המאכילך מן במדבר למען ענותך What kind of suffering could there be in having mon to eat? The gemara in Yoma (74b) comments אמר אינו דומה מי שרואה ואוכל למי שאינו רואה ואוכל אמר רב יוסף מכאן רמז לסומין שאוכלין ואין שבעין If you thought of steak when eating the mon, you tasted steak, but the food still looked like mon; therefore, a person was never fully satiated or satisfied. From here, says the gemara, we learn that a blind person who cannot ever see his food never really feels satiated either.
I saw quoted in the name of the Damesk Eliezer that this is why we daven on Yom Tov שׂבּענו מטובך. We don't just want Hashem to give us טובה, all that is good for us. He does that all the time. The problem is that we don't see His goodness for what it is, as we live in a world of hester. שׂבּענו מטובך -- we want to be able to see the goodness, not just believe in it, as only then will we feel satiated from Hashem's blessing.
הפּסח נאכל על השׂובע. The korban pesach was eaten only after one was satiated and full, as a desert. We have to be satiated and full from Hashem's goodness to truly take away the message of Pesach with us.
1) The scariest thing about what is going on at Columbia, Yale, MIT, et al, is that the radical Jew hater students of today are the professors, business leaders, and politicians of tomorrow. There is little future for Jews in America, and I've been writing that for years.
My hunch (I would love to see if anyone has done a study on this) is that had you taken a poll before events of the past few monthsof 12th graders in your average Jewish day school high school, you would have found more students aspiring for a spot in an ivy league college than students aspiring to make aliya.
Hashem has forced us the hard way to reassess our values.
2) For some reason someone in my house last night mentioned using teeth to identify a body through DNA (don't ask). I said that I thought teeth were usable if there were dental records like X-rays or impressions of the teeth, but not for DNA. Turns out I was wrong. Punkt fahrkert -- the first hit in my google search says, "DNA is an excellent means for identification of unidentified human remains. As dental pulp is surrounded by dentin and enamel, which forms dental armor, it offers the best source of DNA for reliable genetic type in forensic science."
My wife heard this and immediately chimed in that this is the pshat in הקהה את שיניו. The rasha wants to eliminate his spiritual DNA, his connection to Klal Yisrael. It's the teeth that are the best means of preserving DNA, so that's what we point to when we reply to him. I think it's a great pshat.
3) The gemara in Eiruvin (4a) quotes a Mishna in Negaim:
הנכנס לבית המנוגע וכליו על כתיפיו וסנדליו וטבעותיו בידיו הוא והם טמאין מיד היה לבוש כליו וסנדליו ברגליו וטבעותיו באצבעותיו הוא טמא מיד והן טהורין עד שישהא בכדי אכילת פרס פת חיטין ולא פת שעורין מיסב ואוכל בליפתן
Why does is the eating davka מיסב ואוכל, b'haseiba? Rashi writes: מיסב. שהייה זו בהסיבה שיערוהו ולא בנאכלת בעמידה והולך ובא שהוא שוהה באכילתו יותר When you recline and are engaged in doing nothing but eating, the eating goes faster than when you are walking around with your plate (hence the reason people linger at smorgasbords).
Maybe another reason to do haseiba on Pesach night is as a sign of chipazon, because when you eat that way you eat faster.
4) R' Tzadok haKohen writes that the reason we start the seder with karpas, a vegetable, is because Adam haRishon, in response to his eating eitz ha'daas, was cursed וְאָכַלְתָּ֖ אֶת־עֵ֥שֶׂב הַשָּׂדֶֽה. (Adam complained that he cannot be so degraded as to eat like an animal of the field, so Hashem softened the blow a bit and allowed him to eat bread, בְּזֵעַ֤ת אַפֶּ֙יךָ֙ תֹּ֣אכַל לֶ֔חֶם. ) Pesach is not just about the release from Egypt, but is about the tikun of man's earliest sin as well. That is the ultimate goal of geulah, which is still in process.
I don't like eating vegetables. Most parents have to twist their kids' arms to get them to eat veggies. I think this may be a remnant deep in our psyche of Adam haRishon's reaction. Either that, or vegetables just don't taste very good.
5) R' Noson Gestetner points out that there are a number of parallels between what we do on Pesach night and the events surrounding Yaakov getting the bracha from Yitzchak. Yaakov wore special clothes; on leil ha'seder we wear a kittel. The שְׁנֵ֛י גְּדָיֵ֥י עִזִּ֖ים טֹבִ֑ים are an allusion to the korban pesach and the korban chagiga. Yaakov said to his father קֽוּם־נָ֣א שְׁבָ֗ה וְאׇכְלָה֙ מִצֵּידִ֔י upon which Rashi comments שבה – לשון מיסב על השלחן, that this means haseiba. Yakov brings wine, וַיָּ֧בֵא ל֦וֹ יַ֖יִן וַיֵּֽשְׁתְּ, which may be an allusion to the 4 kosos. Rashi comments on וַיָּ֛רַח אֶת־רֵ֥יחַ בְּגָדָ֖יו וַֽיְבָרְכֵ֑הוּ וַיֹּ֗אמֶר רְאֵה֙ רֵ֣יחַ בְּנִ֔י כְּרֵ֣יחַ שָׂדֶ֔ה that שנתן בו ריח טוב, וזהו שדה תפוחים. Rashbam adds את השדה שהוא מלא נרד וכרכום קנה וקנמון. These are the basic ingredients of our charoset.
Why do we have this strange minhag of stealing the afikoman? It all harkens back to Yaakov "stealing" the brachos, which we re-enact this night of leil ha'seder.
There is a Midrash Pli'ah on the words בָּ֥א אָחִ֖יךָ בְּמִרְמָ֑ה וַיִּקַּ֖ח בִּרְכָתֶֽךָ that that says that Yitzchak showed Eisav the afikoman. The Sheivet haMussar quotes that the word בְּמִרְמָ֑ה is equal to the gemastriya of afikoman -- pretty incredible.
This explains, says R' Gestetner, why Yitzchak told Eisav that he already ate from the meal brought to him earlier and so there was nothing he could do for Eisav. Why not eat again?! There's always room for desert! The answer is that Yitzchak had already eaten afikoman, and אין מפטירין אחר הפּסח אפיקומן.
If you're still a reader here you know in the past few weeks we've been doing some of R' Shteinman's torah on the parsha. It's shabbos ha'gadol and everyone is into inyanei Pesach, but at this point I feel bad skipping a week.
R' Shteinman raises the question of whether a kohen can be metaheir a metzora al tnai. Tos (Kesubos 74) holds that you can only make a tnai in a matter that lends itself to shlichus (see this post). The ability to appoint a shliach to take care of something indicates that you have control over the outcome, and that is the key ingredient necessary in order to be able to make a tnai that will effect the outcome. In the case of tzaraas, the kohen has to personally declare whether something in tamei or tahor -- he cannot appoint a shliach to do so on his behalf. It would seem, therefore, that he cannot make a tnai either.
There seem to be exceptions to the above rule, e.g. you can make a tnai in nezirus (see Tos Nazir 11), or in nedarim. R Akiva Eiger writes that someone who is afraid that they will miss zman krias shema should read shema before davening al tnai that if they make the zman during birchos krias shema, they want to be yotzei only with the later recitation with the brachos. You can't have a shliach read k"s for you, so this sounds like yet another exception to the rule. A number of Achronim hold that Tos rule is limited to cases where an action is being done. However, when it comes to dibur -- the case of neder, nezirus, etc. -- a tnai can be made to undo dibur even if a case where a shliach cannot be appointed. This would seem to cover the declaration of the kohen as well.
The reason R' Shteinman has this on his radar is because Rashi at the beginning of the parsha quotes a din ביום טהרתו – מלמד שאין מטהרין אותו בלילה. What would happen if the kohen saw the nega during the day, and declared it tamei or tahor al tnai that the psak goes into effect after dark? Is it the maaseh of psak at night which is barred, or is it the chalos of the psak? Would such a tnai even work? (This is reminiscent of R' Akiva Eiger's safeik with regards to the issur of mekach u'memkar on shabbos -- is it the act of buying/selling which is prohibited, or is it the chalos of the sale? What if you made a sale on Friday which is chal on Shabbos?)
