Who are you going to believe -- Sanhedrin or your eyes?

For better or worse, our worldview of Torah is shaped by chumash and Rashi that we learned as children and that we re-learn every week (sadly often advancing no further in our understanding).  We all "know" that Avraham sent Eliezer to fetch Rivka and bring her to his home, but nowhere does it say this in the text.  It speaks about Avraham's eved, but Eliezer is not named.  We just assume it because Rashi told us that's who the perek is talking about.  It's an innocuous example, but not all examples are so innocuous.  Rashi in our parsha comments:

 לֹ֣א תָס֗וּר מִן־הַדָּבָ֛ר אֲשֶׁר־יַגִּ֥ידֽוּ לְךָ֖ יָמִ֥ין וּשְׂמֹֽאל׃

 

ימין ושמאל – אפילו אומר לך על ימין שהוא שמאל, ועל שמאל שהיא ימין, וכל שכן שאומרים לו על ימין ימין ועל שמאל שמאל.

 

This Rashi is so well known that I think comes as a shock to most people to discover it is against a black on white gemara.  The first Mishna in Horiyot has a din: הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין וְיָדַע אֶחָד מֵהֶן שֶׁטָּעוּ אוֹ תַלְמִיד שֶׁהוּא רָאוּי לְהוֹרָייָה וְהָלַךְ וְעָשָׂה עַל פִּיהֶם, בֵּין שֶׁעָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה עִמָּהֶם בֵּין שֶׁעָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה אַחֲרֵיהֶם, בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא עָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה – הֲרֵי זֶה חַייָב

 

The gemara tries to figure out what case this could be talking about.  מַתְנִיתָא כְּגוֹן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי יוֹשֵׁב לִפְנֵיהֶן.  The gemara (I am quoting the Yerushalmi) posits that we are dealing with someone who is a baki b'halacha like Shimon ben Azai.  If so, m'mah nafshach: if he made a mistake in the din, then he is not really an expert; if he didn't make a mistake but rather intentionally violated the din, then he is not chayav a chatas because he is not shogeg.  Answers the gemara: אֶלָּא שֶׁהוּא כְטוֹעֶה לוֹמַר: תּוֹרָה אָמְרָה אַחֲרֵיהֶם אַחֲרֵיהֶם  The person is an expert in the case before B"D and knew that they made a mistake, but thought there is a chiyuv to follow them anyway.  At this point the Bavli stops, but the Yerushalmi goes a step further and says that can't be the mistake because someone of a R' Shimon ben Azai would not err in something like that:

 

אֵין זֶה שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי. כְּהָדָא דְתַנֵּי: יָכוֹל אִם יֹאמְרוּ לָךְ עַל יְמִין שֶׁהִיא שְׂמֹאל וְעַל שְׂמֹאל שֶׁהִיא יְמִין תִּשְׁמַע לָהֶם? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: לָלֶכֶת יָמִין וּשְׂמֹאל, שֶׁיֹּאמְרוּ לָךְ עַל יָמִין שֶׁהוּא יָמִין וְעַל שְׂמֹאל שֶׁהִיא שְׂמֹאל

 

Exactly the opposite of the derasha Rashi quotes!  If B"D makes the wrong call and you know they are mistaken, of course you don't have to follow them.  (The only difference between Bavli and Yerushalmi is the Bavli accepted the thought that following B"D even if they are in error is a potential mistake someone can make; the Yerushalmi thinks a Shimon ben Azai type expert would not make that mistake, but they both agree that it is a mistake.  I quoted the Ylmi because it spells out the derasha that stands in sharp contrast to Rashi; the Bavli doesn't quote the derasha.)

 

If someone starts with Rashi's comment as their baseline, esp if they are not aware of the contradictory sugya, then a person might come to accept all kinds of things as true even if the face of evidence to the contrary.  Call it emunah peshuta, call it daas Torah, call it some other name, at the end of the day it means the answer to Groucho Marx's question, "Who are you going to believe -- me or your own eyes? is "me" when that "me" is a Rabbi.   That's a dangerous thing.  There is no proof that will shake someone out of this state ut of their reverie, as what good is proof when the Torah says you have to believe אפילו אומר לך על ימין שהוא שמאל, ועל שמאל שהיא ימין?  L'havdil, this is the same mindset of people still singing the accolades of Fauci, who still believe Russiagate, and who think Joe Biden had 81 million people who voted for him.

 

When you start with the Yerushalmi as your baseline, you start with the assumption that reality is reality, left is left and right is right, and there is no reason to listen to anyone, even the Sanhedrin, if they tell you otherwise. G-d does not want us to turn our brains off and unquestioningly accept falsehood.

 

What should be the baseline we start with?  How do we square Rashi with the Yerushalmi?  First off, who says we have to?  Perhaps the two sources disagree, end of story.  See Shu"T Melamed l'Ho'il who wants to be toleh the two derashos on the issue of whether yesh aim l'mikra or yesh aim la'masoret and you don't need to reconcile the two.  At the end of the day, Rashi on chumash is a mefareish, not a posek.   When it comes to halacha, if I am not mistaken, the derasha he quotes in not brought by the Rambam.  This is far from the only place where Rashi's peirush on chumash is not consistent with the maskana l'dina.  Rashi's concern is peshutp shel mikra, and if a derasha that is not k'halacha does a better job at explaining the pasuk (see Kli Yakar), that will be what Rashi goes with.   

 

The problem gets sticky when we look at Ramban, who not only quotes Rashi, but expands upon it and holds that this is the normative view:

 

וענינו: אפילו תחשב בלבך שהם טועים, והדבר פשוט בעיניך כאשר אתה יודע בין ימינך לשמאלך, תעשה כמצותם, ואל תאמר: איך אוכל החלב הגמור הזה או אהרוג האיש הנקי הזה, אבל תאמר: כך צוה אותי האדון המצוה על המצות שאעשה בכל מצותיו ככל אשר יורוני העומדים לפניו  במקום אשר יבחר, ועל משמעות דעתם נתן לי התורה אפילו יטעו. וזה כענין רבי יהושע עם רבן גמליאל ביום הכפורים שחל להיות בחשבונו (בבלי ר״ה כ״ה.)

 

.כי על הדעת שלהם הוא נותן לנו התורה, אפילו יהו בעיניך כמחליף הימין בשמאל. וכל שכן שיש לך לחשוב שהם אומרים על ימין שהוא ימין, כי רוח השם על משרתי מקדשו ולא יעזוב את חסידיו, לעולם נשמרו (תהלים ל״ז:כ״ח) מן הטעות ומן המכשול.

