mah inyan shemita eitzel shiluach ha'kan (and sefira)?

One of my daughters sent me a picture of a table she left out on her mirpeset upon which a bird had built a nest and laid an egg.  

She wanted to know whether there was a mitzvah of shiluach ha'kan.  Earlier in the week I was thinking that this week's parsha would be a good opportunity to discuss a shemita sugya, but I ended up getting swept into shiluach ha'kan, which I discovered actually has a link to shemita and sefiras ha'omer, as you shall see.

First, some basics:

 

1) The mitzvah only applies to the female bird of a kosher species.  Does that apply here?  My daughter later sent a picture of the bird roosting.  

My guess was that it was a mourning dove, but she said ChatGPT told her it was a laughing dove.  My original thought was that the difference between my guess and ChatGPT was a matter of personality.  I'm not an upbeat guy, so I guessed mourning dove; ChatGPT  is more positive, so it said laughing dove.  The truth is that in North America, the doves we see are mourning doves.  The doves native to Eretz Yisrael are laughing doves.  Score 1 for ChatGPT. 

 

2) My daughter has no desire for the eggs.  Is there still a mitzvah to send away the mother?  This is a big machlokes between Chavos Yair and Chasam Sofer.  Chasam Sofer says the mitzvah only applies if you want to get the eggs.  If not, why bother the bird?  CY says you can do the mitzvah anyway.  R' Yaakov Ariel makes two interesting points regarding this machlokes.  He suggests that there may be a parallel between these views and the different opinions in Rishonim with regard to the reason for the mitzvah.  If the reason is to avoid causing the mother bird pain by taking its young in its presence, as the Rambam suggests in Moreh (3:48), then the view of the Chasam Sofer that there is no reason to disturb the bird if you don't want eggs makes more sense.  Why cause the bird any discomfort if you don't have to?  However, Ramban rejects the idea that the mitzvah is motivated by rachmanus on animals.  The kabbalists and midrashim see great segulos as inherent in the mitzvah.  There is a suggested parallel between the cry of the mother bird for mercy on her children and crying by the Shechina on our behalf, our being Hashem's children.  CY may be in line with this approach and therefore sees inherent value in the act irrespective of the need for the eggs.

 

(This view of the Rambam has to be squared away with the din that one is not allowed in davening to cry out to Hashem "whose mercy extends even to kan tzipor."  R' Soloveitchik suggested that this is a din specific to tefilah.  That is not the appropriate context to give voice to our attempted justification and understanding of Hashem's mitzvos.)

 

Secondly, he suggests a conceptual difference between the two views.  According to CS, what concerns us is the end results, the toza'ah of the mitzvah -- retrieving the eggs without bothering the bird.  According to CY who holds the mitzvah applies even if you don't want the eggs, it is the act itself, the maaseh mitzvah, which is important.

 

When all that concerns us is the totza'ah, then kavanah for the action being done is not a factor.  For example, it doesn't matter if you have kavanah l'shem mitzvah when you give tzedakah.  You get credit anyway, no matter your intention, because what we are after is helping people.  When you put on tefillin, however, you have to have kavanah.  The act of donning the tefillin is what is crucial.

 

Rav Ariel suggests a proof to the CS's position: The gemara (Kid 39b) tells the story of a man who was sent by his father to gather eggs and fell off a ladder in the process of sending away the mother bird and retreiving them.  A witness to the event could not understand how could this happen.  This individual was engaged in doing two mitzvos -- kibud av and shiluach ha'kan -- where the Torah explicitly promises a blessing of long life!  The witness ended up going off the derech.  The gemara itself is bothered why the mitzvah did not protect the person from harm, and suggests that the person might have been harboring thoughts of idolatry. 

 

Why did the gemara need to come up with this extreme case as a solution to its question?  According to CY, so long as the one doing the mitzvah did not have kavanah for the mitzvah of shiluach ha'kan -- and he probably didn't, because his concern was getting the eggs for his father -- that should be enough to negate the credit for the mitzvah.  From the fact that the gemara did not offer this simple solution, it points in favor of CS's position.

 

3) Last point, which is one a lot of people overlook: the mitzvah of shiluach ha'kan only applies to a bird in the wild, not a domesticated bird or a bird that you own.  This makes finding a scenario where this mitzvah applies is exceedingly rare.  A person's chatzeir is koneh on behalf of the owner anything that falls within it.  Meaning, anything in my daughter's mirpeset is hers.  Anything on your windowsill is yours.  Anything in your backyard, in your garage rafters, etc. all belongs to you.  B'pashtus, this would include a bird living there as well.  A bird found in your yard is your bird and is no longer considered a bird in the wild.  Based on this, Achronim have a whole debate about whether the mitzvah can be done on a nest found on your property.  Even though she probably never thought about it before discovering this nest, my daughter has absolutely no desire to own that bird.  Does kinyan chatzeir work against her presumptive will (R' Moshe holds not)?  Would being mafkir the nest after it was found help?  These and other factors need to be investigated.

 

So much for the basics.  What does any of this have to do with shemita (our parsha) or sefirah?

 

Rishonim write that the mitzvah of shiluach applies in all places and at all times. However, there is a Rashash (the kabbalist, not the one in the back of the gemara) who writes that it should not be done during sefirah, and it should not be done in shemita years post-churban ha'bayis.

 

Even if you reject this Rashash is light of the statement in Rishonim to the contrary, the question that still begs asking is what he was thinking.  Is there any explanation for his view that we can make sense of?

 

Rav Yehoshua Van Dyke (RY of Itamar) brings us back to taamei ha'mitzvah, in particular the notion of this mitzvah eliciting rachmei Shamayim.  He compares it to saying tachanun.  We don't say tachanun on days like Shabbos and Y"T.  Ramban in Emor writes that the entirety of sefirah is like a chol ha'moed between Pesach and Shavous.  Shemita is like Shabbos on a national level, following a yearly instead of a weekly cycle.  Because of the significance and holiness of these days, it is not a time to cry out for rachamim and tachanunim via the instrument of shiluach ha'kan.

 

While some poskim reject the Rashash outright, R' Van Dyke suggests that perhaps it can be used as an additional snif l'hakeil where there is a doubt as to whether one is obligated to do the mitzvah or not, e.g. if one does not want the eggs.

 

I was surprised this bird had no fear of making a nest where it did.  My daughter said she is more afraid of the bird than it is of her, so she did not want to approach it.  According to the CS, she certainly is exempt from shiluach, as she does not want the eggs.  Aside from that, there is the question of whether there is any obligation of shiluach here given that by virtue of kinyan chatzeir the bird is no longer considered a wild bird.  Lastly, there is the additional snif l'hakeil of the Rashash, for whatever it's worth, since we are in the middle of sefirah,  All that adds up to the conclusion: find a practicing Rav to ask what to do : )

 

For the record, my daugher now reports two eggs in the nest.  The bird is making a habit of this and my daughter is not happy about it.

sechora with peiros sheviis

Yesh lachkor whether the issur of sechora with peiros sheviis stems from the fact that if one uses the peiros for barter one cannot fulfill the mitzvah of achilas peiros, or whether sechora is an independent issur? 

Ramban counts the mitzvah of achilas peiros sheviis as a mitzvas aseh, and cites the derasha of l'achla v'lo l'sechora as his source, implying that the problem with sechora is that it negates the possibility of fulfilling the mitzvah of achila.  Rambam never counts eating peiros as its own mitzvah, so sechora must be an indepdent issur.

