the smell of gan eden

When Yitzchak smelled the clothes of Yaakov, now dressed as Eisav, he called out , “R’ei reiach bni k’reich sadeh asher beiracho Hashem.” The simple pshat I think is, like Ibn Ezra writes, that Eisav’s clothes had absorbed the smell of the outdoors -– not outdoors like the smog of NY City, but outdoors like the fragrant smell of country fields.  But that’s not how Rashi explains the pasuk.  Rashi writes that there is no more repulsive odor than that of the hairy hides that Eisav wore.  The sweet fragrance that Yitzchak smelled was not Eisav’s clothes, but rather was the odor of gan Eden that entered with Yaakov.

Sefas Emes (5647) asks: but the pasuk says that it was Eisav’s smelly clothes -– “bigadav” --  which Yitzchak sniffed, not some holy smell of gan eden.  How can Rashi ignore what the text says and substitute something else in its place? 

The Sefas Emes suggests an approach that puts together two ideas we've learned in the past.  Lets start with a gemara in Shabbos 152 that we spoke about a few years ago:

The rabbis taught: "Return the soul to the Lord as clean as He gave it to thee." This is illustrated by a parable of a king who once gave to his attendants suits of clothes. The wise among them took care of them, kept them clean and folded, and used them on special occasions only. The fools put them on and performed their work in them. Naturally, the clothes became dirty. All at once, the king demanded the clothes back again. The wise men returned them clean and whole, but the fools returned them in a dirty and dilapidated condition. The king was well pleased with the wise men, and told them to depart in peace, and had their clothes stored; but the clothes of the fools he ordered to be sent to the washers, and the fools were sent to prison.

Chazal are not interested in when or how we do laundry.  What Chazal are speaking of is how we treat our neshoma.  Sefas Emes quotes from the Zohar that when a person learns Torah his neshoma is dressed in the garb of the ruach of gan eden; when a person does mitzvos he dresses his neshoma in the levush of the nefesh of gan eden; when a person has holy thoughts and aspirations, he merits a suit of the neshoma of gan eden.  A person can also dress the neshoma in the shmutz of olam ha’zeh and make it filthy.   What kind of levush will the neshoma have on it when it comes time for it to return it its maker?

We learn from  “v’kibadito…” that one’s dress on Shabbos has to be different than the way one dresses during the week.  (In certain locales that seems to mean that you wear a suit and tie to work during the week in order to look professional, but come to shul Shabbos morning in Dockers and a casual shirt because it’s the weekend. I don't think that's what Chazal meant...)  Chazal here too are speaking about the neshoma: if you want to absorb the me’ein olam ha’ba of Shabbos then the neshoma needs the appropriate levush. 

In contrast, Rav Ben Tzion Mutzafi writes in his derashos that it was only because Yaakov put on the garments of his brother Eisav that he  was able to utter the words “Anochi Eisav bechorecha.”  Even if, as Rashi explains, this was not a direct lie (Anochi = I am who am I, and “Eisav bichorecha” = Eisav is the bechor), Yaakov would still not have done it if not for his having slipped on the levushim of Eisav.

Anyone who has heard the Carlebach story “Shvartze Wolf” knows that a person’s neshoma can have an exalted levush in the next world, but in this world we don’t see it and don’t sense it.  Someone who is one of the 36 tzadikim can look like just a simple woodchopper or beggar.  It’s hard for a levush that is so holy to make an appearance down here in olam ha’zeh. 

To again borrow from an idea in an old post, when you walk in the door late Friday afternoon and you smell the cholent on the stove, you smell the fresh challah, the kugel, etc. it’s like it’s Shabbos already even though the candles have not been lit -– the whiff of what’s coming makes the Shabbos a reality.  When Shabbos departs we comfort ourselves with besamim –- we want to keep a whiff of Shabbos, of aliya, with us, even though the day itself is gone.  So too, even though the levush of a great person may not really visible in this world, we are still able to pick up a whiff that there is something special there. 

“Va’yarach es rei’ach begadav” –- Yitzchak did smell the scent of the hides, the smell of Eisav, a foul smelling odor, exactly as the words say.  This was the levush of a man of the fields, not a yosheiv ohalim.  This is the pshat, the surface meaning of what happened.  But along with that, Yitzchak got a whiff of something else, of gan eden.   Yitzchak detected that there was something more here, something below the surface, something that is beyond pshat, beyond the olam ha'zeh appearance of things.   Therefore, he gave his bracha. 

korban pesach and the bracha of the Avos

1) My wife pointed out that it's only natural that Yitzchak, about whom we read last week "Vayeitzei Yitzchak la'suach ba'sadeh," should have an affinity for Eisav, the "ish sadeh."  See her post here for (among other things) another interesting diyuk: Eisav is an "ish sadeh," but Yaakov is not called an "ish ohalim" -- he is an "ish tam," which also connects with Yitzchak, but you have to read her post for more on that.

2) Rashi writes that the two sheep which Rivka prepared for Yaakov to serve to Yitzchak  were the korban pesach and korban chagigah.  Malbi”m explains that Pesach is the time when we reach l’ma’alah min ha’teva.  There is no way barring supernatural intervention that Klal Yisrael could have escaped the bondage of Mitzrayim and there was no way based purely on merit that we deserved to escape.  “Halalu ovzei avodah zarah v’halalu ovdei avodah zarah.”  Pesach means destiny trumps zechuyus/chiyuvim.  The bracha of the Avos that Yitzchak was going to pass on was a bracha that transcended any and all obstacles. 

