ra'avad) which would prohibit eating it without kiddush.

Emunah, skepticism, and the j-blogosphere

Why did I devote a post to Torah min haShamayim? Do I really think I am going to win over the skeptics of the world?
In a nutshell, No. And I will limit my postings on these type topics, bli neder.
However, I must admit that there is a trend out there which concerns me. A recent letter to a 5T newspaper had a wife writing (I quote), "Probably just as disturbing, and in some ways more so, is that he reads blogs that relate to Judaism. People post blogs about the credibility of everything that has always been the foundation of our lives, our upbringing, and our Torah." Personally, I have my doubts about the letter's authenticity, but I think the attitude is real. Pseudo-intellectual debate is entertaining! Suddenly it is "smart" to be "orthodox", but what passes for "orthodoxy" in a far cry from the basic truths picked up in elementary school. Instead, many people pick up a more "sophisticated" view on the historicity of Tanach, on the ikkarei emunah, on the truths of many of the minhagim. Having never opened a Moreh Nevuchim to check what the Rambam really says, or learned sifrei machshava, or thought about what the ikkarei emunah really mean, a guy suddenly finds himself with all sorts of questions and doubts that a 20 minute Shabbos morning derasha is not going to solve.
I don't necessarily have all the answers, and I don't want this blog to turn into an emunah question and answer forum, but I think someone better grab the bull by the horns before a lot of damage is done.

Here's my 2 minute answer to emunah questions: learn gemara. Put your skeptical baggage to the side, and sit on a blatt in Bava Kamma. Not the Artscroll blatt, but the REAL THING. Work through every kashe and teirutz, asking what did the gemara think in the hava amina, what did the maskana resolve. Ask on every Rashi why did Rashi offer the comment, what is he trying to explain, and if you have a different pshat, why did Rashi not learn that way. Same approach for every Tosfos. Try to get to the conceptual underpinnings of every machlokes rishonim. What bothered R' Akiva Eiger? What insight did the Ktzos have? Why does the Nesivos disagree? etc. etc. Repeat for 6 months daily for as much time as possible.
At the end of 6 months come back to all the skeptical baggage and see if you still have any doubts as to the Divinity of Torah. See what perspective you have on Torah SheBa'al Peh.
Isn't this just sweeping all problems under the psychological rug? Nope. It's called keeping perspective. I need some minor repairs done in my home that have not been taken care of for months - does that mean I should move out of the house? Or not enjoy living there? That would be stupid. The same with theological issues. To someone who is captivated with the beauty of limud haTorah and shmiras hamitzvos, so there is a kashe here and there, a repair that is needed. Maybe I will fix it, maybe it will linger because I don't know how to fix it. But I'm not moving out! To a guy who spent a week on a kashe of R' Akiva Eiger (and R' Akiva Eiger spent a lifetime on it!) and then discovers a yesod in R' Chaim that answers it up and clarifies the whole sugya, mattan Torah is not a historical event, it is a daily experience.
Historically even Volozhin produced its share of high-level apikorsim who could learn up a Ktzos while smoking a cigarette on Shabbos. IMHO this is not a danger for our times. I'm far more afraid of the guy who can't read a Ktzos, but feels free to offer comprehensive theories on theology and philosophy of yahadut.
(Lest anyone take unnecessary umbrage: this post is not meant as an "attack" on anyone or any particular hashkafa - don't take it as such. I'm just reflecting on what I perceive as general trends).

