female role models for avodas Hashem (II) - cross currents and gender stereotypes

Earlier this week, I challenged, “If you have daughters, take a moment and think of 3 contemporary female role models who inspire your daughters with their wisdom, insight, and intellectual acumen in Torah. I would bet you couldn't name three.” Almost too good to be true, my point was underscored when the very first comment came in (and I hope the author is not offended by being quoted – if you are, I will change this post and ask mechila) – “However, for what it is worth, I can name you some compelling and "inspirational" female rolemodels, who are also very intellectually-minded yet promote personal growth and a love of Torah: Rebbitzen Tzipporah Heller..., Rebbitzen Shira Smiles. There is also a Rebbitzen, I forget her name…”
I don't count as three names Rebbetzin Heller, Smiles, and what’s her name… My point was that no one would have the same degree of trouble naming three Roshei Yeshiva, male role models. And as I wrote, “…I do take issue with those who do not see the harmful effects produced by the dearth of role models and lack of serious learning opportunities open to young women.”
Contrary to my view, Avi Shafran weighs in this week with the following: “There is certainly no dearth of Orthodox women role-models who shoulder important responsibilities in bona fide Orthodox communities.” Indeed! So where are these inspirational leaders and role models? Shafran explains, “They fill the fundamental, vital positions of homemakers (in the word’s most literal and sublime sense), wives and mothers…” Yes, inspiration in the kitchen! There is the sublime of the laundry and dirty dishes! What can be greater avodas Hashem then doing laundry, baking challah, and scrubbing the floor when you are done? I shouldn't be so cynical, but the fact that anyone can write this stuff is amazing.
Chores are not avodas Hashem - they are chores. My wife happens to do much of the work at home, but is not naive enough to believe that this should be the totality of her religious experience. The fact that she reviews parsha with a different peirush every year, learns and knows Nach better than I do, and I know where to find the good R' Tzadok's in Pri Taddik based on her underlining in the sefer says far more about her avodas Hashem then the fact that she bakes good challah. This is certainly not the derech for every women. I don't know if it is the derech for most. I do know that whatever her derech is or the derech my daughers choose for themselves when they get older should not be based on gender stereotypes that come from the world of 1940s TV sitcoms. A person needs to seek out his or her own path to fulfillement. For some, baking challah is enough. For others, women as well as men, a more intellectual approach is yearned for. For these women, the kitchen is not the answer to religious fulfillment.

the authority of a navi vs. the authority of nevuah (II)

When can one listen to a Navi who says to disobey the Torah? The gemara in Sanhedrin (89) tells us that the reason Bnei Yisrael listed to Eliyahu at Har haKarmel to offer a korban outside the Bais HaMikdash and the reason Yitzchak listened to Avraham to agree to the akeidah was because Eliyahu and Avraham were ‘muchzak’, they already had established their bona fides as Nevi’im. The gemara in Yevamos (90) asks why we cannot derive from this halacha that Bais Din also has the right to uproot a mitzvah b’kum v’aseh, and answers that the law for a Navi is different because the Torah specifically mandates “eilav tishma’un’, to listen to the Navi. Asks the gemara further, why not use this as a binyan av for Bais Din as well (see Tosfos), and answers that the case of Eliyahu and Avraham was l’migdar milsa, just an emergency measure, which would be permissible for B”D as well, but not as a general rule. Tosfos puts the two gemaras together and writes that emergency measures allow the Navi license to act, but the validity of the Navi’s assessment of what constitutes ‘l’migdar milsa’ can be made only by a Navi who is muchzak.
Tosfos asks: how could the gemara in Yevamos try to derive from the Navi’s right to override Torah law that Bais Din could do so as well – the Navi acts under the direct command of G-d, which Bais Din does not have?! Tosfos (Sanhedrin 89b) answers that the gemara’s assumption is that the Navi does not always have a direct command from G-d either, but must still be obeyed in even violation of Torah law based on the Navi’s own assessment and da’as of what is correct. The Minchas Chinuch points out that from the Rambam (Yesodei haTorah 9:6) it seems that the mitzvah to obey the Navi is limited to where the Navi speaks “b’dvar Hashem”, through direct prophecy.
There seems to be a fundamental issue at the core of this debate: is the gavra of Navi a person invested with authority who must be obeyed even in matters that he intuits based on his da’as, or is it nevuah, the cheftza of prophecy, which we are commanded to obey? Reflecting back on the issue raised yesterday, R’ Soloveitchik’s distinction between the cheftza of nevuah and the cheftza of Torah seems to assume the latter approach to the mitzvah. However, according to the former approach, that the person of the Navi is invested with authority, irrespective of the subject matter of the Navi’s command, the mitzvah of obeying the Navi still might apply.

rebelling against a navi (I)

The parsha of melech warns a Jewish king not to deviate from “the mitzvah” (17:20), meaning (as Rashi explains) not to ignore even a small command issued by a Navi. Indeed, we know that Shaul lost his position for failing to follow the command of Shmuel, and Yoshiyahu met his tragic death for ignoring Yirmiyahu’s warning to let the Egyptian army cross through Eretz Yisrael. Later, in the parsha of the Navi, (18:19), the Torah prohibits any member of Klal Yisrael from ignoring the words of a Navi. In light of this issur on any member of Klal Yisrael to disobey a Navi, why does the Torah place a separate issur on the king? And why in the case of Shaul did he suffer only a loss of his status when the punishment for ignoring a Navi is death? The Minchas Chinuch suggests that the issur of disobeying a Navi applies only to a rebellious act done in defiance of the words of the Navi. Merely failing to fulfill the words of the Navi properly is not an act of rebellion. However, the Torah applies a higher standard to the leadership of the Jewish people and demands that a king not err even in this regard.
The Minchas Chinuch proves his point by asking why any violation of any issur in the Torah is not also punishable as a violation of the words of the greatest navi, Moshe Rabeinu? Obviously, Minchas Chinuch writes, we cannot define any transgression as an overt act of rebellion against the Navi. R’ Soloveitchik offered a different solution to this question raised by the M.C. Although Moshe was indeed the greatest of prophets, that does not mean every charge he gave had the status of prophecy. Torah and mitzvos are not words of nevuah, but are a separate cheftza shel Torah, a distinctly different form of Divine communication. It is only words of nevuah, not words of Torah, which the prohibition of rebelling against the Navi addresses.
To be continued, bli neder…

thoughts on cosmology and evolution from the former head of the vatican observatory

A bit off the beaten path of my usual topics, here is an article by the (former) director of the Vatican observatory trying to reconcile his belief in scientific cosmology and evolution with his religious faith. I write "former" in the preceding sentence because as of this week, he was replaced (supposedly) in part because his views are inconsistent with Church doctrine. In affirming that the scientific worldview is not inconsistent with creationism, Father Coyne acknowledges that he is forced to reinterpret the whole concept of a “designer G-d” that Genesis suggests – even though the scholastic philosophers did adopt such a view, he finds support for his approach in earlier Church writings like Augustine. The money quote – “But, if we confront what we know of our origins scientifically with religious faith in God the Creator – if, that is, we take the results of modern science seriously – it is difficult to believe that God is omnipotent and omniscient in the sense of many of the scholastic philosophers. For the believer, science tells us of a God who must be very different from God as seen by them.” He further writes, "If they respect the results of modern science and, indeed, the best of modern biblical research, religious believers must move away from the notion of a dictator God or a designer God, a Newtonian God who made the universe as a watch that ticks along regularly."
I am not going to enter the debate which is ongoing in the our Jewish world on these same issues other than to say that I think much of the reluctance to accept scientific theories that reread ma'aseh Braishis is rooted in the clash Father Coyne notes between the scientific approach and the concept of G-d as omniscient and omnipotent. Father Coyne is honest enough to admit that acceptance of "modern science... and biblical research" forces a philosophical reassessment and is not simply a matter of how to read Genesis; I think many Jewish supporters of evolution or intelligent design are not sufficiently attuned to the philosophical consequences of the theories they choose to embrace.

interesting article about R' She'ar Yashuv Cohen

This is a fascinating article based on an interview with R' She'ar Yashuv Cohen, Rav of Haifa and son of the famous Nazir, the great talmid of Rav Kook - worth taking a look.

mitzvos - duty or inspiration?