Later on in the parsha (14:36) by nigei batim there is a din וְצִוָּ֨ה הַכֹּהֵ֜ן וּפִנּ֣וּ אֶת־הַבַּ֗יִת בְּטֶ֨רֶם יָבֹ֤א הַכֹּהֵן֙ לִרְא֣וֹת אֶת־הַנֶּ֔גַע to clear out the house before the kohen comes to pasken on the nega afflicting it so that the kelim inside do not become tamei. If it is possible to pasken on a nega al tnai, why couldn't the kohen give his psak al tnai that it does not take effect for another hour or however long so that the house can be cleared? It seems from here that tnai does not work.
R' Shteinman rejects this proof. Forget about tnai; one can ask more fundamentally why the house needs to be cleared before the kohen gets there -- let the kohen just hold off on paskening until the kelim are removed? It must be (as Ohr haChaim spells out) that the kohen is obligated to pasken as soon as he sees the nega and put the house in a state of hesger, if required. By that same token, tnai cannot work either because of that same obligation to enforce hesger as soon as the nega is seen.
2) Rashi comments that nigei batim is a gift from Hashem. וְנָתַתִּי֙ נֶ֣גַע צָרַ֔עַת בְּבֵ֖ית אֶ֥רֶץ אֲחֻזַּתְכֶֽם Rashi writes
בשורה היא להם שהנגעים באים עליהם, לפי שהטמינו אמוריים מטמוניות של זהב בקירות בתיהם כל ארבעים שנה שהיו ישראל במדבר, ועל ידי הנגע נותץ הבית ומוצאן.
R' Shteinman points out that the gemara implies that negaim come as punishment for sin. How then can Rashi tell us that Hashem did this in order to give a person a rewrd and allow them to find buried treasure?
He answers that there is no contradiction. A person might need to receive a punishment, but at the same time, Hashem can bless them with a buried treasure. Had they not sinned, they might have gotten that treasure without having to destroy their house, but given the circumstances, this is how it had to work out.
The day after the Iran attack, I thought we should say hallel. Whether the "we" should be everyone, or those living in Eretz Yisrael alone, I don't know. But what I do know is that it is incredible that over 300 drones and missiles should be fired and cause just about no damage. I don't care how good you think the IDF is, and how good the cooperation is with other forces, it's still incredible. Just like the Rambam says in Hil Taanis (1:3)
אבל אם לא יזעקו ולא יריעו אלא יאמרו דבר זה ממנהג העולם אירע לנו וצרה זו נקרה נקרית. הרי זו דרך אכזריות וגורמת להם להדבק במעשיהם הרעים. ותוסיף הצרה צרות אחרות.
The same is true of salvation. We should not say דבר זה ממנהג העולםbecause it absolutely is not.
Unfortunately I only saw this video now otherwise I would have posted it earlier. Baruch she'kivanti, R' Ouri Cherki said to say hallel shaleim without a bracha:
When things are bad, everyone pulls out a Tehillim and we cry to Hashem, as it should be.
But when thing are good, you have to remember to also pull out a Tehillim, to sing shirah and say thank you.
My son quotes a letter of the L Rebbe in which he writes that it's not by accident that Pesach comes in chodesh ha'aviv. During the long winter months it looks like nothing is alive, nothing can grow, but then suddenly the weather changes, the trees are blossoming and we can say birkat ha'ilanot, and the flowers and grass start sprouting again. These winter months were a necessary preparatory step to allow things to bloom again; just because nothing was visible on the surface does not mean nothing was taking place. So too in life, there are periods when we feel like we are stagnating and in a funk and not progressing, but these are just passing winters, and a new spring will eventually arrive. This is the lesson of galus Mitzrayim, where it seemed we had sunk to irredeemable levels, but suddenly geulah happened and we blossomed forth as a nation.
I would add the words of the Midrash Rabbah (Braishis 10:6):
It is Shabbos haGadol. Throughout the year we may be unaware of that malach standing above and may not hear the whisper commanding גְּדַל. This Shabbos, this time of year, all of us hear it's call.
But it is not just a whisper. מַּכֶּה אוֹתוֹ**, וְאוֹמֵר לוֹ גְּדַל**. Growth is hard and growth can be painful. That is true for us as individuals and true for us as a nation. But grow we must.
Why is this shabbos called Shabbos haGadol?
In Parshas Braishis we read (1:16) that Hashem made אֶת־שְׁנֵ֥י הַמְּאֹרֹ֖ת הַגְּדֹלִ֑ים, but then the pasuk continues and tells us that there is אֶת־הַמָּא֤וֹר הַגָּדֹל֙ לְמֶמְשֶׁ֣לֶת הַיּ֔וֹם וְאֶת־הַמָּא֤וֹר הַקָּטֹן֙ לְמֶמְשֶׁ֣לֶת הַלַּ֔יְלָה. Rashi comments:
שוים נבראו, ונתמעטה הלבנה על ידי שקיטרגה ואמרה: אי איפשר לשני מלכים שישתמשו בכתר אחד.
The Kozhiglover explains that the difference between the sun and the moon is not merely a matter of size, but rather lies in the fact that the sun gives light, but the moon merely reflects light. The gemara in Bava Metziya (12b) tells us גדול וסמוך על שלחן אביו זהו קטן קטן ואינו סמוך על שלחן אביו זהו גדול A gadol gives; a katan receives. Similarly the gemara in Nedarim (24a) writes that a neder made to force someone to reciprocate a gift is taken seriously because the noder might be thinking לאו מלכא אנא דמהנינא לך ואת לא מהנית לי . I don't want to be like a melech, as a melech gives without taking in return. The moon argued that there could not be two melachim, two gedolim, two bodies that give off light independent of each other. As a result, it became a katan. It no longer is able to give off light, only to receive and reflect it.
The masechta in shas dedicated to the laws of chol ha'moed is called Moed Katan. Chol haMoed receives its kedusha from the days of Y"T that precede and come after it. These days are the sibah for its issurim; chol ha'moed merely reflects their light. The Kozhiglover explains that the machlokes whether to put in tefillin on chol ha'moed revolves around this point: do we look at the fact that it has no independent kedusha apart from that which comes from the days of Y"T that surround it and therefore treat it like chol, or do we say that sof sof the fact that it reflects that light of Y"T is enough to push of tefillin.
This is also the difference between Eretz Yisrael and chutz la'aretz. Ramban famously writes in P Acharei Mos that mitzvos should in theory only apply in Eretz Yisrael, but in chu"l we do them in order to keep in practice. Eretz Yisrael is the source of light; chu"l merely reflects what Hashem channels through Eretz Yisrael.
Pesach is the first of the regalim and is called a day of shabbos (the omer is brought "mi'macharas ha'shabbos"), but there is a source of light even greater than itself. Shabbos is תחילה למקראי קודשׁ, it is the primal source, the source from which springs the kedusha of all the other Moadim of the year, the first of which is Chag haPesach. This is why our shabbos is called Shabbos haGadol. It is the well from which Pesach and the other Moadim all draw, the source of the kedusha that we will IY"H receive and grow from in the upcoming week.
1) Just to make it a chazakah of 3 weeks in a row with R' Shteinman's torah: R' Shteinman has a safeik whether the kohen who rules whether a nega is tamei or tahor recites a bracha, something like, "v'tzivanu liros v'lifsok ha'nega." Beis din does not recite a bracha when they pasken, so why should this case be any different?
The difference is that the role of beis din is birur -- they are just there to clarify the facts, and m'meila what the din should be is clarified. The kohen's psak is not birur. The facts on the ground -- whether the afflication in question is a nega -- might be perfectly clear before the kohen says anything. However, until the kohen declares something to be a nega, it's like it does not exist. The kohen's psak does not merely clarify; it creates a new reality.
My 2 cents: whether b"d's function is just a matter of birur may not be so simple. The Rashba (B"K 90) writes that lo te'hey shmiya gedolah m'reiya only works for a beis din of three, but not a yachid mumcheh. From the perspective of ascertaining the facts, there is no difference between the re'iya of the mumcheh and the re'iya of a b"d of three. It would therefore seem that there is some extra ingredient involved in the mix. See Sharei Yosher 7:1 For a different approach, see also R' Amiel in his Darkei Kinyanim.
