וַיֹּאמְר֞וּ אִ֣ישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵ֗הוּ הָ֚בָה נִלְבְּנָ֣ה לְבֵנִ֔ים וְנִשְׂרְפָ֖ה לִשְׂרֵפָ֑ה וַתְּהִ֨י לָהֶ֤ם הַלְּבֵנָה֙ לְאָ֔בֶן וְהַ֣חֵמָ֔ר הָיָ֥ה לָהֶ֖ם לַחֹֽמֶר׃
וַיֹּאמְר֞וּ הָ֣בָה׀ נִבְנֶה־לָּ֣נוּ עִ֗יר וּמִגְדָּל֙ וְרֹאשׁ֣וֹ בַשָּׁמַ֔יִם וְנַֽעֲשֶׂה־לָּ֖נוּ שֵׁ֑ם פֶּן־נָפ֖וּץ עַל־פְּנֵ֥י כׇל־הָאָֽרֶץ׃
The Netziv points out that the first pasuk here seems entirely redundant. Who cares about the process involved in building the migdal Bavel? Who cares if is was made of bricks or sticks and stones?
Netziv suggests that the Torah mentions the brick furnace because that furnace has significance -- according to the Midrash that is where Nimrod threw Avraham as punishment for Avraham's rejection of idolatry. The problem with this approach is ikar chaseir min ha'sefer -- the Torah mentions the furnace, but leaves out the entire back story (see Netziv who addresses this issue).
Malbim and Seforno see the two pesukim as reflection two groups of people or two stages in a progression. At first, people simply wanted something better than tents or straw huts to live in, so they said to each other, "How about we try this new thing called a 'brick?'" Folks were then able to build houses, to build cities. But then along came another group of people, or people reached another stage of working with this new technology called the "brick," and they said why should we stop at houses? Let's build a great tower, let's set up a centralized administration of big government. The rest is history. Technology, whether it is bricks or the interweb, needs to be carefully managed. What starts out as a good thing that can fill a need can quickly become misused.
Looking a little closer at the pesukim here, what is striking is the amount of dialogue that is going on. "Va'yomru ish el reyeihu..." "Va'yomru ahav niveh lanu ir..." Why not just tell us that the people made bricks, the people made a tower, etc. Why introduce each stage by telling us that there was a conversation that took place?
Furthermore, when Hashem punishes the people, he says, "Hein am echad **v'safah achas** l'kulam v'zeh hachilam la'asos..." Again, the focus is on language -- having one language is the cause of wrongdoing. Why not ban hammers since they used hammers to build, or ban bricks, since it was the use of bricks that started this whole process? Why is it language that is identified as the source of the problem?
Man was created as a "ruach m'malela," with the exceptional capability of speech. I know someone who is constantly talking about their job: the work, the frustrations, future plans, etc. The entire "ruach" that gives this person chiyus is invested in their job. Instead of just a means to make a living, their job is their life. What a person talks about is who they are. (Hashem gave us Torah sheba'al peh to do with our mouths for a good reason.) The dor ha'palagah was not just interested in using technology -- they were interested in talking about technology, in investing their chiyus and ruach into technology. You can just picture one of the people there saying to the other, "Did you get the latest brick 2.0? I mean, how can you live without it?" It's the "va'yomru lo," not the bricks or buildings, not the ipad or the interweb which is the problem. Therefore, Hashem's punishment was addressed at language, not at bricks or ipads.
Sefas Emes (5632 and a few other places) quotes a play on words: the teivah of Noach = words of Torah. What the Sefas Emes does NOT mean is that a person should withdraw from the secular world into an ivory tower of holy books/words. Aderaba, what he means (look it up!) is that everything in the world, even that which appears as secular, is really a teivah that contains within it a spark of G-dliness. But you have to look inside -- outside is just a bilbul, a mabul, a flood that drowns out the true meaning of things. This is what the dor ha'palaga missed. They were focused on the outside -- they settled in Shinar=Bavel because their words were just a bilbul, just noise, just an endless parade of tweets and posts, but lacking any true meaning and content. The Torah says to go into the teivah, go find depth in everything. Do you think you can find depth in a 200 character dashed off comment?