A thought question regarding teaching about torah and mitzvos (or you can even reflect on your personal experience): which would you say is more crucial – helping people find some emotional or inspirational meaning that drives them to perform mitzvos, or helping people strengthen their sense of duty and commitment to do mitzvos even if they find them uninspiring or make them uncomfortable?
(No, I do not mean to present this as an either/or false dichotomoy. It’s a matter of emphasis…)

d'mai - issur gavra or issur cheftza

The gemara (Chulin 6) tells a story of Rav Asi being served a mixture of eggs and wine (which had the status of d’mai) at an inn. R’ Zeira did not eat the mixture but R’ Asi did. When R’ Zeira asked how R’ Asi ate d’mai, R’ Asi answered that his action was inadvertent as he had not considered the situation. Asks the gemara: hashta b’hemtam shel tzadikim ain HKB”H mavi takalah al yadam, tzadikim atzmam lo kol shekein – we know Hashem does not let a tzadik come to an inadvertent sin of eating something prohibited, so how could this have happened?! R’ Yosef Engel and R’ Elchanan focus on this question and relate it to our chakira of whether issurei derabbanan are issurei gavra or issurei cheftza. D’mai is food which comes from an am ha’aretz, someone not completely trustworthy when it comes to being mafrish terumos u’ma’asros k'halacha. In truth, rov amei ha’aretz m’asrin heim, most people did take off terumah and ma’aser properly, but the chachamim made the takanah of d'mai to be chosheish for the minority. Given that background, it is strange that the gemara should compare d’mai to eating ma’achalos asuros. The fact that Hashem does not allow tzadikim to stumble might simply mean in this case that the d’mai which was served came from an am ha’aretz who was properly mafrish terumah and ma’aser and therefore there was nothing wrong with the wine. From the fact that the gemara does not consider this possibility, it seems to indicate that once the gezeira of d’mai is in place, irrespective of the truth of whether teruma and ma’aser was properly taken, the food becomes a chefzta shel issur, something inherently prohibited. Does this mean issurei derabbanan should be treated as issurei cheftza, or can you distinguish between d'mai and other types of issurim?

the mitzvah to obey chazal and ma'achilin lo hakal hakal techila

The Minchas Chinuch presents a radical chiddush in this week’s parsha. The halacha is that if someone is dangerously ill and issurim must be violated to help that person, it is better to minimize the extent of the issurim violated – ma’achilin lo hakal hakal techila, we feed the ill person the lighter issur first. The Rishonim debate how one measures which actions entail greater or lesser issurim – is it the number of issurim violated or the severity of the issur? For the sake of his argument the Minchas Chinuch presents the Ran’s view that the number of issurim violated is the determining criteria. If so, given that in our parsha there is an issur of ‘lo tasur’ for violating the words of Chazal and a mitzvas aseh to listen to the words of Chazal, one might very well have a situation where a law derived from a derasha carries more weight than a law which is explicit in a pasuk. Minchas Chinuch’s example: if one eats a non-kosher bird in violation of explicit pesukim in the Torah, one violates a lav and and an aseh (the mitzvas aseh of eating only kosher food). The gemara learns from a derasha that that there is a lav and mitzvas aseh not to eat the bird which was shechted as part of the ceremony of being metaheir a metzora. Since these two issurim are derived from a derasha, violating these issurim would also be a violation of the mitzvas aseh of listening to Chazal and the lav of disobeying their words. So 4 issurim to 2, it is better to feed a sick person a non-kosher bird than to feed a sick person a kosher bird shechted properly which was used for taharas metzora!
There are a few reasons one might argue on this chiddush, but I won’t spoil the fun of letting you mull it over. R’ Elchanan discusses in Kuntres Divrei Sofrim 1:35-39.

on female role models and chinuch

If you have daughters, take a moment and think of 3 contemporary female role models who inspire your daughters with their wisdom, insight, and intellectual acumen in Torah. I would bet you couldn't name three. Now switch gears and name role models for your son(s) and I am sure there is no shortage of names of prominent Roshei Yeshiva which roll off the tongue. I cannot help but view together the reaction of many to the woman featured in this article with the story I overheard on Shabbos from a father bemoaning his teenage daughter’s lack of interest in ruchniyus. I am not entertaining a debate here over the issue of woman as Rabbis – that is a political question and I don’t do politics. But I do take issue with those who do not see the harmful effects produced by the dearth of role models and lack of serious learning opportunities open to young women. Lessons on tzniyus and baking challah don’t make for a serious and profound commitment to Judaism for the intellectually curious any more than knowing how to put on tefillin and wear a kippah would satisfy an intellectually gifted ben Torah. I admit my bias to thinking of Judaism primarily as an intellectual experience - if you disagree, you should probably not bother reading this blog : ) I do not mean to suggest that every girl needs to be thrust into a demanding regimen of learning when she has other interests. Nor do I mean that every girl needs to learn gemara or shach and taz. Even for those who want to learn, there is plenty to go through without ever learning gemara. For those who can excel in limudei kodesh and have a willingness to do so, why should they not be afforded every opportunity to succeed personally, to share their knowledge with other young women, and to serve as role models of avodas Hashem for the entire community? How can you expect a young lady raised in a modern orthodox home to feel good about Judaism when she might be attending a high school and taking AP physics, AP History, studying for the SAT, but has never met a woman who knows more than basic chumash and Rashi and some halachos heard orally which the sources for remain unknown? Judaism without thinking, Judaism without role models who have a deep intellectual commitment and understanding of Torah, seems to me to be a sterile experience and an experience we should not force upon young women who aspire to a deeper and more profound connection to avodas Hashem.
(Yes, I am in a bad mood, which leads to these type posts. I will snap out of it and get back to learning topics soon, I hope).

issurei d'oraysa: issur gavra or issur cheftza?