 

The Steipler suggests that this question may underpin a sasfeik in the gemara.  (Bechoros 12b) discusses whether one can use an animal purchased with peiros sheviis to be podeh a peter chamor. 

 

לפדות בבהמת שביעית ודאי לא תיבעי לך לאכילה אמר רחמנא ולא לסחורה כי תיבעי לך ספק

 

Rashi explains:

 

ודאי לא תיבעי לך. פטר חמור ודאי לא תיבעי לך דכיון דבעי למיתב פדיונו לכהן לא פריק ליה דלאכלה אמר רחמנא ולא לסחורה ונמצא זה קונה חמור בפירות שביעית שאינו ראוי לאכילה: ספק. כגון שילדה אמו זכר ונקבה דאמר במתני' מפריש טלה והוא לעצמו:

 

In a case of safeik peter chamor you have to be mafrish a lamb to remove the issur hanaah from the chamor, but you don't have to give it to the kohen because ha'motzi mei'chaveiro alav ha'raaya.  The pediya = sechora, but the lamb can still be still eaten by the owner.

If sechora is a problem because it negates the mitzvah of achila, in this case there should be no issue because the owner can eat it.  But if sechora is an issur in its own right, then this case should pose a problem.

Rambam/Raavad on allegorical readings of pesukim

Rambam opens the last chapter of Mishne Torah telling us that in the days of mashiach the lion will not literally lie down with the lamb; it's just a mashal that means Israel will be at peace with its neighbors:

 אל יעלה על הלב שבימות המשיח יבטל דבר ממנהגו של עולם. או יהיה שם חידוש במעשה בראשית. אלא עולם כמנהגו נוהג. וזה שנאמר בישעיה וגר זאב עם כבש ונמר עם גדי ירבץ משל וחידה. ענין הדבר שיהיו ישראל יושבין לבטח עם רשעי עכו"ם המשולים כזאב ונמר. שנאמר זאב ערבות ישדדם ונמר שוקד על עריהם. ויחזרו כולם לדת האמת. ולא יגזלו ולא ישחיתו. אלא יאכלו דבר המותר בנחת עם ישראל. שנאמר ואריה כבקר יאכל תבן. וכן כל כיוצא באלו הדברים בענין המשיח הם משלים. ובימות המלך המשיח יודע לכל לאי זה דבר היה משל. ומה ענין רמזו בהן:

 

Raavad argues by cryptically simply quoting a pasuk from our parsha:

 

כתב הראב"ד ז"ל והלא כתוב בתורה והשבתי חיה רעה מן הארץ

 

What is his objection?  Just like the pasuk in Yeshayahu is a mashal, this pasuk is a mashal as well!  As Radbaz writes

 

ואין זו השגה, כמו ששאר הכתובים משל גם זה משל על אומה רעה כמו שדרשו על חיה רעה אכלתהו

 

The Margoliyos haYam (Sanhedrin 72) puts this Rambam together with another machlokes Rambam/Raavad l'shitasam.  The pasuk tells us with respect to ba ba'machteres אם־זרחה השמש עליו דמים לו שלם ישלם אם־אין לו ונמכר בגנבתו (Shmos 22).  The gemara in Sanhedrin darshens as follows:

 

ת"ר אין לו דמים אם זרחה השמש עליו וכי השמש עליו בלבד זרחה אלא אם ברור לך הדבר כשמש שאין לו שלום עמך הרגהו ואם לאו אל תהרגהו תניא אידך אם זרחה השמש עליו דמים לו וכי השמש עליו בלבד זרחה אלא אם ברור לך כשמש שיש לו שלום עמך אל תהרגהו ואם לאו הרגהו

 

The gemara interprets the term  אם זרחה השמש עליו to mean that it has to be clear as day that the ganav will allow nothing to stand in his way. The Rambam paskens (Geneiva 9:10)

 

היה הדבר ברור לבעל הבית שזה הגנב הבא עליו אינו הורגו ואינו בא אלא על עסקי ממון אסור להרגו ואם הרגו הרי זה הורג נפש שנאמר אם זרחה השמש עליו אם ברור לך הדבר כשמש שיש לו שלום עמך אל תהרגהו. לפיכך אב הבא במחתרת על בנו אינו נהרג שודאי שאינו הורגו. אבל הבן הבא על אביו נהרג:

 

Raavad disagrees and writes that a ba ba'machteres can never be killed if he comes during the day. אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו.  Irrespective of the derasha of Chazal, if the words of the pasuk tell us that אם זרחה השמש עליו, that when the sun is shining you can't kill the ganav, then we have to respect the literal meaning of the text.

 

Now we understand, says the Margoliyos haYam, what the Raavad's objection is in that last chapter about mashiach.  The Raavad l'shitaso holds that you can allegorize and take pesukim of navi as a mashal, but when it comes to words written in the chumash, you cannot ignore the literal meaning of the text. The punchline of Raavad's hasaga is **והלא כתוב **בתורה, and since we are dealing with a pasuk in chumash, it's a whole different ball game.  If the Torah tells us that the lion will change its ways, then it means animals won't behave the same.  Torah is on a different level than neviim and kesuvim, and אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו.

 

There is a danger of getting involved in issues that relate to ikkarei emunah, so with that caveat and the hope that I am not making an error, I was thinking that this machlokes l'shitasam is reflected as well in the famous machlokes Rambam and Raavad in ch 3 of hil teshuvah.  Rambam writes that someone who thinks והאומר שיש שם רבון אחד אבל שהוא גוף ובעל תמונה is an apikores.  Raavad comments:

 

א"א ולמה קרא לזה מין וכמה גדולים וטובים ממנו הלכו בזו המחשבה לפי מה שראו במקראות ויותר ממה שראו בדברי האגדות המשבשות את הדעות:

 

The usual hesber people give to the machlokes is that the Raavad of course accepted the incorporeality of G-d as a given.  What Raavad is objecting to is the labelling of everyone who thinks otherwise as an apikores.  In Raavad's view someone led astray by their literal reading of the text is an inadvertent apikores, a shogeg, and his heresy should not be held against him.  Rambam disagrees, as "nebach an apikores" is still an apikores (the aphorism quoted in the name of R' Chaim Brisker).  There are no excuses, there is no shogeg, when it comes to errors of belief.

 

Perhaps the Raavad is more tolerant of those led astray לפי מה שראו במקראות because the Raavad l'shitaso holds אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו and the literal reading of the text carries weight despite the derashos of Chazal.  I'm not suggesting Raavad would go so far as to accept the notion of G-d having form, but what I am suggesting is that he at least sees the possibility of a rational, understandable error given the need to preserve the literal reading of the text.  Rambam, on the other hand, holds that even when it comes to the text of the Torah, the derashos of Chazal and/or the principles of ikkarei emunah completely override the literal meaning of the text, so much so that if someone is a literalist and assigns G-d a form, the error is inexcusable. 

shemita, ona'ah. and lag ba'omer

Our parsha opens with the sugya of shemita and yovel, and then proceeds to tell us the halachos of ona'as mamon and ona'as devarim.  The parsha then returns to the sugya of shemita/yovel, and responds to the farmer's worry (25:20-21):

וְכִי תֹאמְרוּ מַה⁠ נֹּאכַל בַּשָּׁנָה הַשְּׁבִיעִת הֵן לֹא נִזְרָע וְלֹא נֶאֱסֹף אֶת⁠ תְּבוּאָתֵנוּ

 וְצִוִּיתִי אֶת⁠ בִּרְכָתִי לָכֶם בַּשָּׁנָה הַשִּׁשִּׁית וְעָשָׂת אֶת⁠ הַתְּבוּאָה לִשְׁלֹשׁ הַשָּׁנִים

Why does the Torah wait until after the parsha of ona'ah to respond to the farmer's concern about going hungry during shemita and yovel?  Shouldn't these pesukim appear earlier?

