amazing chiddush of R' Yosef Engel regarding matanos la'evyonim

The gemara (Shabbos 10b) quotes Rav as teaching that if you give a gift to a friend, you have to tell him about it -- don't just leave an anonymous present in his mailbox. Maharal explains that by definition a gift is meant to express love, appreciation, etc., to create a bond between giver and recipient. Unless the two parties are aware of each other, that connection is lost. However, writes the Maharal, the mitzvah of tzedaka is simply to fulfill the needs of the poor. Therefore, it can be fulfilled even when the recipient and giver are unaware of each other.

My wife is learning Maharal so I told her to take a look. She immediately threw back at me the pasuk, “Matan b’seiser yichpeh af,” (Mishlei 21) but Tosfos beat her to the punch. Tosfos explains, the gemara is speaking specifically about a present sent to express affection, not just any gift. That’s exactly why a gift of charity can be given secretly.

Why do I bring up this Maharal a week before Purim? Because R’ Yosef Engel uses it as the basis for a tremendous chiddush. The mitzvah on Purim is called “matanos la’evyonim.” It’s a gift! Therefore, unless you know who you are giving to and unless the recipient knows whom he/she is receiving from, you are not yotzei the mitzvah.

Not all poskim are happy with this. Why not compare matanos l’evyonim to the mitzvah of tzedakah, which can be done anonymously? That question gets to the very crux of the debate: is the mitzvah of matanos la’evyonim just a subcategory of the mitzvah of tzedaka that happens to be connected to Purim, or is it a unique mitzvas ha’yom of Purim that operates with its own rules? The fact that we can point to nafka minos between matanos l’evyonim and tzedaka – even the poor are obligated in matanos la’evyonim, the shiur of matanos la’evyonim is different than the shiur for tzedaka, and others – lends weight to the latter position. On the other hand, the purpose of the mitzvah of matanos la'evyonim seems consistent with the purpose of mitzvas tzedaka, and I would venture to guess that most people would equate the two.

motzei shabbos megillah reading -- this week?

My son showed me a Mes. Sofrim (14:18) that quotes a minhag that on the first Motzei Shabbos of Adar people would lein megillah until "Balayla ha'hu..." and then on the second Motzei Shabbos they would lein from there until the end in addition to the normal reading done on Purim day. The mashgiach of my son's yeshiva explained that properly appreciating and observing Purim demands preparation. You don't just burst into Purim -- you need time to get ready for it. These additional megillah readings helped focus attention on the upcoming chag in advance.

haman min haTorah

Haman min haTorah minayin? Chazal point to the pasuk in Parshas Braishis, "Ha’min ha’eitz … achalta?” What does G-d's question to Adam about his having eaten the forbidden fruit have to do with Purim?

Ksav Sofer explains that tshuvah is usually the product of reflection and remorse. Yet, sometimes we need a little push to get there. One might have had a hava amina that tshuvah of this sort doesn’t carry much weight – it’s not too hard to do soul searching when Haman’s decree or the threat of some other suffering is hanging over your head! Yet, we see from the story of the first sin in the Torah that Hashem doesn’t wait for us – Hashem reached out to Adam and asked him whether he ate from the forbidden fruit, inviting Adam to confess and own up to the crime. Haman min haTorah – the tshuvah elicited by the evil of Haman already has a precedent in the Torah.

simchas Yom Tov

R’ Akiva Eiger (Shut”T siman 1) writes that women are allowed to fast on Yom Tov because the mitzvah to eat on Yom Tov is an extension of the halacha of oneg, which is a mitzvas aseh she’hazman gerama. The same holds true of the mitzvah of simcha. According to many Rishonim the mitzvah of simcha is incumbent upon a husband to make his wife happy, but there is no chiyuv of simcha that applies directly to women (Ra’avad Hil Chagiga 1:1, see Rambam and meforshim there). Therefore, a women who forgets ya’aleh v’yavo in her bentching need not repeat birchas hamazon.

Rav Zolti in his discussion of simcha on Purim makes a beautiful point. There is no one who suggests that a women should observe aveilus on Yom Tov, despite the fact that they have no chiyuv of simcha. Yet, wouldn’t this be the logical outgrowth of R’ Akiva Eiger’s chiddush?

The reason aveilus does not apply to women, explains R’ Zolti, is because it's not the kiyum mitzvah of simcha by the individual which is doche aveilus [it’s not an aseh doche lo ta’aseh halacha], but rather it is the characters of the day of Yom Tov itself as a day of simcha which blocks aveilus [the day is mufka from aveilus]. Women may be exempt from kiyumei mitzvah of simcha, but that does not change the nature of the day. For the same reason, women must repeat birchas hamazon of they forget ya'aleh v'yavo.

Support for this conclusion comes from the Rambam:

שבעת ימי הפסח ושמונת ימי החג עם שאר ימים טובים, כולם אסורים בספד ותענית. וחייב אדם להיות בהן שמח וטוב לב, הוא ובניו ואשתו ובני ביתו וכל הנלווים עליו, שנאמר "ושמחת, בחגך . . ."

