Noda b'Yehuda on what to do if one leined shekalim before the kriah of rosh chodesh

There is a machlokes Rama/Taz in siman 684 regarding what to do if on rosh chodesh teves/chanukah the tzibur mistakenly started leining the chanukah kriah first instead of the kriah of rosh chodesh, which should come first.  Rama says to stop immediately and switch to reading rosh chodesh.  Taz disagrees and says that even though rosh chodesh is tadir and therefore should come first, tadir is only a lichatchila and is not m’akeiv. 

 This week we have shabbos shekalim and rosh chodesh together.  Noda b’Yehuda (mh”t 11) was asked what to do in this case if the tzibur mistakenly started leining parshas shekalim before the kriah of rosh chodesh.  Lichora this sounds like it should hinge on exactly like the same machlokes Rama and Taz.  However, Noda b’Yehuda says here l’kulei alma you should continue and not stop.  What’s the chiluk between the cases?

In siman 684 there is another din that if you took out only one sefer and read the leining of rosh chodesh and left out chanukah, you are yotzei.  GR”A points you to meg 29b that “ain mashgichim b’chanukah” (which if you look up the gemara you will see means something else in context).  That’s why Rama holds that when you took out both sefarim but started reading the chanukah leining first, you stop right away.  It’s not just that rosh chodesh is tadir – it’s that chanukah really carries no weight compared with r”c.  

The same is not true of shekalim.  If you didn't take out a sefer to lein shekalim and just leined the kriah of rosh chodesh, you haven't fulfilled your chiyuv properly and have to take out a sefer to read shekalim.  Since we see that shelakim does carry at least as much weight as the reading of rosh chodesh, you cannot stop and cut it off in the middle.

(See further in the teshuvah where the Nb"Y discusses which haftarah to read.)

I understand the proof, but I don’t understand the lomdus/sevara.  Why is the leining of chanukah “ain mashgichim bo” viz a viz the kriah of rosh chodesh but not shekalim?   

I am not sure, but my thinking so far is that when it comes to chanukah and rosh chodesh, it is the kedushas ha’yom that gives rise to the chiyuv of kriah.  For whatever reason, the kedushas hayom of rosh chodesh eclipses that of chanukah, and defines that kriah as the primary one of the day.  

Yesh lachkor: do you read parshas shekalim because it’s Shabbos shekalim, or is it Shabbos shekalim because you lein parshas shekalim?   Obviously, it's the latter.  It's not the kedushas ha'yom which is mechsyeiv the kriah, but aderaba, it is the kriah which gives this shabbos its unique name and character.  Therefore, the kriah of r"c which stems from the kedushas ha'yom cannot substitute for or eclipse the kriah of shekalim, which is an independent chovas ha'gavra.

(Yes, I am aware of the Rav's piece in Shiurim l'Zecher Aba Mari about the function of krias haTorah in establishing the kedushas hayom of chagim.)

Chizkuni on when parshas shekalim was given; machtzis ha'shekel as a tikun for mechiras Yosef

1) First up, a pshat issue.  According to Rashi and Ramban and most meforshim, the count of Ki Tisa is a different count than the count at the beginning of sefer Bamidbar.  The count in Ki Tisa took place in Tishrei, after Moshe came down with the second luchos, and three different donations were collected: 1) a fixed half shekel per person which was used to make the adanim of the mishkan; 2) another fixed half shekel per person which was used to buy korbanos; 3) a give-what-you-like donation used to buy material to construct the mishkan.  The count in BaMidbar took place in the second month of the second year (i.e. Iyar) and was a census to determine how many soldiers were on hand.

The main difficulty with Rashi's approach is that the number of people in the Ki Tisa count exactly matches the number of people in the census of BaMidbar.  How could there be absolutely no population change in the intervening months?  To compound the problem, the count of Ki Tisa seems inclusive of the entire nation.  The count in BaMidbar is exclusive of sheivet Levi.  Shouldn't that lead to an inevitable discrepancy?  Rashi attempts to address the problem, but Ramban already attacks the answer, followed by all the various meforshei Rashi jump into the fray to try to come up with a solution. 

Chizkuni goes against the tide and writes that the count of Ki Tisa is in fact one and the same as the count in BaMidbar:

בשנה השנית, כדכתיב בפרשת במדבר: בשנה השנית וגו׳ שאו את ראש כל עדת בני ישראל (במדבר א׳:ב׳), שכן כי תשא – להבא משמע, ושאו (במדבר א׳:ב׳) – מיד משמע. ופרשה זו נאמרה מבאחד באדר כדי להשמיע על השקלים לתרומת הלשכה לקנות הקרבנות להקריב מבאחד בניסן ואילך שבו הוקם המשכן. והלשון מוכיח: ונתת על עבודת אהל מועד (שמות ל׳:ט״ז), שמע מינה שכבר נעשה אהל מועד כלו

Ki Tisa is not a command to count, but means WHEN you count, this is how to do it, by collection shekalim.  The command to count comes later, in BaMidbar.  Chizkuni adds that this parsha was given in the beginning of Adar.  Our practice of reading the parsha parallels when the parsha was actually given.

