some notes from the Ayeles haShachar

Some he'oros from the Ayeles haShachar this week because I am preoccupied.  In some cases I left out his answers and some of the shakla v'terya:

 1) Rashi comments (21:1) לא יטמא בעמיו – בעוד שהמת בתוך עמיו, יצא מת מצוה that a kohen can be mitamei to bury a meis mitzvah.  The Chofetz Chaim writes that so long as there is another jew who can do the burial, it's not a meis mitzvah.  The implication is that if there are only aku"m available, a kohen can be metamei himself.  R' Shteinman asks: the din is that it is preferable to bury a meis by an aku"m on Y"T rishon rather than delay the burial until Y"T sheni.  If the fact that the burial is being done by an aku"m is not enough reason to allow for halanas ha'meis, why is it enough reason to allow for tumas kohanim?

 

2)  וְלַאֲחֹתוֹ הַבְּתוּלָה הַקְּרוֹבָה אֵלָיו - presumably the only way to know that she is a besula is because she has a chazakah as such.  Why does the gemara (Ch 10) never suggest this as the makor for the principle of chazakah?  (True, the gemara talks about examinations that can be performed to ascertain whether someone is a besulah, but it would be a dochak to say that the pasuk is speaking about the specific case that such an exam was done just before aveilus set in.)

 

3) The gedarim of "v'kidashto" are a bit unclear.  The PM"G (OC 53:14) writes that ideally a kohen gets first dibs to be the sha"tz for davening.  There is a a Keren Orah (Horiyos 12) that says if a kohen and a Yisrael have a bris milah on the same day, the mohel should do the bris of the kohen first.  Ah"S raises the question of two burials on the same day.  Does the mitzvah of v'kidashto apply even to a meis (like the din of kibud av v'eim, which continues after death) or not? 

 

4) A kohen asked the Steipler whether he should train his left handed son to be a righty because m'heira yibaneh ha'mikdash and a lefty can't do avodah (Bech 45).  The Steipler quoted a midrash that says all mumim will be healed when mashiach comes, so he has nothing to worry about.  The Ah"S asks: the Rambam brings down the halachos of what constitutes a mum, implying that these halachos are and will be noge'a l'maaseh.

 

5) The gemara equates the fact that a lulav with a split ti'yomes is pasul on Y"T with the fact that it is a shinuy which is koneh in dinei mamonos.  However, R' Elchanan in Koveitz Shiurim (B"K 112) points out that not every mum constitutes a shinuy, e.g. a nick in the ear of a korban is a mum that disqualifies but is not a shinuy that would be koneh.  How do you distinguish between these cases?

 

Yesh lachkor whether the presence of a mum is the sibah which pasels a korban, or whether the mum is a siman that the object is changed from its original state and therefore no longer acceptable?

 

The nicked ear falls into the former category.  The animal is essentially the same animal, but the presence of the nick disqualifies it.  The split ti'yomes falls into the latter category.  It's not the fact that it is pasul which proves that it is a shinuy, but aderaba, it's the fact that it is a shinuy which creates a psul because the object is a different object. 

 

Which category does the mumim of kohanim fall into?  Rashi writes (21:21) that a mum is posel only while it is present מום בו – בעוד מומו בו פסול, הא אם עבר מומו, כשר.  R' Shteinman argues that this proves that it is the presence of the mum which is the psul, not the fact that it indicates a shinuy, otherwise even if the mum is removed, the psul should still remain.  (Why this is true is a but unclear to me, but I think he means is that when something is acquired through a shinuy, if the shinuy is removed, the object does not revert back to the original owner.  So too, if mum is a psul because it indicates that there is a shinuy, it is the fact that the shinuy happened which is the psul, it is the change which occurred, irrespective of whether it can be undone or not.)

 

6)  וּמִיַּד בֶּן נֵכָר לֹא תַקְרִיבוּ אֶת לֶחֶם אֱלֹקיכֶם מִכׇּל אֵלֶּה כִּי מׇשְׁחָתָם בָּהֶם מוּם בָּם לֹא יֵרָצוּ לָכֶם. (22:25) Is there a din of "ritzuy" by the korban of an aku'm?  The gemara (Zev 45b) writes that עובדי כוכבים לאו בני הרצאה נינהו:  Similarly the Hagahos Ashr"I in Baba Basra explains the reason that we cannot accept tzedakah from an aku"m but can accept korbanos nedava from them is because there is no kaparah associated with korbanos nedava [tzedakah is a mechapeir!]  Some therefore explain that the end of our pasuk is not talking about the particular case of korbanos aku"m, but in a more general sense.

 

7) The gemara writes that the issur of oso v'es bno only applies when shechita is done, but not if you just stab the animal.  The gemara doesn't mean davka shechita, but rather means whatever the halachically proper way to kill the animal is, as we see from the fact that oso v'es bno applies to the sa'ir la'Azazel pushed off the cliff on Y"K.  Yesh lachkor according to R' Akiva who holds (Chulin 17a) that during the 40 years in the midbar shechita was not required on non-korban meat, was there an issur of oso v'es bno?  Does the gemara mean there was no din of shechita then, or for those 40 years was stabbing the animal the equivalent of shechita? 

