shaylos based on second hand info

HaKsav vhaKabbalah comments on the words  וַ֠יֹּאמְר֠וּ הָאֲנָשִׁ֤ים הָהֵ֙מָּה֙ אֵלָ֔יו אֲנַ֥חְנוּ טְמֵאִ֖ים לְנֶ֣פֶשׁ אָדָ֑ם of the people who wanted a chance to offer pesach sheni:

 היה ראוי לקצר ויאמרו אליו, מה הוא האנשים ההמה שהוסיף מגיד שאין נשאלים אלא לבעל המעשה (ספרי) אם הוצרך אדם דבר לשאול, הוא בעצמו ילך לשאול, ואם שולח שלוחו אין משיבין לו, כי השליח אינו יודע לסדר הענין היטב לכן הוסיף האנשים ההמה, בעלי המעשה עצמם סדרו שאלתם

 

Davka the people who have a question or an issue to raise are the one who have to come to ask the shayla -- האנשים ההמה -- not messengers or third parties.

 

This applies l'maaseh.  I did not have a chance to look up the sources first hand, but there seems to be some discussion in a case, for example, where your wife is cooking dinner and accidentally mixes up milchig and fleishig, should you be the one calling the Rav to ask the shayla since it's your dinner, or should your wife be the one to ask since she is the בעל המעשה who did the cooking?  Perhaps a better example, which I did not see discussed, would be how to apply this to taharas ha'mishpacha shaylos. 

The obvious takeaway lesson from from this din is that second hand information does not cut it.  Only someone who is involved first hand knows and can convey the facts of a case accurately and only armed with that information can proper decisions be rendered.  

Miriam's wait -- נצב vs עמד

I saw a question raised by R' Moshe Tzvi Neriah that I am going to take the liberty of embellishing on by connecting it to last week's haftarah.  In last week's haftarah an angel comes and tells Manoch's wife that she will have a baby and he instructs her not to drink wine or become tamei since the baby will be a nazir from birth.  Manoach apparently did not buy his wife's story, so the angel came back and repeated the message for him.  Manoach offered the angel food, but the angel declined because angels don't eat.  Manoch asked the angel it's name, and the angel answered that that it has no regular name because it's name reflects its mission and an angel's mission can change from one day to the next.   Manoach then offered the food he prepared as a korban, and the navi tells us that the angel rose back to shamayim through the fire that consumed the korban וַיְהִי֩ בַעֲל֨וֹת הַלַּ֜הַב מֵעַ֚ל הַמִּזְבֵּ֙חַ֙ הַשָּׁמַ֔יְמָה וַיַּ֥עַל מַלְאַךְה׳ בְּלַ֣הַב הַמִּזְבֵּ֑חַ.  Amazing.  You would think that if Manoach had any doubt whether this was an angel or not all bets would be off at this point.  But not so fast!  The navi continues and says: לֹא־יָ֚סַף עוֹד֙ מַלְאַ֣ךְ ה׳ לְהֵרָאֹ֖ה אֶל־מָנ֣וֹחַ וְאֶל־אִשְׁתּ֑וֹ אָ֚ז יָדַ֣ע מָנ֔וֹחַ כִּֽי־מַלְאַ֥ךְ ה׳ הֽוּא:  When the "person" never reappeared, it was then and only then that Manoch knew it was an angel.  Why was that the clincher?  Why was it the fact that the angel never came back again that convinced Manoach that this could not have been a regular person? 

Imagine a person who suggests a shidduch to a young man and gives them a bracha that it should work out and he be zocheh to get married.  The young man accepts, and the shadchan sets up the date.  Don't you think the person who suggested the match would either call the boy afterwards, or even informally, next time they bump into the boy, ask how the date was?  Actually, they would probably make a point of bumping into him to ask.  And if they go out a few times, the person who suggested the match might nudge the parents and ask when they get a mazel tov (and not just because they want to collect their shadchanus :)  And when the wedding comes, don't you think the shadchan will be sure to attend in order to tell everyone how they were the one who introduced the couple?  That's human nature!  We want to see how things work out, we want to monitor the progress of what we put in motion.  R' Eliyahu Baruch Finkel from the Mir explained that the "makeh b'patish" that convinced Manoach that he was dealing with an angel is the fact that the angel lacked this very human quality.  The angel never came back.  The angel was not curious to check in after a few months to see if Manoach's wife was wearing maternity clothes yet; he didn't stop by to ask how the pregnancy was progressing; he didn't show up at the bris to see the new baby his bracha had helped bring into the world and take a bow.  He just walked away and that was it.  A human being doesn't act that way.  Our curiosity and desire to see things unfold is an inescapable part of our nature.

 

Rashi writes at the end of our parsha:

 

והעם לא נסע – זה כבוד חלק לה המקום בשביל שעה אחת שנתעכבה למשה כשהושלך ליאור, שנאמר: ותתצב אחתו מרחק וגו׳ (שמות ב׳:ד׳).

 

Miriam prophesized that her baby brother would be the one to lead Klal Yisrael out of galus.  Isn't it just human nature for her to want to see what would happen to that baby?  Isn't it just human nature for her to want to see if her nevuah would come to fulfillment?  So why, as R' Neriah, does she get a reward for going to watch that basket holding her brother as it floated down the Nile?  What's the big deal?