Interestingly, Gur Aryeh, who normally defends Rashi, in this case learns pshat like Chizkuni, albeit with minor differences:

ויותר היה נראה לומר כי היה זה מספר אחד עם מספר אשר הוא אחר שהוקם המשכן, ואמר הכתוב (פסוק יב) ״כי תשא את ראש בני ישראל לפקודיהם״ אחר שהוקם המשכן, שאז יהיו נמנים ישראל, ״ונתנו איש כופר נפשם בפקוד אותם״ (שם), ורוצה לומר שיתנו כופר נפשם בפקוד אותם, לכך יקדימו שקליהם לתת אותם קודם המנין, ויתנו אותם לתרומת המשכן לאדנים שיהיו כפרה עליהם בפקוד אותם אחר כך. ולפי זה היה שפיר שאמר הכתוב ״כי תשא את ראש בני ישראל״, ולא היה מצוה ׳שאו את ראש בני ישראל׳ כמו שאמר בחומש הפקודים (במדבר א, ב) ״שאו את ראש״, ולא היה כאן מנין בפני עצמו, רק ״כי תשא״ בסוף, אחר שהוקם המשכן, והמנין היה אחר שהוקם המשכן

He marshals proof for his position from the Midrash Tanchuma, which refers to only one count in the desert, not two.  Our parsha is about the mitzvah to give shekalim **in advance** of the count that will take place later in BaMidbar:

וכן משמע בתנחומא (כאן סימן ט), דקאמר התם; עשרה פעמים נמנו ישראל, וחשיב התם אחד בירידתן למצרים, ואחד בעלייתם משם, דכתיב (ראו לעיל יב, לז) ״ויסעו בני ישראל מרעמסס כשש מאות אלף״, אחד בחומש הפקודים כו׳, הרי שלא מנה כלל אותו של ״כי תשא״, וכמשמעות הכתוב שלא נאמר בו מנין כלל, רק ״ויהי כסף פקודי העדה״ (ראו להלן לח, כה), דפירושו הכסף של הפקודים, אבל לא נמצא שם למנות ישראל. והפירוש על דעת מדרש זה, שהיה מצוה לתת את השקלים קודם למנין שלהם שיהיה בחומש הפקודים.

2) Last week I posted the Berdichiver's interpretation of  בְי֣וֹם פׇּקְדִ֔י וּפָקַדְתִּ֥י עֲלֵהֶ֖ם חַטָּאתָֽם׃.  The Techeiles Mordechai (#5 here )  on this week's parsha quotes a different interpretation. ובְי֣וֹם פׇּקְדִ֔י, means when Bnei Yisrael are counted -- meaning, we are a mass of individuals that can be enumerated instead of a being united, singular entity -- then פָקַדְתִּ֥י עֲלֵהֶ֖ם חַטָּאתָֽם, then we have to pay the debt for our sins.  When we are united as one unit, however, Hashem puts that aside.  

The Yerushalmi explains that machtzis ha'shekel is a kaparah for mechiras Yosef:

אתם מכרתם בכורה של רחל בעשרים כסף שהגיע לכל אחד טבעא [היינו מטבע של מחצית השקל] לפיכך יהי' שוקל כל אחד מכם מחצית השקל

Shem m'Shmuel (Mishpatim 5675) writes:

ויש להסבביר הדברים כי השקלים הם קיבוץ כל כחות ישראל לעבודה בכלל ובפרט, היינו שהוא עשר גרה רומז לעשרה חלקי הנפש שבאדם, והוא של כסף שהוא רומז לאהבה, והיינו שכל אחד מקבץ כל כחות נפשו ומסרם לעבודת הש"י באהבה, ולא בפ"ע לבד אלא כל ישראל יחד כענין ויעשו כולם אגודה אחת לעשות רצונך בלבב שלם, זהו נשמת המצוה, והפועל דמיוני הוא גוף המצוה, כמו גוף שנושא את הנשמה כן גוף המצוה נושא את נשמת המצוה, והוא תיקון לחטא מכירת יוסף צדיק יסוד עולם המאחד את כל קהל ישראל שפגמו בזה, וע"כ אחר המכירה כתיב וירד יהודה מאת אחיו, והתיקון הוא התאספות כל ישראל ע"י השקלים לקרבנות ציבור שאין דינם כקרבנות השותפין אלא כמו איש אחד, ובפרט נמי הוא תיקון לפגם ברית היינו התאספות כל החושים וכל האברים, כמ"ש כל עצמותי תאמרנה ה' מי כמוך והוא תיקון לחטא שכל אבריו מרגישין בו, שהחטא נמשך ג"כ מהחטא של מכירת יוסף כנ"ל, והיינו הא דפסיקתא וירושלמי הנ"ל, וכל זה הכנה לניסן להשגת חיים חדשים, וע"כ הזמן לשקלים הוא כל חודש אדר וכולי האי ואולי יספיק לזה כל החודש:

The cheit of mechiras Yosef was a blow to the unity of Yaakov's family.  The machtzis ha'shekel is the tikun.  All the darshanim explain that we take 1/2 a shekel rather than a whole one to reinforce the idea that each individual is just a piece of the whole in need of a neighbor to become complete.  It's only when we bond together than we become whole.  We use shekalim for korbanos tzibur.  A tzibur is not the same as a partnership of individuals.  It is a new entity, like a corporation, that is greater than the sum of its parts.  

As we once explained, this was Haman's mistake.  Haman paid millions of shekalim to Achashveirosh thinking that we were "mefuzar u'meforad," disjointed and disunited, and therefore vulnerable.  However, Chazal tell us that our shekalim preempted Haman's attack.  The mitzvah of machtzis ha'shekel underscored the core unity of Am Yisrael.

If each individual thinks he/she counts more than anyone else, then we run the risk of ובְי֣וֹם פׇּקְדִ֔י וּפָקַדְתִּ֥י עֲלֵהֶ֖ם חַטָּאתָֽם.  If we count using shekalim, if the individual sees him/herself as part of a greater whole, then we are spared having to deal with the Haman's of the world.

Rosh Devarcha Emes = Adar

Chazal tell us that Moshe had difficulty understanding וְנָ֨תְנ֜וּ אִ֣ישׁ כֹּ֧פֶר נַפְשׁ֛וֹ by giving a half shekel.  That's all it takes to redeem a person's nefesh -- a half shekel?!  Hashem answered by showing him a half shekel of fire that he took from under the kisei ha'kavod (whatever that answer means).  

Chasam Sofer (Derashos, Shekalim 5669) asks: the pasuk in our parsha of Mishpatim by the din of a shor muad that kills someone tells us (21:30) אִם־כֹּ֖פֶר יוּשַׁ֣ת עָלָ֑יו וְנָתַן֙ פִּדְיֹ֣ן נַפְשׁ֔וֹ כְּכֹ֥ל אֲשֶׁר־יוּשַׁ֖ת עָלָֽיו׃  Here you have the same idea -- a payment of kofer that is "pidyon nafsho," to redeem the value of a nefesh -- but here Moshe did not have any problem understanding the pasuk.  What's the difference between the two cases?

The idea of machtzis ha'shekel is that you don't know it all and don't have it all; you are incomplete without the input of others, without someone else providing the other half of the coin.  

B'shlama in our parsha, Moshe had no problem understanding how one person could pay a debt of  וְנָתַן֙ פִּדְיֹ֣ן נַפְשׁ֔וֹ . But Moshe Rabeinu was no fool and he understood Klal Yisrael.  וְנָ֨תְנ֜וּ אִ֣ישׁ כֹּ֧פֶר נַפְשׁ֛וֹ not by each person paying for himself, but only b'shutfus, only by coming together, only by each individual realizing that he has just half of the equation.  That Moshe had trouble understanding how to pull off.  How do you get Jews to be united?  How do you get people who are "mefurad," as Haman said, to work together?

The Chasam Sofer explains the symbolism of Hashem showing Moshe the machtzis ha'shekel of fire was an answer to that question, but I don't think we really have an answer yet or understand the answer yet, as we see from what goes on in our communities.  

אדר = ראשׁ דברך אמת.  Adar is the month of truth.  Maharal explains in Nesiv ha'Emes that "chosamo shel HKB"H emes" (Shabbos 55) because Hashem is one and truth is one.  If I put something in a box and ask you to guess what it is, there are an infinite number of wrong guesses you can make, but there is only one possible true answer.  

 מִדְּבַר־שֶׁ֖קֶר תִּרְחָ֑ק (23:7) we have in our parsha.   R' Zusha of Anipoli explained that if you have in you even a smidgin of falsehood, tirchak, it will push you away from Hashem.  "Chosamo shel HKB"H emes," so only someone who is true to themselves, true to Hashem, true to their fellow man, can be close to Hashem.

