Rabbi Dr Aaron Twerski writes in Crain's that the success some hareidim achieve in the business world proves that the education in hareidi schools is more than adequate to meet the needs of the secular world.
One can debate how many B&H Photo-like successes stories it takes to outweigh the many sad stories of hareidim who remain unemployed and unemployable due to lack of basic skills. However, I think R' Twerski's piece suffers from a more basic error: Education does not mean having a good job. There may be some correlation between the two, but they certainly are not identical.
If the entire purpose of education was to allow one to succeed in business, I would say we should end school at about sixth grade, or certainly by the end of elementary school. (Some of you, like me, may be old enough to remember Robert Fulghum's All I Really Need to Know I Learned in Kindergarten.) We should abolish algebra and trigonometry from the curriculum (it would certainly spare me my daughter's constant whining, "Why do we have to learn this?!") We should forget about challenging students to read Hamlet or Lear, to learn about other parts of the world, to discover something of past history, or to study other living creatures.
None of the above will help them run a business. None of the above are required to succeed at most professions. It will help them, however, appreciate their humanity, their past, the world around them. In other words, it will make them educated.
R' Twerski, this is what is lacking in the hareidi school system.
Sunday, December 31, 2017
Wednesday, December 27, 2017
the bracha of self awareness
Ya'akov's final charge to his children concludes, "V'zos asher dibeir lahem avihem vayivarch osam..." (49:28) This is the blessings that he gave them.
Blessings? Reuvain was told that he is impetuous. Shimon and Levi were told that they were guilty of murder, that they angered too quickly and plotted to do wrong. What kind of blessings are these? Ibn Ezra (48:1) writes in fact that what Ya'akov told his children was not a bracha -- it was a nevuah of their future. Afterwards, "vayivarech osam..." he gave them some blessing that is not recorded, but what was said until that point was prophecy (see also Ohr haChaim 49:28).
Ralbag disagrees and says that yes, even what was said to Reuvain, Shimon, and Levi is a bracha. It's a bracha to know you are impetuous. It's a bracha to know you anger easily. It's a bracha to know you are aggressive. When a person recognizes their own personality traits -- and I deliberately say traits and not flaws -- then they can control and channel those traits properly. It doesn't have to be a flaw if you are aware of it and manage it properly. The bracha Ya'akov gave his children is the bracha of self-awareness.
Blessings? Reuvain was told that he is impetuous. Shimon and Levi were told that they were guilty of murder, that they angered too quickly and plotted to do wrong. What kind of blessings are these? Ibn Ezra (48:1) writes in fact that what Ya'akov told his children was not a bracha -- it was a nevuah of their future. Afterwards, "vayivarech osam..." he gave them some blessing that is not recorded, but what was said until that point was prophecy (see also Ohr haChaim 49:28).
Ralbag disagrees and says that yes, even what was said to Reuvain, Shimon, and Levi is a bracha. It's a bracha to know you are impetuous. It's a bracha to know you anger easily. It's a bracha to know you are aggressive. When a person recognizes their own personality traits -- and I deliberately say traits and not flaws -- then they can control and channel those traits properly. It doesn't have to be a flaw if you are aware of it and manage it properly. The bracha Ya'akov gave his children is the bracha of self-awareness.
Monday, December 25, 2017
bracha on shul talis
The M"B paskens in 14:11 that if a person takes a shul talis to get an aliya or daven for the amud he is obligated to say a bracha on the talis. The logic here is that the shul talis is jointly owned by everyone in the shul. Therefore, just like you would say a bracha on your own talis, you should say a bracha on the shul talis.
Maybe I am wrong, but my impression is that most people do not recite a bracha when they take a shul talis to daven for the amud. Maybe the reason why is because if you fast forward to the M"B in 18:5, there he paskens that anyone who davens for the amud, even someone who says kadish, needs to put on a talis; however, since he is just wearing the talis for kavod tzibur and not as a garment, no bracha is recited.
I am not sure how you get these two M"B's to fit together. In 14:11 M"B applies the sevara of the garment being worn only l'kavod tzibur only to a talis borrowed from another individual. It sounds like the concern is that since you are borrowing the talis only for the purpose of kavod tzibur, the person lending it is not really makneh it to you for use as a garment. However, if the talis belongs to you, or is the shul talis, i.e. it belongs to everyone, then even if you put it purely l'kavod tzibur, a bracha is required. Yet this seems to fly in the face of the psak in 18:5.
Maybe I am wrong, but my impression is that most people do not recite a bracha when they take a shul talis to daven for the amud. Maybe the reason why is because if you fast forward to the M"B in 18:5, there he paskens that anyone who davens for the amud, even someone who says kadish, needs to put on a talis; however, since he is just wearing the talis for kavod tzibur and not as a garment, no bracha is recited.
I am not sure how you get these two M"B's to fit together. In 14:11 M"B applies the sevara of the garment being worn only l'kavod tzibur only to a talis borrowed from another individual. It sounds like the concern is that since you are borrowing the talis only for the purpose of kavod tzibur, the person lending it is not really makneh it to you for use as a garment. However, if the talis belongs to you, or is the shul talis, i.e. it belongs to everyone, then even if you put it purely l'kavod tzibur, a bracha is required. Yet this seems to fly in the face of the psak in 18:5.
Sunday, December 24, 2017
ha'od avi chai?
"Ani Yosef -- Ha'od avi chai?"
Surely Yosef was aware that his father was still alive, as he had been told so already numerous times by his brothers. Yehudah had just finished arguing that Binyamin must be allowed to return home lest his absence cause Ya'akov's death. So what was Yosef asking?
Rashi in Parshas VaYeishev (37:2) tells us that Ya'akov and Yosef shared many similarities. Not only were their life stories similar, but, says Rashi, they even looked alike.
Yosef therefore wondered: granted that when he left home he was still young and had no beard, but even so, how could his brothers fail to recognize him? He was the spitting image of their father -- how could they stand before him, eat with him, meet with him multiple times, and fail to see that it was him?
Perhaps, worried Yosef, a little too much of Egypt had rubbed off on him. Perhaps that resemblance to Ya'akov, which was as much a product of a spiritual resemblance as much as physical looks, had been lost.
Yosef's first question therefore was "Is my father still alive?" -- do you see his image alive within me? Do I still resemble my father? Or have I become just another Egyptian?
"V'lo yachlu echav la'anos oso ki nivhalu mi'PANAV." Suddenly the brothers saw the truth -- the face they were looking at, the face of Yosef, was the face of Ya'akov Avinu. Despite all that had happened, their brother Yosef had not lost that resemblance, physical and spiritual, to their father Ya'akov.
Isn't this the question we all need to ask ourselves? When we look in the mirror, do we see our parents and grandparents reflected there? "Ha'od avi chai?" Or do we see a foreign face, someone with foreign values and a foreign lifestyle, someone who looks nothing like the past that he/she came from?
(Based on R' Chaim Charlap's Mayan Chaim here)
Surely Yosef was aware that his father was still alive, as he had been told so already numerous times by his brothers. Yehudah had just finished arguing that Binyamin must be allowed to return home lest his absence cause Ya'akov's death. So what was Yosef asking?
Rashi in Parshas VaYeishev (37:2) tells us that Ya'akov and Yosef shared many similarities. Not only were their life stories similar, but, says Rashi, they even looked alike.
Yosef therefore wondered: granted that when he left home he was still young and had no beard, but even so, how could his brothers fail to recognize him? He was the spitting image of their father -- how could they stand before him, eat with him, meet with him multiple times, and fail to see that it was him?
Perhaps, worried Yosef, a little too much of Egypt had rubbed off on him. Perhaps that resemblance to Ya'akov, which was as much a product of a spiritual resemblance as much as physical looks, had been lost.
Yosef's first question therefore was "Is my father still alive?" -- do you see his image alive within me? Do I still resemble my father? Or have I become just another Egyptian?
"V'lo yachlu echav la'anos oso ki nivhalu mi'PANAV." Suddenly the brothers saw the truth -- the face they were looking at, the face of Yosef, was the face of Ya'akov Avinu. Despite all that had happened, their brother Yosef had not lost that resemblance, physical and spiritual, to their father Ya'akov.
Isn't this the question we all need to ask ourselves? When we look in the mirror, do we see our parents and grandparents reflected there? "Ha'od avi chai?" Or do we see a foreign face, someone with foreign values and a foreign lifestyle, someone who looks nothing like the past that he/she came from?
(Based on R' Chaim Charlap's Mayan Chaim here)
Thursday, December 14, 2017
chanukah without a menorah?
You would think that if the whole celebration of Chanukah is about the Chashmonaim being able to light the menorah in the beis hamikdash, then the way we should celebrate is by lighting a menorah in our homes. Yet that is not the halacha. "Ner ish u'beiso" is the mitzvah -- just one candle per night per house. Not only that, but the achronim discuss whether or not you even need to use a menorah to hold however many candles you light -- maybe you can even just stick your candles in the windowsill or doorway all by themselves, with no kli to hold them, and light that way. One light, no menorah -- how is this at all like what the Chashmonaim did?
Can I be yotzei writing about the parsha by quoting a Rogatchover in Tzofnas Pa'aneiach? : ) The Rambam writes in Hil Temidim u'Musafim 10:13:
נר מערבי שכבה אין מדליקין אותו אחר דשונו אלא ממזבח אבל שאר הנרות כל נר שכבה מהן מדליקו מנר חבירו:
In case you missed the Rambam's point, the Raavad makes note:
א"א נראה מדבריו שהוא עכוב לנר מערבי שלא להדליקו אלא ממזבח העולה
The Rambam tells us that the ner ma'aravi, unlike all the other lamps in the menorah, must -- an absolute requirement -- be lit only using the fire of the mizbeyach.
Read the Rambam in Hil Chanukah 3:2 carefully and you will see that he doesn't say that when the Chashmonaim found an untainted jug of oil they lit the menorah. What he says is that they lit "neiros ha'ma'aracha," they lit the fire on the mizbeyach. The Rogatchover writes that Rambam stresses this point because the Chashmonaim did not actually light the whole menorah -- what they lit for 8 days was only that single ner ma'aravi, which must be kindled with mizbeyach fire.
But what about the din (Menachos 28) that the 7 neiros of the menorah are me'akeiv each other, i.e. you need to light them all to be yotzei lighting the menorah?
Apparently the Rogatchover understood (see his Shu"t #251 and see R Wahrman's Sheiris Yosef vol 1 #24 who develops this theme) that there are 2 dinim in play here: 1) a mitzvah of hadlakah, which can be fulfilled even by lighting the single ner ma'aravi from the mizbeyach; 2) a mitzvah for the cheftza of the menorah to be lit, which is accomplished when all the candles that are part of the menorah are kindled (the choice of Brisker language here is mine and is inexact.)
Rav Wahrman brings a brilliant proof to the Rogatchover's idea. The gemara debates whether it is permissible to use one Chanukah candle to light another one -- madlikin m'ner l'ner. One proof the gemara tries to bring is from the fact that the lamps of the menorah were lit from the ner ma'aravi. At first glance the analogy from menorah to Chanukah candles makes no sense. Once one lights one Chanukah light, the essential mitzvah has been done -- lighting additional lights is a secondary hidur. However, until all the branches of the menorah have been lit, the essential mitzvah of lighting menorah is incomplete. How are these two cases comparable?
It must be that lighting the ner ma'aravi is a complete kiyum in and of itself, even if the rest of the menorah lights are not lit.
Based on this idea we can answer the question of the Tos Yeshanim (Yoma 24b). The gemara says that the hadlakah of the menorah in the mikdash can be done even by a zar. Tos Yeshanim asks: so why then does Parshas Beha'alosecha, which opens with the mitzvah of lighting the menorah, address itself specifically to Aharon? According to the Rambam, the answer is simple: Parshas Beha'aloscha is speaking about the ner ma'aravi ("el mul pnei ha'menorah...") which must be lit from the mizbeyach, which only a kohen has access to; the gemara is speaking about the second din of lighting the menorah as a whole.
Coming back to our original questions, R' Wahrman quotes his rebbe, R' Leizer Silver, who explained based on this Rogatchover that Chanukah commemorates lighting the single ner ma'aravi, and therefore, Chazal instituted that the base mitzvah consist of ner ish u'beiso, one simple candle. Lighting the whole menorah is a hidur, a secondary kiyum -- even using a menorah is secondary -- but what is essential is simply lighting just one candle.