Thursday, October 31, 2019
Thursday, October 24, 2019
Euthyphro dilemma and Chavah's mistake
Something like 13 years ago I quoted a chakirah from the Shiurei Da’as (vol 2 "Bein Yisrael l'Amim): are the laws of the Torah that tell us good vs bad a giluy milsa to the way teva works, and punishment and reward are just natural outcomes, or is it the mitzvos themselves that make things good (=keeping the law) or bad (=violating it) and reward and punishment are decrees, not consequences.
This is a very old issue that goes back to the ancient Greeks and is known as the Euthyphro dilemma: Is something holy (moral) because it is loved by the gods, or is it loved by the gods because it is holy (or moral)?
We once used this to explain the sin of Chavah. When Chavah said the eitz ha'da'as was "tov lma'achal" when she was in effect saying was that really, the tree by its nature is something good to eat, but G-d imposed a decree upon us preventing us from eating it.
I started thinking about the same issue again this year. Chavah mistakenly thought she was not allowed to touch the eitz hada'as. Rashi writes (3:4) that the nachash pushed Chavah into the tree to show her that nothing would happen if she touched it, and therefore, he argued that nothing would happen if she ate from it either.
The Sifsei Chachamim asks: this reasoning makes no sense. Chavah was pushed into the tree against her will -- it was a case of ones. Of course she would not be liable for that. How can that be compared to willingly eating from the tree?
It must be that Chavah assumed that the prohibitions having to do with the tree were built into its nature. G-d was simply revealing how teva works. If come in contact with acid, even if someone pushed you into it, the claim of ones doesn't help -- the acid will burn you anyway. Similarly, Chavah thought that by its nature the eitz hada'as was toxic. When the nachash proved to her otherwise, her mental castle fell apart.
This is a very old issue that goes back to the ancient Greeks and is known as the Euthyphro dilemma: Is something holy (moral) because it is loved by the gods, or is it loved by the gods because it is holy (or moral)?
We once used this to explain the sin of Chavah. When Chavah said the eitz ha'da'as was "tov lma'achal" when she was in effect saying was that really, the tree by its nature is something good to eat, but G-d imposed a decree upon us preventing us from eating it.
I started thinking about the same issue again this year. Chavah mistakenly thought she was not allowed to touch the eitz hada'as. Rashi writes (3:4) that the nachash pushed Chavah into the tree to show her that nothing would happen if she touched it, and therefore, he argued that nothing would happen if she ate from it either.
The Sifsei Chachamim asks: this reasoning makes no sense. Chavah was pushed into the tree against her will -- it was a case of ones. Of course she would not be liable for that. How can that be compared to willingly eating from the tree?
It must be that Chavah assumed that the prohibitions having to do with the tree were built into its nature. G-d was simply revealing how teva works. If come in contact with acid, even if someone pushed you into it, the claim of ones doesn't help -- the acid will burn you anyway. Similarly, Chavah thought that by its nature the eitz hada'as was toxic. When the nachash proved to her otherwise, her mental castle fell apart.
Sunday, October 20, 2019
rav chessed v'emes -- hoshana rabbah
A few weeks ago when the Y"T season started we started saying slichos with the 13 midos ha'rachamim, "Hashem Hashem K-l rachum v'chanun... v'rav chessed v'emes." I think most of us would say that we hope the court upstairs does not judge us based on the "whole truth and nothing but the truth," because then we would be in big trouble. We want Hashem's thumb on the scale tilting it in our favor -- that's what chessed, rachum, chanun, is all about. So how is it that "emes" is one of the 13 midos ha'rachamim? How can truth possibly work in our favor?
The Maharal often distinguishes between properties of a thing that are b'etzem and those that are b'mikreh. All the books on child rearing say never criticize the child -- only criticize the behavior. Johnny is b'etzem a good boy, just right now b'mikreh because he hasn't had his nap and instead had 6 pounds of sugar candy he is acting like a monster.
The Kohzhiglover says that's the pshat in our 13 midos. Yes, we did aveiros. But that's not the truth of who we are. We're in galus, we're surrounded by all kinds of bad influences, we have all kinds of distractions -- b'mikreh, we end of sinning. But b'etzem, if you look at who we really are, and it's only Hashem that can really see who we really are underneath all the bad behavior on the surface, then the "emes" is that we are innocent.
Hoshana Rabbah is 26 days after the creation of mankind. 25 Elul was the day man was created; we are now 26, gematriya shem Havaya, days later. The shem Havaya means this day represents the real essence, the etzem, of who a person really us. We know the 4 minim represent the 4 types of Jews, some with ta'am and reiach, taste and smell, Torah and mitzvos, and then you have the aravah that has nothing -- no taste, no smell, no Torah, no mitzvos. Yet it's the aravah that we take in our hand and put in parade this day. Even if you've got nothing, it doesn't matter -- that's b'mikreh. Today we focus on the etzem, and the etzem of a Jew is always good.
