Friday, March 15, 2024

could AI build a better mishkan?

Rashi in our parsha alludes to the gemara in Brachos (55a):

א"ר שמואל בר נחמני א"ר יונתן בצלאל על שם חכמתו נקרא בשעה שאמר לו הקדוש ברוך הוא למשה לך אמור לו לבצלאל עשה לי משכן ארון וכלים הלך משה והפך ואמר לו עשה ארון וכלים ומשכן אמר לו משה רבינו מנהגו של עולם אדם בונה בית ואחר כך מכניס לתוכו כלים ואתה אומר עשה לי ארון וכלים ומשכן כלים שאני עושה להיכן אכניסם שמא כך אמר לך הקב"ה עשה משכן ארון וכלים אמר לו שמא בצל אל היית וידעת

Even though, says the gemara, that Moshe told Betzalel to first make kelim and them the mihskan, Betzalel intuited that Hashem had actually instructed to first make the mishkan and then kelim.  This has to be the case because where would you put kelim if you don't already have a mishkan.

There are two problems with the sugya (see Tos on the spot):

1) How can it be that Moshe misunderstood or did not properly communicate the dvar Hashem?  Chazal tell us that in a small handful of places "nisalma mi'menu halacha," that Moshe did not know something, but this instance is not on that list, not to mention that to admit the possibility of this type of error calls into question the whole mesorah.  

2) In point of fact, Hashem first gave the command to make kelim and then the command to make the mishkan, as we read in parshas Terumah.  Moshe got it right; Betzalel's surmise that שמא כך אמר לך הקב"ה עשה משכן ארון וכלים was in fact wrong.  So why did Moshe respond אמר לו שמא בצל אל היית וידעת?  Why did he accept Betzalel's interpretation of Hashem's command as being more accurate than his own?

Maharal in Gur Aryeh (and similarly, GR"A) answer that Hashem told Moshe about the kelim first because the kelim, starting with the aron, were the most important things in the mishkan.  The building existed for the kelim, not the other way around. However, when it came to the actual construction of the mishkan, which was Betzalel's domain, the process was reversed.  First the building had to be assembled, and only then the kelim put inside.  The difference order in the parshiyos reflects these different perspectives, that of theory vs that of practice.

The Alter of Kelm says a beautiful yesod here to answer the questions: 

When Bn"Y committed the sin of cheit ha'eigel, Hashem told Moshe (32:10)  וְעַתָּה֙ הַנִּ֣יחָה לִּ֔י וְיִֽחַר־אַפִּ֥י בָהֶ֖ם וַאֲכַלֵּ֑ם וְאֶֽעֱשֶׂ֥ה אוֹתְךָ֖ לְג֥וֹי גָּדֽוֹל.  In a nutshell, Hashem's message was, "Leave me alone -- we are ending this show now."  So why didn't Moshe do that?  The very next pasuk says that Moshe began to daven וַיְחַ֣ל מֹשֶׁ֔ה אֶת־פְּנֵ֖י ה׳ אֱלֹהָ֑יו -- the exactly opposite of the plain meaning of Hashem's request!

Says the Alter, Hashem does not want us to be robots or computers.  Hashem wants us to be human beings and use our brains.  When a computer gets the instruction הַנִּ֣יחָה לִּ֔י, it obeys to the letter.  When Moshe got that same instruction, he realized something was up.  As Rashi writes  עדיין לא שמענו שהתפלל משה עליהם, והוא אומר: הניחה לי? אלא כאן פתח לו פתח, והודיעו שהדבר תלוי בו, שאם יתפלל עליהם לא יכלם. 

Hashem wants us to read between the lines, to interpret, to go beyond the surface meaning, and in that way arrive at His true intent.  Sometimes what appears to be disobedience in fact demonstrates true fidelity to Hashem's wishes.

Hashem did give Moshe the command to make the kelim first.  Moshe heard Hashem's command correctly and relayed it to Betzlalel correctly.  However, that doesn't mean that's what Hashem wanted.  Betzalel had the insight to understand that the mishkan building had to be put together first rather than making the kelim.