This has already been a long post, but I do want to make just one point about R' Shteinman zt"l. There has been so much written this week about him, but what I found most incredible is a video clip of him sitting at his desk, surrounded by little school age kids, and him testing them on mishnayos. This was one of the gedolei ha'dor, someone who had the problems of Klal Yisrael on his shoulders, someone consulted by leaders, other Roshei Yeshiva, etc. Can you imagine a big politician stopping by an elementary school to test children on their math skills, or something like that? Unheard of. R' Shteinman, despite a schedule crammed with meetings with bigwigs who sought his advise and counsel, never lost sight of the importance of simple people and simple things like inspiring Jewish children to learn Torah. That's gadlus.
Can I be yotzei writing about the parsha by quoting a Rogatchover in Tzofnas Pa'aneiach? : ) The Rambam writes in Hil Temidim u'Musafim 10:13:
נר מערבי שכבה אין מדליקין אותו אחר דשונו אלא ממזבח אבל שאר הנרות כל נר שכבה מהן מדליקו מנר חבירו:
In case you missed the Rambam's point, the Raavad makes note:
א"א נראה מדבריו שהוא עכוב לנר מערבי שלא להדליקו אלא ממזבח העולה
The Rambam tells us that the ner ma'aravi, unlike all the other lamps in the menorah, must -- an absolute requirement -- be lit only using the fire of the mizbeyach.
Read the Rambam in Hil Chanukah 3:2 carefully and you will see that he doesn't say that when the Chashmonaim found an untainted jug of oil they lit the menorah. What he says is that they lit "neiros ha'ma'aracha," they lit the fire on the mizbeyach. The Rogatchover writes that Rambam stresses this point because the Chashmonaim did not actually light the whole menorah -- what they lit for 8 days was only that single ner ma'aravi, which must be kindled with mizbeyach fire.
But what about the din (Menachos 28) that the 7 neiros of the menorah are me'akeiv each other, i.e. you need to light them all to be yotzei lighting the menorah?
Apparently the Rogatchover understood (see his Shu"t #251 and see R Wahrman's Sheiris Yosef vol 1 #24 who develops this theme) that there are 2 dinim in play here: 1) a mitzvah of hadlakah, which can be fulfilled even by lighting the single ner ma'aravi from the mizbeyach; 2) a mitzvah for the cheftza of the menorah to be lit, which is accomplished when all the candles that are part of the menorah are kindled (the choice of Brisker language here is mine and is inexact.)
Rav Wahrman brings a brilliant proof to the Rogatchover's idea. The gemara debates whether it is permissible to use one Chanukah candle to light another one -- madlikin m'ner l'ner. One proof the gemara tries to bring is from the fact that the lamps of the menorah were lit from the ner ma'aravi. At first glance the analogy from menorah to Chanukah candles makes no sense. Once one lights one Chanukah light, the essential mitzvah has been done -- lighting additional lights is a secondary hidur. However, until all the branches of the menorah have been lit, the essential mitzvah of lighting menorah is incomplete. How are these two cases comparable?
It must be that lighting the ner ma'aravi is a complete kiyum in and of itself, even if the rest of the menorah lights are not lit.
Based on this idea we can answer the question of the Tos Yeshanim (Yoma 24b). The gemara says that the hadlakah of the menorah in the mikdash can be done even by a zar. Tos Yeshanim asks: so why then does Parshas Beha'alosecha, which opens with the mitzvah of lighting the menorah, address itself specifically to Aharon? According to the Rambam, the answer is simple: Parshas Beha'aloscha is speaking about the ner ma'aravi ("el mul pnei ha'menorah...") which must be lit from the mizbeyach, which only a kohen has access to; the gemara is speaking about the second din of lighting the menorah as a whole.
Coming back to our original questions, R' Wahrman quotes his rebbe, R' Leizer Silver, who explained based on this Rogatchover that Chanukah commemorates lighting the single ner ma'aravi, and therefore, Chazal instituted that the base mitzvah consist of ner ish u'beiso, one simple candle. Lighting the whole menorah is a hidur, a secondary kiyum -- even using a menorah is secondary -- but what is essential is simply lighting just one candle.
This has already been a long post, but I do want to make just one point about R' Shteinman zt"l. There has been so much written this week about him, but what I found most incredible is a video clip of him sitting at his desk, surrounded by little school age kids, and him testing them on mishnayos. This was one of the gedolei ha'dor, someone who had the problems of Klal Yisrael on his shoulders, someone consulted by leaders, other Roshei Yeshiva, etc. Can you imagine a big politician stopping by an elementary school to test children on their math skills, or something like that? Unheard of. R' Shteinman, despite a schedule crammed with meetings with bigwigs who sought his advise and counsel, never lost sight of the importance of simple people and simple things like inspiring Jewish children to learn Torah. That's gadlus.
Wednesday, December 06, 2017
v'kisinu es damo -- the cover-up
1. Rashi in last weeks parsha comments on the words "vayichbkeyhu... vayishakeyhu" (33:4) that even though it was out of character for Eisav to express love for Ya'akov, in this case the hugs and kisses were sincere as he was truly moved. Yet two weeks ago in Parshas VaYeitzei the Torah uses nearly the identical phrase of "va'yichabek lo va'yinashek lo..." (29:3) in describing Lavan's greeting of Ya'akov and there Rashi writes that Lavan was insincere and was trying to pat down Ya'akov to find out if he had any jewels on him. Why in one case does Rashi interpret the hugs and kisses as sincere expressions of love and in the other case as a selfishly motivated act?
HaKsav vHaKabbalah explains that in describing what Lavan did, the Torah separates the verb from it's object: "va'yinasek" = verb, "lo" = object. There was a disconnect between what Lavan was doing and what he felt about Ya'akov. In describing Eisav's actions, the Torah lumps subject, verb, and object into one word: "vayichakeyhu." The person taking action -- Eisav -- was 100% invested into the action of giving those hugs and kisses. There was no disconnect between them and his true self, his true emotions.
R' Yisrael Resiman brilliantly connects this to our parsha. "V'lo yachlu dabro l'shalom..." Of course, had the brothers wants to, they could have spoken nicely to Yosef and about Yosef. But they wouldn't have meant it. It would just be words. They couldn't speak in the manner of "dabro," subject+verb+object in one, where your true self is invested 100%in what you say and every word reflects your true feelings.
2. Speaking of the Ksav vHaKabbalah, here's another nice one: Yehudah says, "Mah betzah ki na'harog es achinu v'kisinu es damo." (37:26) Why should we kill Yosef and have to cover up his blood? It's an incomprehensible statement. Is this the way the shivtei K-h speak? This is like a line from a Mafia movie. Yehudah is only worried about having to do a cover-up once the crime is committed -- aside from that, no problem?
HaKsav vHaKabbalah explains that the word kisinu here does not mean cover-up. It is like the word ksus, a garment. Yehudah was giving mussar to his brothers! If Yosef is killed, he told them, then we will wear the guilt of that deed like a badge of shame for all of our lives.
The kabbalists speak of the body being a levush for the neshoma. A person can take his holy neshoma and dress it in a body that does all kind of crimes and misdeeds. When Yaakov stole his father's brachos dressed up like Eisav, what that meant is that even when the precious neshoma of a Jew finds itself in the kesus, the levush, of Eisav, his inside remains pure and blessed.
When Eishes Potifar tries to seduce Yosef, the Torah tells us, "Vatispiseihu b'bigdo," she grabbed his clothing (39:12). The Sefas Emes explains that the yetzer ha'ra has the power to sink its hook into our external levush=begged=kesus. The yetzer can't really get at who we are deep down, but he can nip at our externals and try to change our behavior and our outer personality. (It's a great strategy because how many of us are in touch with or even think about who we are deep down? Life is about switching from one role to another, one levush to the next, without taking the time to pay attention to what's underneath.) So what does Yosef do? "Va'ya'azov bigdo b'yadah," he abandons that outer shell. He retreats into himself and digs down to his root core. (My wife has a creative take on these pesukim here.) Once you do that, the yetzer no longer has a hold.
HaKsav vHaKabbalah explains that in describing what Lavan did, the Torah separates the verb from it's object: "va'yinasek" = verb, "lo" = object. There was a disconnect between what Lavan was doing and what he felt about Ya'akov. In describing Eisav's actions, the Torah lumps subject, verb, and object into one word: "vayichakeyhu." The person taking action -- Eisav -- was 100% invested into the action of giving those hugs and kisses. There was no disconnect between them and his true self, his true emotions.
R' Yisrael Resiman brilliantly connects this to our parsha. "V'lo yachlu dabro l'shalom..." Of course, had the brothers wants to, they could have spoken nicely to Yosef and about Yosef. But they wouldn't have meant it. It would just be words. They couldn't speak in the manner of "dabro," subject+verb+object in one, where your true self is invested 100%in what you say and every word reflects your true feelings.
2. Speaking of the Ksav vHaKabbalah, here's another nice one: Yehudah says, "Mah betzah ki na'harog es achinu v'kisinu es damo." (37:26) Why should we kill Yosef and have to cover up his blood? It's an incomprehensible statement. Is this the way the shivtei K-h speak? This is like a line from a Mafia movie. Yehudah is only worried about having to do a cover-up once the crime is committed -- aside from that, no problem?
HaKsav vHaKabbalah explains that the word kisinu here does not mean cover-up. It is like the word ksus, a garment. Yehudah was giving mussar to his brothers! If Yosef is killed, he told them, then we will wear the guilt of that deed like a badge of shame for all of our lives.
The kabbalists speak of the body being a levush for the neshoma. A person can take his holy neshoma and dress it in a body that does all kind of crimes and misdeeds. When Yaakov stole his father's brachos dressed up like Eisav, what that meant is that even when the precious neshoma of a Jew finds itself in the kesus, the levush, of Eisav, his inside remains pure and blessed.
When Eishes Potifar tries to seduce Yosef, the Torah tells us, "Vatispiseihu b'bigdo," she grabbed his clothing (39:12). The Sefas Emes explains that the yetzer ha'ra has the power to sink its hook into our external levush=begged=kesus. The yetzer can't really get at who we are deep down, but he can nip at our externals and try to change our behavior and our outer personality. (It's a great strategy because how many of us are in touch with or even think about who we are deep down? Life is about switching from one role to another, one levush to the next, without taking the time to pay attention to what's underneath.) So what does Yosef do? "Va'ya'azov bigdo b'yadah," he abandons that outer shell. He retreats into himself and digs down to his root core. (My wife has a creative take on these pesukim here.) Once you do that, the yetzer no longer has a hold.
historic
Are you tired of winning yet? I'm not.
It is lovely to hear and read the protests by the usual Jew haters and self-hating Jews whose moral and intellectual compass is almost always 180 degrees off the mark.
Despite all his faults, aren't you glad you chose
It is lovely to hear and read the protests by the usual Jew haters and self-hating Jews whose moral and intellectual compass is almost always 180 degrees off the mark.
Despite all his faults, aren't you glad you chose
And not
In case you are too lazy to look it up, here is a link to the White House contact page where you can express your hakaras ha'tov.
Kima'ah Kima'ah -- baby steps.
Since it's 19 Kislev, at the risk of sacrilege, let me end with this:
Keep up the winning Mr. Trump!
Monday, December 04, 2017
a place in the beis medrash
I came across an interesting Avos d"R' Nosson by way of this shiur from Dr/Reb Michal Tukachinsky.
חופר גומץ בו יפול וגו' – זו דינה בת לאה
שהיו אחיה ובית אביה יושבים ושונים בבית המדרש,
ויצאה לראות בבנות הארץ שנאמר: ותצא דינה בת לאה (בראשית ל"ד א')
מי הוא נחש שנשכה? זה שכם בן חמור (אבות דר' נתן נוסחא ב פ"ג)
Chazal describe how Ya'akov and his sons were learning in the beis medrash, but Dinah went out and was poreitz geder, which is why she was taken by Shechem. It is possible that Chazal here are suggesting that Ya'akov and sons are at least partially to blame here for ignoring their sister while she wandered off. They were in their own world oblivious to her until it was too late.
That alone is an interesting idea, but I think there is another message especially relevant to our time in this Chazal. How is a Dinah situation to be avoided? One approach is that if the problem is "poreitz geder," then the solution must be to build a better, bigger, stronger geder. And this is exactly what most girls' education boils down to (trust me -- I have 3 girls.)
