Dinah in the box

1) Last week we discussed why Ya'akov is blamed for sticking Dinah in a box to keep her away from Eisav while Leah gets credit for not wanting to marry Eisav.  Isn't that a double-standard?  Indeed it is, answers the Darkei Mussar -- G-d judges each of us by the yardstick appropriate to our own abilities.

Still, it's hard to understand what the expectation was for Ya'akov and Dinah.  My wife pointed out that Eisav was at this point an old man well over 90 with multiple wives.  Dinah was just a little girl.  Would she really be able to influence him to do teshuvah?  Was it fair to Dinah to put her in that situation and risk her exposure to Eisav?  (My wife knows that I read the Midrash as just using the text as a springboard to teach us a didactic lesson.  Whether the details like age fit exactly is not so important, as the point is the moral we are supposed to draw.) 

R' Shach and R' Shteinman both suggest that the Midrash does not mean that Ya'akov should have given Dinah to Eisav as a wife.  To the contrary -- Ya'akov did the right thing in keeping Dinah away.  What Ya'akov is being taken to task for -- and I don't know a better way to put this -- is for not giving a krechtz when he did it.  In other words, the fact that Ya'akov had a mitzvah to protect Dinah from Eisav given who Eisav was should not have prevented Ya'akov from feeling pain at what he had to do and at least pausing a moment to deliberate over it.  There should have at least been a moment when Ya'akov had a shikul ha'da'as about the situation.

This is a tremendous vort.  It's not enough to do the right thing -- you also need to know what attitude you have to have while doing it. 

2) The gemara in Chulin has a machlokes R' Yehudah and Chachamim whether the isur of eating gid ha'nasheh applied to Ya'akov's children or whether it became obligatory on Klal Yisrael only after mattan Torah.  The Rambam in Peirush haMishnayos sets down a general rule: we are not bound by the mitzvah of milah because Avraham did it; we are not bound by the issur of gid ha'nasheh because Ya'akov was told not to eat it.  The parshiyos that tell us about these mitzvos and issurim give us historical background, but the only reason we are bound to keep mitzvos is because they were given to us by G-d at Sinai.

Sounds simple, but it actually seems to fly in the face of a gemara.  The gemara (Horiyos 8b) has a hava amina that the first commandment given to Klal Yisrael is the isur avodah zarah, as that was the first of the dibros we heard at mattan Torah.  The gemara challenges and rejects this hava amina, as we know that there were 10 halachos already given pre-mattan Torah at Marah: 7 mitzvos bnei Noach + dinim, Shabbos, and kibud av.   We had a bunch of commandments that we heard before the isur avodah zarah. 

According to the Rambam, the gemara's question makes no sense.  What we were told at Marah should be no more binding than what Ya'akov was told about gid ha'nasheh or what Avraham was told about milah.  Those instructions don't become "mitzvos" until repeated at mattan Torah.  The first commandment given to Klal Yisrael should indeed have been the isur avodah zarah, as that was the first thing we heard at Sinai!  

I should save this for Parshas Beshalach, but b'kitzur, we see from here that Marah is not just another set of pre-mattan Torah laws like milah, or like gid ha'nasheh -- Marah is actually the start of mattan Torah.  

Bli neder maybe we will come back to this in Parshas Beshalach.  See the Masa'as haMelech of R' Shimon Moshe Diskin on the Rambam.

3) Rashi in our parsha famously quotes (33:4) "halacha b'yadu'a she'Eisav sonei Ya'akov."  Ksav Sofer asks what the "yadu'a" means here -- how do we know it?  It has to be telling us something beyond that it is a "halacha," as that's what the previous word says.

When Rivka sent Ya'akov away to Lavan's house, she told him, "V'yashavta imo yamim achadim ad asher tashuv chamas achicha."  (27:44)  The very next pasuk continues with what seems like a repetition: "Ad shuv af achicha mimcha..."  Ksav Sofer and others explain that there is a actually a big difference between the two phrases.  "Tashuv chamas achicha" means Eisav will no longer be angry.  "Shuv af achicha MIMCHA" means you will no longer be angry at Eisav.  How others feel about us is often a reflection of how we feel about them.  Rivka was hinting to Ya'akov that the best way to stop Eisav from feeling anger and resentment is for Ya'akov to get rid of his own negative feelings toward Eisav.  

Our Rashi can be interpreted in the same light.  "B'yadu'a" means we know it to be true because we can feel it.  Our feelings toward Eisav are to some degree a reflection of Eisav's feelings toward us.  We only need to look inside ourselves, to our own feelings toward Eisav, to have some idea of what Eisav's feelings toward us is.

(That is not an excuse for feeling hatred for Eisav because as Rivka said, the change can start with us and then spread to Eisav.)

va'yeitzei or va'yivrach?

There is an interesting contrast between the way our parsha describes Ya'akov's departure for Lavan's house -- "Vayeitzei Ya'akov... vayeilech...," which sounds like Ya'akov was leaving for a vacation trip -- and the way the haftarah describes the same event -- "Va'yivrach Ya'akov," Ya'akov fled.  See Sefas Emes 5634.  Maybe the difference is that our parsha is speaking about what happened after Ya'akov spent 14 years learning in yeshivas Shem v'Eiver.  When he first departed, Ya'akov was in fact running for his life.  Then he paused and took stock and immersed himself in Torah.  He had to continue the journey, but now it was a different journey, one which he embarked upon with a different attitude.  Ya'akov now had a sense of calm and purpose, a sense of mission.  

Rashi (28:17) writes that Ya'akov passed by the makom mikdash en route to Lavan's home but continued without stopping.  He later said to himself, "Have I passed by the spot where my forefather's prayed without stopping to pray there myself?" and he turned to go back.  According to Rashi, Hashem then miraculously moved the makom mikdash to Ya'akov to spare him the trip.

R' Shteinman (in his Ayeles haShachar -- and have in mind when you learn this torah that it should be a zechus for a refuah sheleimah for him) makes a nice diyuk in this Rashi.  Ya'akov doesn't say, "I passed the makom mikdash without stopping."  It's not the place itself which he bemoans missing. What he says is maybe I missed "the place where my forefather's davened."  Places themselves are not inherently meaningful or special.  It is what we do there that endows them with significance.

Parenthetically, where do we see that the other Avos davened at the makom mikdash?  Targum Yonasan (25:21) on "va'ye'etar Yitzchak la'Hashem," a phrase we discussed last week, writes that Yitzchak went to Har HaMoriah.  My cousin-in-law R' Avraham Wagner in his sefer Na'ar Yehonasan on the Targum quotes a Zohar and other sources which indicate that Yitzchak went there to offer a korban.  Maybe you can learn k'peshuto that Yitzchak simply went there to daven, as we see from Rashi that the makom mikdash was a makom tefilah for the Avos.

So Ya'akov gets to Lavan's house and discovers that he has two daughters, Rachel and Leah.  Rachel is beautiful, but Leah is described as "einey Le'ah rakos," her eyes were sore.  Rashi, quoting B"B 123, explains that Leah thought that since she was the older daughter, she would have to marry Yitzchak's oldest son, Eisav.  Therefore, she was constantly crying.  Chazal say that Leah got a tremendous reward for those tears.  "Va'yar Hashem ki senu'ah Leah" doesn't mean Leah was hated by Ya'akov -- it refers to Leah hating Eisav, her crying over her plight.  G-d saw that hatred Leah had for Eisav and as a result, "Vayiftach es rachmah," Leah was blessed with children.


The Iyun Ya'akov on this gemara asks: Chazal attribute the tragedy of Dinah being taken by Shechem that we will read about in next week's parsha to Ya'akov failing to give her as a wife to Eisav, which would have pushed Eisav to do teshuvah.  How can Chazal be critical of Ya'akov for not giving Dinah to Eisav as a wife when they praise Leah for not wanting to marry him?   If Leah is justified in not wanting to marry Eisav, why is Ya'akov not justified in not allowing Dinah to marry him?

R' Ya'akov Neiman in Darkei Musar answers that what we learn from this Chazal is that Hashem does not use the same standard yardstick for each of us when he evaluates our behavior.  Hashem measured Leah against the yardstick appropriate for her, and viz a viz where she was holding, it was meritorious for her reject Eisav.  Hashem used a different yardstick when it came to measuring Ya'akov Avinu, one appropriate to the level he was on.  Relative to the expectations for someone on that super-high level, Ya'akov was found wanting in not wanting Dinah to marry his brother.