 

The Ramban is a bit unclear (see the whole thing inside and R' Elchanan in Kuntres Divrei Sofrim in Koveitz Shiurim) as to whether he holds you have to listen to B"D because it's just your impression that they are in error, or whether he holds you have to listen because even if they are in fact wrong, Hashem wants you to listen to them anyway.

 

I thought Ramban's amguity should be seen in light of Ramban later in our parsha by eidim zomimim, who asks why it is that if eidim are discovered to be zomimim after B"D carries out punishment on the defendant, they get off with no punishment.  Why shouldn't they be liable for causing de  or pain to the defendant?  Ramban answers that if B"D meted out justice based on their testimony, then it means the defendant is guilty of some crime.  Hashem would not allow B"D to mete out punishment in error to an innocent party.  From that Ramban is would seem that a person might have the *impression* that B"D got it wrong, but in reality, they did not (I found R' Yehuda Herzl Henkin in Shu"T Bnei Banim II:23 also links these two parshiyot).  Chasam Sofer goes down this same road.  He writes that the reason you have to listen to B"D אפילו אומר לך על ימין שהוא שמאל is because Hashem would not allow righteous people to make such an error.  The Lubavitcher Rebbe writes (Likutei Sichos v 5 end of the second piece on Toldos) that B"D's psak can change reality (see Yerushalmi (Kesubos 1 halacha 2) regarding the regrowth of besulim in response to psak of B"D).  Therefore, if they tell you left is right, that will become the reality.  All that being said, we know that B"D can make mistakes, otherwise we would not have a parsha of par he'elem davar shel tzibur!

 

What did Ramban do with the Yerushalmi? 

 

Ramban elsewhere, in Sefer haMitzvos, tries to answer this question.  Ramban writes that if B"D makes an error, you can do what you like until you raise the issue with B"D (which is what you should do) and have your day in court.  Once you do have your day in court and B"D has heard your side of the story and still rejected it, then from that point onward you are bound to follow their view.  Ramban is a but difficult to read into the sugya in the Yerushalmi.   מַתְנִיתָא כְּגוֹן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי יוֹשֵׁב לִפְנֵיהֶן -- when it says יוֹשֵׁב לִפְנֵיהֶן it means someone present in B"D but did not raise their own view for discussion?

 

Chida goes a step further and writes that there is no obligation to follow B"D unless you are dead wrong.  Most things in life, halacha included, are seldom black and white.  Chid"a suggests that if you make your argument to B"D and they think you are mistaken, then you have to follow their view. However, if things are not so clear cut -- your argument has merit, but for whatever reason, the majority of B"D feels their position has more merit -- you don't have to follow. 

 

Other Achronim throw their own hat into the ring and offer other suggestions to resolve the discrepancy, but I am not going to do a full review of every shita here as this is as blog post, not a journal article.  I do want to make just two other points:

 

1) Facts are facts.  B"D can't pasken against empirical evidence.  Yevamos 92a: הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין שֶׁשָּׁקְעָה חַמָּה, וּלְבַסּוֹף זָרְחָה — אֵין זוֹ הוֹרָאָה, אֶלָּא טָעוּת.  

 

Along the same lines, Ksav v'haKabbalah explains Rashi as follows:

 

פי׳ דלפי מראה עיניך הם טועין בדין מ״מ תשמע להם; אבל אם ידוע בודאי שהם טועים, כבר אמרו בירושלמי (רשפ״ק דהוריות) אם יאמרו על ימין שהוא שמאל ועל שמאל שהוא ימין אין לשמוע להם

 

What he doesn't explain is how you know with certainty that you are right and they are wrong.  Is it a case of factual error?  Or perhaps it is a case where you have a kabbalah ish m'pi ish and B"D doesn't and is trying to figure things out mi'sevara.  See end of ch 5 of Ediyot regarding עֲקַבְיָא בֶּן מַהֲלַלְאֵל). 

 

2) B"D alone can determine public policy.  To use an example from last week's post, if B"D says not to blow shofar on Shabbos, arguing that they are wrong because the Torah allows it is a non-starter.  A gezeira or a hor'as sha'ah deliberately upends the din.  Yes, B"D is going against what the Torah says, but they have a right to do so for the sake of public policy.  You may disagree with their ruling, but that is a matter of perception, not one of clear cut error.

So much for matters of halacha.  What can we walk away with from this pasuk?  Derech derush the Divrei Shaul explains it as as a warning to follow the Rambam's famous golden mean.  Don't become an extremist.  (Everyone of course thinks he/she is a centrist and the other guy is the extremist.)  ֹֹ֣֣לֹ֣א תָס֗וּר...יָמִ֥ין וּשְׂמֹֽאל׃  Stick to the middle of the road. 

 

I would like to suggest derech derush another interpretation based on Shabbat 63a (I later found that Chasam Sofer also uses this gemara derech derush to explain the pasuk, but takes it in a different direction than I do):

 

אָמַר רָבָא בַּר רַב שֵׁילָא וְאָמְרִי לַהּ אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף בַּר חָמָא אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת מַאי דִכְתִיב אֹרֶךְ יָמִים בִּימִינָהּ בִּשְׂמֹאלָהּ עֹשֶׁר וְכָבוֹד אֶלָּא בִּימִינָהּ אֹרֶךְ יָמִים אִיכָּא עֹשֶׁר וְכָבוֹד לֵיכָּא אֶלָּא לַמַּיְימִינִין בָּהּ אֹרֶךְ יָמִים אִיכָּא וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן עוֹשֶׁר וְכָבוֹד לַמַּשְׂמְאִילִים בָּהּ עוֹשֶׁר וְכָבוֹד אִיכָּא אוֹרֶךְ יָמִים לֵיכָּא

 

Rashi comments:

 

למיימינין. של תורה שמפשפשין טעמיהן בדקדוק ובוררין כימין המיומנת למלאכה

 

למשמאלין בה. שאין יגעים בה כל צרכן אי נמי מיימינין בה עוסקין לשמה משמאילים שלא לשמה

 

Sometimes a person thinks he is giving 110% in his learning, but his Rebbe, like a good coach, knows that in reality he has more to give and can work harder.  His "yemin" = hard work is in reality "smol."  By the same token, sometimes a person thinks that they are doing far less than they should be doing, leading to their feeling depressed.  A Rebbe can right the ship and explain that what this person thinks is "smol" is really "yemin."  Maybe he is already maxed out and there is no need for stress or depression.  Sometimes we need someone who can look a things more objectively to guide us in how we measure ourselves.  אפילו אומר לך על ימין שהוא שמאל, it's a good idea to listen.