 

8) בַּחֹדֶשׁ הָרִאשׁוֹן בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר לַחֹדֶשׁ בֵּין הָעַרְבָּיִם פֶּסַח לַה׳.  (23:5)  14 Nisan is not a moed.  Why is it listed here? 

 

9) Yesh lachkor whether וּשְׂמַחְתֶּם לִפְנֵי ה׳ אֱלֹקיכֶם שִׁבְעַת יָמִים is a tnai in the mitzvah of lekichas lulav, and therefore if someone is noteil lulav but is not b'simcha while doing so his mitzvah of netilas lulav is lacking, or whether  וּשְׂמַחְתֶּם לִפְנֵי ה׳ אֱלֹקיכֶם שִׁבְעַת יָמִים is its own mitzvah which netilas lulav is one element of fulfilling.  (According to the Bikurei Yaakov's understanding of the Rambam the mitzvah of netilas lulav for 7 days applies in Yerushalayim even today.)

 

10) Does someone who is sitting in the sukkah have to leave to go inside and shower for Shabbos?  Would we not apply the rule of oseik b'mitzvah patur min ha'mitzvah here?

 

11) The gemara writes that there was (at one point in time) a special bracha associated with lechem ha'panim so that even if a person ate only a small portion (less than a k'zayis) he would feel satiated.  Yesh lachkor in that case whether a person would have to say birkas ha'mazon.  On the one hand it is "v'savata" from the eating, but on the other hand less than a k'zayis is not considered a maaseh achila.

 

12)  וַיַּנִּיחֻהוּ בַּמִּשְׁמָר (24:123)  Was that just so he would not run away, or is there a din that required putting such a person in prison?

 

13) Rashi comments on  וְרָגְמוּ אֹתוֹ כׇּל הָעֵדָה that from here we learn כל העדה – במעמד כל העדה, מכאן ששלוחו של אדם כמותו.  R' Akiva Eiger (Kid 41) points out that the gemara never suggests this as a source for the din of שלוחו של אדם כמותו.  Interestingly the Sifra which is the source for the first half of Rashi's statement --  בְּמַעֲמַד כָּל הָעֵדָה --  omits the second half.  As Ah"S points out, if everyone (כל העדה) was in fact present, then you don't need a din of shlichus here.  The first half of Rashi/Sifra seems to contradict the second half. 

tochacha is not just for others; Torah on one foot

1) R' Gershon Edelstein z"l points out that the mitzvah of tochacha doesn't just mean going around and telling other people what they are doing wrong.  Rabbeinu Yonah writes in the Shaarei Teshuvah 2:26

וְיִתְבּוֹדֵד בְּחַדְרֵי רוּחוֹ וְיָשׁוּב יַהֲפֹךְ יַד תּוֹכַחְתּוֹ עַל נַפְשׁוֹ. וְלֹא יִסְמֹךְ עַל תּוֹכַחַת הַמּוֹכִיחַ לְבַדּוֹ.

The mitzvah is also to give oneself tochacha!  Chazal darshen הוכח תוכיח אפילו מאה פעמים.  Certainly this applies to correcting one's own shortcomings.

2) The gemara tells the famous story of the convert who came to Hillel and asked to be taught the entire Torah on one foot.  Hillel responded with a reformulation of v'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha -- don't treat others in a way that you would not want to be treated yourself.  Treat other people with kindness and respect.

What a crazy request -- the whole Torah on one foot?!  Was he just trying to test Hillel's patience?  (discussed this before here)

R' Shlomo Fischer explained that we learn in Avos that על שׁלשׁה דברים העלם עומד.  The world stands on three things: Torah, avodah, and gemillus chassadim.  

The ger was asking Hillel: if you had to choose one of the three -- one foot to stand on instead of three -- which is the most important?

To which Hilel replied: chessed comes before everything else.  Master midos and chessed, and the rest will follow.  

lifnei iveir -- bein adam l'chaveiro or bein adam laMakon? issur klali or issur prati?

R' Yaakov Kaminetzky in Emes l'Yaakov on the parsha sets down a fundamental yesod in understanding lifnei iveir.  We think of lifnei iveir as a bein adam l'chaveiro din, like many of the other dinin in the parsha.  Don't cause someone to trip and come to physical harm, don't give bad advice, don't cause someone spiritual harm by causing them to violate an issur.  R' Yaakov is mechadesh (and others say this as well, e.g. see Koveitz Shiurim from R' Elchanan in Pesachim #95 very muck b'kitzur) that lifnei iveir contains a bein adam laMakom component as well.  When the Torah prohibits eiver min ha'chai, for example, the issur is not just for you to not eat eiver min ha'chai. The issur is for you to cause eiver min ha'chai to be eaten by yourself *or* by others.  To put in another way, not only is there a din klali of lifnei iveir that says not to cause harm, but lifnei iveir is also a prat in every individual lav which extends it to actions done by others.   