The Mishna in Nedarim tells us that one cannot take a shavua to do or not do a mitzvah or issur because one is already mushba m’har Sinai, bound by oath from mattan Torah to obey mitzvos, and one shavua cannot be chal on top of another pre-existing shavua. However, one can take a neder on a mitzvah – e.g. one can take a neder from sitting in sukkah even though one is already bound to do the mitzvah of yeshivas sukkah. The difference is that a shavua is an issur gavra – it relates to the act of sitting in sukkah, in direct contradiction to the Torah’s command; a neder is an issur cheftza – it addresses the sukkah as an object, but does not directly address the mitzvah act of sitting in sukkah.
A neder is made through hatpasa, saying X is assur like Y, where Y is something that one has created an issur on by a neder or some other declaration, e.g. hekdesh. One can take a neder not to eat food on day X just like one does not eat on day Y, provided day Y is one which has previously been demarcated as a fast day though a neder. The gemara (Shavuos 20b) discusses a more complicated case where day Y is the day on which Gedalya ben Achikam was killed - even though one would not eat on that day anyway because it is a fast day, if one also took a neder not to eat on the day of Tzom Gedalya, it can serve as a term of hatpasa for the neder saying day X is like that day. How does this neder not to eat on Tzom Gedlaya work? Rashi writes that just as a neder is chal on sukkah because it creates an issur cheftza, so too, the neder adds an issur cheftza to the prohibition of Tzom Gedalya which already exists. Tosfos disagrees with Rashi's blanket rule and holds (based on a girsa change rejected by Rashi) that this chiddush is true only by issurei derabbanan like Tzom Gedalya, but not by issurei d’oraysa. If one were to take a neder not to eat neveila or not to eat on Yom Kippur, according to Rashi such a neder is chal; according to Tosfos it is void.
Returning to the discussion from last week re: issurei gavra and issurei cheftza, perhaps this is the issue here. According to Rashi, all issurim, both d’oraysa and derabbanan, e.g. Tzom Gedalya and issur neveila, are issurei gavra, and a neder is chal on top of them to add an issur cheftza. According to Tosfos, only issurei derabbanan are issurei gavra, but issurim d’oraysa like neveila and achila on Y”K are issurei chaftza which a neder adds nothing to and cannot be chal on. A middle position is taken by R’ Akiba Eiger (Y”D 215:6): neveila is an issur cheftza which a neder cannot be chal on, but Yom Kippur is an issur gavra, as it is the day which creates a temporary issur, but the food is fundamentally heter.

eivar hayarden and yishuv eretz yisrael

The Meshech Chochma in the opening to this week’s parsha addresses a kashe raised on the Ramban's opinion that there is a mitzvas aseh of yishuv Eretz Yisrael. The gemara in Sota asks why Moshe was so anxious to enter Eretz Yisrael – did he desire to eat the fruit of the land?! Obviously not – his desire was to fulfill the mitzvos hateluyos ba’aretz. According to the Ramban, even without mitzvos hateluyos ba’aretz Moshe should have wanted to enter Eretz Yisrael simply to fulfill the mitzvah of kibbush and yishuv ha’aretz! The Meshech Chochma answers that Moshe had already fulfilled yishuv ha’aretz by conquering the land of Sichon and Og. The simple proof he offers is that it is unthinkable that the tribes of Reuvain and Gad would want to completely abrogate the mitzvah of yishuv ha’aretz by living in Eiver haYarden – it must be that these lands too are included in the mitzvah of yishuv. What the Meshech Chochma takes as a given is a major debate in rishonim and achronim. The Mishna in Bikkurin has an argument between Tanna Kamma and R’ Yosi whether bikkurim can be brought from Eiver haYarden. R’ Yosi holds that these lands are patur because this land is not “zvas chalav u’devash” – does this mean these are not included in the borders of Eretz Yisrael, or simply that these lands, although part of Eretz Yisrael, do not produce choice produce and are therefore exempted by the pasuk? Rashi (Sanhedrin 11b) holds that the korban ha’omer could be brought (b’di’evad) from wheat grown in Eiver haYarden, while the Ran (Nedarim 22) disagrees. The Parashas Derachim notes Moshe’s sevara for davening to enter the Eretz Yisarel after defeating Sichon v’Og was based on “neder sh’hutar miktzato hutar kulo”, a neder which has been partially been annulled is completely void. Clearly, the logic here assumes that entering the Eiver haYarden was already a partial termination of the neder, yet at the same time Hashem did not acquiesce to this sevara! I have not done a full survey of the mekoros on this topic - just wanted to call attention to the issue for now. Yishma chacham v'yosif lekach

kaltuhu mechitzos and kedushas yerushalayim

As previously discussed, the din of kaltuhu mechitzos teaches that once ma’aser sheni has entered Yerushalayim, it can no longer be nifdeh if removed from the city but must be eaten in Yerushalayim. This halacha is the basis of the Ra’avad’s critique of a fairly well known Rambam. The Rambam paskens (Hil Bais haBechira ch 6) that the gemara’s debate whether “kidsha l’shayta” or “kidsha l’asid lavo”, whether Eretz Yisrael was endowed with permanent sanctity or whether that sanctity was null and void after the Land was destroyed, applies only to those areas outside Yerushalayim. However, writes the Rambam, Yerushalayim has permanent irrevocable sanctity. The reason for this distinction is based on the nature of the mekadesh – the Rambam poetically explains that Yerushalayim is sanctified by the presence of the Shechina, and just as the Shechina is permanent and unchanging, so too, the city remains sanctified for eternity. The Ra’avad disagrees, and while his final argument, “sod Hashem l’yereivav” leaves little room for debate, his other proofs are interesting. Ra’avad points to a gemara (B.M. 53b, cited by the Rambam, Hil Ma’aser Sheni 6:16) regarding ma’aser sheni which entered Yerushalayim and was then removed from the city, and then the walls of Yerushalayim were destroyed. The ma’aser sheni cannot be nifdeh because of the din of kaltuhu mechitzos, but at the same time cannot be eaten because there are no mechitzos left around Yerushalayim. Doesn’t the fact that ma’aser sheni cannot be eaten in Yerushalayim after the destruction of the city walls prove that the kedusha of the city has been nullified? The Rambam may very well have taken issue with the very assumption behind this question. The din of kaltuhu mechitzos may not at all be dependent upon the kedushas hamakom of Yerushalayim, but upon the existence of physical walls – literally, kaltuhu mechitzos, it is the walls themselves which hold the ma’aser back from pidyon. If ma’aser sheni had entered the city after the walls fell, then according to the Rambam even though there is still a kedushas makom to the place, the absence of walls cancels the din of kaltuhu mechitzos (see Moadim u’Zmanin vol 5, #348).
Just as an aside, it is worth seeing the Ra’avad’s language in Hil Bais haBechira because it reflects a certain ambiguity regarding entering the Har HaBayis. Ra’avad writes that there is no kedushas hamakom and therefore one who enters the area is not liable for an issur kareis – does that mean it is permitted, or just one incurs no issur kareis for doing so?

issurei derabbanan - issurei gavra or issurei cheftza?

Following up on the previous post, the Yerushalmi (which Rambam quotes l’halacha, Ma’aser Sheni 2:12-13) adds one additional important detail not mentioned yesterday. If ma’aser sheni became tamei either in or out of Yerushalayim from an av hatumah, or from a vlad hatumah (see yesterday’s post) outside Yerushalayim, the halacha is that we do not apply the din of “kaltuhu mechitzos” – you can be podesh the ma’aser sheni even in Yerushalayim and eat the food anywhere. (The exception noted yesterday is if it became tamei in Yerushalyim from a vlad hatumah, you must be podeh the ma’aser sheni, but the food must remain in Yerushalayim because of kaltuhu mechitzos). The Yerushalmi adds that if the food is tamei from a vlad hatumah, the owner of the food must make a tnai and stipulate that the din of kaltuhu mechitzos not apply upon his entrance to Yerushalayim, otherwise the default din of kaltuhu mechitzos will take effect.
R’ Yosef Engel in Esvan D’Oraysa (#10) cites this halacha as proof to the question of whether issurei derabbanan are issurei gavra or issurei cheftza. If the din of kaltuhu mechitzos does not apply to food which is tamei, why should whether or not the owner stipulated anything make a difference? However, if one assumes that food which is tamei m’derabbanan is not the same as a chefzta of food which is tamei min haTorah – tumah derabbanan is really tahor food that the chachamim impose restrictions on the gavra from using, then we can understand why an additional tnai is required to remove from this cheftza of tahor food the default din of kaltuhu mechitzos. R’ Yosef Engel brings a number of proofs in the rest of the essay to the opposite position, namely that issurei derabbanan are indeed issurei cheftza.

sheni l'tumah - d'oraysa or derabbanan?