revenge is not a mitzvah

Way back over 10 years ago we discussed the difference between the two words the Torah has for "maybe" -- פּן vs אולי.     The word פּן is used when the outcome is not desired.  When you see פּן  expect the English translation to be something like "lest..."  The word אולי is used when the outcome is desired.  HaKsav v'haKabbalah writes that we know Eliezer was secretly hoping that his mission to find a wife for Yitzchak would end in failure and Yitzchak would marry his daughter because Eliezer says to Avraham אוּלַי לֹא תֹאבֶה הָאִשָּׁה לָלֶכֶת אַחֲרַי (24:5).  He doesn't use the word פּן , i.e. "What will happen if/lest the girl not come with me," but rather the word אוּלַי because that is what he wanted to happen.  Similarly, Yitzchak argues with his mother than he cannot impersonate Eisav because  אוּלַי יְמֻשֵּׁנִי אָבִי (27:12).  Yitzchak does not say  פּן, "lest he be discovered," because in his heart of hearts he did not want to fool his father and he wantde to be discovered. 

 

Given that background, let's turn to our parshsa.  According to one opinion in Chazal (Makkos 11a) there is a mitzvah for the goel ha'dam to pursue a murderer and avenge the blood that was spilled.  Why then, asks R' Yosef Shaul Nathanson , does our parsha use the word פּן in the pasuk  פֶּן יִרְדֹּף גֹּאֵל הַדָּם אַחֲרֵי הָרֹצֵחַ כִּי יֵחַם לְבָבוֹ וְהִשִּׂיגוֹ (19:6) and not the word אולי?  Isn't having a goel ha'dam something we should want and encourage if he is fulfilling a mitzvah?

 

Malbi"M in his peirush reads the pasuk in a way that gets out of the problem:

 

פן ירדוף גואל הדם והשיגו – ר״ל פן ישיגו והכהו נפש. ומלת פן אינו בא על הרדיפה, שהרדיפה מצוה לשטת הספרי

 

I'm not sure I understand what he is saying. Is the mitzvah only the chase?  When the goel ha'dam catches the guilty party, isn't the mitzvah for him to carry out the penalty of misa?  

 

R' Yosef Shaul Nathanson offers his own answer based on a yesod we've discussed before: 

Ramban in P' Lech Lecha asks why it is that the Mitzrim were punished for enslaving Bn"Y when Hashem had told Avraham that his children would be punished by being forced into servitude.  The Egyptians were fulfilling the nevuah, the ratzon Hashem!  Ramban explains that ain hachi nami, had they done so lishma, that excuse would work.  However, the reality is that they enslaved Bn"Y for their own ends alone.  Without the l'shem shamayim, it's not a kiyum of ratzon Hashem -- it's abuse and torture.  The Chofetz Chaim similarly explains that when Shaul haMelech failed to kill Agag, the navi Shmuel accuses him, "VaTa'as ha'ra b'einei Hashem," of doing wrong.  You would think that Shaul's sin was in NOT doing what he was supposed to -- killing every member of Amalek -- not what he actually did do. Yet, that's not what the navi tells us.  The sin is "VaTa'as," what Shaul did, because once he allowed his own cheshbonos and thoughts of right and wrong to enter into the equation, he was following his own agenda, and not purely the ratzon Hashem.  To wipe out a nation based on your own agenda is genocide, not a mitzvah.  We also find by the cheit ha'eigel, before the Leviim took up arms Moshe told them, "Mi l'Hashem ei'lei," (32:26, see Netziv), as only those motivated l'shem shamayim had a right to participate.  You see from these sources and more that even when there is a heter, even when there is a mitzvah to cause harm, it has to be done carefully for the right reasons.

He bases the same idea on a SM"A (CM 425) that writes that the permissibility of killing a rodef to save a nirdaf applies only when the person intervening acts l'shem shamayim.  If he has an axe to grind against the rodef and steps in for his own ulterior motive of settling some other score, that is not allowed.

 

Coming back to our pasuk, the Torah not only to tell us that the goel ha'dam was in pursuit, but also WHY he was in pursuit: כִּי יֵחַם לְבָבוֹ.  Netziv comments that the Torah is just telling us the metziyus.  The reason why the goel ha'dam is able to catch up to the person he is chasing is because he is in hot pursuit, כִּי יֵחַם לְבָבוֹ.  When you are motivated, you have an advantage. שאע״ג שהרוצח נס ובורח במהירות, מ״מ קרוב הדבר שהגואל הדם לא ייעף ולא ייגע בחמימותו עד שישיגו Since according to Netziv it is not a din but just a metziyus, it still begs the question of why mention it.  

According to the Divrei Shaul, the pasuk is in fact telling us a din. The pasuk is talking about פן ירדוף, something we don't want to happen, because we are dealing with a situation of כִּי יֵחַם לְבָבוֹ, a goel motivated by his own lust for revenge and not l'shem shamayim. There is no kiyum mitzvah in revenge for revenge's sake.

does lo techanem apply to aku"m only? heter mechira, land for peace

Shu"t v'Darashta v'Chakarta (vol 1 OC 54:3) responds to someone who claimed that lo techanem applies only to ovdei avodah zarah by saying that this is a chiddush gadol that requires proof to be believable, especially given that Tos seems to say otherwise. Tos in A"Z 20a interprets the issur broadly, writing that it applies not only to the 7 umos, but to all ovdei aku"m. The chesronos ha'shas quotes the girsa of Tos as reading "kulhu umos," not just ovdei a"z. Why narrow the issur when you see the reverse trend in Tos?

B'mechilas kvodo, not so fast. Ralbag in last week's parsha comments on the pasuk (14:21) לֹא תֹאכְלוּ כׇל נְבֵלָה לַגֵּר אֲשֶׁר בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ תִּתְּנֶנָּה וַאֲכָלָהּ אוֹ מָכֹר לְנׇכְרִ that the reason the pasuk speaks of giving away neveilah to a ger but when it comes to an aku"m is specifies selling it is because:

והנה לא רצה השם יתעלה שתתן אותה לנכרי לפי שהוא עובד עבודה זרה ולזה לא רצתה שנהנה אותו מתנת חנם.

According to Ralbag, the issur of lo techanem is limited to ovdei a"z.

