arvus - the ger who was a baal toke'a

Our parsha tells us that the principle of arvus started only after Bn"Y crossed into Eretz Yisrael. 

I want to revisit a post from 20 years ago because of a chiddush my wife wanted to suggest on the parsha.  

 

The gemara in Brachos has a safeik whether women are chayavos in birchas hamazon min hatorah or not. The Rosh writes that since this issue is unresolved, a woman may not be motzi a man in bentching.  The principle that allows one person to be motzi another only works if the two share parallel chiyuvim. Since the woman's chiyuv may only be derabbanan and the man's chiyuv is d’oraysa, it doesn't work.

 

Asks the Rosh, why should this distinction in the levels of chiyuvim matter?  This principle of arvus tells us that even if person A has already fulfilled their chiyuv and no longer has any obligation to do a mitzvah, that person can still be motzi person B.  A man who ate a k’zayis (chiyuv derabbanan) can be motzi a man who ate k’dei seviya (chiyuv d’oraysa) because of this principle.  In fact, in theory, even if person A ate nothing, he should be able to be motzi person B (l'maaseh we don't hold that way for different reasons).  Therefore, by the same token, even if a woman’s chiyuv in bentching is only derabbanan, she should be able to be motzi a man.

 

Rosh answers with a tremendous chiddush: the principle of arvus does not apply to women.

 

The Dagul m’Revava raises a number of questions on this yesod of the Rosh, the most well known (O.C. 271) relating to the mitzvah of kiddush. According to the Magen Avraham, a man is yotzei his mitzvah of kiddush m’doraysa by reciting kiddush hayom in ma’ariv of Shabbos. How can a man be motzi his wife, who is chayeves in kiddush min hatorah, when he has already fulfilled his kiddush m’doraysa and the principle of arvus does not apply?

 

R’ Akiva Eiger disagrees with the Dagel m’Revava’s reading of the Rosh. The Rosh never meant that arvus does not extend to women.  What the Rosh meant is in a case where women might not be obligated in the mitzvah at all, like bentching, then there is no arvus. Where women have a chiyuv, like the case of kiddush, the principle of arvus applies.

 

What is the nekudas ha'mahlokes between them?  Yesh lachkor whether arvus is a din prati, a detail in each and every mitzvah, which allows someone who already was yotzei to do the mitzvah for someone who was not, or whether it is a din klali, a blanket rule that covers all mitzvos?  The SM"G, for example, counts arvus as one of the 613 mitzvos.  It is an independent din its own right, not a detail of each individual mitzvah.  This would fit the Dagul m'Revava's position that either you are included in arvus or not; it's all or nothing.  RAK"E, on the other hand, judges each mitzvah independently, and conditions arvus on whether or not a person has a chiyuv in that particular mitzvah or not, suggesting that it is a din prati.

 

What my wife wanted to suggest is that that arvus is not just linked to coming into Eretz Yisrael, but is linked to having a cheilek in Eretz Yisrael.  The reason women are excluded from arvus is because, barring exceptions like Bnos Tzelafchad, they received no portion in the land.

 

I pointed out that if this is correct, it should also mean that a ger is not included in arvus since a ger has no cheilek in Eretz Yisrael.  This is a machlokes even in Rishonim, see Tos Kiddusin 70b, Tos Nidah 13b. 

 

R' Shternbruch has a teshuvah (Teshuvos v'Hanhagos 3:162) where he tries to soften this conclusion a bit.  The question posed to him was regarding a bal toke'a who was a ger and wanted to go to the hospital on R"H after davening to blow shofar for those who were too sick to make it to shul.  Interestingly, the people asking whether this is a good idea were only concerned with whether it is proper to have a non-meyuchas ger take the lead in this role.  R" Shternbruch brushes that aside and points out that there is a more fundamental problem: if a ger is excluded from arvus, then he cannot be motzi anyone after he has done the mitzvah already!

 

R' Shternbruch comes up with a chiddush that I don't fully understand.  He suggests that there are 2 dinim in arvus: 1) the question of whether a yachid can be motzi another yachid in mitzvos; 2) the question of whether gerim as a collective unit are included in the tzibur of klal Yisrael or not.  He posits that the whole debate about whether gerim are included in arvus only relates to that second din, to the question of whether gerim as a unit are part of the tzibur or not.  The Rashi in our parsha which speaks about arvus is speaking about whether Hashem holds the tzibur as a whole responsible for actions of individuals.  That question hinges on how you define who is or who is not part of the tzibur.  However, when it comes to an individual's right or ability to be motzi another individual in a mitzvah, there is no question that a ger can do so just as much as anyone else.