This post was instigated by my brother-in-law, who noted it makes a good yediya to post on my blog, so here it is. There is a din by ma’aser sheni that “mechitzos koltos”, once ma’aser enters the walls of Yerushalayim, it must be eaten there. Of course, if you remove kedushas ma’aser sheni, then the food could theoretically be eaten anywhere, but the halacha is that you cannot be podeh ma’aser sheni in Yerushalayim. The only exception is if the food becomes tamei, in which case, based on a dersaha, pediya is allowed even in the city. The Yerushalmi has what I thought is a fantastic chiddush in the name of Bar Pada (daf 18) – if food becomes tamei only as a “vald hatumah”, i.e. tamei from a rishon so it is only a sheni l’tumah, since it is tamei we allow pediya, but since min haTorah this food is still tahor, we still apply the law of mechitzos koltos and the redeemed food must be eaten in the city. Seems pretty clear from this din that a sheni l’tumah is only a din derabbanan --I am tempted to add exclamation points here, because I certainly was baffled when I learned this. My BIL was kind enough to point out my ignorance of the Rambam, who indeed paskens exactly like this gemara (hil ma’aser sheni perek 2) and writes that a "vlad hatumah" is only m'divreihem (derabbanan). As he remarked, doesn't picking up interesting yediyos like this make learning Yerushalmi worth it? (The truth is no, yediyos like this just leave me perplexed, and I don't have enough time to devote to delving into them). Not being quick enough on my feet when talking this over 5 minutes before seudah shlishis (we were both at another relative's bar mitzvah), I had to wait until this morning to e-mail my BIL back to explain upon further reflection why taking this Rambam k'pshuto is next to impossible! The Mishna in Sota (5:2) proves from pesukim that a sheni l’tumah causes a shlishi l’tumah – if food falls into a kli cheres oven which has a sheretz dangeling in it, the sheretz is matamei the oven (rishon), the ovens airspace is matamei the food (sheni), which in turn the Torah says is ‘yitma”, causes other things to become tamei. All this is on a d’oraysa level, as the Rambam writes in hil Avos haTumah ch 11. So how can you say a "vlad hatumah" is only derabbanan?! This difficulty is raised by the Mareh HaPanim right on the daf, who changes the girsa in the Rambam to fit the rule in avos hatumah. But, as my BIL pointed out originally, the meforshei haRambam take the words and girsa k’peshutan, so what in the world do they do with the Mishna in Sota?

lomdus on luchos and aron

Some lomdus on the aron and luchos over at mishmar.

kerias shema and kavanah (II)

Apologies for not finishing this topic sooner (or very coherently) - swamped with too much other stuff on my plate right now! Continuing from last post...
Unlike the Ramban (Milchamos R"H ch 3) who understood the sugya's debate over kavanah in kerias shema as the same as the general debate over whether mitzvos tzerichos kavanah, R' Soloveitchik explained (as David also commented on the previous post) that the Rambam held that kerias shema requires a unique higher level of kavanah by virtue of its being a fulfillment of kabbalas ol malchus shamayim. This is why although the braysa quotes a number of opinions as to the shiur of kavanah for kerias shema - the first pasuk, the first perek, etc. - the gemara never relates these opinions to the general debate of mitzvos tzerichos kavanah. Acceptance of Hashem as King (kabbalas ol) by definition is a mental act which requires intent; the debate over mitzvos tzerichos kavanah is whether a physical act of mitzvah performance requires accompanying intent to define it as a mitzvah. The Rambam understood the case of korei l'hagiha not as mitaskek (Rashi) or as improperly pronouncing the words (Tosfos), but as simply reading without this higher level of intent for kabbalas ol, which is sufficient outside the requirements that apply to the first pasuk.
R' Soloveitchik used this same idea to explain the Rambam's opinion regarding someone who falls asleep in the middle of kerias shema. The gemara writes that R' Yehudah instructed that if he dozes off, he should be woken up to recite the first pasuk of shema with kavanah. According to many rishonim, he would recite the rest of kerias shema, but he was not concerned with the intensity of kavanah for the remainder. However, the Rambam writes that one must be woken to read the first pasuk, and then if one dozes, one is not obligated to recite the remainder of k"s at all. According the the simple reading of the Rambam (in perek 1), all three parshiyos of k"s are d'oraysa, so why must one be woken only to read the first pasuk? The Rav explained that if one falls asleep one is patur from mitzvos becuase of ones, and this ptur is relevant even for the mitzvah of k"s. However, there is a specific din in kabbalas ol malchus shamayim which supercedes the exemption of ones and requires being woken to recite the first pasuk.

krias shema and mitzvos tzerichos kavanah

The mishna in Brachos (13) tells us that someone who is reading the torah and gets to the parsha of krias shema fulfills the mitzvah of k"s only if he has kavanah to do so. The gemara suggests that we can deduce from this mishna that mitzvos tzerichos kavanah, intent is required to fulfill any mitzvah, but then rejects the proof - perhaps the mishna is speaking of a case of 'korei l'hagiha', reading with no intention whatsoever (Rashi) or stumbling over the words (Tosfos), which is not accurate reading. The mishna's requirement of kavanah refers to simple cognizance that one is performing an act of reading, but has nothing to do with the general disagreement whether intent to fulfill a mitzvah is required to be yotzei. The Rambam (krias shema 2:1) seems to pasken exactly the opposite of the gemara's conclusion. Rambam writes that as long as one had kavanah while reading the first pasuk of krias shema (which is derived in a braysa as mandatory according to some Tanaim for just the first pasuk, according to others for the first perek) one fulfills the mitzvah of k"s even if one is "korei l'hagiha" through the rest of the parsha. To be continued...

the Ohr Sameiach on nacheim and nachamu

The Rosh asks: why is it that we only recite nacheim in the shmoneh esrei of mincha on 9 Av - if it is akin to "me'ein hame'ora", a tefila based on the character of the day, we should recite it in all our tefilos just as we recite ya'aleh v'yavo in every tefila of rosh chodesh and al hanisim in every tefila of chanuka? The Ohr Sameiach (hil tefila) answers this question with a gemara in Ta'anis (30). Shmuel haKatan declared a fast, and after a full day of tefila it began to rain. The tzibur assumed this was due to their good grace, but Shmuel haKatan warned otherwise. He gave a mashal to a Master whose servant needs a certain request granted - rather than grant the favor immediatly, the Master let the servant sweat out the day in suffering and pleading and only then consented. Explains the Ohr Sameiach: if we were to say nacheim at night and again in the morning, and then follow with the leining of "ki tolid banim" and "asof asifeim", it would seem that Hashem is piling suffering on before granting our wish. By not saying nacheim until mincha at the end of the day, we go immediatly from the close of our tefila of 9 Av of "nacheim" to shabbos nachamu, where Hashem offers the response of "nachamu nachamu ami".

ahavas Hashem through Torah lishma

In the middle of explaining the mitzvah of ahavas Hashem in last week's parsha, the Ramban cites the Sifri that one should not learn Torah in order to be called wise, in order to sit in yeshiva, or for some other reward, but rather one should learn for its own sake. It seems according to Ramban that the concept of "lishma" is not a din in hilchos talmud torah or in the specific mitzvah being performed, but rather is part of the general obligation of ahavas Hashem. This idea is reflected in the Rambam as well, who cites the halacha of "lishma" not in hilchos talmud torah, but instead in the last chapter of hilchos tshuvah. Based on this, perhaps we can explain "mitoch shelo lishma ba lishma" means that talmud torah or any mitzvah done "shelo lishma" fulfills the basic prerequisite of the mitzvah, but lacks the additional kiyum of ahavas Hashem that is possible had the mitzvah been done with proper motivation.

new blog to have a look at

I was asked to participate in a new joint blog venture http://mishmar.blogspot.com/, which you may want to have a look at. Seems we are off to a good start, with an interesting debate on whether pikuach nefesh is more significant than talmud torah and how that relates to whether yeshiva students should serve - ayen sham! I am not giving up posting here, but will try to do both and see how it goes.