While the Rambam's view in Hil A"Z 10:3-4 is less clear, in Sefer haMitzvos he refers specifically and only to ovdei a"z:

הזהירנו מהושיב עובדי ע"ז בארצנו כדי שלא נלמוד כפירותם, באמרו לא ישבו בארצכם פן יחטיאו וגו', ואילו רצה העכו"ם לעמוד בארצנו אינו מותר לנו עד שקבל עליו שלא לעבוד ע"ז ואולם עובדי ע"ז לא ישכנו עמנו ולא נמכור להם נחלה ולא נשכיר להם בית, ובבאור אמרו לנו הפירוש לא תתן להם חנייה בקרקע

And finally, Ramban in our parsha (20:18) writes as well:

והנה בתורה הזהיר: לא ישבו בארצך פן יחטיאו אותך לי כי תעבוד את אלהיהם כי יהיה לך למוקש (שמות כ״ג:ל״ג), והיא אזהרה בעבודה זרה, כי אם תכרות להם ולאלהיהם ברית, ישבו בארצך הרבים מהם יפתוך לעבוד עבודה זרה.

It is not outlandish at all, and in fact, seems to be the dominant view in Rishonim, that the issur of lo techanem is limited to ovdei a"z.

This is not a trivial issue.  It impacts two major contentious issues:

1) Land for peace -- can we trade control over territory in Eretz Yisrael for peace (assuming the theoretical possibility of such an agreement holding water) with the Muslim population, who are not ovdei a"z?  I am surprised that R' Hershel Shachter (RJJ Journal #16 )in discussing this issue writes, "Although such an act [trading land for peace] would be a violation of the injunction of lol techanem... it is permissible in the interest of avoiding a situation of sakanat nefashot." Before getting to the question of whether there is a heter pikuach nefesh, one can question the fundamental premis of whether lo techanem even applies when not dealing with ovdei aku"m. (Aside from the issur of lo techanem, according to Ramban, there is also a mitzvas aseh of kibush ha'aretz.  Whether when the Torah mandates milchama, which by definition entails casualties, there is any heter pikuach nefesh is another major issue that is not my topic here.)

2) Heter mechira -- can we sell/lease land to Muslims for the duration of the shemita year so that farming can continue? The Chazon Ish writes that doing so constitutes an issur d'oraysa of lo techanem, but R' Ovadya points out that before getting into the nitty gritty of whether sheviis is d'oraysa or whether a temporary sale actually amounts to ceding control and is a violation of lo techanem, the fundamental flaw in the C.I.'s position is that according to many Rishonim lo techanem cannot apply unless you are dealing with ovdei a"z.

matzeivah vs mizbeiach -- the value of individualism

 וְלֹֽא⁠־תָקִ֥ים לְךָ֖ מַצֵּבָ֑ה אֲשֶׁ֥ר שָׂנֵ֖א ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ׃

Why do we find this expression אֲשֶׁ֥ר שָׂנֵ֖א ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ davka here by the issur of matzeivah?  The Torah doesn't say not to be mechalel Shabbos because it is something that Hashem hates, or not to engage in arayos because it is hated.  Why here?

Rashi writes that worship at a matzeivah was acceptable during the time of the Avos but no longer since it is used for avodah zarah.  Why then is worship at a mizbeiach acceptable?  That too is used by ovdei avodah zarah?

The difference between a matzeivah and a mizbeiach is that a matzeivah is made of one stone, while a mizbeiach is made from many.  

A matzeivah represents avodas Hashem through one, singular path.  It's one size fits all.  That worked well when dealing with the Avos, who were individuals.  It does not work well when dealing with a plurality, with a nation.  For the nation, only worship on a mizbeiach, composed of multiple stones, each representing a different path, a different steam of avodah, can succeed.

The first commandment of the aseres ha'dibros is not "Anochi Hashem Elokeichem," but rather "Anochi Hashem Elokecha" -- Hashem addressed himself to each individual, acknowledging that each person has their own way of relating to Him.

Building a matzeivah, turning Judaism into a one size fits all religion, is a direct contradiction to that message of "...Hashem Elokecha," which affirms the value of individualism.

malchus - Divine right or by consent of the people?

Why is it that מלך שמחל על כבודו אין כבודו מחול (Kes 17a)?  Rashi explains:

שום תשים עליך מלך. ישראל הוזהרו שישימו עליהם שימות הרבה כלומר שתהא אימתו עליהם הלכך אין כבודו מחול שלפיכך ריבה הכתוב שימות הרבה:

In other words, the Torah demands that we give respect to the king; it has nothing to do with his wishes, and so he cannot choose to demur.

Rabeinu Yonah (San 21), however, offers a different explanation. He writes that the honor due to a king is not because of his person, but rather is because he is representative of the nation.   As Tos in Zevachim (16a d"h meyushav) puts it, אין זה שלו אלא של אחרים. Therefore, the honor is not his to dispense with.

These two views may reflect a larger issue, namely, from where does a king derive his authority -- is it a Divine right, or a reflection of the will of the people?  

Radbaz comments on the halacha of moreid b'malchus (Melachim 3:8) that this din applies to 

 והאי מלך היינו שהומלך על פי נביא או שהסכימו עליו כל ישראל

We see two distinct tracks: authority based on appointment by a navi and authority that is vested in the office by the people.

This dichotomy is reflected in different halachos in the Rambam.  In Hil Melachim 1:3 Rambam writes:

אין מעמידין מלך בתחילה אלא על פי בית דין של שבעים זקנים ועל פי נביא. כיהושע שמינהו משה רבינו ובית דינו. וכשאול ודוד שמינם שמואל הרמתי ובית דינו:

You need a prophet and a beis din to appoint a king, which seems to reflect authority being bestowed by G-d.  Yet the Rambam writes with respect to dina d'malchusa (Gezeila 5:18):

במה דברים אמורים במלך שמטבעו יוצא באותן הארצות שהרי הסכימו עליו בני אותה הארץ וסמכה דעתן שהוא אדוניהם והם לו עבדים. אבל אם אין מטבעו יוצא הרי הוא כגזלן בעל זרוע וכמו חבורת ליסטים המזויינין שאין דיניהם דין וכן מלך זה וכל עבדיו גזלנין לכל דבר:

Here the Rambam indicates that it is the consent of the governed which is the ultimate source of authority.