 

One of the arguments he makes is along the same lines as the point I raised to my wife: Why was RAK"E so convinced that women are included in arvus when Rishonim hold that geirim are not?  I was willing to work with the idea that the machlokes Rishonim maybe parallels the macholes RAK"E and the D"R.  R' Shternbruch's solution, based on his thesis, is that the question mixes apples and oranges.  RAK"E is talking about the ability of a yachid to be motzi a yachid.  The Rishonim are speaking about the question of who is included in the collective tzibur.

 

The Steipler has a piece where he mentions a proof for the D"mR against RAK"E from an unnamed talmid chacham.  The gemara calculates that the number of britot that created arvus was 600,000 yotzei Mitzrayim x 600,000 each individual was responsible for.  The reason geirim are exluded from arvus is because this number -- 600,000 (I'm rounding) -- does not include geirim.  Well, but the same token, it does not include women either.  The Steipler mentions that his son, R' Chaim, was doche this proof based on Tos (Nidah 13) that the number 600,000 is simply the people we know about, who were innumerated, not a grand total.  According to R' Shternbruch (and I think he alludes to this question himself), the whole calculation does not make sense.  The calculation is speaking about the responsibility of each individual member of Klal Yisrael towards each other individual member.  According to R' Shternbruch, the exclusion of geirim means the collective of geirim as a group are not part of the tzibur, but that has no impact on the level of each person's individual arvus for his/her neighbor.

 

This gets to the heart of what bothers me most about this sevara.  If there are two dinim in operation here, then there should be two independent sources for each.  The source for arvus is the pasuk in our parsha that speaks about the brit that took effect after the entrance to Eretz Yisrael.  If that refers only to the issue of defines who is part of the tzibur, then what is the source for the individual's responsibility for arvus on his/her friend? 

Amalek, Yosef, and bikkurim

1) Yesh lachkor what the geder of kri u'kesiv is, like we have in our parsha.  Does kri u'kesiv mean that we read the word in question שׁלא מן הכּתב, or does it mean that the kri is how to pronounce the word in question, like if you saw the letters ghoti but read it as /fish/ -- the /gh/ like in cough, the /o/ like in women, the /ti/ like in nation?

See PM"G end of siman 141 who says even if wax covers the letters of the word of a krei u'kesiv, it's not a problem because by definition these words are read שׁלא מן הכּתב.  However, I saw R' Elyashiv quoted as disagreeing.

2) What is the connection between the conclusion of last week's parsha which dealt with Amalek and the mitzvah of bikurim at the beginning of this week's parsha?

 Meshech Chochma at the end of this week's parsha quoted the following Midrash:

 

ובמדרש (דברים רבה ז, י) על פסוק זה: כיון שבא ליכנס לארץ ישראל התחיל אומר (לעיל ג, כה): ״אעברה נא ואראה״ וכו׳. א״ל הקב״ה, משה! ביטלת שלי ושלך קיימת. אני אמרתי (לעיל ט, יד): ״ואשמידם״, ואתה אמרת (במדבר יד, יט): ״סלח נא״, ונתקיים שלך. (ואף עכשיו מבקש אני לקיים את שלי ולבטל את שלך!) א״ל הקב״ה למשה, אין אתה יודע מה לעשות, אתה רוצה לאחוז את החבל בשני ראשין?! אם ״אעברה נא״ אתה מבקש לקיים, בטל ״סלח נא״, ואם ״סלח נא״ אתה מבקש לקיים, בטל ״אעברה נא״. (אמר ריב״ל, כיון ששמע משה רבינו כך, אמר לפניו, רבש״ע ימות משה ומאה וכיוצא בו ולא תינזק צפורנו של אחד מהם, עכ״ל המדרש).

  

Why is אעברה נא linked to סלח נא?  Why is this an either/or choice?