Could AI build a mishkan better than a human?  Maybe, if all it took to build it was blindly following a blueprint.  But Hashem wanted more than that.  Hashem wanted human intuition and intelligence invested in the product, not just gold, silver, and precious metals.  AI cannot substitute for that.  

Hashem b'davka gave the instructions in the way he did, seemingly backwards, says the Alter, so that Betzalel would have the opportunity to use his brains to work out what Hashem wanted.  In this way, the mishkan would contain the most precious commodity of all: the חכמת לב of a human being.  

Monday, March 11, 2024

with friends like these...

Jonathan Tobin, editor in chief of JNS writes:

Regardless of whether you support the Democrats or the Republicans, with respect to Jewish interests, Biden’s State of the Union address was a disaster. While he deplored the Oct. 7 attacks on Israel and even invited relatives of the hostage families to be in the gallery of the U.S. House of Representatives for the speech, the fact that he went on to have more harsh words for the democratically elected government of Israel than the terrorists of Hamas was shocking.

So, too, was his unrealistic demand that Israel could wage a justified war against the Islamists without harming the Palestinians Hamas hides behind. And his demand that Israel accede to a Palestinian state at the end of the war is not only immoral, it will grant a reward to the terrorists and undermine U.S. interests in the region.

His plans to deploy U.S. troops and resources to create a floating harbor to facilitate the delivery of aid to Gaza was an ill-thought-out idea that will likely do far more to help Hamas, which is certain to steal most of the supplies that the Americans will deliver unless Biden foolishly breaks his promise and U.S. troops do land in the Strip.

Worst of all, the president had not a single word to say about the unprecedented surge of antisemitism sweeping through America, driven by his erstwhile intersectional allies on the left-wing of his party.

The headline of Philip Klein's article in NRO says sums it up: "Biden Delivers the Most Anti-Israel Presidential Speech in History."  (I personally am not sure about that given Obama's anti-semitic hatred of Israel).  He writes, "The overarching message was clear: The October 7 attacks were bad, but Israel’s response has been worse. Palestinians deserve our support, but Israel does not."

The Wall Street Journal editorial page writes today: "President Biden likes to say that no President has been a better friend to Israel, but of late he doesn’t sound like it. He beat up Israel’s leaders in his State of the Union speech, criticized its war strategy in Gaza with regularity, and on the weekend called Israel’s plans to clear Hamas from its last stronghold in the city of Rafah a “red line” that Israel shouldn’t cross."

Biden is even making Lindsey Graham look like a right-winger in an interview with NBC News:

Graham also responded to questions about the war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, saying, “I literally about fell out of my seat” during the president’s State of the Union address to Congress on Thursday when Biden said Hamas could end the conflict by releasing all of the hostages they took on Oct. 7.

“Is the president saying that if the hostages are released by Hamas, they can stay in power?” Graham asked on Sunday.

“President Trump believes it’s non-negotiable when it comes to Hamas. They have to be destroyed militarily. They can’t be in charge. So I’m challenging the Biden administration today to clear this up. You cannot allow Hamas to stay in power,” Graham added.

With friends like these...

Friday, March 08, 2024

Do hasbara and havana go hand in hand? Ibn Ezra, R' Chaim Brisker, and Gardner's multiple intelligences

It is attributed I think to R' Chaim Brisker that if you can't explain an idea, it means you don't really understand it. Or, as they say in yeshivish אז ס'פעהלט אינעם הסברה פעהלט אינעם הבנה  Or as they put it in other parts of the world: חסרון בּהסבּרה זה חסרון בּהבנה 

R' Shteinman points out that in our parsha aside from being praised for his brilliance, וַיְמַלֵּ֥א אֹת֖וֹ ר֣וּחַ אֱלֹקים בְּחׇכְמָ֛ה בִּתְבוּנָ֥ה וּבְדַ֖עַת וּבְכׇל־מְלָאכָֽה, the Torah says Betzalel had the gift of  וּלְהוֹרֹ֖ת נָתַ֣ן בְּלִבּ֑וֹ (35:34).  Ibn Ezra explains:

כי יש חכם גם חרש לא יוכל להורות היטב

Ohr haChaim similarly writes:

 שיש חכמים רבים שתהיה חכמתם בלבם לבד שלא ידעו ללמדה, לזה אמר ולהורות נתן בלבו השכיל חכמת הלימוד

Not everyone who is an expert can pass on that expertise and teach it to others.