2) There is a derasha (Nida 41) on the second pasuk of our parsha, אִשָּׁה֙ כִּ֣י תַזְרִ֔יעַ וְיָלְדָ֖ה זָכָ֑ר:
א״ר יצחק א״ר אמי, אשה מזרעת תחלה יולדת זכר, איש מזריע תחלה יולדת נקבה, שנאמר אשה כי תזריע וילדה זכר.
The gemara at the end of Brachos (60) raises the possibility of a person davening for their child to be a boy, at least within 40 days from conception, and asks how this is possible given that everything is determined already at the moment of conception, by whether אשה מזרעת תחלה or איש מזריע תחלה:
והא"ר יצחק בריה דרב אמי איש מזריע תחלה יולדת נקבה אשה מזרעת תחלה יולדת זכר שנאמר אשה כי תזריע וילדה זכר הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שהזריעו שניהם בבת אחת
The dochak seems evident. The Zohar raises the same issue in a slightly different way, but the answer is unclear (to me at least):
The difference between the Zohar and the gemara is that the gemara seems like a "G-d of the gaps" type argument. Most things are determined by the teva of whether אשה מזרעת תחלה or איש מזריע תחל, but where that's not possible, G-d steps in to take over. The Zohar sees G-d as taking a hand in everything and somehow ironing out there being a need for that alongside how teva works.
In short, we are left with this tension between whether the determining factor of things is G-d or teva, which the Chasam Sofer encapsulates nicely with the following question: We thank Hashem every morning שׁלא עשׂני אשׂה. What are we thanking Hashem for? אשה מזרעת תחלה יולדת זכר, איש מזריע תחלה יולדת נקבה, it's determined by nature?
Chasam Sofer answers that there is in effect a two track system. There is the derech ha'teva system of אשה מזרעת תחלה יולדת זכר, איש מזריע תחלה יולדת נקבה. On top of that, there is the system that Klal Yisrael operates under, the system that transcends teva, that allows for Hashem to step in and direct things.
He then reads this into the pesukim. The parsha starts אִשָּׁה כִּי תַזְרִיעַ וְיָלְדָה זָכָר, which is the normal progression of teva. The continuation וְאִם נְקֵבָה תֵלֵד וְטָמְאָה שְׁבֻעַיִם כְּנִדָּתָהּ is not the flipside case of איש מזריע תחלה and having a girl. Were that the case, ikkar chaseir, why not say אישׁ כּי תזריע...? Rather, the continuation is this second track, the l'maalah min ha'teva track. Even though al pi teva אשה מזרעת תחלה יולדת זכר, sometimes Hashem will redirect things. Even though it's a case of אשה מזרעת תחלה, it can still come out that וְאִם נְקֵבָה תֵלֵד... In such a case you might have thought that the dinei tumah should be like a זָכָר, like the case of אשה מזרעת תחלה, which is what happened, kah mashma lan that it doesn't work that way.
The lesson here does not just apply to our parsha. Al pi derech ha'teva all kinds of things are determined -- how much $ you will make, how good you will do in school, etc. -- but there is an override switch to everything. Only Hashem has the final say.
Maybe that's why this parsha of tumas leida appears as an introduction to the rest of our parsha, which deals with the issue of negaim. A nega can come as a result of disease; it can be the result of teva. But that does not make a person tamei. Without the declaration of the kohen, the nega is meaningless. There is the override switch that determines the true reality of what is and what will be.
One or more of the local supermarkets has for years has offered a free box of 5lbs of matzah if you spend some amount on groceries before Pesach. When we were shopping on Sunday we noticed the box is a little small. Lo and behold, instead of 5lbs, the package now contains 4lbs of matzah. We have always gotten a 5lb box. My parents had 5lb boxes of matzah in the house. Amazingly, for literally decades, none of the manufacturers thought they could get away with "shrinkflation" and selfishly make more $ by selling you less in the package until the Biden presidency. Has absolutely nothing to do with the roaring rate of inflation caused by mismanagement of the economy, of course.
The same is true of Trader Joe's bananas, which have been $.19 cents each for decades until they recently went up to $.23 each. Government mis-spending is not to to blame. As the AP points out, "Such concerns go well-beyond bananas. Researchers expect food prices and inflation overall to rise as temperatures climb with climate change." If it wasn't climate change, my money would have been on racism or sexism as the cause for the price increase, as those two get the blame for just about everything these days.
Last week I mentioned the Rogatchover's chakira whether the simanei kashrus of an animal are a siman or a sibah, i.e. is it the actual presence of simanim that make the animal kosher, or are the simanim just a means of identifying what species an animal belongs to, and it is being a member of a kosher species that makes the animal kosher. Nafka mina: what if you have a member of a kosher species that lacks simanin? What if you genetically engineer a non-kosher species so that it does have simanin?
Since it's shloshim yom kodem ha'chag, let's use the same chakira in hil chametz u'matzah. The Mishna (Pes 35) lists 5 species of grain that can be used to make matzah. The gemara explains that only grain which can potentially become chamtez is acceptable. Yesh lachkor: is this quality of being ראוי לחימוץ a siman to identify whether a grain is one of the 5 acceptable species, or is it the sibah that makes that particular grain usable for matzah?
There is a safeik of the MG"A that may reflect the 2 sides of this chakira. Rashi holds that one can use the shell of the grain, סובּין, in order to make matzah. (We don't pasken this way.) The MG"A (OC 454:1) writes:
סובין. פירש"י קליפת חיטים הנושרים בשעת כתישה ומורסן הנשאר בנפה ע"ש מוכח קצת דבא לידי חימוץ מדיוצאין בהם י"ח מצה לדעת רש"י ואפשר לומ' כיון שהוא ממין הבא לידי חימוץ יוצא בה י"ח
Does Rashi mean that סובּין can actually become chameitz, or does Rashi just mean that סובּין are part of a species of grain that can become chameitz?
Lichorah the safeik of the MG"A is this issue of siman vs sibah. If ראוי לחימוץ is the sibah that makes something usable for matzah, then סובּין must themselves be capable of becoming chametz. If ראוי לחימוץ is just a siman, a way to identify whether a grain belongs to one of the 5 acceptable species, than even if סובּין never turn into chametz, it doesn't matter, since we know that סובּין are a byproduct of wheat, which is one of the 5 acceptable species. (See Shu"T L'Horos Noson vol 14 #25)
Rashi comments that the אֲלֵהֶם in the first pasuk refers to Elazar and Itamar.
אמור שיאמרו להם לאלעזר ולאיתמר, או אינו אלא לאמר לישראל? כשהוא אומר: דברו אל בני ישראל (ויקרא י״א:ב׳), הרי דבור האמור לישראל, הא מה אני מקיים: לאמר אלהם – לבנים, לאלעזר ולאיתמר
The word דַּבְּרוּ in the next pasuk refers to Moshe, Aharon, and his children together. Rashi comments:
את כולם השוה להיות שלוחים לדבור זה, לפי שהושוו בדמימה וקבלו עליהם גזירת המקום מאהבה.
The reward given to Aharon and his children was their being given the opportunity to teach this parsha. We see a beautiful chiddush : The capacity to teach Torah is a gift from Hashem, it's a reward. Don't take it for granted!
2) Yesterday I touched on the mitzvah of bedikas simanin to check whether an animal is kosher. R' Itzelege Ponovicher has a chiddush based on a Rivash that R' Shteinman ties to another din in our parsha. The gemara (Chulin 63b) writes that the Torah only lists the tamei birds because most birds in the world are kosher. Tos asks: if we are unaware of the identity of a bird, why can't we rely on rov and assume it is kosher? Tos answers that there might be multiple subspecies of each tamei bird, so they outnumber the kosher ones and there is no rov. (Alternatively, one could say that even if the # of kosher species is greater than th # of tamei species, there are more individual tamei birds.) R' Shteinman offers a more "lomdish" answer and suggests that whether a bird is kosher or not is a safeik in din, and a safeik in din cannot be resolved with a rov in metziyus. According to these answers either there is no rov, or rov is not good enough to resolve the issue. R' Itzele Ponovicher (Zecher Yitzchak #80) writes that in fact the rov is a good rov and takes off the lav of eating a tamei animal -- the metziyus as determined by the rov is that the bird is a kosher bird. However, the mitzvah of bedikas simanim tells us that knowing that a bird is kosher based on rov is not enough. Eating such an animal violates the aseh of bedikas simanim.