Avraham the CEO?

1) Many meforshim see the pasuk “v’Avraham zakein… v’Hashem beirach es Avhraham ba’kol,” (24:1) which prefaces the parsha of Eliezer’s quest to find a bride for Yitzchak, as a justification of Avraham’s actions.   Why did Avraham Avraham send Eliezer and not take charge of things himself?  Why the need to administer an oath to Eliezer?  And why send him far away to find a bride for Yitzchak –- was there no local girl who wanted to marry Yitzchak? 

Avraham was blessed “ba’kol” – he had it all.  Surely a rich and powerful man, a CEO, cannot ignore managing his enterprise in order to personally make a long journey that can be delegated to others (Netziv).  And surely someone rich and powerful needs to take precautions lest his delegate be pressured, bribed, coerced –- hence the oath administered to Eliezer to not succumb to any impediments (Seforno).  And surely anyone would gladly marry into such a powerful family. Sending Elizer to look elsewhere was not for want of shidduch offers, but was Avraham’s deliberate choice (Rashbam).

All this would be true of any rich and powerful man.  But truthfully, it's hard to think of Avraham in those terms.  Sefas Emes writes that what motivated Avraham was not really protecting his wealth and power.  The focus of the pasuk is not WHAT Avraham had -– fame, riches, etc. -- but rather HOW Avraham got all that: “HASHEM beirach es Avraham ba'kol"  Avraham is not merely a powerful CEO -– Avraham is G-d’s CEO.  It's not his personal business that Avraham is out to protect, but rather G-d's business -- the mission of bringing kvod shamayim into the world.  Therefore, it was critical for Eliezer to find the right girl.

No one can really argue with a straight face that since "Hashem beirach" therefore they will only date a girl who wears size 2 or less.  That's not an argument of an Avraham Avinu.  If you really think "Hashem beirach" and gave you whatever talent, whatever mission you have, and you need a mate to match those she'ifos, then dress size is not on the list of what you are looking for.  "Hashem beirach" means it's not about me -- I'm just a kli for some higher purpose.  That's the hakdamah to Eliezer's mission and the hakdamah to what to look for in a shidduch. 
2) Simple pshat in (25:5) “vayitein Avraham es KOL asher lo l’Yitzchak” is that Avraham gave everything in his possession to Yitzchak.  However, the very next pasuk  (25:6) tells us that he gave gifts to the bnei ha’pilagshim as well.  So what does it mean when it says “KOL asher lo?”




Instead of emphasizing the first word, Sefas Emes puts the emphasis on the last: “kol asher LO.”  What really belongs to a person?  What does a person really want to give over -- what can a person really give over -- to their kids?  It’s not the bank account, or the house, or the new car.  Hashem told Avraham at the start his journey: “Lech LECHA…  el ha’aretz asher ar’eka.”  This mission is “LECHA” –- it belongs to you Avraham; you own it.  When it comes time to leave the world, that's what Avraham passes on to Yitzchak, and that mission is what has been continuously passed on through the generations until it has reached us.   

blind to the truth

1. “Ain ha’Shechina shurah elah m’toch simcha” -– simcha is a prerequisite to receiving nevuah.  Shem m'Shmuel (last piece in 5671) points out that since Avraham received a revelation of a malach who told him to stop what he was doing even as he had the knife in his hand ready to shecht Yitzchak, it must mean that he was b'simcha to fulfill the dvar Hashem even at that moment!
  
The nisayon of the akeidah was not whether Avraham would do what Hashem asked or not.  Disobeying a direct tzivuy from Hashem was not an option.  The nisayon was whether he would obey b’zerizus and b’simcha or not.  We all want to do mitzvos.  But how are we doing them?  Are they a burden, or are they something we approach b'simcha, even when it is hard?

2. Last week I circled back to a question from an old post: once the sons-in-law of Lot saw the angels smite the people of Sdom with blindness, why did they laugh when Lot told them that these same angels would destroy the city?  They just saw an open miracle –- wouldn’t they at least want to hedge their bets and run?

Kli Yakar answers that when Lot spoke to his sons-in-law he told them that Hashem -– the name associated with midas ha’rachamim -– is going to destroy the city.  This they thought impossible.  Surely the midas ha’rachamim could not be used for an act of destruction.

To me this answer seems overly technical.  If you hear that the city is going to be wiped out, is it really the time to quibble over whether the right shem Hashem was used in the announcement? 

Shem m’Shmuel (5680) here too says something insightful: The sons-in-law of Lot may not have suffered physical blindness like those who attacked Lot’s home, but they nonetheless were afflicted with spiritual blindness.  A person who wants to shut out the dvar Hashem can literally see miracles, but due to their own stubbornness, or their lack of mindfulness to the message, it will make no impression.  Seeing requires not just open eyes, but an open heart and mind as well.

yashrus of the Avos

Chazal call sefer Braishes “Sefer haYesharim,” the Book of the Just.  A “yashar” is someone who doesn’t cheat, doesn’t steal, doesn’t act with malice – a straight shooter, a mentch.  While I would take it as a compliment if someone described me as a yashar, when we are speaking about the Avos, points out the Netziv, it’s a bit of an understatement.  Why don’t Chazal call it the Book of Tzadikim?  The Book of Avos? 