R' Shteinman asks: What happened to the rule of חסרון בּהסבּרה זה חסרון בּהבנה? 

Lulei d'mistafina I would say there is a difference between understanding a sevara and mastering a skill.  The former is theoretical knowledge and the only thing required is sufficient brainpower.  It falls under the logical-mathematical heading in Gardner's breakdown of seven intelligences.  Not so the latter.  I can perfectly understand the mechanics and theory of hitting a baseball, but that doesn't mean I can play for the Yankees.  Bodily-kinesthetic intelligence, as Gardner calls it, is a different ballgame.  

The greatness of Betzalel is that he was a master of both, and a master teacher of both, something that is rare indeed.

Thursday, March 07, 2024

Chizkuni on when parshas shekalim was given; machtzis ha'shekel as a tikun for mechiras Yosef

1) First up, a pshat issue.  According to Rashi and Ramban and most meforshim, the count of Ki Tisa is a different count than the count at the beginning of sefer Bamidbar.  The count in Ki Tisa took place in Tishrei, after Moshe came down with the second luchos, and three different donations were collected: 1) a fixed half shekel per person which was used to make the adanim of the mishkan; 2) another fixed half shekel per person which was used to buy korbanos; 3) a give-what-you-like donation used to buy material to construct the mishkan.  The count in BaMidbar took place in the second month of the second year (i.e. Iyar) and was a census to determine how many soldiers were on hand.

The main difficulty with Rashi's approach is that the number of people in the Ki Tisa count exactly matches the number of people in the census of BaMidbar.  How could there be absolutely no population change in the intervening months?  To compound the problem, the count of Ki Tisa seems inclusive of the entire nation.  The count in BaMidbar is exclusive of sheivet Levi.  Shouldn't that lead to an inevitable discrepancy?  Rashi attempts to address the problem, but Ramban already attacks the answer, followed by all the various meforshei Rashi jump into the fray to try to come up with a solution. 

Chizkuni goes against the tide and writes that the count of Ki Tisa is in fact one and the same as the count in BaMidbar:

בשנה השנית, כדכתיב בפרשת במדבר: בשנה השנית וגו׳ שאו את ראש כל עדת בני ישראל (במדבר א׳:ב׳), שכן כי תשא – להבא משמע, ושאו (במדבר א׳:ב׳) – מיד משמע. ופרשה זו נאמרה מבאחד באדר כדי להשמיע על השקלים לתרומת הלשכה לקנות הקרבנות להקריב מבאחד בניסן ואילך שבו הוקם המשכן. והלשון מוכיח: ונתת על עבודת אהל מועד (שמות ל׳:ט״ז), שמע מינה שכבר נעשה אהל מועד כלו

Ki Tisa is not a command to count, but means WHEN you count, this is how to do it, by collection shekalim.  The command to count comes later, in BaMidbar.  Chizkuni adds that this parsha was given in the beginning of Adar.  Our practice of reading the parsha parallels when the parsha was actually given.

Interestingly, Gur Aryeh, who normally defends Rashi, in this case learns pshat like Chizkuni, albeit with minor differences:

ויותר היה נראה לומר כי היה זה מספר אחד עם מספר אשר הוא אחר שהוקם המשכן, ואמר הכתוב (פסוק יב) ״כי תשא את ראש בני ישראל לפקודיהם״ אחר שהוקם המשכן, שאז יהיו נמנים ישראל, ״ונתנו איש כופר נפשם בפקוד אותם״ (שם), ורוצה לומר שיתנו כופר נפשם בפקוד אותם, לכך יקדימו שקליהם לתת אותם קודם המנין, ויתנו אותם לתרומת המשכן לאדנים שיהיו כפרה עליהם בפקוד אותם אחר כך. ולפי זה היה שפיר שאמר הכתוב ״כי תשא את ראש בני ישראל״, ולא היה מצוה ׳שאו את ראש בני ישראל׳ כמו שאמר בחומש הפקודים (במדבר א, ב) ״שאו את ראש״, ולא היה כאן מנין בפני עצמו, רק ״כי תשא״ בסוף, אחר שהוקם המשכן, והמנין היה אחר שהוקם המשכן