 

Chazal (Baba Basra 123) tell us that אין זרעו של עשו נופל אלא בידי זרעו של רחל.  Mesech Chochma explains the reason why this is so.  The Mechilta tells us יבא (עמלק) כפוי טובה ויפרע (מן העם) כפוי הטובה.  Rashi in parshas Beshalach writes:

 

סמך פרשה זו למקרא זה, לומר תמיד אני ביניכם ומזומן לכל צרכיכם, ואתם אומרים היש ה' בקרבנו אם אין, חייכם שהכלב בא ונושך אתכם ואתם צועקים אלי ותדעון היכן אני. משל לאדם שהרכיב בנו על כתפו ויצא לדרך, היה אותו הבן רואה חפץ ואומר, אבא טול חפץ זה ותן לי, והוא נותן לו, וכן שניה וכן שלישית, פגעו באדם אחד, אמר לו אותו הבן ראית את אבא. אמר לו אביו אינך יודע היכן אני, השליכו מעליו ובא הכלב ונשכו:

 

We did not appreciate Hashem's protection, so He had to give us a reminder through Amalek that He is watching over us.

 

In parshas Ki Teizti the story of Amalek follows the prohibition against having unequal weights and measures.  Rashi there comments on the smichus ha'parshiyot: אם שקרת במדות ובמשקלות, הוי דואג מגרוי האויב.  Bn"Y were not running makolot or Rami Levy supermarkets in the midbar.  How would they be cheating on their scales?  

R' Shlomo Fisher explains that this is one and the same yesod as Rashi in Beshalach.  The issur or weights and measures here is not knowing how to properly calibrate events in your life.  Some people only see what they are lacking.  Their scale is always tipped to the negative; they always think they are being shortchanged. 

 

Amalek is the epitome of having your scale tipped too far to the negative.  Amalek cannot be happy so long as someone else, Bn"Y is enjoying life, and they are not the center of attention. 

 

The Eitz Yosef on the Tanchuma suggests that Amalek is called  כפוי הטובה  because Bn"Y was barred from taking their land.  Had they not attacked, there was no reason for us to go to war with them.  R' Moshe Tzuriel goes a step further and says Amalek is called כפוי הטובה because, as we just read in last week's parsha, we were given a mitzvah לא תתעב אדומי כי אחיך הוא (דברים כג, ח).  Where is their brotherly love in response? 

 

The 180 degree inverse of Amalek is Yosef, who instead of holding a grudge against his brothers for what they did to him supported them and cared for them while they were in Egypt.  Therefore, Amalek stands no chance against the descendants of Yosef.

 

Had Moshe been the one to lead Bn"Y and his wish of אעברה נא was granted, given that he was not a descendant of Rachel, Bn"Y would have not had the confidence and trust in Hashem needed to wage war  against Amalek.  They would still be plagued with the fear that held the meraglim back, and there could therefore be no סלח נא for that sin.  It's only because Yehoshua, from sheivet Ephraim, a descendent of Yosef, a descendent of Rachel, was in charge, that Bn"Y felt that they could succeed. 

The essence of the mitzvah of bikkurim is hakaras hatov, appreciating the gift of Eretz Yisrael and its bounty.  Therefore, the Torah juxtaposes this mitzvah with the command to obliterate Amalek.  By giving thanks, we eliminate the sin of being כפוי טובה which mars Amalek's character.

Rabeinu Yonah: the one thing teshuvah cannot cure

The Tiferet Shlomo on our parsha comments that the pasuk כי תצא מחנה על אויביך ונשמרת מכל דבר רע derech remez alludes to Rosh haShana, a time when the machanot of angels of the sitra achara gather and try to ruin our upcoming year. How can a person assure that they are zocheh to a good year? He writes:

ועיקר ההכנה על יום הנורא הזה להיות אחוה וריעות בין בני ישראל כמ"ש בחצוצרות וקול שופר הריעו לפני המלך ד' לשון אחוה וריעות

Rosh haShana is a "yom teru'ah," meaning, a dat of re'us, i.e. v'ahavta l'rei'acha. If you get along with others, then you have nothing to worry about. Hashem will make sure that He gets along with you.

How do you do that? By training yourself to to not speak ill of other people. ונשמרת מכל דבר רע means דיבּור רע.