He offers a second suggestion: Leah was only Eisav's cousin; Ya'akov was a brother.  It may be appropriate for a cousin to reject an Eisav, but a brother can't reject another brother even if he is an Eisav.

The Tiferes Shlomo notes that while Chazal explain to us how "Va'yar Hashem ki senu'ah Leah" is actually a praise, they don't explain why it is that we find only by Rachel and Leah the next phrase of "vayiftach es rachma."  Why not just say "va'tahar va'teiled?"  And how does the first half of the pasuk tie together with the end, "ki Rachel akarah?"

Contrary to what a simple reading of the text might suggest, Leah and Rachel cared for each other very deeply.  Brothers have a responsibility toward each other, and so do sisters.  Why did Leah deserve to have children?  Because "vayftach es rachma," the well of rachmanus in her was open, "ki Rachel akarah," because what bothered her more than her own plight was the fact that her sister was barren.  

l'nochach ishto

"Va'ye'etar Yitzchak laHashem l'nochach ishto..."  Rashi paints a picture for us: Yitzchak was in one corner of the room, Rivka in the opposite corner, each one davening for a child.  The description is vivid, but what bothers me is why it is necessary at all.  Who cares if Yitzchak and Rivka were standing in opposite corners, in the same corner, in different rooms, in the same room?  Since when is the chumash concerned with painting a scene for us?  What matters is that they davened, period, full stop -- not where they stood in relation to each other.  I'm not sure what according to Rashi the point here is (assuming you understand Rashi literally -- see Maor vaShemesh for a kabbalistic derash).

I actually started thinking about this phrase "l'nochach ishto" two weeks ago when we read the haftarah of VaYeira.  The navi there describes how Elisha put his mouth on the mouth of the dead son of the Isha Shumanis, placed his eyes against his eyes, his hands on his hands, etc.  It sounds like he is doing CPR, but the child was brought back to life miraculously, not by medical intervention (according to most views).  So why did Elisha need to go through this whole act?  Radak answers that Elisha was doing it to arouse his kavanah.  He need the child in his proximity, he needed the physical closeness to atune himself to the situation and focus on it.  Continues Radak, this is just like Yitzchak daveing "l'nochach ishto."  Yitzchak needed Rivka's presence there to focus himself on her plight.  (Parenthetically, for those who pace during davening, I think you have a makor in that haftarah -- "vayashav va'yeilech babayis achas heina v'achas heina.."  See Radak there as well.)  Maybe this is why we place our hands on our children when we bless there before Shabbos or before Y"K.  The physical closeness is there to bring our kavanah to its maximum. 

The simplest pshat in "l'nochach ishto" is, I think, the Rashbam, who writes that it means simply "bishvil ishto," for Rivka's sake.  But this begs the question: doesn't that go without saying?  For whose sake other than Rivka's could he have been praying?  "Ishto" as opposed to who?  Seforno anticipates the question and writes that Yitzchak prayed that his children he would come from Rivka, the most suitable wife for him.  In other words, he wanted to avoid having to take another wife to have children. 

Maybe there is more to it, however, than that.  The Taz in Divrei David raises two (actually more - take a look) fundamental questions on the parsha.  1) Before telling us about Yitzchak's tefilah, the parsha reminds us that Rivka was "bas Besuel ha'Arami... achos Lavan."  Rashi comments that the Torah comes to praise Rivka.  She grew up in a home of idolaters, and nonetheless was a tzadekes. Yet, just one pasuk later the Torah tells us, with respect to Yitzchak's tefilah, "va'yei'aser LO Hashem," Hashem listened to HIS tefilah.  It was to Yitzchak that Hashem responded, not Rivka (according to Rashi, who assumes both were praying independently).  It seems incongruous.   On the one hand, the parsha opens with lavish praise of Rivka, only to set us up for her prayer being rejected due to a shortcoming in her background, at least in comparison to Yitzchak. 2)  We already know who Rivka is from last week's parsha.  We know she grew up in the home of Lavan and Besuel and rose above their bad influence.  Why inject a retelling of her background here?  

The Yismach Moshe suggests a radical pshat in "l'nochach ishto" that will resolve both problems.  Yitzchak viewed himself as continuing the legacy of his father -- there was nothing original or groundbreaking in what he was doing.  Rivka, on the other hand,  had forged her own path to avodah.  The opening of the parsha recounts Rivka's background perhaps to set up the tension between these two approaches.  On the one hand, "Yitzchak ben Avraham" and "Avraham holid es Yiztchak,"  the parsha emphasizes Yitzchak's connection with his father, with the past, with a path that was already forged, vs. "Rivka bas Besuel... achos Lavan," coming from nothing and forging a new path.  

Yitzchak believed, says the Yismach Moshe, that Rivka had the edge on him.  He davened, "l'nochach ishto," invoking her merit as the basis by which G-d should grant them children.  Originality trumps mere fidelity to the past.  "Ishto" here is not to the exclusion of some other potential wife, but rather to the exclusion of Yitzchak himself, to the exclusion of his own merits, which he thought insufficient.

How does G-d respond?  "Va'yei'aser LO," G-d responded to Yitzchak's own prayer.  Three possible ways to read this: 1) According to Rashi, G-d responded to Yitzchak, not Rivka.  The zechus of the tzadik ben tzadik in facts trumps the merit of the tzadik ben rasha.  Following in the footsteps of the past trumps those who must make their own way.  2) Given the Yismach Moshe's understand of the first half of the pasuk, perhaps the meaning here is that G-d responded to Yitzchak davka because he invoked his wife's merits.  3) Finally, and most radically, the Yismach Moshe's own reading is that G-d responded "lo," to Yitzchak as an individual, as opposed to Yitzchak the extension of his father Avraham.  G-d's message to Yitzchak was that his avodah was not merely a replay of his father's life, and therefore devoid of originality, but rather he too stood on his own merits, had his own path, he too had his own way to carve just as Rivka had carved her own (albeit in a more extreme set of circumstances.)

To take one more step, perhaps the tension here between the zechus of following in the foosteps of the past vs. carving a new path is davka highlighted in the context of Yitzchak and Rivka's tefilah for children because the Torah is asking us to consider what we expect from our children -- do we want them to merely walk in our foosteps, or are we davening for a new generation that will carve their own path and move off in a new direction of their own?  And perhaps the better question is not which approach we expect from our children, but which approach we aspire to ourselves.

root cause

"Hinei yaldah Milkah gam hi banim l'Nachor achicha..."  We know that Nachor is Avraham's brother -- why does the Torah mention it again in recounting the geneology of Nachor's family at the end of last week's parsha?

We learn an important yesod from here.   Even though Avraham had no contact with Nachor for decades (Netziv explains that this was the intent of "Lech lecha... m'beis avicha"), a brother is still a brother, and all the shefa, bracha, and benefits that came into the world because of the tzidkus of Avraham Avinu overflowed and benefited Nachor as well.  They of course probably never suspected that as the cause, but, "Nachor achicha...," when you are related to the tzadik ha'dor and have even a small connection, good things rub off and come your way.  

It is nice to pat yourself on the back and think that if things are going well it is because Hashem is getting nachas ru'ach from your avodah.  But the truth may be that your second cousin twice removed, or even a stranger who you don't even know, is such a tremendous ba'al chessed, ba'al avodah, etc. that the whole world benefits from -- including you.  

On the other hand, who knows?  It could be your tefilos, that you don't think are having any effect, are benefiting a Jew somewhere in the world who really needs it.

We see the same idea in our parsha.  "Hinei Rivka yotzeis asher yuldah l'Besuel..."  Why the passive voice, "yuldah?"  Kedushas Levi explains that Rivka may have biologically born to Besuel, but what caused a girl like Rivka to come into the world was the chessed of Avraham miles and miles away.  Besuel reaped the results, but the cause of events was Avraham Avinu.