Chameitz sh'avar alav hapesach

Just as R' Shimon and R' Yehudah disagree whether there is an issur lav on chamietz after chatzos (but before nightfall) on Erev Pesach, they also disagree whether chameitz sh'avar alav hapesach, chameitz which was owned over Pesach, is assur because of an issur d'oraysa or derabbanan (a penalty, knas, for failing to fulfill bal yera'eh). We saw that the Rambam and Ra'avad disagree whether we pasken like R'SH or R"Y on Erev Pesach. However, almost all Rishonim hold that chameitz after Pesach is an issur derabbanan because of the knas of having violated bal yera'ah.
Returning to the Noda B'Yehudah's case, everyone agrees that the Torah does not force yerusha of issur to occur. If a father died r"l during Pesach, no yerusha of his chameitz would take place by his children. If he dies on Erev Pesach after chatzos without doing bittul chameitz, then either already violated bal yera'eh (Rambam's view) and the chameitz is assur, or (acc. to Ra'avad) his children yarshen the chameitz and they violate bal yera'eh at nightfall, and the chameitz is still assur.
Here is where the Noda b'Yehudah comes to the rescue with a chiddush. In many places in shas the gemara debates whether a knas extends to the children of the person who did an issur - e.g. the gemara in Moed Katan discusses whether "kansu b'no acharav" with respect to one who intentionally does work on chol hamoed. The N.B. suggests that perhaps the knas on chameitz applies only one who intentionally violated bal yera'eh, not that chameitz simply by virtue of "avar alav hapesach" becomes a cheftza shel issur. Therefore, if the owner of the chameitz dies, his chameitz cannot be subject to the knas.
The N.B. in the end rejects his own chiddush. It would be too much to summarize the whole pilpul, but one diyuk he makes shows how much can hang on a word of the Rambam. The Rambam writes "chameitz sh'avar alav haPesach assur L'OLAM". The N.B. is medayek from the extra word "l'olam" that even if the ba'al hachameitz dies, the knas of "chameitz sh'avar alav hapesach" still applies.

Torah: Divine Inspiration vs. Min haShamayim

Elsewhere in the Blogosphere, the debate is on whether there is any difference between saying the Torah is Divinely inspired vs. the concept of Torah min haShamayim. This started I think with a comment to Harry Maryles's blog worth quoting:
>>>As a former Conservative Jew (JTS undergraduate) and now MO Jew (somewhat centrist in orientation), here's the fundamental difference between what I view as the MO outlook and the Conservative outlook.The Torah is divine. End of story. ...The Conservative movement, by way of contrast, rejects the idea that any part of the Torah is divine (both oral and written). Both are the products of man, with varying degrees of "divine inspiration."There's a big difference between questioning the historicity of certain parts of the Torah and questioning the divine authorship.<<<
GH ( http://godolhador.blogspot.com/2006/03/difference-between-orthodox-and.html ) has devoted an entire analysis to why this distinction holds no water and Divine Inspiration and Torah min HaShamayim are one and the same idea. I don't know why I am moved to write about this one in particular, other than the fact that a comment of mine was highlighted in one of his postings. As an aside: I find there is a lot of healthy skepticism in the blogosphere, a lot of good questions asked, yet not a lot of rishonim or gemaras brought to address the issues. The issues get further clouded by fundementalist responses that engender more extreme skepticism, and so the vicious cycle of skepticism (hey, I think I just coined a new phrase) is perpetuated.
I think even the rational/skeptics, or whatever they are, will agree that (1) There have been many Divinely inspired prophets. In fact, Chazal tell us that the few works of Nach we have written are but a small sample of the many prophets who lived and spoke to klal yisrael. (2) There is only one unique work of Torah.
If Torah is just a Divinely inspired work which could have been composed at any point in time by anyone, how can (2) and (1) simulatenously be correct? Why is every Divinely inpired work not THE Torah? If Ezra could indeed have written the Torah, why is Sefer Ezra itself on a lower level of kedusha than Sefer VaYikra? Was this an arbitrary decision by G-d? If so, then we just lost any attempt to rationally understand things, which is what I thought the skeptics' goal was. Was this a result of people's whim of choice and in reality the truth of the 5 Books are not superior to those of any other sefer? Are some people just endowed with more inspiration than others (which leads us in circles: the Torah is Torah because it was composed by the most supremely inspired prophet, who we know was supremely inspired because after all, he wrote the Torah)?
There is a big difference between Divine inspiration and Torah. The Rambam in Moreh (II:39) explains that the nevuah of Moshe was unique. All other prophets transmitted the philosphical message of G-d's truth; only Moshe transmitted Mitzvos. Torah as a book of halacha is categorically different from all other prophecy; Moshe as the bearer of that unique truth was categorically different from all other prophets (II:33)
This distinction has halachic consequence. One who violated the words of a Navi is over a lav. The Minchas Chinuch asks, why does this lav not apply when one violates any mitzva of the Torah, which is the nevuah of Moshe? R' Soloveitchik explained that Torah is categorically distinct from prophecy. No other Navi created or could create Torah except for Moshe.
The Conservative movement sees no difference between the Divine inspiration of Moshe, Yirmiyahu, perhaps even Chazal, etc. Their human hand was guided to compose great works of inpiration that contained the truth of Judaim.
Orthodox Judaism goes beyond that. Torah is unique; sui generis. Whether Moshe composed every word of Torah or parts were added later is irrelevant. The significance of the event of ma'amad Har Sinai is that a new CATEGORY of revelation was introduced to the world which transcended normal prophecy or Divine inspiration. Therefore, matan Torah could only occur through Moshe Rabeinu, the only Navi who attained this level (see Moreh Nevuchim II: 33 and 39. If you want a more technical analysis, see Ch. haGRI"Z on Baba Basra re: the pesukim that Moshe wrote b'dema.)
Is belief in ma'amad Har Sinai just a "historical fact" and of no theological consequence? As a historical fact, can it cavalierly be dismissed without harming the halachic or ideological framework of Judaism?
One of the Taryag mitzvos according to the Ramban's count is to remember for eternity the historical event of "ma'amad Har Sinai" and transmit the experience to future generations. I don't see how anyone can denying one of the 613 mitzvos without pretty deep theological ramifications. Please don't argue that the Rambam did not count it - that is a technicality of how to count mitvos, not because the Rambam denied the significance of the event (see those chapters in Moreh!). It is requires more than a strong question or doubt in order to reject a shitas Rishonim.
What would a theology of Judaism without the historical event of matan Torah be like? Just to raise a theoretical question: is it rational to think one can celebrate Pesach by eating matzah, a korban, haseibah, haggadah, etc. but deny that there was a historical event called "Yetziyas Mitzrayim" which is referenced by so many mitzvos in the Torah? Is is all just an elaborate hoax that became part of our cultural consciousness?
I can maybe celebrate Shavuos without cheesecake; asking me to celebrate it without mattan Torah is not possible.