וזה הרמז בפ' שהתחלנו כי תצא מחנה על אויביך ונשמרת מכל דבר רע. לבל ידבר ח"ו רע על חבירו ולא יראה כלל בחסרונו רק במעלות חבירו וז"ש מי האיש החפץ חיים לבקש בר"ה כתבנו בספר החיים. נצור לשונך מרע לבל ידבר על חבירו סור מרע ועשה טוב. וזהו הכנה ליום הדין להוציא משפטינו לאורה. כי אם האדם מחזיק את חבירו בחזקת צדיק אזי גם אותו יכתוב בספרי הצדיקים:

We can use our words to build people up, to spread positivity. You can make the lowest person feel great. If you do that, Hashem then no matter where you are in life, Hashem will inscribe you for a good din and make you feel great too.

Rabeinu Yonah writes something in his Sefer haYirah (and the GR"A references it in his Iggeret) that should make you shake:

לכּל ישׁ רפואה חוץ מלשׁון הרע

(This line needs explanation, as R"Y himself in Shaarei Teshuvah 3:210 based on Archin 15b writes וְאָמְרוּ רַבּוֹתֵינוּ מַרְפֵּא לָשׁוֹן הָרַע לְהִנָּצֵל מִמֶּנּוּ, שֶׁיַּעֲסֹק אָדָם בַּתּוֹרָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (משלי ט"ו:ד') מַרְפֵּא לָשׁוֹן עֵץ חַיִּים. וְזֶהוּ שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (תהילים ל"ט:ב') אֶשְׁמְרָה לְפִי מַחְסוֹם וְגוֹ' פֵּרְשׁוּ רַבּוֹתֵינוּ זִכְרוֹנָם לִבְרָכָה כִּי הַמַּחְסוֹם הוּא הָעֵסֶק בַּתּוֹרָה.

He is quoting the sugya in Archin 15b

מר רבי חמא בר' חנינא מה תקנתו של מספרי לשון הרע אם תלמיד חכם הוא יעסוק בתורה שנא' מרפא לשון עץ חיים ואין לשון אלא לשון הרע שנאמר חץ שחוט לשונם ואין עץ יא] אלא תורה שנאמר עץ חיים היא למחזיקים בה ואם עם הארץ הוא ישפיל דעתו שנאמר וסלף בה שבר רוח רבי אחא ברבי חנינא אומר סיפר אין לו תקנה שכבר כרתו דוד ברוח הקדש שנאמר יכרת ה' כל שפתי חלקות לשון מדברת גדולות אלא מה תקנתו שלא יבא לידי לשון הרע אם תלמיד חכם הוא יעסוק בתורה ואם ע"ה הוא ישפיל דעתו שנאמר וסלף בה שבר רוח

It could be that R"Y paskens like the second opinion, and לְהִנָּצֵל מִמֶּנּוּ means to avoid speaking lashon ha'ra.)

It is a frightening thought that as powerful as teshuvah is, there is some things it won't work for. The Shem m'Shmuel (beginning of Metzora) tries to soften it and say that regular teshuvah is not enough, but teshuvah on some higher level does work, but whatever the hesber, it shows the seriousness of the sin of lashon ha'ra.


We don't need really need to reach for remazim to this idea in our parsha, as the Rishonim spell it out in pshat in the pesukim 24:8-9):

הִשָּׁ֧מֶר בְּנֶֽגַע־הַצָּרַ֛עַת לִשְׁמֹ֥ר מְאֹ֖ד וְלַעֲשׂ֑וֹת כְּכֹל֩ אֲשֶׁר־יוֹר֨וּ אֶתְכֶ֜ם הַכֹּהֲנִ֧ים הַלְוִיִּ֛ם כַּאֲשֶׁ֥ר צִוִּיתִ֖ם תִּשְׁמְר֥וּ לַעֲשֽׂוֹת

זָכ֕וֹר אֵ֧ת אֲשֶׁר־עָשָׂ֛ה יְקוָ֥ק אֱלֹקיךָ לְמִרְיָ֑ם בַּדֶּ֖רֶךְ בְּצֵאתְכֶ֥ם מִמִּצְרָֽיִם

Rashi explains that Miriam was afflicted with tzaraas because she spoke lashon ha'ra; therefore, if you want to be careful to avoid tzaraas, don't speak ill of people.