Nachamu Nachamu Ami

It’s post 9 Av, erev Shabbos Nachamu, and the neighborhood is already filled with the happy hum of washing machines, the music in every camp is queued up to start playing at chatzos, and the unshaven look will be gone for many of us before Shabbos. Nachamu Nachamu Ami… The Midrash tells us that the Jewish people are doubly-consoled (hence the repetition “nachamu nachamu…”) because they sinned doubly and were doubly punished. G-d meets out perfect justice - how is it possible to be doubly punished!? And if a double sin means sinning 2x, the punishment is not double-punishment, but a single punishment for each sin? Chardal's blog hit the nail right on the head, but I will add my 2 little cents. Seforim tell us that the 600,000 paradigmatic Jewish souls of Am Yisrael correspond to the 600,000 letters of a sefer Torah. Just as if one single letter is missing or defective, the entire sefer Torah becomes pasul, so too, if one Jew is defective in his observance, the nation as a whole is deficient. Our chataim are indeed “kiflayim”, doubled – when we sin, we taint not only ourselves, but we taint and weaken the soul of the Jewish nation. And when we are punished, we bear the punishment not alone, but the pain of each Jew has a doubled effect in creating suffering and weakness in the Jewish nation. “Nachamu nachamu AMI”, Be consoled, be consoled MY NATION. A single perfect letter is a pasul sefer Torah, for all its hiddur and beauty, is lacking in kedushas sefer Torah – only when the sefer as a whole is complete is that single letter also endowed with kedusha. And only to the extent that we view ourselves not as isolated individuals responsible only for our own religious fate, but as part of the greater nation of Am Yisrael, can we be receptive to the comfort of Nachamu.

galus and geulah

I usually have a very difficult time fasting - hope everyone else has an easy fast tomorrow.
I think there is one message that is not communicated so well in the way 9 Av is taught and learned about, at least judging from my kids' education. We have the wrong impression that living in a nice home in NY is "normal", and the Jewish people living united on their homeland is some dream that can only take place through a great miracle. MaHaRaL writes just the opposite: galus is abnormal. Only because of Hashem's miraculous intervention have we been able to survive 2000 years spread across the globe outside our natural homeland - the "normal" state of the Jewish nation is to be united in our own homeland. Galus is like a rubber band stretched to its limit and poised to snap back - only the force holding it in place prevents that from happening. One cannot compare a pauper who dreams of riches and an escape from his life to a prince who has been exiled from the palace and yearns for a return to his rightful place. Remove the force and the rubber band snaps back; remove the spiritual obstacles holding us down and the Jewish nation naturally will return united to its homeland. Lets work to make it happen.

seudah mamafseket (III) - learning torah erev 9 Av

A careful reading of the Ramban seems to belie the understanding that bathing is prohibited from the time of seudah hamafeseket because the seudah is a quasi- state of aninus. Recall that the Ramban explains that bathing, as opposed to wearing shoes, is prohibited from seudah hamafseket because the enjoyment of feeling refreshed extends into 9 Av itself, not just at the time of washing. Why does the Ramban need this sevara if the seudah obligates nihugei aveilus? I think the answer to this question is that the Ramban is not offering a new sevara to explain the reason for the issur, but is simply offering an indicator (siman, not sibah) why only the aveilus pratice of washing was prohibited but not wearing shoes, etc. However, in Moadim u’Zmanim, R’ Shternbruch takes this sevara of the Ramban at face value as the reason for the issur – it is the hana’ah which comes afterwards, on 9 Av, which creates the issur of bathing beforehand. This too suggests R” Shternbruch, is the reason for the prohibition of wine and meat – not because of aninus, but because these foods provide relish and enjoyment long after the meal has ended.
The Rama paskens that on erev 9 Av one should learn only material dealing with bad events or aveilus which are also permitted on 9 Av. The GR”A describes this as a chumra yeseira, an excessive prohibition, and the Aruch haShulchan as well does not seem to accept this Rama. Wwhen someone accused R’ Chaim Brisker of being too machmir, he offered a list of kulos he held of, among them the leniency to learn anything one wishes until nightfall on erev 9 Av. R’ Shternbruch writes that based on the Ramban, we can perhaps understand this Rama. Pekudei Hashem yesharim, mesamchei lev – we cannot learn Torah on 9 Av because there is no greater joy than engaging on Talmud Torah. Just as one cannot bathe, eat meat or drink wine on erev 9 Av because that enjoyment extends into the ta’anis itself, so too, the talmud torah of erev 9 Av would undoubtedly fill one with joy even after nightfall. The difficulty of this approach is why these issurim do not apply to Shabbos when 9 Av follows on Sunday. Regardless of whether the Moadim U’Zmanin’s sevara is correct in lomdus, it certainly is a powerful mussar to take away from hilchos tisha b’av.

seudah hamafseket (II)

Following up on yesterday’s discussion, we left off with the Ramban who holds that the issur of washing starts at the time of seudah hamafseket. As was pointed out in the comments, the gemara (Ta’anis 30) tells us that the issurim of washing, anointing, not wearing leather shoes, and not having relations are not only prohibited because of the issurim of ta’anis, but are prohibited based on hilchos aveilus – on 9 Av we adopt the halachic practices of actual mourning. This question, however, remains – why must we adopt the practices of mourning (at least with respect to washing) during the seudah hamafseket when the day of 9 Av does not begin until nightfall? M’mah nafshach - if one has accepted the fast from seudah hamafseket, then why is eating and drinking permitted until nightfall, and if one has not accepted the fast, why is washing prohibited?
One approach (see Keren Orah, Brisker Rav, and Chaim Markowitz’s comment from yesterday) is that the prohibition of aveilus from seudah hamafseket are not due to the acceptance of the fast, but are because dinei aveilus apply to the seudah itself. The Rambam (ta’aniyos 5:9) describes how the seudah hamafseket is eaten as if “one’s dead is before him” – what halacha would define as the status of onein. Although the RI”F and Rambam hold that an onein is not obligated in nihugei aveilus until after the deceased is buried, the Ramban disagrees, and holds that an onein must immediately practice the prohibitions of aveilus which will not interfere with his preparing the meis for burial. An onein is permitted to wear shoes to expedite movement to carry out the tasks needed to prepare for kevurah, but is not permitted (according to Ramban) to wash. Therefore, although eating and drinking are permitted until the fast begins, the seudah itself must be observed in a state of animus/aveilus, which prohibits meat/wine/washing.