My wife's grandfather, R' Dov Yehudah Shochet, answers (see my wife's post here)  that the very same worry of  מַה נֹּאכַל that the farmer feels free to openly express (וְכִי תֹאמְרוּ...) during the shemita year also lives in the back of the mind of the person who violates the issurim of ona'ah.  It's the fear of not being able to make a go of it unless you chisel more out of the other guy, or put down the other guy so that you are not left with less.  If you trust that Hashem will always give you your fair share, then overcharging the next guy accomplishes nothing. Therefore, the Torah waits and puts the response of וְצִוִּיתִי אֶת בִּרְכָתִי לָכֶם after the parsha of ona'ah, as the message of bitachon, the message that Hashem will ensure you get what you deserve, undercuts not just the worry of shemita observance, but undercuts the temptation for ona'ah as well.

This same theme is at the root of our celebration of Lag baOmer.  The Yerushalmi (Sheviis 9:1) records that when Rashb"i came out of the cave, he saw a hunter trying to trap birds.  He heard a voice in shamayim declare that the bird should go free, and off flew the bird.  He heard a bas kol declare that a bird should be caught, and so it was:

רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹחַי עֲבַד טְמִיר בִּמְעַרְתָּא תְּלַת עָשָׂר שְׁנִין בִּמְעָרַת חָרוּבִין. (דתרומה)  עַד שֶׁהֶעֱלָה גוּפוֹ חֲלוּדָה לְסוֹף תְּלַת עָשָׂר שְׁנִין. אֲמַר לֵינָה נְפַק חָמִי מַה קָלָא עָֽלְמָא נְפַק וְיָתִיב לֵיהּ עַל פּוּמָא דִמְעַרְתָּא חָמָא חַד צַייָד צְייַד צִיפּוֹרִין פְּרַס מְצוּדָתֵיהּ שְׁמַע בְּרַת קָלָא אָֽמְרָה דִימִוס וְאִישְׁתֵּיזְבַת. אֲמַר צִיפּוֹר מִבַּלְעֲדֵי שְׁמַיָּא לָא יִבְדָּא. וְכָל־שֶׁכֵּן בַּר נַשָּׁא

Rashb"i concluded that if the fate of birds is determined by hasgacha pratis, kal v'chomer the fate of man.  

It's not our own efforts and actions that determine our success or failure.  Working an extra day, an extra year more than everyone else, charging more than everyone else, will get you nowhere.

Chasam Sofer in his derashos cites a Midrash that says that the matzah from Egypt lasted until 15 Iyar, and then Bn"Y went three days with nothing. They complained (Shmos 16:3):

וַיֹּאמְרוּ אֲלֵהֶם בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל מִי יִתֵּן מוּתֵנוּ בְיַד ה׳ בְּאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם בְּשִׁבְתֵּנוּ עַל סִיר הַבָּשָׂר בְּאׇכְלֵנוּ לֶחֶם לָשֹׂבַע כִּי הוֹצֵאתֶם אֹתָנוּ אֶל הַמִּדְבָּר הַזֶּה לְהָמִית אֶת כׇּל הַקָּהָל הַזֶּה בָּרָעָב

This is the desert version of the farmer's complaint of מַה נֹּאכַל בַּשָּׁנָה הַשְּׁבִיעִת.  On 18 Iyar = Lag Ba'Omer Hashem responded by giving the people mon.  In other words, on 18 Iyar Hashem fulfilled וְצִוִּיתִי אֶת בִּרְכָתִי לָכֶם -- sans hishtadlus, sans any effort, food literally fell from the sky.  

Rashb"i, the baal hilula,opined (Brachos 35b)

 ר"ש בן יוחי אומר אפשר אדם חורש בשעת חרישה וזורע בשעת זריעה וקוצר בשעת קצירה ודש בשעת דישה וזורה בשעת הרוח תורה מה תהא עליה אלא בזמן שישראל עושין רצונו של מקום מלאכתן נעשית ע"י אחרים שנא' ועמדו זרים ורעו צאנכם וגו'

What the famer lived for one year, what we live one day out of seven, Rashbi lived year round (perhaps this is why the Zohar refers to tzadikin as "shabbos.")

Coming back to the opening of our parsha:

 דַּבֵּר אֶל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאָמַרְתָּ אֲלֵהֶם כִּי תָבֹאוּ אֶל הָאָרֶץ **אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי נֹתֵן לָכֶם** וְשָׁבְתָה הָאָרֶץ שַׁבָּת לַה׳.

Do we need a reminder that Eretz Yisrael was promised to us by Hashem -- הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי נֹתֵן לָכֶם -- a fact we know from many earlier places in the Torah?  (See Oznayim laTorah)?  

In light of the above, perhaps we can say that these pesukim perhaps set the stage for us for the rest of the parsha.  It's the recognition that Hashem is in chage that makes the observance of shemita, yovel, avoiding ona'ah, all possible.  If you think you are the baal ha'bayis, that your actions alone that determine success or failure, then you are walking into the parsha with the wrong attitude from the get-go.

not dependent on anyone

 וְכִ֣י תֹאמְר֔וּ מַה־נֹּאכַ֖ל בַּשָּׁנָ֣ה הַשְּׁבִיעִ֑ת הֵ֚ן לֹ֣א נִזְרָ֔ע וְלֹ֥א נֶאֱסֹ֖ף אֶת־תְּבוּאָתֵֽנוּ

 וְצִוִּ֤יתִי אֶת־בִּרְכָתִי֙ לָכֶ֔ם בַּשָּׁנָ֖ה הַשִּׁשִּׁ֑ית וְעָשָׂת֙ אֶת־הַתְּבוּאָ֔ה לִשְׁלֹ֖שׁ הַשָּׁנִֽים

Apparently the concern for having enough food during shemita is not something trivial, as Hashem responds with a promise that miraculously there will be a bumper crop the previous year.  But why should people worry?    Couldn't they just import produce from neighboring countries?  

Most if not all countries are rich in some resources but lack others.  They are dependent to some degree or other on trade with their allies and neighbors to make up the difference.  You scratch my back, I'll scratch yours.

Rav Charlap writes that Eretz Yisrael is different.  The only dependency Eretz Yisrael has is on Hashem.  Even at the cost of making miracles, Hashem does not allow for a situation where Eretz Yisrael would have to rely on its neighbors.

(26:5)  וְהִשִּׂ֨יג לָכֶ֥ם דַּ֙יִשׁ֙ אֶת־בָּצִ֔יר וּבָצִ֖יר יַשִּׂ֣יג אֶת־זָ֑רַע וַאֲכַלְתֶּ֤ם לַחְמְכֶם֙ לָשֹׂ֔בַע וִֽישַׁבְתֶּ֥ם לָבֶ֖טַח בְּאַרְצְכֶֽם Abarbanel, Netziv, and others interpret the end of the pasuk not as a bracha for protection against enemies attacking, but rather as a continuation of the beginning bracha for prosperity.  As a result of having all that you need in Eretz Yisrael proper, you won't have to travel elsewhere to seek out resources that are lacking.  As Ksav v'haKabbala puts it:

אינו יעוד השלום שלא ילחמו בהם אויביהם, רק הבטחה, שמפני רוב השובע שתהיה בארצם לא יצטרכו ללכת נע ונד בארץ אחרת לבקש מאכל כמו שכתוב נודד הוא ללחם איה

Hopefully we will be zocheh to see this bracha fulfilled in our lifetimes.

counting sefirah, counting years to yovel

1) Tzror haMor writes that there is a connection between the opening of week's parsha and the conclusion of last week's.  The end of last week's parsha told us about the person who was mevarech Hashem and who disrespected Moshe's authority.  Just like you must have kvod Shamayim and respect kvod talmidei chachamim, so too, writes Tzror haMor, our parsha teaches us that the land of Eretz Yisrael is holy and requires the same respect and kavod.  