(Seems to me that lifnei iveir is like the opposite side of the coin as arvus.  Arvus means (according to some Rishonim) that if someone else needs help to do a mitzvah, even if you've done the mitzvah already yourself, it’s like your chiyuv is incomplete.  Here too, even if you haven’t eaten the eiver min ha'chai, if you enable someone else to do so, your observance of the lav of maachalos assuros is faulty.)

 The difference between these two components comes into play when we speak of lifnei iveir by an aku"m.  The gemara tells us that lifnei iveir applies even to an aku"m, e.g. you cannot offer a piece of eiver min ha'chai to an aku"m to eat.  That din reflects the second element, the bein adam laMakom, of lifnei iveir.  It cannot possibly apply to the bein adam l'chaveiro aspect.  We learn in San 85b  כּוּתִי אַתָּה מְצֻוֶּוה עַל הַכָּאָתוֹ וְאִי אַתָּה מְצֻוֶּוה עַל קִלְלָתוֹ.   How then can you be chayav for indirectly causing the aku"m to stumble and fall? 

 

Achronim use this yesod to answer a kasha on the Emunas Shmuel.  The Tur writes that the issur of eiver min ha'chai applies only to kosher animals.  Taz (Y"D 62) asks: בטור כתוב ואינו נוהג אלא בטהורים וקשה למאי נ״מ כ״כ דהא טמאה בלאו הכי אסור .  You can't eat a tamei animal anyway, so l'mai nafka mina whether there is additionally an issur eiver min ha'chai or not?  Emunas Shmuel answers that there is a nafka mina for lifnei iveir.  He writes that lifnei iveir applies only to something which is assur to you.  You can't offer a nazir a glass of wine because were you a nazir, you would not be allowed to drink wine.  You can't give an aku"m eiver min ha'chai because eiver min ha'chai is assur for you to eat.  However, since there is no issur of eiver min ha'chai on a tamei animal, it is not assur for you to eat, and therefore there is no lifnei iveir.  In this case, you can give it to an aku"m.  Asks the Beis haLevi and R' Chaim Ozer (Achiezer III:81): the gemara (BM 10b) speaks about a case of   ֹּ כֹּהֵן דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ לְיִשְׂרָאֵל צֵא וְקַדֵּשׁ לִי אִשָּׁה גְּרוּשָׁה. and Tos says there is lifnei iveir for the yisrael.  A yisrael is allowed to marry a gerusha.  According to the Emunas Shmuel why then is there a problem of lifnei iveir?  How is this case different than offering eiver min ha'chai of a tamei animal to an aku"m?

 

With R Yaakov's yesod we can say the following chiluk.  When it comes to giving eiver min ha'chai to an aku"m, all I have to worry about is the bein adam laMakom din of eiver min ha'chai.  I have no bein adam l'chaveiro obligation viz a viz an aku"m.  Therefore, since on a tamei animal there is no issur eiver min ha'chai, there can't be any lifnei issur of enabling others to eat it.  However, when it comes to a yisrael being mekadesh a gerusha on behalf of a kohen, here the bein adam l'chaveiro also comes into play.  The yisrael may not have an issue to marry a gerusha, so there is no bein adam laMklom issue, but there is a din klali that says he cannot harm his fellow member of Klal Yisrael.  If I can't cause the kohen harm by giving him bad advice, I certainly can't cause him harm by doing kiddushin on he behalf to a woman he is not allowed to marry!

 

There are a few other nafka minos from this yesod:

 

1) R' Akiva Eiger on the first Mishna in Shabbos writes that if you enable someone else to be mechalel shabbos, you violate the lav of lifnei iveir, but that does not make you a mumar.  Only chilul shabbos makes you a mumar.  According to R' Yaakov, the bein adam laMakom of lifnei iveir is a prat in hil Shabbos.  When the Torah commands you not to violate Shabbos, included in that issur is not enabling others to do so.  Therefore, perhaps you would be a mumar.

 

2) The Shach writes (YD 151:6) that the issur derabbanan of afrushei m'isura (similar to lifnei iveir) does not apply to a mumar.  Dagul meiRevava asks why not?  A mumar is still a Jew!  R' Yaakov answers that there is no bein adam l'chaveiro responsibility to a mumar (moridin v'lo maalin), and so the lifnei iveir/afrushei m'isura does not apply.

 

3) R' Akiva Eiger has a safeik whether one can give eiver min ha'chai to an aku"m in need of it for pikuach nefesh.  Does the din of "v'chai ba'hem," the heter of pikuach nefesh, apply to an aku"m, or is that pasuk speaking only to us? R' Yaakov points out that based on the logic of the Emunas Shmuel, lifnei iveir is an extension of that which is assur to me.  If under the circumstance of pikuach nefesh eating eiver min ha'chai is mutar for me, the issur cannot extend to an aku"m.  The whole safeik does not get off the ground.

 

4) The Rama writes that lifnei iveir of avodah zarah is not a yei'hareg v'al yaavor.  What would be the hava amina otherwise?  R' Yaakov explains that if lifnei iveir is not an issur klali but is an extension of the issur avodah zarah, one could argue that it should take on all the parameters of the parent issur including being yei'hareg v'al yaavor.  (I am a bit confused by this point.  If you accept the argument of the Emunas Shmuel l'kula like in the above case, why indeed does it not apply l'chumra here?  The hava amina would seem to be correct!)