r' tzadok's fasting to avert the churban - setting goals in avodas Hashem

Chazal tells us (Gittin 56) that Rav Tzadok fasted for 40 years to try to forestall the impending tragedy of the churban, yet in the end, despite R’ Tzadok’s great tshuvah and avodah, the Bais HaMikdash was destroyed. The Radomsker (Tiferes Shlomo) asks: does this mean that those 40 years of fasting were for naught? We might ask ourselves the same question – despite all those who are davening, returning to do tshuvah, and learning for the sake of peace in Eretz Yisrael, the daily rocket barrages continue. Is our avodah for naught?
The Radomsker writes that the answer to this question is a basic yesod in avodas Hashem. R’ Tzadok did NOT make a 40 year effortof fasting to avert the churban which failed. Rather, R’ Tzadok made a 1 day effort of fasting and tefilah to avert the churban each and every day which was successful for over 39 consecutive years!
Each day is its own spiritual battle. Our task is to focus on the moment, the day, what can be done now, and measure success against that yardstick without looking at what will be in the next week or month or year. For example: a person who sets out with the goal of finishing shas at some point is going to lose steam and have second thoughts – the burden of the goal seems so distant and overwhelming. But if instead of setting the goal at finishing shas, a person sets his goal at learning just 1 blatt today, and repeats that goal the next day and the day after, a person can have hundreds of successful accomplishments in talmud torah regardless of whether they reach the cumulative goal of one masechta, one seder, or all of shas.
If a person thinks that by his or her tefillah the entire war will be won, peace in Eretz Yisrael completely achieved, or some other overwhelming result, he/she is bound to be disappointed and left with nagging doubts whether his/her avodah is making a difference. But if one thinks of the one rocket that landed in a field instead of on someone's house, the one soldier who may have escaped harm, etc. , then I think one can draw chizuk from the many "little" things our tefillos and teshuvah surely have played a role in influencing.

seudah hamafseket before 9 Av

The gemara (Ta'anis 30) quotes a braysa: 'kol she'hu machmas 9 Av asur l'echol basar, lishtos yayin, v'asur lirchotz' - In a meal due to 9 Av one cannot eat meat, dring wine, or bathe [afterwards], but in a meal not due to 9 Av these would be permitted. R' Yishmael b"r Yosi in the name of his father holds as long as one may eat, one may wash.
The Rosh (4:38) cites the Ramban who interprets the tana kamma of the braysa to mean that once one eats the seudah hamafseket before 9 Av, one is also prohibited from washing. Even though the seudah is eaten before dark and the laws of 9 Av are not yet in effect, since one has accepted some of the practices of aveilus (i.e. not eating meat or drinking wine), the prohibition of washing applies as well. This applies only to washing, where the enjoyment of feeling refreshed and clean from bathing before the fast would give one pleasure on the actual day of 9 Av itself, but not to wearing leather shoes or other aveilus practices.
The Rosh writes that this interpretation is a 'davar teima', a baffeling idea. How can it be that even after finishing the seudah hamafseket one is permitted to eat and drink right up until the very moment it gets dark and 9 Av begins, yet by eating the seudah hamafseket it becomes prohibited to wash? Clearly the aveilus practices of not eating meat or drinking wine during seudah hamafseket do not trigger the 9 Av prohibitions on eating and drinking to apply, so why should the aveilus practice trigger the prohibition of washing to apply?
Bli neder to be continued - comments welcome.

Hashem is listening to our tefilos

If you need a little chizuk, look no further than this week's parsha:
"Ki mi goy gadol asher lo Elokim kerovim elav ka'Hashem Elokeinu b'chol korei'nu elav"? (4:7)
Targum explains: What other nation is so great that has a god who listens to its prayers in time of need like our G-d who listens to our tefilos when we daven to him.

Shabbos Chazon - the Ishbitzer and R' Tzadok on re'iya and binah

R’ Tzadok haKohen m'Lublin writes that the 3 haftaros of puranusa (evil tidings) which we read before 9 Av – Divrei Yirmiyahu, Shimu, and Chazon – correspond to the three attributes of dibbur (speech), shmiya (hearing), and re’iya (sight), which in turn correspond to the three higher sefiros of keser, chochma, and binah. I don’t think in a few paragraphs I can do justice to explaining this idea fully, but at least for Shabbos Devarim - Chazon wanted to try to shed some light on the relationship between re’iya/chazon and the tikkun of binah, understanding. The Ishbitzer teaches (P’ VaYakhel) that the word “re’u”, see, when used in the Torah, is a keyword that means to look beyond the superficial appearance of things in order to discern some deeper meaning. Some examples: “Re’eh karasi b’shem Betzalel”, see I have called to Betzalel – look beyond the fact that Moshe did the appointment and realize it was not his choice, but I, Hashem, who called for his appointment. Eished Potifar declares, ‘re’u havi lanu ish ivri l’tzachek banu” – here in the negative, she calls on the onlookers to not be "deceived" by Yosef’s outward appearance of innocence and accept her declaration that he is charlatan. Pharoah accuses Moshe, “re’u ki ra’ah neged pneichem”, there is some hidden evil plan you have in mind. It is probably not coincidence that the word “r’eu” b’gematriya is the same as the word “raz” secret. With this idea we can appreciate the conncetion R' Tzadok draws between sight, re’iya/chazon, and the concept of binah, understanding. The sight the Torah speaks of is not merely observing the superficial appearance of events, but is seeing the reality of the world through the prism of Torah and grasping the true meaning of things. I remember in college taking a course in perceptual psychology, and time and again this simple lesson was underscored – sight is not just a physical process, but is a cognitive process as well.
The Ishbitzer writes that the 9th pasuk of every parsha has a deep sod beyond the pashut pshat. In P’ Devarim the 9th pasuk is “lo uchal levadi s'es eschem”, Moshe’s complaint that alone he could not bear the burden of the Jewish people’s complaints, while led to the appointment of judges. The Ishbitzer explains: Moshe Rabeinu sensed that it was Yehoshua who was destined to lead the Jewish people into the Land, yet he deeply wished to be the one to fulfill that mission. “Eichah esah levadi”, for Moshe alone the burden was too great, as his personal tefilos that we read in next week’s parsha could not overturn the gezeirah against him, yet if Klal Yisrael had davened on his behalf, there was room for mercy. We heard Moshe call, yet we failed to truly see what was before us. We should have had the intelligence to discern that it was our tefillos, not our acceptance of substitute judges, which is what Moshe wanted. Moshe’s lamented that he could find no judges who were nevonim, people of understanding for precisely this reason. We grasped the superficial sense of the words, but lacked the insight, the binah, which marks true “re'iya”.
Rashi cites the Sifri to explain the appointment of judges who were “yedu’im”, known people: Moshe said when someone sat before him wrapped in a talis, he could not discern what sheivet or place that person came from, but to outsiders, these facts were known. In life, we wrap ourselves in levushim, garments that conceal our identity – the face we wear at work is often not who we really are, and for some, the face they wear in shule is also not who they really are. Life is a series of acts and roles that we step in and out of as required. When a person came wrapped in his talis, Moshe had no cognizance of the levush, the where and who of the person’s outer self, the veil of piety or honor that a person may don, but Moshe saw with re'iya the depths of each person’s soul as it truly was. The Zohar writes that Moshe could pasken a din Torah without the litigants needing proof or witnesses – he simply saw the truth in souls of the parties. By failing to heed the call of “eichah esah levadi”, we accepted a substitute. Without going through yeshivishe lomdus in Baba Metziya, it is obvious that concepts like rov and muchzak tell the court how to act based on the evidence before them, but do not guarantee that the law ever arrives at truth – these are rules of hanhaga, not rules of birur. Our judgment lacks the power of true insight, reiya behind the facts into the soul and truth of the matter, and relies on the substitute of superficial evidence.
When the Tanaim saw foxes running in the makom mikdash (Makos 24) they cried in sorrow, yet R’ Akiva laughed, confident that just as the prophecy of destruction was fulfilled, the prophecy of rebuilding would be as well. Did the other Tanaim doubt the nevuah of eventual geulah? The Midrash teaches, ‘V’chol yekar ra’asa eino’ – that which was not revealed to Moshe Rabeinu was revealed to R’ Akiva (see Menachos 29). R’ Akiva was the master of torah sheba’al peh, the master of seeing the depths of Torah within what was revealed at Sinai. R’ Tzadok haKohein teaches that others believed in the prophecy of redemption, but their eyes were filled with the desolation which surrounded them. R’ Akiva taught that there is yet a higher level – even as one looks at desolation, one who has true understanding and in-sight sees only goodness. This is true re’iya, seeing reality not with physical eyes alone, but with the cognizance of binah that reveals the shoresh below the surface, the neshoma of reality which is kulo tov. Shabbos Chazon calls to us for the tikun of re'iya, the ability to see even in the pain that surrounds am yisrael at this time, the seeds of redemption - u're'eh b'tuv yerushalayim v'shalom al yisrael.