The best jewish wedding magazine

...Is of course the one edited by my wife, which she has now uploaded in .pdf format to her website, which also has many other nice tidbits. So if you have not seen a print copy, you can still read it online at www.kallahmagazine.com (and of course enjoy the article by me).

chameitz on erev pesach - issur lav? (II)

The Noda B'Yehudah has a famous tshuvah discussion a father who passed away on Erev Pesach, leaving chameitz b'yerusha to his children. In the middle of the tshuvah he addresses this Rambam (see previous post). Unlike most achronim (see Magid Mishne) who rejected the idea that the Rambam really held that there was an issur of bal yera'eh on erev pesach, the N.B. writes this this indeed is the Rambam's opinion. He bases this chiddush on the assumption that once we have a gezeirah shava of "se'or-se'or" from bal yera'eh to bal yimatzeih (see Pesachim 5), we also employ the same limud to connect "se'or" in the pasuk "tashbisu se'or m'bateichem" to these lavim. All three mitzvos - tashbisu, bal yera'eh, bal yimatzeih - always go hand in hand! Not only does this explain why there is bal yera'ah on Erev Pesach, but it answers another fundemental question: the mitzva of tashbisu is stated only by Erev Pesach - how do we know it applies during the duration of the chag? Answers the N.B., if bal yera'eh applies for all seven days, then tashbisu automatically goes hand in hand with it.
Based on this, the machlokes Rambam and Ra'avad works l'shitasam. The Ra'avad paskens like R' Shimon (daf 28) that there is no issur lav on chameitz until nightfall of Erev Pesach; the Rambam, however, paskens like R' Yeshudah that there is a lav from after chatzos. The Rambam l'shitaso holds that the gezeirah shavah of "se'or" extends bal yera'eh down to chatzos as well. The Ra'avad l'shitaso holds that once we establish that the lav of "lo tochal" applies only at nightfall, the hekesh between the lavim limits bal yera'eh to nightfall and overrides the gezeirah shavah . [I am not clear why that should be so].
The Rambam opens each section of his halachos with a heading listing the mitzvos that apply in that section. In the opening to Hil Chameitz u'Matzah, the Rambam lists the lav of "bal yera'eh" as applying for the seven days of Pesach. The Rambam l'shitaso is difficult, as he seems to tacitly grant the Ra'avad's point and clinh the argument in favor of the Magid Mishne's reading of the Rambam which assumes that bal yera'eh does not apply before the seven days of Pesach start! The N.B. brilliantly writes that the Rambam in his heading is simply reflecting his "minyan hamitzvos", the count of the mitzvos that apply to that section. The Rambam in his Sefer haMitzvos teaches that anything learned through a derasha of torah sheb'al peh cannot fomally be counted as a mitzvah. Therefore, even though bal yera'eh does apply on Erev Pesach, since that is derived from a gezeirah shavah, it cannot be included as part of the minyan hamitzvos.
As to how this applies to the practical question of the yorshim - stay tuned...