2) Rabeinu Yerucham compares the counting of sefiras ha'omer to the counting of shemitah cycles and years leading up to yovel.  Just like after 49 years we are mekadesh the yovel year, so too, after 49 days we are mekadesh the 50th day as the holiday of Shavuos.

R' Berel Povarski suggests that the analogy is not just derush b'alma.  

The Rambam opens hil shemita with the din

מצות עשה לשבות מעבודת הארץ ועבודת האילן בשנה שביעית

And in perek 10 he writes with respect to yovel

מצות עשה ***לספור שבע שבע שנים ו*** לקדש שנת החמשים

Note that with respect to shemita, the Rambam does not mention the need to count six years in order to get to year 7, but he mentions the need to count seven shemitot to get to a yovel.  Tos (Menachos 65b d"h u'sefartim) writes that there may even be a chiyuv on B"D to recite a bracha and count each year (R' Akiva Eiger mh"k 29,30 is medayek otherwise from the Ran at the end of Pesachim).  

The seventh year of shemita happens even if no one counts the previous six.  Yovel, however, only comes if there is a count of 49 years beforehand to lead to it.

Meshech Chochma on our parsha draws a comparison between shemita and Shabbos and yovel and Yom Tov.  The kedusha of Shabbos is "kevi'a v'kayma;" it does not need a mekadesh.  The kedusha of Yom Tov depends on beis din sanctifying that period of time and designating it as the chag.  Yovel needs a count in order for it to happen; it does not take effect on its own.

The Rambam (Shemtia 10:5) quotes a mesorah from the Geonim that between bayis rishon and bayis sheni only shemitah and not yovel was observed, and the same, of course, was true post-churban.  If yovel was suspended because celebrating yovel is only done when "kol yoisheveha aleha," the majority of Jews live in Eretz Yisrael, then it should not have been observed for many years earlier than the bayis rishon/sheni interregnum?

R' Chaim (al haRambam) explains that there is a difference between observance of yovel and the count of yovel.  Even if in practice none the halachos of yovel can be fulfilled, so long as beis din is functioning and can count years, year 50 will be yovel and the next 49 year cycle will start the year afterward.  Only when there is no beis din to count, which happened during the interregnum period, year 50 is skipped and one 49 year cycle will follow immediately the prior one.

Coming back to Rabeinu Yerucham, now that we understand the the count of years to yovel is necessary for yovel to happen, it's parallel, sefiras ha'omer, takes on additional significance as not just marking time, but as a necessary preparation period without which Shavuos would not have the same meaning.  

kedushas peiros sheviis

There is a din by sheviis that if a person sells peiros sheviis, the kedusha transfers to the money and the money has to be used to buy food and eat that food with kedushas sheviis. Pnei Yehoshua has an interesting chakira that I have to preface with a story.  A long time ago when my kids were little we went to the Brooklyn Children's Museum (a wonderful place) either on chol hamoed Sukkos or around that time.  The BCM is located right near Crown Heights, home of Chabad, and that afternoon the museum had a little talk given by a chossid who came to tell the kids about esrogim.  So this Lubavitcher chossid stands up in front of an auditorium filled with kids of all colors and races, takes out an esrog, and asks who can guess how much it costs.  One young non-Jewish boy started off the guessing at something like 79 cents.  Was he in for a surprise!  But the truth is that if it wasn't sukkos, you wouldn't spend more than 79 cents for an esrog, if that much.  The Pnei Yehoshua asks: if you spend $100 on an esrog which is peiros sheviis, does $100 have kedushas sheviis, or does only $.79 have kedushas sheviis, because that is the value of the fruit if not for the mitzvah-value inflating the price?

The gemara (Sukkah 39) writes that during shemita year one cannot buy an esrog because the $ given to the am ha'artz farmer would have kedushas sheviis and one cannot give more than the value of 3 meals of kedushas sheviis $ to an am ha'aretz (see Rashi and Tos as to why).  Tos on the spot quotes other gemaras that indicate that an esrog is not worth so much $, certainly not more than the value of 3 meals, so what is the gemara talking about?  Answers Tos that those other gemaras are the $.79 esrogim you buy all year, but on sukkos, everybody knows you pay a premium for the mitzvah:

התם באתרוג פסול דלא בעי ליה אלא לאכילה אבל הכא כשר והדר לברכה דמיו יקרים:

You see from Tos that the entire value of the esrog on sukkos gets the status of kedushas sheviis, not just the $.79

It could be what's driving the PnY's chakira is not simply whether you measure value based on a one time a year price or the normal price, but more fundamentally whether kedushas sheviis is transfer of the value of the fruit, or whether it is the inverse, if you will, of the mitzvas achilas peiros sheviis.  In other words, since you failed to eat the peiros sheviis, you "owe" that makeup value.  If the latter is true, then the value of an esrog is simply its value as an edible commodity, not its true market value.

mah inyan naaseh v'nishma to the farmer observing shemita?

Barchu Hashem malachav giborei koach osei devaro lishoma kol d'varo (Teh 103:20).  The angels are described as serving G-d through their actions simply for the privilige of hearing what Hashem says, for no other reward (Metzudas David, Ibn Ezra).   

Chazal focus on the fact that the angels put action before hearing/understanding, and apply the pasuk to Klal Yisrael's acceptance of the Torah by saying naaseh v'nishma:

 א״ר ישמעאל בשעה שהקדימו ישראל נעשה לנשמע יצאה בת קול ואמרה להם בני מי גלה לכם רז זה שמלאכי השרת משתמשים בו דכתיב ברכו ה׳ מלאכיו גבורי כח עושי דברו וגו׳, ברישא עושי והדר לשמוע.

Yet Chazal also darshen then same pasuk as referring to the farmers who are giborei koach and manage to keep shemita for a whole year:

רבי יצחק נפחא אמר אלו שומרי שביעית, בנוכהג שבעולם אדם עושה מצוה ליום אחד לשבת אחד לחדש אחד שמא (לשאר) [לכל] ימות השנה ודין חמי חקליה ביירא כרמיה ביירא ושתיק יש לך גבור חיל גדול מזה. נאמר כאן עושי דברו ונאמר להלן וזה דבר השמטה מה להלן שביעית אף כאן שביעית, ושנו רבותינו אי זהו גבור הכובש את יצרו, 

Mah inyan shemita eitzel har Sinai?  So which is it -- are talking about naaseh v'nishma or about farmers?  

Sefas Emes (5646) explains that the machlokes we discussed last week (Brachos 35) between R"Y and Rashb"Y --  R"Y holds a person has to plant when its time to plant, plow when its time to plow, harvest when its time to harvest, but Rashb"Y said if you do that, what becomes of talmud Torah? -- is only a question after the cheit of Adam haRishon.  Everyone agrees that the ideal situation, the kodem ha'cheit, the kodem "b'ze'as apech tocham lechem," is only Torah.  

When Klal Yisrael stood at Sinai, they were like malachim, like Adam before the cheit.  No misa, no need for food -- lo nitna Torah elah l'ochlei ha'mon, the food of malachim -- totally focused on the one goal of fulfilling ratzon Hashem.