Eliezer says that if the test he devised to find the right girl works out it proves, "ki asisa chessed im adoni." (24:14).  G-d was not doing chessed "l'adoni"  = for Avraham, i.e. giving him a gift, but rather "im adoni" = with Avraham, i.e. the chessed Avraham himself did was what created and set in motion events leading to Rivka.

How does this work?  The way Hashem interacts with a person mirrors the way that person interacts with the world.  For example, Chazal say that a person who is ma'avir al midosav, who is forgiving, will have his/her own sins forgiven.  But it goes beyond personal benefit.  The way Hashem interacts with the whole world changes.  The chessed of Avraham opened a channel of chessed -- there was more chessed coming down to the entire world.  That abundance of chessed caused a Rivka, another ba'alas chessed, to develop.

This idea can also shed light on how Eliezer managed to have such tremendous success Eliezer had on his mission.  Ya'akov Avinu, the paragon of emes, had to spend 14 years in Yeshivas Shem v'Eiver preparing himself to deal with the cheat and liar Lavan.  Here, Eliezer walks into the lion's den and walks out with Rivka on the same day.  How did that happen?

Chazal tell us that Eliezer had a daughter of marriageable age who he would have loved to see married to Yitzchak.  Shem m'Shmuel writes that this was not a coincidence.  Hashem was using reverse psychology in placing him in this situation.  Davka because Eliezer faced the temptation of not being true to Avraham and to his mission made him that much more on guard and dedicated to carrying out his shlichus faithfully.  When a person makes such a great effort to be true to his master, his mission, in turn Hashem mirrors that and more truth and faithfulness come into the world.  That extra burst of truth energy, if you will, is what enabled him to overcome Lavan.

better than a free gift

After passing the test of the akeidah Avraham is told his reward: "V'hisbarchu b'zaracha kol goyei ha'aretz eikev asher shamata b'koli." (22:18)

Some of the meforshim ask: what kind of a reward is this?  Avraham had already been promised this by G-d at the beginning of Lech Lecha: "V'nivrechu becha kol mishp'chos ha'adamah." (12:3)  Now, ten tests later, he is promised the same thing all over again -- that's it?! 

I want to suggest a solution based on a beautiful Netziv elsewhere in our parsha.  B'pashtus, the story of the angels being welcomed by Lot and being invited into his home in contrast to the attack upon them by the rest of the populace of Sdom serves to establish a zechus for Lot so that he would merit being saved and seals the fate of the people of Sdom by their wickedness.  Yet that can't be.  As we discussed last post, the fate of Sdom was already sealed before the malachim even got there.  Hashem had already refused Avraham's prayers on their behalf and one the angels was on a mission to destroy the city.  The other angel that came to Sdom was there to save Lot, so his fate too was already sealed.  The reaction of Lot and the reaction of the people of Sdom to the arrival of the angels did not make any difference to the outcome.  So why is this story interjected?

Netziv (Harchev Davar) answers that there is something even better than G-d given you a free favor and rescuing you in a time of need.  What's even better is earning that gift and reward.  G-d would certainly have saved Lot no matter what; Sdom would have been destroyed in any case.  However, by sending the angels, Hashem provided Lot with the opportunity to do chessed and earn the rescue that he was going to be given (see also Ohr haChaim 19:1).  Hashem have the people of Sdom the opportunity to demonstrate their wickedness so that there was no question of their deserving everything they got. 

The greatest gift that Hashem can give is the opportunity to serve him and earn the bracha and yeshu'a that is needed and not have to get it as a handout.

Perhaps the key difference between the bracha in parshas Lech Lecha and the bracha in VaYeira is the end of the pasuk: "Eikev asher shamata b'koli."   EIkev means you've earned it; it's not a favor, but rather it's a justified outcome.  That could only come after the tenth test. 

a pardon for the guilty

The Rambam writes in Hil Teshuvah 3:2

אדם שעונותיו מרובין על זכיותיו מיד הוא מת ברשעו שנאמר על רוב עונך. וכן מדינה שעונותיה מרובין מיד היא אובדת שנאמר זעקת סדום ועמורה כי רבה וגו'. וכן כל העולם כולו אם היו עונותיהם מרובין מזכיותיהן מיד הן נשחתין שנאמר וירא ה' כי רבה רעת האדם.

A person, city, or country whose sins outweigh its merits is immediately sentenced to death and destruction; a person, city, or country that has a majority of merits gets to keep going. 

Lechem Mishna asks: The Rambam proves that this calculus applies on the broader level to the city or country, not just to the individual, from the fact that G-d destroyed Sdom.  But if that is true, then why did Avraham bother to daven on their behalf?  Either the numbers add up to their being spared or they don't?!

Two weeks ago R' Eliezer Eisenberg discussed a similar question. If the calculus applies even to the entire world, as the Rambam writes, then why was Noach spared during the flood?  Why wasn't the entire world destroyed?  See here.

It's a great kasha, but the answer is even better.  Lechem Mishna suggests that tefilah overrides the calculus.  Mipnei tefilas Avraham ha'ya mochel af al pi she'ain ha'din kach.  Some of you I am sure are thinking that what he means is that the tefilah itself is a zechus that comes in and tips the scales.  Maybe tefilah creates a tziruf between the one who davens and the city and his merits now get counted for them.  A nice sevara, but that's not what the Lch"M is saying.  That sevara would mean the city legitimately deserves to get off.  What the Lch"M is saying is that the scales are still tipped in the direction of destruction -- the city does NOT deserve to be spared.  Nonetheless, G-d is willing to spare it anyway.  There is, so to speak, an override button.  (Does that mean the judgment is not true?  I would say see Mei HaShiloach in P VaYeishev end of the first piece on the difference between emes and emes l'amito.  G-d's justice is emes l'amito, not just emes.)  The power of tefilah is so great that G-d puts aside what justice demands.

So we see the issue raised in Noach, we see raised in connection with Sdom. One more place: Lot begs the angels for permission to flee to the city of Tzo'ar to seek refuge there, meaning they would have to spare the city.  Or haChaim (19:20) asks: if the Tzo'ar deserved to be destroyed because its sins outweighed its merits, then why should it be spared just because Lot wanted to take refuge there?  And if it's sins did not outweigh its merits, then shouldn't it be spared even if Lot didn't take refuge there?   Take a look at his answer as well as Shem m'Shmuel (5678).

Now for the flipside.  G-d says that the cities of Sdom and Amora will be destroyed because, "Za'akas Sdom v'Amora ki rabah, v'chatsam ki kavdah me'od."  (18:20)  The Netziv and Brisker Rav note the redundancy.  If "chatasam" seals their fate, why add the beginning of the pasuk about "za'akas Sdom v'Amora?" 

Netziv quotes Tos B"K 93a d"h echad that when the poor cry out in oppression, G-d responds much more quickly than when there is no one crying out.  Ramban writes that "za'akas Sdom v'Amora" refers to interpersonal crime.  The people of Sdom sinned against each other, not just against G-d.  If a person commits idolatry, it is essentially a victimless crime.  Not so when a person commits theft, arayos, and other such evils.  Sdom was filled with the cries of victims. 

The Lch"M taught us that if you, or even someone else, cries out in tefilah to G-d, that averts din.  The Netziv is teaching us that if the victim of sin cries out to G-d, that hastens din. 

It's an amazing thing -- G-d kavyachol us moved by the pleas of we puny human beings.  Our words matter more than we can imagine.

Lot: can't you live in beautiful pastures without giving up G-d?

Our parsha tells us that there was a dispute that broke out between the shepherds of Avraham and the shepherds of Lot.  The Torah immediately tacks on, "V'ha'K'na'ani v'haPrizi az yosheiv ba'aretz." (13:7) Note the use of "yosheiv," as opposed to earlier in the parsha when we were told (12:6), "V'ha'K'na'ani az ba'aretz."  "Yosheiv," means our enemies were settled in the land, not just temporarily there or there by happenstance.  When Jews fight with each other, even if it is just fight, even if it is a fight against the injustices committed by a Lot, even if it is a fight where one side is defending the interests of an Avraham Avinu in all his tzidkus, the net result is a gain for our enemies, who as a result are bolstered and have a greater sense of security and a stronger foothold.  It's the Chasam Sofer who says this, someone who knew how to fight when he perceived a threat to Orthodoxy, but here he is telling us to be careful.  Apply as you like to current events.