There is a collection of talks given by R’ Eli Sadan after the Rabin assassination in which he repeatedly quotes the answer of the Netziv: the Avos lived surrounded by idolaters and evil doers whose lifestyle and beliefs were diametrically opposed to everything the Avos stood for.  The lifestyle of Sdom was an anathema to Avraham.  Nonetheless, the Avos never lashed out with hatred and/or violence.  To the contrary, we find Avraham praying for G-d to spare Sdom, Avraham extending hospitality to wandering idol worshippers, Avraham making a treaty with Avimelech, etc.  They Avos treated everyone they came in contact with -- even those with whom they had profound disagreements -- with respect and dignity, with yashrus.  That's an even harder challenge than having tzidkus in avodah. 

When Bilam saw Klal Yisrael camped in the desert, he exclaimed, “Tamos nafshi mos yesharim” –- I want to be able to go to the grave like the yesharim of that nation.  Bilam was “s’sum ha’ayin,” he certainly knew that he was not a real navi and did not have even a small percentage of the tzidkus of the Avos.  He did not even have a hava amina that he could be like them in that way.  But he thought al kol panim that at least he is a yashar, a mentch – he has derech eretz.  However, when he saw Klal Yisrael and the mesorah of the Avos,  he realized that even in this regard he was wrong.  His conception of derech eretz was no match for the true yashrus that the Avos embodied. 

you don't have to be orthodox to appreciate shabbos

In light of this week being the Shabbos Project I wanted to mention two books I recently read, neither of which is by someone who identifies as Orthodox, but both of which have something to say about Shabbos.  Braided – A Journey of a Thousand Challahs by Dr. Beth Ricanati is not really about challah, but rather is about time.  In today’s world the demands of one’s job can easily prove overwhelming and crowd out the important things in life.  Faced with the problem, Dr Ricanati has for years now made a point of taking time out every Friday to bake her own challah.  This simple weekly ritual helped her reconnect with her values, with her children, with herself, not to mention that it made Friday night dinner with her family more delicious and nutritious.
24/6 The Power of Unplugging One Day a Week by Tiffany Shane, the creator of the “webby awards,” talks about the need to disconnect.  She and her family do a “tech Shabbos” every week.  They shut off their iphones and devices and keep the world at bay for a day.  She is not shomer Shabbos in the way we think of it, but she recognizes the need for a day of quiet to escape.

You don’t have to be Orthodox to recognize that in our day and age Shabbos is more important than ever.

Avos == there have to be tolados

“Ayei ha’seh l’olah?” Yitzchak asks Avraham Avinu.  Where is the sheep for the offering?  The Alshich quotes a Midrash Rabbah (ch 96) that Yaakov did not want to be buried in Mitzrayim because Yisrael is called a “seh,” a sheep –- “seh pezurah Yisrael” (Yirmiyahu 50) –- and Egyptians worship the seh.   What Yitzchak was asking is if he is schechted, then how will there ever be a Yaakov Avinu, the seh?  How will the mesorah of the Avos continue?

Forget how will there be a Yaakov Avinu – if Yitzchak is shechted, how will there be a Yitzchak Avinu?!

What makes the Avos into Avos is that there is no concern for self.  The concern is always for the future, for the continuity of Klal Yisrael.  “Avos – m’chlal d’ika tolados.”  (B"K2)

"yesod gadol b'avodas Hashem" from the Chiddushei haRI"M

Rashi writes that there were people who did not believe the story we learn in Midrash that Avraham had been miraculously saved from the burning furnace that Nimrod had thrown him into.  Maybe they thought Avraham had great PR, great marketing, and this was all an exaggeration.  G-d therefore made a miracle in our parsha and enabled the King of Sdom to miraculously escape from a lime pit during the war of 4 kings against 5.  Once people saw that miracle, they retroactively had faith in Avraham's escape as well.
     
Ramban asks: if anything, the fact that the king of Sdom was saved should weaken people's emunah, not strengthen it.  If even the King of the most wicked city on the planet can have an escape that defies natural explanation, then how is Avraham's escape a proof of his tzidkus, his philosophy, his vision?  

Mizrachi gives the answer that probably is pashut pshat in Rashi: people had no belief in the concept of a miracle occurring until they saw it happen to the King of Sdom.  Once they grasped that such a concept was real, they could believe something similar happened to Avraham.
 
Maharal in Gur Aryeh explains that had it not been for Avraham's intervention, "team Sdom" would have been routed in the war.  These kingdoms had been subjugated for years and their attempt at rebellion was a failure.  Had G-d wanted to help Sdom, the time for it to happen was long before the lime pit episode.  The only reason for the miracle, the only reason for King Sdom being saved, was because Avraham was now fighting on his side. 
     
The Chidushei haRI"M uses this question of Ramban to teach us something fundamental about faith.  If all that was in the news was the miracle of Avraham being saved from a furnace, something extraordinary that no one could help but marvel at, then accepting the truth of Avraham's message would be a no-brainer.  For faith to be real, there has to be a possibility to choose not to believe. 

For people to have "faith" / emunah in the miracle of Avraham's escape, there had to be a similar miracle that occurred to the King of Sdom in order to level the playing field.  Counter intuitively, there had to be something that would give people a reason not to believe in order for their faith in Avraham to be real. 
     