That situation did not last, but there is a m'ein that survived.  Once a week we put down the shovel and the plow, we put away our iphone and computer, and we come back to that level of Torah only, like we were when we stood at Sinai like angels.  We become like the ochlei ha'mon, but in this case it's ochlei cholent.  

The farmer goes a step further.  He puts everything aside not just for a day, or a month, but for an entire year he lives without "b'ze'as apecha," like Adam before the cheit  "V'tzivisi es birchasi..." we all know the vort from R' Zusha, that it's only those who ask "mah nochal" who need the "tzivisi," but otherwise during shemita the farmers is sustained derech nes, ochel min ha'shamayim, just like the ochlei ha'mon.

Eilu v'eilu, the pasuk "osei devaro..." is talking about maamad Har Sinai and also about observing shemita because they are one and the same idea.  Shemita is a return (the "v'shavtem... el achuzaso" of yoveil is the same return to one's shoresh), albeit temporarily, to that ideal achieved at Sinai, of life as it was in Eden.

haftarah of Behar -- left hanging with a question

In the haftarah for P' Behar Yirmiyahu is told by Hashem to buy a plot of land from his relative and to deposit the deed, the shtar, in a jug for safekeeping.   Yirmiyahu then speaks to Hashem, and we have a few pesukim of introductory shevach before he gets to the point.  According to some minhagim, the haftarah ends right after the shevach concludes, at pasuk 32:22, and we in fact never actually get to hear the point Yirmiyahu was driving at.

The more prevalent minhag (at least from what I heard) is to continue for a few more pesukim.  In those added pesukim Yirmiyahu asks G-d a question: Bnei Yisrael are about to be exiled from their land by the Kasdim.  The enemy will lay waste to Eretz Yisrael and there will be mass destruction.  What's the point of storing away this deed to land?  There will be no one left in the land, there will be no one to claim the property.  Who is this record meant for?  If you look up this chapter in the navi, Hashem gives a rather lengthy response; however, the haftarah concludes at 32:26 with only one pasuk of that long answer: "Hinei ani Hashem Elokei kol basar, ha'mimeni yipalei kol davar?" 

The halacha says that ideally a haftarah should be at least 21 pesukim long (to correspond to 7 aliyos x a minimum of 3 pesukim each from the parsha), so there is a halachic logic to extending the haftarah to 32:26 so that it passes the 21 pasuk threshold.  However, from a literary perspective, we are left hanging.  Yirmiyahu has just raised a powerful question -- why not tell us G-d's answer?  Why leave us dangling and give us just one pasuk, just a taste of the message that is to come?

My guess is that "Ha'mimeni yipalei kol davar?" is all we need in a nutshell and all the rest is commentary.  If Hashem can do anything, then it should be no wonder if He can promise that the land which will desolate for years will ultimately be reclaimed.

mah nochal... v'tzivisi es birchasi

Al pi dereh ha’teva, land should be least fertile in the year just before shemitah, after it has been farmed for six straight years without rest. Yet, the Torah says that davka in that sixth year the land will produce a greater abundance than usual in order to provide enough food to last through the  shemitah year. This proves, says the Shem m’Shmuel, that the land of Eretz Yisrael does not follow the normal laws of nature. It’s all hashgachas Hashem.

According to many meforshim shemitah is a lesson in bitachon. It’s one thing to skip work for one day of Shabbos, like we all do – it’s quite another thing to take an entire year off. Ramban comments on the pasuk, “Ki tomar mah nochal ba’shanah hashevi’is…” that the pasuk is mesuras, the phrases are out of order. The meaning is not, “When you ask, ‘What shall we eat in the seventh year?’” as during the seventh year there is plenty of food left from the sixth year -- there is no mystery about what to eat. The meaning of the pasuk is, “When in the seventh year you ask, ‘What shall we eat [in the upcoming eighth year]?’”  Since you can’t plant in the seventh year, there will be no leftovers for year eight. The bracha, according to Ramban, is that the food from year six will last even until then.

R’ Shimon Sofer explains the pasuk k’peshuto, without reversing the order of the phrases. Even though the farmer’s storehouse is fully stocked for that seventh year, he still feels he can't eat anything because if he does, he will have nothing left for year eight.   "Mah nochal...?" right now, in year seven, even though the fridge is full, because if it's eaten now, what will be left for the future? 

That's how many of us go through life (es chata'ei ani mazkir).  We are so nervous about the future, so worried about what will be, that we can't enjoy the bracha of what we have in the present moment.  It's human nature to be concerned about the future, to fear uncertainty, but it has to be balanced with bitachon as well. 

There is a famous Noam Elimelech that asks why the bracha of "v'tzivisi es birchasi" for the sixth year to produce such a bountiful harvest is couched as a response to the question of "Mah nochal...?"  Why does the Torah not just tell us that Hashem will give a bracha in year six?  The N.E. answers that Hashem would give the bracha automatically, but by asking, "Mah nochal..?" and showing a lack of bitachon, the farmer jeopardizes it.  He doesn't really deserve the bracha anymore.  Nonetheless, Hashem overrides the normal outcome and in this case, "v'tzivisi es birchasi" despite the lack of merit.  

The N.E. demands a very high level of bitachon.  To not even worry, to not even b'chdrei ha'lev ask, "Mah nochal...?" is hard.  The Chasam Sofer has a more positive spin to the pesukim.  A normal person wants to earn his living and not live on handouts.  There is an idea of "nahama d'kisufa," an embarrassment in doing so.  "Mah nochal..." reflects that attitude -- if we don't work, what will we eat?  We don't want a handout.  Hashem could just as easily do a miracle and provide food during the shemitah year for the farmer without the land being worked at all.  But since we want to earn our own keep, Hashem does us a chessed and allows us to do so.  "V'tzivisi es birchasi" in year six, when the farmer does have the opportunity to farm the land, to work, so that he feels he has a hand in producing something, in earning the bread on his table. 

beheimas shevi'is -- chatzi shiur by an issur aseh

The gemara (Bechoros 12b) writes that if you trade in peiros shevi’s for a cow, the calf of this “beheimas shevi’s” would be exempt from dinim of bechora. Since the kedushas shevi’is of the fruits transfer to the cow, it’s bechor cannot be offered as a korban because peiros shevi’s are “l’achla,” only for eating, not for being burned. The Rambam offers his own reason for this din (maybe based on a different girsa – see the nosei keilim) and quotes the derasha that peiros shevi’is are only “l’achla” to the exclusion of “sechora,” business transactions.

Asks the gemara: by this same logic, why don’t we say that the mitzvah of challah should not apply during shemitah? Since there would be a chiyuv to burn challah if the dough became tamei, why not apply the same rule of “l’achlah” but not for burning? (How the Rambam would learn this question if the reason of beheimas shevi’is has to do with sechorah is difficult).

The gemara answers that there is a special gezeiras hakasuv of “l’doroseichem” by challah that tells us that it applies at all times.

The Maharit Algazi is not happy with this question of the gemara. His objection is built on three assumptions, the first two being relatively simply, the third being quite a chiddush:

1)There is no shiur m’doraysa as to how much dough you need to separate to fulfill the mitzvah of hafrashas challah. Just like separating one stalk of wheat is enough to fulfill the mitzvah of terumah m’doraysa, so too, you can seperate a drop of dough to fulfill the mitzvah of challah.

2) The prohibitions of burning or sechorah stem from an aseh of “lachlah.” Since the shiur achilah in the Torah is always a k’zayis, the shiur of these issurei aseh must also be a k’zayis.