 

There are a few other nafka minos as well, ayen sham for more.

korban oleh v'yoreid vs korbanos of metzora

In the case of korban oleh v'yoreid the Torah allows a poor person to bring 2 birds, a chatas and olah, in place of animals.  Sefer haChinuch (mitzvah 123) has a chiddush that if the poor peson voluntarily brings the higher priced animal korban instead of the birds, he is not yotzei.  He explains that the Torah does not want a person to extend himself beyond his means, even if for a good cause.  (Kal v'chomer a person should not live beyond his means and waste $ on nahrishkeit). 

 

Achronim ask the following kashe: a metzora is chayav to bring a chatas, asham, and olah.  If a person cannot afford to bring three animals, the Torah says he can subatitute bird offerings for the chatas and olah.  There is a mishna mefureshes at the end of negaim (14:12) that says that a poor person who brings the regular korban of three animals instead of the birds is yotzei.  If so, that should serve as the binyan av paradigm.  The same din should apply to korban oleh v'yoried.  Why, according to the Chinuch, is there a difference betweem these cases and the poor person is not yotzei with the higher priced korban in the case of oleh v'yoreid?   (See Chasam Sofer Shabbos 132a and see my son's post from 5 years ago on this topic.)

 

The Imrei Emes was asked this kashe and gave a cryptic one sentence answer: oleh v'yoreid is different because the person is missing a korban.  No one understood what he meant -- the poor peson brings a korban, a more expensive one than required in fact, so what is he missing?  When R' Menachem Zemba heard the answer, he deciphered it.  In the case of metzora, the rich person brings a chatas, olah, and asham, as does the poor person.  The only difference is that the poor person substitutes birds in place of animals.  In the case of oleh v'yoreid, the rich person brings one animal as a chatas; the poor person brings 2 birds, one as a chatas, one as an olah.  When the poor person who is chayav chatas and an olah brings a rich person's korban of a single chatas, he is missing something -- he is missing the korban olah that goes with his chatas.  True, he may have spent more money on that single animal, but that doesn't make up for the fact that he is getting off with one korban in place of two. 

 

This is such a great answer you have to wonder why all the other achronim who were spinning their wheels trying to work out a solution didn't come up with it.  There's a great explanation for that as well.

 

The Ohr Sameich once had a dream that he was in the yeshiva shel maalah and the giants of the past were sitting and learning and the Rashba stood up and announced in front of everyone that there is a Jew in Dvinsk who was mechavein l'amita shel Torah more than he was.  The gem (Chulin 22) has a hava amina that an olas ha'of can be offered at night.  Asks the Rashba: avodah is always done during the day.  How can there be even a hava amina of bringing a korban at night?  There must be an error in the girsa.

 

A bunch of years ago I posted the Meshech Chochma's brilliant answer to this Rashba.   He quotes Ibn Erza who explains why it is that the poor person who brings a korban oleh v'yoreid has to being 2 birds in place of the single korban chatas.  When a korban chatas animal is offered there are fats brought on the mizbeiach and meat eaten by the owner.  A bird chatas ha'oef has no fat or meat that is offered.  Just the blood is offered.  Therefore, says Ibn Erza, the chatas bird has to be paired with an olah.  The olah is offered in its entirety, with all the meat, and it therefore makes up for the missing fats that are normally part of the chatas. 

 

Avodah cannot be done at night, but hekter chalavim, the burning of the korban fats, can be.  Since the bird olah is a substitute for the fats of the animal chatas, one might therefore have a hava amina that it can be brought at night, akin of hekter chalavim, kah mashma lan. 

 

Queue applause from the Rashba.

 

In light of this yesod the Imrei Emes's argument takes a hit.  The reason a poor person has to bring the olah bird is because he needs to make up for the missing fats.  Were he to bring an animal chatas, he is not missing anything.  He doesn't need the make up korban because the animal korban is all inclusive.

R' Shayaleh's yahrzeit? Yom haAtzmaut?

Such is the state of the world in which we live that in some shuls if I were to give a klop on the bimah this morning and announce no tachanun because it is Reb Shayale's yahrzeit, no one would bat an eyelash, but were I to give a klop and say no tachanun because Yom ha'Atzmaut, that's a whole different ball game.  