 

We translate that pasuk ותתצב אחתו מרחק to mean, "His [Moshe's] sister stood afar [and watched]," but that translation does not do justice to the text.  There are two different words in Hebrew for standing: עמד and נצב.  The root עמד is used when we are talking about physical position, i.e. getting up from sitting to  take a standing position.  The root נצב is like the word stand in the expression "stand by."  You don't have to get up out of your chair to stand by.  It's being in a mental state of anticipation, of expectation; it's not about physical position.  When you hear, "stand by," you know something is going to happen, it's just a question of what.  (Compare with Malbim Yeshayahu 3:13)  When Moshe stood at Yam Suf and told Bn"Y הִתְיַצְּבוּ וּרְאוּ אֶת יְשׁוּעַת ה׳ (Shmos 14:13), he didn't mean they all have to get up on their feet.  What he meant was get ready, Hashem is about to do something.  Ramban comments on  אַתֶּם נִצָּבִים הַיּוֹם כֻּלְּכֶם that  שאתם עומדים *ומזומנים* לפני השם כדי לעבור בבריתו,  you are prepared in anticipation of entering Hashem's bris.  And when we read at the beginnng of Parshas vaYeira that Avraham saw  וְהִנֵּה שְׁלֹשָׁה אֲנָשִׁים נִצָּבִים עָלָיו, it means, as Seforno writes,  פונים אליו כממתינים לדבר עמו, they were waiting *expectantly* to speak with Avraham, בהיותו פנוי מן המראה הנכבדת, until Avraham finished his conversation with G-d.

 

Yes, it's human nature to want to see how things will turn out.  But that's not what Miriam was doing when she went to follow the basket containing baby Moshe.  When you watch a baseball game, you are watching to see how things will turn out.  Either team can win or lose.  The shadchan who suggests a match, even if they give a bracha, has no idea whether it will work out or not.   But when you watch Mission Impossible, you know the bad guys aren't going to win, and I hope I didn't just spoil all eight movies for anyone.  You know how it will turn out in the end before you even start watching.  But you watch anyway, expectantly, in anticipation of all the stunts, thrills, and action that will bring victory to Ethan's team.  That's what the root  נצב  is all about.  ותתצב אחתו מרחק  Miriam had no doubt that her prophecy would be fulfilled, just like she didn't need Moshe to announce הִתְיַצְּבוּ וּרְאוּ אֶת יְשׁוּעַת ה by Yam Suf; she had her tambourine in hand already from the moment they left Egypt.  וַתֵּתַצַּב אֲחֹתוֹ מֵרָחֹק לְדֵעָה *מַה* יֵּעָשֶׂה לוֹ - not אם יֵּעָשֶׂה לוֹ.  She expected and believed that Hashem would work things out.  It was just a matter of observing to see how it would unfold. 

I'm left with one question.  If what I wrote is correct, then wouldn't it have made more sense in our parsha  ויאמר אלהם משה עמדו ואשמעה מה יצוה ה׳ לכם. for the pasuk to use the word נצב?  Moshe wasn't telling the people to stand on their feet, he was telling them to anticipate an answer from Hashem?

the GR"A's five year plan

Maaseh Rav quotes that the practice of GR"A was to start each day after davening by learning 2 blatt of gemara.  The new editions of Maaseh Rav quote commentaries that look for mekoros for the practices of the Gaon, and on this section they point to the gemara (Chulin 24):

 כתוב אחד אומר (במדבר ח, כד) מבן חמש ועשרים שנה ומעלה וכתוב אחד אומר (במדבר ד, ג) מבן שלשים אי אפשר לומר שלשים שכבר נאמר כ"ה ואי אפשר לומר כ"ה שכבר נאמר שלשים הא כיצד כ"ה ללמוד ושלשים לעבודה מכאן לתלמיד שלא ראה סימן יפה במשנתו ה' שנים שוב אינו רואה

 

These meforshim say by covering 2 blatt a day you can finish shas in 5 years and check to make sure you hopefully see siman bracha.

 

I don't understand this explanation.  First of all, simple math: 365 days a year at 2 blatt a day means covering 730 blatt a year.  At that pace you can finish shas (2711 blatt according to daf yomi cycle, which includes Ylmi Shekalim for whatever reason) in less than 4 years, not in 5 years.  Even if we chop off some time because our lunar calendar has 354 or so days in a year, you gain it back because of the leap years.  If you want a 5 year cycle to finish shas, doing 1.5 blatt a day seems closer to the mark.  Is there some magic to a round number of doing 2 blatt as opposed to 1.5 a day?  Did the GR"A maybe factor in more time to do the masechtos ketanos as well and the mishnayos not covered in the Bavli?  Or is this just a "b'erech" calculation?

 

It also seems that the test of siman bracha comes during the first 5 years of training.  After that, inertia takes over and either you have it or you don't.  Why should one follow a 5 year regime throughout one's life?

 

Putting aside the GR"A, there is a different question asked on that gemara: l'mai nafka minah to whether one sees siman bracha or not?  One has a chiyuv to learn whether one enjoys it or not, whether one finds the material easy or not, whether one sees bracha or not!

 

By way of analogy, the gemara writes that a person should always learn even she'lo lishma.  The gemara also says that someone who learns she'lo lishma deserves to have never come into the world.  Tos resolves the contradiction by distinguishing two types of she'lo lishma: a "neutral" she'lo lishma desire for kavod, money, etc. which is acceptable, and a negative she'lo lishma where one learns in order to argue with others, which is unacceptable.  Maharal and R' Tzadok quoting Mahar"Ch Ohr Zaru'a offer a simpler answer.  Yes, learning she'lo lishma is a terrible thing, but what's the alternative if that's all one is capable of doing at the moment?  Not learning?!  That's not an option.  A person can't live without learning.  So even if it's terrible, learn that way anyway.  Here too, after five years if a person takes stock and realizes they just don't have the brains for a daf gemara and there is no siman bracha in it, what's the alternative?  Not learning!?  There is no such option.  So what's the point of this meimra of Chazal?  