more on eating vs. tasting - ta'anis, brachos, and meat during 9 days

Since I mentioned my wife’s sevara yesterday to distinguish te’ima (tasting) from achila (eating)as a basis for tasting fleishig food while preparing for shabbos during the 9 days, I owe a better follow up based on some comments (including hers!) The gemara (Berachos 14) poses the question of whether one who is fasting may taste food: is a kabbalas ta’anis the equivalent of accepting an issur achila, which does not include tasting, or is it the equivalent of accepting an issur hana’ah from food, which would prohibit tasting as well. The gemara concludes with a braysa that one who is fasting may taste, and one is also not required to recite a bracha on tasting (the shiur of taste is then defined as less than a revi’is). What is unclear from this simple statement is how it resolved the original question (see Tzla”ch). Is tasting permitted because a kabbalas ta’anis is a kabbalah only of an issur achila and not an issur hana’ah, or even hana’ah prohibited on a fast day, but a eating a small amount is not considered hana’ah? A number of issues may hinge on this question. 1) According to R’ Chananel (cited by Tos), tasting is permitted only if one spits out the food, yet Rashi (in Sefer haPardes) allows swallowing. If the prohibition on the fast or the mechayeiv of a bracha is hana’ah, then one might argue that swallowing even a small amount leads to hana’ah and tasting is allowed only if one spits out the food. But if a kabbalas ta’anis or the mechayeiv of bracha involves an act of achila, meaning ingesting a a specific shiur of food, swallowing less than that shiur would be permitted. Interestingly, the Rambam splits the psak: in Hil Ta’aniyos the Rambam prohibits swallowing even less than a shiur, yet in Hilchos Brachos the Rambam paskens that less than a shiur would not necessitate a bracha (this is how the GR”A paskens). One could learn that the Rambam paskened l’chumra on both issues to avoid a safeik, or one could create a more lomdish distinction between the mechayeiv of bracha vs. the kabbalas issur of ta’anis. For practical purposes, as my wife wrote, the Rama paskens this issue is a safeik bracha, and therefore achronim recommend to explicitly have in mind to have hana’ah when tasting to avoid the whole issue. 2) There is a major debate in Rishonim what type of ta’anis the gemara is speaking of. If the resolution of the gemara is that tasting is not considered hana’ah, that sevara might hold true on all fast days. But if the resolution is that kabbalas ta’anis only creates an issur achila and not hana’ah, on fast days which are obligatory m’divrei Torah (Yom Kippur) or divrei kabbalah, which have nothing to do with one’s personal kabbalas ta’anis, perhaps even tasting would be prohibited. 3) Classically, Yoreh De’ah issues depend on the shiur of ta’am, taste, as the threshold for many issues of bittul. Would one be allowed to taste a mixture to determine of there is a shiur of issur persent or not, on the assumption that tasting is not eating? (This idea may not work, as it may require a real ma’aseh achila to determine ta’am).
In short, considering that the issur achila of meat during the 9 days is a minhag, which is at best a din neder, one could argue that it depends on the extent of the kabbalah of the issur (like kabbalas ta'anis), and being only a minhag, perhaps one would have a right to rely on Rashi’s opinion that tasting even if one swallows is not prohibited. However, I still like my sevara better: toa'meha chaim zachu is an achilas mitzva and was never included in the issur of achilas basar. According to the logic of te'ima not being prohibited because it is not a ma'aseh achila, why should the heter only apply to food prepared for Shabbos? (And I guess the response may be that hachi nami, all te'ima is permitted, but who is cooking fleishigs during the 9 days except for Shabbos!)

tasting fleishig Shabbos food (before Shabbos) during the 9 days

Poskim write that one who has the minhag of tasting the food for Shabbos before Shabbos is permitted to do so even during the 9 days. Was wondering if this applies only on Friday afternoon, or even if one starts cooking for Shabbos on Thursday night?
When I mentioned this to my wife she thought this halacha was obvious because tasting is not defined as eating. Irrespective of whether that sevara is correct or not elsewhere, it seems to me that it is not the reasoning here. The prohibition of meat and wine does not apply to achilas mitzvah - one is permitted to eat meat/wine at a siyum and for kiddush and havdalah (m'ikar hadin). The tasting of Shabbos food is a bona fide minhag based on 'toame'ha chaim zachu', and hence should be defined as an achilas mitzvah. (Please correct me if you know otherwise.)

bathing on a fast day

The Ramban writes that all fasts (10 Teves, 17 Tamuz) theoretically should share the same prohibitions of washing, wearing shoes, etc. as 9 Av. As all the fasts are recorded in one pasuk together – “tzom harevi’i v’tzom hachamishi v’tzom ha’sehvi’i v’tzom ha’asiri” – why distinguish between the halachos which apply to each? However, as we discussed earlier in the week, these fast days depend in time of no oppression/no peace on the kabbalah of the people. In terms of practical halacha, Ramban assumes that Klal Yisrael accepted fasting on all these days, but never accepted the other prohibitions. Ramban points to the gemara (Megillah 5b) which takes the fact that Rebbi washed in the public bathhouse in the marketplace of Tzipori on 17 Tamuz as indicative that the fast was not accepted – the implication is that were it an accepted fast day, bathing as well as eating should be prohibited. Tosfos disagrees, and writes that the gemara simply means that there was no prohibition of bathing m’ikar hadin in spite of it being a fast day. The nafka mina between the opinions (see Biur haGR"A 550) would be in a time of oppression, when all fasts are obligatory, would bathing, leather shoes, etc. be prohibited? According to Tosfos all these would be permitted, except on 9 Av; according to Ramban, when choice plays no role, all fasts carry the same prohibitions as 9 Av.

meat for seudas rosh chodesh av

The Minchas Eluzar brings down (Sha'arei Yisaschar os 9 on Av) that the practice he saw among tzadikim was that they would eat meat on Rosh Chodesh Av as seudas Rosh Chodesh even without a siyum. I have wondered about this in the past myself - why should Rosh Chodesh itself not push off aveilus for an extra day - but the simple reading of Shulchan Aruch is that the practice of aveilus starts from Rosh Chodesh, meaning on that day itself. The Bnei Yisaschar (Tamuz-Av, Mahus haChodashim, 10) goes so far as to suggest that the leftover meat from seudas Rosh Chodesh or Shabbos may be consumed during the nine days! The proof for this astounding chiddush comes from the Rosh. The gemara in Chulin writes that until the conclusion of the conquest of Eretz Yisrael, 'basar nechira', meat which was killed without shechita, was permitted. The gemara leaves as an unresolved question whether basar nechira which could have been eaten before the end of the period of conquest was still permitted afterwards when the mitzva of shechita applied - do we say that the meat takes on a status of heter which is not lifted afterwards. The Rosh takes this historical question and derives an application l'ma'aseh - if one took a neder not to eat meat, would the leftovers from a previous meal be permitted and only new meat be assur, or would any meat now be prohibited? Since not eating meat during the 9 days is only a minhag, some suggest being lenient on the safeik of the Rosh - once the meat was permitted for seudas Shabbos or Rosh Chodesh, the leftovers remain with the status of heter. The Bnei Yisaschar is unconvinced of this ra'aya, and the Aruch haShulchan (551:24) rejects it for his own reasons. Aside from their reasons it seems that one can make a lomdish chiluk, but I'll leave that for thought (or the comment section).

