yerushalmi on obligation of women to eat matzah

The Yerushalmi (pesachim 58 in vilna ed) cites the hekesh of matzah to chameitz to explain why women are obligated in the mitzvah of matzah. The simple pshat in the hekesh that I remember from the Bavli is that the limud is needed to overcome the exemption of zman gerama. The Yerushalmi, however, cites the mishna that exempts women from mitzvos which are zman gerama as a contradiction to the hekesh – very strange, because the whole point is that the hekesh is the exception that proves the rule. The Yerushalmi answers that matzah is different because it is an aseh “she’hi ba’ah m’koach lo ta’aseh”, which stems from a lav. What does that mean?

Kiddushin 34 gives three examples of mitzvos which are not zman gerama which women are therefore obligated in: hashavas aveidah, ma’akeh, and shiluach hakan. Tosfos points out that in each of these three cases there is a potential lav that is violated along with the aseh: there is an issur of lo tasim damim for not building a ma’akeh, an issur of lo tuchal l’hitalem for not returning a lost object, an issur of lo tikach ha’aim by shiluach hakan. Whether or not women are obligated in the mitzvos aseh would seem irrelevant, as women would be obligated to avoid the lavim. Ramban answers that in certain cases the lav is not an independent violation, but is just an extension of the aseh associated with it, an added stringency to enhance the aseh. Had women not been obligated in the aseh, the lav would not apply either.

Perhaps the Yerushalmi is the reverse sevara of the Ramban. Matzah is not an independent mitzvas aseh, but is an extension of the lav of chameitz. In other words, the Torah demands not only that we avoid eating chameitz, but that we go to the opposite extreme an enhance the lav by eating a food which is anti-chamietz. (I heard this sevara in a different context from R’ Friedman from Mesivta Rambam, but I am borrowing it for here).

secular court coercing compliance with religious law - cases of gittin

There is an interesting discussion on volokh.com regarding a Canadian case where a Muslim man’s withholding a religious divorce from his wife was considered aggravating circumstances in evaluating a later crime. Is enhancing punishment for failure to comply with religious doctrine tantamount to secular compulsion to observe religion? Eugene Volokh seems to think so. I don’t buy the argument. Evaluating aggravating circumstance seems to not be a question of compliance with some fixed secular standard, but is more of a subjective assessment or attitude - why not consider whether a person used the rules of a religious system to bring harm to another in making that determination? Anyway, Volokh draws a comparison to the NY Get Laws, which he thinks also amount to coercion by the State – I don’t know enough to opine whether the Get Laws violate church-state separation (see here), but coercion by secular court does pose halachic problems (see here).

Someone commenting on the issue tried to distinguish a get from a religious ritual. I am reminded of one of the stupider points (and there were many) made by “Rabbi” Irwin Kula in his book “Yearnings”. Kula claims that some people remain trapped in bad marriages because they see marriage as a sacred bond that is holy. He counsels that Judaism, unlike other religions, holds that divorce can be a sacred experience as well, because it is effectuated by a “holy document”, meaning a get. A get or kesubah is no more holy than a contract to buy a house or car. In fact, I have always wondered, artwork aside, why people hang kesubos on their walls - I have never seen a deed to a home hung on the wall, or a bill of sale for a car. If laypeople knew what they were really getting into by signing a kesubah, they would realize it would be better to have a lawyer by their side rather than a rabbi who is thinking of “holy” documents.

On the same topic, see this article from a few months ago on a bill that was narrowly defeated in Maryland which would have forced husbands to grant a get (similar to NY Get Law). Supporters framed the bill as a women’s rights issue, designed to insure that a woman is fairly granted the right to remarry, while opponents objected on church-state grounds.

would the eidah chareidis accept truth from a maskil?