 

Some Achronim cite the gemara (Kid 29b):

 

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הוּא לִלְמוֹד וּבְנוֹ לִלְמוֹד – הוּא קוֹדֵם לִבְנוֹ. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אִם בְּנוֹ זָרִיז וּמְמוּלָּח וְתַלְמוּדוֹ מִתְקַיֵּים בְּיָדוֹ – בְּנוֹ קוֹדְמוֹ.

 

and suggest that if there are limited resources, best to invest in a person who does see siman bracha than the person who is struggling. 

 

I think the simplest pshat is the Meiri:

 

לעולם יהא אדם חרוץ בלמודו בילדותו להשתדל בו כמה שאפשר לו כדי שתהא יגיעת ילדותו מועלת לו לעולם כבר אמרו כל תלמיד שלא ראה במשנתו סימן יפה עד חמש שנים שוב אינו רואה:

 

Chazal are not speaking from the perspective of someone looking back *after* 5 years and taking stock of whether they have had success in learning or not.  Chazal are forward looking, speaking from the perspective of someone about to start this 5 year journey.  The point is to inspire a person *before* the 5 years are up to give it his all, because those initial 5 years determine the trajectory of the future. 

sotah and the sanctity of the machaneh

Sefer Bamidbar opened with the setup of the machaneh in the midbar.  We then jump to a different array of topics -- sotah, nazir, birchas kohanim -- that seems out of place.  About 10 years ago I posted the Ralbag's beautiful explanation that the Torah is working from the macro to the micro.  First, it addresses the sanctity of the camp as a whole.  We have the halachos of sending those who are tamei out of the camp.  Then we turn to the family unit, and we have the parsha of sotah which is designed to restore shalom bayis.  Finally, we have the kedusha of the individual, the greatest heights of which are realized by the nazir. 

In the Sichos of R' Yissachar Meir from Yeshivat HaNegev he proposes that the entire parsha revolves around the one theme of kedushat ha'machaneh.  The springboard for this approach comes from a question raised by Seforno on the parsha of gezel ha'ger.  The Torah describes this sin as follows (5:6):

 

אִישׁ אוֹ אִשָּׁה כִּי יַעֲשׂוּ מִכׇּל חַטֹּאת הָאָדָם לִמְעֹל מַעַל בַּה׳

 

Why is theft called a מַעַל בַּה׳ when it is a sin bein adam l'chaveiro?  Seforno comments:

 

כבר באה הקבלה (בבא קמא ק״ט.) שזה נאמר על גזל הגר, כי אמנם הגוזל אותו מחלל שם אלקיו בעיני הגר אשר בא לחסות תחת כנפיו. ולכן יקרא מועל בקדש, וחייב אשם כמשפט כל מועל בו.

 

The ger thinks he is joining am ha'nivchar and taking a step up in kedusha.  Ripping him off is liable to make him question that assumption and even question his commitment.  Is that what Judaism  is all about? Is this how a holy nation behaves?  The theft in this case leads to a chilul Hashem, מַעַל בַּה׳.

 

R' Yissachar Meir takes things in a bit of a different direction and suggests that the ganav fears being discovered by the police or his neighbors so he sneaks around to do his dirty work, but he has no fear of G-d seeing what he is doing.  In his mind, G-d's presence is absent from the machaneh.  This is his מַעַל בַּה׳.   

That's why when there is no one else to return the theft to, the payment goes to the kohen.  It's the kohen's job to bring about hashra'as haShechina, through his avodah in the Mikdash, through his teaching Torah.  The tikun for failing to respect the presence of Hashem in the camp is to enable those who safeguard and reveal His presence to do their job. 

 

In that same vein, he reads the parsha of sotah as not just about preserving shalom bayis between husband and wife, but  about preserving standards of tzenius and kedusha in the machaneh as a whole.  Immorality has to be rooted out because G-d is immanant. 

 

R' Yisschar Meir does not quote it, but I think his approach helps explain a midrash later in our parsha.  Commenting on the gift of the nasi of sheivet Yissachar, the Midrash writes:

 

קָרְבָּנוֹ קַעֲרַת כֶּסֶף אַחַת וגו׳ – בָּא נְשִׂיא שִׁמְעוֹן וְהִקְרִיב עַל סֵדֶר מַעֲשֶׂה הַמִּשְׁכָּן, וְלָמָּה הִקְרִיב קָרְבָּנוֹ כְּנֶגֶד מַעֲשֵׂה הַמִּשְׁכָּן, דּוּגְמַת מַעֲשֶׂה שִׁמְעוֹן אֲבִי הַשֵּׁבֶט, לְפִי שֶׁשִּׁמְעוֹן קִנֵּא עַל הַזְּנוּת וְהָרַג כָּל אַנְשֵׁי שְׁכֶם עַל שֶׁעִנּוּ דִּינָה אֲחוֹתוֹ, כְּמָה דְתֵימָא: וַיִּקְּחוּ שְׁנֵי בְנֵי יַעֲקֹב שִׁמְעוֹן וְלֵוִי אֲחֵי דִינָה אִישׁ חַרְבּוֹ וַיָּבֹאוּ עַל הָעִיר בֶּטַח וַיַּהַרְגוּ כָּל זָכָר וְאֶת חֲמוֹר וְאֶת שְׁכֶם בְּנוֹ הָרְגוּ לְפִי חָרֶב וַיִּקְחוּ אֶת דִּינָה מִבֵּית שְׁכֶם וַיֵּצֵאוּ (בראשית ל״ד:כ״ה-כ״ו). וְכֵן הַמִּשְׁכָּן הָיָה הוֹרֵג בַּנּוֹאֲפִים וּבַסּוֹטוֹת, כְּמָה דְּתֵימָא: וְלָקַח הַכֹּהֵן מַיִם קְדשִׁים בִּכְלִי חָרֶשׂ וּמִן הֶעָפָר אֲשֶׁר יִהְיֶה בְּקַרְקַע הַמִּשְׁכָּן וגו׳ (במדבר ה׳:י״ז), וְאוֹמֵר: וְהִשְׁקָה אֶת הַמַּיִם וְהָיְתָה אִם נִטְמְאָה וַתִּמְעֹל מַעַל וגו׳ (במדבר ה׳:כ״ז), וּלְכָךְ הִקְרִיב שְׁלֻמִיאֵל קָרְבָּנוֹ עַל סֵדֶר מַעֲשֶׂה הַמִּשְׁכָּן, זִכָּרוֹן לְמַעֲשֵׂה שִׁמְעוֹן. קָרְבָּנוֹ קַעֲרַת כֶּסֶף אַחַת וגו׳, קַעֲרַת, כְּנֶגֶד חֲצַר הַמִּשְׁכָּן שֶׁהָיָה מַקִּיף אֶת הַמִּשְׁכָּן כְּשֵׁם שֶׁהַיָּם מַקִּיף אֶת הָעוֹלָם.