I've written about these pesukim a few times in the past, but for some reason Rashbam never caught my eye until this year. He offers a different takeaway than Rashi. Where I work, there are policies and procedures, but there are always people who assume those are for everyone else, not them, or they assume that their need is special, their circumstance is special, and so the rules don't apply. Rashbam address himself to the first half of that argument. Our pasuk warns that if someone is afflicted with tzaraas, no matter who it is, no matter how chashuv a person, they are not immune from punishment. We don't play favorites. The policy applies to everyone equally. אפילו הוא מלך כעוזיה לא יכבדוהו, אלא יסגירוהו וישלחוהו ובדד ישב. Look no further than Miriam, who despite being a nevi'ah, despite being Moshe's sister, was forced to sit outside the camp until her tzaraas was cured. (The Netziv here is a peleh, as he explains Rashbam here as follows: ורשב״ם פירש שלא יהיה עליך שמירת דיני צרעת למשא, שהרי גם מרים נהגה כך. I don't understand how he read it that way.)

This fits well with a midrash I quoted over a dozen years ago:

רבנן אמרי:

למה הדבר דומה? למלך שעלה מן המלחמה קילסה אותו מטרונה.

אמר המלך: תיקרי אומן של סנקליטור. לאחר ימים התחילה לערב אוננא של מלך.

אמר המלך: כך עשית?!

תיטרד למטלון!

כך, בשעה שעשה הקב"ה מלחמת הים אמרה מרים שירה ונקראת נביאה, שנאמר: (שמות טו) ותקח מרים הנביאה. כיון, שאמרה לשון הרע על אחיה, אמר הקב"ה תיטרד למטלון! שנאמר: (במדבר יב) ותסגר מרים:

R' Shlomo Kluger in Imrei Shefer explains that Midrash comes to explain why our pasuk needs to mention בַּדֶּ֖רֶךְ בְּצֵאתְכֶ֥ם מִמִּצְרָֽיִם. He reads the Midrash in a way that is similar to Rashbam. An important person usually has "protektzia."  The Midrash compares Miriam to an official appointed by the king as a reward for great service. Remember the shirah she sang when Bn"Y left Egypt, בַּדֶּ֖רֶךְ בְּצֵאתְכֶ֥ם מִמִּצְרָֽיִם? How great was that! Only a major blunder would cause a person on that level to come under scrutiny or be punished for an infraction. Well, lashon ha'ra is a major blunder on that level.

Ralbag / Abarbanel address the second argument, that due to extenuating circumstances, policy and procedure goes out the window and we can make exceptions. Bn"Y were en route to Eretz Yisrael and anxious to get there. Under those circumstances, you might have said to forget about Miriam's tzaraas so as to keep moving. That's not what happened. Even if everyone had to wait, Miriam's tzaraas had to be addressed and tended to. There is no "emergency" that trumps tzaraas because there is no need that is greater than demonstrating the severity of lashon ha'ra.

I still prefer the interpretation of the Midrash that I posted way back when. The greater the gifts and ability a person has, the greater hi/her responsibility to develop and use those talents wisely and properly. It is davka because Miriam sang shirah and understood the power of words that she is faulted for tripping up and using that power of speech improperly to criticize Moshe.

Bn"Y are lauded for being able to use words correctly. "HaKol kol Yaakov" -- our voice is meant to be used for tefillah and for Torah. That is what brings chiyus to a person. That is why מה תקנתו של מספרי לשון הרע אם תלמיד חכם הוא יעסוק בתורה. Precisely because we have that gift, we are held to account for lashon ha'ra, we are held to account when we improperly using our voice. As the Tif Shlomo says, ונשמרת מכל דבר רע, meaning דיבּור רע, is the key to a kesiva v'chasima tovah.

Who are you going to believe -- Sanhedrin or your eyes?

For better or worse, our worldview of Torah is shaped by chumash and Rashi that we learned as children and that we re-learn every week (sadly often advancing no further in our understanding).  We all "know" that Avraham sent Eliezer to fetch Rivka and bring her to his home, but nowhere does it say this in the text.  It speaks about Avraham's eved, but Eliezer is not named.  We just assume it because Rashi told us that's who the perek is talking about.  It's an innocuous example, but not all examples are so innocuous.  Rashi in our parsha comments:

 לֹ֣א תָס֗וּר מִן־הַדָּבָ֛ר אֲשֶׁר־יַגִּ֥ידֽוּ לְךָ֖ יָמִ֥ין וּשְׂמֹֽאל׃

 

ימין ושמאל – אפילו אומר לך על ימין שהוא שמאל, ועל שמאל שהיא ימין, וכל שכן שאומרים לו על ימין ימין ועל שמאל שמאל.