R' Shteinman understood the Rivash a little differently. He understood that the din of bedikas simanim precludes relying on the rov. The mitzvah tells us thsat in this case so long as you cannot identity the animal with simanin, you must be choshesh for the miyut and there would therefore be a lav.
3) Rashi comments regarding the deaths of Nadav and Avihu (10:3) ועל פני כל העם אכבד – כשהקב״ה עושה דין בצדיקים מתיירא ומתעלה ומתקלס: אם כן באילו, כל שכן ברשעים. This piece that R' Shteinman quotes from R' Chaim has little to do with the parsha, but it's R' Chaim, so how could I leave it out? We say in kedusha of musaf that the angels turn to each other and ask, "Where is the place of kavod Shamayim?" משׁרתיו שׁואלים זה לזה אי׳ מקום כּבודו. R' Chaim explained that the angels' safeik is whether there is greater kvod Shamayim in Hashem bestowing goodness on the tzadikim for all to see, or is there greater kvod Shamayim in Hashem punishing tzadikim for transgressions so all can see the demonstration of justice. The angels bleibt by a safeik. We therefore continue and say given all things being equal, ממקומו הוא יפן בּרחמים לעמו..., let the kvod Shamayim come through rachamim, by giving us good things, not through onesh. (Note from me: קטונתי מכל החסדים ומכל האמת... Sefas Emes explains that there are two ways that Hashem can make a person feel small: 1) by punishing them and knocking them down to size; 2) by giving them so much goodness that they feel unworthy of the gift. Yaakov Avinu asked that קטונתי come from the latter, מכל החסדים ומכל האמת, rather than the former).
Rashi tells us that a greater kavod Shamayim than either the carrot or stick for tzadikim is the punishment of reshaim. This is why we daven, says R' Shteinman, "V'lamalshinim al t'hi tikvah..." The problem is this seems to fly in the face of a well known gemara (Brachos 10a):
הנהו בריוני דהוו בשבבותיה דר"מ והוו קא מצערו ליה טובא הוה קא בעי ר' מאיר רחמי עלויהו כי היכי דלימותו אמרה לי' ברוריא דביתהו מאי דעתך משום דכתיב יתמו חטאים מי כתיב חוטאים חטאים כתיב ועוד שפיל לסיפיה דקרא ורשעים עוד אינם כיון דיתמו חטאים ורשעים עוד אינם אלא בעי רחמי עלויהו דלהדרו בתשובה ורשעים עוד אינם בעא רחמי עלויהו והדרו בתשובה
Bruriah told R' Meir that he should daven for troublemakers to repent, not for their elimination. So how do we explain the bracha in our shmoneh esrei?
R' Shteinman makes no attempt here to offer an answer, but many others already address this question. Maharal in Be'er haGolah reinterprets the bracha of lamalshinim as a request to eliminate wickedness, not the evildoers themselves, in concert with Bruriah's approach. Maybe one can distinguish between different types of evildoers. Or maybe the truth is far simpler: who says we pasken like Bruriah and not R' Meir? Sure, Bruriah's sentiments sound nice, but that doesn't mean she was correct.
4) Lastly, a question that only a Litvishe Rosh Yeshiva could ask. וַיֹּאמֶר מֹשֶׁה אֶל אַהֲרֹן קְרַב אֶל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ (10:7) Rashi comments שהיה אהרן בוש וירא לגשת, אמר לו משה: מה אתה בוש? לכך נבחרת Aharon was hesitating, so Moshe had to encourage him to step up to the plate. R' Shteinman asks: so what if Aharon felt a sense of unworthiness or shame? Hashem gave the command for him to do the avodah, so what difference should his emotional reaction make? A command is a command!
I think I've written this about the Ayeles haShachar before. Certain questions are ra'uy specifically for the person asking them. Only someone who is capable of overcoming the challenge of putting aside their own emotions to do whatever Hashem asks can ask such a question on this Rashi.
1) The gemara (Pesachim 6) has a din שואלין ודורשין בהלכות הפסח קודם הפסח שלשים יום which is derived from the fact that Moshe taught the halachos of Pesach Sheni one month in advance, on Pesach Rishon שהרי משה עומד בפסח ראשון ומזהיר על הפסח שני שנאמר ויעשו בני ישראל את הפסח במועדו וכתיב ויהי אנשים אשר היו טמאים לנפש אדם. R' Chaim Kanievsky held that this is a real derasha, not just an asmachta, and is therefore a din d'orasya. Rokeach writes that reading parshas Parah and HaChodesh is a kiyum of this din of being shoel v'doresh hil ha'chag, as the whole point of these parshiyos is to teach us the halachos of becoming tahor and offering korban pesach. Acc to R' Chaim, the reading would therefore be a kiyum d'orasya. Rama (282:4, see R' Akiva Eiger there) quotes a yesh omrim that a katan should not be called by for any of the 4 parshiyos.
I enjoyed posting the Ayeles haShachar pieces last week, so I am going to do more of the same this week, with a mix of halacha and aggadah.
2) זֹאת הַחַיָּה אֲשֶׁר תֹּאכְלוּ - מלמד שהיה משה אוחז בחיה ומראה אותה לישראל. Why did Moshe have to hold up the animals for display? What was the necessity of having a show and tell session instead of just teaching the halachos?
The Rogatchover has a chakira whether the simanei kashrus are a siman or a sibah for a creature's kashrus (see post here, also here ). Tos (Nida 50b) writes with respect to some kind of wild chicken that lives by a pond:
תרנגולתאדאגמא. הזכר אסור לפי שאין לו סימני טהרה ולא שרי מטעם כל היוצא מן הטהור טהור שהרי האם לא ילדה האפרוח אלא ביצים הטילה והאפרוח מעפרא קא גדיל ונאסר ממילא ע"י סימני טומאה ונקבה נמי אין לאוסרה למאן דאסר זה וזה גורם דהא אפרוח לא יצא אלא מן הביצה ומעפרא קגדיל כדפרישית.
Even though we know that this chicken is born from the egg of a kosher mother bird, it is considered a min tamei because it lacks simanim. It seems from Tos that simanim are a sibah -- even though we know the family the bird is related to, it still needs simanim to be kosher. Ralbag on our parsha seems to disagree and hold that simanin just serve to identify the species of the animal, and it's by virtue of being a member of that species that it is kosher.
R' Shteinman suggests that our Rashi speaks to this issue. Let's say a person could genetically engineer a tamei animal and cause it to be born with simanei kashrus, or genetically engineer a kosher animal so it was not born with simanim. What would be its status -- tamei or tahor? Are the simanim the sibah for the animal's status, and without them it is tamei, or are the simanim just a siman that help us identify the species? R' Shteinman writes that Moshe held up each animal so that we can recognize it and know what species it is because that is what determines whether it is tamei or tahor, not the presence/absence of simanin.
Rashi works well l'shitaso, as he writes at the end of the parsha (11:47) writes that the mitzvah of knowing the simanei kashrus is לא בלבד השונה, אלא שתהא יודע ומכיר ובקי בהן. Theoretical knowledge is not enough; you have to be able to recognize the physical signs of what makes an animal kosher.
3) וְאֶת הַשָּׁפָן...וְאֶת הָאַרְנֶבֶת For those interested in this sort of thing (which, for the record, I am not), R Shteinman quotes R' Hirsch who writes והנה, רגילים לפרש ששפן וארנבת הם בעלי החיים הקרויים כן בימינו. אך פירוש זה לא ייתכן, אלא אם כן שני בעלי חיים אלה יהיו מעלי גרה, ודוחק לומר כן and then adds that today we know that the ארנבת actually does chew its cud, but it is almost undetectable. (I'm not sure why this piece is in brackets.)
4) Yesh lachkor whether אין אכילה פּחותה מכּזית means it is not a maaseh achila, or whether it is a maaseh achila but there is a ptur onshin?
Rashi comments on the pasuk וְהָאֹכֵל מִנִּבְלָתָהּ יְכַבֵּס בְּגָדָיו וְטָמֵא עַד הָעָרֶב וְהַנֹּשֵׂא אֶת נִבְלָתָהּ יְכַבֵּס בְּגָדָיו וְטָמֵא עַד הָעָרֶב that the reason the pasuk mentions eating is to tell us that the shiur of noge'a or nosei is the same amount as that which constitutes achila, namely, a k'zayis:
האוכל – ליתן שיעור לנושא ולנוגע כדי אכילה, והוא כזית.