3) The din of chatzi shiur only applies only to a lav and not a mitzvas aseh. Therefore, there is no issur of chatzi shiur on an issur aseh either.

Putting it all together, he asks: why is the gemara bothered by how to be mafrish challah during shemitah – just be mafrish less than a k’zayis, which is enough to fulfill the mitzvah d’oraysa of challah but less than the shiur of the issur aseh learned from “l’achlah?”

Is assumption #3 really true? We’ve discussed before whether there is any significance to chatzi shiur of a mitzvas aseh, but even if one holds there isn’t, maybe one can still argue that the din of chatzi shiur should still apply to an issur aseh since it effectively functions like a lav.

R' Tzadok haKohen on "Mah inyan shemitah eitzel Har Sinai?"

“VaYidaber Hashem el Moshe b’Har Sinai leimor…”  Rashi famously asks on the first pasuk in our parsha, “Mah inyan shemita eitzel Har Sinai?”  Why does the Torah need to mention that this mitzvah was given at Har Sinai?  All mitzvos were given at Sinai!  Rashi quotes the Toras Kohanim’s answer: we learn from here that even the details of all mitzvos were given at Sinai.  Why single out shemitah as the mitzvah to use to convey that lesson?   Rashi explains that the halachos of shemitah were never repeated in Devarim, where other halachos were taught and reviewed.  The only source we have for shemitah is Sinai.  Shemitah serves as the exception that proves the rule, namely, that all mitzvos, even those reviewed in Devarim, were explicated fully at Sinai.

Other meforshim offer other explanations along these same lines of shemitah being an exception that proves some rule regarding mitzvos in general.  Chasam Sofer sees shemitah singled out demonstrating the Divine authorship of all mitzvos, as the promise of a bumper crop in the sixth year before shemitah can only come from G-d.  Ksav Sofer writes that observance of shemitah is possible only if one has faith that G-d will provide food for the seventh year and only if Klal Yisrael bands together to help those farmers who have no means of making a living that year.  Shemitah is the paradigm of emunah and ahavas yisrael, qualities that are basic to a fulfillment of the rest of Torah.

The assumption of all these approaches is that shemitah is no different than any other mitzvah; there should be no reason to suspect it should not have been given at Sinai, and no need for the pasuk to mention that fact.  R’ Tzadok haKohen with his unique perspective forces us to rethink those assumptions .  It’s clear from Rashi that there are two “sugyos” in Chumash where Torah was given to Klal Yisrael: 1) Sinai; 2) Arvos Moav, as recounted in Sefer Devarim.  It’s not just 40 years of time that separate these events, but rather the two parshiyos address different generations with different goals and different needs.  The generation that stood at Sinai looked forward to a life of consuming mon, of studying Torah at the feet of Moshe Rabeinu, a life surrounded by miracles, of living in Eretz Yisrael with the final geulah realized.  We know that was not to be.  The generation that stood at Arvos Moav forty years later looked to Yehoshua for leadership, looked toward dealing with the challenge of the physical conquest of Eretz Yisrael, of toil in the fields and hard work to simply have food to eat and secure homes. 

Who does the mitzvah of shemitah speak to?  It addresses itself to the farmer who works the soil year after year and now must stop to recharge and remember that his parnasa is really b’ydei shamayim.  The generation that stood at Sinai and anticipated a life living on mon didn’t need this mitzvah; it’s the generation that stood at Arvos Moav and would become farmers who needed this mitzvah.  “Mah inyan shemitah eitzel Har Sinai?”  The mitzvah was given to the wrong generation! 

The lesson here, as R’ Tzadok sees it, is that even as Klal Yisrael was on the highest and most lofty levels, standing at Sinai, the Torah acknowledged human frailty and was addressing itself to the challenges of those farmers who would live 40 years later.  Even as a person grows and climbs to greater and greater heights, he must not lose sight of his own shortcomings, of the potential to fall and to fail.  Even while standing on Sinai, we need to have in mind mitzvos like shemitah.

recognizing our own limitations

The Torah writes that if a farmer will ask, “What will we eat if we can’t farm during shemita and yovel?” Hashem answers that he will command the fields to produce and abundant crop in advance.  Why does the Torah not say simply tell us Hashem promise – why does the Torah couch the bracha in the context of a question-and-answer shakla v’terya format?

I think the most popular answer is some variation on the one the Noam Elimelech writes in the name of his brother (posted about it here).  A true ba’al bitachon asks no questions.  He trusts that if Hashem says not to farm, he will survive in some way.  That’s exactly what will happen – someway, somehow, the food will last.  The teva cannot and will not contradict the belief of the ba’al bitachon.  What the Torah here is saying is that even if you do ask questions and therefore maybe you don’t deserve teva to be in harmony with your shmiras hamitzvos, you don’t deserve the food to last, still Hashem promises that so long as you are willing to do the mitzvah, he will force the food to be there by commanding his bracha to the fields.

I want to share with you the answer of the Maharasham (I saw this quoted by R’ Shmuel Ya’akov Rubenstein in his She’eiris Menachem, where he adds additional hesber that I am not going into, so here’s a link).  There is another place in the Torah where a promise appears in the context of a question and answer:  the Torah writes (Devarim 7:17) that if you should say when you enter Eretz Yisrael, “How can I conquer all these great nations?” don’t worry because Hashem promises that He will help get the job done.  Again, one can ask why the promise is couched in the context of shakla v’terya instead of being said straight out.  The Bina La’ittim answers (and I once quoted the same pshat from Sefas Emes) that the Torah is teaching that Hashem’s promise is conditional on our asking for it.  Meaning, we have to first recognize that we can’t do it ourselves; the job is too great and our ability is limited.  We have to say to Hashem that we need him.  If we do that, then Hashem promises to deliver the help we need.  If think we can do it ourselves, we fail to recognize our own limitations, then Hashem leaves it up to us, and of course, we can’t really succeed by ourselves.  The same is true of shemita.  The Torah prefaces the promise of Hashem's help with the farmer's question to teach us that Hashem will provide us with all the help we need to get through the years without farming – but we have to recognize that we need that help and ask for it. 

Netziv on the ethical cost of assimilation

Before getting to an interesting paradox the Netziv points out in the parsha that deals with a Jewish slave sold to a ger, let me start out by spelling out an assumption he makes: wealth and success comes from being careful in interpersonal relations, mitzvos bein adam l’chaveiro.  Chazal tell us (Shabbos 151b) that one who acts with mercy towards others will merit receiving mercy from Heaven.  Be nice to others, and G-d will be nice to you and keep you from becoming destitute.  We can debate whether that’s exactly what the gemara means (it sounds to me that the gemara doesn’t mean poverty is avoidable, but rather it means that if you show mercy toward the poor and treat them with dignity and respect, Hashem will see that even if you do become poor, you will still retain your dignity.)  We can debate whether other mitzvos, not just bein adam l’chaveito deeds, have the same effect.  But let’s put that aside for now, let’s grant the Netziv the point, and let’s see where he goes with it.

Rashi comments on “v’ki tasig yad ger v’toshav imach…” (25:47) that the reason this ger toshav has the wealth and ability to acquire slaves is because he is “imach,” – “dibuko imach” – he has decided to cast his lot in with you and connect with the Jewish people.   A ger toshav still eats cheeseburgers at McDonalds, but he is a humanitarian; he observes the mitzvos bnei noach, and, based on the yesod of the Netziv above, the ger toshav we are speaking about is very particular about observing mitzvos bein adam l’chaveiro.  He is the nice non-Jewish neighbor that gave a nice donation when they collected for the hurricane rebuilding effort, he knows to turn the light on for you on Shabbos if you forgot to set the timer, he acts like a mentch.  Since he acts with care towards others, Heaven cares for him and blesses him with riches.