Ramban writes that positive things need to be translated into concrete action. When a navi got a message, he often would do something concrete -- when the message is translated into something concrete, it becomes more real. Sukkos has a multitude of concrete mitzvos for us to do -- lulav, esrog, sukkah. Shmini Atzeres comes along and we have nothing. At least on Shavuos we have cheesecake, but Shmini Atzeres doesn't even have that.
Maharal writes that the number 8 represents going beyond teva. 7 days is the natural cycle of the world as it was created; 8 is outside the boundaries, outside the lines. During Sukkos we want to bring the ruchniyus into our world so we need concrete mitzvos, kelim, to contain the ohr. Shmini Atzeres is 8 -- we are outside the boundaries. It's not about bringing ohr into the concrete world, but rather about bringing ourselves to a place outside the normal confines of teva, outside the concrete and finite that is the day to day of our lives. Shmini Atzeres if the extra mile, the extra 10% of the 110% we need to give.
The Maharal often distinguishes between properties of a thing that are b'etzem and those that are b'mikreh. All the books on child rearing say never criticize the child -- only criticize the behavior. Johnny is b'etzem a good boy, just right now b'mikreh because he hasn't had his nap and instead had 6 pounds of sugar candy he is acting like a monster.
The Kohzhiglover says that's the pshat in our 13 midos. Yes, we did aveiros. But that's not the truth of who we are. We're in galus, we're surrounded by all kinds of bad influences, we have all kinds of distractions -- b'mikreh, we end of sinning. But b'etzem, if you look at who we really are, and it's only Hashem that can really see who we really are underneath all the bad behavior on the surface, then the "emes" is that we are innocent.
Hoshana Rabbah is 26 days after the creation of mankind. 25 Elul was the day man was created; we are now 26, gematriya shem Havaya, days later. The shem Havaya means this day represents the real essence, the etzem, of who a person really us. We know the 4 minim represent the 4 types of Jews, some with ta'am and reiach, taste and smell, Torah and mitzvos, and then you have the aravah that has nothing -- no taste, no smell, no Torah, no mitzvos. Yet it's the aravah that we take in our hand and put in parade this day. Even if you've got nothing, it doesn't matter -- that's b'mikreh. Today we focus on the etzem, and the etzem of a Jew is always good.
Ramban writes that positive things need to be translated into concrete action. When a navi got a message, he often would do something concrete -- when the message is translated into something concrete, it becomes more real. Sukkos has a multitude of concrete mitzvos for us to do -- lulav, esrog, sukkah. Shmini Atzeres comes along and we have nothing. At least on Shavuos we have cheesecake, but Shmini Atzeres doesn't even have that.
Maharal writes that the number 8 represents going beyond teva. 7 days is the natural cycle of the world as it was created; 8 is outside the boundaries, outside the lines. During Sukkos we want to bring the ruchniyus into our world so we need concrete mitzvos, kelim, to contain the ohr. Shmini Atzeres is 8 -- we are outside the boundaries. It's not about bringing ohr into the concrete world, but rather about bringing ourselves to a place outside the normal confines of teva, outside the concrete and finite that is the day to day of our lives. Shmini Atzeres if the extra mile, the extra 10% of the 110% we need to give.
fleishig bread
Most of the time we keep the bread on the table parve and the leftover challah makes for perfect French toast after Shabbos/yom tov. It doesn't always work out, and so over Y"T we ended up with half a challah that was fleishig. My wife put it away and later used it for a bread kugel.
There is a din (Y.D. 97) that we don't bake milchig or fleishig bread to eat with a milchig or fleishig meal. The reason is because one may get things mixed up and assume the bread is parve and end up eating either milchig bread with fleishigs or vice versa. I found that the Badei HaShulchan not in that siman, but earlier in siman 91 (s.k. 17), asks why the same din does not apply to leftover bread -- why not say that once your bread became milchig or fleishig by coming in contact with things on the table that it has the same din as bread baked milchig or fleishig and cannot be eaten? He notes that the minhag ha'olam is to do what we did and not throw out the bread, but he leaves it as a tzarich iyun as to how this works.