שְׁלשִׁים וּמֵאָה מִשְׁקָלָהּ – כְּמָה דְּתֵימָא: אֹרֶךְ הֶחָצֵר מֵאָה בָאַמָּה (שמות כ״ז:י״ח), וְהַמִּשְׁכָּן שֶׁהָיָה בְּתוֹכוֹ שְׁלשִׁים אַמָּה אָרְכּוֹ, הֲרֵי מֵאָה וּשְׁלשִׁים

 

The Midrash goes on to connects all the elements of his gift to the Mishkan, e.g. פַּר אֶחָד בֶּן בָּקָר – כְּנֶגֶד יְרִיעוֹת הַמִּשְׁכָּן שֶׁהָיוּ שֶׁל מִינֵי צִבְעוֹנִין, and עִיר עִזִּים – כְּנֶגֶד הָאֹהֶל שֶׁהָיָה יְרִיעוֹת עִזִּים, etc. 

 

If the parsha of sotah was just a matter between  husband and wife, then what does that have to do with the construction of the Mishkan?  True, וְכֵן הַמִּשְׁכָּן הָיָה הוֹרֵג בַּנּוֹאֲפִים וּבַסּוֹטוֹת, but is that really the essence of what the place is about?  Hypothetically, if not for the korban mincha brought by the sotah, couldn't the entire ceremony just as well have taken place somewhere outside the Mishkan? 

 

If we understand, as R' Yissachar Meir suggests, that the parsha of sotah is not just a personal matter between husband and wife but is really about preserving the sanctity of the machaneh, then the answer is clear.  Bringing about and preserving the hashra'as haShechina in the machaneh is *exactly* what the function of the Mishkan is.  The sotah ceremony is not incidental to the Mishkan, but is part of its very purpose.  

making a kabbalah for the future

Rashi comments on (3:1) וְאֵלֶּה תּוֹלְדֹת אַהֲרֹן וּמֹשֶׁה בְּיוֹם דִּבֶּר ה׳ אֶת מֹשֶׁה בְּהַר סִינָי that even though the pasuk is speaking about Aharon's children, they are called Moshe's תּוֹלְדֹת because לפי שלימדן תורה, מלמד שכל המלמד את בן חברו תורה, מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו ילדו.  Netziv explains at length that לימדן תורה in this context means specifically חכמת התלמוד.  Moshe taught Torah to all of Klal Yisrael, but they are not called his תּוֹלְדֹת because he did not (at least at this point in time) give over to them that added level of pilpul that he shared only with the Bnei Aharon. Netziv then asks on himself: the pasuk is talking about what took place בְּהַר סִינָי, at the moment of kabbalas haTorah.  At that moment, Moshe was not being mi'palpel with the Bnei Aharon.  At that moment Moshe was not sharing חכמת התלמוד with the Bnei Aharon.  Why then already at that moment are they called Moshe's תּוֹלְדֹת? 

Netziv answers that even though on that day the Bnei Aharon had not yet started learning from Moshe, nonetheless באותו יום קבלו עליהם ללמוד ממנו אח״כ, on that day they made a kabbalah and accepted upon themselves to become his students.  Therefore, it was from that moment that their status changed.

Netziv proves his point from the story (BM 84) of Reish Lakish, who started out as a bandit/robber.  One day he jumped into the river to chase after R' Yochanan, but R' Yochanan turned the tables on him and was able to convince Reish Lakish to take his great strength and dedicate his kochos to learning Torah.  The gemara then says that Reish Lakish found himself unable to jump out of the river he had just jumped in to. Rashi explains: ולא מצי. לקפוץ כבראשונה דמשקבל עליו עול תורה תשש כוחו  Reish Lakish hadn't learned a single daf yet or spent a single day in the beis medrash, but once he was mekabel upon himself to learn Torah, he became a changed person.

 

This is what Chag haShavuos is all about.  Even if you stay up both nights of Shavuos and manage to not sleep a wink in the day as well, you are not going to finish shas or Shulchan Aruch in 2 days.  But the point of the holiday is not to have a cram session.  The point is to make a kabbalah.  It's not how much you cover during those 48 hours that will make a difference, but rather what you are mekabeil upon yourself in those 48 hours to accomplish during the next days, months, years ahead that will make the difference. 