He marshals proof for his position from the Midrash Tanchuma, which refers to only one count in the desert, not two.  Our parsha is about the mitzvah to give shekalim **in advance** of the count that will take place later in BaMidbar:

וכן משמע בתנחומא (כאן סימן ט), דקאמר התם; עשרה פעמים נמנו ישראל, וחשיב התם אחד בירידתן למצרים, ואחד בעלייתם משם, דכתיב (ראו לעיל יב, לז) ״ויסעו בני ישראל מרעמסס כשש מאות אלף״, אחד בחומש הפקודים כו׳, הרי שלא מנה כלל אותו של ״כי תשא״, וכמשמעות הכתוב שלא נאמר בו מנין כלל, רק ״ויהי כסף פקודי העדה״ (ראו להלן לח, כה), דפירושו הכסף של הפקודים, אבל לא נמצא שם למנות ישראל. והפירוש על דעת מדרש זה, שהיה מצוה לתת את השקלים קודם למנין שלהם שיהיה בחומש הפקודים.

2) Last week I posted the Berdichiver's interpretation of  בְי֣וֹם פׇּקְדִ֔י וּפָקַדְתִּ֥י עֲלֵהֶ֖ם חַטָּאתָֽם׃.  The Techeiles Mordechai (#5 here )  on this week's parsha quotes a different interpretation. ובְי֣וֹם פׇּקְדִ֔י, means when Bnei Yisrael are counted -- meaning, we are a mass of individuals that can be enumerated instead of a being united, singular entity -- then פָקַדְתִּ֥י עֲלֵהֶ֖ם חַטָּאתָֽם, then we have to pay the debt for our sins.  When we are united as one unit, however, Hashem puts that aside.  

The Yerushalmi explains that machtzis ha'shekel is a kaparah for mechiras Yosef:

אתם מכרתם בכורה של רחל בעשרים כסף שהגיע לכל אחד טבעא [היינו מטבע של מחצית השקל] לפיכך יהי' שוקל כל אחד מכם מחצית השקל

Shem m'Shmuel (Mishpatim 5675) writes:

ויש להסבביר הדברים כי השקלים הם קיבוץ כל כחות ישראל לעבודה בכלל ובפרט, היינו שהוא עשר גרה רומז לעשרה חלקי הנפש שבאדם, והוא של כסף שהוא רומז לאהבה, והיינו שכל אחד מקבץ כל כחות נפשו ומסרם לעבודת הש"י באהבה, ולא בפ"ע לבד אלא כל ישראל יחד כענין ויעשו כולם אגודה אחת לעשות רצונך בלבב שלם, זהו נשמת המצוה, והפועל דמיוני הוא גוף המצוה, כמו גוף שנושא את הנשמה כן גוף המצוה נושא את נשמת המצוה, והוא תיקון לחטא מכירת יוסף צדיק יסוד עולם המאחד את כל קהל ישראל שפגמו בזה, וע"כ אחר המכירה כתיב וירד יהודה מאת אחיו, והתיקון הוא התאספות כל ישראל ע"י השקלים לקרבנות ציבור שאין דינם כקרבנות השותפין אלא כמו איש אחד, ובפרט נמי הוא תיקון לפגם ברית היינו התאספות כל החושים וכל האברים, כמ"ש כל עצמותי תאמרנה ה' מי כמוך והוא תיקון לחטא שכל אבריו מרגישין בו, שהחטא נמשך ג"כ מהחטא של מכירת יוסף כנ"ל, והיינו הא דפסיקתא וירושלמי הנ"ל, וכל זה הכנה לניסן להשגת חיים חדשים, וע"כ הזמן לשקלים הוא כל חודש אדר וכולי האי ואולי יספיק לזה כל החודש:

The cheit of mechiras Yosef was a blow to the unity of Yaakov's family.  The machtzis ha'shekel is the tikun.  All the darshanim explain that we take 1/2 a shekel rather than a whole one to reinforce the idea that each individual is just a piece of the whole in need of a neighbor to become complete.  It's only when we bond together than we become whole.  We use shekalim for korbanos tzibur.  A tzibur is not the same as a partnership of individuals.  It is a new entity, like a corporation, that is greater than the sum of its parts.  