Chameitz on Erev Pesach - issur lav?

The Rambam (1:8) writes that in addition to the mitzva of tashbisu, there is an additional lav of "lo tochal alav chamietz" (do not eat chameitz with the korban pesach) that applies after chatzos on 14 Nissan during the timeframe the k.p. was offered. The Ra'avad comments that it specifically says by bal yera'eh ubal yimatzei the words "shivas yamim" -- they only apply during the actual seven days of Pesach, not Erev Pesach. It is hard to understand this hasaga. The Rambam only suggested that the lav of "lo tochal" applies, not bal yera'eh! Apparently the Ra'avad assumed that if there is an issur lav on eating chameitz, there must also be bal yera'eh. Why should this be the case and does the Rambam agree?
Once again, no time for a full answer now - I hope I am accomplishing something by at least raising the issues (she'eilat chacham chatzi tshuvah). I get depressed over the time pressure of dealing with job, family, and trying to learn something, but that's life.

Chatzi shiur by chameitz

The Rambam writes (1:7) that even a "kol she'hu" of chameitz is prohibited because of the pasuk "lo ye'achel chamietz". The achronim all ask: achila in the Torah always means a k'zayis. There is a machlokes R' Yochanan and Reish Lakish (Yoma 85) whether less than the shiur of k'zayis (a "chatzi shiur") is assur min haTorah or only m'derabbanan, based either on a limud from a pasuk by cheilev or because of a sevara that each chatzi shiur is "chazi l'itztarufei", it can potentially combine with another chatzi to become a complete shiur. So here we have the Rambam (1) using the pasuk "lo ye'achel", with the term achila which means k'zayis, to prove the halacha of chatzi shiur; and (2) citing a makor for chatzi shiur that is unique to chameitz and distinct from the sugya in Yoma.
I unfortunately am pressed for time, so I will just be m'orer the difficulty for now. Maybe at some other point I can offer more.

gedolim cards

My son informs me that Gedolim Album II is out (Gedolim Strike Back?), which has gotten some comment in the blogosphere. My 2 cents on the matter is that this is pure shtick , a waste, and sends the wrong message. I won't even discuss the choice of who is on the cards, but will just take as a given that these are really the "gedolim" we want kids to emulate. Even so, I don't see the value. The reason why these cards are put out is simple. Everyone knows boys like baseball cards. So why not redirect the collecting habit toward "gedolim" instead of the Yankees? The message is that our heroes are not Mariano Rivera or Derek Jeter, but R' Elyashiv and R' Shteinman. So where is the downside?
The reason a kid wants a Mariano Rivera or Derek Jeter card is because unless he has been living in a cave the past 5 years, he knows Mariano is the best closer is baseball and Jeter comes through with the 110% effort in the clutch. And if you need reminding, the back of the card gives you the stats year by year, and sometimes you get a bit of trivia too. What does my son know of R' Elyashiv or R' Shteineman other than that they have black hats and long beards? Can he say over any Torah from them? A chiddush that really impressed him? Absolutely not. He has a completely superficial non-appreciation of what a gadol is - a man in a long white beard and black hat.
I am not anti-gadol veneration. I revere R' Chaim Brisker even though I have seen maybe 1 or 2 pictures of him in my life and have none hanging on my wall. That veneration comes from being exposed to R' Chaim's thinking and developing an appreciation for it. When I am learning a sugya b'iyun, my thought process (hopefully!) seeks out an approach that I feel emulates R' Chaim on some level. It's not the same as just looking at the card of Mariano Rivera - it's like holding the ball like Mariano, trying to imitate the windup of Mariano, trying to learn a cutter to be like Mariano, etc. My BIL once wrote a humorous essay on the different darchei halimud of Brisk, Telz, etc. It's like knowing who is a power pitcher vs. a knuckleballer, etc. Each player is valuable because you appreciate the nuance each one brings to the game. It is true that I have a job and am not sitting in Bais Medrash all day, but my antenna have not picked up "torah" from R' Shteineman the way "torah" of the Brisker Rav has permeated every Bais Medrash. My son has cards, but he can't tell me a chiddush of any of these gedolim. He does not appreciate the thought process of any of them. All he sees is hats, beards, and frocks, and they all look the same. What is being reinforced? Conformity and superficiality.
On a different critical note, (perhaps my wife http://kallahmagazine.com/WordPress/ will do her own posting on this), what inspiration can my 3 daughters draw from gedolim cards? Are there any role models for women to look at and aspire to emulate???