Probably the most important thing is not to descend into the sefirah trap of "lo nahagu kavod zeh la'zeh" whatever you personally do.  

why Nadav and Avihu had to be punished; how the opening of the parsha of kashrus is a response to their sin

1) Earlier this year  on parshas zachor I revisited the yesod the Meshech Chochma quotes from the Rambam many places: a nevuah l'tovah that is related to others can never be rescinded and must come true.   This is why Shaul could not do teshuvah for sparing Agag.  The punishment of  קָרַע ה׳ אֶת⁠ מַמְלְכוּת יִשְׂרָאֵל מֵעָלֶיךָ הַיּוֹם was linked to a promise l'tovah to David, וּנְתָנָהּ לְרֵעֲךָ הַטּוֹב מִמֶּךָּ, and a nevuah l'tovah cannot be undone.  R' Yosef Shaul Nathanson in Divrei Shaul uses this same yesod to explain why Nadav and Avihu had to receive punishment.  Their misa was linked to the positive outcome of creating a kiddush Hashem for the masses, as Moshe told Aharon  הוּא֩ אֲשֶׁר⁠־דִּבֶּ֨ר ה׳  לֵאמֹר֙ בִּקְרֹבַ֣י אֶקָּדֵ֔שׁ וְעַל⁠־פְּנֵ֥י כׇל⁠־הָעָ֖ם אֶכָּבֵ֑ד.  When there is a positive outcome involved, the nevuah must come to fruition. 

2) Rashi comments on  וַיֹּ֨אמֶר מֹשֶׁ֜ה אֶֽל⁠־אַהֲרֹ֗ן קְרַ֤ב אֶל⁠־הַמִּזְבֵּ֙חַ֙  that שהיה אהרן בוש וירא לגשת, אמר לו משה: מה אתה בוש? לכך נבחרת.  I heard the following pshat a few weeks ago but can't recall who says it: When Moshe was first chosen to be a navi by Hashem at the burning bush, he had a whole back and forth argument with G-d.  Moshe insisted that he was not the right one for the job.  Finally, Hashem had enough.  We read  וַיִּֽחַר⁠־אַ֨ף ה׳ בְּמֹשֶׁ֗ה וַיֹּ֙אמֶר֙ הֲלֹ֨א אַהֲרֹ֤ן אָחִ֙יךָ֙ הַלֵּוִ֔י יָדַ֕עְתִּי כִּֽי⁠־דַבֵּ֥ר יְדַבֵּ֖ר ה֑וּא וְגַ֤ם הִנֵּה⁠־הוּא֙ יֹצֵ֣א לִקְרָאתֶ֔ךָ וְרָאֲךָ֖ וְשָׂמַ֥ח בְּלִבּֽוֹ (Shmos 4:14).  Rashi there writes

ויחר אף – ר׳ יהושע בן קרחה אומר: כל חרון אף שבתורה עושה רושם, וזו לא נאמר בו רושם, לא מצינו שבא עונש עלא אותו חרון. א״ל ר׳ יוסי: אף זה נאמר בו רושם:⁠ב הלא אהרן אחיך הלוי – שהיה עתיד להיות לוי ולא כהן, והכהונה הייתי אומר לצאת ממך, מעתה לא יהא כן, אלא הוא כהן ואתה לוי, שנאמר: ומשה איש האלהים בניו יקראו על שבט הלוי

Moshe here in pour parsha is alluding to this episode from his past.  You know why you were chosen Aharon?  Because I made the mistake of protesting too much, of being too bashful and reluctant to take the job.  So why are you now doing the same, repeating my mistake?  מה אתה בוש?  The whole reason you were chosen, לכך נבחרת, is because you weren't guilty of my error.  Don't make it now.

 

3) The Rishonim address why the laws of kashrus appear in our parsha after the hakamas ha'mishkan, e.g. Abarbanel writes:

 

. אחר שהוקם המשכן והושמו בו כהני ה׳ וצוה להם שלא ישתכרו מפני שעיני ישראל עליהם להודיעם את דבר ה׳ להבדיל בין הקדש ובין החול ובין הטמא ובין הטהור. ולהורות חקי השם הוצרך ית׳ לדבר אל משה ואל אהרן יחד ולהודיעם מה הם הב״ח הטהורי׳ לאכילה

 

Others explain that once the mikdash and kohanim have been sanctified, the parsha can turn its attention to the sanctification of the rest of the nation, which begins with tumah and tahara of food. 

 

I think, in light of a Sefas Emes (5631), that at least the opening of this parsha is also a response to the sin of Nadav and Avihu.  

 

וַיְדַבֵּר ה׳ אֶל⁠ מֹשֶׁה וְאֶל⁠ אַהֲרֹן לֵאמֹר אֲלֵהֶם

דַּבְּרוּ אֶל⁠ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לֵאמֹר זֹאת הַחַיָּה אֲשֶׁר תֹּאכְלוּ מִכׇּל⁠ הַבְּהֵמָה אֲשֶׁר עַל⁠ הָאָרֶץ.

 

Who is the לֵאמֹר אֲלֵהֶם in the first pasuk speaking about?  Rashi opines that it refers to Elazar and Itamar:

 

לאמר אלהם – אמור שיאמרו להם לאלעזר ולאיתמר, או אינו אלא לאמר לישראל? כשהוא אומר: דברו אל בני ישראל (ויקרא י״א:ב׳), הרי דבור האמור לישראל, הא מה אני מקיים: לאמר אלהםא – לבנים, לאלעזר ולאיתמר.

 

Rashbam disagrees and sees the phrase as reflexive, speaking about Moshe and Aharon לאמר אליהם – למשה ולאהרן.  He makes a general observation: ומזה יש להוכיח על כל לאמר הכתוב בוידבר ה׳ אל משה, כי פירושו לאמר למשה.