Interesting tshuva in Even Israel (vol 8 #9) from R’ Yisrael Fisher, who was one of the dayanim of the Eidah haChareidis. He was asked his opinion of a certain kuntres which advocated saying mashiv haruach u’morid ha’geshem (segol under the gimel) instead of morid hagashem (kamatz under the gimel) because the use of gashem had been proposed by a certain Yitzchak Satnow (see the reference in this article from seforim’s blog in footnote #37) who was known as a maskil. R’ Fisher writes that he had actually been approached by the author of the kuntres, but refused to give a haskama (!). Aside from marshalling sources other than Satnow to support the use of gashem over geshem, R’ Fisher notes that just because an idea was advanced by a maskil is no reason to reject it outright without evidence that it is wrong.

definition of "whole loaf" for lechem mishne

To properly fulfill the requirement of lechem mishne on Shabbos requires two whole loaves, but a glance at your typical challah roll smushed into the bag among others will inevitably reveal flaking crust, bits of dough hanging over from where it was broken away from its neighbor, etc. How whole does whole have to be? As far as I know you won’t find a standard in hilchos lechem mishne, but you do find a standard in hilchos eiruvin. The gemara (eiruvin 81) says that an eiruv can be made with a whole loaf but not a partial loaf, even if the piece is greater than the whole. The reason for the din is eivah, to avoid an argument between parties over why one person only gave only a piece and the other gave a whole loaf. The gemara says that the shiur challah (for a baker: 1/48) can be removed from a loaf and it is still considered whole. Tosfos assumes that this is only true id the shiur challah actually needs to be removed for the purpose of mitzvas challah, otherwise, the parties may still fight over who gave a whole vs. who gave a part, but the Rosh argues and assumes that the reason why a small part is missing is irrelevant. Once people are willing to make a concession and allow a small part to be missing for the sake of challah, whether that small part was actually taken for challah or just happens to be missing is not important. The Korban Nesanel interestingly writes that this is true only with respect to eiruv where the criteria for wholeness is dependent on people’s tolerance (the purpose of the din was to avoid argument), but not with respect to lechem mishne. However, the Shmiras Shabbos k’Hilchisa in a footnote writes that R’ Shlomo Zalman disagreed and assumed that the same standard applies in both cases.

should teachers emphasize process or facts?

Let’s say you wanted to teach a student about the history of music – clearly, a large # of dates, places, and names must be absorbed to have any knowledge of the subject matter. On the other hand, if you wanted to teach a student to play music, having his/her memorize facts about the instrument is not going to do anything – the way to go about it is to practice playing. Obviously, studying history also involves the process of placing ideas into a conceptual framework, and playing music needs knowledge of facts like how to read notes, but I think it is fair to say there is a difference in emphasis, in defining the means vs. ends in achieving these different goals. When elementary school age kids are taught gemara, is the goal to impart facts, or to impart the process of gemara thinking and study? When students are given tests, homework, etc., does the work ask them to simply spit back vocabulary words or facts from the page, or does it call upon the use of process-skills? When a teacher speaks with parents, is the emphasis on how many pages of material are covered, or what new skills he/she has practiced with students? What do you look for in your kids' school?

skeptics want to avoid bechira

The more I read in bloggerland the more I am convinced that skeptics are most uncomfortable not with mitzvos per se but with the basic concept of bechira chofshis. The whole search for unassailable proof is a desire to escape the most basic choice any religious person makes – the choice to believe.

undermining your own message

Just saw on the top of another website/blog an ad which reads “When people think Louis Armstrong was the first man to walk on the moon, there’s not enough art in our schools.” I wonder if the foundation which paid for this ad and advocates increased funding for the arts considered that if kids really think Louis Armstrong was the first man on the moon, we should perhaps be spending more on science education? Talk about undermining your own message…

schoolyard halacha

My son had a practical halachic question that stems undoubtably from his learning (by himself) mishnayos baba kamma. His class was playing kickball at recess and as he kicked the ball, it popped. As he put it, the ball was "meisa machmas melacha" (after all, he argued, the ball was quite dead). Is he chayav to pay the school for a new ball? I was about to tell him a katan is always patur, but that doesn't fly because he is over bar mitzvah now!