But there is another way. Ya'akov and his sons were not in danger from Shechem because they were busy in the beis medrash. There is no temptation for them to go out. It's only Dinah who is not part of that world who lands in trouble. The solution would therefore seem to be to help her find a place within it.
Does that mean Beis Ya'akov should start teaching R' Chaim's and Ketzos? Lav davka. You don't need that to have a place in the walls of the beis medrash. For you men out there, you don't know what you are missing if you have never read/heard a sichah from Yemima Mizrachi. Here is a woman (and there are others like her) teaching torah on the parsha that inspires hundreds of women who come to hear her every week. It's musar, chassidus, hashkafa, pshat -- all of that is part of torah too.
So why don't we have more Yemina Mizrachi's, more Michal Tukachinsky's? Because we have become so afraid of the dreaded threat of "feminism" in the form of JOFA and the like that we've overcompensated and gone to the opposite extreme. We've kicked women out of the figurative beis medrash and become obsessed with walls. Walls don't inspire. Walls don't feed the intellect or the heart. Perhaps a different strategy is needed.
חופר גומץ בו יפול וגו' – זו דינה בת לאה
שהיו אחיה ובית אביה יושבים ושונים בבית המדרש,
ויצאה לראות בבנות הארץ שנאמר: ותצא דינה בת לאה (בראשית ל"ד א')
מי הוא נחש שנשכה? זה שכם בן חמור (אבות דר' נתן נוסחא ב פ"ג)
Chazal describe how Ya'akov and his sons were learning in the beis medrash, but Dinah went out and was poreitz geder, which is why she was taken by Shechem. It is possible that Chazal here are suggesting that Ya'akov and sons are at least partially to blame here for ignoring their sister while she wandered off. They were in their own world oblivious to her until it was too late.
That alone is an interesting idea, but I think there is another message especially relevant to our time in this Chazal. How is a Dinah situation to be avoided? One approach is that if the problem is "poreitz geder," then the solution must be to build a better, bigger, stronger geder. And this is exactly what most girls' education boils down to (trust me -- I have 3 girls.)
But there is another way. Ya'akov and his sons were not in danger from Shechem because they were busy in the beis medrash. There is no temptation for them to go out. It's only Dinah who is not part of that world who lands in trouble. The solution would therefore seem to be to help her find a place within it.
Does that mean Beis Ya'akov should start teaching R' Chaim's and Ketzos? Lav davka. You don't need that to have a place in the walls of the beis medrash. For you men out there, you don't know what you are missing if you have never read/heard a sichah from Yemima Mizrachi. Here is a woman (and there are others like her) teaching torah on the parsha that inspires hundreds of women who come to hear her every week. It's musar, chassidus, hashkafa, pshat -- all of that is part of torah too.
So why don't we have more Yemina Mizrachi's, more Michal Tukachinsky's? Because we have become so afraid of the dreaded threat of "feminism" in the form of JOFA and the like that we've overcompensated and gone to the opposite extreme. We've kicked women out of the figurative beis medrash and become obsessed with walls. Walls don't inspire. Walls don't feed the intellect or the heart. Perhaps a different strategy is needed.
pre-mattan torah mitzvos
There seems to be a machlokes between the Bavli and Yerushalmi whether a mitzvah given pre-mattan Torah is a stronger mitzvah or a weaker mitzvah. The Yerushalmi quoted in Tos Kid 38 writes that that the mitzvah of matzah is not doche the issur of chadash because matzah was given pre-mattah Torah and therefore is a weaker aseh. However, the Bavli Yevamos 5b in searching for a source that an aseh can be doche even an issur kareis says you cannot bring proof from the korban pesach being doche shabbos, or milah being doche Shabbos, because these mitzvos were given pre-mattan Torah and therefore are stronger than all other mitzvos.
How does either possibility fit with the Rambam's view (see last post) that all mitzvos are binding only because they were given at Sinai? There is no pre-mattan Torah mitzvos -- everything became binding at the same time. Why should the fact that there is some pre-mattan Torah background history to some mitzvos have any legal ramification?
How does either possibility fit with the Rambam's view (see last post) that all mitzvos are binding only because they were given at Sinai? There is no pre-mattan Torah mitzvos -- everything became binding at the same time. Why should the fact that there is some pre-mattan Torah background history to some mitzvos have any legal ramification?
Thursday, November 30, 2017
Dinah in the box
1) Last week we discussed why Ya'akov is blamed for sticking Dinah in a box to keep her away from Eisav while Leah gets credit for not wanting to marry Eisav. Isn't that a double-standard? Indeed it is, answers the Darkei Mussar -- G-d judges each of us by the yardstick appropriate to our own abilities.
Still, it's hard to understand what the expectation was for Ya'akov and Dinah. My wife pointed out that Eisav was at this point an old man well over 90 with multiple wives. Dinah was just a little girl. Would she really be able to influence him to do teshuvah? Was it fair to Dinah to put her in that situation and risk her exposure to Eisav? (My wife knows that I read the Midrash as just using the text as a springboard to teach us a didactic lesson. Whether the details like age fit exactly is not so important, as the point is the moral we are supposed to draw.)
R' Shach and R' Shteinman both suggest that the Midrash does not mean that Ya'akov should have given Dinah to Eisav as a wife. To the contrary -- Ya'akov did the right thing in keeping Dinah away. What Ya'akov is being taken to task for -- and I don't know a better way to put this -- is for not giving a krechtz when he did it. In other words, the fact that Ya'akov had a mitzvah to protect Dinah from Eisav given who Eisav was should not have prevented Ya'akov from feeling pain at what he had to do and at least pausing a moment to deliberate over it. There should have at least been a moment when Ya'akov had a shikul ha'da'as about the situation.
This is a tremendous vort. It's not enough to do the right thing -- you also need to know what attitude you have to have while doing it.
2) The gemara in Chulin has a machlokes R' Yehudah and Chachamim whether the isur of eating gid ha'nasheh applied to Ya'akov's children or whether it became obligatory on Klal Yisrael only after mattan Torah. The Rambam in Peirush haMishnayos sets down a general rule: we are not bound by the mitzvah of milah because Avraham did it; we are not bound by the issur of gid ha'nasheh because Ya'akov was told not to eat it. The parshiyos that tell us about these mitzvos and issurim give us historical background, but the only reason we are bound to keep mitzvos is because they were given to us by G-d at Sinai.
Sounds simple, but it actually seems to fly in the face of a gemara. The gemara (Horiyos 8b) has a hava amina that the first commandment given to Klal Yisrael is the isur avodah zarah, as that was the first of the dibros we heard at mattan Torah. The gemara challenges and rejects this hava amina, as we know that there were 10 halachos already given pre-mattan Torah at Marah: 7 mitzvos bnei Noach + dinim, Shabbos, and kibud av. We had a bunch of commandments that we heard before the isur avodah zarah.
According to the Rambam, the gemara's question makes no sense. What we were told at Marah should be no more binding than what Ya'akov was told about gid ha'nasheh or what Avraham was told about milah. Those instructions don't become "mitzvos" until repeated at mattan Torah. The first commandment given to Klal Yisrael should indeed have been the isur avodah zarah, as that was the first thing we heard at Sinai!
I should save this for Parshas Beshalach, but b'kitzur, we see from here that Marah is not just another set of pre-mattan Torah laws like milah, or like gid ha'nasheh -- Marah is actually the start of mattan Torah.
Bli neder maybe we will come back to this in Parshas Beshalach. See the Masa'as haMelech of R' Shimon Moshe Diskin on the Rambam.
3) Rashi in our parsha famously quotes (33:4) "halacha b'yadu'a she'Eisav sonei Ya'akov." Ksav Sofer asks what the "yadu'a" means here -- how do we know it? It has to be telling us something beyond that it is a "halacha," as that's what the previous word says.
When Rivka sent Ya'akov away to Lavan's house, she told him, "V'yashavta imo yamim achadim ad asher tashuv chamas achicha." (27:44) The very next pasuk continues with what seems like a repetition: "Ad shuv af achicha mimcha..." Ksav Sofer and others explain that there is a actually a big difference between the two phrases. "Tashuv chamas achicha" means Eisav will no longer be angry. "Shuv af achicha MIMCHA" means you will no longer be angry at Eisav. How others feel about us is often a reflection of how we feel about them. Rivka was hinting to Ya'akov that the best way to stop Eisav from feeling anger and resentment is for Ya'akov to get rid of his own negative feelings toward Eisav.
Our Rashi can be interpreted in the same light. "B'yadu'a" means we know it to be true because we can feel it. Our feelings toward Eisav are to some degree a reflection of Eisav's feelings toward us. We only need to look inside ourselves, to our own feelings toward Eisav, to have some idea of what Eisav's feelings toward us is.
(That is not an excuse for feeling hatred for Eisav because as Rivka said, the change can start with us and then spread to Eisav.)
Still, it's hard to understand what the expectation was for Ya'akov and Dinah. My wife pointed out that Eisav was at this point an old man well over 90 with multiple wives. Dinah was just a little girl. Would she really be able to influence him to do teshuvah? Was it fair to Dinah to put her in that situation and risk her exposure to Eisav? (My wife knows that I read the Midrash as just using the text as a springboard to teach us a didactic lesson. Whether the details like age fit exactly is not so important, as the point is the moral we are supposed to draw.)
R' Shach and R' Shteinman both suggest that the Midrash does not mean that Ya'akov should have given Dinah to Eisav as a wife. To the contrary -- Ya'akov did the right thing in keeping Dinah away. What Ya'akov is being taken to task for -- and I don't know a better way to put this -- is for not giving a krechtz when he did it. In other words, the fact that Ya'akov had a mitzvah to protect Dinah from Eisav given who Eisav was should not have prevented Ya'akov from feeling pain at what he had to do and at least pausing a moment to deliberate over it. There should have at least been a moment when Ya'akov had a shikul ha'da'as about the situation.
This is a tremendous vort. It's not enough to do the right thing -- you also need to know what attitude you have to have while doing it.
2) The gemara in Chulin has a machlokes R' Yehudah and Chachamim whether the isur of eating gid ha'nasheh applied to Ya'akov's children or whether it became obligatory on Klal Yisrael only after mattan Torah. The Rambam in Peirush haMishnayos sets down a general rule: we are not bound by the mitzvah of milah because Avraham did it; we are not bound by the issur of gid ha'nasheh because Ya'akov was told not to eat it. The parshiyos that tell us about these mitzvos and issurim give us historical background, but the only reason we are bound to keep mitzvos is because they were given to us by G-d at Sinai.
Sounds simple, but it actually seems to fly in the face of a gemara. The gemara (Horiyos 8b) has a hava amina that the first commandment given to Klal Yisrael is the isur avodah zarah, as that was the first of the dibros we heard at mattan Torah. The gemara challenges and rejects this hava amina, as we know that there were 10 halachos already given pre-mattan Torah at Marah: 7 mitzvos bnei Noach + dinim, Shabbos, and kibud av. We had a bunch of commandments that we heard before the isur avodah zarah.
According to the Rambam, the gemara's question makes no sense. What we were told at Marah should be no more binding than what Ya'akov was told about gid ha'nasheh or what Avraham was told about milah. Those instructions don't become "mitzvos" until repeated at mattan Torah. The first commandment given to Klal Yisrael should indeed have been the isur avodah zarah, as that was the first thing we heard at Sinai!
I should save this for Parshas Beshalach, but b'kitzur, we see from here that Marah is not just another set of pre-mattan Torah laws like milah, or like gid ha'nasheh -- Marah is actually the start of mattan Torah.
Bli neder maybe we will come back to this in Parshas Beshalach. See the Masa'as haMelech of R' Shimon Moshe Diskin on the Rambam.
3) Rashi in our parsha famously quotes (33:4) "halacha b'yadu'a she'Eisav sonei Ya'akov." Ksav Sofer asks what the "yadu'a" means here -- how do we know it? It has to be telling us something beyond that it is a "halacha," as that's what the previous word says.
When Rivka sent Ya'akov away to Lavan's house, she told him, "V'yashavta imo yamim achadim ad asher tashuv chamas achicha." (27:44) The very next pasuk continues with what seems like a repetition: "Ad shuv af achicha mimcha..." Ksav Sofer and others explain that there is a actually a big difference between the two phrases. "Tashuv chamas achicha" means Eisav will no longer be angry. "Shuv af achicha MIMCHA" means you will no longer be angry at Eisav. How others feel about us is often a reflection of how we feel about them. Rivka was hinting to Ya'akov that the best way to stop Eisav from feeling anger and resentment is for Ya'akov to get rid of his own negative feelings toward Eisav.
