There is a machlokes Tanaim how to resolve the contradiction between the pesukim "atzeres l'Hashem" and "atzeres lachem" -- which one is it? R' Yehoshua holds that you have to make a compromise and split Yom Tov between G-d and your own enjoyment; R' Eliezer holds it's either/or -- you can spend the day immersed in Torah and avodas Hashem, or you can spend the day immersed in doing what you enjoy. This machlokes fits a general pattern of disputes in Chazal as to how to handle situations where there are contradictory pesukim or halachos and no "kasuv ha'shelishi" that resolves what to do: are you supposed to make some a compromise between the two extremes or choose between fulfilling one or the other. (The two pesukim in this case appear in two different contexts with respect to two different yamim tovim, but the gemara was not willing to entertain the possibility of reading each pasuk as applying only to its particular yom tov context as a feasible answer.)
Maharasha (Pesachim 68) asks: according to R' Eliezer, if one spends the entire day immersed in Torah, how can one fulfill the mitzvah of "v'samachta b'chagecha?"
He answers that learning gufa is simchas Yom Tov! What could be more enjoyable than a blatt gemara? (R' Tzadok haKohen writes that the "atezeres lachem" is fulfilled by the joy in learning; the "atzeres l'Hashem" should be how you approach eating your meal -- it should be l'shem shamayim.)
R' Zolti suggested based on this Maharasha that when one learns on Y"T, aside from the kiyum mitzvah of talmud Torah, one gets an additional kiyum of simchas Y"T. This may explain a difficult Rashi in Sukkah (25). The Mishna tells us that people who are engaged in doing a mitzvah are peturim from sukkah. Rashi gives as an example someone who is travelling to learn Torah. Achronim ask: the rule of oseik b'mitzvah patur min hamitzvah normally does not apply to talmud Torah -- we assume that you have to stop learning to do mitzvos. The raison d'etre of learning is to perform mitzvos, so it makes no sense to say that learning should supersede doing mitzvos. How then could Rashi say that someone going to learn is exempt from the mitzvah of sukkah?
Some of the Achronim answer that Rashi is not speaking about learning itself. but about travelling to learn, and the travel, the hechsher mitzvah of going to learn, is what creates the exemption (which itself is an interesting chiddush -- the hechsher mitzvah of a mitzvah which itself does not exempt one from sukkah can create an exemption). In the sefer "M'Shulchani shel R' Eliyahu Baruch" from the Mir he quotes from his son that based on R' Zolti's chiddush, Rashi makes perfect sense. When one is learning on Y"T, it is also a kiyum of simchah. It is not the mitzvah of talmud Torah which exempts one from sukkah, but rather it is the kiyum mitzvah of simchas Y"T inherent in that same act of learning which does so.
R' Eliyahu Baruch did not like this approach and argued that it's not the kiyum hagavra of learning that does not allow any an exemption from mitzvos, but rather the cheftza of Torah itself is overridden by any other mitzvah. Therefore, whether the kiyum mitzvah is one of simchas Y"T or purely one of talmud Torah does not matter in the end.
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> "R' Eliyahu Baruch did not like this approach and argued that it's not the kiyum hagavra of learning that does not allow any an exemption from mitzvos, but rather the cheftza of Torah itself is overridden by any other mitzvah. Therefore, whether the kiyum mitzvah is one of simchas Y"T or purely one of talmud Torah does not matter in the end."
ReplyDeleteI have difficulty with this objection. (I didn't see the original and don't know his proofs.) Even granting for sake of argument that for some reason in applying the osek b'mitzvah rule we prioritize the "cheftzas" and not the related kiyumim -- still, why don't we think of Talmud Torah in this case as a "cheftza" of simchas yom tov, as well as a cheftza of Torah? Once we accept R. Zolti's basic chiddush that learning Torah fulfills simchas yom tov, how is such learning any less of a "cheftza" of simchas yom tov than a yom tov meal of meat and wine? If so, why should the fact that learning is *also* a cheftza of Talmud Torah make it less eligible for osek b'mitzva priority? Why isn't learning Torah at least "as good" as eating a traditional yom tov meal for osek b'mitzva purposes, according to R. Zolti's position?
Instead of using gavra/cheftza, it's probably easier to understand in simple English: R' Elya Baruch is saying that the study of Torah, irrespective of what mitzvah is fulfilled in doing so, cannot supersede any other mitzvos because by definition, the whole point of study is to fulfill mitzvos and so they always take precedence over learning. His son assumed that it's the specific fulfillment of the mitzvah of talmud Torah which cannot be pushed off for the sake of fulfilling other mitzvos. (Chaim -- P.S. good yom tov!)
DeleteBut according to R. Zolti, on yom tov "the whole point of study" is *not* only to help one fulfill (other) mitzvos -- rather, on yom tov, Torah study *also* has independent value in itself as a form of simchat yom tov. Bottom line, why shouldn't Talmud Torah on yom tov (per Rav Zolti) qualify as osek b'miitzvah as much as any other act of simchat yom tov? and if so isn't that a fine solution for Rashi, as Rav Baruch's son suggested?