Yet, in the very same pasuk the Torah describes the Jewish slave being purchased as “u’mach achicha imo.”  Rashi again comments on the word “imo” that the reason this individual has become destitute and forced to resort to becoming a slave is “dibuko imo,” because he has thrown his lot in life in with the goy.  Once again, based on the yesod of the Netziv, we are not just speaking of a person who may eat at McDonald’s (maybe he orders the fish) or who goes shopping on Shabbos like his goyish neighbors.  That alone would not do it – poverty is a result specifically of becoming lax in mitzvos bein adam l’chaveiro. We are speaking of a person who, as a result of assimilation, as a result of wanting to be like his goyish neighbor, ends up abandoning the traits of gemilus chassadim and rachmanus that characterize our people.  We are dealing with a selfish boor. 

But one second – who is the “imo,” the “him,” that this Jewish slave wants to emulate?  It’s the the same ger discussed earlier in the pasuk.  That ger toshav is not a selfish boor – he is a model of good midos, someone who so admires our traits of chessed and rachmanus that he practices them himself, and as a result has been blessed by Hashem!  So why is it that this Jewish slave who ends up assimilating because he wants to be like his ger toshav master ends up not only eating at McDonalds like that ger toshav, not only goes shopping on Shabbos like that ger toshav, but even worse than his ger toshav master, loses all semblance of humanity and becomes a degenerate?  Why doesn’t his master’s model of good midos have any effect?

If you have children or remember your own childhood, you might remember eating lunch or supper on some colorful plastic plate or bowl that costs next to nothing to buy in Ikea or someplace like that.  If you remember those days, then you know the answer to the Netziv’s question.  Why is it that the china dishes you use on Shabbos and paid a small fortune for break so easily if you drop them, but that plastic bowl that costs next to nothing can be thrown from a high chair across the room and not suffer a dent?  Kal v’chomer: if the cheap bowl doesn’t break, certainly you should get the same value from the china dishes!  But we know that’s not how it works.  The more precious something is, the easier it is to destroy and the uglier it becomes when ruined. 
 

The ger toshav shines as much as he can when he draws close to Klal Yisrael, but he is like a plastic bowl made to look like real china – the end result is a decent human being.  If it loses its shine, no great loss, it’s back to being just a plain bowl.  The Yisrael who becomes an eved and decides to assimilate is like fine china dropped to the floor – once it breaks, you have a thousand pieces of nothingness, total disintegration. 

It's a nice vort, but is it true?  The Netziv is basically saying that you cannot seperate a Jew's Jewishness from his humanity.  Slice off Shabbos, kashrus, etc., and inevitable you slice away morality and ethics as well.  The eved who tries to assimilate cannot give up one without also inevitably giving up the other.  We know in our society many people try to do just that -- they try to be good people, whatever that means -- without shmiras hamitzvos, and I am not sure we would call the effort a complete failure, at least in some cases.  Yesh l'chaleik, but it's something to think about.

shemita and Har Sinai

If the only point of the juxtaposition of Har Sinai with the laws of shemita in Parshas Behar is to teach that the details of all mitzvos were given at Sinai, the lesson could have just as easily conveyed by mentioning Sinai in the context of any number of other mitzvos aside from shemita and yovel(Ramban).  There must be some more fundamental  connection between the two ideas. The gemara (Shabbos 88) tells us that Hashem lifted Har Sinai and held it over the heads of Klal Yisrael and threatened to drop it on them if they did not accept the Torah.  From here, says the gemara, "moda'ah rabbah l'oraysa," Bnei Yisrael had an excuse for not keeping Torah and mitzvos, as their initial kabbalah was done under duress.  Only later, at the time of Purim, was there a willing re-acceptance. But how can this be?  We just read in Parshas Bechukosai all the promises of reward for doing mitzvos and the punishment of galus for disobeying.  If mattan Torah was done under duress and therefore the kabbalas haTorah was not binding, how could there be punishment for disobeying?   Perhaps this was the question of "Al mah avdah ha'aretz?" that all the Nevi'im and Chachamim could not answer (Bava Metziya 85).  They could not fathom why Klal Yisrael was being sent into galus despite the claim of duress that would excuse them from punishment. The Ramban answers (see Parashas Derachim derush 22) that there is a difference between all other punishments and the punishment of galus.  Eretz Yisrael is a special gift.  You can use duress as an excuse to get out of punishment, but you can't expect to get an extra special gift while making excuses.  Our stay in Eretz Yisrael is predicated on our acceptance of Torah, no matter what.   I think this is what the opening to Parshas Behar is hinting at.  The excuse of "moda'ah rabbah" may work for other mitzvos, but when it comes to shemitah and yovel, mitzvos that depend on kedushas ha'aretz and yishuv ha'aretz, even if given "b'har Sinai," with the mountain suspended over our heads and under duress, there are no excuses.  

Shemita and bitachon

After discussing all the laws of shemita and yovel the Torah writes:

וְנָתְנָה הָאָרֶץ פִּרְיָהּ, וַאֲכַלְתֶּם לָשֹׂבַע; וִישַׁבְתֶּם לָבֶטַח, עָלֶיהָ.
כ וְכִי תֹאמְרוּ, מַה-נֹּאכַל בַּשָּׁנָה הַשְּׁבִיעִת: הֵן לֹא נִזְרָע, וְלֹא נֶאֱסֹף אֶת-תְּבוּאָתֵנוּ.
כא וְצִוִּיתִי אֶת-בִּרְכָתִי לָכֶם, בַּשָּׁנָה הַשִּׁשִּׁית; וְעָשָׂת, אֶת-הַתְּבוּאָה, לִשְׁלֹשׁ, הַשָּׁנִים.

It's unclear when exactly the farmer will ask this question, "Mah nocahl ba'shana ha'shevi'is?" (see Ramban, Kil Yakar) The sixth year is a regular farming year, so the farmer has no need for alarm. By the time the seventh year rolls around, the farmer's storehouses will be overflowing with the harvest from the previous year; the farmer again has no cause for concern.

The Alter of Navardok in Madreigas ha'Adam answers that it's not in the sixth year or seventh year that the farmer will worry -- it's in the first year. From day one the farmer knows that a shemita is coming, so he spends six years planning and worrying about how to get through that one year.

The farmer who does this may keep shemita to the letter of the law, but he circumvents the entire spirit of the law. The lesson of shemita is that our parnasa depends on Hashem, not only on our own efforts. The Midrash extols the level of bitachon demonstrated by simple farmers who keep shemita. What kind of bitachon does it show if you scrimp and save a little bit each year because you don't trust that you will find the resources to get through that seventh year of shemita?

"V'nasna ha'aretz pirya, v'achaltem la'sova," says the Alter, is not a bracha -- it's a mitzvah. Enjoy the bounty of the land, eat your fill of produce, trust that there will be enough for the seventh year. Don't scrimp and save like your life depends on it to get through shemita.

This is Navardok bitachon in its purest form, no histhtadlus required. For many of us, myself included, it's easier to swallow a model of bitachon that allows or even obligates us to make our own histadlus before relying on Hashem.