It sounds from here like the definition of achila is a k'zayis.
However, R' Shteinman points out that the implication of there being a chiyuv for eating a chatzi shiur (according to R' Yochanan Yoma 74) is that the shiur k'zayis is a maaseh achila, just there is a ptur onshin. If achila less than a shiur is not a maaseh aveira, then the sevara of "chazi l'itztarufei" makes no sense -- 0+0 is still 0.
Yes, I know it's too early to do posts about Pesach, but saw this in the supermarket and can't resist. If you see these candles on the table, get ready for a long night, as in, "Raboseinu, it's zman kri'as shema shel shacharis," long.
I usually don't post on weekends, but I am stuck in front of the computer taking care of some work related things today. Tablet Magazine has a wonderful article entitled The President's War Against the Jews well worth your attention. The punchline:
Biden owns this war imposed on Israel. The president inherited a Middle East marked by a bankrupt Iran and amicable relations between Israel and Arab countries with more in the works, thanks to President Trump’s historic Abraham Accords. Biden reversed course, enriched Tehran, funded terrorists and destabilized the Middle East—setting the stage for Oct. 7.
Biden shows no sign of reversing even one of his deadly failures. Instead of taking responsibility for his policy mistakes, he blames Israel for not going further and providing Iran with a launching pad on its border by establishing a Palestinian state. Perversely, the attacks of Oct. 7 have only led Biden to kick his effort to establish a Palestinian state into high gear.
Perfectly put. I would only add that while the buck stops with Biden, he would not be in a position to do the harm he has done if not for those who voted for him, including, sadly, people in our own community. One can only hope that they will not make the same terrible mistake a second time this November.
Meanwhile, at my workplace today the internal bulletin board reminds me that we are celebrating Transgender Visibility Day, as well as National Indigenous Languages Day. No mention of any other meaning for the day. Now, you may think who cares? What does it have to do with us? But it does have to do with us. It does make a difference whether the community around us celebrates religion, even the wrong one, or celebrates the perversion of gender. One of these two is supported by the President and Democrat party; one is not.
ת"ר כשמן הטוב היורד על הראש וגו' כמין שתי טיפין מרגליות היו תלויות לאהרן בזקנו אמר רב כהנא תנא כשהוא מספר עולות ויושבות בעיקרי זקנו ועל דבר זה היה משה רבינו דואג שמא חס ושלום מעלתי בשמן המשחה יצתה בת קול ואמרה כטל חרמון שיורד על הררי ציון מה טל אין בו מעילה אף שמן שיורד על זקן אהרן אין בו מעילה ועדיין אהרן היה דואג שמא משה לא מעל ואני מעלתי יצתה בת קול ואמרה לו הנה מה טוב ומה נעים שבת אחים גם יחד מה משה לא מעל אף אתה לא מעלת
Why was Moshe worried about the issue me'ila when he had no benefit from the shem ha'mishcha? Rabeinu Gershom on the daf explains שמא מעלתי לפי שהזקן לא נצטוה למשוח והיה רואה בו ב׳ טיפין מן הראש ירדו לזקן:. R' Baruch Mordechai Ezrachi, however, quotes the comment of the Shita MeKubetzet on the same sugya and uses that to answer the question. The full text of the chapter of Teh (133) the gemara is quoting is as follows:
Why does the word זְקַֽן appear twice in the second pasuk? The Shita answers that when the shemen ha'mishcha was placed on Aharon's beard, Moshe felt as if it was on his own beard. That's מה טוב ומה נעים שבת אחים גם יחד. Moshe felt such pleasure from seeing his brother become kohen gadol, it was as if he gufa was standing in Aharon's shoes. M'meila, if it was as if Moshe was annointing himself as well as his brother, then b'shmala annointing Aharon, that was the mitzvah, but there was no mitzvah for Moshe himself to be annointed. Was that hanaah that Moshe himself got an issur me'ila?
Putting aside the issue me'ila issue, the takeaway thought here is that when you are singing אחינו כּל בּית ישׂראל, do you really feel like you are in your brothers' shoes? That his/her experience is your experience, that you vicariously share in everything? That was the level of Moshe Rabeinu's הִנֵּ֣ה מַה־טּ֖וֹב וּמַה־נָּעִ֑ים שֶׁ֖בֶת אַחִ֣ים גַּם־יָֽחַד. That is what we should aspire to.
R' Baruch Mordechai Ezrachi goes on to discuss why it is that Aharon became concerned for the issue me'ila only after the bas kol responded to Moshe. M'mah nafshach: if there was something to be concerned about, he should have been concernde from the get-go, and if the bas kol revealed there was nothing for Moshe to be concerned about, then why Aharon troubled? Take a look.
The punchline of why there is no me'ila is מה טל אין בו מעילה אף שמן שיורד על זקן אהרן אין בו מעילה. The shemen ha'mishcha is compared to tal, and tal is not subject to any issur me'ila.
R' Shimon Sofer asks: Why does the gemara compare the shemen davka to tal? Why not some other liquid?
The gemara (Taanis 4) writes that Bn"Y asked Hashem to be like rain:
To which Hashem responded that their request was wrong. Rain is not always a blessing. Rain does not always fall. They instead should have asked for Him to be like dew, which always is there, and is always a blessing. Our request was not formulated properly, but Hashem responded anyway and blessed us that he would be like dew:
Shem m'Shmuel (Pesach 5772) explains the difference between rain and dew as follows:
כי גשם פעמים מתבקש פעמים אינו מתבקש, פי' דגשם הוא השפעה הבאה לעומת המעשים לטוב או למוטב וכשח"ו אין מעשים טובים מה גם להיפוך יכולה ח"ו לבוא השפעה להיפוך, וכעין גשם המבול, אבל בבחי' טל הוא לטובה לבד, ובא אף בלא אתעדל"ת, רק אם הוא כלי מוכשר לקבל,
Rain is something you ask for. When you make a request, you don't always deserve to get what you ask for. You don't always realize the right thing to ask for. Dew is something that is there whether you ask for it or not, whether you want it or not, whether you deserve it or not.
Aharon was concerned lest his acceptance of the kehuna be tainted by the desire for pesonal aggrandizement, for his own enjoyment of the position, for the honor. Accepting the position on those terms would be an issur me'ila, taking advantage of hekdesh for personal gain.
Hashem responded that He knows this is not somethign Aharon would ever ask for. It's not like the rain -- פעמים מתבקש. Rather, the position is like the dew. Aharon's acceptance was not because he wanted the position and not even because he thought he deserved or earned the position, but simply because it was the ratzon Hashem.
1) One of the things I like about R' Shteinman's torah is that his questions/answers are not far-flung lomdus, but are, dare I say it, rooted in common sense. On this week's parsha he quotes the Chofetz Chaim's charge to learn kodshim so that once geulah comes b'karov gedolei yisrael will be able to pasken on issues relating to the mikdash and kodshim. R' Shteinman asks: how are these gedolim supposed to figure out what to do? He quotes that the Ponivicher Rav dealt with this very question and responded that he will just follow the Chofetz Chaim's lead. That just kicks the can down the road. How is the Chofetz Chaim supposed to figure out how to pasken? And if you say that we will have a techiyas ha'mesim and can just ask Moshe or Aharon, then why bother learning kodshim to try to figure everything out? We can just ask Moshe and Aharon?
I've had a similar thought since I began wearing techeiles. When you order techeiles from the Ptil Tekhelet site they give you a whole menu of options to choose from as to which shita to follow in tying the tzitzis. How do you know what to choose? Any mesorah as to what to do has been lost for at least 1200 years or so! We are halachically flying blind. And that is assuming you even want to wear techeiles, which a large segment of the Jewish world, for one reason or other, has yet to be convinced to start doing. Imagine we somehow finally fulfill the mitzvah of binyan beis ha'mikdash in our times. Any mesorah as to what to do has been lost for even longer than the mesorah of techeiles. Already in Mishnayos (Midot 2:5) we have Tanaim saying about lishkos of the azarah אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב: שָׁכַחְתִּי מֶה הָיְתָה מְשַׁמֶּשֶׁת that they forgot what the space was used for. How are we supposed to know?
2) While on the topic of R' Shteinman's torah, here is another interesting question he raises:
Is this a mitzvah or a matir? Meaning, what if you want to just throw the utensils in the garbage? Is there an obligation of מֹרַ֥ק וְשֻׁטַּ֖ף בַּמָּֽיִם or is it just a matir if you want to use the kli?