The Rambam prefaces the obligation of simcha on Yom Tov with the halacha that mourning is prohibited. Isn't that that putting the cart before the horse? It’s the obligation of simcha which is what deflects mourning; shouldn't it therefore be mentioned first?

The answer is that the Rambam is describing two different obligations: 1) the chovas hagavra of simcha; 2) simcha which is part of the character of the day itself. The Rambam begins by telling us mourning is suspended; the day itself has a certain character. The Rambam then follows with a detailed explanation of what an individual must do to reflect that character in tangible kiyum mitzvah behavior.

simchas Purim vs. simchas Yom Tov (II)

Last week (link) we explained that there is no din of ain m’arvin simcha b’simcha when it comes to getting married on Purim because simchas Purim is not a characteristic of the kedushas hayom but is a detail specific to the chiyuv seudah.

Other sources seem to indicate otherwise. The Shulchan Aruch quotes a view (yesh mi she’omer) that an onein may eat meat and drink wine the night of Purim because the communal obligation of simcha overrides the private obligation of aninus / aveilus. The chiyuiv of seudah on Purim does not begin until the next day; clearly, the simcha which pushes off aveilus is of a more general nature. The fact that we wear bigdei Shabbos on Purim night, that at night we (according to the Rama) “yismach v’yirbeh ktzas b’seudah,” eat a festive meal, albeit a less lavish one than during the day, all point to a more global chiyuv of simcha.

If so, hadra kushya l’duchta – why is one allowed to hold a wedding on Purim but not on Yom Tov? Rav Zolti answers, based on a careful reading of the Rama in Darkei Moshe, that the din of ain m’arvin simcha b’simcha applies where the halacha of simcha directs us to focus our attention on the celebration of the day itself – v’samachta b’chagecha. Not so Purim, which is a day of “mishteh v’simcha -- b’kol mah d’misameiach sagi leih,” as the Rama writes -- however and whatever you chose to have simcha about is a fulfillment of the mitzvas hayom. If holding a wedding brings you simcha, that does not contradict the spirit of the day – to the contrary, that is what the spirit of the day is all about.

parting the clouds

We read at the end of Pekudei that Moshe found himself unable to enter the completed Mishkan because of the cloud, representing the Shechina, which enveloped the tent (40:35). The Ohr haChaim points out that this seems to contradict the close of parshas Mishpatim where we read, "Vayavo Moshe b'toch he'anan," Moshe had no problem entering into the cloud which enveloped Har Sinai. Why the difference? Ohr haChaim offers two answers: 1) Moshe had been called to enterinto the cloud that surrounded Sinai; he was not yet called to enter the cloud surrounding the Mishkan; 2) the cloud enveloped the Mishkan; the cloud hovered above Sinai, but did not block Moshe's access to the mountain. I would like to suggest a third possibility which also relates to how we deal with the clouds that muddle our ability to move forward or to see things clearly. The difference between the two clouds is the context in which they occur. Sinai represents the experience of matan Torah; the Mishkan represents avodah, tefilah. Torah provides direction through the cloud -- chayav or patur, mutar or asur, the halacha provides a resolution, an answer, which allows us to move forward. Tefilah operates very differently. It's when we have given up the quest for answers or when we realize that despite our best efforts, we will fall short, that we turn to tefilah. Tefilah is not about finding a way through the cloud; it's about asking Hashem to just remove the cloud entirely because if we dare venture into it, we will be lost and be unable to find our own way out. We wait outside the cloud, not daring to enter, waiting expectently for a response.

the fiery shekel

The Midrash teaches that Moshe found the parsha of shekalim difficult to understand. Hashem responded by showing him a “matbe’a shel eish” pulled from under his throne. The Midrash is ambiguous – what did Moshe find hard to understand and how did Hashem’s response allay his concern? – and it leaves the door open to various interpretations.

The Sefas Emes explains: Machatzis hashekel was an equalizer. No matter how rich or poor you were, you had to give exactly half a shekel, no more and no less. This was the point which troubled Moshe. Are the poor man and the rich, the stingy miser and the benevolent “nediv lev” really cut from the same cloth? How can all people be expected to give exactly the same amount, to be counted the same way, as if on some level all are equal? Especially in our day and age, where our community is so splintered, with so many divergent viewpoints on anything and everything, does it make sense to speak of commonality in any sense of the word?

להגיד גדולתו של מלך מלכי המלכים, הקדוש ברוך הוא, שאדם טובע מאה מטבעות בחותם אחד, וכולן דומין זה לזה, מלך מלכי המלכים הקדוש ברוך הוא טובע את כל האדם בחותמו של אדם הראשון, ואין אחד מהם דומה לחברו. לפיכך לכל אחד ואחד לומר, בשבילי נברא העולם.

The Mishna in Sanhedrin (4:5) teaches that Hashem was “tove’a” all humanity with one common stamp. The word “matbe’a” used by the Mishna shares the same root as this word “tove’a” used in the Mishna. It was this commonality which Hashem showed Moshe in response to his questions. As different as we appear on the surface, underneath it all we do share a common core. The Midrash refers to a “matbe’a shel eish,” a burning stamp, because as different as how we act, how we speak, how we think, there is an inextinguishable spark of common goodness that lies in the heart.