The Alter reveals a fascinating paradox inherent in this model of bitachon: What happens if the farmer ignores this directive and does spend his time socking away grain for the lean year? "V'tzivisi es birchasi..." only applies to those who exercise their bitachon and fulfill the "mitzvah" of "V'achaltem la'sova..." If you sock away the grain instead -- no bracha, no bountiful harvest The situation becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy -- the farmer who spends his time socking away grain for six years will not receive a bracha and in year six will suddenly say, "Aha! You see, I was right to store away what I can, because this year's crop is no different than any other year!" It's only the farmer who makes the initial commitment and takes the plunge with bitachon who will be zocheh to see the fruits of his effort in that sixth year.

By definition, the value of bitachon is not something that can be proven beforehand -- those who exercise bitachon will enjoy its rewards; those who don't will see exactly the results they expect to justify their lacking.

the connection between tochacha and archin

Someone asked me on Shabbos why the parsha of archin follows the tochacha – what does one thing have to do with the other? The Rishonim ask this question and explain (see Rashbam in particular, also Ramban, Abarbanel) that the tochacha is primarily a punishment for failure to observe shemita. Rashi writes that the length of the galus predicted by the tochacha corresponds exactly to the years of shemita and yovel that were not observed properly by the Jewish people. The tochacha is therefore connected with the laws of shemita that open Parshas BeHar. The close of Bechukosai, with its discussion of the assessment of the value of property, returns the discussion to the laws of yovel. Since a field will return to its original owner at the yovel, its value must be assessed relative to when the next yovel will be.

It is a bit difficult to understand, however, why the Torah inserted the tochacha between the sections that deal with yovel. Abarbanel addresses this point, but I like the idea suggested by the Ishbitza. The theme of the parsha of archin is pidyon – redemption of pledges. The Ishbitza suggests that the idea of redemption should be understood more generally. Faced with a disheartening list of punishments, the Torah ends the parsha by telling us that all is lost; there is always an opportunity to redeem onself. Excluding the first pasuk of "Vayidaber Hashem el Moshe…" and the last pasuk which closes the parsha, there is an exact pasuk by pasuk match between the thirty-three pesukim of parshas archin and the thirty-three pesukim of tochacha. Every punishment has an escape clause should a person sincerely return to Hashem.

My wife thought of a slightly different formulation along these same lines. By connecting archin to tochacha perhaps the Torah is teaching that punishment itself is a means of redemption. G-d does not punish merely to cause pain; he punishes for the sake of kaparah and to teach us to change our ways.

the aseh of shemita - zman gerama?

Why according to the Chinuch are women obligated in the mitzvas aseh of shemitah (shnas shabason…) when it is zman gerama? As we once discussed (link), some Rishonim (see Tosfos Kiddushin 34a, Ramban) treat the case of an aseh which coincides with a lav as different than a regular aseh. Since women are obligated to keep the lav, the aseh tags along even though it is zman gerama. With respect to shemita, since women are obligated to keep the lav of not working the field, they are also obligated in the aseh as well.

The Ritva distinguishes between two types of mitzvos. The exemption of zman gerama applies where the mitzvah demands some act on the part of the individual, a chovas hagavra. However, where the mitzvah relates to the object instead of the person there is no zman gerama exemption. According to the Ritva the gemara does not classify milah as zman gerama mitzvah (See Tos Kiddushin 29) because the purpose of the mitzvah is to bring the child into the state of being nimol, not the actual act of cutting off the orlah.

The Minchas Chinuch applies the logic of the Ritva to shemita. The aseh of shemita is not a chovas hagavra on the individual, but is din in the land, i.e. the land must be given a year of rest. Therefore, women as well as men are obligated.

A number of other interesting conclusions follow from this chiddush. 1) If one asks an aku”m to work the land during shemita, one is not merely in violation of an issur derabbanan of amira l’aku”m, as on Shabbos, but rather one is in violation of the issur d’oraysa of shabason. Since the focus of the mitzvah is the land, not the farmer, causing the land to be disturned by work violates this aseh. 2) The M.C. further debates whether the aseh would be violated if one planted seed just before shemita and that seed took root on shemita. While no actual work was done during shemita in this case, there was an effect produced on the land.

My son asked me recently why we need a gezeiras hakasuv (see Shavuos 15b) to teach us that the beis hamikdash cannot be built on Shabbos or Yom Tov – since binyan mikdash is an aseh and yom yov is an aseh and a lav, the standard rule that ain aseh doche lo ta’aseh v’aseh should apply. A simple answer is that without the gezeiras hakasuv you might have thought that just like korbanos are doche shabbos and yom tov, the building of the mikdash itself should be doche yom tov. Also, it also does not seem from the gemara that all the amoraim agree that there is in fact an aseh associated with yom tov. I prefer a more lomdish answer. Perhaps the chiddush here is that the issur of building is not just a din in shabbos or yom tov, but is a din in the mitzvah of binyan mikdash. A nafka minah would be in a case where an aku”m is asked to do the building: if the issur were a regular hilchos shabbos din based on ain aseh doche lo ta’aseh v’aseh, then we would be dealing with a standard issur derabbanan of amira l’aku”m; however, if the issur is a din in binyan mikdash, meaning the mikdahs is precluded from being built on yom tov or shabbos, then the work of the aku”m would be an issur d’oraysa, similar to the sevara of the Minchas Chinuch with respect to shemita.

ain ona'ah l'karka'os

My son is learning Kiddushin and is familar with the rule of "ain ona'ah l'karka'os", there is no issur ona'ah by a sale of land. I asked him on Shabbos how this makes sense when the issur ona'ah appears in the Torah davka in the context of selling land - the Torah tells us that the buyer and seller must calculate the number of years until shemita to determine the fair price of land and avoid ona'ah.

The Ramban on that pasuk offers a few approaches to resolve this question. When buying and selling metaltilin, if the discreprency between what was charged/paid is too egregious, the buyer or seller has a right to rescind the sale. "Ain ona'ah l'karka'os" may simply mean that the buyer and seller may not rescind the sale, but the issur of ona'ah still applies.

safety-nets and bitachon

כה) כִּי-יָמוּךְ אָחִיךָ וּמָכַר מֵאֲחֻזָּתוֹ וּבָא גֹאֲלוֹ הַקָּרֹב אֵלָיו וְגָאַל אֵת מִמְכַּר אָחִיו
כו) וְאִישׁ כִּי לֹא יִהְיֶה-לּוֹ גֹּאֵל וְהִשִּׂיגָה יָדוֹ וּמָצָא כְּדֵי גְאֻלָּתוֹ
כז) וְחִשַּׁב אֶת-שְׁנֵי מִמְכָּרוֹ וְהֵשִׁיב אֶת-הָעֹדֵף לָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר מָכַר-לוֹ וְשָׁב לַאֲחֻזָּתוֹ

If a person sells property, a relative has the right to redeem it on behalf of the owner. A person without relatives, the parsha continues, will find funds and redeem his own land. The Netzi"v is medayek: 1) Why not simply state that a person has the right to redeem his own land - why must this idea be couched in the context of someone who has no relatives? 2) The pasuk states as a matter of certainty that "he shall obtain funds", not "if he obtains funds..." Shouldn't this be a conditional clause?

What the formulation of the pasuk suggests, writes the Netzi"v, is that only the person who has no relatives upon whom to rely will find the funds to redeem his own land. When there is a safety net in life, be it relatives, be it some other means, a person's natural instinct is to place his/her trust in that safety net, lessing his/her trust in G-d (and I would add, lessening his/her self-reliance). When all the safety nets have been stripped away and one's full trust is placed in G-d alone, only then does Hashem guarantee with certainty that one will find one's own means of redemption (and I wouldn't take that in the financial sense alone).