As we once explained, this was Haman's mistake.  Haman paid millions of shekalim to Achashveirosh thinking that we were "mefuzar u'meforad," disjointed and disunited, and therefore vulnerable.  However, Chazal tell us that our shekalim preempted Haman's attack.  The mitzvah of machtzis ha'shekel underscored the core unity of Am Yisrael.

If each individual thinks he/she counts more than anyone else, then we run the risk of ובְי֣וֹם פׇּקְדִ֔י וּפָקַדְתִּ֥י עֲלֵהֶ֖ם חַטָּאתָֽם.  If we count using shekalim, if the individual sees him/herself as part of a greater whole, then we are spared having to deal with the Haman's of the world.

Wednesday, March 06, 2024

living Elsewhere, in a land of make-believe

One Man's Meat, by E.B. White, better known as the author of Charlotte's Web and Stuart Little, is a delightful collection of essays written in the late '30's/early '40's. The following is an excerpt from a July 1938 essay in which White comments on the TV era, which was in its infancy (I added the bolding):

...Radio has already given sound a wide currency, and sound "effects" are taking the place once enjoyed by sound itself.  Television will enormously enlarge the eye's range, and, like radio, will advertise Elsewhere.  Together with the tabs, the mags, and the movies, it will insist that we forget the primary and the near in favor of the secondary and the remote.  More hours in every twenty-four will be spent digesting ideas, sounds, images -- distant and concoctedIn sufficient accumulation, radio sounds and television sights may become more familiar to us than their originals.  A door closing, heard over the air; a face contorted, seen in a panel of light -- these will emerge as the real and the true; and, when we bang the door of our own cell or look into another's face the impression will be of mere artifice.  I like to dwell on this quaint time, and when the solid world becomes make believe, McCarthy corporeal and Bergen stuffed, when all is reversed and we shall be like the insane, to whom the antics of the sane seem the crazy twistings of a grig.

When I was a child people simply looked about them and were moderately happy; today, they peer beyond the seven seas, bury themselves waist deep in tidings, and by and large what they see and hear makes them unutterably sad.

If this is what he had to say about TV, imagine what he would have made of our internet era.

Last Sunday was a beautiful, sunny 60 degree day in NY. My wife and I were walking in a park and she commented on the fact that there were so few children out on such a nice day.  I reminded her that children no longer go outside to play; they are happy to sit glued to a screen, and if they want to see the outdoors, they simply bring up a video of it to watch while they down their Prozac pills by the handful.

Monday, March 04, 2024

more on shluchei mitzvah ainon nizokin -- chakira of the Sdei Chemed

I) I saw the following chakira quoted from the Sdei Chemed: when we speak about shluchei mitzvah ainan nizokin does it mean that Hashem removes the threat of danger, or does it mean that the threat is there, the danger is there, but Hashem does not allow the person doing the mitzvah to come to harm?

In YD 339:5 the SA quotes a minhag to spill out any drawn water in the neighborhood in which a death occurs.  Some explain that this was simply a way of communicating to all what had occurred without having to actually announce the bad news.  Others, however, explain that there is a supernatural reason for the practice.  When the malach ha'maves marches into town, some kind of poison can drop from his sword into the water and render it dangerous for anyone to drink.

In accord with the rule of shluchei mitzvah ainan nizokin Rama in Hil Pesach (455) writes that mayim she'lanu that is used for matzah baking does not have to be spilled out.  The same (see Pischei Teshuvah in YD) applies to water drawn for shabbos food.