 

Sefas Emes takes the position that לֵאמֹר אֲלֵהֶם is speaking about Bnei Yisrael.  What then are we to make of the next pasuk   דַּבְּרוּ אֶל⁠ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לֵאמֹר ?  One of the two phrases must be redundant?

 

To answer this question Sefas Emes sets down a yesod based on the Chazal at the end of Makkos  ר' חנניא בן עקשיא אומר רצה הקב"ה לזכות את ישראל לפיכך הרבה להם תורה ומצות שנאמר (ישעיהו מב, כא) ה' חפץ למען צדקו יגדיל תורה ויאדיר.  Rashi/Rivan explain כדי שיהו מקבלין שכר במה שמונעין עצמן מן העבירות לפיכך הרבה להן שלא היה צריך לצוות כמה מצות וכמה אזהרות על שקצים ונבלות שאין לך אדם שאינו קץ בהן אלא כדי שיקבלו שכר על שפורשין מהן.  What Rashi/Rivan is telling us is that R' Chananya ben Akashya didn't mean to say that Hashem dreamt up meaningless, arbitrary laws for us to obey just for the sake of giving us reward.  What he meant is that there are laws in the Torah that would seem to go without saying.  Do you really need a pasuk to tell you not to eat bugs?  Who in their right mind would have an appetite or want to do so anyway?  Nonetheless, Hashem gave us a mitzvah so that we get credit for doing what we might otherwise do anyway.  Ad kan Rashi/Rivan.  The Sefas Emes adds another layer.  If I wouldn't eat pig or bugs anyway, what is Hashem rewarding me for?  The answer is that I am being rewarded not for that what, but for the why. אל יאמר האדם אי אפשי בבשר חזיר רק אפשי ומה אעשה אבי שבשמים גזר עלי. Chazal tell us, "Don't say I don't like pig."  Don't do what you are doing because of your personal taste, your common sense, your intuition, your upbringing, social norms, etc.  Rather do it because Hashem decreed that this is what we have to do.  Do it for the sake of the mitzvah.  Attitude and intent make all the difference 

 

In our parsha, says Sefas Emes, the second pasuk of דַּבְּרוּ אֶל⁠ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לֵאמֹר זֹאת הַחַיָּה אֲשֶׁר תֹּאכְלוּ address the what.  The first pasuk is needed to address the why.  לֵאמֹר אֲלֵהֶם means don't just tell them what to do, but tell them that I, G-d, and the one telling them to do it.   

 

Nadav and Avihu wanted ruchniyus, so they offered "eish zarah" to achieve that goal.  They were guided by their own subjective intuition rather than the letter of the law.  Therefore, when it came to giving the laws of kashrus, the Torah stressed that even if you wouldn't eat it anyway, what should guide your behavior is not personal, subjective taste, but rather the fact that it is a mitzvah. 

R' Shlomo Zalman Auerbach's chiddush on what constitutes a hefsek

No she'hechiyanu is recited in kiddush on shevii shel Pesach.  What if a person made a mistake and accidentally said shehechiyanu?  Is it a hefsek?  Does he have to repeat kiddush?

I would have expected the MB to deal with this, but he doesn't (at least nowhere I could find).  When I raised the question my SIL suggested a parallel to kiddush on second night of R"H.  Even though according to some shitos there is no obligation to say shehechiyanu, which is why we try to have a new fruit or wear new clothes, we are not choshesh that doing so may be a hefsek.  I countered that this is not a good analogy.  Mei'ikar ha'din we pasken that on R"H there is an obligation to say shehechiyanu.  It's nice to be yotzei all shitos and try to have a new fruit, but it's not an absolute requirement.  Shevii shel Pesach is actually the flipside case, as on shevii shel Pesach mei'ikar ha'din there is no obligation at all to say shehechiyanu.

 

R' Shlomo Zalman addresses himself to this question and has an interesting sevara.  R'SZ suggests that hefsek, by definition, is a result of hesech ha'daas.  If you start talking about something else in the middle of making a bracha, it's not the interruption of the words themselves which are the issue, but rather it's the fact that in speaking about something else you are diverting attention and thought away from the bracha.  Therefore, if a person mistakenly thought they were obligated to say shehechiyanu in kiddush, since in their mind they are reciting kiddush as required, there is no hesech hadaas from the bracha, and hence the addition is not a hefsek.

 

Let me give you two sources, one in support of RS"Z's idea, one that poses a difficulty.  Let's say a person recited kiddush only to discover as they are about to drink that the kos was filled with water.  The MG"A (quoted by MB) writes that the person has to repeat kiddush, as they failed to fulfill the chiyuv of reciting kiddush al ha'kos.  However, so long as they intended to drink other wine during the meal which was available on the table, they cdo not repeat borei pri ha'gefen.  That bracha was chal on the wine on the table.  What does this have to do with RS"Z?  Even though the kiddush recited over the cup of water counted for nothing and was a hefsek of meaningless words, we see from the MG"A that it doesn't matter.  The the initial borei pri ha'gefen still stands and can combine with the kiddush now being repeated over the refilled kos.  This fits beautifully with RS"Z's reasoning.  The person was unaware the first time around that the kos had water in it, and so there was never a hesech hadaas from the first moment to the last. 