Our Rashi can be interpreted in the same light. "B'yadu'a" means we know it to be true because we can feel it. Our feelings toward Eisav are to some degree a reflection of Eisav's feelings toward us. We only need to look inside ourselves, to our own feelings toward Eisav, to have some idea of what Eisav's feelings toward us is.
(That is not an excuse for feeling hatred for Eisav because as Rivka said, the change can start with us and then spread to Eisav.)
Wednesday, November 22, 2017
va'yeitzei or va'yivrach?
There is an interesting contrast between the way our parsha describes Ya'akov's departure for Lavan's house -- "Vayeitzei Ya'akov... vayeilech...," which sounds like Ya'akov was leaving for a vacation trip -- and the way the haftarah describes the same event -- "Va'yivrach Ya'akov," Ya'akov fled. See Sefas Emes 5634. Maybe the difference is that our parsha is speaking about what happened after Ya'akov spent 14 years learning in yeshivas Shem v'Eiver. When he first departed, Ya'akov was in fact running for his life. Then he paused and took stock and immersed himself in Torah. He had to continue the journey, but now it was a different journey, one which he embarked upon with a different attitude. Ya'akov now had a sense of calm and purpose, a sense of mission.
Rashi (28:17) writes that Ya'akov passed by the makom mikdash en route to Lavan's home but continued without stopping. He later said to himself, "Have I passed by the spot where my forefather's prayed without stopping to pray there myself?" and he turned to go back. According to Rashi, Hashem then miraculously moved the makom mikdash to Ya'akov to spare him the trip.
R' Shteinman (in his Ayeles haShachar -- and have in mind when you learn this torah that it should be a zechus for a refuah sheleimah for him) makes a nice diyuk in this Rashi. Ya'akov doesn't say, "I passed the makom mikdash without stopping." It's not the place itself which he bemoans missing. What he says is maybe I missed "the place where my forefather's davened." Places themselves are not inherently meaningful or special. It is what we do there that endows them with significance.
Parenthetically, where do we see that the other Avos davened at the makom mikdash? Targum Yonasan (25:21) on "va'ye'etar Yitzchak la'Hashem," a phrase we discussed last week, writes that Yitzchak went to Har HaMoriah. My cousin-in-law R' Avraham Wagner in his sefer Na'ar Yehonasan on the Targum quotes a Zohar and other sources which indicate that Yitzchak went there to offer a korban. Maybe you can learn k'peshuto that Yitzchak simply went there to daven, as we see from Rashi that the makom mikdash was a makom tefilah for the Avos.
So Ya'akov gets to Lavan's house and discovers that he has two daughters, Rachel and Leah. Rachel is beautiful, but Leah is described as "einey Le'ah rakos," her eyes were sore. Rashi, quoting B"B 123, explains that Leah thought that since she was the older daughter, she would have to marry Yitzchak's oldest son, Eisav. Therefore, she was constantly crying. Chazal say that Leah got a tremendous reward for those tears. "Va'yar Hashem ki senu'ah Leah" doesn't mean Leah was hated by Ya'akov -- it refers to Leah hating Eisav, her crying over her plight. G-d saw that hatred Leah had for Eisav and as a result, "Vayiftach es rachmah," Leah was blessed with children.
The Iyun Ya'akov on this gemara asks: Chazal attribute the tragedy of Dinah being taken by Shechem that we will read about in next week's parsha to Ya'akov failing to give her as a wife to Eisav, which would have pushed Eisav to do teshuvah. How can Chazal be critical of Ya'akov for not giving Dinah to Eisav as a wife when they praise Leah for not wanting to marry him? If Leah is justified in not wanting to marry Eisav, why is Ya'akov not justified in not allowing Dinah to marry him?
R' Ya'akov Neiman in Darkei Musar answers that what we learn from this Chazal is that Hashem does not use the same standard yardstick for each of us when he evaluates our behavior. Hashem measured Leah against the yardstick appropriate for her, and viz a viz where she was holding, it was meritorious for her reject Eisav. Hashem used a different yardstick when it came to measuring Ya'akov Avinu, one appropriate to the level he was on. Relative to the expectations for someone on that super-high level, Ya'akov was found wanting in not wanting Dinah to marry his brother.
He offers a second suggestion: Leah was only Eisav's cousin; Ya'akov was a brother. It may be appropriate for a cousin to reject an Eisav, but a brother can't reject another brother even if he is an Eisav.
The Tiferes Shlomo notes that while Chazal explain to us how "Va'yar Hashem ki senu'ah Leah" is actually a praise, they don't explain why it is that we find only by Rachel and Leah the next phrase of "vayiftach es rachma." Why not just say "va'tahar va'teiled?" And how does the first half of the pasuk tie together with the end, "ki Rachel akarah?"
Contrary to what a simple reading of the text might suggest, Leah and Rachel cared for each other very deeply. Brothers have a responsibility toward each other, and so do sisters. Why did Leah deserve to have children? Because "vayftach es rachma," the well of rachmanus in her was open, "ki Rachel akarah," because what bothered her more than her own plight was the fact that her sister was barren.
Rashi (28:17) writes that Ya'akov passed by the makom mikdash en route to Lavan's home but continued without stopping. He later said to himself, "Have I passed by the spot where my forefather's prayed without stopping to pray there myself?" and he turned to go back. According to Rashi, Hashem then miraculously moved the makom mikdash to Ya'akov to spare him the trip.
R' Shteinman (in his Ayeles haShachar -- and have in mind when you learn this torah that it should be a zechus for a refuah sheleimah for him) makes a nice diyuk in this Rashi. Ya'akov doesn't say, "I passed the makom mikdash without stopping." It's not the place itself which he bemoans missing. What he says is maybe I missed "the place where my forefather's davened." Places themselves are not inherently meaningful or special. It is what we do there that endows them with significance.
Parenthetically, where do we see that the other Avos davened at the makom mikdash? Targum Yonasan (25:21) on "va'ye'etar Yitzchak la'Hashem," a phrase we discussed last week, writes that Yitzchak went to Har HaMoriah. My cousin-in-law R' Avraham Wagner in his sefer Na'ar Yehonasan on the Targum quotes a Zohar and other sources which indicate that Yitzchak went there to offer a korban. Maybe you can learn k'peshuto that Yitzchak simply went there to daven, as we see from Rashi that the makom mikdash was a makom tefilah for the Avos.
So Ya'akov gets to Lavan's house and discovers that he has two daughters, Rachel and Leah. Rachel is beautiful, but Leah is described as "einey Le'ah rakos," her eyes were sore. Rashi, quoting B"B 123, explains that Leah thought that since she was the older daughter, she would have to marry Yitzchak's oldest son, Eisav. Therefore, she was constantly crying. Chazal say that Leah got a tremendous reward for those tears. "Va'yar Hashem ki senu'ah Leah" doesn't mean Leah was hated by Ya'akov -- it refers to Leah hating Eisav, her crying over her plight. G-d saw that hatred Leah had for Eisav and as a result, "Vayiftach es rachmah," Leah was blessed with children.
The Iyun Ya'akov on this gemara asks: Chazal attribute the tragedy of Dinah being taken by Shechem that we will read about in next week's parsha to Ya'akov failing to give her as a wife to Eisav, which would have pushed Eisav to do teshuvah. How can Chazal be critical of Ya'akov for not giving Dinah to Eisav as a wife when they praise Leah for not wanting to marry him? If Leah is justified in not wanting to marry Eisav, why is Ya'akov not justified in not allowing Dinah to marry him?
R' Ya'akov Neiman in Darkei Musar answers that what we learn from this Chazal is that Hashem does not use the same standard yardstick for each of us when he evaluates our behavior. Hashem measured Leah against the yardstick appropriate for her, and viz a viz where she was holding, it was meritorious for her reject Eisav. Hashem used a different yardstick when it came to measuring Ya'akov Avinu, one appropriate to the level he was on. Relative to the expectations for someone on that super-high level, Ya'akov was found wanting in not wanting Dinah to marry his brother.
He offers a second suggestion: Leah was only Eisav's cousin; Ya'akov was a brother. It may be appropriate for a cousin to reject an Eisav, but a brother can't reject another brother even if he is an Eisav.
The Tiferes Shlomo notes that while Chazal explain to us how "Va'yar Hashem ki senu'ah Leah" is actually a praise, they don't explain why it is that we find only by Rachel and Leah the next phrase of "vayiftach es rachma." Why not just say "va'tahar va'teiled?" And how does the first half of the pasuk tie together with the end, "ki Rachel akarah?"
Contrary to what a simple reading of the text might suggest, Leah and Rachel cared for each other very deeply. Brothers have a responsibility toward each other, and so do sisters. Why did Leah deserve to have children? Because "vayftach es rachma," the well of rachmanus in her was open, "ki Rachel akarah," because what bothered her more than her own plight was the fact that her sister was barren.
Thursday, November 16, 2017
l'nochach ishto
"Va'ye'etar Yitzchak laHashem l'nochach ishto..." Rashi paints a picture for us: Yitzchak was in one corner of the room, Rivka in the opposite corner, each one davening for a child. The description is vivid, but what bothers me is why it is necessary at all. Who cares if Yitzchak and Rivka were standing in opposite corners, in the same corner, in different rooms, in the same room? Since when is the chumash concerned with painting a scene for us? What matters is that they davened, period, full stop -- not where they stood in relation to each other. I'm not sure what according to Rashi the point here is (assuming you understand Rashi literally -- see Maor vaShemesh for a kabbalistic derash).
I actually started thinking about this phrase "l'nochach ishto" two weeks ago when we read the haftarah of VaYeira. The navi there describes how Elisha put his mouth on the mouth of the dead son of the Isha Shumanis, placed his eyes against his eyes, his hands on his hands, etc. It sounds like he is doing CPR, but the child was brought back to life miraculously, not by medical intervention (according to most views). So why did Elisha need to go through this whole act? Radak answers that Elisha was doing it to arouse his kavanah. He need the child in his proximity, he needed the physical closeness to atune himself to the situation and focus on it. Continues Radak, this is just like Yitzchak daveing "l'nochach ishto." Yitzchak needed Rivka's presence there to focus himself on her plight. (Parenthetically, for those who pace during davening, I think you have a makor in that haftarah -- "vayashav va'yeilech babayis achas heina v'achas heina.." See Radak there as well.) Maybe this is why we place our hands on our children when we bless there before Shabbos or before Y"K. The physical closeness is there to bring our kavanah to its maximum.
The simplest pshat in "l'nochach ishto" is, I think, the Rashbam, who writes that it means simply "bishvil ishto," for Rivka's sake. But this begs the question: doesn't that go without saying? For whose sake other than Rivka's could he have been praying? "Ishto" as opposed to who? Seforno anticipates the question and writes that Yitzchak prayed that his children he would come from Rivka, the most suitable wife for him. In other words, he wanted to avoid having to take another wife to have children.
Maybe there is more to it, however, than that. The Taz in Divrei David raises two (actually more - take a look) fundamental questions on the parsha. 1) Before telling us about Yitzchak's tefilah, the parsha reminds us that Rivka was "bas Besuel ha'Arami... achos Lavan." Rashi comments that the Torah comes to praise Rivka. She grew up in a home of idolaters, and nonetheless was a tzadekes. Yet, just one pasuk later the Torah tells us, with respect to Yitzchak's tefilah, "va'yei'aser LO Hashem," Hashem listened to HIS tefilah. It was to Yitzchak that Hashem responded, not Rivka (according to Rashi, who assumes both were praying independently). It seems incongruous. On the one hand, the parsha opens with lavish praise of Rivka, only to set us up for her prayer being rejected due to a shortcoming in her background, at least in comparison to Yitzchak. 2) We already know who Rivka is from last week's parsha. We know she grew up in the home of Lavan and Besuel and rose above their bad influence. Why inject a retelling of her background here?
The Yismach Moshe suggests a radical pshat in "l'nochach ishto" that will resolve both problems. Yitzchak viewed himself as continuing the legacy of his father -- there was nothing original or groundbreaking in what he was doing. Rivka, on the other hand, had forged her own path to avodah. The opening of the parsha recounts Rivka's background perhaps to set up the tension between these two approaches. On the one hand, "Yitzchak ben Avraham" and "Avraham holid es Yiztchak," the parsha emphasizes Yitzchak's connection with his father, with the past, with a path that was already forged, vs. "Rivka bas Besuel... achos Lavan," coming from nothing and forging a new path.