In fact, the Brisker Rav points out that the Mishna in Sanhedrin which lists off the functions of Sanhedrin:

אֵין דָּנִין לֹא אֶת הַשֵּׁבֶט וְלֹא אֶת נְבִיא הַשֶּׁקֶר וְלֹא אֶת כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל, אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. וְאֵין מוֹצִיאִין לְמִלְחֶמֶת הָרְשׁוּת, אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. אֵין מוֹסִיפִין עַל הָעִיר וְעַל הָעֲזָרוֹת, אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. אֵין עוֹשִׂין סַנְהֶדְרִיּוֹת לַשְּׁבָטִים, אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. אֵין עוֹשִׂין עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת, אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. וְאֵין עוֹשִׂין עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת בַּסְּפָר, וְלֹא שְׁלֹשָׁה, אֲבָל עוֹשִׂין אַחַת אוֹ שְׁתָּיִם

omits any mention of their role in appointing a king. GRI"Z explains (the Rav developed this idea as well) that Sanhedrin served a dual role: as the executive branch, and as representatives of the people.  The Mishna in Sanhedrin is an enumeration of the executive branch roles of Sanhedrin.  Appointing a king is a function of their role as representatives of the people, and therefore does not belong on this list.  This is perhaps not just a procedural issue, but is reflective of the source of the king's authority.

This question may underpin a machlokes Rav and Shmuel regarding the scope of a king's power.  When Bn"Y demanded that Shmuel haNavi appoint a king, he warned them of the consequences (Sh I:8):

יאוַיֹּ֕אמֶר זֶ֗ה יִֽהְיֶה֙ מִשְׁפַּ֣ט הַמֶּ֔לֶךְ אֲשֶׁ֥ר יִמְלֹ֖ךְ עֲלֵיכֶ֑ם אֶת־בְּנֵיכֶ֣ם יִקָּ֗ח וְשָֹ֥ם לוֹ֙ בְּמֶרְכַּבְתּ֣וֹ וּבְפָרָשָׁ֔יו וְרָצ֖וּ לִפְנֵ֥י מֶרְכַּבְתּֽוֹ:

יבוְלָשֹ֣וּם ל֔וֹ שָׂרֵ֥י אֲלָפִ֖ים וְשָׂרֵ֣י חֲמִשִּׁ֑ים וְלַחֲר֚שׁ חֲרִישׁוֹ֙ וְלִקְצֹ֣ר קְצִיר֔וֹ וְלַעֲשֹ֥וֹת כְּלֵֽי־מִלְחַמְתּ֖וֹ וּכְלֵ֥י רִכְבּֽוֹ:

יגוְאֶת־בְּנוֹתֵיכֶ֖ם יִקָּ֑ח לְרַקָּח֥וֹת וּלְטַבָּח֖וֹת וּלְאֹפֽוֹת:

ידוְאֶת־שְֹ֠דֽוֹתֵיכֶם וְאֶת־כַּרְמֵיכֶ֧ם וְזֵיתֵיכֶ֛ם הַטּוֹבִ֖ים יִקָּ֑ח וְנָתַ֖ן לַעֲבָדָֽיו:

טווְזַרְעֵיכֶ֥ם וְכַרְמֵיכֶ֖ם יַעְשֹ֑ר וְנָתַ֥ן לְסָרִיסָ֖יו וְלַעֲבָדָֽיו:

טזוְאֶת־עַבְדֵיכֶם֩ וְֽאֶת־שִׁפְח֨וֹתֵיכֶ֜ם וְאֶת־בַּחוּרֵיכֶ֧ם הַטּוֹבִ֛ים וְאֶת־חֲמוֹרֵיכֶ֖ם יִקָּ֑ח וְעָשָֹ֖ה לִמְלַאכְתּֽוֹ:

יזצֹאנְכֶ֖ם יַעְשֹ֑ר וְאַתֶּ֖ם תִּֽהְיוּ־ל֥וֹ לַעֲבָדִֽים:

יחוּזְעַקְתֶּם֙ בַּיּ֣וֹם הַה֔וּא מִלִּפְנֵ֣י מַלְכְּכֶ֔ם אֲשֶׁ֥ר בְּחַרְתֶּ֖ם לָכֶ֑ם וְלֹֽא־יַעֲנֶ֧ה יְהֹוָ֛ה אֶתְכֶ֖ם בַּיּ֥וֹם הַהֽוּא:

Was Shmuel haNavi just making a threat as to what might happen should the king abuse his power, or does this list accurately reflect what a king is empowered to do?  The gemara (San 20b) writes:

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל כל האמור בפרשת מלך מלך מותר בו רב אמר לא נאמרה פרשה זו אלא לאיים עליהם שנאמר שום תשים עליך מלך שתהא אימתו עליך

Rav Yaakov Ariel suggests that Rav does not necessarily hold that a king is just a figurehead with no real power.  That would not seem to fit with many examples in Tanach.  Rather, the machlokes Rav and Shmuel revolves around this question of whether power is Divinely granted to the king and therefore there is little limit on its scope, or whether it depends on the consent of the goverened, and therefore has a more narrow scope and can be reined in.  

This whole discussion brought to my mind a famous vort of the Gaon m'Vilna on the pasuk in Teh (22:29)  כִּי לַה׳ הַמְּלוּכָה וּמֹשֵׁל בַּגּוֹיִם.  The Gaon explains (see Ibn Erza to Braishis 37:8) that there is a difference between a malchus and memshala.  Memshala means ruling by coercion; malchus is with the consent of those ruled.  When it comes to Bn"Y, כִּי לַה׳ הַמְּלוּכָה because we willingly accept Hashem as our king.  When it comes to the other nations, וּמֹשֵׁל בַּגּוֹיִם, they willy-nilly accept Hashem as king, only against their will.

I think there is a parallel between the malchusa d'arah and the malchusa d'rekiya, and these two terms reflect the issue we have been discussing.  Memshala is not just malchus with an arm twist.  It's a different animal entirely, both in the scope and source of the authority it defines.  It is authority that is imposed form without, as opposed to authority that is a reflection of the will of the people.  The idea of tekiyas shofar, of malchiyos on Rosh haShana, of our acceptance of Hashem as our ruler, is what differentiates us from the aku"m in that it reflects a relationship of malchus and not memshala, authority that comes from isarusa d'litata, bottom up, from the people, as opposed to one of isarusa d'leila, top down, imposed from without, based in fear instead of love.