To acquire the midah of emes you need to start with the midah of anivus.  In order to acquire truth, you have to first have the humility to admit that you don't already have it.  Titein emes l'Yaakov -- the pasuk uses the name Yaakov, not Yisrael, because it signifies the heel, the lowest point.  Emes mei'eretz titzmach because when you plant a seed and it disintegrates into nothing before it can grow.    אדר = ראש דברך אמת is the birthday of Moshe Rabeinu, the anav m'kol ha'adam, and therefore Moshe emes v'toraso emes because Moshe had nothing of his own, he was just a kli kibul for Hashem's truth. 

This why we start Adar by being "mashmi'im al ha'shekalim," announcing the collection of machtzis ha'shekel.  You can't absorb the "chosamo shel HKB"H" of emes which is oneness if you are a splintered people divided into factions.  Machtzis ha'hekel = we need each other (and we need the humility to know that we need each other) in order to complete the picture, to provide the other half of the coin, so that we can function as one people.

zecher to the machtzis ha'shekel -- 3 coins or 1 -- Rama vs GR"A

The Rama (O.C. 694) writes that the minhag is to give three machtzis ha'shekels (bad dikduk, I know) on Ta'anis Esther because the word terumah appears 3x in parshas shekalim.  However, GR"A in Ma'aseh Rav (282) writes that the minhag is to give only one machtzis ha'shekel.

Aside from trying to understand the nekudas ha'machlokes between them, it's very hard to understand the Rama.  The reason we read parshas shekalim is to remember the annual donation of machtzis ha'shekel given to the mikdash to pay for korbanos tzibur expenses.  We once a year do something to remember this once a year donation. The additional shelakim alluded to in parshas shekalim were one-in-history donations used in constructing the mishkan.  Why do we need an annual remembrance for that?

My son pointed out that the GR"A in S"A on this Rama points you to Tos in Megillah (21) which says that on ta'aneisim we give tzedaka at mincha time.  My son suggested that the GR"A is perhaps not just explaining to us when the machtzis ha'shekel is given, but is defining for us the geder ha'din, what machtzis ha'shekel is -- it's not a zecher, but a din in hilchos tzedaka, just like tzedaka given on any ta'anis.  Therefore, the shiur is machtzis ha'shekel, not 3x a machtzis shekel.  The Rama understood that it is a zecher.

I'm not yet convinced that the GR"A there is doing anything more than explaining why the machtzis ha'shekel is given on ta'anis esther afternoon -- why not give it sometime close to when we read the parsha?   I would formulate the issue a little differently.  The GR"A sees our machtzis ha'shekel as a zecher to the machtzis ha'shekel of the mikdash.  The Rama perhaps sees giving machtzis ha'shekel as part and parcel of our kiyum of parshas shekalim.  By way of analogy, RYBS and others understood that our eating matzah on pesach night is not just a kiyum in achilas matzah, but is a kiyum in sipur as well -- it's part of how we tell the story.  So too here, perhaps Rama means that reading parshas shekalim also entails donating 3 machtzis shekalim --- davka 3, because 3 are alluded to in the parsha, and our giving is in some way an extension of the mitzvah of reading the parsha.  (I don't know if my explanation is any less dachuk, but I have no other ideas yet.) I found that R' Yisachar Shlomo Teichtel hy"d, who these days is better known as the author of Eim haBanim Smeicha, discusses this topic in his shu"t, Mishne Sachir.  (O.C. 34).  He quotes what appears to be two contradictory gemaras: On the one hand, the gemara (Meg 13) quotes Reish Lakish as teaching that the shekalim that Klal Yisrael gave in the midbar served to nullify the money Haman paid to bribe Achashveirosh.  We proved with our pocketbooks that we are dedicated to good before he even had the idea of showing his financial dedication to evil.   On the other hand, Chazal tell us (Meg 16) that Haman chanced upon Mordechai teaching hilchos kemitza of the korban mincha and remarked that the small offering of kemitza outweighed all the thousands he had poured into doing evil (Meg 16).  So which was it -- was it the shekalim donated to the Mishkan, or was it the actual offerings of the Mikdash, e.g. kemitza -- which foiled Haman's plans?