My son reasoned that he was a shoel, as the class had borrowed the ball for use at recess, and a shoel is chayav even in a case of ones. Sounds reasonable, but not so easy on his pocketbook. I helped him out a bit and suggested some other possibilities: 1) since he (or we) pay tuition for use of the school's property and materials, he might actually be a socheir, not a shoel; 2) since his rebbe was supposesdly supervising the class, the case may be one of ba'alav imo; 3) there is an implicitly mechila on the part of the school for these things otherwise they would be billing students for every broken piece of chalk, spilled milk at lunch, and other little calamities that are overlooked as par for the course of a school day (this is admittedly the weakest argument).

I told him to ask his principal, as I think the discussion he could have about applying dinei nezikin would be a real learning experience (not too many of those, unfortunately, in the school day). Anyone have any other sevaros on this one?

listening to l'shon hara and nivul peh

I recently did a series of posts on shome'a k'oneh, and just came another reference. The gemara says that one who listens to nivul peh and is silent (i.e. does not protest) is as culpable as the one speaking. Maharal (Nesiv haTzniyus, end ch 4) explains through shome'a k'oneh it is as if the listener were the speaker. I assume the same could be said about listening to l'shon hara as well - it is not an independent issur, but an extension of the issur of speaking through shome'a k'oneh. (Parentheticaly, the Maharal makes an interesting distinction between nivul peh, which is inherently wrong, and l'shon hara, which is wrong because it is a subcategory of mazik, it brings harm to another person.)

bikurim - zman gerama? (part 2)

The second point raised by the Turei Even, that bikurim are zman gerama because they are only brought between Shavuos and Chanukah, is easier to answer. Zman gerama is a limitation on when a chiyuv applies. By bikurim, the chiyuv applies 24x7. However, to fulfill that obligation requires a certain type of good fruit, i.e. a proper cheftza shel mitzvah. The time span of Shavuos to Chanukah is when such fruit is available, a demarcation of the cheftza shel mitzvah, not a limitation on the chovas hagavra.

The Sefer haChinuch interestingly writes that women are exempt from the mitzvah of bikurim. One could argue that the Chinuch’s position is motivated by either of the two questions of the Turei Evev. However, this position is still difficult to understand. Recall that the Mishna only said women are exempt from reading the parsha of viduy bikurim, implying, that they are obligated in the mitzvah of bringing bikurim. Even if one argues that this obligation is only Rabbinic, it begs the question of why the Rabbis would obligate women in this mitzvas aseh she’hazman gerama and no other (Minchas Chinuch).

bikurim - zman gerama? (part 1)

The Mishna lists women among those who are m’vi’im v’ainam korin, obligated to bring bikurim, but exempt from reading the parsha of viduy bikurim because they cannot refer to “adama asher na’sata li”, the land which they received, as the land of Eretz Yisrael was apportioned to men and not women. The Turei Even asks why women should be obligated to bring bikurim – isn’t it a mitzvas aseh she’hazman gerama, a time bound mitzvah? Bikurim require tenufah, being waved like a korban, and the act of tenufah could only be done during the day and not at night, and bikurim could only be brought from Shavuos up until Chanukah, but not throughout the year.

The Turei Even answers the first point by suggesting that a mitzvah which is done daily, even if it cannot be done at certain times of the day, is not called zman gerama. For example, milah is not a zman gerama mitzvah because even though it cannot be done at night, the obligation is in effect every day to insure a milah is done. This chiddush is open to challenge. I would suggest an alternate approach. The Mishna (Kiddushin 36a) lists tenufah among a long list of preparatory acts to bringing a korban which women are exempt from performing, all of which are derived from pesukim. The Rishonim ask why specific limudim are required to exclude women – every act of bringing a korban should be zman gerama because korbanos can only be brought during the day. The Ritv”a answers by distinguishing between a mitzvah and a machshir – zman gerama exempts women from having to perform a mitzvos, meaning unavoidable obligations, but acts which are just preparatory toward some goal, machshirim, are not covered by that blanket dispensation. Tenufah is therefore not necessarily included in the exemption of zman gerama, and where bikurim themselves are not subject to a time constraint, perhaps women should not be excluded on the basis of zman gerama.