I hadn't thought about it before I saw his comment.
There is a din (Y.D. 97) that we don't bake milchig or fleishig bread to eat with a milchig or fleishig meal. The reason is because one may get things mixed up and assume the bread is parve and end up eating either milchig bread with fleishigs or vice versa. I found that the Badei HaShulchan not in that siman, but earlier in siman 91 (s.k. 17), asks why the same din does not apply to leftover bread -- why not say that once your bread became milchig or fleishig by coming in contact with things on the table that it has the same din as bread baked milchig or fleishig and cannot be eaten? He notes that the minhag ha'olam is to do what we did and not throw out the bread, but he leaves it as a tzarich iyun as to how this works.
I hadn't thought about it before I saw his comment.
Thursday, October 17, 2019
sukkah and Eretz Yisrael
The Mishnayos and gemara frequently use the term "going up" into the sukkah, e.g. the Mishna (2:5) says that Rabban Gamliel and R' Yochanan ben Zakai were brought food and they said "he'alum la'sukkah," bring it up to the sukkah. The simple explanation for the term is that the sukkot in the times of Chazal were built on roofs or balconies. However, al pi derush perhaps Chazal are hinting to us that going into the sukkah is a spiritual aliya (R' Avraham Shapira; see Bnei Yisaschar for a kabbalistic interpretation.)
I would like to suggest that there is an additional connotation to the term that Chazal might have had in mind. The Sefas Emes (5650, see R' Avrohom Schor in Lekach v'Libuv 5760/61) writes that the sukkah has connection to the kedusha of Ererz Yisrael. Similarly, the Radomsker in Tiferes Shlomo asks what happened to Hashem's promise at yetzi'as Mitzrayim to bring Klal Yisrael into Eretz Yisrael? Justice delayed is justice denied -- it took 40 years in the desert passed before we got to Eretz Yisrael! The Radomsker answers that during those 40 years we had sukkos -- we were in fact living in the avir of Eretz Yisrael. Way back in 2007 I posted that as far as I can figure out (others in the comments disagreed) there are only2 mitzvos you can do while sleeping: 1) yeshivas sukkah; 2) yishuv Eretz Yisrael. Like they say, half the job is just showing up; all you have to do is show up and be in the sukkah, be in Eretz Yisrael, and you've accomplished something. Maybe that's why Chazal use the term aliya with respect to sukkah. When we hear the term "aliya" we think of the mitzvah of going to Eretz Yisrael. Maybe that's exactly what Chazal intended to remind us of when we enter the sukkah.
The Tur writes that the holiday of Pesach corresponds to Avraham, Shavuos to Yitzchak, Sukkos to Yaa'kov. Pesach marks our formation as a nation. Shavuos marks our getting the Torah. Yaakov made his sukkot when settled the outstanding feud with Eisav and returned home to Eretz Yisrael. The three chagim stand for the three essential pillars that define us -- nationhood, Torah, and Eretz Yisrael.
I would like to suggest that there is an additional connotation to the term that Chazal might have had in mind. The Sefas Emes (5650, see R' Avrohom Schor in Lekach v'Libuv 5760/61) writes that the sukkah has connection to the kedusha of Ererz Yisrael. Similarly, the Radomsker in Tiferes Shlomo asks what happened to Hashem's promise at yetzi'as Mitzrayim to bring Klal Yisrael into Eretz Yisrael? Justice delayed is justice denied -- it took 40 years in the desert passed before we got to Eretz Yisrael! The Radomsker answers that during those 40 years we had sukkos -- we were in fact living in the avir of Eretz Yisrael. Way back in 2007 I posted that as far as I can figure out (others in the comments disagreed) there are only2 mitzvos you can do while sleeping: 1) yeshivas sukkah; 2) yishuv Eretz Yisrael. Like they say, half the job is just showing up; all you have to do is show up and be in the sukkah, be in Eretz Yisrael, and you've accomplished something. Maybe that's why Chazal use the term aliya with respect to sukkah. When we hear the term "aliya" we think of the mitzvah of going to Eretz Yisrael. Maybe that's exactly what Chazal intended to remind us of when we enter the sukkah.
The Tur writes that the holiday of Pesach corresponds to Avraham, Shavuos to Yitzchak, Sukkos to Yaa'kov. Pesach marks our formation as a nation. Shavuos marks our getting the Torah. Yaakov made his sukkot when settled the outstanding feud with Eisav and returned home to Eretz Yisrael. The three chagim stand for the three essential pillars that define us -- nationhood, Torah, and Eretz Yisrael.