Yitzchak believed, says the Yismach Moshe, that Rivka had the edge on him. He davened, "l'nochach ishto," invoking her merit as the basis by which G-d should grant them children. Originality trumps mere fidelity to the past. "Ishto" here is not to the exclusion of some other potential wife, but rather to the exclusion of Yitzchak himself, to the exclusion of his own merits, which he thought insufficient.
How does G-d respond? "Va'yei'aser LO," G-d responded to Yitzchak's own prayer. Three possible ways to read this: 1) According to Rashi, G-d responded to Yitzchak, not Rivka. The zechus of the tzadik ben tzadik in facts trumps the merit of the tzadik ben rasha. Following in the footsteps of the past trumps those who must make their own way. 2) Given the Yismach Moshe's understand of the first half of the pasuk, perhaps the meaning here is that G-d responded to Yitzchak davka because he invoked his wife's merits. 3) Finally, and most radically, the Yismach Moshe's own reading is that G-d responded "lo," to Yitzchak as an individual, as opposed to Yitzchak the extension of his father Avraham. G-d's message to Yitzchak was that his avodah was not merely a replay of his father's life, and therefore devoid of originality, but rather he too stood on his own merits, had his own path, he too had his own way to carve just as Rivka had carved her own (albeit in a more extreme set of circumstances.)
To take one more step, perhaps the tension here between the zechus of following in the foosteps of the past vs. carving a new path is davka highlighted in the context of Yitzchak and Rivka's tefilah for children because the Torah is asking us to consider what we expect from our children -- do we want them to merely walk in our foosteps, or are we davening for a new generation that will carve their own path and move off in a new direction of their own? And perhaps the better question is not which approach we expect from our children, but which approach we aspire to ourselves.
I actually started thinking about this phrase "l'nochach ishto" two weeks ago when we read the haftarah of VaYeira. The navi there describes how Elisha put his mouth on the mouth of the dead son of the Isha Shumanis, placed his eyes against his eyes, his hands on his hands, etc. It sounds like he is doing CPR, but the child was brought back to life miraculously, not by medical intervention (according to most views). So why did Elisha need to go through this whole act? Radak answers that Elisha was doing it to arouse his kavanah. He need the child in his proximity, he needed the physical closeness to atune himself to the situation and focus on it. Continues Radak, this is just like Yitzchak daveing "l'nochach ishto." Yitzchak needed Rivka's presence there to focus himself on her plight. (Parenthetically, for those who pace during davening, I think you have a makor in that haftarah -- "vayashav va'yeilech babayis achas heina v'achas heina.." See Radak there as well.) Maybe this is why we place our hands on our children when we bless there before Shabbos or before Y"K. The physical closeness is there to bring our kavanah to its maximum.
The simplest pshat in "l'nochach ishto" is, I think, the Rashbam, who writes that it means simply "bishvil ishto," for Rivka's sake. But this begs the question: doesn't that go without saying? For whose sake other than Rivka's could he have been praying? "Ishto" as opposed to who? Seforno anticipates the question and writes that Yitzchak prayed that his children he would come from Rivka, the most suitable wife for him. In other words, he wanted to avoid having to take another wife to have children.
Maybe there is more to it, however, than that. The Taz in Divrei David raises two (actually more - take a look) fundamental questions on the parsha. 1) Before telling us about Yitzchak's tefilah, the parsha reminds us that Rivka was "bas Besuel ha'Arami... achos Lavan." Rashi comments that the Torah comes to praise Rivka. She grew up in a home of idolaters, and nonetheless was a tzadekes. Yet, just one pasuk later the Torah tells us, with respect to Yitzchak's tefilah, "va'yei'aser LO Hashem," Hashem listened to HIS tefilah. It was to Yitzchak that Hashem responded, not Rivka (according to Rashi, who assumes both were praying independently). It seems incongruous. On the one hand, the parsha opens with lavish praise of Rivka, only to set us up for her prayer being rejected due to a shortcoming in her background, at least in comparison to Yitzchak. 2) We already know who Rivka is from last week's parsha. We know she grew up in the home of Lavan and Besuel and rose above their bad influence. Why inject a retelling of her background here?
The Yismach Moshe suggests a radical pshat in "l'nochach ishto" that will resolve both problems. Yitzchak viewed himself as continuing the legacy of his father -- there was nothing original or groundbreaking in what he was doing. Rivka, on the other hand, had forged her own path to avodah. The opening of the parsha recounts Rivka's background perhaps to set up the tension between these two approaches. On the one hand, "Yitzchak ben Avraham" and "Avraham holid es Yiztchak," the parsha emphasizes Yitzchak's connection with his father, with the past, with a path that was already forged, vs. "Rivka bas Besuel... achos Lavan," coming from nothing and forging a new path.
Yitzchak believed, says the Yismach Moshe, that Rivka had the edge on him. He davened, "l'nochach ishto," invoking her merit as the basis by which G-d should grant them children. Originality trumps mere fidelity to the past. "Ishto" here is not to the exclusion of some other potential wife, but rather to the exclusion of Yitzchak himself, to the exclusion of his own merits, which he thought insufficient.
How does G-d respond? "Va'yei'aser LO," G-d responded to Yitzchak's own prayer. Three possible ways to read this: 1) According to Rashi, G-d responded to Yitzchak, not Rivka. The zechus of the tzadik ben tzadik in facts trumps the merit of the tzadik ben rasha. Following in the footsteps of the past trumps those who must make their own way. 2) Given the Yismach Moshe's understand of the first half of the pasuk, perhaps the meaning here is that G-d responded to Yitzchak davka because he invoked his wife's merits. 3) Finally, and most radically, the Yismach Moshe's own reading is that G-d responded "lo," to Yitzchak as an individual, as opposed to Yitzchak the extension of his father Avraham. G-d's message to Yitzchak was that his avodah was not merely a replay of his father's life, and therefore devoid of originality, but rather he too stood on his own merits, had his own path, he too had his own way to carve just as Rivka had carved her own (albeit in a more extreme set of circumstances.)
To take one more step, perhaps the tension here between the zechus of following in the foosteps of the past vs. carving a new path is davka highlighted in the context of Yitzchak and Rivka's tefilah for children because the Torah is asking us to consider what we expect from our children -- do we want them to merely walk in our foosteps, or are we davening for a new generation that will carve their own path and move off in a new direction of their own? And perhaps the better question is not which approach we expect from our children, but which approach we aspire to ourselves.
Thursday, November 09, 2017
root cause
"Hinei yaldah Milkah gam hi banim l'Nachor achicha..." We know that Nachor is Avraham's brother -- why does the Torah mention it again in recounting the geneology of Nachor's family at the end of last week's parsha?
We learn an important yesod from here. Even though Avraham had no contact with Nachor for decades (Netziv explains that this was the intent of "Lech lecha... m'beis avicha"), a brother is still a brother, and all the shefa, bracha, and benefits that came into the world because of the tzidkus of Avraham Avinu overflowed and benefited Nachor as well. They of course probably never suspected that as the cause, but, "Nachor achicha...," when you are related to the tzadik ha'dor and have even a small connection, good things rub off and come your way.
It is nice to pat yourself on the back and think that if things are going well it is because Hashem is getting nachas ru'ach from your avodah. But the truth may be that your second cousin twice removed, or even a stranger who you don't even know, is such a tremendous ba'al chessed, ba'al avodah, etc. that the whole world benefits from -- including you.
On the other hand, who knows? It could be your tefilos, that you don't think are having any effect, are benefiting a Jew somewhere in the world who really needs it.
We learn an important yesod from here. Even though Avraham had no contact with Nachor for decades (Netziv explains that this was the intent of "Lech lecha... m'beis avicha"), a brother is still a brother, and all the shefa, bracha, and benefits that came into the world because of the tzidkus of Avraham Avinu overflowed and benefited Nachor as well. They of course probably never suspected that as the cause, but, "Nachor achicha...," when you are related to the tzadik ha'dor and have even a small connection, good things rub off and come your way.
It is nice to pat yourself on the back and think that if things are going well it is because Hashem is getting nachas ru'ach from your avodah. But the truth may be that your second cousin twice removed, or even a stranger who you don't even know, is such a tremendous ba'al chessed, ba'al avodah, etc. that the whole world benefits from -- including you.
On the other hand, who knows? It could be your tefilos, that you don't think are having any effect, are benefiting a Jew somewhere in the world who really needs it.
We see the same idea in our parsha. "Hinei Rivka yotzeis asher yuldah l'Besuel..." Why the passive voice, "yuldah?" Kedushas Levi explains that Rivka may have biologically born to Besuel, but what caused a girl like Rivka to come into the world was the chessed of Avraham miles and miles away. Besuel reaped the results, but the cause of events was Avraham Avinu.
Eliezer says that if the test he devised to find the right girl works out it proves, "ki asisa chessed im adoni." (24:14). G-d was not doing chessed "l'adoni" = for Avraham, i.e. giving him a gift, but rather "im adoni" = with Avraham, i.e. the chessed Avraham himself did was what created and set in motion events leading to Rivka.
How does this work? The way Hashem interacts with a person mirrors the way that person interacts with the world. For example, Chazal say that a person who is ma'avir al midosav, who is forgiving, will have his/her own sins forgiven. But it goes beyond personal benefit. The way Hashem interacts with the whole world changes. The chessed of Avraham opened a channel of chessed -- there was more chessed coming down to the entire world. That abundance of chessed caused a Rivka, another ba'alas chessed, to develop.
This idea can also shed light on how Eliezer managed to have such tremendous success Eliezer had on his mission. Ya'akov Avinu, the paragon of emes, had to spend 14 years in Yeshivas Shem v'Eiver preparing himself to deal with the cheat and liar Lavan. Here, Eliezer walks into the lion's den and walks out with Rivka on the same day. How did that happen?
Chazal tell us that Eliezer had a daughter of marriageable age who he would have loved to see married to Yitzchak. Shem m'Shmuel writes that this was not a coincidence. Hashem was using reverse psychology in placing him in this situation. Davka because Eliezer faced the temptation of not being true to Avraham and to his mission made him that much more on guard and dedicated to carrying out his shlichus faithfully. When a person makes such a great effort to be true to his master, his mission, in turn Hashem mirrors that and more truth and faithfulness come into the world. That extra burst of truth energy, if you will, is what enabled him to overcome Lavan.
Monday, November 06, 2017
better than a free gift
After passing the test of the akeidah Avraham is told his reward: "V'hisbarchu b'zaracha kol goyei ha'aretz eikev asher shamata b'koli." (22:18)
Some of the meforshim ask: what kind of a reward is this? Avraham had already been promised this by G-d at the beginning of Lech Lecha: "V'nivrechu becha kol mishp'chos ha'adamah." (12:3) Now, ten tests later, he is promised the same thing all over again -- that's it?!
I want to suggest a solution based on a beautiful Netziv elsewhere in our parsha. B'pashtus, the story of the angels being welcomed by Lot and being invited into his home in contrast to the attack upon them by the rest of the populace of Sdom serves to establish a zechus for Lot so that he would merit being saved and seals the fate of the people of Sdom by their wickedness. Yet that can't be. As we discussed last post, the fate of Sdom was already sealed before the malachim even got there. Hashem had already refused Avraham's prayers on their behalf and one the angels was on a mission to destroy the city. The other angel that came to Sdom was there to save Lot, so his fate too was already sealed. The reaction of Lot and the reaction of the people of Sdom to the arrival of the angels did not make any difference to the outcome. So why is this story interjected?
Netziv (Harchev Davar) answers that there is something even better than G-d given you a free favor and rescuing you in a time of need. What's even better is earning that gift and reward. G-d would certainly have saved Lot no matter what; Sdom would have been destroyed in any case. However, by sending the angels, Hashem provided Lot with the opportunity to do chessed and earn the rescue that he was going to be given (see also Ohr haChaim 19:1). Hashem have the people of Sdom the opportunity to demonstrate their wickedness so that there was no question of their deserving everything they got.
The greatest gift that Hashem can give is the opportunity to serve him and earn the bracha and yeshu'a that is needed and not have to get it as a handout.