Can one eat matzah baked with that water after pesach is over?  Can one eat the leftover cholent after shabbos?  This should be taluy in the Sdei Chemed's chakira.  If the principle of shluchei miztvah ainin nizokin means there is no threat present, i.e. no drop from the malach ha'maves' sword ever falls into mitzvah water, then the answer would seem to be yes, one can eat the leftovers.  But if the principle of shluchei miztvah ainin nizokin means the drop of poison is there but the mitzvah protects one from harm, then after pesach (or even the seder) is over, after the seudas shabbos is over, once the mitzvah is complete, the leftovers cannot be eaten.  


II) The context of shluchei mitzvah ainin nizokin in Pesachim is a discussion of the braysa תנא אין מחייבין אותו להכניס ידו לחורין ולסדקין לבדוק מפני הסכנה.  The gemara gives two explanations why a person would not have to search these literal holes in the wall:

1) Lest one be bitten by a scorpion.  Asks the gemara: והא אמר ר' אלעזר שלוחי מצוה אינן ניזוקין? To which the gemara answers that maybe a person will accidentally drop something of theirs in the hole and search for it after he is done with the bedika, at which point they would be exposed to danger.

2) The house adjoining the wall belongs to an aku"m who is might not understand the bedika and think it is some kind of witchcraft, which would be dangerous.  Again, asks the gemara: האמר רבי אלעזר שלוחי מצוה אינן ניזוקין  To which the gemara answers that this is a case of clear and present danger, שכיח היזיקא, and all bets are off.

Why does the gemara not gives this answer of שכיח היזיקא when it talks about why there is no protection from the scorpions?  

It could be that these are not just two possible scenarios to explain the braysa, but rather there is a difference between the views.  The Ohr haChaim writes that Reuvain thought it preferable to throw Yosef into a pit of scorpions rather than have his brothers deal with him because scorpions have no bechira and could harm Yosef only if Hashem decreed such; the brothers had bechira, and Hashem allows bechira to play out even if it goes against the ideal Divine plan.  It could be that shchiach he'zeika only comes into play when one is dealing with a human agent, a baal bechira.  When it comes to animals, since they are like robots that cannot deviate from Hashem's plan, even if shchiach he'zeika one is still protected.

Friday, March 01, 2024

R' Levi Yitzchak miBerdichiv on וּפָקַדְתִּ֥י עֲלֵהֶ֖ם חַטָּאתָֽם

In response to Moshe's plea to forgive Bn"Y for cheit ha'eigel, Hashem told him to go back for now and comfort the people, וּבְי֣וֹם פׇּקְדִ֔י וּפָקַדְתִּ֥י עֲלֵהֶ֖ם חַטָּאתָֽם׃ (32:34), and going forward, whenever the time comes for other punishments, Hashem will dole out a bit of punishment for cheit ha'eigel as well (see Rashi).

R' Levi Yitzchak mi'Berdichiv ask two questions (see the Koznitzer Maggid in Avodas Yisrael end of P' Balak):

1) We say every Yom Kippur that Hashem is מעביר אשׁמותינו בּכל דור.  The slate is wiped clean, the past forgotten.  How then is cheit ha'eigel counted against us for eternity?  How can we forever after get a bit of punishment for this sin that is past history?

2) The gemara (Brachos 32b) tells us that Hashem in fact does not keep in mind any recollection of cheit ha'eigel:

אמרה לפניו רבש"ע הואיל ואין שכחה לפני כסא כבודך שמא לא תשכח לי מעשה העגל אמר לה גם אלה תשכחנה אמרה לפניו רבש"ע הואיל ויש שכחה לפני כסא כבודך שמא תשכח לי מעשה סיני אמר לה ואנכי לא אשכחך 

If Hashem forgets about our wrongdoing, then again, how do we understand בְי֣וֹם פׇּקְדִ֔י וּפָקַדְתִּ֥י עֲלֵהֶ֖ם חַטָּאתָֽם׃?

