Something like 13 years ago I quoted a chakirah from the Shiurei Da’as (vol 2 "Bein Yisrael l'Amim): are the laws of the Torah that tell us good vs bad a giluy milsa to the way teva works, and punishment and reward are just natural outcomes, or is it the mitzvos themselves that make things good (=keeping the law) or bad (=violating it) and reward and punishment are decrees, not consequences.
This is a very old issue that goes back to the ancient Greeks and is known as the Euthyphro dilemma: Is something holy (moral) because it is loved by the gods, or is it loved by the gods because it is holy (or moral)?
We once used this to explain the sin of Chavah. When Chavah said the eitz ha'da'as was "tov lma'achal" when she was in effect saying was that really, the tree by its nature is something good to eat, but G-d imposed a decree upon us preventing us from eating it.
I started thinking about the same issue again this year. Chavah mistakenly thought she was not allowed to touch the eitz hada'as. Rashi writes (3:4) that the nachash pushed Chavah into the tree to show her that nothing would happen if she touched it, and therefore, he argued that nothing would happen if she ate from it either.
The Sifsei Chachamim asks: this reasoning makes no sense. Chavah was pushed into the tree against her will -- it was a case of ones. Of course she would not be liable for that. How can that be compared to willingly eating from the tree?
It must be that Chavah assumed that the prohibitions having to do with the tree were built into its nature. G-d was simply revealing how teva works. If come in contact with acid, even if someone pushed you into it, the claim of ones doesn't help -- the acid will burn you anyway. Similarly, Chavah thought that by its nature the eitz hada'as was toxic. When the nachash proved to her otherwise, her mental castle fell apart.
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-- "natural outcomes...or...decrees"?
ReplyDeletewould Hashem Elokim decree death to all future generations for the fault of two individuals? or would fruit of the forbidden tree* stunt that couple's natural longevity [and thus that of their offspring] by repressing regenerative genes?
on the other hand, it is a decree to spare a fruit tree the ax (Devarim 20:19) that allows soldiers to naturally nourish themselves in the field,
though he** whose ax-head kills b'shogeg, a natural possibility, is punished/protected by a seemingly artificial decree (galus in an ir miklat, Devarim 19:5)...
back at the ranch, a natural urge to beautify the Mikdash by planting a tree is punishable by decree***, yet if the Jew's deeper need is to conform to G-d's will, then the divine lashes received are ultimately acceptable to him [as one more part of that inmost Jewish nature which justifies his existence].
in any case, isn't fear of the onesh that is expressly added by G-d closer to yiras Hashem, than is the fear of natural (or built-in) harm [the latter compatible with hester panim, which would hardly apply to gan eiden* *]? the two tochachas announce G-d's seizure of creation, a storm of Divine interference, rather than nature's own contortions...
-- "and therefore"
IF Chavah had been pushed into contact with the tree, would she not retort (in place of pasuk 6) that since her eyes weren't opened by touching** *, neither would they be opened by eating? this was not a ditzy woman...
* a botanical anomaly presenting a unique horticultural challenge
** who wrongly axed a fruit tree for war?
*** M.T., avodat kochavim 6:9
* * since G-d was so plainly present early on in the garden, He hid punishment in teva [in the genetic compromise above] to preserve free will [while in our day He must suspend a visible ax over our heads if we are to feel a competitive quantity of yiras ha'onesh type 2 (the type tied to fear of heaven, than to fear of snakes)]. as for the curses on snake, woman, man, though they all sound like spontaneous "decrees", at only two points can that be ascertained: at 'I will put', 3:15, and at 'I will increase", 3:16. 3:14, 17-19, and intersticial phrases in :14 and :15, could all be sudden revelations of inbuilt dynamics/"natural outcomes"...
** * as goes the risk (death), so goes the reward (become like G-d)
{viduy milsa: that "decree" should here refer to punishment, not to mitzvahs ('decree to spare a fruit tree'), moreover to punishments that are supernaturally induced, not practically prescribed ('galus', 'lashes'), but the ready pairing of trees and conduct invited three independent twistings of the term. 'For the sin of railroad switchery, of snaking railroad switchery'...}
Delete> ha'shamayim v'ha'aretz (Bereishis 2:4) -- s'char v'onesh by "decree"? eretz v'shamayim (same) -- s'char v'onesh as "natural outcome"? both arrangements, mixed and matched?
ReplyDelete> "Euthy.phro"
had Socrates wised up to the notion that Hashem is G-d of the gods (Devarim 10:17), and shown his pantheon to the back bench of the academy, had he broken his habit of philosophizing and converted to Judaism, he might have championed the need to condition conversion on acceptance of every law, even Rabbinic (Bechoros 30b). for didn't he say in the Crito that a citizen must not defy even one law of the state, as that would mean defiance of Law altogether?