Tovas hana'ah mamon and tashbisu (II)

It seems to me that you can resolve the Sha'agas Arye's "kusha atzuma" based on the Shita Mekubetzet in B.M., which writes that when the gemara says that "tovas hana'ah aino mamon l'knos b'chalipin" it means that "even if you hold tovas hana'ah is mamon, it is not 'mamon chashuv' to be bought/sold via chalipin, and therefore the sugya follows either opnion of 'tovas hana'ah mamon' or 'aino mamon'" (rough translation). IOW, the gemara in B.M. is concerned with the general debate of tovas hana'ah mamon or not (which is what R' Eliezer and R' Yosi in Pesachim are arguing about), but is a seperate discussion about the scope of kinyanim - can a kinyan agav or a kinyan chalipin (which are lower levels of kinyanim) work on this "inferior" type of possession called "tovas hana'ah"? The Shita Mekebetzet writes that this is meduyak in the gemara - the gemara doesn't say "aino ma'amon v' aino niknais" but rather "aino mamom liknos" , meaning only with respect to kinyan is tovas hana'ah aino mamon.
The only missing step is if kinyanim don't work on tovas hanaah, how did R' Gamliel transfer his ma'aser? The Ktzos (who also discusses the Shita Mekubetzet and the entire sugya) addresses this issue in a long discussion (275:1), the punchline of which is that if the kinyan to the other party fails, the tovas hana'ah becomes hefker, and kinyan agav will work on hefker.

Tovas hana'ah mamon and tashbisu (I)

The Sha'agas Arye (#77), in the middle of the discussion of tashbisu mentioned last post, asks what he calls a "kusya atzuma", a great question. The Mishna in Pesachim (46) records a machlokes R' Eliezer and R' Yosi regarding what to do with dough which became tamei on Y"T before hafrashas challah - baking challah is not tzorech ochel nefesh because it cannot be eaten, but just leaving the dough will cause it to turn into chameitz. R' Eliezer says to bake all the dough into matzah before desiginating the loaf for challah until after the baking - since each loaf is potentially usable, that is permissable cooking. R' Yosi argues and says even if it turns into chameitz, one does not violate bal yera'ah for challah. The essential point of the machlokes if whether "tovas hana'ah mamon" - does the right to give the challah to one's desginated kohein count as a right of ownership? R' Eliezer holds tovas hana'ah mamon and therefore one would in theory violate bal yera'ah on challah; R' Yosi hold "tovas han'ah aina mamom" and one has no responsibility for that chameitz (this is a greatly simplified reading of the gemara, ayen sham).
The Sha'agas Arye quotes the gemara in B.M. (10) which indicates that R' Gamliel distributed his ma'aser ani and terumos via a kinyan agav, and that Mishna tells us that R' Yosi acted in the same way. The gemara rejects the hava amina that "tovas hana'ah aino mamon l'kinos b'chalipin" or with a kinyan agav - meaning, R' Gamliel and R' Yosi both hold "tovas hana'ah mamon" and therefore kinyanim can be made on the distribution of terumos and ma'asros. Here R' Yosi holds "tovas hana'ah mamon"; in Pesachim he holds "aino mamon"!?
Stay tuned...