R' Levi Yitzchak explains that there are two types of wrongdoers.  There is the wrongdoer who comes from a broken home, who had horrible friends in his youth, who went to the worst schools, and m'meila, became a gangster.  What do you expect?  And then there is the wrongdoer who came from the best family, who went to the best schools, grew up in the "right" neighborhood, had wonderful friends, but nebech, took a wrong turn and became a criminal.  He surely should have known better and deserves harsher punishment.

On the flipside, if one of these two becomes an outstanding member of society, a real do-gooder, if we are speaking about the person who came from the right family, neighborhood, and school, we would say m'meila, what else would you have anticipated?  But if we are speaking about someone who grew up without all those benefits, then all the more credit to them, because they rose above expectations.

Bnei Yisrael said naaseh v'nishma and accepted the Torah, something no other nation was willing to do.  One could say what else would you expect?  These are the descendants of Avraham, Yitzchak, Yaakov, people with such a distinguished and noble background.  But on the other hand, the fact that 40 days later Bnei Yisrael made an eigel proves that there was something not quite right inside, that there was a rottenness in the core of the people that was waiting to get out and express itself, and that had to be dealt with.  When we said naaseh v'nishma, we rose above that flaw, and achieved more than could have been expected.  

This is the shakla v'terya of the gemara in Brachos.  Hashem says to Bnei Yisrael that he will forget the cheit ha'eigel.  מעביר אשׁמותינו בּכל דור  If so, Bnei Yisrael answer, what about our credit for saying naaseh v'nishma?  If you now view us as noble people, the finest stock, then we did no more than live up to expectations and don't deserve such a big pat on the back!  To which Hashem answers, speaking still about cheit ha'eigel, that He will not forget Sinai.  In the context of Sinai, the context of naaseh v'nishma, he will not forget the eigel.  He will view naaseh v'nishma as the response of a people burdened by something not quite right inside, something evil that would come out later in the eigel, but something that they rose above to achieve greatness.  

The root פּקד comes up when the Torah speaks about positive things. ה׳  פּקד את שׂרה.  when it was time for geulah, Moshe said פּקד פּקדתי אתכם.  Hashem tells Bn"Y וּבְי֣וֹם פׇּקְדִ֔י וּפָקַדְתִּ֥י עֲלֵהֶ֖ם חַטָּאתָֽם.  I am not going to remember or think about cheit ha'eigel now.  The slate is wiped clean.  However, when it comes time to remember all the good that Bn"Y does, וּבְי֣וֹם פׇּקְדִ֔י, if someone then tries to take away credit, if someone says that what else should you expect from bnei Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov, then I will remember and remind them of cheit ha'eigel, proving that we too had burdens to overcome, and we managed to do so. 

shluchei mitzvah ainan nizokin

The gemara Pesachin 8b is the source for the concept of shluchei mitzvah ainan nizokin based on a pasuk at the end of our parsha (34:28):

א"ר אלעזר שלוחי מצוה אינן ניזוקין לא בהליכתן ולא בחזירתן כמאן כי האי תנא דתניא איסי בן יהודה אומר כלפי שאמרה תורה ולא יחמוד איש את ארצך מלמד שתהא פרתך רועה באפר ואין חיה מזיקתה תרנגולתך מנקרת באשפה ואין חולדה מזיקתה והלא דברים ק"ו ומה אלו שדרכן לזוק אינן ניזוקין בני אדם שאין דרכן לזוק על אחת כמה וכמה אין לי אלא בהליכה בחזרה מנין תלמוד לומר ופנית בבקר והלכת לאהליך מלמד שתלך ותמצא אהלך בשלום וכי מאחר דאפילו בחזירה בהליכה למה לי לכדר' אמי דא"ר אמי כל אדם שיש לו קרקע עולה לרגל ושאין לו קרקע אין עולה לרגל 

The Noda b'Yehudah (mh"t OC 94) asks why it is that the Rambam does not quote R' Ami's din that someone who does not own land is exempt from aliya la'regel. (Parenthetically, Tos Pesachim 3b d"h alya seems to compare the chiyuv to bring korban pesach with aliya la'regel and exempt someone who does not have land.) This is the sugya's conclusion and there is no dissenting opinion?  He answers by quoting the gemara a few lines earlier on the page:

בעו מיניה מרב הני בני בי רב דדיירי בבאגא מהו למיתי קדמא וחשוכא לבי רב אמר להו ניתו עלי ועל צוארי ניזיל מאי אמר להו לא ידענא

Rav told his students that they could rely on not coming to harm travelling in the dark to get to yeshiva, but he was not sure whether the same rule applied for the trip home.  