Perhaps the key difference between the bracha in parshas Lech Lecha and the bracha in VaYeira is the end of the pasuk: "Eikev asher shamata b'koli." EIkev means you've earned it; it's not a favor, but rather it's a justified outcome. That could only come after the tenth test.
Some of the meforshim ask: what kind of a reward is this? Avraham had already been promised this by G-d at the beginning of Lech Lecha: "V'nivrechu becha kol mishp'chos ha'adamah." (12:3) Now, ten tests later, he is promised the same thing all over again -- that's it?!
I want to suggest a solution based on a beautiful Netziv elsewhere in our parsha. B'pashtus, the story of the angels being welcomed by Lot and being invited into his home in contrast to the attack upon them by the rest of the populace of Sdom serves to establish a zechus for Lot so that he would merit being saved and seals the fate of the people of Sdom by their wickedness. Yet that can't be. As we discussed last post, the fate of Sdom was already sealed before the malachim even got there. Hashem had already refused Avraham's prayers on their behalf and one the angels was on a mission to destroy the city. The other angel that came to Sdom was there to save Lot, so his fate too was already sealed. The reaction of Lot and the reaction of the people of Sdom to the arrival of the angels did not make any difference to the outcome. So why is this story interjected?
Netziv (Harchev Davar) answers that there is something even better than G-d given you a free favor and rescuing you in a time of need. What's even better is earning that gift and reward. G-d would certainly have saved Lot no matter what; Sdom would have been destroyed in any case. However, by sending the angels, Hashem provided Lot with the opportunity to do chessed and earn the rescue that he was going to be given (see also Ohr haChaim 19:1). Hashem have the people of Sdom the opportunity to demonstrate their wickedness so that there was no question of their deserving everything they got.
The greatest gift that Hashem can give is the opportunity to serve him and earn the bracha and yeshu'a that is needed and not have to get it as a handout.
Perhaps the key difference between the bracha in parshas Lech Lecha and the bracha in VaYeira is the end of the pasuk: "Eikev asher shamata b'koli." EIkev means you've earned it; it's not a favor, but rather it's a justified outcome. That could only come after the tenth test.
Thursday, November 02, 2017
a pardon for the guilty
The Rambam writes in Hil Teshuvah 3:2
אדם שעונותיו מרובין על זכיותיו מיד הוא מת ברשעו שנאמר על רוב עונך. וכן מדינה שעונותיה מרובין מיד היא אובדת שנאמר זעקת סדום ועמורה כי רבה וגו'. וכן כל העולם כולו אם היו עונותיהם מרובין מזכיותיהן מיד הן נשחתין שנאמר וירא ה' כי רבה רעת האדם.
A person, city, or country whose sins outweigh its merits is immediately sentenced to death and destruction; a person, city, or country that has a majority of merits gets to keep going.
Lechem Mishna asks: The Rambam proves that this calculus applies on the broader level to the city or country, not just to the individual, from the fact that G-d destroyed Sdom. But if that is true, then why did Avraham bother to daven on their behalf? Either the numbers add up to their being spared or they don't?!
Two weeks ago R' Eliezer Eisenberg discussed a similar question. If the calculus applies even to the entire world, as the Rambam writes, then why was Noach spared during the flood? Why wasn't the entire world destroyed? See here.
It's a great kasha, but the answer is even better. Lechem Mishna suggests that tefilah overrides the calculus. Mipnei tefilas Avraham ha'ya mochel af al pi she'ain ha'din kach. Some of you I am sure are thinking that what he means is that the tefilah itself is a zechus that comes in and tips the scales. Maybe tefilah creates a tziruf between the one who davens and the city and his merits now get counted for them. A nice sevara, but that's not what the Lch"M is saying. That sevara would mean the city legitimately deserves to get off. What the Lch"M is saying is that the scales are still tipped in the direction of destruction -- the city does NOT deserve to be spared. Nonetheless, G-d is willing to spare it anyway. There is, so to speak, an override button. (Does that mean the judgment is not true? I would say see Mei HaShiloach in P VaYeishev end of the first piece on the difference between emes and emes l'amito. G-d's justice is emes l'amito, not just emes.) The power of tefilah is so great that G-d puts aside what justice demands.
So we see the issue raised in Noach, we see raised in connection with Sdom. One more place: Lot begs the angels for permission to flee to the city of Tzo'ar to seek refuge there, meaning they would have to spare the city. Or haChaim (19:20) asks: if the Tzo'ar deserved to be destroyed because its sins outweighed its merits, then why should it be spared just because Lot wanted to take refuge there? And if it's sins did not outweigh its merits, then shouldn't it be spared even if Lot didn't take refuge there? Take a look at his answer as well as Shem m'Shmuel (5678).
Now for the flipside. G-d says that the cities of Sdom and Amora will be destroyed because, "Za'akas Sdom v'Amora ki rabah, v'chatsam ki kavdah me'od." (18:20) The Netziv and Brisker Rav note the redundancy. If "chatasam" seals their fate, why add the beginning of the pasuk about "za'akas Sdom v'Amora?"
Netziv quotes Tos B"K 93a d"h echad that when the poor cry out in oppression, G-d responds much more quickly than when there is no one crying out. Ramban writes that "za'akas Sdom v'Amora" refers to interpersonal crime. The people of Sdom sinned against each other, not just against G-d. If a person commits idolatry, it is essentially a victimless crime. Not so when a person commits theft, arayos, and other such evils. Sdom was filled with the cries of victims.
The Lch"M taught us that if you, or even someone else, cries out in tefilah to G-d, that averts din. The Netziv is teaching us that if the victim of sin cries out to G-d, that hastens din.
It's an amazing thing -- G-d kavyachol us moved by the pleas of we puny human beings. Our words matter more than we can imagine.
אדם שעונותיו מרובין על זכיותיו מיד הוא מת ברשעו שנאמר על רוב עונך. וכן מדינה שעונותיה מרובין מיד היא אובדת שנאמר זעקת סדום ועמורה כי רבה וגו'. וכן כל העולם כולו אם היו עונותיהם מרובין מזכיותיהן מיד הן נשחתין שנאמר וירא ה' כי רבה רעת האדם.
A person, city, or country whose sins outweigh its merits is immediately sentenced to death and destruction; a person, city, or country that has a majority of merits gets to keep going.
Lechem Mishna asks: The Rambam proves that this calculus applies on the broader level to the city or country, not just to the individual, from the fact that G-d destroyed Sdom. But if that is true, then why did Avraham bother to daven on their behalf? Either the numbers add up to their being spared or they don't?!
Two weeks ago R' Eliezer Eisenberg discussed a similar question. If the calculus applies even to the entire world, as the Rambam writes, then why was Noach spared during the flood? Why wasn't the entire world destroyed? See here.
It's a great kasha, but the answer is even better. Lechem Mishna suggests that tefilah overrides the calculus. Mipnei tefilas Avraham ha'ya mochel af al pi she'ain ha'din kach. Some of you I am sure are thinking that what he means is that the tefilah itself is a zechus that comes in and tips the scales. Maybe tefilah creates a tziruf between the one who davens and the city and his merits now get counted for them. A nice sevara, but that's not what the Lch"M is saying. That sevara would mean the city legitimately deserves to get off. What the Lch"M is saying is that the scales are still tipped in the direction of destruction -- the city does NOT deserve to be spared. Nonetheless, G-d is willing to spare it anyway. There is, so to speak, an override button. (Does that mean the judgment is not true? I would say see Mei HaShiloach in P VaYeishev end of the first piece on the difference between emes and emes l'amito. G-d's justice is emes l'amito, not just emes.) The power of tefilah is so great that G-d puts aside what justice demands.
So we see the issue raised in Noach, we see raised in connection with Sdom. One more place: Lot begs the angels for permission to flee to the city of Tzo'ar to seek refuge there, meaning they would have to spare the city. Or haChaim (19:20) asks: if the Tzo'ar deserved to be destroyed because its sins outweighed its merits, then why should it be spared just because Lot wanted to take refuge there? And if it's sins did not outweigh its merits, then shouldn't it be spared even if Lot didn't take refuge there? Take a look at his answer as well as Shem m'Shmuel (5678).
Now for the flipside. G-d says that the cities of Sdom and Amora will be destroyed because, "Za'akas Sdom v'Amora ki rabah, v'chatsam ki kavdah me'od." (18:20) The Netziv and Brisker Rav note the redundancy. If "chatasam" seals their fate, why add the beginning of the pasuk about "za'akas Sdom v'Amora?"
Netziv quotes Tos B"K 93a d"h echad that when the poor cry out in oppression, G-d responds much more quickly than when there is no one crying out. Ramban writes that "za'akas Sdom v'Amora" refers to interpersonal crime. The people of Sdom sinned against each other, not just against G-d. If a person commits idolatry, it is essentially a victimless crime. Not so when a person commits theft, arayos, and other such evils. Sdom was filled with the cries of victims.
The Lch"M taught us that if you, or even someone else, cries out in tefilah to G-d, that averts din. The Netziv is teaching us that if the victim of sin cries out to G-d, that hastens din.
It's an amazing thing -- G-d kavyachol us moved by the pleas of we puny human beings. Our words matter more than we can imagine.
Thursday, October 26, 2017
Lot: can't you live in beautiful pastures without giving up G-d?
Our parsha tells us that there was a dispute that broke out between the shepherds of Avraham and the shepherds of Lot. The Torah immediately tacks on, "V'ha'K'na'ani v'haPrizi az yosheiv ba'aretz." (13:7) Note the use of "yosheiv," as opposed to earlier in the parsha when we were told (12:6), "V'ha'K'na'ani az ba'aretz." "Yosheiv," means our enemies were settled in the land, not just temporarily there or there by happenstance. When Jews fight with each other, even if it is just fight, even if it is a fight against the injustices committed by a Lot, even if it is a fight where one side is defending the interests of an Avraham Avinu in all his tzidkus, the net result is a gain for our enemies, who as a result are bolstered and have a greater sense of security and a stronger foothold. It's the Chasam Sofer who says this, someone who knew how to fight when he perceived a threat to Orthodoxy, but here he is telling us to be careful. Apply as you like to current events.
Getting back to the story, Avraham tells Lot that they must separate, and wherever he chooses to go, Avraham will head in the opposite direction. Lot sees the land of Sdom and its beautiful fertile pastures before him, and he makes the logical choice to move there with his flocks. "Va'yisa Lot m'kedem" (13:11) -- literally, he headed away from the east, where Avraham was camped (see Seforno,) but the Midrash reads much more into the phrase and tells us that Lot was moving away from G-d, the "kadmono shel olam." Lot was running away from religion, abandoning his faith.
Asks the Alter m'Kelm: in next week's parsha we are going to read how Lot, despite living amidst the wicked people of Sdom, risked his life to fulfill the mitzvah of hachnasas orchim. We are going to read how he baked matzah for his guests because it was Pesach (Rashi). Unlike his sons in law, he did not doubt the malach's message that Sdom would be destroyed, and he immediately abandoned his home when he was told to flee. Does this sound like someone who has run away from G-d and religion?! OK, so he wanted to move to the best pasture land, he cared maybe too much about his flocks and his wealth, and so he ended up is Sdom, but why does that mean he is someone trying to escape from religion?
The Alter answers that we see from here that even if you eat the most kosher matzah, do mitzvos, dress the dress and walk the walk, if what really anchors your life is the almighty $ instead of the Almighty, then you are on the wrong path. Then you are a Lot.
Is it too early in the year for me to write about advertisements for Pesach vacations in luxury hotels with pools and beaches and every amenity one can dream of, including a 24 hour a day tea room because you never know when you will be hungry, as if the banquet size meals were not enough (don't worry -- there is a gym and exercise room too, probably with a personal trainer available to help you)? Of course they all have the best hashgachos, non-gebrokst food, daf yomi shiurim daily (maybe poolside?). This is what Lot wanted -- the beautiful pastures of Sdom! -- while doing mitzvos.
You can dress it up in hashgachos and mitzvos and other nice frum things, but it's still Sdom, far away from the values of kadmono shel olam.
Getting back to the story, Avraham tells Lot that they must separate, and wherever he chooses to go, Avraham will head in the opposite direction. Lot sees the land of Sdom and its beautiful fertile pastures before him, and he makes the logical choice to move there with his flocks. "Va'yisa Lot m'kedem" (13:11) -- literally, he headed away from the east, where Avraham was camped (see Seforno,) but the Midrash reads much more into the phrase and tells us that Lot was moving away from G-d, the "kadmono shel olam." Lot was running away from religion, abandoning his faith.