We find a similar idea in Ramban in sefer Shmos.  G-d did not remove Pharoah's bechira by hardening his heart, explains Ramban, but rather he restored his bechira.  If all you see is miraculous plagues, then choosing to obey G-d is a no-brainer.  G-d muted the influence the plagues had on Pharaoh by hardening his heart in order to give him the option to disobey, so that he would have a true choice.
     
Ch haRI"m ends with an interesting historical observation.  He writes that the "olam" says that when the Besh"T revealed himself to the world there was a big tumult on high because the scales had been massively tilted in favor of greater avodas Hashem.  Therefore, a certain "lamdan" (the word he uses) had to come on the scene to take the opposing side to the BesH"T to balance things out.  Wow.
     
Now for my 2 cents: you need look no further than next week's parsha to find an example which seems to undermine the whole basis of the Ch haRI"m's argument.  Is it really true that given the example of an undeniable miracle people have no choice other than to believe?  The sons-in-law of Lot witnessed masses of people who ganged up against Lot being stricken with blindness by the angels, yet they still mocked the idea that Sdom would be destroyed.  They were so confident that they did not even leave town just as a matter of hedging their bets.  Why didn't the overt miracle convince them?
        
You have a whole week to think about that (or read this post from a decade ago).  Maybe I'll come back to it next week.
        
On to another point regarding emunah, also from the Ch haR"M, a point which he calls "ikar gadol b'avodas Hashem," and which puts the previous idea in a different light.
     
Hashem promised Avraham that he will be the father of a great nation.  Avraham responds (15:6), "V'he'emin b'Hashem va'yachshiveha lo tzedaka."  Who is the "lo" referred to in the pasuk?  Rashi interprets the pasuk to mean that Hashem gave credit to "lo" = Avraham for his unquestioning belief in Hashem's promise.  Ramban disagrees with Rashi's pshat.  Does a great navi like Avraham get credit simply for belief?  Ramban instead argues that the pasuk means that Avraham gave "lo" = to Hashem credit for promising him children independent of his merit -- it was a pure act of love and benevolence.
     
Ch haRI"m combines elements of both peshatim to arrive at a third approach.  He reads "lo" as referring to Hashem, like Ramban, but he reads "va'yichashveha" as referring not to the promise of children, but rather to Avraham's faith in G-d, like Rashi. 
     
What comes out of this peshara is an amazing reading of the pasuk: Avraham was thanking Hashem and giving Him credit for giving him the strength to believe in Hashem's words. 
     
The first Ch haR"IM we learned gave the impression that belief is a product of free choice of the individual.  This Ch haRI"M sends us in a completely different direction and teaches that ultimately, belief is a gift bestowed by Hashem. 
     
I don't think there is a contradiction here.  In its initial stage a person feels that he/she is choosing to believe, to accept G-d.  At some point the person progresses in their faith to the point that they see everything as the product of yad Hashem, even their initial choice to accept G-d in the first place.  It seems paradoxical -- I don't know if I've done justice to the idea.  It's striking that both yesodos appear in the same parsha.

what can be accomplished in a week

This idea is relevant to aseres ymei teshuvah, but what can I do -- the idea only came up here in parshas Noach.
     
Subtract Rosh haShana and Yom Kippur and aseres ymei teshuvah amounts to one week.  One week to correct a year, a lifetime's work of mistakes!  How is that possible?
     
Rashi observes that at the beginning of the parsha Noach is called a "tzadik tamim," yet when Hashem appears to Noach to tell him to enter the ark he tells him that "oscha ra'isi tzadik lifanei," he is a tzadik -- Hashem leaves out the word "tamim."
     
Ksav Sofer offers an original explanation (see Rashi for a different explanation) for the discrepancy: Rashi writes that Hashem delayed the command to enter the ark until the after the seven days of mourning for Mesushelach were completed.  Mesushelach was a tzadik, so long as he was alive, the flood was held off.  Ksav Sofer adds that so long as Mesushelach was alive, Noach was also not held accountable for failing to rebuke the people or for failing to daven on their behalf.  Why should he have that responsibility when there was a tzadik like Mesushelach around?  However, once Mesushelach died, the world rested on Noach's shoulders.  Since Noach at that point still remained passive and did nothing, some of the shine of his tzidkus was lost.  He was no longer a "tzadik tamim," but merely a "tzadik."
     
Mesushelach lived 969 years -- he literally had hundreds of years to try to make an impression on the people around him, to arouse them to teshuvah.  When he died, Noach had one week to step in and fill his shoes before the flood hit.  Imagine a shul where the Rabbi has held the pulpit for decades and has not made a dent in raising the religious observance of the community, not for lack of effort, but for lack of a receptive audience.  The Rabbi passes away, and the assistant Rabbi must now step in.  Are you going to hold the assistant accountable for failing to reach the community mamesh during the week of shiva of his predecessor when his predecessor couldn't reach them in the decades he served?!  Here too, what kind of knock it is on Noach's tzidkus when he couldn't do anything in only a week when Mesushelach was no more successful in centuries?!
     