Another interesting one: Off the cuff I would have assumed that when you have a lav ha'nitak l'aseh, the aseh has to be done by the person who violated the lav in order to give him a ptur from malkos. You see from our parsha that is not true The gemara writes that there are no malkos for the issur nosar because it is a lav ha'nitak l'aseh, but it sounds like the mitzvah of burning nosar (6:17) can be done by anyone.
And if you like a Brisker style chakira, R' Shteinman occasionally throws those out there too: The gemara (Zev 87) raises the question of whether something hung in the airspace above the mizbeiach counts as being on the mizbeiach itself or not. Yesh lachkor whether the gemara means the airspace is the makom mizbeiach, or whether it's not the makom mizbeich, but it has the din of makom mizbeiach.
I could go on all day quoting interesting points from the Ayeles haShachar, but I don't have all day so תן לחכם ויחכּם עוד. That was just to whet the appetite. Maybe I should do something like that every week.
Based on the language of the pasuk the Malbim makes what sounds like a Brisker chiluk . He writes that when the Torah uses the term אוכל, it is referring to the gavra, but תֵּֽאָכֵל֙, passive voice, nifal, refers to the cheftza, the item being eaten. Nafka minah: whether or not you need to eat a shiur. When the object is being referred to, the shiur is any amount; when it is the person eating being referred to, then אין אכילה פּותה מכּזית (see Beis haLevi quoted in this post.)
יש הבדל בין פעל ׳אכל׳ בקל ובין הנפעל. שפעל ׳אכל׳ בקל מוסב על האדם האוכל ולא יקרא אוכל אלא בכזית; שפחות מזה נקרא ׳טועם׳ – ״כי טעמתי מעט דבש״ (שמואל א י״ד). וכמ״ש בספרא לקמן [(פרשה י מ״י) (אחרי מות פרק יב מ״ב) (אמור פרק ד מט״ז) (אמור פרק ו מ״ג) ובפסחים (דף לב.)] ״סתם אכילה בכזית״. אבל הנפעל מוסב על הדבר, ואף אם נאכל כל שהוא – הגם שלא יקרא ׳אכילה׳ מצד האוכל שלא אכל רק טעם – מכל מקום הדבר ׳נאכל׳ ואיננו. וזהו שאמר בספרא שלכן שינה ואמר ״מצות יֵאכל״ בנפעל ולא תפס הלשון שדבר בו עד עתה – ״יאכלו אהרן״ ״יאכלוהו״; והיה לו לומר ״מצות יֹאכלו״. ללמד שאף שלא נשאר רק מקצתה - בכל זאת תאכל.
With this he explains the Rambam (Cu"m 1:7) who writes that the shiur of the issur achilas chameitz is a kol she'hu:
האוכל מן החמץ עצמו בפסח כל שהוא הרי זה אסור מן התורה שנאמר לא יאכל
The Kesef Mishna asks two questions, the second of which is . ועוד קשה דאי מקרא איפכא ה"ל למילף מיניה דלא יאכל שיעור אכילה משמע וצ"ע. It uses the word achila, so how can the Rambam say you are chayav on less than a k'zayis? Answers the Malbim: because it is nifal, passive voice, a din in the cheftza, not the gavra, so there is no shiur.
The problem is if this is correct, then the same chiddush should apply to other issurim as well written in lashon nifal:
The pasuk is talking about Pesach Mitzryaim, not Pesach as celebrated for future generations. At the time of that Pesach, we had not undergone the geirus of mattan Torah and in effect, were still bnei Noach. Rambam says in Hil Melachim that there is no concept of shiurim for a ben Noach (see this post); therefore, the issur chametz would be violated even on a kol she'hu. Once the issur was established, it carried over the Pesach doros in the same way.
1) My wife pointed out that the seudah of Achashveirosh was 180 days. ונהפּוך הוא! We needed to correct that to earn the holiday of Purim. This may be the first instance of a 180 turnabout.
Pretty amazing chiddush -- if you can't fulfill drinking ad d'lo yada yourself, you can have a shliach do it on your behalf and sit back and watch them get drunk. You don't get a full kiyum, but the Rebbe says it is better than nothing.
How does that work? Drinking is a מצוה שׁבּגופו, and you can't fulfill a מצוה שׁבּגופו through shlichus? (The classic example is putting on tefillin -- you can't appoint a shliach to put on tefillin for you; they have to be placed on your own arm.)
My wife's cousin, R' Akiva Wagner a"h, has a hesber that hinges on two points:
a) You can have a partial kiyum ha'mitzvah. For example, as we've discussed before, even though the shiur for mitzvos achila is a k'zayis, if you don't have the full shiur available there you may still get some credit for doing achila on a chatzi shiur.
b) Yesh lachkor: when we say you cannot fulfill a מצוה שׁבּגופו through shlichus, does that mean the shlichus is invalid, or does it mean the shliach is your shliach, i.e. the shlichus works, but the shlichus cannot result in a kiyum ha'mitzvah.
If you accept the second side of the chakira (which you need to prove), you at least have an opening to say that the shlichus may not be enough for a full kiyum mitzvah, but may be enough to get you a partial kiyum, akin to a chatzi shiur of a mitzvas aseh.
1) See my wife's blog for a nice take on the relationship between Esther and Sarah.
2) There is a machlokes Rebbi and Chachamim whether עיצומו שׁל יום is mechapeir on Yom Kippurim or whether teshuvah is required as well. R' Yaakov Moshe Charlap held that the machlokes is only viz a viz Yom Ki-Purim, but on Purim itself, everyone agrees that עיצומו שׁל יום is mechapeir.
R' Yisrael Salanter is reported to have said that a wise person can accomplish as much in ruchniyus in his seudas Purim as an unintelligent person accomplishes with his tefilas ne'ila.
The gemara (Meg 7b) follows up on Rava's statement
אמר רבא מיחייב איניש לבסומי בפוריא עד דלא ידע בין ארור המן לברוך מרדכי
with a story:
רבה ורבי זירא עבדו סעודת פורים בהדי הדדי איבסום קם רבה שחטיה לרבי זירא למחר בעי רחמי ואחייה לשנה אמר ליה ניתי מר ונעביד סעודת פורים בהדי הדדי אמר ליה לא בכל שעתא ושעתא מתרחיש ניסא
The Maharasha writes, דבר תמוה הוא לפרשו כפשטיה, taken at face value, the story is incredible. Even granting the inebriation of Rava, or Rabbah according to some girsa'ot, could he really have committed murder? Would an even keeled person (much less a tzadik like an amora!), out of the blue, without any prior animosity towards a person, jump up and kill them, no matter how drunk they might be? Were that the case bars should be the scenes of a lot more murders.
Some explain (see Baal HaMaor quoting Rabeinu Ephraim) the whole point of the story is in its shock value, as an illustration of the dangers of drinking עד דלא ידע בין ארור המן לברוך מרדכי. It could be that the Rambam and others who write that one should drink until one dozes off read the story as a rejection of Rava's extreme formulation.
Others (e.g. see the Ben Ish Chai, or the Sichos of the L Rebbe) take the story less literally, and explain that Rabbah taught R' Zeira great esoteric secrets of Torah, which R' Zeira's soul could not receive while contained in his physical body, so his soul departed. The Rebbe notes that the name Rabbah indicates rav=greatness, while Zeira is like the Aramaic word=smallness, indicating the gap between their knowledge.
Chasam Sofer in his teshuvos (OC end of 185) points out that the gemara (Shabbos 156a) tells us that someone born under the planetary influence of mars will have a proclivity to spill blood, הַאי מַאן דִּבְמַאְדִּים — יְהֵי גְּבַר אָשֵׁיד דְּמָא. Guess who was born when mars was visible? אָמַר רַבָּה: אֲנָא בְּמַאְדִּים הֲוַאי. None other than Rabbah! Therefore, says Chasam Sofer, it is davka Rabbah who ended up committing murder. This is why the majority of poskim do not reject Rava's statement in the face of the story, as most people do not share that proclivity to blood lust.