 

R' Akiva Eiger is not a fan of this MG"A, and he more clearly spells out his shira in the following case in hil havdalah (interestingly also quoted by MB, in the Biur Halacha): one is not permitted to use a candle that was lit b'issur on shabbos for havdalah. The SA writes that the bracha of m'orei ha'eish needs to be repeated if one does so.  R Akiva Eiger jumps in and adds that in this scenario, one has to go back and repeat the borei pri ha'gefen as well.  Since the bracha of me'orei h'eish is invalid, it is a hefsek in the havdalah and invalidates the entire thing.  You can see why l'shitaso RAK"E doesn't like the previous MG"A, and you can see the difficulty this poses to R"SZ's sevara.  There was no hesech hadaas here.  The person intended to recite havdalah.  The only problem was the candle used invalidated the bracha.

 

According to many shitos a woman is not obligated to say the bracha of borei m'orei ha'eish in havdalah.  If she does so, is it a hefsek?  Halichos Beisa is medayek (against the view of R' Tukichinski) from the MB that women may add the bracha if they desire to do so and it is not a hefsek.  Unlike in the cases above where the bracha was invalid, or in the case of shehechiyanu where it is a completely inappropriate addition, in this case the addition is appropriate, just not obligatory.  

A far greater problem is the question of whether a woman answering amein to shehechiyanu in kiddush when she already said the bracha at the time of hadlakas neiros is a hefsek or not.   

back where we started from -- or (hopefully) not; interesting chiddush of the Ben Ish Chai re: isru chag

1) Chazal tell us that not only did Yam Suf split to allow Bn"Y to cross, but all the waters in the world split as well.  Some explain that water symbolizes all of our troubles.  הושיעני אלקים כי באו מים עד נפש (Teh 69).  Shevi'i shel Pesach is not just about getting across the particular obstacle of Yam Suf, but is about being able to get across all of the obstacles and difficulties in our path.

Some have the custom to stay up all night learning.  I want to suggest that water also symbolizes, as it does many other places, אין מים אלא תורה.  You are stuck on a difficult Tos?  You are breaking your head on a R' Akiva Eiger?  Shevi'i shel Pesach is for you.  You can break through the difficulty and get to the other side.

2) According to Tos (Archin 15) Bn"Y did not cross the Yam Suf from one side to the other, but made rather traverssed the sea in a U shape path to end up back on the same side that they started out on.  Even though Bn"Y ended up back where they started from, they had undergone a sea change (pun intended) in the course of their journey.  The Egyptians who had persecuted them were finally destroyed completely, never to haunt them again.  My wife suggested that this is the lesson of shevi'i shel Pesach.  We may find ourselves at the end of the chag back where we started from -- the same home, the same job, the same challenges and pressures -- but hopefully we have undergone change over the past week and are not the same people coming out of the chag that we were going in.

3) R' Shternbruch in his teshuvos (vol 2 #321) quotes an interesting chiddush of the Ben Ish Chai that on isru chag one should wear bigdei shabbos and only do melacha necessary for davar ha'aveid, like chol ha'moed.  I don't know if anyone accepts this shita l'halacha (I asked a Sefardi Rav yesterday about it and he was unfamiliar with this view), but even if it not lmaaseh, we can still take the message with us of clinging to the orot of the chag as it departs from us and not being too quick to rush back into the turmoil of the mundane world.

התיצ⁠בו וראו את⁠ י⁠שועת ה׳ - a challenge, not a promise

  וַיּ֨⁠וֹשַׁע ה׳ בַּיּ֥⁠וֹם הַה֛וּא אֶת⁠־יִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל מִיַּ֣⁠ד מִצְרָ֑יִם  Why do we need the words בַּיּ֥⁠וֹם הַה֛וּא in that pasuk?  They obviously do not come l'afukei other days or times, as Hashem has saved us on many occassions and continues to do so.  Ohr haChaim answers that until this point Bn"Y were not secure in their salvation.  There had been a yetzi'as Mitzrayim, but they recognized that they were not out of the woods yet.  It was only בַּיּ֥⁠וֹם הַה֛וּא at the splitting of the sea that they could breathe a sigh of relief.  R' Levi Yitzchak mi'Berdichiv offers a different explanation.  There are certain points in time where Hashem reveals his love for the Jewish people and showers them with his goodness.  The days most mesugal for this are the days of Pesach.  וַיּ֨⁠וֹשַׁע ה׳ happened davka because it was בַּיּ֥⁠וֹם הַה֛וּא, *the* auspicious time for yeshu'a.  These last two days of Pesach are that special time, a mesugal time, so make the most of them.