Yet the Torah doesn't see things that way.  Who knows what you can accomplish is a week of dedicated effort?  Remember, Hashem would have saved Sdom had there only been a minyan of tzadikim there.  Noach didn't have to reach the entire world -- he could have focused on one, on a handful, of people and that might have tilted the balance to prevent the flood. 

babbling Babel

 וַיֹּאמְר֞וּ אִ֣ישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵ֗הוּ הָ֚בָה נִלְבְּנָ֣ה לְבֵנִ֔ים וְנִשְׂרְפָ֖ה לִשְׂרֵפָ֑ה וַתְּהִ֨י לָהֶ֤ם הַלְּבֵנָה֙ לְאָ֔בֶן וְהַ֣חֵמָ֔ר הָיָ֥ה לָהֶ֖ם לַחֹֽמֶר׃
    
     וַיֹּאמְר֞וּ הָ֣בָה׀ נִבְנֶה־לָּ֣נוּ עִ֗יר וּמִגְדָּל֙ וְרֹאשׁ֣וֹ בַשָּׁמַ֔יִם וְנַֽעֲשֶׂה־לָּ֖נוּ שֵׁ֑ם פֶּן־נָפ֖וּץ עַל־פְּנֵ֥י כׇל־הָאָֽרֶץ׃
     
The Netziv points out that the first pasuk here seems entirely redundant.  Who cares about the process involved in building the migdal Bavel?  Who cares if is was made of bricks or sticks and stones? 
    
Netziv suggests that the Torah mentions the brick furnace because that furnace has significance -- according to the Midrash that is where Nimrod threw Avraham as punishment for Avraham's rejection of idolatry.  The problem with this approach is ikar chaseir min ha'sefer -- the Torah mentions the furnace, but leaves out the entire back story (see Netziv who addresses this issue).
    
Malbim and Seforno see the two pesukim as reflection two groups of people or two stages in a progression.  At first, people simply wanted something better than tents or straw huts to live in, so they said to each other, "How about we try this new thing called a 'brick?'"  Folks were then able to build houses, to build cities.  But then along came another group of people, or people reached another stage of working with this new technology called the "brick," and they said why should we stop at houses?  Let's build a great tower, let's set up a centralized administration of big government. The rest is history.  Technology, whether it is bricks or the interweb, needs to be carefully managed.  What starts out as a good thing that can fill a need can quickly become misused.
    
Looking a little closer at the pesukim here, what is striking is the amount of dialogue that is going on.  "Va'yomru ish el reyeihu..."  "Va'yomru ahav niveh lanu ir..."  Why not just tell us that the people made bricks, the people made a tower, etc.  Why introduce each stage by telling us that there was a conversation that took place?
    
Furthermore, when Hashem punishes the people, he says, "Hein am echad **v'safah achas** l'kulam v'zeh hachilam la'asos..."  Again, the focus is on language -- having one language is the cause of wrongdoing.  Why not ban hammers since they used hammers to build, or ban bricks, since it was the use of bricks that started this whole process?  Why is it language that is identified as the source of the problem?
    
Man was created as a "ruach m'malela," with the exceptional capability of speech.  I know someone who is constantly talking about their job: the work, the frustrations, future plans, etc.  The entire "ruach" that gives this person chiyus is invested in their job.  Instead of just a means to make a living, their job is their life.  What a person talks about is who they are.  (Hashem gave us Torah sheba'al peh to do with our mouths for a good reason.)  The dor ha'palagah was not just interested in using technology -- they were interested in talking about technology, in investing their chiyus and ruach into technology.  You can just picture one of the people there saying to the other, "Did you get the latest brick 2.0?  I mean, how can you live without it?"  It's the "va'yomru lo," not the bricks or buildings, not the ipad or the interweb which is the problem.  Therefore, Hashem's punishment was addressed at language, not at bricks or ipads.
    
Sefas Emes (5632 and a few other places) quotes a play on words: the teivah of Noach = words of Torah.  What the Sefas Emes does NOT mean is that a person should withdraw from the secular world into an ivory tower of holy books/words.  Aderaba, what he means (look it up!) is that everything in the world, even that which appears as secular, is really a teivah that contains within it a spark of G-dliness.  But you have to look inside -- outside is just a bilbul, a mabul, a flood that drowns out the true meaning of things.  This is what the dor ha'palaga missed.  They were focused on the outside -- they settled in Shinar=Bavel because their words were just a bilbul, just noise, just an endless parade of tweets and posts, but lacking any true meaning and content.  The Torah says to go into the teivah, go find depth in everything.  Do you think you can find depth in a 200 character dashed off comment? 

Euthyphro dilemma and Chavah's mistake

Something like 13 years ago I quoted a chakirah from the Shiurei Da’as (vol 2 "Bein Yisrael l'Amim): are the laws of the Torah that tell us good vs bad a giluy milsa to the way teva works, and punishment and reward are just natural outcomes, or is it the mitzvos themselves that make things good (=keeping the law) or bad (=violating it) and reward and punishment are decrees, not consequences. 















This is a very old issue that goes back to the ancient Greeks and is known as the Euthyphro dilemma: Is something holy (moral) because it is loved by the gods, or is it loved by the gods because it is holy (or moral)? 
We once used this to explain the sin of Chavah.  When Chavah said the eitz ha'da'as was "tov lma'achal" when she was in effect saying was that really, the tree by its nature is something good to eat, but G-d imposed a decree upon us preventing us from eating it.  