In a simplified nutshell, these two views represent the roots of the GR"A vs Rama.  According to Reish Lakish's view, the "kesef ha'kipurim" donated to the mishkan served as a kaparah not just for that generation, but for future generations as well -- for Mordechai and Esther's time, for our time, for all time.  Therefore, according to Rama we make a zecher even for the machtzis ha'shekel donated for the building of the mishkan.  However, if Haman's downfall was brought about by hilchos kemitza, it is the korbanos themselves, purchased with the single machtzis ha'shekel given annually, which is what saved us, and therefore, as GR"A writes, it is this single machtzis ha'shekel that we make a remembrance for.

who gave our kings their names? a chiddush of the Tiferes Yisrael

Last week I quoted the Seforno’s explanation of the double-language in language in the pasuk, “K’chu mei’itchem terumah la’Hashem kol nediv libo y’vi’eha es terumas Hashem…” (35:5) “Terumah la’Hashem,” explains the Seforno, was a voluntary donation; “terumas Hashem” was the required half shekel each individual had to bring.   The pasuk is telling us that both of these donations were brought together. Why should that be?

Rashi comments on “V’yikchu li terumah” that terumah has to be “li=lishmi,” given without ulterior motives, completely l’shem shamayim. R’ Shimon Sofer explains that this is why the two donations had to be given together. This can cut one of two ways: 1) When it comes to giving a voluntary amount, there is always the danger that someone is giving a lot just to show off. Therefore, the Torah says to bundle the voluntary donation with the required machtzis ha’shekel, where everyone gave the same amount, as a reminder to give for the right reason. 2) Since the machtzis ha’shekel was a requirement and not voluntary, there was the danger that people would be less motivated to give and not give with as full a heart. Therefore, the Torah says to bundle it with the voluntary donations.

2) Regarding the question I raised on the Netziv, pellehDin pointed out in the comments that the Netziv elsewhere identifies chochmah with yirah and inspiration, not just smarts. The Torah repeatedly refers in the parshiyos of the Mishkan to those who are “chachmei lev” – not chachmei mo’ach.  The artisans did not have a greater IQ or a bigger brain – what they had is a bigger heart. Or, as my son put it when I mentioned this topic to him, “Hein yiras Hashem hi chochmah.” The biggest chochma is to have yirah. That’s why the Netziv raised the question of how G-d can give such chochma/ inspiration when “hakol b’ydei shamayim chutz m’yiras shamayim.”  Apologies for not noticing the other Netziv until it was too late to change the post.

3) Shabbos Shekalim was a chance to review shekalim, and a Tiferes Yisrael in ch 6 caught my eye.  He elaborates on a point not directly connected to the Mishna there because, he writes, it is a peleh, something amazing, i.e. something we should take note of.  The peleh is:  the name of each king in Nach corresponds to a central theme or central event of that individual’s life.  For example, to take an easy one, Shaul – Bnei Yisrael asked, were sho’el, a king in his lifetime. Also, the monarchy was borrowed, sha’ul, from Yehudah, during his reign. David comes from the same word as “ani l’dodi,” beloved. The Tif Yisrael goes right down the list of kings until Tzidkiyahu, who was a tzadik and was matzdik the din against him. Was this just a remarkable coincidence that the names matched the events?  He suggests that there must have been nevi’im present at the royal births who suggested the names that were given. This makes sense when speaking of later kings who were part of a royal dynasty, but I don’t see how it works when comes to Shaul or David. No one knew they would be king – even Shmuel haNavi didn't suspect it.  Is it just coincidence that their names fit? My wife suggested that perhaps it was not a navi who chose the names, but it was the parents who are blessed with the special gift of ruach hakodesh when it comes to choosing names for their children.

In the same perek the Mishna refers to two gates on the western side of the azarah “she’lo haya lahem shem,” which were unnamed. The Tosfos Yom Tov points out that in fact Josephus tells us that there were no gates in the west, and there is no mention of these gates in Yechezkel.  The Tos Y”T is troubled by the discrepancy, and concludes that we have to side with Chazal’s mesorah. The Tiferes Yisrael quotes his father who read the Mishna in a way that avoids the problem. It’s not that the gates had no name, “shem,” but rather “she’lo haya lahem sham,” they were not there. As opposed to bayis rishon, where such gates might have existed, they were not present in bayis sheni. (I checked Kahati and his nikud follows the standard reading.) 

civil law and the source of human rights

1) Why does the Torah place open its discussion of civil law with the idea of eved ivri?  Why not talk about theft, propertly law, shomrim, etc,. all of which seem more common and more basic to establishing a just society than the laws of someone sold into slavery as a result of not being able to pay his debts?  And then there is the term “eved ivri” itself: Rashi already notes that it’s a confusing phrase – does it mean a slave (even non-Jewish) owned by a Jewish master, or does it mean the slave himself is Jewish?  Rashi has to connect the pasuk of “ki tikneh eved ivri” to another pasuk in Devarim of “ki yimacheir lecha achicha ha’ivri” to clarify and derive that it is in fact talking about a slave who is Jewish.  I was studying Chumash (a different parsha) with my youngest daughter a week or so ago and she asked a great question: if the Torah means what Rashi says, why doesn’t the Torah itself say so clearly?  We could ask the same question here: why does the Torah opt for the longer, more ambiguous phrase of “eved ivri” that requires a peirush Rashi to unravel instead of just simply saying “ivri,” which is both shorter and leaves no doubt that it means someone who is Jewish?  Lastly, the introduction of “ki tikneh eved ivri,” “When you acquire a Jewish slave…” seems unnecessary.  We are not discussing the laws of kinyanim here; we are discussing when and how the slave goes free.  The fact that the slave had to have been bought seems redundant and irrelevant to the main point of the parsha.  Why does the Torah bother to mention it?

