Sunday, May 03, 2020

Notes from the Underground - pikuach nefesh, hutra or dechuya

Last week I referred to an article written by R' Meir Twersky shlita.  I would like to quote some more from that piece (the translation was done by talmidim):
 
In our family, we have a tradition regarding the following story: When Rav Chaim Soloveitchik's oldest grandson (the Rav, Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik) was an infant, he became gravely ill and the doctor came to examine him on Shabbos. During the examination, Rav Chaim asked the doctor if he needed more light. The doctor, neither accepting or dismissing Rav Chaim's offer, replied, "nu, nu." Immediately, Rav Chaim instructed the family member who was standing closest to the fire to tend to the fire to provide more light. The family member, however, was deterred by the doctor's neutral answer, and did not immediately comply with Rav Chaim's directive. Rav Chaim excoriated him: "du bist a am ha'aretz un an apikores -- you are an am ha'aretz (ignoramus) and an apikores (heretic)!" Rav Simcha Zelig Rieger, who was also present, then hastened to fulfill Rav Chaim's directive.
 
This story is both awesome and instructive; per Rav Chaim, Rambam's designation --apikores!-- includes even one who subscribes axiomatically to the preeminence of pikuach nefesh, but is remiss in acting commensurately. After all, of what value is one's nominal belief if he does not act accordingly?
 
Two points -- first, I don't understand the instructive point.  The same rhetorical question -- "of what value is one's nominal belief if he does not act accordingly" -- can be raised with respect to any person who identifies as an orthodox Jew, but, for whatever reason, does any aveira.  Based on this standard, every chotei becomes an apikores?     
 
Secondly, though I love hearing a good R' Chaim just as much as anyone else, I was wondering just how justified the terms am ha'aretz and apikores really are here. 
 
There is a machlokes Rishonim with respect to the scope of chilul Shabbos that is permitted for a choleh in life threatening danger. Rashi (Shabbos 129a d"h davar) writes that only for those things necessary for the well being of the choleh may be done.  Magid Mishne (Rambam Shabbos ch 2) in contrast writes that anything may be done on the choleh's behalf -- Shabbos becomes like a weekday. 
 
In a nutshell, the issue seems to be whether Shabbos is hutra or decuya with respect to pikuach nefesh.  There are Rishonim that line up on both sides of the issue, with lots of literature in Achronim as to which side of the debate the Rambam comes down on.
 
Although the Beis Yosef seems to side with Rashi, when he codifies the din in S.A. he sides with the Magid Mishne and writes (328:4) that when dealing with a wound to an internal organ (i.e. a life threatening danger) even if there is no doctor to evaluate the situation and even if the choleh himself does not say he is in danger one may do **anything at all** for the choleh's sake.
 
The M.B, however, notes that many Rishonim agree with Rashi.  Furthermore, the S.A. himself in Hil Yom Kippurim (siman 617) paskens that a choleh should be given food on Y"K only based on a doctor's evaluation of what is needed, and one should ideally give only a bit at a time, less than the shiur, if possible.  In other words, here the S.A. limits the heter of pikuach nefesh to fulfilling only the most basic necessities needed to sustain the choleh and only under advice of a doctor, consistent with Rashi's view, not the M.M.'s  M.B. therefore concludes that when it comes to a melacha d'oraysa in one should violate Shabbos only out of necessity for the choleh's health, otherwise it is better to ask an aku"m to do the melacha. 
 
Since in the story the doctor did not affirm that stoking the fire was necessary for the choleh (what does "nu,nu" mean?) is it so far fetched, given shitas Rashi, which is how the M.B. paskens, for the bystander to pause and not jump to do the stoking? 
 
I would say the am ha'ratzus here may be not in not knowing hilchos shabbos, but rather in not knowing hilchos moreh halacha b'fnei rabbo.  R' Chaim knew the shitas Rashi too and nonetheles said to kindle the fire! -- but that's a different flavor of am ha'ratzus than I think was intended to be the point in quoting the story.
 
What do we do with the stira between S.A. in Hil Shabbos and Hil Y"K?  Two approaches:
 
1) R' Elchanan (Koveitz He'oros 18:5-11) writes that Shabbos is hutra, but Y"K and other issurim are dechuya.  Paradoxical, because you would think Shabbos is more chamur.
 
2) The Brisker Rav (quoted by R' Zevin in Moadim b'Halacha) explained that the S.A. in Hil Y"K is speaking about a choleh who WILL BECOME sick unless he eats -- not a choleh who because of his present illness must eat.  
 
What is the upshot l'halacha?  For that, ask your Rabbi.  The sefer Nishmas Avraham quotes the M.B., but then writes that after printing that psak in the first edition of his sefer he got a letter from R' Ovadya Yosef arguing that Shabbos should be treated as hutra -- see the long teshuvah in Yechaveh Daat vol 4 #30 where he marshals many proofs for this position.

4 comments:

  1. "not knowing hilchos moreh halacha b'fnei rabbo"


    or, is "the family member" busy pausing long enough to say 'shalom aleichem Rashi u'Mori' [u'Rav Chaim], thus to acknowledge the dechuya side of the deal in the presence of his Rabbi?

    Rav Chaim shouts: [in the present situation, never mind me; a pause to say 'shalom aleicha Rashi' is] 'Enough!'

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  2. re the instructive point: "of what value is one's nominal belief if he does not act accordingly"

    I think the difference between that and a regular sinner is that a regular sinner is acting לתאבון, while to be "machmir" in shabbos over pikuach nefesh is not לתאבון, but can only come from a (perhaps subliminal) philosophy that mishpitei hatorah are nekama beolam.

    Like you, however, I also have difficulty in understanding the rest of the letter and its application to covid -- where by locking people up, we are also killing them! וצריך עיון

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    Replies
    1. >>>a regular sinner is acting לתאבון, while to be "machmir" in shabbos over pikuach nefesh is not לתאבון, but can only come from a (perhaps subliminal) philosophy

      According to your interpretation, the sin here is one of deyos, a wrong philosophy. R' Twersky sounds to me like he is saying the opposite, namely that the person "subscribes axiomatically to the preeminence of pikuach nefesh," i.e. he has the right philosophy, but "is remiss in acting commensurately," i.e. his deeds don't measure up to his creed. Hence my question.

      (from Chaim)

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  3. Re Apikores, it's pashut. See Rambam Shabbos 2:3. Min is the new girsa. Old Rambams say apikorsim.
    כשעושים דברים אלו, אין עושין אותן לא על ידי גויים, ולא על ידי קטנים, ולא על ידי עבדים, ולא על ידי נשים--כדי שלא תהא שבת קלה בעיניהם; אלא על ידי גדולי ישראל וחכמיהם. ואין מורין לנשים לעשות דברים אלו. ואסור להתמהמה בחילול שבת, לחולה שיש בו סכנה, שנאמר "אשר יעשה אותם האדם וחי בהם" (ויקרא יח,ה), ולא שימות בהם. הא למדת, שאין משפטי התורה נקמה בעולם, אלא רחמים וחסד ושלום בעולם. ואלו המינים שאומרים שזה חילול ואסור, עליהן הכתוב אומר "וגם אני נתתי להם, חוקים לא טובים; ומשפטים--לא יחיו, בהם" (יחזקאל כ,כה).

    About you saying they argue if Rambam holds hutra or dechuya, he says דחויה היא שבת, אצל סכנת נפשות, כשאר כל המצוות; in Shabbos 2:1, but I guess some hold he means hutra een though he says dechuya,

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