The mitzva of tashbisu

The gemara (daf 4) tells us that although bittul chameitz is sufficient min hatorah, Chazal required that one eliminate chameitz before Pesach. How does bittul fulfill the Biblical mitzva of "tashbisu se'pr m'bateicheim"? Rashi writes that since the Torah uses the term "tashbisu" instead of directly telling us to burn chameitz (tiva'aru), it implies that bittul is sufficient. Tosfos disagrees and explains that bittul works through the mechanism of hefker. The Ran elaborates: theoretically all chameitz is by definition assur b'hana'ah and ownerless, but the Torah still considers it on your possession, just like a pit (bot b'reshus harabim) in a public domain is not in your possession but you are liable for damages that occur because of it. To avoid having chameitz thrust back into one's possession because of bal yera'eh, a simple declaration suffices.
According to Rashi, tashbisu entails the active removal of chameitz from one's possession, either through bittul or destruction. According to Tosfos, all bittul does is prevent chameitz from becoming one's responsibility. It is not an active removal or destruction, but a passive avoidance of ownership reasserting itself.
The Rambam paskens that if one purchases chameitz during Pesach one would receive malkos. Any lav which is connected with a mitzvas aseh which serves as a correction to the lav is exempt from malkos - "lav hanitak l'aseh". Why should there be malkos for buying chameitz when it is subject to the corrective aseh of "tashbisu"? R' Chaim (al haRambam) answers that the aseh of tashbisu is an "issur aseh" - it does not entail actively destrying chameitz, but functions itself as a prohibitition of bringing chameitz into one's possession. This chiddush of R' Chaim may depend on the machlokes between Rashi and Tosfos with regard to the nature of tashbisu (see Minchas Chinuch).
The Sha'agas Arye discusses a possible nafka mina between the two approaches in the case of one who accepts someone else's chameitz for safekeeping, including achrayus so that if lost/stolen one would have to repay the owner. The gemara is mechadesh that even though the potential liability in case of loss is merely a "goreim l'mamom", and the one watching does not actually own the chameitz, he would violate bal yera'eh for keeping that chameitz over Pesach. According to Rashi that bittul is the same as a destructive act on the chameitz, bittul would remove the issur in this case. However, according to Tosfos, how can one do bittul on such chameitz? If bittul is merely a form of hefker, how can one be mafkir what one already does not own? It is the liability for loss, not ownership, which causes bal yera'eh in this case!

Chareidi logic - take 3

Consider the following statements:
1. Orthodox Jews affirm the centrality of Torah study to their lives.
Not too many people would disagree with that one, for obvious reasons.
2. Orthodox Jews affirm the centrality of the value of life .
Again, not much disagreement.
But, we have now run into trouble. If it comes to saving a life or studying Torah, the halacha is clear: saving a life wins. Pikuach nefesh is doche everything. So how can we affirm the centrality of Torah study AND also affirm the value of human life?
I hope it is clear that this is a klutz kashe. We can affirm the centrality of both because they are simultaneously of greatest importance viz. a viz. all the many other competing values and interests that are peripheral to our lives. There can always be extreme cases where the values we hold most dear come into conflict, forcing a painful choice, but that does not negate their relative supreme importance over all else.
So when someone tries to argue that the two statements:
1. Orthodox Jews affirm the centrality of the State of Israel to their values.
2. Orthodox Jews affirm the centrality of Torah study to their lives.
are mutually exclusive because when a conflict between State and Torah arises, one must choose Torah over State, I don't buy it at all. How is it different than the example I have offered above?

Shmura matzah - eight days or one

The Torah commands "Ushamrtem es hamatzos", to guard matzah. Exactly what the parameters of this halacha are is not clear. The gemara in Pesachim quotes Rava as saying matzah needs shmira from the time of cutting the wheat for harvest (ketzira), while the opposing view holds that shmira from the time of kneading the dough (lisha) is sufficient. The simple pshat in the gemara, which is how the Rambam and RIF pasken, is that shmira is needed for the wheat to not turn into chameitz. However, Rashi writes that the shmira we are speaking of is shmira for the purpose of the mitzva of matzah, i.e. "lishma". What compelled Rashi to learn that way is another braysa that tells us that matzah baked by an aku"m is perfectly acceptable for eating during Pesach with the exception of the miztva of achilas matzah. The Rambam, lshitaso, does not cite this braysa l'halacha. The Rosh stakes out an interesting middle ground and argues for shmira from the time of grinding the wheat when it potentially could come in contact with water (the Rishonim were speaking of water wheel mills), which is not an option the gemara mentioned.
The upshot of all this is a chumra and kula for each approach. The chumra of Rashi is that you need shmira "lishma", which precludes a katan or aku"m from baking matzah, but the kula is you only need this for matzas mitzva. The Rambam's chumra is that you need shmira m'sha'as ketzira for all your matzah, but the kula is that a katan or aku"m can bake matzah.
For those who have the hakpadah for the Rambam's opinion of using only shmura matzah for all of Pesach, it seems to me (and I'm not anyone's posek) that aside from leil haseder, you would be fine using only machine matzah. According to Rashi you don't need shmura except leil haseder, and according to the Rambam you don't need lishma, so you have nothing to lose even if you hold a machine cannot bake "lishma". For the leil haseder, you would have to determine the status of machinary viz. "lishma" in order to be yotzei the shita of Rashi.