R' Menashe Klein (O.C. Tinyana 556) writes that Rabbah intended to channel his blood lust towards the fulfillment of a mitzvah and wanted to carry out mech'ias Amalek k'peshuto. How did R' Zeira get involved in that? He suggests that R' Zeira, as is our custom, came to Rabbah's feast dressed in costume. Rather than dress up like Mordechai, like all other little boys, R' Zeira decided he would dress up like Haman, or an Amaleiki. Overcome with drunkenness, in his zeal to fulfill mechi'as Amalek, Rabbah did not recognized his friend, thought it was really Amalek at his party, and took advantage of the opportunity.
Just when you thought we've reached the limits of creative interpretation here, I found in the last piece of the "yoman" kept by R' Yisrael Be'eri (note for those who learned in Kerem b'Yavneh: this is R' Binyamin Be'eri's father), R' Yaakov Moshe Charlap's son in law, (well worth your reading in its entirety!) a pshat that I am not sure is not Purim torah, but you can decide. R' Charlap writes that there must have been some friction between Rabbah and R' Zeira before this incident. The murder was the culmination of the story, not the start of the story. Who was R' Zeira? Chazal tell us (Kesubos 110b) that R' Zeira avoided R" Yehuda because R' Yehudah held there was an issur of going from Bavel to Eretz Yisrael. The gemara (BM 85) tells us that R' Zeira made aliya and then fasted so that he would forget the Babvli and could immerse himself completely in Talmud Yerushalmi, the torah of Eretz Yisrael. (My son pointed out R' Zeira is highlighted in the last sugya in Horiyos as the exemplar of exceptional ability to be maksheh u'mefareik, so his transformation from a Bavli-Amora to a Yerushalmi thinker must have been a dramatic change.) Not only was R' Zeira a confirmed Zionist, a lover of Eretz Yisrael, but he was also a great lover of the Jewish people. The gemara (San 37) writes that he was mekareiv a bunch of outlaws in his neighborhood, against the wishes of the other Rabbis who wanted nothing to do with them. Who was Rabbah? The gemara (Shabbos 153) writes that Rabbah was so despised by the inhabitants of Pumbadita because of his criticisms that Abayei wondered if anyone would even come to his funeral אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרַבָּה: כְּגוֹן מָר דְּסָנוּ לֵיהּ כּוּלְּהוּ פּוּמְבְּדִיתָאֵי, מַאן מַחֵים הֶסְפֵּידָא. Rabbah and R' Zeira represent a clash of ideologies, two different approaches to avodas Hashem. They met at the Purim seudah, things came to a head, and Rabbah, in the heat of the moment, struck R' Zeira.
Fast foward to modern times. R Charlap quotes his rebbe, Rav Kook, as saying who is R' Zeira other than himself, a great lover of Eretz Yisrael, a great lover of even the most wayward of Am Yisrael. Zeira is roshei teivos, the same letters as זירא = זה רב אברהם יצחק. And Rabbah is of course those who stood against Rav Kook and did not follow in his footsteps.
May we be zocheh this year to fulfill mechi'as Amalek k'peshuto mamesh, in the literal sense, and I make no apologies for choosing sides here, I hope we become a little more like R' Zeira, to come to greater love of Eretz Yisrael and drawing close those who need to be drawn close. Just as Purim was the prelude to the return and aliya of Ezra and binyan ha'bayis, so too should our Purim be the prelude to our full return to Eretz Yisrael, culminating in binyan ha'bayis as well.
This is more meaningful than anything I have to say about parshas zachor:
I originally had the idea for this post early in the week, but the more I thought about the topic the more questions I had. Now I've reached the point where I think I've managed to at least partially put Humpty Dumpty back together again, but you can be the judge of that.
R' Bachyei (last pasuk in Beshalach) that the property of Amalek is assur b'hanaah:
וע״ד הפשט כי יד על כס יה יאמר כי הש״י משביע לכל מלך ישראל שישב על כסא מלכות שיעשה מלחמה לה׳ בעמלק, באר כי המלחמה והשלל הכל יהיה אסור בהנאה ויהיה הכל לה׳ לא לבני אדם ומפני זה בא העונש לשאול ומדורו של שאול עד דורו של מרדכי וידע מרדכי כי שאול זקנו נענש בעונש גדול והיה עונשו מדה כנגד מדה כי תלה הכתוב שלמות הכסא בנקמת עמלק והוא לא נזהר בנקמתו ועל כן נענש שאבד השם והכסא כי לא נשאר לו שם אחריו אלא נהרג הוא ויהונתן בנו עמו ונפל כסא מלכותו, ומפני זה נזהר מרדכי בדבר שלא ליהנות משלל המן שהיה מזרע עמלק כענין שכתוב בפורענות המן (אסתר ט׳:י׳) ובבזה לא שלחו את ידם, לפי שהתורה הזהירה בכך (דברים כ״ה:י״ט) תמחה את זכר עמלק, וכן מצינו לעתיד המלחמה והשלל הכל לה׳ שנאמר (מיכה ד׳:י״ג) והחרמתי לה׳ בצעם וחילם לאדון כל הארץ.
The problem is that we read in the Megillah (8:1) בַּיּ֣וֹם הַה֗וּא נָתַ֞ן הַמֶּ֤לֶךְ אֲחַשְׁוֵרוֹשׁ֙ לְאֶסְתֵּ֣ר הַמַּלְכָּ֔ה אֶת־בֵּ֥ית הָמָ֖ן, that Achashveirosh turned over Haman's estate to Esther. How could Esther have accepted a gift of issuei hanaah?
R' Chaim Kanievsky in Taama d'Kra suggests that the din of issurei hanaah applies only in a situation of war against Amalek, where preserving the property of Amalek preserves the zecher of Amalek. Haman, however, was killed by Achashveirosh, not in battle. The property of someone killed by royal edict belongs to the king (I'm not sure why R' Chaim quotes this din which lichorah applies to a melech yisrael). It was not Haman's property that became Esther's gift, but rather Achashveirosh's.
He adds that this is why the pasuk says בַּיּ֣וֹם הַה֗וּא. It was davka property taken on that day, when Achashveirosh was meting out justice, that Esther took possession of. Once the full blown war against the hundreds and thousands of other Amalkites in the kingdom started on the next day, nothing else could be taken.
This answer follows the same basic outline of the Oneg Y"T's explanation of why Shaul thought it was OK to keep the livestock of Amalek. Shaul thought that so long as the animals were made hefker before the battle the issur hanaah no longer applied to them -- they are not the property of Amalek at the time of war. The common theme of both answers is that technically, the property in question no longer belonged to Amalek at the time possession was taken by a Jew.
There is a more fundamental chiluk that emerges from a chiddush of the Meshech Chochma, and this is where the picture began to get muddled for me.
The Sefer haChinuch in mitzvah 604 writes that the mitzvah of destroying Amalek does not only apply to the tzibur fighting a battle, but applies to any yachid who chances upon an Amaleiki:
Rav Yaakov Ilan in his sefer Masa Yad (vol 1) suggests that the dual nature of the chiyuv is reflected in the two different parshiyos that speak about destroying Amalek. The parsha at the end of Beshalach speaks about מִלְחָמָ֥ה לַה׳ בַּֽעֲמָלֵ֑ק; the parshas in Ki Teitzei speaks about תִּמְחֶה֙ אֶת־זֵ֣כֶר עֲמָלֵ֔ק, but no mention of war. The chiyuv to wage war is incumbent on the tzibur; the chiyuv to destroy any zeicher of Amalek is incumbent upon every individual. (I'm not sure based on this why Rashi quotes the din at the end of Ki Teitzei and not in Beshalach.)
Based on this distinction, the Meshech Chochma suggests that the mitzvah of obliterating the property of Amalek, inclusive of the livestock, applies only to the tzibur, but not to the chovas ha'yachid of eliminating Amalek:
בספר החנוך כתב דעל כל יחיד שיקרה לפניו מזרע עמלק מצוה זו. ולרש״י שפירש זכר מאיש כו׳ משור ועד שה שלא יאמרו גמל זה של עמלק, והוא מהמכילתא דפרשה בשלח, ועיין הגהת הגר״א כאן בספרי מוכח דעל יחיד אין המצוה דהרי מפורש בשמואל א׳ כ״ז ויעל דוד ואנשיו כו׳ והעמלקי כו׳ ולקח צאן ובקר כו׳ הרי דביחיד אין מצוה לאבד הצאן ובקר. והא דאמרו במכילתא שהרג גר עמלקי שאין מקבלין גרים מעמלק, היינו לכן הרגו בהודאת עצמו כמו בן נח שנהרג עפ״י עצמו. וברור.