I started thinking about the same issue again this year.  Chavah mistakenly thought she was not allowed to touch the eitz hada'as.  Rashi writes (3:4) that the nachash pushed Chavah into the tree to show her that nothing would happen if she touched it, and therefore, he argued that nothing would happen if she ate from it either.

The Sifsei Chachamim asks: this reasoning makes no sense.  Chavah was pushed into the tree against her will -- it was a case of ones.  Of course she would not be liable for that.  How can that be compared to willingly eating from the tree?

It must be that Chavah assumed that the prohibitions having to do with the tree were built into its nature.  G-d was simply revealing how teva works.  If come in contact with acid, even if someone pushed you into it, the claim of ones doesn't help -- the acid will burn you anyway.  Similarly, Chavah thought that by its nature the eitz hada'as was toxic.  When the nachash proved to her otherwise, her mental castle fell apart. 

rav chessed v'emes -- hoshana rabbah

A few weeks ago when the Y"T season started we started saying slichos with the 13 midos ha'rachamim, "Hashem Hashem K-l rachum v'chanun... v'rav chessed v'emes."  I think most of us would say that we hope the court upstairs does not judge us based on the "whole truth and nothing but the truth," because then we would be in big trouble.  We want Hashem's thumb on the scale tilting it in our favor -- that's what chessed, rachum, chanun, is all about.  So how is it that "emes" is one of the 13 midos ha'rachamim?  How can truth possibly work in our favor?

The Maharal often distinguishes between properties of a thing that are b'etzem and those that are b'mikreh.  All the books on child rearing say never criticize the child -- only criticize the behavior.  Johnny is b'etzem a good boy, just right now b'mikreh because he hasn't had his nap and instead had 6 pounds of sugar candy he is acting like a monster. 

The Kohzhiglover says that's the pshat in our 13 midos.  Yes, we did aveiros.  But that's not the truth of who we are.  We're in galus, we're surrounded by all kinds of bad influences, we have all kinds of distractions -- b'mikreh, we end of sinning.  But b'etzem, if you look at who we really are, and it's only Hashem that can really see who we really are underneath all the bad behavior on the surface, then the "emes" is that we are innocent.

Hoshana Rabbah is 26 days after the creation of mankind.  25 Elul was the day man was created; we are now 26, gematriya shem Havaya, days later.  The shem Havaya means this day represents the real essence, the etzem, of who a person really us.  We know the 4 minim represent the 4 types of Jews, some with ta'am and reiach, taste and smell, Torah and mitzvos, and then you have the aravah that has nothing -- no taste, no smell, no Torah, no mitzvos.  Yet it's the aravah that we take in our hand and put in parade this day.  Even if you've got nothing, it doesn't matter -- that's b'mikreh. Today we focus on the etzem, and the etzem of a Jew is always good.

Ramban writes that positive things need to be translated into concrete action.  When a navi got a message, he often would do something concrete -- when the message is translated into something concrete, it becomes more real.  Sukkos has a multitude of concrete mitzvos for us to do -- lulav, esrog, sukkah.  Shmini Atzeres comes along and we have nothing.  At least on Shavuos we have cheesecake, but Shmini Atzeres doesn't even have that. 

Maharal writes that the number 8 represents going beyond teva.  7 days is the natural cycle of the world as it was created; 8 is outside the boundaries, outside the lines.  During Sukkos we want to bring the ruchniyus into our world so we need concrete mitzvos, kelim, to contain the ohr.  Shmini Atzeres is 8 -- we are outside the boundaries.  It's not about bringing ohr into the concrete world, but rather about bringing ourselves to a place outside the normal confines of teva, outside the concrete and finite that is the day to day of our lives.  Shmini Atzeres if the extra mile, the extra 10% of the 110% we need to give. 

fleishig bread

Most of the time we keep the bread on the table parve and the leftover challah makes for perfect French toast after Shabbos/yom tov.  It doesn't always work out, and so over Y"T we ended up with half a challah that was fleishig.  My wife put it away and later used it for a bread kugel. 

There is a din (Y.D. 97) that we don't bake milchig or fleishig bread to eat with a milchig or fleishig meal.  The reason is because one may get things mixed up and assume the bread is parve and end up eating either milchig bread with fleishigs or vice versa.  I found that the Badei HaShulchan not in that siman, but earlier in siman 91 (s.k. 17), asks why the same din does not apply to leftover bread -- why not say that once your bread became milchig or fleishig by coming in contact with things on the table that it has the same din as bread baked milchig or fleishig and cannot be eaten?  He notes that the minhag ha'olam is to do what we did and not throw out the bread, but he leaves it as a tzarich iyun as to how this works.

I hadn't thought about it before I saw his comment.

sukkah and Eretz Yisrael

The Mishnayos and gemara frequently use the term "going up" into the sukkah, e.g. the Mishna (2:5) says that Rabban Gamliel and R' Yochanan ben Zakai were brought food and they said "he'alum la'sukkah," bring it up to the sukkah. The simple explanation for the term is that the sukkot in the times of Chazal were built on roofs or balconies. However, al pi derush perhaps Chazal are hinting to us that going into the sukkah is a spiritual aliya (R' Avraham Shapira; see Bnei Yisaschar for a kabbalistic interpretation.)