When we hear the word “slavery” we immediately think of whippings, discrimination, perhaps even torture.  But this is not the concept of slavery the Torah speaks about in our parsha.  I would bet that if people went through the laws of avadim they might even find that they would be willing to trade their jobs with the job of being an eved because of the protections and security built into the system.  Why is the Torah’s concept of slavery so different than the concept we think of?  “Ki li Bnei Yisrael avadim” – Hashem has declared that we are his servants.  A Jew is not hefker.  We are responsible to Hashem, but by the same token, Hashem as our master looks after our interests as well. The Alshich explains that this is the meaning behind the phrase “eved ivri.”  Torah tells the potential slave master up front that when he buys a slave, what he is buying is an someone who already is indentured, someone who is already an “eved” and belongs to a Higher authority than their own.  There are limits to what can be done to the Jewish slave because ownership is not absolute – it must answer to a prior claim, to the real “owner” of every ivri, namely G-d.  Without that extra phrase “eved,” the entire moral thrust of the parsha is missing. 

It’s this concept of “ki li Bnei Yisrael avadim” which is the backbone for the entire parsha of Mishpatim and therefore serves as its first chapter.  Just this past week a news anchor declared that “our rights do not come from G-d,” something that would have been news to the founding fathers of the USA.  More importantly for us, it is a mistake the reveals the chasm between the Torah’s idea of rights, which do stem from G-d, from “ki li Bnei Yisrael avadim,” and the idea of rights in other cultures and societies. 

2) In an earlier post I wrote that the eved ivri is pierced only if he chooses to stay on with his master and not at the time that he chooses to sell himself because at the time he made the choice to become an eved he may not have known what he is getting himself into.  If after experiencing avdus he still hasn’t learned the lesson, then he deserves to be punished.  The Sefas Emes raises an objection: shouldn’t the choice to remain an eved be a less serious offense considering that the eved has gotten used to the situation and become habituated to it?  “Ahavti es adoni v’es ishti v’es banay…”  For better or worse, the slave is comfortable where he is and doesn’t welcome change. 

The answer is that it’s this habituation to being a slave that is exactly what we are punishing!  To say that one is comfortable being an eved only proves how low and degraded the individual has allowed himself to become. 

3) Let me end off with something about shekalim.  I don’t think there is a charity in the world that would turn away donations, yet that’s exactly what the Torah seems to suggest: “he’ashir lo yarbeh v’ha’dal lo yamit,” the rich can’t give more than a half a shekel and the poor can’t give less.  Shouldn’t the person who wants to give be encouraged, not turned away?

Some organizations send letters where you can just check a box to confirm the amount you want to give.  What’s interesting is the scale of the donations you can choose from on these letters: you have your organizations where the lowest amount is something like $18, but then you have the organizations where the lowest amount is $100 and it goes up exponentially from there.  It’s either a deliberate ploy to try to get a higher amount or it just doesn’t occur to them that some people may not have $100 to plunk down.  In either case, when you get that letter, you feel what’s the point of checking the box that says “other” and sending in your $18 – that’s clearly not what they are interested in.  The same idea holds true for shekalim. Imagine if when the shekalim were collected the first gut stepped forward with a huge  sack of money, the next guy has an even bigger sack, and then along comes a guy like me with a half shekel – I would just turn around and go home.  Why bother when clearly it’s the big rollers who are managing the whole show?  So the Torah says there is one box to check here: half a shekel.  Everyone can pitch in equally.

But what about the guy who is so motivated, who wants to give more?  The Sefas Emes says a brilliant answer: that individual is giving, and what he is giving is worth more than his dollars – he is giving others the opportunity to have a share and participate. He is giving part of “his” mitzvah to the tzibur so that everyone can have a chance.  That’s no less a form of generosity than writing a bigger check, and sometimes it's an even harder mitzvah to do.

is there a makeup if you miss reading parshas shekalim?

What’s the din if b’dieved a tzibur was not able to read parshas shekalim on the appropriate Shabbos – can they do a makeup next Shabbos or some other time? 