Asks the Alter m'Kelm: in next week's parsha we are going to read how Lot, despite living amidst the wicked people of Sdom, risked his life to fulfill the mitzvah of hachnasas orchim. We are going to read how he baked matzah for his guests because it was Pesach (Rashi). Unlike his sons in law, he did not doubt the malach's message that Sdom would be destroyed, and he immediately abandoned his home when he was told to flee. Does this sound like someone who has run away from G-d and religion?! OK, so he wanted to move to the best pasture land, he cared maybe too much about his flocks and his wealth, and so he ended up is Sdom, but why does that mean he is someone trying to escape from religion?
The Alter answers that we see from here that even if you eat the most kosher matzah, do mitzvos, dress the dress and walk the walk, if what really anchors your life is the almighty $ instead of the Almighty, then you are on the wrong path. Then you are a Lot.
Is it too early in the year for me to write about advertisements for Pesach vacations in luxury hotels with pools and beaches and every amenity one can dream of, including a 24 hour a day tea room because you never know when you will be hungry, as if the banquet size meals were not enough (don't worry -- there is a gym and exercise room too, probably with a personal trainer available to help you)? Of course they all have the best hashgachos, non-gebrokst food, daf yomi shiurim daily (maybe poolside?). This is what Lot wanted -- the beautiful pastures of Sdom! -- while doing mitzvos.
You can dress it up in hashgachos and mitzvos and other nice frum things, but it's still Sdom, far away from the values of kadmono shel olam.
Tuesday, October 24, 2017
ba'avur vs biglal
Both the Malbim and Netviv distinguish between the words "biglal" and "ba'avur," both of which can be translated as "because," but which actually have different connotations. (The Malbim throughout his commentary assumes there are no synonyms in Hebrew and there must be at least subtle differences between words that seem at first glace to mean the same thing.)
"Ba'avur" implies doing something because there is some tangible benefit to be gained. Rivka tells Ya'akov to prepare a meal and bring it to Yitzchak, "ba'avur yivarechicha lifnei moso." Prepare a meal because you want to get a blessing.
"Biglal" is about logical causes, not gain/loss. G-d promised to remove the 7 nations from Canaan and give us their land "biglal ha'toeivos ha'eileh" which they did -- because of their wrongs.
Interestingly you have a pasuk in our parsha (12:13) that contains both words. Avraham tells Sarah that when they enter Egypt she should say he is her brother "l'ma'an yitav li ba'avureich" -- there is a tangible gain of wealth that Avraham will accrue, hence "ba'avur." He then adds, "v'chaysa nafshi biglaleiach" -- Sarah will be the cause of the Egyptians avoiding the crime of murder. (Shouldn't the latter point have come first? Good question, but not for this post : )
Turning back two weeks to parshas Braishis, which "because" word would you use in the sentence telling us that man was giving the earth to toil because of his sin? You would think it should be "biglal," -- sin is a logical cause. But we know that's not what the pasuk says -- it says "arura ha'adaman ba'avurecha..." (3:17) What's going on?
Malbim and Netziv explain that the pasuk is in one word giving us a beautiful lesson: man's punishment forcing him to toil is to his benefit -- it is something he can gain from and grow from. Work and toil will serve to curb his yetzer ha'ra so that the sin of eitz ha'da'as can ultimately be rectified. The punishment is itself a bracha in disguise.
Homework: check your concordance -- does the Malbim"s distinction work in all the places these words are used? I was a bit puzzled by a number of examples...
"Ba'avur" implies doing something because there is some tangible benefit to be gained. Rivka tells Ya'akov to prepare a meal and bring it to Yitzchak, "ba'avur yivarechicha lifnei moso." Prepare a meal because you want to get a blessing.
"Biglal" is about logical causes, not gain/loss. G-d promised to remove the 7 nations from Canaan and give us their land "biglal ha'toeivos ha'eileh" which they did -- because of their wrongs.
Interestingly you have a pasuk in our parsha (12:13) that contains both words. Avraham tells Sarah that when they enter Egypt she should say he is her brother "l'ma'an yitav li ba'avureich" -- there is a tangible gain of wealth that Avraham will accrue, hence "ba'avur." He then adds, "v'chaysa nafshi biglaleiach" -- Sarah will be the cause of the Egyptians avoiding the crime of murder. (Shouldn't the latter point have come first? Good question, but not for this post : )
Turning back two weeks to parshas Braishis, which "because" word would you use in the sentence telling us that man was giving the earth to toil because of his sin? You would think it should be "biglal," -- sin is a logical cause. But we know that's not what the pasuk says -- it says "arura ha'adaman ba'avurecha..." (3:17) What's going on?
Malbim and Netziv explain that the pasuk is in one word giving us a beautiful lesson: man's punishment forcing him to toil is to his benefit -- it is something he can gain from and grow from. Work and toil will serve to curb his yetzer ha'ra so that the sin of eitz ha'da'as can ultimately be rectified. The punishment is itself a bracha in disguise.
Homework: check your concordance -- does the Malbim"s distinction work in all the places these words are used? I was a bit puzzled by a number of examples...
Thursday, October 19, 2017
the one word diffence between ya'aleh v'yavo in tefilah vs bentching
Over Yom Tov I reminded my family of a halacha that will come up once again on Rosh Chodesh when we have the addition of ya'aleh v'yavo in our davening and bentching. If you look in your bentcher, you will see one little difference in the way ya'aleh v'yavo appears there from the way it appears in the siddur: the word melech in ki K-l melech chanun v'rachum atah is in parenthesis. This is based din in O.C. 188:3 The Shulchan Aruch says that when you mention malchus beis David (rachem... al malchus beis David m'shichecha) in the third bracha of bentching you should not mention the malchus of Hashem along side it, e.g. a person should not say malchuscha u'malchus beis David, as if one were to do so it would give the impression that one is equating the malchus of Hashem with another malchus. Adds the Rama, that the same principle holds true at the end of the bracha as well and the word melech should be left out of ya'aleh v'yavo. That being said, the Rama continues and says that he has noticed that the minhag does not follow this recommendation. Achronim (see Taz) try to justify the common practice, but the Aruch haShulchan writes that has noticed that where he lived people do in fact follow the Rama and leave the word melech out. Now that I've made you aware of the issue, you can start leaving it out too : )
One other interesting note on the parsha: Chazal (Sanhedrin 58) darshen from the words "yom v'layla lo yisbosu" that an aku"m who observes a day of shabbos is chayav misa. Achronim say pilpulim to explain how it is that the Avos were able to keep Shabbos (the gemara in Kiddushim tells us that Avraham kept even dinim derabbanan) when technically they might still have had the status of bnei Noach and not been allowed to set aside a day of rest.
Shu"T Binyan Tzion (126) suggests that the key word is "yishbosu." Resting means avoiding hard labor. That is very different that our definition of Shabbos, which is based on the word "melacha," referring specifically to the 39 actions done in the construction of the mishkan. An aku"m who moves a heavy couch between rooms in his house has broken his "shabbos" because he has done hard work, not kept it as a day of "shevisa", but a Jew who does the same action on our Shabbos is not liable because it does not fall into the category of melacha.
One other interesting note on the parsha: Chazal (Sanhedrin 58) darshen from the words "yom v'layla lo yisbosu" that an aku"m who observes a day of shabbos is chayav misa. Achronim say pilpulim to explain how it is that the Avos were able to keep Shabbos (the gemara in Kiddushim tells us that Avraham kept even dinim derabbanan) when technically they might still have had the status of bnei Noach and not been allowed to set aside a day of rest.
Shu"T Binyan Tzion (126) suggests that the key word is "yishbosu." Resting means avoiding hard labor. That is very different that our definition of Shabbos, which is based on the word "melacha," referring specifically to the 39 actions done in the construction of the mishkan. An aku"m who moves a heavy couch between rooms in his house has broken his "shabbos" because he has done hard work, not kept it as a day of "shevisa", but a Jew who does the same action on our Shabbos is not liable because it does not fall into the category of melacha.
Wednesday, October 18, 2017
dor ha'mabul -- dor she'kulo chayav
The end of last week's parsha sets the stage for the story of the mabul. "Va'yinachem Hashem ki asah es ha'adam ba'aretz." Netziv notes that it doesn't say "ki bara es ha'adam," like "braishis bara..." G-d did not "regret" kavyachol the creation of man. What G-d wanted to change is "ki asah es ha'adam." Asiya is a more complete stage of creation. Man needs to struggle, to work. There has to be a void for us aspire to fill. When things are done for us and we don't have enough to do, it's not good. "Ha'batalah m'vi'ah l'ydei shi'amum," Chazal tell us. Indolence breeds sloth and bad behavior.
The Kozhnitzer Magid similarly writes that if a human artisan sets out to make a vessel and it does not meet expectations, he tosses it out and starts again, but it is impossible to say the same thing about G-d. To think that G-d would destroy the world and start again because it did not work out the way he "anticipated" is an impossibility. (What about the Midrash that G-d created many worlds and destroyed them before creating ours? He does not address it. My hunch is that the difference is that only our world was created based on the blueprint of Torah, and Torah is eternal).
With this background we can understand a Rashi a little more deeply. The Midrash writes (quoted in Rashi) that the dor ha'mabul threatened that if Noach entered the ark they would to destroy it and kill him. "Va'yisgor Hashem ba'ado" means Hashem protected Noach and ensured he could enter the ark without harm. R' Shteinman in Ayeles haShachar asks what it is the dor ha'mabul were hoping to gain by this. Did they want to prevent Noach from saving himself out of sheer vindictiveness? What did Noach do to them that would warrant such a reaction? After all, he had been trying to convince them to repent and save themselves for years. Why were they out to get him?
The Kozhnitzer Magid answers that had Noach not entered the ark, the result would not have been his perishing with everyone else. Once G-d created the world, there is no undoing the act of creation -- again, G-d is not like a human artisan who tosses side a failed product to start over. There had to be a shei'ris ha'pleita of the old world; there had to be continuity. Therefore, the only possible result of Noach not entering the ark would be no one perishing. If the choice was total destruction or no destruction, the only possible outcome would have been no destruction.
Chazal (Sanhedrin 98) tell us that there are two ways Moshiach can come: he can come in a generation that proves itself completely righteous, but more amazingly, he can also come in a generation that is completely wicked. If the historical struggle between good and evil comes to the point where evil completely vanquishes good, then game over, but it does not mean the world is destroyed. It means that there is no longer any purpose to the game, and G-d will reveal himself fully (see Michtav m'Eliyahu vol1 p 28). The end of the game is the same no matter how it plays out. This was the plan of the dor ha'mabul. So long as there was a Noach, a spark of righteousness, of hope, then the status quo of schar v'onesh and the struggle between good and evil would continue. If Noach however was killed, the struggle would end in complete redemption of dor she'kulo chayav.
In his Mayan Chaim, R' Chaim Charlap (son of R' Y"M Charlap) suggests that this is what Rashi means when he writes that Noach vacillated, "ma'amin v'aino ma'amin," when it came time to enter the ark. Surely Noach, the tzadik tamim, did not harbor doubts in emunah. Yet, what Noach realized is that his very lack of doubt, his tzidkus, his belief, would destroy the world. What he realized is that he was the one thing that stood between the complete redemption of dor she'kulo chayav and a flood that would destroy most of mankind. The flood is called "mei Noach," says the Kozhnitzer Magid, because Noach's righteousness effectively doomed the world. Would it not be better under those circumstances to maybe doubt a little bit, maybe as an aveira lishma, to spare the world and bring it to redemption?
Yet paradoxically, the very thought of doing an aveira lishma to spare the world itself only enhances and proves Noach's tzidkus. Who else other than a tzadik would do an aveira for the sake of sparing a generation of such evildoers? And so G-d protected Noach as he entered the ark and the flood came.
"Va'ya'as Noach k'chol asher tzivah oso Elokim..." A perplexing diyuk: why the name Elokim, which connotes midas ha'din, when we are speaking about the means of rescue? Should the pasuk use the shem Hashem that connotes rachamim?
Based on this approach, the pasuk hits the nail right on the head. Davka because Noach had a path to rescue himself, the rest of the world was doomed and was subject to din.