As for the second point, stay tuned…

minhagim of lighting yom tov candles - avoiding a tartei d'sasrei

There are two different customs women follow when lighting Yom Tov candles. Many first say the bracha and then light, as opposed to on Shabbos where they first light and then say the bracha. The logic behind the switch is as follows: the bracha on lighting constitutes a kabbalah of shabbos/yom tov – on shabbos, saying the bracha first would mean shabbos has started and the act of lighting would be prohibited, so we light first and then say the bracha; on yom tov, lighting a candle is permitted, so there is no problem in saying the bracha first (in fact, there is the added benefit of it now being over l’asiyasan) and then lighting. Others do not reverse the order because lo plug – the custom established saying the bracha after lighting as a universal rule, and we avoid creating any differentiation between Shabbos and Yom Tov.

There is an additional difference in customs as to when to light the Yom Tov candles. Some women light a number of minutes before shkiya, as is done on Shabbos. Others follow the custom of lighting after dark before the meal – since lighting a candle on Yom Tov is permitted, there is no reason to push the lighting back to before sundown like we do on Shabbos.

The Shmiras Shabbos k’Hilchisa points out that one should not err and adopt mutually incompatible customs. The whole reason for saying the bracha after the lighting is to not differentiate Yom Tov from Shabbos. Yet, lighting after dark by definition is possible only on Yom Tov and not on Shabbos, a clear differentiation between the two. It would make no sense to light after dark but to only say the bracha after lighting.

tikun leil shavuos=ta'aroch lefanei shulchan

I noticed a local shule has printed on its flier with its schedule of shiurim for tikun leil shavuos a quote from the Belzer Rebbe, R’ Shalom, that the roshei teivos of ta’aroch lifanei shulchan is the same as tikun leil shavuos, meaning one can be achieve the same tikunim through eating as though one’s learning – of course, refreshments will be served all night. I am not a chassid, but I am willing to grant that perhaps the Rebbe R’ Sar Shalom could accomplish with his eating cheesecake the same tikkunim I accomplish with my learning. But that I can accomplish with my eating cheesecake the same as with my learning – that I can’t believe!

shlichus to deliver bikurim (II)

To return to the issue I left off with last week, Rashbam and Tosfos disagree whether the owner of bikurim can read the parsha of viduy bikurim if the fruit is brought by a shliach. Rashbam invokes the rule of shlucho shel adam k’moso to justify the owner saying “heyveisi es pri ha’adama’. Why does Tosfos disagree?

I think the key to understanding the issue is a yesod of the Dvar Avraham touched on once before. There is a minhag to deliver mishloach manos through a shliach, and usually people ask a child to be the delivery boy. The Dvar Avraham asks why this accomplishes anything, as a katan is excluded from shlichus? The D.A. explains that where shlichus requires that the shliach be representative of the sender, a katan is excluded, as we cannot invoke shlucho shel adam k’moso, but where all that is required is delivery, even a katan can serve as a means to that end.

In our case, perhaps Tosfos would argue that the shlichus of bikurim is simply a means to the end of delivery, and not a function of shlucho shel adam k’moso. Rashbam disagrees, because the idea of ‘heyveisi’ implies the actual presence of the owner.

Once we invoke shlucho shel adam, as Ezra noted in a comment, why does having to recite 'adamah asher nasata li' preclude the shliach reading the parsha himself - isn't he the equivalent of the owner? I would suggest that shlucho shel adam k’moso can be invoked when the shliach represents the owner in performing some act; however, the parsha of viduy bikurim requires not just a delivery act, but a status of landowner, and for that shlichus is insufficient. IIRC, one cannot apply the din of ‘ba’alav imo” if a shliach of the owner if present because ‘ba’alav imo’ is a status, a state of being, not an action.

shlichus to deliver bikurim

The gemara B"B (81) quotes R’ Yosi bar Chanina who derives from the juxtaposition of "v’lakachta...v’haveisa" that the lekicha and hava’ah of bikurim must be done by the same person – i.e. if the owner harvests the fruit but it is delivered by a shliach, or a shliach does the harvesting and the owner delivers it, the parsha of bikurim cannot be read. Tosfos and the Rashbam disagree as to whether lekicha refers to the harvesting of the fruit (Rashbam) or to taking the fruit from the house and setting out on the trip (Tos.)