DeleteMoadim l'simcha!
Because if learning was defined as simcha based on the subjective emotional reality of happiness or joy, we couldn't say it was universal. If it is categorically defined as simcha, that must be a gezeiras Hakasuv that tells us that the spiritual joy of the kiyum of that mitzva is viewed in halacha as a kind of simcha. If so, you first have to decide whether the mitzva itself has the din of oseik. It's not like eating, which is simcha per se. It's only simcha when it is being done properly.
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DeleteI like the theory that learning = "simcha" only when it constitutes a mitzva, but I don't think it really goes far enough to interfere with R' Baruch's son's answer for Rashi. For one thing, in a situation where a person is technically exempt from learning (e.g. osek be-mitzva) -- and even if they are making an improper halachic choice by learning instead of attending to the other mitzva -- doesn't such learning still count as a kiyum of talmud torah? And if so why couldn't Rashi reasonably hold it's a fulfillment of simcha? Why should R. Baruch be convinced it is not? (Please see also my reply below to your comment regarding Aruch haShulchan OC 554.)
DeleteMoreover, applying this theory to Rashi is even more of a stretch. In the case Rashi addresses, there is no issue of a conflicting mitzva on yom tov when the learning actually occurs. That learning is 100% mitvas talmud torah in the proper time and manner, and thus will also be a full and proper kiyum of simchas yom tov according to Rav Zolti. Therefore, when the person is traveling in order to perform this learning -- i.e. Rashi's case -- he is traveling in order to do what will be a 100% proper fulfillment of simchas yom tov. So for this additional reason too, isn't R. Baruch's son correct that Rashi makes very good sense in saying that our traveler is osek b'mitzvas simchas yom tov?
I think that Rashi's case involves traveling to learn where the learning will interferes with or diminishes the ability to be mekayeim the mitzva of Sukkah. Even the Ran agrees that there has to be some degree of conflict.
DeleteBut it's the traveling that interferes, no? not the learning (or pidoyn shevuyim etc.) that will be performed when you get there. I don't see anything from Rashi (or the Gemara?) indicating there will be an osek b'mitzva conflict when the person finally arrives, just that their traveling poses a conflict with yeshivas sukka. So I would stand by the claim that traveling for purposes of kiyum simchas yom tov seems like a very nice way to explain the Rashi.
DeleteWe were discussing this on Shabbos, and Reb Reuven Feinstein showed us that the Aruch Hashulchan says a svora similar to mine in Hilchos Tisha Ba'av, 554:1-3.
ReplyDeleteKind of similar, but maybe not so much (554:3):
Deleteאמנם עיקר עסק התורה משמח את הנפש הישראלי אף שיש לו צער ויגיעה בשעת מעשה
AH"S says nothing about whether intrinsic "joy for the Jewish soul" from immersion in Torah depends on a technical status of mandatory chiyuv, or if there would still be such joy when a person chooses to learn Torah in a situation where he/she is technically exempt, e.g. an osek be-mitzva. While such a person makes an improper halachic choice by learning instead of attending to the other mitzva, would anyone claim that such learning doesn't still count as a kiyum of talmud torah? Who says it doesn't still create comparable joy in the Jewish soul per AH"S?
Also, in 554:4 AH"S explains that this intrinsic "joy for the soul" is reduced/counteracted if the material is sad, even though it is still 100% Talmud Torah -- which suggests we are not dealing with an arbitrary gezeiras hakasuv (as if "talmud Torah has a din/shem of simcha") independent of actual human emotion, but rather AH"S is simply saying that Torah learning truly gladdens our souls at a deep level and that this soulful joy outweighs the superficial discomfort of working hard at it; learning deeply sad content (aveilus/churban) on tisha b'av naturally gladdens us much less.
The whole point of the AH in 554 is to explain why the simcha sometimes outweighs the surface unpleasantness, and he says it's like the Rambam by Gittin. If so, step one is that you ought to be learning now. If not, it's like a get that is forced by non-Jews.
DeleteI do see your point and your insight that talmud torah in circumstances where l'chatchila one should instead be doing something else is different than the normal talmud torah which Rav Zolti presumably had in mind when he called it a kiyum of simchas yomtov. To expand a bit on what you say about AHS 554, perhaps the inner joy of one who improperly chooses to learn would be negated/outweighed by the inner sadness of forfeiting the other mitzva that they should have been attending to instead, and so might not be a kiyum of simchas yom tov.
DeleteHowever, still see my other point above. Even if the distinction about "improper" learning is correct, in Rashi's case the actual learning in question will be 100% l'chatchila when the traveller actually arrives, and thus should clearly be a kiyum of simchas yomtov. Hence the journey to get there is 100% a journey to perform simchas yomtov -- and so Rashi makes sense, no?
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