Getting back to the story, Avraham tells Lot that they must separate, and wherever he chooses to go, Avraham will head in the opposite direction.  Lot sees the land of Sdom and its beautiful fertile pastures  before him, and he makes the logical choice to move there with his flocks.  "Va'yisa Lot m'kedem" (13:11) -- literally, he headed away from the east, where Avraham was camped (see Seforno,) but the Midrash reads much more into the phrase and tells us that Lot was moving away from G-d, the "kadmono shel olam."   Lot was running away from religion, abandoning his faith.

Asks the Alter m'Kelm: in next week's parsha we are going to read how Lot, despite living amidst the wicked people of Sdom, risked his life to fulfill the mitzvah of hachnasas orchim.  We are going to read how he baked matzah for his guests because it was Pesach (Rashi).  Unlike his sons in law, he did not doubt the malach's message that Sdom would be destroyed, and he immediately abandoned his home when he was told to flee.  Does this sound like someone who has run away from G-d and religion?!  OK, so he wanted to move to the best pasture land, he cared maybe too much about his flocks and his wealth, and so he ended up is Sdom, but why does that mean he is someone trying to escape from religion?

The Alter answers that we see from here that even if you eat the most kosher matzah, do mitzvos, dress the dress and walk the walk, if what really anchors your life is the almighty $ instead of the Almighty, then you are on the wrong path.  Then you are a Lot.  

Is it too early in the year for me to write about advertisements for Pesach vacations in  luxury hotels with pools and beaches and every amenity one can dream of, including a 24 hour a day tea room because you never know when you will be hungry, as if the banquet size meals were not enough (don't worry -- there is a gym and exercise room too, probably with a personal trainer available to help you)?  Of course they all have the best hashgachos, non-gebrokst food, daf yomi shiurim daily (maybe poolside?).  This is what Lot wanted -- the beautiful pastures of Sdom! -- while doing mitzvos.  

You can dress it up in hashgachos and mitzvos and other nice frum things, but it's still Sdom, far away from the values of kadmono shel olam.  

ba'avur vs biglal

Both the Malbim and Netviv distinguish between the words "biglal" and "ba'avur," both of which can be translated as "because," but which actually have different connotations.  (The Malbim throughout his commentary assumes there are no synonyms in Hebrew and there must be at least subtle differences between words that seem at first glace to mean the same thing.) 

"Ba'avur" implies doing something because there is some tangible benefit to be gained.  Rivka tells Ya'akov to prepare a meal and bring it to Yitzchak, "ba'avur yivarechicha lifnei moso."  Prepare a meal because you want to get a blessing. 

"Biglal" is about logical causes, not gain/loss.  G-d promised to remove the 7 nations from Canaan and give us their land "biglal ha'toeivos ha'eileh" which they did -- because of their wrongs. 

Interestingly you have a pasuk in our parsha (12:13) that contains both words.  Avraham tells Sarah that when they enter Egypt she should say he is her brother "l'ma'an yitav li ba'avureich" -- there is a tangible gain of wealth that Avraham will accrue, hence "ba'avur." He then adds, "v'chaysa nafshi biglaleiach" -- Sarah will be the cause of the Egyptians avoiding the crime of murder.  (Shouldn't the latter point have come first?  Good question, but not for this post : )

Turning back two weeks to parshas Braishis, which "because" word would you use in the sentence telling us that man was giving the earth to toil because of his sin?   You would think it should be "biglal," -- sin is a logical cause.  But we know that's not what the pasuk says -- it says "arura ha'adaman ba'avurecha..."  (3:17)  What's going on?

Malbim and Netziv explain that the pasuk is in one word giving us a beautiful lesson: man's punishment forcing him to toil is to his benefit -- it is something he can gain from and grow from.  Work and toil will serve to curb his yetzer ha'ra so that the sin of eitz ha'da'as can ultimately be rectified.  The punishment is itself a bracha in disguise. 

Homework: check your concordance -- does the Malbim"s distinction work in all the places these words are used?  I was a bit puzzled by a number of examples... 

the one word diffence between ya'aleh v'yavo in tefilah vs bentching

Over Yom Tov I reminded my family of a halacha that will come up once again on Rosh Chodesh when we have the addition of ya'aleh v'yavo in our davening and bentching.  If you look in your bentcher, you will see one little difference in the way ya'aleh v'yavo appears there from the way it appears in the siddur: the word melech in ki K-l melech chanun v'rachum atah is in parenthesis.  This is based din in O.C. 188:3  The Shulchan Aruch says that when you mention malchus beis David (rachem... al malchus beis David m'shichecha) in the third bracha of bentching you should not mention the malchus of Hashem along side it, e.g. a person should not say malchuscha u'malchus beis David, as if one were to do so it would give the impression that one is equating the malchus of Hashem with another malchus.  Adds the Rama, that the same principle holds true at the end of the bracha as well and the word melech should be left out of ya'aleh v'yavo.  That being said, the Rama continues and says that he has noticed that the minhag does not follow this recommendation.  Achronim (see Taz) try to justify the common practice, but the Aruch haShulchan writes that has noticed that where he lived people do in fact follow the Rama and leave the word melech out.  Now that I've made you aware of the issue, you can start leaving it out too : )

One other interesting note on the parsha: Chazal (Sanhedrin 58) darshen from the words "yom v'layla lo yisbosu" that an aku"m who observes a day of shabbos is chayav misa.  Achronim say pilpulim to explain how it is that the Avos were able to keep Shabbos (the gemara in Kiddushim tells us that Avraham kept even dinim derabbanan) when technically they might still have had the status of bnei Noach and not been allowed to set aside a day of rest. 

Shu"T Binyan Tzion (126) suggests that the key word is "yishbosu."  Resting means avoiding hard labor.  That is very different that our definition of Shabbos, which is based on the word "melacha," referring specifically to the 39 actions done in the construction of the mishkan.  An aku"m who moves a heavy couch between rooms in his house has broken his "shabbos" because he has done hard work, not kept it as a day of "shevisa", but a Jew who does the same action on our Shabbos is not liable because it does not fall into the category of melacha. 

dor ha'mabul -- dor she'kulo chayav

The end of last week's parsha sets the stage for the story of the mabul.  "Va'yinachem Hashem ki asah es ha'adam ba'aretz."  Netziv notes that it doesn't say "ki bara es ha'adam," like "braishis bara..."  G-d did not "regret" kavyachol the creation of man.  What G-d wanted to change is "ki asah es ha'adam."  Asiya is a more complete stage of creation.  Man needs to struggle, to work.  There has to be a void for us aspire to fill.  When things are done for us and we don't have enough to do, it's not good.  "Ha'batalah m'vi'ah l'ydei shi'amum," Chazal tell us.  Indolence breeds sloth and bad behavior. 

The Kozhnitzer Magid similarly writes that if a human artisan sets out to make a vessel and it does not meet expectations, he tosses it out and starts again, but it is impossible to say the same thing about G-d.  To think that G-d would destroy the world and start again because it did not work out the way he "anticipated" is an impossibility.  (What about the Midrash that G-d created many worlds and destroyed them before creating ours?  He does not address it.  My hunch is that the difference is that only our world was created based on the blueprint of Torah, and Torah is eternal).

With this background we can understand a Rashi a little more deeply.  The Midrash writes (quoted in Rashi) that the dor ha'mabul threatened that if Noach entered the ark they would to destroy it and kill him.  "Va'yisgor Hashem ba'ado" means Hashem protected Noach and ensured he could enter the ark without harm.  R' Shteinman in Ayeles haShachar asks what it is the dor ha'mabul were hoping to gain by this.  Did they want to prevent Noach from saving himself out of sheer vindictiveness?  What did Noach do to them that would warrant such a reaction?  After all, he had been trying to convince them to repent and save themselves for years.  Why were they out to get him?

The Kozhnitzer Magid answers that had Noach not entered the ark, the result would not have been his perishing with everyone else.  Once G-d created the world, there is no undoing the act of creation -- again, G-d is not like a human artisan who tosses side a failed product to start over.  There had to be a shei'ris ha'pleita of the old world; there had to be continuity.  Therefore, the only possible result of Noach not entering the ark would be no one perishing. If the choice was total destruction or no destruction, the only possible outcome would have been no destruction. 