Saturday, October 12, 2019
leishev ba'sukkah on sleeping
The Rosh (Sukkah 4:3) asks why it is that we don't say a "leishev ba'sukkah" on sleeping in the sukkah. Two answers: 1) If it should happen that you don't fall asleep the "leishav ba'sukkah" would be a bracha l'vatala, so we don't say it; 2) Rabeinu Tam argues that ke'va is defined as having a meal (everything we Jews do revolves around food); sleeping, learning, schmoozing and everything else you do in the sukkah are all tafeil to the seudah and are covered by the bracha of "leishev" done at the meal.
A possible nafka mina: what if someone ate at a neighbor's house and came home to sleep in his own sukkah (or what if one had nothing to eat)? According to the first answer, there would still be no requirement to say "leishev" before going to sleep. However, one could argue that according to Rabeinu Tam the "leishev" on the keviyus in a different sukkah has no connection to your sukkah and a bracha would be required. Aruch haShulachan even suggests that even though Rama paskens like Rabeinu Tam and we usually only recite a "leishev ba'sukkah" when we have a meal in the sukkah (GR"A disagrees), that is only the case when you are sitting in your own sukkah and all the other activities of the day are tafeil to the meal you ate there. If you go to visit a friend and sit there for awhile, even if you have no meal, you would need to say a bracha there.
Be that as it may, a question to ponder: what's the difference between the bracha of "leishev" on sleeping, which we avoid lest one fail to doze off and it be a bracha l'vatala, and the bracha of "ha'mapil" that we recite every night before going to sleep? Why are we not concerned lest a person fail to doze off and that bracha be a bracha l'vatala?
(If you are going to tell me ha'mapil is a birchas ha'shevach, pls be prepared to defend that assertion. And please don't bother to tell me about Brisker shitos on not reciting ha'mapil -- I'm obviously asking according to Shulchan Aruch psak.)
A possible nafka mina: what if someone ate at a neighbor's house and came home to sleep in his own sukkah (or what if one had nothing to eat)? According to the first answer, there would still be no requirement to say "leishev" before going to sleep. However, one could argue that according to Rabeinu Tam the "leishev" on the keviyus in a different sukkah has no connection to your sukkah and a bracha would be required. Aruch haShulachan even suggests that even though Rama paskens like Rabeinu Tam and we usually only recite a "leishev ba'sukkah" when we have a meal in the sukkah (GR"A disagrees), that is only the case when you are sitting in your own sukkah and all the other activities of the day are tafeil to the meal you ate there. If you go to visit a friend and sit there for awhile, even if you have no meal, you would need to say a bracha there.
Be that as it may, a question to ponder: what's the difference between the bracha of "leishev" on sleeping, which we avoid lest one fail to doze off and it be a bracha l'vatala, and the bracha of "ha'mapil" that we recite every night before going to sleep? Why are we not concerned lest a person fail to doze off and that bracha be a bracha l'vatala?
(If you are going to tell me ha'mapil is a birchas ha'shevach, pls be prepared to defend that assertion. And please don't bother to tell me about Brisker shitos on not reciting ha'mapil -- I'm obviously asking according to Shulchan Aruch psak.)
Friday, October 11, 2019
Shirah -- how to look at the world
Al regel achas: the concept of the "shirah" of haazinu comes from the same root as "ashurenu v'lo karov" (in parshas balak) -- it refers to seeing. Shirah is about how we see the world. Do things just happen, or is it "haTzur tamim pa'alo?"
The Rambam writes that the mitzvah of "kisvu lachem es hashirah ha'zos" refers to writing shiras haazinu. However, since there is din that you can't write a sefer of an individual parsha, so m'meila you have to write an entire sefer Torah.
To be able to see the world properly, to absorb the shirah-vision, one needs the context of kol hatorah. The individual parshiyos of life, of history, may not make sense on their own unless they are put in broader context.