 

We celebrate 6 Sivan and not just 7 Sivan, which was the actual date of kabbalas haTorah.  Moshe added an extra day so Hashem gave us the Torah on the seventh, but we still celebrate on the 6th because that is the day when we were already ready to receive it, when our kabbalah to accept it was made.  That is as worthy of celebration as the actual giving on the Torah b'poel that took place on the next day.

The Midrash on the pasuk in Rus (2:12)  יְשַׁלֵּם ה׳ פׇּעֳלֵךְ וּתְהִי מַשְׂכֻּרְתֵּךְ שְׁלֵמָה מֵעִם ה׳ אֱלֹקי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֲשֶׁר בָּאת לַחֲסוֹת תַּחַת כְּנָפָיו comments אָמַר רַבִּי חָסָא אֲשֶׁר בָּאת לַחֲסוֹת תַּחַת כְּנָפָיו.  All the sifrei dersush ask what R' Chasa adds to what the pasuk already tells us.  The Sanz Klausenberger (5733) explains that the Midrash is coming to justify Boaz's promise to Rus of  מַשְׂכֻּרְתֵּךְ שְׁלֵמָה, a complete reward.  Even though in point of fact Rus had not yet done anything yet as a Jew  to earn reward, she deserved it anyway because she took upon herself a kabbalah. The decision to make a commitment and throw one's lot in with Klal Yisrael, אֲשֶׁר בָּאת לַחֲסוֹת תַּחַת כְּנָפָיו, irrespective of what might happen going forward, is itself a life changing act.  Shem m'Shmuel similarly writes that we have a principle that mitzvah goreres mitzvah.  Good deeds create their own inertia, their own snowball of positive energy that keeps going. Reward is not given for following that path of inertia, but rather for the initial kabbalah that set things in motion. 

 

This also explains R' Yosef's cryptic remark that, "If not for this day [of Shavuos], there are many other Yosef's in the marketplace."  R' Yosef forgot his learning due to illness. He went from being Rosh Yeshiva to knowing no more than any other Joe on the street.  If all that mattered was what you know -- how many sugyos, how many blatt -- then Rav Yosef was washed up.  But it's not just what you know that counts, but what you aspire to know, the kabbalah to try and know.  Rav Yosef could not remember his learning, but he still had the desire to remember, the desire to learn, the kabbalah to do better if he could.          

 

I've written before that I am not a big fan of staying up all night on Shavuos and then the next day of Y"T or next Shabbos going right back to davening at 9:15.  (I think last time I wrote I said 9:00, but now shuls have pushed the starting times even later.)  Doing that is a one night stand.  Mattan Torah is "yom chasunaso."  When you get married, hopefully it is a lifelong commitment, not a one night celebration.  It's a kabbalah about how you intend to live your life going forward.  That's what we should be striving for.

sechora with peiros sheviis

Yesh lachkor whether the issur of sechora with peiros sheviis stems from the fact that if one uses the peiros for barter one cannot fulfill the mitzvah of achilas peiros, or whether sechora is an independent issur? 

Ramban counts the mitzvah of achilas peiros sheviis as a mitzvas aseh, and cites the derasha of l'achla v'lo l'sechora as his source, implying that the problem with sechora is that it negates the possibility of fulfilling the mitzvah of achila.  Rambam never counts eating peiros as its own mitzvah, so sechora must be an indepdent issur.

 

The Steipler suggests that this question may underpin a sasfeik in the gemara.  (Bechoros 12b) discusses whether one can use an animal purchased with peiros sheviis to be podeh a peter chamor. 

 

לפדות בבהמת שביעית ודאי לא תיבעי לך לאכילה אמר רחמנא ולא לסחורה כי תיבעי לך ספק

 

Rashi explains:

 

ודאי לא תיבעי לך. פטר חמור ודאי לא תיבעי לך דכיון דבעי למיתב פדיונו לכהן לא פריק ליה דלאכלה אמר רחמנא ולא לסחורה ונמצא זה קונה חמור בפירות שביעית שאינו ראוי לאכילה: ספק. כגון שילדה אמו זכר ונקבה דאמר במתני' מפריש טלה והוא לעצמו:

 

In a case of safeik peter chamor you have to be mafrish a lamb to remove the issur hanaah from the chamor, but you don't have to give it to the kohen because ha'motzi mei'chaveiro alav ha'raaya.  The pediya = sechora, but the lamb can still be still eaten by the owner.

If sechora is a problem because it negates the mitzvah of achila, in this case there should be no issue because the owner can eat it.  But if sechora is an issur in its own right, then this case should pose a problem.

a hatred that never goes away

וְנָתַתִּ֤י שָׁלוֹם֙ בָּאָ֔רֶץ וּשְׁכַבְתֶּ֖ם וְאֵ֣ין מַחֲרִ֑יד וְהִשְׁבַּתִּ֞י חַיָּ֤ה רָעָה֙ מִן־הָאָ֔רֶץ וְחֶ֖רֶב לֹא־תַעֲבֹ֥ר בְּאַרְצְכֶֽם׃

וּרְדַפְתֶּ֖ם אֶת־אֹיְבֵיכֶ֑ם וְנָפְל֥וּ לִפְנֵיכֶ֖ם לֶחָֽרֶב׃

 

 

Ohr haChaim asks: if וְנָתַתִּ֤י שָׁלוֹם֙ בָּאָ֔רֶץ , then what does the next pasuk mean וּרְדַפְתֶּ֖ם אֶת־אֹיְבֵיכֶ֑ם?  If there is peace, then who are the enemies that need pursuing?