I would like to suggest that there is an additional connotation to the term that Chazal might have had in mind. The Sefas Emes (5650, see R' Avrohom Schor in Lekach v'Libuv 5760/61) writes that the sukkah has connection to the kedusha of Ererz Yisrael. Similarly, the Radomsker in Tiferes Shlomo asks what happened to Hashem's promise at yetzi'as Mitzrayim to bring Klal Yisrael into Eretz Yisrael? Justice delayed is justice denied -- it took 40 years in the desert passed before we got to Eretz Yisrael!  The Radomsker answers that during those 40 years we had sukkos -- we were in fact living in the avir of Eretz Yisrael. Way back in 2007 I posted that as far as I can figure out (others in the comments disagreed) there are only2 mitzvos you can do while sleeping: 1) yeshivas sukkah; 2) yishuv Eretz Yisrael.  Like they say, half the job is just showing up; all you have to do is show up and be in the sukkah, be in Eretz Yisrael, and you've accomplished something.  Maybe that's why Chazal use the term aliya with respect to sukkah.  When we hear the term "aliya" we think of the mitzvah of going to Eretz Yisrael.  Maybe that's exactly what Chazal intended to remind us of when we enter the sukkah. 
    
The Tur writes that the holiday of Pesach corresponds to Avraham, Shavuos to Yitzchak, Sukkos to Yaa'kov. Pesach marks our formation as a nation. Shavuos marks our getting the Torah.  Yaakov made his sukkot when settled the outstanding feud with Eisav and returned home to Eretz Yisrael.  The three chagim stand for the three essential pillars that define us -- nationhood, Torah, and Eretz Yisrael.         

leishev ba'sukkah on sleeping

The Rosh (Sukkah 4:3) asks why it is that we don't say a "leishev ba'sukkah" on sleeping in the sukkah.  Two answers: 1) If it should happen that you don't fall asleep the "leishav ba'sukkah" would be a bracha l'vatala, so we don't say it; 2) Rabeinu Tam argues that ke'va is defined as having a meal (everything we Jews do revolves around food); sleeping, learning, schmoozing and everything else you do in the sukkah are all tafeil to the seudah and are covered by the bracha of "leishev" done at the meal. 

A possible nafka mina: what if someone ate at a neighbor's house and came home to sleep in his own sukkah (or what if one had nothing to eat)?  According to the first answer, there would still be no requirement to say "leishev" before going to sleep.  However, one could argue that according to Rabeinu Tam the "leishev" on the keviyus in a different sukkah has no connection to your sukkah and a bracha would be required.  Aruch haShulachan even suggests that even though Rama paskens like Rabeinu Tam and we usually only recite a "leishev ba'sukkah" when we have a meal in the sukkah (GR"A disagrees), that is only the case when you are sitting in your own sukkah and all the other activities of the day are tafeil to the meal you ate there.  If you go to visit a friend and sit there for awhile, even if you have no meal, you would need to say a bracha there.

Be that as it may, a question to ponder: what's the difference between the bracha of "leishev" on sleeping, which we avoid lest one fail to doze off and it be a bracha l'vatala, and the bracha of "ha'mapil" that we recite every night before going to sleep?  Why are we not concerned lest a person fail to doze off and that bracha be a bracha l'vatala?

(If you are going to tell me ha'mapil is a birchas ha'shevach, pls be prepared to defend that assertion.  And please don't bother to tell me about Brisker shitos on not reciting ha'mapil -- I'm obviously asking according to Shulchan Aruch psak.)

Shirah -- how to look at the world

Al regel achas: the concept of the "shirah" of haazinu comes from the same root as "ashurenu v'lo karov" (in parshas balak) -- it refers to seeing.  Shirah is about how we see the world.  Do things just happen, or is it "haTzur tamim pa'alo?"

The Rambam writes that the mitzvah of "kisvu lachem es hashirah ha'zos" refers to writing shiras haazinu.  However, since there is din that you can't write a sefer of an individual parsha, so m'meila you have to write an entire sefer Torah.

To be able to see the world properly, to absorb the shirah-vision, one needs the context of kol hatorah.  The individual parshiyos of life, of history, may not make sense on their own unless they are put in broader context.

Becha chosmin -- Yom Kippur is the chag of chessed

Neila is the time of the chasimas ha'din.  "Chasmeinu l'chaim...". Rashi in parshas Lech Lecha comments that the brachos given to Avraham, "v'e'escha l'goy gadol va'avarechicha..." etc refer to the fact that we mention the Avos in our shmoneh esrei -- Elokei Avraham, Elokei Yitzchak, v'Elokei Yaakov.  Rashi continues, "yachol yehiyu **chosmin** b'kulan?  Talmud lomar 'v'heyei bracha' -- becha chosmin."  We end the bracha "magen Avraham" -- the chasima is only with Avraham's name.  The Tiferes Shlomo quotes the Tikunei Zohar that Rosh haShana, "vaHashem pakad es Sarah...," is the holiday of Yitchak; the Tur (417) writes that Sukkos is the holiday of Yaakov, "ulmikneihu asah sukkos." Yom Kippur, says the Tif Shlomo, is the holiday of Avraham Avinu, and particularly neila, the chasima, is in his merit -- becha chosmin.  Avraham personified the midah of chessed, and it is only through chasdei Hashem that we are given a chasima ltovah.

How do we earn chasdei Hashem?  By emulating Avraham and doing chessed ourselves.