Tuesday, October 08, 2019
Becha chosmin -- Yom Kippur is the chag of chessed
Neila is the time of the chasimas ha'din. "Chasmeinu l'chaim...". Rashi in parshas Lech Lecha comments that the brachos given to Avraham, "v'e'escha l'goy gadol va'avarechicha..." etc refer to the fact that we mention the Avos in our shmoneh esrei -- Elokei Avraham, Elokei Yitzchak, v'Elokei Yaakov. Rashi continues, "yachol yehiyu **chosmin** b'kulan? Talmud lomar 'v'heyei bracha' -- becha chosmin." We end the bracha "magen Avraham" -- the chasima is only with Avraham's name. The Tiferes Shlomo quotes the Tikunei Zohar that Rosh haShana, "vaHashem pakad es Sarah...," is the holiday of Yitchak; the Tur (417) writes that Sukkos is the holiday of Yaakov, "ulmikneihu asah sukkos." Yom Kippur, says the Tif Shlomo, is the holiday of Avraham Avinu, and particularly neila, the chasima, is in his merit -- becha chosmin. Avraham personified the midah of chessed, and it is only through chasdei Hashem that we are given a chasima ltovah.
How do we earn chasdei Hashem? By emulating Avraham and doing chessed ourselves.
On erev Y"K there is a halacha of ritzuy. True, the shulchan aruch says this means that we should ask each other for forgiveness, but, as the Sefas Emes explains, that's not exactly all that ritzuy means. Tikabeil brachamim ub'**ratzon** tifilaseinu. Y'yehu na amareinu **l'ratzon**. We want Hashem to want to listen to us and want to accept our tefilos. How do we earn that? By doing ritzuy ourselves, which means that we should not just forgive, not just to tolerate, but that we should have "ratzon" for our friends -- we should want good for them.
Wishing you all a gmar chasima tovah, that our tefilos should be accepted bratzon, that we be zocheh to chasdei Hashem, and that we be zocheh to see the good in others and accept each other b'ratzon as well.
Friday, October 04, 2019
Oseh ha'shalom
Although there seems to be an old established minhag to change the ending of the last bracha of shmoneh esrei from ha'mevarech es amo yisrael ba'shalom to oseh ha'shalom during the aseres ymei teshuvah, many (I would say most) shuls these days opt to keep the standard ending rather than tamper with the nusach of the chasimas habracha. I've noticed most of these same shuls have no problem on Yom Tov changing the chasimas habracha of retzey from ha'machazir Shechinaso l'Tzion to she'odcha levadcha b'yirah naavod.
Tartei d'sasrei, or can you come up with a difference?
Thursday, October 03, 2019
mitzvah of hakhel
Ramban writes that the children who the Torah says should be brought to hakhel, "u'bneihem asher lo yad'u yishm'u v'lamdu," must be children of the age of chinuch, otherwise how could they learn anything by coming -- what kind of "lamdu" could there be for children too young to understand anything. However, continues Ramban, it does not appear from the gemara that this is the case, as the gemara quotes R' Elazer ben Azarya as saying that the children are brought "litein schar l'mivi'eihem," only to give their parents more reward for shlepping them. The Minchas Chinuch goes so far as to suggest that even newborns should be brought, as there is no shiur given for the definition of "taf."
The question of what age child should be brought may hinge on what the purpose of the mitzvah of hakhel is. "L'ma'an yishm'u u'lma'an yilmidu v'yar'u es Hashem Elokeichem" (31:12): Is the mitzvah of hakhel one of limud, and yiras shamayin is a byproduct, or is the mitzvah to inculcate yiras shamayim, and the limud is just a means to set the stage and create the experience that engenders yirah?
Ramban clearly views the mitzvah as one of limud. Therefore, only children who are old enough to learn and understand need to be brought. Contrast that with the language of the Rambam (Chagigah 3:6):
אפילו חכמים גדולים שיודעים כל התורה כולה, חייבין לשמוע בכוונה גדולה יתרה. ומי שאינו יכול לשמוע--מכוון ליבו לקריאה זו, שלא קבעה הכתוב אלא לחזק דת האמת; ויראה עצמו כאילו עתה נצטווה בה, ומפי הגבורה שומעה--שהמלך שליח הוא, להשמיע דברי ה-ל
According to the Rambam, even chachamim who are already versed in the pesukim must participate in hakhel, and even those who cannot hear must try to be attentive to the kriah. In other words, even when there is no limud involved, the mitzvah still applies. The purpose of the kri'ah is not learning, but rather the because the purpose is "l'chazek das ha'emes" -- the inculcate yiras shamayim.