The Minchas Chinuch assumes that if the shliach or owner did the lekicha and started on the trip, even if someone else took over in the middle, as long as the same person who started the journey completes it, the parsha of bikurim may be read. Completion of the trip is defined as arriving at the azarah.

Rashbam writes that even if a shliach delivers the bikurim, the owner personally must recite the parsha of viduy bikurim. The shliach cannot read on behalf of the owner because he cannot refer to “adamah asher nasata li”, the land given to him, as he is not the owner. The owner, however, can still say “hinei hayveisi es reishis…” even if the fruit is brought by a shliach because shlucho shel adam k’moso, and it is as if he did deliver the bikurim. Tosfos disagrees and says the owner cannot read the parsha unless he personally delivers the fruit as well, as he cannot say "hayveisi". According to Tosfos, R' Yosi's chiddush is that even if the owner delivers the fruit, he still cannot read the parsha unless he also had harvested it or taken it from his house.

Why would Tosfos not apply the principle of shlucho shel adam k’moso in this case? I have an idea, but I’ll just throw out the question for now.

good book on Israel's moral right

I just finished reading and would highly recommend “Right to Exist: A Moral Defense of Israel’s Wars” by Yaakov Lozowick, an archivist at Yad vaShem. Lozowick reviews the history of Israel from its inception until the present time, and presents the reasons for his own transformation from a supporter of the Oslo accords to his acceptance of the stark reality that the Palestinians are unwilling to accept the existence of a Jewish state in the Middle East under any terms. I usually don’t write about this issue it because the facts are obvious and depressing – the world at large (with a few exceptions, of course) has never had a need for the Jews or any sympathy for them, and not much has changed in 2000 years except now the Europeans allow Hamas or Hezbollah to do their dirty work for them instead of taking the direct approach. Ain lanu l’hishaein elah al Avinu shebaShamayim.

acharayus for bikurim - until what point?

Rambam (2:20) holds that someone who brings bikurim which then are lost/destroyed/became tamei is chayav in achrayus unless the bikurim arrive intact to har habayis. Why har habayis – the mitzvah of bikurim is to bring them into the azarah (see Radba”z)?! R’ Chaim explained (as quoted in R’ Reichman’s “Reshimos Shiurim” on Sukkah) that the din of achrayos is not a function of insuring the kiyum mitzvah of bikurim, but is a separate din that one must attend to the bikurim, which has an independent shiur until one reaches har habayis (he brings a makor in Toras Kohanim for such an idea).

ra'uy v'nidche by reading the parsha of bikurim

Nu, so should we get back to the real stuff? In a previous post I mentioned the halacha of not reading viduy bikurim if you are bringing fruit from a tree which has been chopped down; you cannot refer to “adamah asher nasatah li” if you don’t have the tree any longer. The R"Sh learns this Mishna as referring to a case where the tree was chopped down before you harvested the fruit. However, if the tree was standing when you plucked the fruit and then it was chopped down, not only can you not read the parsha, but you can’t bring the bikurim either. His rule: if the fruit was originally unfit to have the parsha read, the reading is not m’akeiv, but if it was fit to have the parsha read and became nidche, the reading is m’akeiv. The Rambam quotes the Mishna k’peshuto, indicating that in either case the fruit can be brought. Apparently, the Rambam does not hold of this chiddush of ra’uy v’nidche disqualifying the fruit.

The issue comes up in other places l’shitasam. If someone sold land the fruit grew on, the Mishna says that the seller cannot read the parsha of bikurim because he cannot refer to “adamah asher nasatah li”. R”Sh learns that the sale had to have taken place before the fruit was harvested from the tree, otherwise the fruit was ra’uy v’nidche and would be disqualified. The Rambam (Bikurim 4:5) again quotes the Mishna as-is, rejecting the qualification of the R”Sh.

more thoughts on YU vs. hesder

Some more thoughts on some of the issues raised in the past post on rav kook and comments. I cannot write much on the hesder/dat-leumi world because I live here in the US, but I think mixing it with the YU world is comparing apples and oranges. At the risk of oversimplification: the dati-leumi/hesder world springs from the ideology of Rav Kook, developed by his son and talmidim for three generations. There are many yeshivos which are part of the hesder network, many talmidim of Rav Kook who claim allegiance to some form of his ideology and who actively try to inculcate it in their talmidim. Dress does not define a person, but practically speaking, show me a kipah seruah wearing yeshiva bachur who can cite Orot, and I am willing to bet he is not learning in the Mir. As the number of yeshivot under the banner of this hashkafa has increased, their effect has spread to communities built around its ideological framework which in turn feed back to the yeshivot.