Chazal (Sanhedrin 98) tell us that there are two ways Moshiach can come: he can come in a generation that proves itself completely righteous, but more amazingly, he can also come in a generation that is completely wicked.   If the historical struggle between good and evil comes to the point where evil completely vanquishes good, then game over, but it does not mean the world is destroyed.  It means that there is no longer any purpose to the game, and G-d will reveal himself fully (see Michtav m'Eliyahu vol1 p 28).  The end of the game is the same no matter how it plays out.  This was the plan of the dor ha'mabul.  So long as there was a Noach, a spark of righteousness, of hope, then the status quo of schar v'onesh and the struggle between good and evil would continue.  If Noach however was killed, the struggle would end in complete redemption of dor she'kulo chayav.

In his Mayan Chaim, R' Chaim Charlap (son of R' Y"M Charlap) suggests that this is what Rashi means when he writes that Noach vacillated, "ma'amin v'aino ma'amin," when it came time to enter the ark.  Surely Noach, the tzadik tamim, did not harbor doubts in emunah.  Yet, what Noach realized is that his very lack of doubt, his tzidkus, his belief, would destroy the world.  What he realized is that he was the one thing that stood between the complete redemption of dor she'kulo chayav and a flood that would destroy most of mankind.  The flood is called "mei Noach," says the Kozhnitzer Magid, because Noach's righteousness effectively doomed the world.  Would it not be better under those circumstances to maybe doubt a little bit, maybe as an aveira lishma, to spare the world and bring it to redemption? 

Yet paradoxically, the very thought of doing an aveira lishma to spare the world itself only enhances and proves Noach's tzidkus.  Who else other than a tzadik would do an aveira for the sake of sparing a generation of such evildoers?  And so G-d protected Noach as he entered the ark and the flood came. 


"Va'ya'as Noach k'chol asher tzivah oso Elokim..."  A perplexing diyuk: why the name Elokim, which connotes midas ha'din, when we are speaking about the means of rescue?  Should the pasuk use the shem Hashem that connotes rachamim?

Based on this approach, the pasuk hits the nail right on the head.  Davka because Noach had a path to rescue himself, the rest of the world was doomed and was subject to din.

(As for R' Shteimnan's second question on the Rashi, maybe you can use Sefas Emes 5641 d"h b'Rashi from "af she'lo matzinu she'pa'al bahem" to answer it.) 

Smach Zevulun b'tzeisecha -- taking the happiness of Y"T out with you

1. The navi concludes its description of the chanukas habayis done by Shlomo by telling us, "Va'ayas Shlomo ba'eis ha'hi es ha'chag... shivas yamim v'shivas yamim arb'ah asar yom." (Melachim I 8:65)  Chazal explain that Shlomo celebrated the dedication of the Mikdash for 7 days, and then immediately thereafter celebrated Sukkos for the next 7 days.  In other words, these were two different celebrations that happened to fall out one right after the other.  Why then, asks R' Tzadok haKohen (Pri Tzadik Sukkos 32), does the navi describe it as a celebration of the chag, singular, and tell us the celebration was 14 days, as if it was one long event?  

R' Tzadok explains that the chanukas haMikdash and the holiday of sukkos are in fact one and the same celebration.  The sukkah is a commemoration of the ananei ha'kavod that surrounded Bnei Yisrael in the desert, and when the Mikdash was dedicated, the navi tells us, "V'he'anan malei es beis Hashem," (8:10) that Hashem's anan descended into the place.  The ananei ha'kavod of the midbar came in Aharon's merit, and it was Aharon's descendants who served in the Mikdash.   Mikdash and sukkah both symbolize the same hashra'as haShechina in Klal Yisrael.  Each one of our sukkos is a mini-Mikdash.  

The Vilna Gaon writes that the reason we celebrate Sukkos in Tishei and not in Nisan is because the ananei ha'kavod departed after the sin of cheit ha'eigel and did not return until 15 Tishrei when Moshe began collecting for the construction of the Mishkan.  In light of R' Tzadok's explanation, it is not coincidental that the clouds returned just then.  The kedusha manifest in Mishkan/Mikdash is the  very same as was manifest by the ananei ha'kavod.

2. On one of the days of Sukkos I suggested that the shalosh regalim correspond to banei, chayaei, and mezonai.  Pesach is the holiday of banai -- the Torah speaks to us of 4 sons.  Shavos is chayai -- chayei olam nata b'socheinu, the Torah.  Sukkos and Shmini Atzeres is mezonai, as it is on this chag that we daven for geshem, which encompasses our material needs.  I found the Sefas Emes alludes to this idea, see 5743 d"h baMishna. 
3. The gemara says Shmini Atzeres is distinct from Sukkos with respect to 6 halachos represented by the siman PZ"R KSh"V.  R=regel.  With respect to what din is it a new regel?  I saw quoted in the name of the Rogatchover that there is a new din of chayav adam l'hakbil pnei rabo ba'regel on Shmini Atzeres in addition to the chiyuv of the same din on Sukkos. 


4. V'Zos haBracha is the only parsha not read on a Shabbos.  R' Tzadok explains that Shabbos is "keviya v'kayma," it's kedusha is set without our having to do anything, unlike the kedusha of Yom Tov which comes through beis din's declaration.  The parsha of each Shabbos, the torah unique to that week, comes down to us like the kedusha of Shabbos, from without.  We hope that we can accept it and absorb it each week when it comes down to us.

The kedusha of Zos haBracha, after a full year of parshiyos, after experiencing a whole cycle of moadim, is a kedushah that comes from within.  At the end of the day, what Torah is all about is not obeying rules imposed upon us from without, but discovering within ourselves that those rules are built into our souls and define who we are. 

Sefas Emes explains that the difference between Shavuos and Simchas Torah is that on Shavuos we celebrate Torah sheb'ksav -- it is the Torah given to is, imposed upon us.  Simchas Torah, Shmini Atzeres, is torah she'ba'al peh, the Torah that comes from within, that we are mechadesh, that is part of who we are.

5. "Smach Zevulun b'tzeisecha..."  Sefas Emes asks: why should Zevulun be happy that he has to go off on business?   I don't know about you, but I don't get much simcha out of riding the subway and dealing with hectic problems at work all day. And it's not just about work.  This is the last few days of Yom Tov, and then we go out -- "tzeisecha" -- out from an intense period of kedusha back to the daily grind, back to the world of chol.  Where's the happiness in that? 



Sefas Emes answers that what the Torah is doing here is giving us advice.  How can we make that transition back to the world that for better or worse we have to be part of a successful one?  By making sure we start off with simcha.  If you are a Zevulun and are stuck going out there, then "smach Zevulun b'tzeisecha," before you go, take a moment to rejoice in what you have before you leave.  Have a simchas Torah, celebrate the dveikus of the chagim, appreciate the experience.  How many people go through three+ weeks of Yom Tov and don't even take a moment to THINK about what is going on?  How many people pause to reflect?  This is the last chance -- take advantage!  Absorb the simcha now, and then it will stick with you, so that even "b'tzeisecha," the Torah will be with you, the dveikus will still be with you.

teshuvah = achdus

I haven't had time to write much lately, but wanted to say gmar chasima tovah to all and thank everyone who takes the time to read, comment, email.  Our biggest tefilah on Yom Kippur should be that Hashem should give all of us strength to continue learning Torah and growing in avodah. 

"Va'yar Moshe es ha'am ki par'ua hu..." (Shmos 25:32)   Rambam explains that as a result of cheit ha'eigel the people were torn apart -- some thought making an eigel was a good idea; others thought just the opposite; everyone was going in a different direction. 

The tikun of cheit ha'eigel -- the achievement of forgiveness -- occurred on Yom Kippur.  On that day the shattering of Am Yisrael into splinter groups was repaired.  We became one people again and regained that lost unity and common direction.

"Shuva Yisrael ad Hashem Elokecha" -- lashon yachid, in the singular, not Elokeichem, the plural.  The path to teshuvah starts with our becoming one united people.