 

Many of the meforshim answer that the pasuk is not speaking about what takes place within Eretz Yisrael, but rather it is speaking about enemies outside Eretz Yisrael.  Ohr haChaim explains ומה שקרא אותם הכתוב אויבים, לא לצד שהם באים לצור על עיר הקודש שאם כן אין בטח ואין שלום ליושביה, אלא קרא אותם אויבים לצד אויבי ה׳ רשעי הגוים נקראים אויבי ה׳ ואויבינו.  He assumes that "oyeiv" means a physical threat, and he is therefore left with a problem: If there is peace in Eretz Yisrael, then there is no threat, so how does the term make any sense?  The O.C. does not consider the possibility that although we may have peace in Eretz Yisrael, there might still be Jews remaining in the diaspora who would have to deal with oyvim and physical threats.  Maybe idea that Jews would remain in disapora lands where they have to face the physical threat of oyvim when there is peace and bracha in Eretz Yisrael  is too silly and remote an idea to even consider. In any case, his solution is that oyvim does not just mean a physical threat, but can also mean אויבי ה׳.

 

The Ohr haChaim then adds something else.  I think the biggest mistake people have made in the past 2 years comes from not knowing this Ohr haChaim.  The history books are filled with the bloody and tragic stories of how Jews have been treated in Europe through the centuries: the endless cycle of pogroms, blood  libels, crusades, persecutions, inquisitions, and finally in our time, the Holocaust.  For some reason we thought this time would be different.  We thought this time the world had learned a lesson.  We thought barbaric attacks against Jews would not longer be condoned, and certainly not encouraged, by the "civilized" West.  Well, we were fools.  France is the same France of the Dreyfus trial; England is the same England that stopped Jews from escaping to Israel in the years preceding and during WWII, the same England that turned a blind eye to Arab violence against Jews under the Mandate.  Ohr haChaim writes  גם לצד שיודע ה׳ כי כל האומות שונא ישראל בטבע המתקנא והיא שנאה יסודית ואין לה תמורה.  And if you don't think that statement applies to the US of A, you are delusional.  

Are there individuals who are exceptions to the rule?  Of course there are.  But the exceptions are just that: exceptions.

I was reading Yardena Schwartz's book Ghosts of a Holy War: The 1929 Massacre in Palestine That Ignited the Arab-Israeli Conflict and every couple of pages she has to bring up the attack by Baruch Goldstein in Chevron, as if to provide something to stack up on the scale and provide balance against the litany of violance perpetrated by the Arabs.  What the author does not grap is that Goldstein is the exception that proves the rule.  For the most part, the Jews have not engaged in murder, in violent attacks, against the Arab population.  Goldstein was widely condemned by all segments of Israeli society.  The attacks against the Jews, however, are the rule.  The few Arabs who saved Jews during the Hebron massacre, the umos who saved Jews during the Holocaust, during other uprisings, had to stand against the masses who did engage in violance, and to this very day, celebrate that violence.  

 

The very next pasuk  וְרָדְפ֨וּ מִכֶּ֤ם חֲמִשָּׁה֙ מֵאָ֔ה וּמֵאָ֥ה מִכֶּ֖ם רְבָבָ֣ה יִרְדֹּ֑פוּ וְנָפְל֧וּ אֹיְבֵיכֶ֛ם לִפְנֵיכֶ֖ם לֶחָֽרֶב׃ ends with exactly the same words וְנָפְל֥וּ לִפְנֵיכֶ֖ם לֶחָֽרֶב׃ as our pasuk.  Why the word for word repitition?  Ibn Ezra answers: ונפלו אויביכם – פעם אחרת, שיפלו פעם אחרי פעם בלי תקומה.  Don't think that once you win the battle you are done.  We are dealing with, like the O.C. writes, a hatred that is built into the DNA of many people.  It will never go away.  Sadly, this is a battle that must be fought again, and again, and again.  

Rambam/Raavad on allegorical readings of pesukim

Rambam opens the last chapter of Mishne Torah telling us that in the days of mashiach the lion will not literally lie down with the lamb; it's just a mashal that means Israel will be at peace with its neighbors:

 אל יעלה על הלב שבימות המשיח יבטל דבר ממנהגו של עולם. או יהיה שם חידוש במעשה בראשית. אלא עולם כמנהגו נוהג. וזה שנאמר בישעיה וגר זאב עם כבש ונמר עם גדי ירבץ משל וחידה. ענין הדבר שיהיו ישראל יושבין לבטח עם רשעי עכו"ם המשולים כזאב ונמר. שנאמר זאב ערבות ישדדם ונמר שוקד על עריהם. ויחזרו כולם לדת האמת. ולא יגזלו ולא ישחיתו. אלא יאכלו דבר המותר בנחת עם ישראל. שנאמר ואריה כבקר יאכל תבן. וכן כל כיוצא באלו הדברים בענין המשיח הם משלים. ובימות המלך המשיח יודע לכל לאי זה דבר היה משל. ומה ענין רמזו בהן:

 

Raavad argues by cryptically simply quoting a pasuk from our parsha:

 

כתב הראב"ד ז"ל והלא כתוב בתורה והשבתי חיה רעה מן הארץ

 

What is his objection?  Just like the pasuk in Yeshayahu is a mashal, this pasuk is a mashal as well!  As Radbaz writes

 

ואין זו השגה, כמו ששאר הכתובים משל גם זה משל על אומה רעה כמו שדרשו על חיה רעה אכלתהו

 

The Margoliyos haYam (Sanhedrin 72) puts this Rambam together with another machlokes Rambam/Raavad l'shitasam.  The pasuk tells us with respect to ba ba'machteres אם־זרחה השמש עליו דמים לו שלם ישלם אם־אין לו ונמכר בגנבתו (Shmos 22).  The gemara in Sanhedrin darshens as follows:

 

ת"ר אין לו דמים אם זרחה השמש עליו וכי השמש עליו בלבד זרחה אלא אם ברור לך הדבר כשמש שאין לו שלום עמך הרגהו ואם לאו אל תהרגהו תניא אידך אם זרחה השמש עליו דמים לו וכי השמש עליו בלבד זרחה אלא אם ברור לך כשמש שיש לו שלום עמך אל תהרגהו ואם לאו הרגהו

 

The gemara interprets the term  אם זרחה השמש עליו to mean that it has to be clear as day that the ganav will allow nothing to stand in his way. The Rambam paskens (Geneiva 9:10)

 

היה הדבר ברור לבעל הבית שזה הגנב הבא עליו אינו הורגו ואינו בא אלא על עסקי ממון אסור להרגו ואם הרגו הרי זה הורג נפש שנאמר אם זרחה השמש עליו אם ברור לך הדבר כשמש שיש לו שלום עמך אל תהרגהו. לפיכך אב הבא במחתרת על בנו אינו נהרג שודאי שאינו הורגו. אבל הבן הבא על אביו נהרג:

 

Raavad disagrees and writes that a ba ba'machteres can never be killed if he comes during the day. אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו.  Irrespective of the derasha of Chazal, if the words of the pasuk tell us that אם זרחה השמש עליו, that when the sun is shining you can't kill the ganav, then we have to respect the literal meaning of the text.

 

Now we understand, says the Margoliyos haYam, what the Raavad's objection is in that last chapter about mashiach.  The Raavad l'shitaso holds that you can allegorize and take pesukim of navi as a mashal, but when it comes to words written in the chumash, you cannot ignore the literal meaning of the text. The punchline of Raavad's hasaga is **והלא כתוב **בתורה, and since we are dealing with a pasuk in chumash, it's a whole different ball game.  If the Torah tells us that the lion will change its ways, then it means animals won't behave the same.  Torah is on a different level than neviim and kesuvim, and אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו.

 

There is a danger of getting involved in issues that relate to ikkarei emunah, so with that caveat and the hope that I am not making an error, I was thinking that this machlokes l'shitasam is reflected as well in the famous machlokes Rambam and Raavad in ch 3 of hil teshuvah.  Rambam writes that someone who thinks והאומר שיש שם רבון אחד אבל שהוא גוף ובעל תמונה is an apikores.  Raavad comments:

 

א"א ולמה קרא לזה מין וכמה גדולים וטובים ממנו הלכו בזו המחשבה לפי מה שראו במקראות ויותר ממה שראו בדברי האגדות המשבשות את הדעות:

 

The usual hesber people give to the machlokes is that the Raavad of course accepted the incorporeality of G-d as a given.  What Raavad is objecting to is the labelling of everyone who thinks otherwise as an apikores.  In Raavad's view someone led astray by their literal reading of the text is an inadvertent apikores, a shogeg, and his heresy should not be held against him.  Rambam disagrees, as "nebach an apikores" is still an apikores (the aphorism quoted in the name of R' Chaim Brisker).  There are no excuses, there is no shogeg, when it comes to errors of belief.

 

Perhaps the Raavad is more tolerant of those led astray לפי מה שראו במקראות because the Raavad l'shitaso holds אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו and the literal reading of the text carries weight despite the derashos of Chazal.  I'm not suggesting Raavad would go so far as to accept the notion of G-d having form, but what I am suggesting is that he at least sees the possibility of a rational, understandable error given the need to preserve the literal reading of the text.  Rambam, on the other hand, holds that even when it comes to the text of the Torah, the derashos of Chazal and/or the principles of ikkarei emunah completely override the literal meaning of the text, so much so that if someone is a literalist and assigns G-d a form, the error is inexcusable. 

some notes from the Ayeles haShachar

Some he'oros from the Ayeles haShachar this week because I am preoccupied.  In some cases I left out his answers and some of the shakla v'terya:

 1) Rashi comments (21:1) לא יטמא בעמיו – בעוד שהמת בתוך עמיו, יצא מת מצוה that a kohen can be mitamei to bury a meis mitzvah.  The Chofetz Chaim writes that so long as there is another jew who can do the burial, it's not a meis mitzvah.  The implication is that if there are only aku"m available, a kohen can be metamei himself.  R' Shteinman asks: the din is that it is preferable to bury a meis by an aku"m on Y"T rishon rather than delay the burial until Y"T sheni.  If the fact that the burial is being done by an aku"m is not enough reason to allow for halanas ha'meis, why is it enough reason to allow for tumas kohanim?

 

2)  וְלַאֲחֹתוֹ הַבְּתוּלָה הַקְּרוֹבָה אֵלָיו - presumably the only way to know that she is a besula is because she has a chazakah as such.  Why does the gemara (Ch 10) never suggest this as the makor for the principle of chazakah?  (True, the gemara talks about examinations that can be performed to ascertain whether someone is a besulah, but it would be a dochak to say that the pasuk is speaking about the specific case that such an exam was done just before aveilus set in.)

 

3) The gedarim of "v'kidashto" are a bit unclear.  The PM"G (OC 53:14) writes that ideally a kohen gets first dibs to be the sha"tz for davening.  There is a a Keren Orah (Horiyos 12) that says if a kohen and a Yisrael have a bris milah on the same day, the mohel should do the bris of the kohen first.  Ah"S raises the question of two burials on the same day.  Does the mitzvah of v'kidashto apply even to a meis (like the din of kibud av v'eim, which continues after death) or not? 