Baking matzah erev pesach

The Rishonim highlight the connection between korban pesach and matzah and suggest (as an asmachta b'alma - not a real limud) that matzah should ideally be baked on erev pesach when the korban pesach was offered. Other Rishonim reject this idea. While baking bo bayom offers the hiddur of fresher (and tastier) matzah, baking earlier has a halachic advantage in that before the time of issur chameitz set in, chameitz can be bateil. Therefore, waiting until the last minute carries with it the danger of not having bittul to fall back on in case of error.
I have yet to understand why some people try to bake their own matzah. The mitzva is eating not baking. The people who bake all day can probably do a better and faster job than I could.

Chareidi logical fallicies - take 2

Another logical trap is "begging the question" - when you assume your own premis as part of an argument. Suppose my son complains he does not want to eat vegetables. Were he to argue that "children should not be forcefed food that is tasteless", he would merely be begging the question: he has assumed his concluding premis - supposedly tasteless food need not be eaten by children- as part of his argument. It is verbiage without content.
In response to the comment that explained that Avi Shafran is after all a chareidi, and therefore he sees Torah and State as mutually exclusive values, I agree wholeheartedly, but that is not an argument - that is begging the question. An argument (or opinion essay) should explain to others why they should share your POV, not repeat your premis.
I made no attempt to defend the argument that the centrality of the state and torah are not mutually exclusive because as long as that possibility exists - and even the comment admitted it does, just labelled "religious zionism" - then Shafran's claim of either/or is a false dilemma.
Anyway, enough with the mini-logic course. Here is the real question that needs to be addressed by Shafran or anyone else in chareidi-land. Without labels that beg the question - e.g. "I believe X because I am chareidi and that's what we do", or "I don't believe Y because that is religious zionism and I don't do that", WHY is the belief in the centrality of the State and the centrality of Torah mutually exclusive values?

The charedi false dilemma and WZO elections

My wife used to incorporate a lesson on logical fallacies in one of her writing courses because errors in logic are so easy to fall into and sometimes hard to spot. One of the classics is the fallacy of "false dilemma" (sometimes knows as either/or fallacy). The idea is that a complex issue is misrepresented as a choice between only two options, one obviously positive and one negative. An example: "Vote for teacher's raises or oppose education", implying the only possible result of a oppossing raises is acceptance of poor education - the dilemma is a false either/or because one can very well oppose raises and at the same time champion good education. The point is the logical issue, not the politcs, and I am sure you get the idea. I bring all this up because of Avi Shafran's latest gem on the WZO elections. I quote:
>>>In order to vote in the elections, one must affirm a set of ideas known as "The Jerusalem Program." It is the credo of the contemporary Zionist movement, and stresses the "centrality" of the "State of Israel" in "the life of the [Jewish] nation." There are no greater "zionists" than haredim, who pray daily and fervently for the Jewish return to Zion; who are so disproportionately overrepresented in the rolls of both those who make aliyah and those who visit Israel regularly; and who are so strongly supportive of ensuring Israel’s security. Yet, for haredim, Israel the state is one thing; Eretz Yisrael, the holy land promised by G-d to His people, another. And to a haredi, the "centrality" of the Jewish people can be only one thing: our Torah.<<<
Its either the centrality of the State or the centrality of the Torah, and we must obviously choose the latter. A classic false dilemma if I ever saw one, yet guaranteed to take in a good many readers of the propaganda machine. Did Avi Shafran consider that it just be possible to affirm the centrality of the State in our lives and at the same time affirm the centrality of Torah? Might it not be the case that Torah can only be actualized in Eretz Yisrael with "kol yoshveha aleha", or that the Torah is itself a blueprint for Jewish nationhood, so that affirming the centrality of Torah is impossible without at the same time affirming the centrality of a State?
As I wrote before, I could never run dry of topics if I all did was respond to the absurd arguments that come from the self-proclaimed defenders of chareidihood, but it is shooting fish in a barrell and only fun when I am annoyed.
(BTW: notice how Shafran puts "zionists" in quotation marks when referring to charedim. That could lead to another whole rant, but I'll save it.)

Yeshiva d'Kilayim

I know nothing factual re: the rumor that has appeared on other blogs ("chavrach chavrah is lei" has new meaning in the internet age) of the merger of two local yeshiva high schools, but my impression of such a mix can be summed up in one word: Kilayim.

(I apologize to those of you who thought this was going to be a post on the yerushalmi yomi).