(Another possible pshat is that teshuvah is not accomplished by thinking about what the Klal can/should do -- it starts with each individual asking what he/she can do about his/her own behavior.  As the Brisker Rav points out, when Yonah was sitting on a boat filled with people who were actual avodah zarah and a storm arose, he stood up and said, "Throw me into the sea -- it's my fault."  He didn't point the finger at anyone but himself.)
Sefas Emes explains that this is why there is a special mitzvah of ritzuy on erev Yom Kippur.  Ritzuy is not appeasement or saying, "I'm sorry."  Ritzuy, says Sefas Emes, is from the word ratzon.  We have to want to be with all our fellow Jews, we have to want good things for them.  (I'm only half joking if I say that this idea is probably a more difficult mitzvah than all 5 inuyim combined.)

Wishing all a year of shalom and achdus and kaparah and geulah.

the parsha of teshuvah

"V'shavta ad Hashem Elokecha... b'chol levavcha u'bchol nafshecha." (30:2)  A few pesukim later we have, "V'atah tashuv... v'asisa es kol mitzvosav." (30:8)  Chasam Sofer explains that the first pasuk is addressing us in galus.  We don't have a beis hamikdash; many of us are not even living in Eretz Yisrael.  Return to authentic Jewish life, meaning living as Jewish nation in our own Jewish homeland where Torah and mitzvos are our national culture, is something we dream of, "b'chol levavcha u'bchol nafshecha," in our hearts,but is something far from our reality.  R' Tzadoh haKohen interprets "lo b'shamayim hi," assuming that the pasuk is speaking about teshuva (as Ramban learns, not like Rashi), as meaning that one should not think that the fact that Beis haMikdash is up in heaven now and inaccessible is an obstacle to teshuvah; "lo mei'eiver l'yam hi," the fact that Eretz Yisrael is across the ocean is not an obstacle either.  We can dream, we can hope, we can have the desire to get there.  Continues the parsha, one day, "v'hevi'acha Hashem Elokecha el ha'aretz..." (30:5) we will return to the land.  When that day comes, "V'atah tashuv... v'asisa," (30:8) we will have the opportunity to do, to take action and live as we are supposed to, not just to dream about it.  But it all starts with the "hishtokekus," the desire to get there.  That much we can all do now. 


Ramban asks why it is that when describing the mitzvah of teshuva the Torah uses "lashon beinoni" -- a description, not a command, e.g. "V'hasheivosa... V'shavta..." but it does not say "tashuv."  Minchas Chinuch raises the possibility that according to the Rambam there is a mitzvah of viduy, but no actual mitzvah of teshuvah.  When you want to do teshuvah, you have to do viduy, but there is no command to do teshuvah.  According to this approach, Ramban's question seems to be moot.  Ramban, however, assumes there is a mitzvah of teshuvah and explains that the Torah here is giving us more than a command -- it is a promise.  We all have dreams, some of which might come true, many of which will not.  The hope and dream of the Jewish people returning to Eretz Yisrael and doing teshuvah is something that is built into our destiny.  The Torah is describing what must come to fruition, not just giving a command that we have a choice whether or not to fulfill.

I would like to flip this model of the Chasam Sofer, of moving from "hishtokekus," from desire, from the heart and soul, to the world of action, on its head.  Shem m'Shmuel is bothered by the order of words in the pasuk, "...b'ficha u'b'levavcha l'asoso"  Ramban writes that the Torah here is describing the mitzvah of teshuvah.  Shouldn't the order be reversed?  Doesn't a person first come to teshuvah with his heart, and only afterwards, articulate through viduy what he/she did wrong, and express and formulate and new, positive direction?  The heart precedes the mouth, not the other way around? 

Of course you should see the Shem m'Shmuel for a great answer, but I would like to suggest that the pasuk makes perfect sense and is telling us how to do teshuvah.  There are lots of people who know that it is the teshuvah season and they therefore run to this shiur or that lecture seeking to be inspired.  They wait to do teshuvah -- they are waiting to hear just the right lecture that will lift them up, they waiting to hear just the right shiur from the right Rabbi that will capture their heart.  In the meantime, while they are waiting for that elusive moment of inspiration, the clock is ticking toward Rosh haShana.  The Torah here is telling us, "Don't wait!"  Say the words of viduy, say an extra perek of tehilim, learn an extra blatt of gemara.  You may not feel inspired -- you may feel like you are just going through the motions -- but those words will sink in.  Start with the words (and deeds) and the heart will follow.  Inspiration will stem from action, not the other way around.

We baruch Hashem get a second helping of parshas hashavu'a this week with Vayeilech.  The Midrash Tanchuma writes that "Vayeilech Moshe" is a tochacha.  Here Moshe steps out of his holy space and comes to each sheivet, maybe each member of Klal Yisrael, to speak to them -- where is the rebuke?  What could be more positive than that?

Shem m'Shmuel writes that the Torah is not telling us that Moshe took a physical walk to get from place to place -- who cares about that?  It is telling us that Moshe had to make a spiritual journey.  He had to leave where he was spiritually holding in and travel down a notch to come speak to us. 

I don't remember what the person did to earn it, but the Tchebiner Rav promised a certain person that he would make sure to get him into Gan Eden.  Later in life the Tchebiner asked that person for one favor: "Don't make it so hard for me."

Why should Moshe Rabeinu need to take a walk down the spiritual ladder in order to speak to us?  Why do we have to make it so hard for him?  Can't we make it a little easier and come a little closer to his level?  That's the tochacha.

for the sake of bikurim

"B-reishis" = the world was created for the sake of reishis, the "reishis pri ha'adamah," the first fruits of bikurim which the farmer brings to the Mikdash, as described in the opening to our parsha.  

I don't mean to minimize the importance of bikurim, but let's be real -- if you asked 100 people to pick one mitzvah for which the world was created, most would answer things like learning Torah, saying shema, emunah.  Not bikurim.  What do Chazal see as so crucial in the mitzvah if bikurim?

When the farmer brings bikurim to the Mikdash in essence what he is saying is, "It's not me."  He may have plowed the field, he may have planted the seeds, he may have weeded, watered, tended the crops, and finally harvested, but the crops are not the product of his work alone.  By bringing bikurim the farmer is saying that it's not "kochi v'otzem yadi," but rather his success comes from Hashem.  

"V'lakach ha'kohen ha'teneh mi'yadecha" -- bikurim takes the fruit out of being "mi'yadecha," the work of your hands (alone), and acknowledges that it is a gift from Hashem.

"Lo achalti b'oni mi'menu" -- R' Shimon Sofer explains that the word "oni" can be interpreted as strength.  Ya'akov describes Reuvain as "kochi v'reishis oni," my first strength.  Again, the farmer is declaring that the fruit does not come from the strength of his labor, but rather is a gift from G-d.

What Chazal are telling us is that G-d created this thing we call "earth" with laws of nature that serve to obscure his presence and where humans can delude themselves into thinking they are in total control in order so that we might have the opportunity to make the biggest kiddush Hashem possible -- to pierce that veil and declare that Hashem is behind it all. Even if there was no physical world there could be angels who learn Torah, who say shema, who have emunah.  You don't need a world for that.  All that can take place in Heaven.  What you need a world for is so that we can declare, through our bikurim, that G-d is present even where he doesn't seem to be.

The Torah uses the term "higadti" when describing the farmer's speech to the kohen. Normally the term hagadah, as opposed to amirah or dibur, connotes harsh words.  The farmer is relating how G-d helped bring us to Eretz Yisrael and his asking for Hashem's bracha -- what's so harsh about what he is saying?

Here we have the kohen, says the Ishbitzer, who lives a holy life, who can cloister himself in the Mikdash, who is involved in Torah (Rambam end of Hil Shemitah) when he is not doing avodah.  Along comes a simple farmer with his basket of fruit and barges into that domain of kedusha.  You can picture him with his overalls, maybe with the mud from the field still on his workboots, marching up to the kohen and handing over that basket. The farmer then declares to the kohen, "Don't think you have an exclusive on G-d.  I may be out on the field working, I may be a simple farmer, but my basket of fruit is as valuable as what you are doing."  That's hagadah = kashe k'gidim, harsh words.  "Higadti l'Hashem Elokecha..." -- your G-d, reb kohen, is my G-d too.  My avodah is at least as valuable as yours.  Real holiness is not just when you live a life in the Mikdash, in the beis medrash, the life of the kohen.  Real holiness is when you live in the darkness of olam=he'elem, where G-d's presence is hidden, out in the field, out dealing with the struggles of the world, and you come with bikurim and declare that that "real" world is just a fake and what is real is G-d. 