 

This Rashi is so well known that I think comes as a shock to most people to discover it is against a black on white gemara.  The first Mishna in Horiyot has a din: הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין וְיָדַע אֶחָד מֵהֶן שֶׁטָּעוּ אוֹ תַלְמִיד שֶׁהוּא רָאוּי לְהוֹרָייָה וְהָלַךְ וְעָשָׂה עַל פִּיהֶם, בֵּין שֶׁעָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה עִמָּהֶם בֵּין שֶׁעָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה אַחֲרֵיהֶם, בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא עָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה – הֲרֵי זֶה חַייָב

 

The gemara tries to figure out what case this could be talking about.  מַתְנִיתָא כְּגוֹן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי יוֹשֵׁב לִפְנֵיהֶן.  The gemara (I am quoting the Yerushalmi) posits that we are dealing with someone who is a baki b'halacha like Shimon ben Azai.  If so, m'mah nafshach: if he made a mistake in the din, then he is not really an expert; if he didn't make a mistake but rather intentionally violated the din, then he is not chayav a chatas because he is not shogeg.  Answers the gemara: אֶלָּא שֶׁהוּא כְטוֹעֶה לוֹמַר: תּוֹרָה אָמְרָה אַחֲרֵיהֶם אַחֲרֵיהֶם  The person is an expert in the case before B"D and knew that they made a mistake, but thought there is a chiyuv to follow them anyway.  At this point the Bavli stops, but the Yerushalmi goes a step further and says that can't be the mistake because someone of a R' Shimon ben Azai would not err in something like that:

 

אֵין זֶה שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי. כְּהָדָא דְתַנֵּי: יָכוֹל אִם יֹאמְרוּ לָךְ עַל יְמִין שֶׁהִיא שְׂמֹאל וְעַל שְׂמֹאל שֶׁהִיא יְמִין תִּשְׁמַע לָהֶם? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: לָלֶכֶת יָמִין וּשְׂמֹאל, שֶׁיֹּאמְרוּ לָךְ עַל יָמִין שֶׁהוּא יָמִין וְעַל שְׂמֹאל שֶׁהִיא שְׂמֹאל

 

Exactly the opposite of the derasha Rashi quotes!  If B"D makes the wrong call and you know they are mistaken, of course you don't have to follow them.  (The only difference between Bavli and Yerushalmi is the Bavli accepted the thought that following B"D even if they are in error is a potential mistake someone can make; the Yerushalmi thinks a Shimon ben Azai type expert would not make that mistake, but they both agree that it is a mistake.  I quoted the Ylmi because it spells out the derasha that stands in sharp contrast to Rashi; the Bavli doesn't quote the derasha.)

 

If someone starts with Rashi's comment as their baseline, esp if they are not aware of the contradictory sugya, then a person might come to accept all kinds of things as true even if the face of evidence to the contrary.  Call it emunah peshuta, call it daas Torah, call it some other name, at the end of the day it means the answer to Groucho Marx's question, "Who are you going to believe -- me or your own eyes? is "me" when that "me" is a Rabbi.   That's a dangerous thing.  There is no proof that will shake someone out of this state ut of their reverie, as what good is proof when the Torah says you have to believe אפילו אומר לך על ימין שהוא שמאל, ועל שמאל שהיא ימין?  L'havdil, this is the same mindset of people still singing the accolades of Fauci, who still believe Russiagate, and who think Joe Biden had 81 million people who voted for him.

 

When you start with the Yerushalmi as your baseline, you start with the assumption that reality is reality, left is left and right is right, and there is no reason to listen to anyone, even the Sanhedrin, if they tell you otherwise. G-d does not want us to turn our brains off and unquestioningly accept falsehood.