On erev Y"K there is a halacha of ritzuy.  True, the shulchan aruch says this means that we should ask each other for forgiveness, but, as the Sefas Emes explains, that's not exactly all that ritzuy means.  Tikabeil brachamim ub'**ratzon** tifilaseinu.  Y'yehu na amareinu **l'ratzon**. We want Hashem to want to listen to us and want to accept our tefilos.  How do we earn that?  By doing ritzuy ourselves, which means that we should not just forgive, not  just to tolerate, but that we should have "ratzon" for our friends -- we should want good for them.

Wishing you all a gmar chasima tovah, that our tefilos should be accepted bratzon, that we be zocheh to chasdei Hashem, and that we be zocheh to see the good in others and accept each other b'ratzon as well.  

Oseh ha'shalom

Although there seems to be an old established minhag to change the ending of the last bracha of shmoneh esrei from ha'mevarech es amo yisrael ba'shalom to oseh ha'shalom during the aseres ymei teshuvah, many (I would say most) shuls these days opt to keep the standard ending rather than tamper with the nusach of the chasimas habracha.  I've noticed most of these same shuls have no problem on Yom Tov changing the chasimas habracha of retzey from ha'machazir Shechinaso l'Tzion to she'odcha levadcha b'yirah naavod.

Tartei d'sasrei, or can you come up with a difference?

mitzvah of hakhel

Ramban writes that the children who the Torah says should be brought to hakhel, "u'bneihem asher lo yad'u yishm'u v'lamdu," must be children of the age of chinuch, otherwise how could they learn anything by coming -- what kind of "lamdu" could there be for children too young to understand anything.  However, continues Ramban, it does not appear from the gemara that this is the case, as the gemara quotes R' Elazer ben Azarya as saying that the children are brought "litein schar l'mivi'eihem," only to give their parents more reward for shlepping them. The Minchas Chinuch goes so far as to suggest that even newborns should be brought, as there is no shiur given for the definition of "taf."

The question of what age child should be brought may hinge on what the purpose of the mitzvah of hakhel is. "L'ma'an yishm'u u'lma'an yilmidu v'yar'u es Hashem Elokeichem" (31:12): Is the mitzvah of hakhel one of limud, and yiras shamayin is a byproduct, or is the mitzvah to inculcate yiras shamayim, and the limud is just a means to set the stage and create the experience that engenders yirah?

Ramban clearly views the mitzvah as one of limud. Therefore, only children who are old enough to learn and understand need to be brought. Contrast that with the language of the Rambam (Chagigah 3:6):

 אפילו חכמים גדולים שיודעים כל התורה כולה, חייבין לשמוע בכוונה גדולה יתרה.  ומי שאינו יכול לשמוע--מכוון ליבו לקריאה זו, שלא קבעה הכתוב אלא לחזק דת האמת; ויראה עצמו כאילו עתה נצטווה בה, ומפי הגבורה שומעה--שהמלך שליח הוא, להשמיע דברי ה-ל

According to the Rambam, even chachamim who are already versed in the pesukim must participate in hakhel, and even those who cannot hear must try to be attentive to the kriah. In other words, even when there is no limud involved, the mitzvah still applies.  The purpose of the kri'ah is not learning, but rather the  because the purpose is "l'chazek das ha'emes" -- the inculcate yiras shamayim.
   
The tension between the two elements of the mitzvah can be seen in the pesukim themselves. The parsha first tells us "mikeitz sheva shanim... tikra es haTorah ha'zos" -- read from the Torah. But then the parsha continues "hakhel es ha'am..." -- the miztvah is for the nation to gather together. Sadya Gaon in fact counts these as two seperate mitzvos: one to read the Torah, one to gather together. The majority of monei ha'mitzvos, however, count them as one mitzvah.  The question is which element is the engine and which is the caboose -- is the ultimate goal limud haTorah, and that's what the nation gathers for, or is the experience of coming together, children included, and end in itself, and the Torah reading is just a means to get us together. 

(A bit of derush: Shouldn't the order of the pesukim be reversed?  First the people have to gather -- "hakhel es ha'am" -- and only then is the Torah read -- "tikra es haTorah ha'zos."  Why does the parsha put it the other way around?  Maor vaShemesh explains that the "Torah ha'zos" that is read to the people, the Torah that they are supposed to learn and take with them, is "hakhel is ha'am" -- we have to come together as a people, men, women, and children included.)
   
See Shu"T Binyan Av vol 2 re: the parallel between the idea of bringing even little children to hear megilas esther and the mitzvah of hakhel.

Yesh tikvah l'achriseich

I think there are two elements that contribute to 'ha'ben yakir li  Ephraim' bring chosen as the haftarah for the second day of Rosh haShana:

1) As a parallel to the kriah on the first day which speaks about our matriarch Sarah and Hashem's fulfillment of her desire to have a child we read about our matriarch Rachel and her desire for the return of all her children.

2) Lest a person think that the job of repentance is too great and too overwhelming we read the words "yesh tikvah l'achriseich," Hashem's encouragement not to give up hope.

I don't know how you can read the final words of that pasuk, "v'shavu banim li'gevulam," without being moved by the fact that for hundreds and hundreds of years Jews have read this promise of return and it was always a distant dream, but we have been zocheh to see it happening in our lifetime.