One would think I could just as quickly summarize the YU ideology considering that I attended the institution from HS through college, one of its grad schools, and got smicha there. But when I think of YU I think of ideological muddle. The philosophy has never spread to a yeshiva gavoha outside the original institution, with the exception perhaps of Chovivei Torah, which YU disassociates itself from. Rav Soloveitchik never formulated Torah U’Mada, arguably the defining philosophy of YU; that was left to Rav Lamm, someone who is certainly an intellectual and talmid chacham, but, without meaning any disrespect, not a gadol of the caliber of Rav Kook or even the Rav (a fact I think he would admit). The Roshei Yeshiva (at least while I was there) make no attempt to communicate any ideological framework – there is no positive spin to Torah u’Mada, never a discussion of the positives of liberal arts or Modern Orthodoxy, only derech shlili, a passive acceptance that certain allowances exist under the banner of MO. Very few, if any, of the Roshei Yeshiva will speak of the value of literature or liberal arts, issues like women taking a positive role in orthodoxy are increasingly downplayed (compare R’ Twersky or R’ Shachter’s approach to the issue with R’ Henkin’s), and there is little to distinguish the Yeshiva portion of YU from its chareidi counterparts. If there is an ideological mission to the institution, the “better” bachurim, aside from a small %, generally eschew fully identifying with it. As far as community impact, I have seen with my own eyes a 2/3 empty shule in my neighborhood when R’ Hershel Shachter and R’ Rozensweig came to speak, this in a community that is not usually identified with the far right. It is not that the message is disagreed with – it’s that modern orthodoxy embraces a passive nonchalance that undermines its own message. When they came to speak, R’ Rozensweig chose as his topic “Da’as Torah”. Why do I need YU for a da’as torah ideology – the RW offers the same thing in stronger doses without apologizing for it? Where is the YU equivalent of communities with kipa-seruga Orot quoting talmidim - i.e. talmidim with a distinctive derech of avodas Hashem that is the result of having been reared in YU's system? The community hosted R’ Alon a few years ago, and R’ Goldvicht earlier this year, and I heard unabashed enthusiasm for Eretz Yisrael beyond what the RW world offers. It was not RW-lite, but a completely different spin. One is not moved to embrace MO from any ideological fervor, but simply it offers a convenient set of heterim for things like college, and on a communal level, identifying onself as MO provides convenient cover for a host of halachic practices the movements leaders would condemn.

A commentator asked, if I send my son to a chareidi yeshiva, how will he learn of the Rav or Rav Kook? But I went to YU, and had it not been for my personal reading and growth since, I would have never been exposed to Rav Kook either, nor would I have any sense of the Rav’s distinctive ideology from what I heard from the Roshei Yeshiva. The ideology of Rav Kook animates the sichot and hashkafa writings of the Roshei Yeshiva of hesder; can anyone point to a single work of machshava from a YU Rosh Yeshiva that develops the hashkafa of the Rav? This is all by way of personal reflection, and there undoubtedly are communities where the YU world has made a greater impact in the ruchniyus and hashkafa (I never lived in Teaneck, but from what I understand it is such a community), and I hope I have not been too critical. However, it seems to me that while hesder has created passion and ideological fervor and communicated a distinctive ideological vision, YU has failed in the same task. At the same time, in the US, the RW world has grown and continues to grow, and sprout institutions which do communicate a fervor for learning, an clear ideology of Torah, and a committment to avodas Hashem, for which they deserve tremendous credit.

same or different?

Weren't convinced by yesterday's post? Maybe this will do it...tzama lecha nafshi





(Or course the classic clip is the Lubavitcher Rebbe's rendition, but I couldn't paste it in. You can hear it here.)