Maybe this is what the Midrash Tanchuma means when it teaches that Moshe was troubled as to how we would get by without bikurim when we no longer had a Mikdash.   Moshe was not worried about the loss of korbanos or avodah -- holiness.  Moshe was worried more about the loss of a place where one could elevate the mundane and make even it holy. That's what bikurim is all about.

Hashem's answer to Moshe was that we will have 3 tefilos a day that will make up for the loss.  Tefilah reminds us (especially when you stop right in the middle of a work day for minchah!) that it's not the hard work we do that makes things happen, but it's G-d who is behind it all.  

Al dvar asher lo tza'akah -- sometimes you have to scream

The one factor, at least based on a superficial reading of the parsha, that distinguishes a case of ones from a case of znus is whether the woman screamed out or not.  "Al dvar asher lo tza'akah ba'ir" (22:24) -- the assumption is that if whatever happened took place in the city, the woman must be guilty as well or someone would have heard her screaming.

Ramban is bothered: why are we so hung up on the screaming?  Maybe this woman lives in NY and knows no one is going to respond to her screams anyway, like the Kitty Genovese story, so she doesn't scream -- she obviously is not still guilty.  The key question should be whether she was coerced or not, whether she engaged in an illicit act willfully, not whether she specifically screamed.    

Ramban answers that you have to say that screaming is lav davka and the Torah is just describing a typical case.

Sefas Emes, however, says screaming makes all the difference in the world.  Screaming is not just a siman, a way to raise an alarm, but screaming is the means to effect yeshu'a.  "Al dvar asher lo tza'akah ba'ir" -- because had she screamed, she surely would have been heard and saved.  Not seizing that opportunity is itself a crime.

(Without the Sefas Emes I think you have a bit of a pshat difficulty.  The Torah tells us exactly what the man did wrong -- "al asher inah..."  When it comes to the woman, if you read the pasuk like Ramban, it does not tell us anything.  It just gives us a siman, "asher lo tza'akah," and leaves us to infer that she therefore consented and committed an immoral act.  According to Sefas Emes, the failure to scream, the failure to avail oneself of the opportunity of rescue, is itself the crime.  It's not just an inference but the Torah is telling us exactly what was done wrong by the man and by the woman.) 

The Sefas Emes is not just a comment on this specific parsha, but is a comment on life.  There is a lot of stuff that does not befit us that we come in contact with due to our having to work in and live in a secular society.  What can you do -- ones!  We can't so easily change when and where we live.  The Sefas Emes is telling us that if it's really ones, then you should be screaming.  If you passively sit back and do nothing, or worse, accommodate yourself to the situation or enjoy he situation, then all bets are off.  If you want to be saved, you have to scream.  And if you do scream, you will be saved.   

(I had a very hard time trying to formulate this Sefas Emes.  For some reason earlier in the week I became fixated on writing this point up and then I couldn't let it go.  It became a mental block to my writing anything else.  After mulling it over for 2 days I don't like the results.  See S.E. in the Likutim, in 5634, and 5640 and see what you make of it.)

Even ha'Azel: special din of bitul Torah that applies only to a melech

(If you don't want any derush skip 1-4 but don't skip #5, the Even ha'Azel's beautiful chiddush based on a diyuk in Rambam.)

1. In Gertrude Himmelfarb's The Demoralization of Society (p 39) she quotes Hipployte Taine as saying, "The aim of every society must be a state of affiars in which every man is his own constable, until at least none other is required."  In other words, "Shoftim v'shotrim titen LECHA," you have to make yourself into the shofet and shoteir.  You have to develop a moral compass and police yourself. 

2. Ksav Sofer notes that the parsha that speaks of the appointment of a king the Torah uses the singular voice: "Asima alay melech.... Som tasim alecha melech..."   There is a din (O.C. 53:19) that when a congregation appoints a new chazzan, any single individual may object to the appointment (provided they can offer a legitimate reason for doing so).  There has to be no dissension with respect to the final choice.  So too, suggests the Ksav Sofer, when it comes to the appointment of a king, the people have to speak with unanimity, with one voice.  There can be no objections to the selection. 

I wonder if this reflects the reality.  David haMelech was chased across the countryside by Shaul -- it doesn't seem that even he had the unanimous consent of the people, at least at the time of his appointment. 

3. Speaking of Shaul haMelech (that last paragraph was an excuse to make a transition : )...   The parsha tells us that we cannot use sorcery or fortune telling like the other nations do.  Hashem instead gives us nevi'im to reveal to us what we need to know of the future.  The Netziv says a chiddush: if there is no navi to consult, if there is no other recourse, and we absolutely need information, then those other means are at our disposal as well.  If it's pikuach nefesh and the only way out is through sorcery, then you have to use it.  Why then, asks the Netziv, was Shaul punished for consulting the witch of Endor?  He was not getting an answer from the u'rim v'tumim or any other way and had no other choice? 

Netziv answers that Shaul was punished because he created the situation in which he found himself.  He killed the kohanim of Nov, he caused G-d not to be responsive to him, and so he was responsible for the outcome.  You can't put yourself in hot water and then cry ones and expect to be excused.  (There is a similar idea the Brisker Rav has on parshas Braishis -- see this post from 11 years ago.)

4. Not every king has access to a navi, and we for sure don't have access to a navi, but Chasam Sofer says the parsha has a solution for us without our having to go to fortune tellers.  "V'haya k'shivta al kisei mamlachto," when the king is sitting on his throne, the Torah tells us that he has to write a sefer Torah.  Chasam Sofer explains that when Klal Yisrael is on the level we are supposed to be on, our king is not sitting just on his throne -- he is sitting on Hashem's throne, as Hashem is the true king.  The melech is just his top representative down here.  So the parsha is not speaking about that ideal time.  The parsha is speaking about the b'dieved state, when the king is just on HIS throne.  There is no navi, there is no ruach hakodesh when we are in that state.  So where are we supposed to get answers from?  This Torah says when "k'shivto al kisei MAMLACHTO," (as opposed to malchus Hashem,) then write a sefer Torah, "V'kara bo kol y'mei chayav," and read about life in it.  You want answers -- learn Torah.  

A solution that applies to us as much as a king.

5. The Rambam (Melachim 3:5) writes that a king is not permitted to drink like a drunkard, but rather he is supposed to learn Torah and deal with the needs of Klal Yisrael day and night.  The Rambam quotes as proof this pasuk of "v'kara bo kol y'mei chayav." 

Don't all of us have to (ideally) learn Torah day and night, to the extent possible?  The Rambam in hil talmud Torah ch 1 paskens this way with respect to any Jew.  So why do we need a special din by a melech that he has to learn day and night? 

R' Isser Zalman Meltzer in the Even ha'Azel answers that there is a difference.  If you or I want to relax, we are free to sit down and have a beer, read a book, take a jog.  If that leads to some bitul Torah, we are excused.  Enjoying life is not assur.  Bitul Torah means deliberately not learning when one has nothing else to do and no other interest at the moment.  The melech, however, is different.  The melech is not allowed to sit back and relax with a beer or go for a jog.  He has an affirmative obligation to be engrossed in Torah and the needs of Klal Yisrael every moment, irrespective of his personal interests. 

When I saw this Even ha'Azel I understood in a completely different light the statement of "man malchai? -- Rabbanan."  The true kings are the Rabbis, talmidei chachamim, because only they, like kings, are engaged every moment in the dvar Hashem to the exclusion of their own interests and pleasures.

don't give tzedaka because it's a mitzvah

Last week's post generated some comments in response to my having written that someone who observes mishpatim simply because it's the right think to do still can call on  zechus avos because he/she is doing the right thing.  Since I opened that can of worms, let me continue on the same theme.  R' Simcha Zisel of Kelm makes a striking claim with respect to the mitzvah of tzedaka mentioned in this week's parsha.  It's davka not the person who gives to charity because it's a mitzvah who fulfills tzedaka to its fullest.  Rather, it's the person who empathizes with the poor and gives because he is moved by their needs who fulfills tzedaka to its fullest. 