At first glance one would think that the 4 parshiyos are just like the special readings done on any Yom Tov. If, for example, you don’t do the correct Torah reading on the first day of Pesach, you can’t make it up the week after Pesach. So too, if you miss reading shekalim on the appropriate week, there is no makeup.

R’ Akiva Eiger paskens this way, but the Eishel Avraham and Maharam Shi”k disagree. The gemara (Meg 29b) compares the takanah to read shekalim to the din of learning hilchos yom tov 30 days before a chag. Since the new shekalim had to be brought by Rosh Chodesh Nisan, the reading was done 30 days earlier to give people advance notice to prepare. Obviously if you don’t start learning hilchos Yom Tov exactly 30 days before a chag, that doesn’t mean you should give up – aderaba, start the next day or as soon as possible (Shu”T Maharam Shi”K 365).

It sounds like the machlokes revolves around the classic issue of whether the reason behind a takanah impacts the din’s parameters. According to R’ Akiva Eiger, there was a takanah to read shekalim on a specific shabbos – the reason behind the takanah does not change anything. According to the Maharam Shi”k, we take the reason into account.

If you want to go a step further, perhaps the Maharam Shi”k would say that if indeed the reading of shekalim belonged on the list of takanos of special Torah readings for special days, then R’ Akiva Eiger would be right. But it doesn’t belong on that list. The takanah is not a din in kri’as haTorah – it’s simply a reminder. It’s the equivalent of the gabai giving a klap on the bimah and yelling out “Don’t forget whatever.” There is no halachic structure called “give a klap on the bimah,” so Chazal used the structure of kri’as haTorah instead to accomplish the same goal. The gemara’s comparison to the din of learning hilchos hachag before Yom Tov is not just a superficial analogy to make the point of when shekalim should be read -- it's telling us that the two halachos are fundametally similar.  Just like learning hilchos ha'chag is just a means of getting us in the mindset for Yom Tov, so too, reading shekalim is just a means to an end, a utilitarian reminder.  Not so the kri'ah on Yom Tov, which is an expression of and helps establish the underlying kedushas hayom (for more on that, see this post).

Haman's shekalim vs. ours

The gemara (Meg 13) writes that Haman’s payment to Achashveirosh to gain permission to destroy the Jewish  people was foiled because our payment of shekalim preceded his.  The coincidence of Haman using shekalim to enable his plot and our doing a mitzvah using shekalim seems to be just that – coincidence.  What’s  the connection between the ideas?

 “Vayivez b’einav lishloach yad b’Mordechai livado ki higidu lo es am Mordechai.”  It seems that there was some “hava amina” in Haman’s mind to strike at Mordechai alone, but then when he heard what people Mordechai came from, he decided to strike at them all.  What has the shakla v’terya behind his thinking?   Rav Moshe Avigdor Amiel explains that Haman originally thought that attacking Mordechai would inevitably bring about the downfall of whatever nation he was part of, as the loss of his leadership would have a massive effect on the population.  However, when “higidu lo es am Mordechai,” when he heard that Mordechai was a member of the Jewish people, he realized that all bets were off.  The chalos shem “tzibur” that applies uniquely to Am Yisrael means that we are more than a collection of individual parts, each with its own identity.  We are not like a car that is made up of a part that is a door, a part that is a motor, a part that is a transmission.  Were that the case, then knocking out the most essential part (e.g. the motor) would cripple the entire vehicle.  The whole of the “tzibur” or “am” is a qualitatively more complex and complete unit than even the sum of its parts and can and will continue to exist absent any member, no matter how significant.  Haman saw that the only way he could win would be by eliminating all the parts completely – which we know to be impossible.

It is the collection of shekalim that reveals this to be true.  The Mishna in Shekalim tells us that the Kohanim thought that they should be exempt from contributing shekalim, as the korban of a kohein is completely burnt.  If the Kohanim own a portion of the korban tzibur by virtue of donating shekalim, they argued, it would mean the halachos of that korban would change to require complete burning of the entire korban.  The Chachamim disagreed.  A korban tzibur is not owned by the sum of the individuals who contribute to its being offered, but is owned by the collective entity called “tzibur” that is greater than the sum of its parts. 