We find the term בּנים used over and over in connection with the splitting of Yam Suf, e.g. מעביר בּניו בּין גזרי ים סוף, and וראו בּניו גבורתו שׁבּחו והודו לשׁמו.  Bn"Y could have just escaped Egypt and there did not have to be a splitting of Yam Suf and final destruction of Egypt.  That was just icing on the cake, an extra bonus.  Did we really even deserve it?  When a parent deals with his children, that is not a question that comes up.  We give our children plenty, and it's not because we think they are the greatest and deserve it -- often they don't.  It's because they are our children, full stop.  We want to give, whether they deserve it or not.  Yam Suf happened because we are Hashem's children.  Saving slaves from persecution is the morally correct thing to do.  That's doesn't prove G-d has a special relationship with the Jewish people.  Yam Suf is the icing on the cake, the bonus, the part that was not required.  It's because we are בּנים (see Sefas Emes 5638).

Do you know what the biggest miracle that occurred at Yam Suf was?  Was it really the splitting of the Yam Suf?  The Yam split other times.  The Yam even split for individuals, as the gemara in Chulin relates regarding R' Pinchas ben Yair.  There was something else that happened that was an amazing miracle that people don't even think about.  You go into any shul, sit somewhere in the back, in the talking section, and you will have 2 Jews and 3 opinions about everything.  Everyone is qualified to be Prime Minister of Israel, chief of the Army, head of the Federal Reserve, Rabbi and President of the shul, etc.  So much latent talent is in those back rows just waiting to be discovered!  And no one is bashful about giving their opinion and revealing their talents -- you don't even have to ask.  The same thing went on at Yam Suf.  Some people insisted they should return to Egypt, the frummies started davening, others wanted to fight.  Moshe's response demanded something entirely different from them: הִֽתְיַצְּ⁠ב֗וּ וּרְאוּ֙ אֶת⁠־יְ⁠שׁוּעַ֣ת ה׳.  That's what you have to do.   ה׳ יִלָּ⁠חֵ֣ם לָכֶ֑ם וְ⁠אַתֶּ֖⁠ם תַּחֲרִשֽׁוּן.  Stop with the advice.  Stop with the speeches.  Stop with the 2 Jews and 3 opinions.  Now is not the time for that -- it's a time to be quiet.  You have a bunch of opinionated Jews gathered together and you want them to be quiet?  Now that's a miracle!

Kidding aside, the Sefas Emes (5632) explains that הִֽתְיַצְּ⁠ב֗וּ וּרְאוּ֙ אֶת⁠־יְ⁠שׁוּעַ֣ת ה׳ is not just a promise -- it's an avodah.  We all like to be back seat drivers and we all have good advice not just for our fellow coreligionists, but for Hashem as well.  We would like Him to being an end to the hostage situation in a certain way, to bring geulah in the certain way (some people will tell you it must be through the State, other [misguided] people will say the State is an obstacle), to give us specific brachos and yeshu'os.  We have our agenda.  The Torah is telling us to put the agenda aside --  וְ⁠אַתֶּ֖⁠ם תַּחֲרִשֽׁוּן.  Our job sometimes is to talk about what we want, but to ask just for kavod shamayim in this world, to want to just see הִֽתְיַצְּ⁠ב֗וּ וּרְאוּ֙ אֶת⁠־יְ⁠שׁוּעַ֣ת ה׳ in whatever form it takes, however He decided to bring it about.  

We read in the shirah that the nation of the world tremebled in their boots after what happened at Yam Suf.  שָֽׁמְ⁠ע֥וּ עַמִּ֖⁠ים יִרְגָּז֑וּן⁠ ⁠חִ֣יל אָחַ֔ז יֹשְׁ⁠בֵ֖י פְּ⁠לָֽשֶׁת and אָ֤ז נִבְהֲלוּ֙ אַלּ⁠וּפֵ֣י אֱד֔וֹם⁠ ⁠אֵילֵ֣י מוֹאָ֔ב יֹֽאחֲזֵ֖מוֹ רָ֑עַד⁠ ⁠נָמֹ֕גוּ כֹּ֖ל יֹשְׁ⁠בֵ֥י כְ⁠נָֽעַן.  We would love for a miracle like this in our times.  We would love for Iran to be trembling, for the terrorists to be trembling.  But how did Bn"Y know what the nations in Canaan were thinking?  How did they know they had heard about the miracle and were afraid?  

The fight we are in is not just a geopolitical fight or a military fight.  The world opposes our ideology, our principles, our philosophy.  When you sit down to daven and can't focus, that's the outside world winning the battle against us.  When you feel Hashem close and your avodah soars, your Jewish pride soars, that's another victory.  Bn"Y didn't need to read the Canaan Times to find out what was going on with the nations.  They knew because they felt it within them.  They felt themselves on a high, and therefore knew that if that's the case, the enemy has no power over them.   Iran would be trembling, as would every single nation in the UN, if we understood fully what it means to be בּניו שׁל מקום and acted as such, if we put our bickering aside and in its place  וְ⁠אַתֶּ֖⁠ם תַּחֲרִשֽׁוּן, and if we stopped the backseat driving and focussed on the one task of הִֽתְיַצְּ⁠ב֗וּ וּרְאוּ֙ אֶת⁠־יְ⁠שׁוּעַ֣ת ה׳.  

If we want to see it, and pray to see it, we will see it.