The truth is that these two tracks, malchus as a function of tzav Hashem and malchus as a  function of consent of the people, are intertwined, as the Shem m'Shmuel points out.  How can you ever arrive at consent of the masses when every person has their own agenda, their own ideas about what should be done and who should do it?  The path to common consensus is only through the common denominator of acceptance of ratzon Hashem.   

don't go it alone

Our parsha tells us that someone who is יָּרֵא֙ וְרַ֣ךְ הַלֵּבָ֔ב is not allowed to go out to battle.  Rashi quotes from Chazal that this refers to ר׳ יוסי הגלילי אומר: הירא מעבירות שביד, someone who has done an aveira, even something as "small" as talking between putting on tefillin shed yad and she rosh.  Yet a few pesukim earlier in that very same section (20:3) the Torah quotes the mashuch milchama's words as he addressed the nation before battle: ... שְׁמַ֣ע יִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל אַתֶּ֨ם קְרֵבִ֥ים הַיּ֛וֹם לַמִּלְחָמָ֖ה עַל־אֹיְבֵיכֶ֑ם.   Rashi comments שמע ישראל – אפילו אין בכם זכות אלא של קריית שמע בלבד, כדיי אתם שיושיע אתכם, that the merit of kri'as shema alone is enough to ensure victory.  So which is it -- does even one aveira put a person in mortal danger and excuse them from battle, or does even just the merit of one mitzvah like krias shema ensure victory, irrespective of whatever other faults a person may have?

Taz in Divrei David answers that there is a difference between the yachid and the tzibur.  The individual solidier who is an avaryan faces a greater risk should he go out to battle.  However, the tzibur as a whole, even if they are not on the highest level, even if they just have the zechus of shema, can rest assured of victory.

The gemara (R"H 18) writes that Hashem will always listen to our cries for help, and even if a gzar din has been issued and signed, it can still be torn up.  וְהָכְתִיב: ״דִּרְשׁוּ ה׳ בְּהִמָּצְאוֹ״?  asks the gemara.  It's only בְּהִמָּצְאוֹ, when He is found, at certain times when Hashem is close, that our cries are heard, but not always?  Answers the gemara, הָתָם בְּיָחִיד, הָכָא בְּצִבּוּר.  When it comes to the tzibur, then  בְּכׇל קׇרְאֵנוּ אֵלָיו, Hashem always responds to our call.  It's the yachid who is limited to times of בְּהִמָּצְאוֹ.

The gemara identifies the period of בְּהִמָּצְאוֹ for the individual as the aseres ymei teshuvah, בְּיָחִיד, אֵימַת? אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: אֵלּוּ עֲשָׂרָה יָמִים שֶׁבֵּין רֹאשׁ הַשָּׁנָה לְיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים.  So what are we doing all chodesh Elul?  Is that just a warm up, a way to get ready for the 10 days during which Hashem listens to the yachid?  I don't think so.  I think Elul is all about the tzibur.  The message of Elul is not to wait for those 10 days and go it alone.  Instead, immerse yourself in the efforts of the community to come close to Hashem, and then you don't have to wait -- בְּכׇל קׇרְאֵנוּ אֵלָיו He hears our prayers.

The Rambam writes in Hil Teshuvah (1:2)

שעיר המשתלח לפי שהוא כפרה על כל ישראל כהן גדול מתודה עליו על לשון כל ישראל שנאמר והתודה עליו את כל עונות בני ישראל. שעיר המשתלח מכפר על כל עבירות שבתורה הקלות והחמורות. בין שעבר בזדון בין שעבר בשגגה. בין שהודע לו בין שלא הודע לו הכל מתכפר בשעיר המשתלח. והוא שעשה תשובה. אבל אם לא עשה תשובה אין השעיר מכפר לו אלא על הקלות. ומה הן הקלות ומה הן החמורות. החמורות הן שחייבין עליהם מיתת בית דין או כרת. ושבועת שוא ושקר אע"פ שאין בהן כרת הרי הן מן החמורות. ושאר מצות לא תעשה ומצות עשה שאין בהן כרת הם הקלות:

Kesef Mishneh on the spot asks:

 ואמרינן דאליבא דרבי אפילו לא עשה תשובה שעיר המשתלח מכפר אבל אליבא דרבנן דוקא בשעשה תשובה שעיר המשתלח מכפר אבל אם לא עשה תשובה אין מכפר, וידוע דאין הלכה כרבי מחביריו ולכך כתב רבינו והוא שעשה תשובה: ומ"ש אבל אם לא עשה תשובה אין השעיר מכפר לו אלא על הקלות. ק"ל דהתם משמע דלרבנן אפילו עבר אעשה אם לא עשה תשובה אין שעיר מכפר ולרבי אפילו על החמורות מכפר בלא תשובה חוץ מפורק עול ומגלה פנים בתורה ומפר בריתו בבשר וצ"ע

There is a machlokes Rebbi and Rabbanan whether Y"K can be mechapeir even without teshuvah.  It seems that the Rambam here paskens with respect to mitzvos kalos like Rebbi, the minority view.  Why did he reject the opinion of Rabbanan, the majority, in this case?

Furthermore, the machlokes Rebbi and Rabbanan pertains equally to all mitzvos and aveiros.  Why does the Rambam distinguish between kalos and chamuros here and what is his source?

R Soloveitchik answered in one of the teshuvah derashos (this is one small point in the larger shiur) that there is a difference between teshuvah of the yachid and teshuvah of the tzibur.  On an individual level, kaparah is not possible without teshuvah.  The Rambam himself in the previous halacha writes that כל מצות שבתורה בין עשה בין לא תעשה אם עבר אדם על אחת מהן בין בזדון בין בשגגה כשיעשה תשובה וישוב מחטאו חייב להתודות .... וכן בעלי חטאות ואשמות בעת שמביאין קרבנותיהן על שגגתן או על זדונן אין מתכפר להן בקרבנם עד שיעשו תשובה. ויתודו וידוי דברים שנאמר והתודה אשר חטא עליה. וכן כל מחוייבי מיתות בית דין ומחוייבי מלקות אין מתכפר להן במיתתן או בלקייתן עד שיעשו תשובה ויתודו. וכן החובל בחבירו והמזיק ממונו אף על פי ששילם לו מה שהוא חייב לו אינו מתכפר עד שיתודה וישוב מלעשות כזה לעולם שנאמר מכל חטאות האדם:  Every sin requires viduy and teshuvah.  Here, in our halacha, the Rambam is not talking to the individual -- he is talking about the community of Klal Yisrael, the tzibur.  When the Rambam says שעיר המשתלח לפי שהוא כפרה על כל ישראל כהן גדול מתודה עליו על לשון כל ישראל he is not telling us a din in kodashim that שעיר המשתלח is a korban tzibur.  We know that from the fact that the momey for it comes from terumas ha'lishka.  What the Rambam is telling us is that the viduy and the korban come to atone for the community, the tzibur.  When we speak about the tzibur, even the Chachamim hold that "iztumu shel yom" is mechapeir; teshuva and viduy are not mandatory.  It is only those sinners who have done crimes like kareis, divorcing themselves from the community at large, who have no part in this kapara.