M'meila, since Haman was killed outside the context of war, his property was not assur b'hanaah.
Sounds like a nice chiluk, but I was bothered by how the Chinuch makes sense l'shitaso. The Chinuch famously exempts women from the mitzvah of zechiras Amalek because he connects it to the mitzvah of mechi'as Amalek, and he holds that women are exempt from mechi'as Amalek because they do not have to participate in battle. Putting aside the fact that when it comes to a milchemes mitzvah Chazal tell us that even "kallah mi'chupasa" has to go out to war (see Marcheshesh 1:22 who tries to explain the Chinuch), there is an additional chiyuv here that applies to the individual, not to a communal battle. As the Chinuch writes, גַּם עַל כָּל יָחִיד מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל הַזְּכָרִים מוּטָל הַחִיּוּב לְהָרְגָם וּלְאַבְּדָם מִן הָעוֹלָם. If you see an Amaleiki walking down the street, you take care of him. Why are women exempt from this mitzvah? And why should the mitzvah of remembering Amalek be connected only to the communal obligation to wage war and not to the obligation on the individual to rid the world of Amalek?
In order to put Humpty Dumpty back together I think we need to backtrack a bit, and here I found help in R' Gershuni's Mishpat haMelucha. There are not 2 chiyuvim, a chovas ha'tzibur and a chovas ha'yachid, when it comes to eradicating Amalek. There is one chiyuv of milchama, and that chiyuv is ongoing -- milchama ba'Amalek m'dor dor. Sometimes that chiyuv is fulfilled on the battlefield. Sometimes that chiyuv is fulfilled when you see an Amaleiki soldier walking down the street. It's the same chiyuv that stems from fighting the war, just in this case you are attacking isolated soldiers.
The chiluk of the Meshech Chochma as to when Amalek's property is off limits vs when it is not does not depend on the chiyuv being fulfilled, yachid v tzibur, as the same chiyuv milchama is being fulfilled by the individual killing an Amaleiki or by the tzibur fighting a battle. What it depends on is the nature of the kiyum b'poel of the mitzvah. For whatever reason, when Amalek is dealt with in the context of battle by the tzibur, his property is off-limits. When Amalek is dealt with on an individual level, the property can be seized. What the reasoning for this distinction might be still eludes me.
Either way, maybe with this background we can explains Shaul's mistake and Shmuel's criticism of him. Shaul did not want the mantle of kingship; he therefore treated the command to fight Amalek not as a national battle incumbent onthe tzibur, but merely as a fight of individuals. When individuals strike at Amalek, their property is permitted to be seized.
Shmuel make clear that this was a tragic error. וַיֹּ֣אמֶר שְׁמוּאֵ֔ל הֲל֗וֹא אִם־קָטֹ֚ן אַתָּה֙ בְּעֵינֶ֔יךָ רֹ֛אשׁ שִׁבְטֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל אָ֑תָּה One cannot shirk leadership when called upon to serve the Jewish people. One must act in a way that reflects the greatness of the Jewish people, and help fulfill our national mandate.
R' Chaim Elazari in his sefer Darkei Chaim (p 172) quotes the Mabi"T who asks how it is that we achieve kaparah when the Torah says that an aveira b'shogeg requires a korban for kaparah. The pashtus is that we have a concept of u'nishalma parim sifaseinu. Hashem allows studying the parsha of the korban to serve as a substitute for actually offering the korban. R' Yonah in Shaarei Teshuvah (4:8) writes
Mabi"T gives a different answer. When does sin need a korban for kaparah? Only when there is a Beit haMikdash standing when you do the aveira. Ignoring the hashra'as haShechina compounds the wrongdoing and therefore makes kaparah impossible without a korban. However, when there is no Mikdash, when the hashra'as haShechina is not manifest for all to see, one's sin is less weighty, and hence the bar to achieve kaparah is lower.
Rashi in our parsha alludes to the gemara in Brachos (55a):
א"ר שמואל בר נחמני א"ר יונתן בצלאל על שם חכמתו נקרא בשעה שאמר לו הקדוש ברוך הוא למשה לך אמור לו לבצלאל עשה לי משכן ארון וכלים הלך משה והפך ואמר לו עשה ארון וכלים ומשכן אמר לו משה רבינו מנהגו של עולם אדם בונה בית ואחר כך מכניס לתוכו כלים ואתה אומר עשה לי ארון וכלים ומשכן כלים שאני עושה להיכן אכניסם שמא כך אמר לך הקב"ה עשה משכן ארון וכלים אמר לו שמא בצל אל היית וידעת
Even though, says the gemara, that Moshe told Betzalel to first make kelim and them the mihskan, Betzalel intuited that Hashem had actually instructed to first make the mishkan and then kelim. This has to be the case because where would you put kelim if you don't already have a mishkan.
There are two problems with the sugya (see Tos on the spot):
1) How can it be that Moshe misunderstood or did not properly communicate the dvar Hashem? Chazal tell us that in a small handful of places "nisalma mi'menu halacha," that Moshe did not know something, but this instance is not on that list, not to mention that to admit the possibility of this type of error calls into question the whole mesorah.
2) In point of fact, Hashem first gave the command to make kelim and then the command to make the mishkan, as we read in parshas Terumah. Moshe got it right; Betzalel's surmise that שמא כך אמר לך הקב"ה עשה משכן ארון וכלים was in fact wrong. So why did Moshe respond אמר לו שמא בצל אל היית וידעת? Why did he accept Betzalel's interpretation of Hashem's command as being more accurate than his own?
Maharal in Gur Aryeh (and similarly, GR"A) answer that Hashem told Moshe about the kelim first because the kelim, starting with the aron, were the most important things in the mishkan. The building existed for the kelim, not the other way around. However, when it came to the actual construction of the mishkan, which was Betzalel's domain, the process was reversed. First the building had to be assembled, and only then the kelim put inside. The difference order in the parshiyos reflects these different perspectives, that of theory vs that of practice.
The Alter of Kelm says a beautiful yesod here to answer the questions:
When Bn"Y committed the sin of cheit ha'eigel, Hashem told Moshe (32:10) וְעַתָּה֙ הַנִּ֣יחָה לִּ֔י וְיִֽחַר־אַפִּ֥י בָהֶ֖ם וַאֲכַלֵּ֑ם וְאֶֽעֱשֶׂ֥ה אוֹתְךָ֖ לְג֥וֹי גָּדֽוֹל. In a nutshell, Hashem's message was, "Leave me alone -- we are ending this show now." So why didn't Moshe do that? The very next pasuk says that Moshe began to daven וַיְחַ֣ל מֹשֶׁ֔ה אֶת־פְּנֵ֖י ה׳ אֱלֹהָ֑יו -- the exactly opposite of the plain meaning of Hashem's request!
Says the Alter, Hashem does not want us to be robots or computers. Hashem wants us to be human beings and use our brains. When a computer gets the instruction הַנִּ֣יחָה לִּ֔י, it obeys to the letter. When Moshe got that same instruction, he realized something was up. As Rashi writes עדיין לא שמענו שהתפלל משה עליהם, והוא אומר: הניחה לי? אלא כאן פתח לו פתח, והודיעו שהדבר תלוי בו, שאם יתפלל עליהם לא יכלם.
Hashem wants us to read between the lines, to interpret, to go beyond the surface meaning, and in that way arrive at His true intent. Sometimes what appears to be disobedience in fact demonstrates true fidelity to Hashem's wishes.
Hashem did give Moshe the command to make the kelim first. Moshe heard Hashem's command correctly and relayed it to Betzlalel correctly. However, that doesn't mean that's what Hashem wanted. Betzalel had the insight to understand that the mishkan building had to be put together first rather than making the kelim.
Could AI build a mishkan better than a human? Maybe, if all it took to build it was blindly following a blueprint. But Hashem wanted more than that. Hashem wanted human intuition and intelligence invested in the product, not just gold, silver, and precious metals. AI cannot substitute for that.
Hashem b'davka gave the instructions in the way he did, seemingly backwards, says the Alter, so that Betzalel would have the opportunity to use his brains to work out what Hashem wanted. In this way, the mishkan would contain the most precious commodity of all: the חכמת לב of a human being.