(As for R' Shteimnan's second question on the Rashi, maybe you can use Sefas Emes 5641 d"h b'Rashi from "af she'lo matzinu she'pa'al bahem" to answer it.)
The Kozhnitzer Magid similarly writes that if a human artisan sets out to make a vessel and it does not meet expectations, he tosses it out and starts again, but it is impossible to say the same thing about G-d. To think that G-d would destroy the world and start again because it did not work out the way he "anticipated" is an impossibility. (What about the Midrash that G-d created many worlds and destroyed them before creating ours? He does not address it. My hunch is that the difference is that only our world was created based on the blueprint of Torah, and Torah is eternal).
With this background we can understand a Rashi a little more deeply. The Midrash writes (quoted in Rashi) that the dor ha'mabul threatened that if Noach entered the ark they would to destroy it and kill him. "Va'yisgor Hashem ba'ado" means Hashem protected Noach and ensured he could enter the ark without harm. R' Shteinman in Ayeles haShachar asks what it is the dor ha'mabul were hoping to gain by this. Did they want to prevent Noach from saving himself out of sheer vindictiveness? What did Noach do to them that would warrant such a reaction? After all, he had been trying to convince them to repent and save themselves for years. Why were they out to get him?
The Kozhnitzer Magid answers that had Noach not entered the ark, the result would not have been his perishing with everyone else. Once G-d created the world, there is no undoing the act of creation -- again, G-d is not like a human artisan who tosses side a failed product to start over. There had to be a shei'ris ha'pleita of the old world; there had to be continuity. Therefore, the only possible result of Noach not entering the ark would be no one perishing. If the choice was total destruction or no destruction, the only possible outcome would have been no destruction.
Chazal (Sanhedrin 98) tell us that there are two ways Moshiach can come: he can come in a generation that proves itself completely righteous, but more amazingly, he can also come in a generation that is completely wicked. If the historical struggle between good and evil comes to the point where evil completely vanquishes good, then game over, but it does not mean the world is destroyed. It means that there is no longer any purpose to the game, and G-d will reveal himself fully (see Michtav m'Eliyahu vol1 p 28). The end of the game is the same no matter how it plays out. This was the plan of the dor ha'mabul. So long as there was a Noach, a spark of righteousness, of hope, then the status quo of schar v'onesh and the struggle between good and evil would continue. If Noach however was killed, the struggle would end in complete redemption of dor she'kulo chayav.
In his Mayan Chaim, R' Chaim Charlap (son of R' Y"M Charlap) suggests that this is what Rashi means when he writes that Noach vacillated, "ma'amin v'aino ma'amin," when it came time to enter the ark. Surely Noach, the tzadik tamim, did not harbor doubts in emunah. Yet, what Noach realized is that his very lack of doubt, his tzidkus, his belief, would destroy the world. What he realized is that he was the one thing that stood between the complete redemption of dor she'kulo chayav and a flood that would destroy most of mankind. The flood is called "mei Noach," says the Kozhnitzer Magid, because Noach's righteousness effectively doomed the world. Would it not be better under those circumstances to maybe doubt a little bit, maybe as an aveira lishma, to spare the world and bring it to redemption?
Yet paradoxically, the very thought of doing an aveira lishma to spare the world itself only enhances and proves Noach's tzidkus. Who else other than a tzadik would do an aveira for the sake of sparing a generation of such evildoers? And so G-d protected Noach as he entered the ark and the flood came.
"Va'ya'as Noach k'chol asher tzivah oso Elokim..." A perplexing diyuk: why the name Elokim, which connotes midas ha'din, when we are speaking about the means of rescue? Should the pasuk use the shem Hashem that connotes rachamim?
Based on this approach, the pasuk hits the nail right on the head. Davka because Noach had a path to rescue himself, the rest of the world was doomed and was subject to din.
(As for R' Shteimnan's second question on the Rashi, maybe you can use Sefas Emes 5641 d"h b'Rashi from "af she'lo matzinu she'pa'al bahem" to answer it.)
Tuesday, October 10, 2017
Smach Zevulun b'tzeisecha -- taking the happiness of Y"T out with you
1. The navi concludes its description of the chanukas habayis done by Shlomo by telling us, "Va'ayas Shlomo ba'eis ha'hi es ha'chag... shivas yamim v'shivas yamim arb'ah asar yom." (Melachim I 8:65) Chazal explain that Shlomo celebrated the dedication of the Mikdash for 7 days, and then immediately thereafter celebrated Sukkos for the next 7 days. In other words, these were two different celebrations that happened to fall out one right after the other. Why then, asks R' Tzadok haKohen (Pri Tzadik Sukkos 32), does the navi describe it as a celebration of the chag, singular, and tell us the celebration was 14 days, as if it was one long event?
R' Tzadok explains that the chanukas haMikdash and the holiday of sukkos are in fact one and the same celebration. The sukkah is a commemoration of the ananei ha'kavod that surrounded Bnei Yisrael in the desert, and when the Mikdash was dedicated, the navi tells us, "V'he'anan malei es beis Hashem," (8:10) that Hashem's anan descended into the place. The ananei ha'kavod of the midbar came in Aharon's merit, and it was Aharon's descendants who served in the Mikdash. Mikdash and sukkah both symbolize the same hashra'as haShechina in Klal Yisrael. Each one of our sukkos is a mini-Mikdash.
The Vilna Gaon writes that the reason we celebrate Sukkos in Tishei and not in Nisan is because the ananei ha'kavod departed after the sin of cheit ha'eigel and did not return until 15 Tishrei when Moshe began collecting for the construction of the Mishkan. In light of R' Tzadok's explanation, it is not coincidental that the clouds returned just then. The kedusha manifest in Mishkan/Mikdash is the very same as was manifest by the ananei ha'kavod.
2. On one of the days of Sukkos I suggested that the shalosh regalim correspond to banei, chayaei, and mezonai. Pesach is the holiday of banai -- the Torah speaks to us of 4 sons. Shavos is chayai -- chayei olam nata b'socheinu, the Torah. Sukkos and Shmini Atzeres is mezonai, as it is on this chag that we daven for geshem, which encompasses our material needs. I found the Sefas Emes alludes to this idea, see 5743 d"h baMishna.
3. The gemara says Shmini Atzeres is distinct from Sukkos with respect to 6 halachos represented by the siman PZ"R KSh"V. R=regel. With respect to what din is it a new regel? I saw quoted in the name of the Rogatchover that there is a new din of chayav adam l'hakbil pnei rabo ba'regel on Shmini Atzeres in addition to the chiyuv of the same din on Sukkos.
4. V'Zos haBracha is the only parsha not read on a Shabbos. R' Tzadok explains that Shabbos is "keviya v'kayma," it's kedusha is set without our having to do anything, unlike the kedusha of Yom Tov which comes through beis din's declaration. The parsha of each Shabbos, the torah unique to that week, comes down to us like the kedusha of Shabbos, from without. We hope that we can accept it and absorb it each week when it comes down to us.
The kedusha of Zos haBracha, after a full year of parshiyos, after experiencing a whole cycle of moadim, is a kedushah that comes from within. At the end of the day, what Torah is all about is not obeying rules imposed upon us from without, but discovering within ourselves that those rules are built into our souls and define who we are.
Sefas Emes explains that the difference between Shavuos and Simchas Torah is that on Shavuos we celebrate Torah sheb'ksav -- it is the Torah given to is, imposed upon us. Simchas Torah, Shmini Atzeres, is torah she'ba'al peh, the Torah that comes from within, that we are mechadesh, that is part of who we are.
5. "Smach Zevulun b'tzeisecha..." Sefas Emes asks: why should Zevulun be happy that he has to go off on business? I don't know about you, but I don't get much simcha out of riding the subway and dealing with hectic problems at work all day. And it's not just about work. This is the last few days of Yom Tov, and then we go out -- "tzeisecha" -- out from an intense period of kedusha back to the daily grind, back to the world of chol. Where's the happiness in that?
Sefas Emes answers that what the Torah is doing here is giving us advice. How can we make that transition back to the world that for better or worse we have to be part of a successful one? By making sure we start off with simcha. If you are a Zevulun and are stuck going out there, then "smach Zevulun b'tzeisecha," before you go, take a moment to rejoice in what you have before you leave. Have a simchas Torah, celebrate the dveikus of the chagim, appreciate the experience. How many people go through three+ weeks of Yom Tov and don't even take a moment to THINK about what is going on? How many people pause to reflect? This is the last chance -- take advantage! Absorb the simcha now, and then it will stick with you, so that even "b'tzeisecha," the Torah will be with you, the dveikus will still be with you.
R' Tzadok explains that the chanukas haMikdash and the holiday of sukkos are in fact one and the same celebration. The sukkah is a commemoration of the ananei ha'kavod that surrounded Bnei Yisrael in the desert, and when the Mikdash was dedicated, the navi tells us, "V'he'anan malei es beis Hashem," (8:10) that Hashem's anan descended into the place. The ananei ha'kavod of the midbar came in Aharon's merit, and it was Aharon's descendants who served in the Mikdash. Mikdash and sukkah both symbolize the same hashra'as haShechina in Klal Yisrael. Each one of our sukkos is a mini-Mikdash.
The Vilna Gaon writes that the reason we celebrate Sukkos in Tishei and not in Nisan is because the ananei ha'kavod departed after the sin of cheit ha'eigel and did not return until 15 Tishrei when Moshe began collecting for the construction of the Mishkan. In light of R' Tzadok's explanation, it is not coincidental that the clouds returned just then. The kedusha manifest in Mishkan/Mikdash is the very same as was manifest by the ananei ha'kavod.
2. On one of the days of Sukkos I suggested that the shalosh regalim correspond to banei, chayaei, and mezonai. Pesach is the holiday of banai -- the Torah speaks to us of 4 sons. Shavos is chayai -- chayei olam nata b'socheinu, the Torah. Sukkos and Shmini Atzeres is mezonai, as it is on this chag that we daven for geshem, which encompasses our material needs. I found the Sefas Emes alludes to this idea, see 5743 d"h baMishna.
3. The gemara says Shmini Atzeres is distinct from Sukkos with respect to 6 halachos represented by the siman PZ"R KSh"V. R=regel. With respect to what din is it a new regel? I saw quoted in the name of the Rogatchover that there is a new din of chayav adam l'hakbil pnei rabo ba'regel on Shmini Atzeres in addition to the chiyuv of the same din on Sukkos.
4. V'Zos haBracha is the only parsha not read on a Shabbos. R' Tzadok explains that Shabbos is "keviya v'kayma," it's kedusha is set without our having to do anything, unlike the kedusha of Yom Tov which comes through beis din's declaration. The parsha of each Shabbos, the torah unique to that week, comes down to us like the kedusha of Shabbos, from without. We hope that we can accept it and absorb it each week when it comes down to us.
The kedusha of Zos haBracha, after a full year of parshiyos, after experiencing a whole cycle of moadim, is a kedushah that comes from within. At the end of the day, what Torah is all about is not obeying rules imposed upon us from without, but discovering within ourselves that those rules are built into our souls and define who we are.
Sefas Emes explains that the difference between Shavuos and Simchas Torah is that on Shavuos we celebrate Torah sheb'ksav -- it is the Torah given to is, imposed upon us. Simchas Torah, Shmini Atzeres, is torah she'ba'al peh, the Torah that comes from within, that we are mechadesh, that is part of who we are.
5. "Smach Zevulun b'tzeisecha..." Sefas Emes asks: why should Zevulun be happy that he has to go off on business? I don't know about you, but I don't get much simcha out of riding the subway and dealing with hectic problems at work all day. And it's not just about work. This is the last few days of Yom Tov, and then we go out -- "tzeisecha" -- out from an intense period of kedusha back to the daily grind, back to the world of chol. Where's the happiness in that?
Sefas Emes answers that what the Torah is doing here is giving us advice. How can we make that transition back to the world that for better or worse we have to be part of a successful one? By making sure we start off with simcha. If you are a Zevulun and are stuck going out there, then "smach Zevulun b'tzeisecha," before you go, take a moment to rejoice in what you have before you leave. Have a simchas Torah, celebrate the dveikus of the chagim, appreciate the experience. How many people go through three+ weeks of Yom Tov and don't even take a moment to THINK about what is going on? How many people pause to reflect? This is the last chance -- take advantage! Absorb the simcha now, and then it will stick with you, so that even "b'tzeisecha," the Torah will be with you, the dveikus will still be with you.
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