The tension between the two elements of the mitzvah can be seen in the pesukim themselves. The parsha first tells us "mikeitz sheva shanim... tikra es haTorah ha'zos" -- read from the Torah. But then the parsha continues "hakhel es ha'am..." -- the miztvah is for the nation to gather together. Sadya Gaon in fact counts these as two seperate mitzvos: one to read the Torah, one to gather together. The majority of monei ha'mitzvos, however, count them as one mitzvah. The question is which element is the engine and which is the caboose -- is the ultimate goal limud haTorah, and that's what the nation gathers for, or is the experience of coming together, children included, and end in itself, and the Torah reading is just a means to get us together.
(A bit of derush: Shouldn't the order of the pesukim be reversed? First the people have to gather -- "hakhel es ha'am" -- and only then is the Torah read -- "tikra es haTorah ha'zos." Why does the parsha put it the other way around? Maor vaShemesh explains that the "Torah ha'zos" that is read to the people, the Torah that they are supposed to learn and take with them, is "hakhel is ha'am" -- we have to come together as a people, men, women, and children included.)
See Shu"T Binyan Av vol 2 re: the parallel between the idea of bringing even little children to hear megilas esther and the mitzvah of hakhel.
The question of what age child should be brought may hinge on what the purpose of the mitzvah of hakhel is. "L'ma'an yishm'u u'lma'an yilmidu v'yar'u es Hashem Elokeichem" (31:12): Is the mitzvah of hakhel one of limud, and yiras shamayin is a byproduct, or is the mitzvah to inculcate yiras shamayim, and the limud is just a means to set the stage and create the experience that engenders yirah?
Ramban clearly views the mitzvah as one of limud. Therefore, only children who are old enough to learn and understand need to be brought. Contrast that with the language of the Rambam (Chagigah 3:6):
אפילו חכמים גדולים שיודעים כל התורה כולה, חייבין לשמוע בכוונה גדולה יתרה. ומי שאינו יכול לשמוע--מכוון ליבו לקריאה זו, שלא קבעה הכתוב אלא לחזק דת האמת; ויראה עצמו כאילו עתה נצטווה בה, ומפי הגבורה שומעה--שהמלך שליח הוא, להשמיע דברי ה-ל
According to the Rambam, even chachamim who are already versed in the pesukim must participate in hakhel, and even those who cannot hear must try to be attentive to the kriah. In other words, even when there is no limud involved, the mitzvah still applies. The purpose of the kri'ah is not learning, but rather the because the purpose is "l'chazek das ha'emes" -- the inculcate yiras shamayim.
The tension between the two elements of the mitzvah can be seen in the pesukim themselves. The parsha first tells us "mikeitz sheva shanim... tikra es haTorah ha'zos" -- read from the Torah. But then the parsha continues "hakhel es ha'am..." -- the miztvah is for the nation to gather together. Sadya Gaon in fact counts these as two seperate mitzvos: one to read the Torah, one to gather together. The majority of monei ha'mitzvos, however, count them as one mitzvah. The question is which element is the engine and which is the caboose -- is the ultimate goal limud haTorah, and that's what the nation gathers for, or is the experience of coming together, children included, and end in itself, and the Torah reading is just a means to get us together.
(A bit of derush: Shouldn't the order of the pesukim be reversed? First the people have to gather -- "hakhel es ha'am" -- and only then is the Torah read -- "tikra es haTorah ha'zos." Why does the parsha put it the other way around? Maor vaShemesh explains that the "Torah ha'zos" that is read to the people, the Torah that they are supposed to learn and take with them, is "hakhel is ha'am" -- we have to come together as a people, men, women, and children included.)
See Shu"T Binyan Av vol 2 re: the parallel between the idea of bringing even little children to hear megilas esther and the mitzvah of hakhel.
Wednesday, October 02, 2019
Yesh tikvah l'achriseich
I think there are two elements that contribute to 'ha'ben yakir li Ephraim' bring chosen as the haftarah for the second day of Rosh haShana:
1) As a parallel to the kriah on the first day which speaks about our matriarch Sarah and Hashem's fulfillment of her desire to have a child we read about our matriarch Rachel and her desire for the return of all her children.
2) Lest a person think that the job of repentance is too great and too overwhelming we read the words "yesh tikvah l'achriseich," Hashem's encouragement not to give up hope.
I don't know how you can read the final words of that pasuk, "v'shavu banim li'gevulam," without being moved by the fact that for hundreds and hundreds of years Jews have read this promise of return and it was always a distant dream, but we have been zocheh to see it happening in our lifetime.
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