 

4) A kohen asked the Steipler whether he should train his left handed son to be a righty because m'heira yibaneh ha'mikdash and a lefty can't do avodah (Bech 45).  The Steipler quoted a midrash that says all mumim will be healed when mashiach comes, so he has nothing to worry about.  The Ah"S asks: the Rambam brings down the halachos of what constitutes a mum, implying that these halachos are and will be noge'a l'maaseh.

 

5) The gemara equates the fact that a lulav with a split ti'yomes is pasul on Y"T with the fact that it is a shinuy which is koneh in dinei mamonos.  However, R' Elchanan in Koveitz Shiurim (B"K 112) points out that not every mum constitutes a shinuy, e.g. a nick in the ear of a korban is a mum that disqualifies but is not a shinuy that would be koneh.  How do you distinguish between these cases?

 

Yesh lachkor whether the presence of a mum is the sibah which pasels a korban, or whether the mum is a siman that the object is changed from its original state and therefore no longer acceptable?

 

The nicked ear falls into the former category.  The animal is essentially the same animal, but the presence of the nick disqualifies it.  The split ti'yomes falls into the latter category.  It's not the fact that it is pasul which proves that it is a shinuy, but aderaba, it's the fact that it is a shinuy which creates a psul because the object is a different object. 

 

Which category does the mumim of kohanim fall into?  Rashi writes (21:21) that a mum is posel only while it is present מום בו – בעוד מומו בו פסול, הא אם עבר מומו, כשר.  R' Shteinman argues that this proves that it is the presence of the mum which is the psul, not the fact that it indicates a shinuy, otherwise even if the mum is removed, the psul should still remain.  (Why this is true is a but unclear to me, but I think he means is that when something is acquired through a shinuy, if the shinuy is removed, the object does not revert back to the original owner.  So too, if mum is a psul because it indicates that there is a shinuy, it is the fact that the shinuy happened which is the psul, it is the change which occurred, irrespective of whether it can be undone or not.)

 

6)  וּמִיַּד בֶּן נֵכָר לֹא תַקְרִיבוּ אֶת לֶחֶם אֱלֹקיכֶם מִכׇּל אֵלֶּה כִּי מׇשְׁחָתָם בָּהֶם מוּם בָּם לֹא יֵרָצוּ לָכֶם. (22:25) Is there a din of "ritzuy" by the korban of an aku'm?  The gemara (Zev 45b) writes that עובדי כוכבים לאו בני הרצאה נינהו:  Similarly the Hagahos Ashr"I in Baba Basra explains the reason that we cannot accept tzedakah from an aku"m but can accept korbanos nedava from them is because there is no kaparah associated with korbanos nedava [tzedakah is a mechapeir!]  Some therefore explain that the end of our pasuk is not talking about the particular case of korbanos aku"m, but in a more general sense.

 

7) The gemara writes that the issur of oso v'es bno only applies when shechita is done, but not if you just stab the animal.  The gemara doesn't mean davka shechita, but rather means whatever the halachically proper way to kill the animal is, as we see from the fact that oso v'es bno applies to the sa'ir la'Azazel pushed off the cliff on Y"K.  Yesh lachkor according to R' Akiva who holds (Chulin 17a) that during the 40 years in the midbar shechita was not required on non-korban meat, was there an issur of oso v'es bno?  Does the gemara mean there was no din of shechita then, or for those 40 years was stabbing the animal the equivalent of shechita? 

 

8) בַּחֹדֶשׁ הָרִאשׁוֹן בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר לַחֹדֶשׁ בֵּין הָעַרְבָּיִם פֶּסַח לַה׳.  (23:5)  14 Nisan is not a moed.  Why is it listed here? 

 

9) Yesh lachkor whether וּשְׂמַחְתֶּם לִפְנֵי ה׳ אֱלֹקיכֶם שִׁבְעַת יָמִים is a tnai in the mitzvah of lekichas lulav, and therefore if someone is noteil lulav but is not b'simcha while doing so his mitzvah of netilas lulav is lacking, or whether  וּשְׂמַחְתֶּם לִפְנֵי ה׳ אֱלֹקיכֶם שִׁבְעַת יָמִים is its own mitzvah which netilas lulav is one element of fulfilling.  (According to the Bikurei Yaakov's understanding of the Rambam the mitzvah of netilas lulav for 7 days applies in Yerushalayim even today.)

 

10) Does someone who is sitting in the sukkah have to leave to go inside and shower for Shabbos?  Would we not apply the rule of oseik b'mitzvah patur min ha'mitzvah here?

 

11) The gemara writes that there was (at one point in time) a special bracha associated with lechem ha'panim so that even if a person ate only a small portion (less than a k'zayis) he would feel satiated.  Yesh lachkor in that case whether a person would have to say birkas ha'mazon.  On the one hand it is "v'savata" from the eating, but on the other hand less than a k'zayis is not considered a maaseh achila.

 

12)  וַיַּנִּיחֻהוּ בַּמִּשְׁמָר (24:123)  Was that just so he would not run away, or is there a din that required putting such a person in prison?

 

13) Rashi comments on  וְרָגְמוּ אֹתוֹ כׇּל הָעֵדָה that from here we learn כל העדה – במעמד כל העדה, מכאן ששלוחו של אדם כמותו.  R' Akiva Eiger (Kid 41) points out that the gemara never suggests this as a source for the din of שלוחו של אדם כמותו.  Interestingly the Sifra which is the source for the first half of Rashi's statement --  בְּמַעֲמַד כָּל הָעֵדָה --  omits the second half.  As Ah"S points out, if everyone (כל העדה) was in fact present, then you don't need a din of shlichus here.  The first half of Rashi/Sifra seems to contradict the second half.