According to many Rishonim, the tekiyos al seder ha'brachos blown during musaf on Rosh haShana can only be done during tefilah b'tzibur.  If an individual davens on his own, he cannot stop to blow during his amidah and would blow only tekiyos d'meyushav, before musaf.  Here too, the Rav explained that we are dealing with a dual obligation.  The tekiyos d'meyushav come to arouse the individual to do teshuvah.  Tekiyos al seder ha'brachos, however, are a communal obligation, part of the teshuvah of the tzibur.

The baalei musar read these parshiyos that speak about going to war as alluding to our fight against our own evil inclination and baser instincts.  If you fight that battle alone, it's a very risky undertaking.  The tzibur, however, is assured of victory.  

כִּ֣י יִפָּלֵא֩ מִמְּךָ֨ דָבָ֜ר לַמִּשְׁפָּ֗ט בֵּֽין־דָּ֨ם ׀ לְדָ֜ם בֵּֽין־דִּ֣ין לְדִ֗ין וּבֵ֥ין נֶ֙גַע֙ לָנֶ֔גַע דִּבְרֵ֥י רִיבֹ֖ת בִּשְׁעָרֶ֑יךָ וְקַמְתָּ֣ וְעָלִ֔יתָ אֶ֨ל־הַמָּק֔וֹם אֲשֶׁ֥ר יִבְחַ֛ר ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ בּֽוֹ  The Sanz-Klausenberger Rebbe darshened as follows: כִּ֣י יִפָּלֵא֩ מִמְּךָ֨ דָבָ֜ר לַמִּשְׁפָּ֗ט בֵּֽין־דָּ֨ם ׀ לְדָ֜ם בֵּֽין־דִּ֣ין לְדִ֗ין וּבֵ֥ין נֶ֙גַע֙ לָנֶ֔גַע if you suffer from a lack of understanding of Torah, a lack of ability to perceive what Hashem wants, the reason is because דִּבְרֵ֥י רִיבֹ֖ת בִּשְׁעָרֶ֑יךָ, there is fighting and disunity.  The solution? וְקַמְתָּ֣ וְעָלִ֔יתָ אֶ֨ל־הַמָּק֔וֹם אֲשֶׁ֥ר יִבְחַ֛ר ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ בּֽוֹ  The halacha says that  ירושׁלים לא נתחלקה לשׁבטים.  We are all joined together there as one.  There are different rules that apply to the tzibur than to a yachid.  

כִּ֣י יִפָּלֵא֩ מִמְּךָ֨ דָבָ֜ר לַמִּשְׁפָּ֗ט The Yamim Noraim are approaching.  If you can't fathom how the din, how your mishpat, is going to turn out, then  וְקַמְתָּ֣ וְעָלִ֔יתָ אֶ֨ל־הַמָּק֔וֹם אֲשֶׁ֥ר יִבְחַ֛ר ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ בּֽוֹ, and forget about you the individual.  Instead focus on you the member of the tzibur and what you can do to strengthen those ties.

ir ha'nidachas -- a sum greater than its parts

The Ramban in this upcoming week's parsha quotes a machlokes between himself and R' Sadya Gaon whether a beis din of 23 is required for the kabbalas eidus in capital cases, or whether the b"d of 23 is required just for the psak and punishment, but the kabbalas eidus can even be done in the b"d of 3.  Do you need the same # of judges for kabbalas eidus as you need to try the case?  

The Minchas Chinuch raises a question on Ramban from the parsha of ir ha'nidachas that we read this past week.  When there are number of cases of idolatry in the city, b"d first sits in judgment of each case as if it was a din on an individual.  After they figure out that it's not just isolated individuals, but it's the majority of the city that is guilty of idolatry, the case is moved to b"d ha'gadol of 71 (Sanhedrin 112) to judge as an ir ha'nidachas.  If kabbalas eidus always has to be done in a court that has the same # of judges as those that will try the case, why is the kabbalas ha'eidus that was originally done in courts of 23 sufficient for ir ha'nidachas?  Shouldn't it require 71 dayanim from the get-go? 

Yesh lachkor whether a city is just a collection of individuals, or whether a city is a new collective unit?  Is the whole greater than the sum of its parts (same chakira with respect to definition of a tzibur)?  

The M.C. treats ir ha'nidachas as a city where, if there were 100 individuals living there, for example, we have 51 dinei torah going on against the population, and those case have to be transferred to a higher court of b"d ha'gadol.  But it could be that what is transferred to b"d ha'gadol is not 51 cases, but rather 1 case, a case against the entity of the city.  (I'm not sure, but it sounds like this is what R' Shmuel Rozovski quoted here means.)  

In the parsha sheet based on the chiddushim of R' Avrohom Genochovski z"l this past week there was a discussion of a question raised by the Chasam Sofer (I wrote about it 10+ years ago as well): since the children as well as the adults of of an ir ha'nidachat are killed, why isn't the testimony against them considered עדות שׁאי אתה יכול להזימה?  After all, we cannot inflict parallel punishment on an eid zomem and kill his children, because, as we learn in first sugya in Makos, לו - ולו לזרעו?  

Here too, the answer could be that the eidim who come to testify are testifying against individual idolaters.  The reason the children of an ir ha'nidachas are killed is because beis din ha'gadol has its din torah against the city as whole -- a whole greater than the sum of dinei torah against its individuals -- and the punishment that applies to the city extends to the children living there as well.

We once discussed the shitas haRambam that seems to say that an ir ha'nidachas can do teshuvah.  Since when can a person simply do teshuvah to get out of misas b"d?  It could be that what the Rambam means is that the city as a whole loses its status of ir ha'nidachas if enough people do teshuvah, but the individual idolaters who comprise most of the city will still be chayav misas b"d for their actions.

egkah arufah -- what went wrong

The gemara interprets the final pasuk in the parsha of eglah arufah, וְאַתָּ֗ה תְּבַעֵ֛ר הַדָּ֥ם הַנָּקִ֖י מִקִּרְבֶּ֑ךָ כִּֽי־תַעֲשֶׂ֥ה הַיָּשָׁ֖ר בְּעֵינֵ֥י הֹ׳, to mean that if the murdered is found after the eglah arufah is done, he is still executed.  R' Chaim Kanievsky in Taama d'Kra  asks what about the end of the pasuk -- כִּֽי־תַעֲשֶׂ֥ה הַיָּשָׁ֖ר בְּעֵינֵ֥י הֹ׳.  What does that come to teach us?