R' Simcha Zisel sees tzedaka as an extension of v'ahavta l'rei'acha kamocha.  Most of us don't eat because it's a mitzvah -- we eat because we feel hungry.  Says R' Simcha Zisel, treat your fellow Jew in need the same way.  Don't feed your friend because it's a mitzvah.  Feed your friend because you empathize with his pain to such a degree that if he is hungry, you are hungry, and when you are hungry, you eat. 

R' Ya'akov Naiman in his Darkei Musar uses this yesod of R' Simcha Zisel to answer a question posed by the Maharasha.  The gemara in Kesubos (67) relates that Nakdimon ben Gurion was punished for not fulfilling the mitzvah of tzedaka properly.  Asks the gemara: Nakdimon ben Gurion was rich and give a fortune to tzedaka; how is it possible to say he did not fulfill the mitzvah properly?  The gemara gives two answers: 1) as much as he gave, he could have done more; 2) he gave for the kavod of giving.  Maharasha on the spot questions this second answer.  We know that someone who gives charity "al menas she'yichyeh b'ni," with ulterior motives, because he wants the zechus of tzedaka to bring a refuah to his child, is called a tzadik gamur.  So who cares of Nakdimon ben Gurion did it for the kavod!?  He should still go down on the books as a tzadik gamur!

Yes, says R' Naiman, someone who gives with ulterior motives is a tzadik and fulfills a mitzvah -- but that mitzvah is not the mitzvah of tzedaka.  When you giving is motivated by any reason other than empathy, other than truly identifying with the needs of another, that's not true tzedaka. 

The point of the mitzvah of tzedaka is not the ma'aseh nesina -- the act of giving -- but rather it's the chalos in the gavra of becoming a person who is sensitive to the needs of others.
Rashi quotes a derush that the Torah juxtaposes "aser te'aser" with "lo tevaseh g'di b'chaleiv imo" because G-d is telling us that if we don't give ma'aser he will be forced to be "mevashel gedi'im shel tevuah" = cause the grain to rot in its husk before it is fully ripe and ready to harvest.  OK, it's talking about ma'aser, ma'ser sheni, and not tzedaka, but Chazal learn ma'aser kesafim from this pasuk, so derech derush you can give me some leeway and in turn I will give you a tremendous Ishbitzer (from Ne'os Desheh, the Mei HaShiloach's son).  Someone who does not give properly is like that grain rotting in it's husk -- on the outside, everything looks OK, but when you peel back the shell, the husk, there is nothing there on the inside.  A person who lacks empathy, who is not moved by others needs to want to help them, is just an empty shell of a person.   

earning our own reward

V'haya eikev tishme'un es hamishpatim ha'eileh v'shamar Hashem Elokecha lecha es ha'bris v'es ha'chessed asher nishba l'avosecha.

Our parsha opens by telling us that if we observe the commandments, specifically mishpatim, then Hashem will fulfill his promise made to the avos and give us the brachos that follow.

If we are doing what we are supposed to, then shouldn't we deserve reward based on our own merits and actions, not because of the promise made to the avos?  (The Sefas Emes explains that the word v'haya, which always connotes simcha, appears here because Hashem has tremendous simcha when a person earns his own reward and doesn't receive gifts based on someone else's merit.)  Zechus avos is invoked when we have no other merits of our own to call on, not when we are doing everything right?

Maybe you can answer that question by way of another question.  Last week's parsha ends with the pasuk, "V'shamarta es ha'mitzvah v'es ha'chukim v'es ha'mishpatim..."  Meforshim are bothered by the fact that that pasuk lists off multiple categories of mitzvos -- mitzvah, chukim, mishpatim -- while the pasuk that opens our parsha refers only to the one category of mishpatim.  Why the difference?

Perhaps the point of our parsha is that even if we are not exactly doing what we are supposed to -- we are only fulfilling the logical laws of mishpatim that make sense to us, but are not on target with all the mitzvos and chukim -- nonetheless, Hashem will reward us because in addition to our own actions, we have zechus avos as well.

es Hashem Elokecha tira - l'rabos talmidei chachamim = community building

The gemara tells us that Shimon ha'Amsuni was able to darshen every single "es" in the Torah, but when he got to the pasuk, "Es Hashem Elokecha tira," "pireish," he could not go further.  R' Akiva, on the other hand, darshened even that "es."   It explained it as coming "l'rabos talmidei chachamim," to include havin awe of talmidei chachamim  (Pesachim 22)

When Shimon ha'Amsuni encountered the mitzvah of yirah, he thought the way to fulfill it was "pireish," through prishus=separating from the world, from the community, and digging inward to achieve self perfection.

R' Akiva, on the other hand, thought just the opposite.  One can achieve yirah by "l'rabos talmidei chachamim," by building the community, increasing the number of people involved in Torah and learning Torah.

Why was it R' Akiva in particular who was able to arrive at this insight?  R' Meir Shapira of daf yomi fame explained that R' Akiva early in life before he came to learning had an intense hatred for talmidei chachamim.  The Rambam writes that the way to correct a midah is to go to the opposite extreme.  Therefore, R' Akiva more than anyone else came to an intense love and appreciation for talmidei chachamim and their influence.

T"u b'Av -- a feminist holiday

The gemara at the end of Ta'anis tells us that the two biggest yamim tovim for Klal Yisrael were 15 Av and Yom Kippur.  On those days the girls would go out into the fields and dance and the boys would come and find their shidduch (simple solution to the shidduch crisis).  The girls who had money would say, "Marry us for our money," the girls who had yichus would say, "Marry for yichus!" and the girls who had nothing would say, "Marry l'shem shamayim and then afterwards give us gold jewelry."

We all know why Yom Kippur is a special day, and the gemara gives a hosts of reasons why 15 Av was a special day, among them that on that day the dor ha'midbar stopped dying for the sin of cheit ha'meraglim.  But why were these days in particular the days set aside to make shidduchim?  What does finding a girl to marry have to do with the nature of these days?

Secondly, what does the gemara mean when it tells us that the girls who said to get married added, "And buy us gold jewelry!"  It seems incongruous with the call to act "l'shem shamayim."  Were the girls who said that being disingenuous and just needed a way to snatch a boy when they had nothing else going for them?  Do we really have to be that cynical?   It's strange that the gemara even bothers add this line about gold when it has nothing to do with the shidduch itself.   Maharasha writes that it's just a "milsa b'alma," but maybe there is more to it.

There were two major sins that Klal Yisrael committed en route to Eretz Yisrael: 1) the sin of the cheit ha'eigel = abandoning G-d; 2) the sin of the meraglim = abandoning Eretz Yisrael.  There was one group of people, however, who did not involve themselves in either sin -- the women of Klal Yisrael.  By the cheit ha'eigel the women did not willingly turn over their gold jewelry to their husbands to make the golden calf.  When it came time to apportion Eretz Yisrael, it was the Bnos Tzelafchad who demonstrated their love of the land and demanded a portion. 

Yom Kippur is the tikun of the cheit ha'eigel.  On that day Hashem gave us the second luchos, a second chance after the first were broken by Moshe in response to the eigel. 

T"u b'Av is the day the dying of the generation of the midbar stopped.  It brought closure to the cheit ha'meraglim.

For the women who needed no tikun, these days are "feminist" holidays -- days when they could boast of their superiority.  Not holidays of modern feminism, where women want to be men, but Torah feminism, when women can be proud of their own stellar achievements.  On these days the women reach out to their male counterparts and call, "bachur, sa na einecha," lift up your eyes and look at the madreiga we reached!   These are days of shidduchim because on these days the bachurim reach out to find partners to help bring up their level of ruchniyus. 

The conclusion, "Adorn us in gold jewelry," is not just an aside, but is part of the whole message, explains the Sefas Emes in Likutim.  The women could boast that they deserved to be adorned with the gold that they did not turn over to the eigel, the gold that we men so eagerly surrendered for avodah zarah.

When we lost Eretz Yisrael and the Mikdash and went into galus, we lost T"u b'Av.  We lost the tikun for the cheit ha'meraglim.  All that is left is Yom Kippur, the tikun for the cheit of avodah zarah.

Maybe a reinvigoration of T"u b'Av is something to look forward to as we get closer to geulah.