 

What should be the baseline we start with?  How do we square Rashi with the Yerushalmi?  First off, who says we have to?  Perhaps the two sources disagree, end of story.  See Shu"T Melamed l'Ho'il who wants to be toleh the two derashos on the issue of whether yesh aim l'mikra or yesh aim la'masoret and you don't need to reconcile the two.  At the end of the day, Rashi on chumash is a mefareish, not a posek.   When it comes to halacha, if I am not mistaken, the derasha he quotes in not brought by the Rambam.  This is far from the only place where Rashi's peirush on chumash is not consistent with the maskana l'dina.  Rashi's concern is peshutp shel mikra, and if a derasha that is not k'halacha does a better job at explaining the pasuk (see Kli Yakar), that will be what Rashi goes with.   

 

The problem gets sticky when we look at Ramban, who not only quotes Rashi, but expands upon it and holds that this is the normative view:

 

וענינו: אפילו תחשב בלבך שהם טועים, והדבר פשוט בעיניך כאשר אתה יודע בין ימינך לשמאלך, תעשה כמצותם, ואל תאמר: איך אוכל החלב הגמור הזה או אהרוג האיש הנקי הזה, אבל תאמר: כך צוה אותי האדון המצוה על המצות שאעשה בכל מצותיו ככל אשר יורוני העומדים לפניו  במקום אשר יבחר, ועל משמעות דעתם נתן לי התורה אפילו יטעו. וזה כענין רבי יהושע עם רבן גמליאל ביום הכפורים שחל להיות בחשבונו (בבלי ר״ה כ״ה.)

 

.כי על הדעת שלהם הוא נותן לנו התורה, אפילו יהו בעיניך כמחליף הימין בשמאל. וכל שכן שיש לך לחשוב שהם אומרים על ימין שהוא ימין, כי רוח השם על משרתי מקדשו ולא יעזוב את חסידיו, לעולם נשמרו (תהלים ל״ז:כ״ח) מן הטעות ומן המכשול.

 

The Ramban is a bit unclear (see the whole thing inside and R' Elchanan in Kuntres Divrei Sofrim in Koveitz Shiurim) as to whether he holds you have to listen to B"D because it's just your impression that they are in error, or whether he holds you have to listen because even if they are in fact wrong, Hashem wants you to listen to them anyway.

 

I thought Ramban's amguity should be seen in light of Ramban later in our parsha by eidim zomimim, who asks why it is that if eidim are discovered to be zomimim after B"D carries out punishment on the defendant, they get off with no punishment.  Why shouldn't they be liable for causing de  or pain to the defendant?  Ramban answers that if B"D meted out justice based on their testimony, then it means the defendant is guilty of some crime.  Hashem would not allow B"D to mete out punishment in error to an innocent party.  From that Ramban is would seem that a person might have the *impression* that B"D got it wrong, but in reality, they did not (I found R' Yehuda Herzl Henkin in Shu"T Bnei Banim II:23 also links these two parshiyot).  Chasam Sofer goes down this same road.  He writes that the reason you have to listen to B"D אפילו אומר לך על ימין שהוא שמאל is because Hashem would not allow righteous people to make such an error.  The Lubavitcher Rebbe writes (Likutei Sichos v 5 end of the second piece on Toldos) that B"D's psak can change reality (see Yerushalmi (Kesubos 1 halacha 2) regarding the regrowth of besulim in response to psak of B"D).  Therefore, if they tell you left is right, that will become the reality.  All that being said, we know that B"D can make mistakes, otherwise we would not have a parsha of par he'elem davar shel tzibur!

 

What did Ramban do with the Yerushalmi? 

 

Ramban elsewhere, in Sefer haMitzvos, tries to answer this question.  Ramban writes that if B"D makes an error, you can do what you like until you raise the issue with B"D (which is what you should do) and have your day in court.  Once you do have your day in court and B"D has heard your side of the story and still rejected it, then from that point onward you are bound to follow their view.  Ramban is a but difficult to read into the sugya in the Yerushalmi.   מַתְנִיתָא כְּגוֹן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי יוֹשֵׁב לִפְנֵיהֶן -- when it says יוֹשֵׁב לִפְנֵיהֶן it means someone present in B"D but did not raise their own view for discussion?