Why was Rav unsure of what would happen on the way home?  Rav apparently held that the rule of shluichei mitzvah ainin nizokin applied on the way to a mitzvah, but not on the way from.  Meaning, he must have learned the pasuk in our parsha לא יחמוד איש את ארצך as speaking only about travel to a mitzvah, not from, in which case there is no kal v'chomer, and the din of R' Ami has no foundation.

The Oznayim laTorah rejects this approach.  Rav had a safeik, he writes, not because he rejected the kal v'chomer, but rather because the mitzvah of talmud torah is not the same as the mitzvah of aliya la'regel. When it comes to aliya la'regel, after 7 days the mitvah is done.  In that case, the Torah guarantees that you will return home safely.  When a person goes to the beis medrash to learn Torah, at what point can we really say the mitzvah is done?  (The Sefer haChinuch #430  discusses why mi'doraysa we recite a bracha *after* eating food, but birchas haTorah *before* learning.  Perhaps the answer is that there is no end to learning, so at what could Chazal be kove'a the bracha?  See the Chinuch's answer.)  Who can say with clear conscience that they are not going home to relax and do something else, or because they are bored, or because they are tired of their chavrusa, etc.?  The guarantee of  אינן ניזוקין לא בהליכתן ולא בחזירתן applies when the mitzvah is over, not if you abandon the mitzvah in the middle.  Therefore,  Rav was not prepared to say that the protection extended on the way home from the beis medrash.

I am not sure this next part makes sense, but I will throw it out there and make of it what you will.  I want to sharpen the chiluk of the Oznayin laTorah.  The sugya in Pesachim adds one important qualifier to the rule of shluchei mitzvah ainan nizokin: ן הֵיכָא דִּשְׁכִיחַ הֶיזֵּיקָא שָׁאנֵי  When there is a real and present danger, all bets are off.

Kesubos 77b:

מכריז רבי יוחנן הזהרו מזבובי של בעלי ראתן רבי זירא לא הוה יתיב בזיקיה רבי אלעזר לא עייל באהליה רבי אמי ורבי אסי לא הוו אכלי מביעי דההיא מבואה ריב"ל מיכרך בהו ועסיק בתורה אמר אילת אהבים ויעלת חן אם חן מעלה על לומדיה אגוני לא מגנא 

Even though being near people afflicted with the sickness called raasan was dangerous, R' Yehoshua ben Levi would sit and learn with them.  The gemara explains that he derived a kal v'chomer from the pasuk אילת אהבים ויעלת חן that Torah provides protection, and so he was not worried.

R' Elchanan in Koveitz Shiurim asks: but isn't שְׁכִיחַ הֶיזֵּיקָא an exception to the rule of shluchei mitzvah ainan nizokin?!  

You have to say, writes R' Elchanan, that talmud Torah is categorically different and provides a more encompassing degree of protection. 

Based on this, I would say there are 2 distinct dinim: the normal din of shluchei mitzvah, learned from the pasuk in our parsha, and the more comprehensive protection which Torah affords, which is learned from the pasuk  אילת אהבים ויעלת חן.

Rav in Pesachim was speaking specifically about talmud Torah, which is categorically different from other mitzvos.  The gemara in Kesubos shows us the upside to T"T, namely, when one is engaged in learning the protection encompasses even situations where שְׁכִיחַ הֶיזֵּיקָא.  Rav shows us the downside, namely, that there is no real חזירתן, as ideally one should constantly be engaged in talmud Torah, v'hagisa bo yomam va'layla, and one is always on the clock. 

(Among other problems with my thesis: why does the gemara in Pesachim introduce Rav's statement if T"T is different than other mitzvos?)