The Midrash writes that Moshe complained to Hashem that once he is gone, there will be no memory left of him.  What will the car be without its engine?  Hashem responded that just as he collected shekalim in his lifetime, it will be as if he continues every year to collect shekalim through our reading of the parsha.  The “tzibur” remains a constant, always retaining the qualities of its members, past, present, and future.  And in turn, they continue to exist by virtue of our collective continuity as a "tzibur."

shekalim donated by a katan

The Mishna in Shekalim writes that although a katan is exempt from the mitzvah of giving machtzis hashekel, if he voluntarily gives, his money is accepted.  The Sha’ar haMelech asks: M’doraysa a katan has no power to be makneh anything to others.  Therefore, the machtzis hashekel money which he gives is owned by hekdesh only m’derabbanan.   Since korbanos tzibur must be bought from the public funds, funds that belong to the tzibur, how is the tzibur yotzei if they use this machtzis hashekel that (m’doraysa) still belongs to the katan?

The Sha’ar haMelech’s suggests that the katan’s machtzis hashekel is but a drop in the bucket compared with thousands of other shekalim donated and is therefore bateil b’rov.  

Many Achronim since have debated how to make sense of this chiddush.  The gemara in Beitzah (38) writes that if I contribute some ingredients to a Yom Tov dish you are cooking, you can’t move the dish outside the limits of my techum; my portion of the ingredients are not bateil.  Just because most of the dish belongs to you doesn’t mean the entire dish belongs to you.  So how is it that just because the majority of the shekalim funds used to buy korbanos belong to the tzibur, the percentage that may belong to a katan can be ignored?   Aside from the gemara, it’s hard to understand how logically the sevara works.  If I mix $10 of yours with a bunch of other bills in my wallet, does your $10 become mine because it is bateil b’rov?  Of course not.  Ownership cannot be bateil.  What does the Sha’ar haMelech mean?

(Aside from the dinei mamonos issue, there is an issue that impacts issur v’heter here as well. Oneg Yom Tov discusses whether bitul b’rov helps in a case where strings for tzitzis not made lishma become mixed into a rov of those that were made lishma – does bitul mean that the miyut takes on the properties of the rov, or does bitul simply render a miyut as if it did not exist?  It seems that the Sha’as haMelech comes down squarely on the side of saying that the miyut takes on the property of the rov, meaning the money of the katan is treated a tzibur money because that is the quality of the majority of funds.)

I think the easiest answer in a nutshell is that the difference between the gemara in Beitzah and this din in Shekalim is that the gemara is speaking about bitul b’rov – when a whole mixture is present, is a miyut counted apart from the whole?  The Sha’ar haMelech’s question is one of kol d’parish – when the gizbar pulls a bunch of coins from the lishka to buy new korbanos (terumas halishka), is there a potential “bad” shekel that belongs to a katan in the mix?  These are two different issues entirely.  To return to the analogy of a wallet, it’s true that if you take your friend’s $10 and mix it into your wallet, that $10 doesn’t become yours, but that doesn’t change the fact that if you pull put a $10 bill at random, odds are that it is one that truly is yours and not the bill you took from your friend.  But again, lots of bigger minds than mine have what to say on these issues (and yes, the Mishna at the end of Me'ila will pose a problem that I don't have time to work out right now.)

Of course, if you hold a kinyan derabbanan has a chalos on a d'oraysa level (see posts here and here), then the whole issue is moot.

the fiery shekel

The Midrash teaches that Moshe found the parsha of shekalim difficult to understand. Hashem responded by showing him a “matbe’a shel eish” pulled from under his throne. The Midrash is ambiguous – what did Moshe find hard to understand and how did Hashem’s response allay his concern? – and it leaves the door open to various interpretations.

The Sefas Emes explains: Machatzis hashekel was an equalizer. No matter how rich or poor you were, you had to give exactly half a shekel, no more and no less. This was the point which troubled Moshe. Are the poor man and the rich, the stingy miser and the benevolent “nediv lev” really cut from the same cloth? How can all people be expected to give exactly the same amount, to be counted the same way, as if on some level all are equal? Especially in our day and age, where our community is so splintered, with so many divergent viewpoints on anything and everything, does it make sense to speak of commonality in any sense of the word?

להגיד גדולתו של מלך מלכי המלכים, הקדוש ברוך הוא, שאדם טובע מאה מטבעות בחותם אחד, וכולן דומין זה לזה, מלך מלכי המלכים הקדוש ברוך הוא טובע את כל האדם בחותמו של אדם הראשון, ואין אחד מהם דומה לחברו. לפיכך לכל אחד ואחד לומר, בשבילי נברא העולם.

The Mishna in Sanhedrin (4:5) teaches that Hashem was “tove’a” all humanity with one common stamp. The word “matbe’a” used by the Mishna shares the same root as this word “tove’a” used in the Mishna. It was this commonality which Hashem showed Moshe in response to his questions. As different as we appear on the surface, underneath it all we do share a common core. The Midrash refers to a “matbe’a shel eish,” a burning stamp, because as different as how we act, how we speak, how we think, there is an inextinguishable spark of common goodness that lies in the heart.