 

Chida goes a step further and writes that there is no obligation to follow B"D unless you are dead wrong.  Most things in life, halacha included, are seldom black and white.  Chid"a suggests that if you make your argument to B"D and they think you are mistaken, then you have to follow their view. However, if things are not so clear cut -- your argument has merit, but for whatever reason, the majority of B"D feels their position has more merit -- you don't have to follow. 

 

Other Achronim throw their own hat into the ring and offer other suggestions to resolve the discrepancy, but I am not going to do a full review of every shita here as this is as blog post, not a journal article.  I do want to make just two other points:

 

1) Facts are facts.  B"D can't pasken against empirical evidence.  Yevamos 92a: הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין שֶׁשָּׁקְעָה חַמָּה, וּלְבַסּוֹף זָרְחָה — אֵין זוֹ הוֹרָאָה, אֶלָּא טָעוּת.  

 

Along the same lines, Ksav v'haKabbalah explains Rashi as follows:

 

פי׳ דלפי מראה עיניך הם טועין בדין מ״מ תשמע להם; אבל אם ידוע בודאי שהם טועים, כבר אמרו בירושלמי (רשפ״ק דהוריות) אם יאמרו על ימין שהוא שמאל ועל שמאל שהוא ימין אין לשמוע להם

 

What he doesn't explain is how you know with certainty that you are right and they are wrong.  Is it a case of factual error?  Or perhaps it is a case where you have a kabbalah ish m'pi ish and B"D doesn't and is trying to figure things out mi'sevara.  See end of ch 5 of Ediyot regarding עֲקַבְיָא בֶּן מַהֲלַלְאֵל). 

 

2) B"D alone can determine public policy.  To use an example from last week's post, if B"D says not to blow shofar on Shabbos, arguing that they are wrong because the Torah allows it is a non-starter.  A gezeira or a hor'as sha'ah deliberately upends the din.  Yes, B"D is going against what the Torah says, but they have a right to do so for the sake of public policy.  You may disagree with their ruling, but that is a matter of perception, not one of clear cut error.

So much for matters of halacha.  What can we walk away with from this pasuk?  Derech derush the Divrei Shaul explains it as as a warning to follow the Rambam's famous golden mean.  Don't become an extremist.  (Everyone of course thinks he/she is a centrist and the other guy is the extremist.)  ֹֹ֣֣לֹ֣א תָס֗וּר...יָמִ֥ין וּשְׂמֹֽאל׃  Stick to the middle of the road. 

 

I would like to suggest derech derush another interpretation based on Shabbat 63a (I later found that Chasam Sofer also uses this gemara derech derush to explain the pasuk, but takes it in a different direction than I do):

 

אָמַר רָבָא בַּר רַב שֵׁילָא וְאָמְרִי לַהּ אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף בַּר חָמָא אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת מַאי דִכְתִיב אֹרֶךְ יָמִים בִּימִינָהּ בִּשְׂמֹאלָהּ עֹשֶׁר וְכָבוֹד אֶלָּא בִּימִינָהּ אֹרֶךְ יָמִים אִיכָּא עֹשֶׁר וְכָבוֹד לֵיכָּא אֶלָּא לַמַּיְימִינִין בָּהּ אֹרֶךְ יָמִים אִיכָּא וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן עוֹשֶׁר וְכָבוֹד לַמַּשְׂמְאִילִים בָּהּ עוֹשֶׁר וְכָבוֹד אִיכָּא אוֹרֶךְ יָמִים לֵיכָּא

 

Rashi comments:

 

למיימינין. של תורה שמפשפשין טעמיהן בדקדוק ובוררין כימין המיומנת למלאכה

 

למשמאלין בה. שאין יגעים בה כל צרכן אי נמי מיימינין בה עוסקין לשמה משמאילים שלא לשמה

 

Sometimes a person thinks he is giving 110% in his learning, but his Rebbe, like a good coach, knows that in reality he has more to give and can work harder.  His "yemin" = hard work is in reality "smol."  By the same token, sometimes a person thinks that they are doing far less than they should be doing, leading to their feeling depressed.  A Rebbe can right the ship and explain that what this person thinks is "smol" is really "yemin."  Maybe he is already maxed out and there is no need for stress or depression.  Sometimes we need someone who can look a things more objectively to guide us in how we measure ourselves.  אפילו אומר לך על ימין שהוא שמאל, it's a good idea to listen.