R' Chaim cites a SHL"AH that quotes a Midrash that if Bn"Y are worthy, there will be worms that crawl out of the eglah arufah and make a beeline straight to the murderers home, exposing the killer.  The last letters of אַתָּ֗ה תְּבַעֵ֛ר הַדָּ֥ם הַנָּקִ֖י spell out the word רימה, alluding to this miracle.  

R' Chaim reads this into the last pasuk: we can be zocheh to אַתָּ֗ה תְּבַעֵ֛ר הַדָּ֥ם הַנָּקִ֖י מִקִּרְבֶּ֑ךָ, to identify the murderer through this special property of the eglah arufah, if כִּֽי־תַעֲשֶׂ֥ה הַיָּשָׁ֖ר בְּעֵינֵ֥י הֹ׳, we are worthy of such a miracle.

R' Chaim is trying to connect כִּֽי־תַעֲשֶׂ֥ה הַיָּשָׁ֖ר בְּעֵינֵ֥י הֹ׳ to the din of killing the actual murdered when found, but al pi peshuto shel mikra, I think the simpler reading follows Ibn Ezra.  As we discussed before, Ibn Erza interprets the confession of the elders where the body is found, יָדֵ֗ינוּ לֹ֤א שָֽׁפְכוּ֙  אֶת־הַדָּ֣ם הַזֶּ֔ה וְעֵינֵ֖ינוּ לֹ֥א רָאֽוּ, not in relation to the specific crime at hand, but rather in relation to other, similar crimes that occurred in their city.  ויתכן, שהשם צוה לעשות כן העיר הקרובה, כי לולי שעשו עבירה כדומה לה, לא נזדמן אדם שיהרג קרוב מהם. ומחשבות השם עמקו וגבהו לאין קץ אצלנו.  This type of outrage -- murder -- does not occur in a vacuum; it occurs in an environment that allows similar crimes to go unpunished and ignored. 

Based on Ibn Ezra, one can answer R' Chaim's question. וְאַתָּ֗ה תְּבַעֵ֛ר הַדָּ֥ם הַנָּקִ֖י מִקִּרְבֶּ֑ךָ is a promise (see Netziv who reads it this way as well), not a din.  The pasuk is teaching that innocent blood will not be spilled in a city where כִּֽי־תַעֲשֶׂ֥ה הַיָּשָׁ֖ר בְּעֵינֵ֥י הֹ׳ in other areas, meaning where there is a general climate of justice.  

Ibn Ezra writes:

 והנכון בעיני, הוא אשר הזכרתי: כי לא ישפך דם נקי בארצך אם תעשה הישר , כסוד ושכר עבירה עבירה ושכר מצוה מצוה 

Where there is justice, שכר מצוה מצוה, but where criminals are free to act as they will in one area, שכר עבירה עבירה and other troubles follow.

 Or, as Ralbag puts it:

, או ירצה בזה שכאשר תעשה הישר בעיני י״י לא יקרה בקרבך כמו זה החטא כי הזקנים יוכיחו העם ויקבלו כלם מוסרם ללכת בדרכי התורה 

Along similar lines, Tzeror haMor makes a nice diyuk in the parsha and places blame on the kohanim for spiritual failure:

וְנִגְּשׁ֣וּ הַכֹּהֲנִים֮ בְּנֵ֣י לֵוִי֒ כִּ֣י בָ֗ם בָּחַ֞ר הֹ׳ אֱלֹהֶ֙יךָ֙ לְשָׁ֣רְת֔וֹ וּלְבָרֵ֖ךְ בְּשֵׁ֣ם הֹ׳ וְעַל־פִּיהֶ֥ם יִהְיֶ֖ה כׇּל־רִ֥יב וְכׇל־נָֽגַע׃

וְכֹ֗ל זִקְנֵי֙ הָעִ֣יר הַהִ֔וא הַקְּרֹבִ֖ים אֶל־הֶחָלָ֑ל יִרְחֲצוּ֙ אֶת־יְדֵיהֶ֔ם עַל־הָעֶגְלָ֖ה הָעֲרוּפָ֥ה בַנָּֽחַל׃

 וְעָנ֖וּ וְאָמְר֑וּ יָדֵ֗ינוּ לֹ֤אשָֽׁפְכוּ֙ אֶת־הַדָּ֣ם הַזֶּ֔ה וְעֵינֵ֖ינוּ לֹ֥א רָאֽוּ׃

Notice the switch between the first pasuk, which speaks about the kohanim gathering, and the second, which speaks about the zekeinim and then goes on to say that they wash their hands and declare that they are innocent of wrongdoing.  Tzeror haMor writes that it is davka the zekeinim and NOT the kohamim who make this declaration because it is only the zekeinim and NOT the kohanim who can truly say they are innocent:

 וכן נראה שהוצרכו בכאן הכהנים לקבל בושה וכלימה. על מה שלא נתכוונו בעבודתם ובתפלתם. כי ידוע שהכהנים נוטלים בשכרם מישראל מתנות כהונה. והכהנים היו עובדים עבודתם בבהמ״ק לכפר על ישראל ולהצילם מכל מכשול ועון. ואחר שנהרג זה בגבולם. לא כיונו בתפלתם ובעבודתם. ואחר שזה כן. ראוי שיבואו לכאן ויקבלו בושה וכלימה על מה שעשו.

The fact that a murder occurred is proof that the avodah of the kohanim was not up to par.  Therefore, they must stand silently, suffering embarrassment, as the elders declare their innocence, but they cannot say the same.

לכן על פיהם יהיה כל ריב וכל נגע. כי מות וחיים ביד לשון

The pasuk davka here describes the kohanim as  עַל־פִּיהֶ֥ם יִהְיֶ֖ה כׇּל־רִ֥יב וְכׇל־נָֽגַע because it is the avodah they do על פיהם with their mouth -- their tefilah -- which has in this case failed.

It's Elul!  Slichos, ymei ha'din, a time of tefilah.   כי מות וחיים ביד לשון.