M'shenichnas Av m'ma'atim b'simcha - court cases during Av

Chazal tell us (Ta'anis 26) that once the month of Av begins, one should be ‘mema’et b’simcha’, lessen the intensity of simcha in one’s life. The gemara quotes Rav’s opinion that this is not just a psychological idea, but has practical halachic significance – if one has a court case with a non-jew scheduled for the month of Av, one should try to postpone the trial for a later date. The Rambam (Ta’aniyos 5:6) cites the law of mema’atin b’simcha, but omits the practical import, leaving us with the question of why. The Chasam Sofer (Shu”t 160) offers two explanations for the Rambam: 1) Rav is l’shitaso elsewhere that the customs of aveilus are observed through the entire month of Av (think of how much laundry you would have been doing yesterday if we paskened like Rav!). Since we follow the practice that aveilus ends with chatzos of 10 Av, we reject Rav’s opinion; 2) Rav assumes that the mazal of the month of Av has an effect on one’s fortune; however, we pasken (Shabbos 156) that ain mazal l’yisrael, the Jewish people transcend the effects of mazalos. In a time of tzarah it bears mentioning that even if one accepts the premis that yesh mazal, according to many rishonim great zechiyus and tefillah have the power to override the influence of mazal.

Some calendar notes for today

A commentator was disappointed that I neglected to mention that today is Rashi's yahrzeit - so there you have it. I don't keep track of these things, but I guess others do. To me Rashi is what brings gemara and chumash to life, not someone who died in France 901 years ago.

While we are on the topic of the calendar, today is my daughter Rachel's birthday (in the hebrew calendar). In case she sees this post (likely not : ), Happy Birthday.

(Now, in case you are wondering if I would have named my daughter after Rashi if I would have realized the coincidence, the answer is no. But I will say that my youngest daughter was due around parshas naso 5 years ago. She was born a bit earlier, so I was never truly tempted to carry through on my threat of the name Tzlalponis. And if you have no idea what I am talking about - Baba Basra 91a near the bottom).

The fast of 9 Av - a day of multiple tragedies

The gemara (R”H 18b) cites Rav Papa as explaining that the obligation of fasting depends on the state of peace/war the Jewish people find themselves in: 1) if there is peace (Rashi: Jewish control over their own lives), then there is no need to fast; 2) if there is oppression, the fasts are obligatory; 3) if there is neither complete peace nor a state of oppression, the obligation is dependent on the people’s choice. The poskim write that generations ago the practice of fasting was adopted by the Jewish people, so one can no longer “opt out”. The gemara challenges Rav Papa: the Mishna (R”H 18a) tells us that messengers from Bais Din would be sent out to inform the distant communities when Rosh Chodesh Av was declared so that they would be aware of the proper day Tisha b’Av falls on. How could the Misha tell us a blanket rule that the messengers of Bais Din would always go out to inform the people of Rosh Chodesh Av in preparation for fasting when if the people chose or there was a state of peace there would be no obligation to fast?! The gemara answers that Tisha b’Av is different because it is a day of many compounded tragedies (huchpelu bo tzaros).
There are two different ways one can understand the gemara's answer (see Aruch laNer):
1) Since 9 Av is a day of multiple tragedies, Rav Papa’s halacha that says fasting is a matter of choice does not apply to 9 Av – fasting on 9 Av is always obligatory.
2) Since 9 Av is a day of multiple tragedies, the messengers of Bais Din went out expecting the people to adopt the fast (or at least be aware of the day), but Rav Papa’s statement remains true even with respect to 9 Av.
The Rambam (Hil Ta’anis ch 5) seems to group 9 Av along with the other fast days with no distinction (yet also interestingly, the Rambam does not quote Rav Papa’s halacha in that chapter). Yet, it would seem that Tosfos disagrees. The gemara (Megillah 5b) tells us that Rebbi either wished to uproot the fast of 9 Av completely or to uproot it if it fell on Shabbos (meaning one would not have to fast on Sunday). Tosfos asks how Rebbi could do this when an enactment of a previous Bais Din cannot be overturned by a later one. If Rav Papa’s halacha applied to 9 Av, then Tosfos’ question is moot - the entire takana of fasting is subject to the people’s will! It seems that according to Tosfos the fast of 9 Av is obligatory independent of the people’s choice.

Recipes that use wine during the 9 days - ta'aroves yayin

My wife was updating her website yesterday with some milchig recipes for the nine days and noticed that the ingredients list for the French (freedom?) onion soup mix that she received called for 2 cups of red wine. She asked me what I thought of this – is a food which has a ta’aroves of wine permitted during the 9 days? Interestingly, ta’aroves basar gets a lot more attention than ta’aroves ya’yin in poskim – I guess fancy French recipes were not the norm in Europe. Is ta'aroves yayin the same as ta'aroves basar, and if you think not, why? Just for the record, I’m not enough of an onion soup fan to encourage my wife to attempt the recipe posted, and instead, offer you my own tried and true onion soup recipe: mix 1 spoon soup mix into 1 cup boiling water, stir, eat : )

Questioning the leadership of Klal Yisrael

Moshe Rabeinu cries out to Bnei Yisrael that he alone was unable to bear their burdensome complaints and fighting - torchachem u'masa'achem v'rivchem (1:12). On the train this morning Rashi's explanation of masa'achem caught my eye. Now, let me just preface this by saying I was quite amused by seeing my name associated with being a "fundie" [i.e. fundementalist] elsewhere, and use of the A-word - Apikores - is sure to rankle, so I am just going to note what Rashi says and why I thought it suprising. Make of it what you will.
Rashi writes "Masa'achem - this teaches that Bnei Yisrael were apikorsim". When I see that word, my immediate association is with issues of ikarei emunah. But Rashi continues and explains - If Moshe left home early, they said why is he leaving early, perhaps his home life is unsettled. If Moshe left home late, they said he is plotting evil plans against the people. Mashma to me: the label of apikorsus applies not only to questioning ikkarei emunah, but to undermining Moshe Rabeinu, the leader of Klal Yisrael, by questioning his integrity.

Why does P' Masei record the borders of Eretz Yisrael?

If you would have asked me, I would have guessed that Parshas Masei (ch 34) records the borders of Eretz Yisrael because Bnei Yisrael stood about to fulfill the mitzva of kibush ha'aretz and needed to know which lands are the 'chefza shel mitzva' for conquest. However, that is not what Rashi says! Rashi instead (34:2) writes that since there are certain mitzvos that are 'teluyos ba'aretz', which only apply in Eretz Yisrael, the Torah had to define the borders. Why didn't Rashi offer the reason of kibush ha'aretz? I did not see this issue raised by the meforshei Rashi.

neder = dira

Aside from the enigmatic facts that the opening of our parsha addresses itself only to the roshei hamatos and that the declaration ‘zeh hadavr asher tzivah Hashem’ might be applied to any mitzvah, even stranger is what is missing. What happened to the almost standard opening of 'vayidaber Hashem el Moshe leimor'?
The word neder, the Sefas Emes and Noam Elimelech teach us, is related to the word dira, dwelling. What does an oath have to do with a dwelling? The Shem m’Shmuel questions the entire parsha of nedarim: how is it that a person has the power through his verbal declaration to create issurim (in the case of nidrei bituei) and create a status of kedush (nidrei hekdesh)? This power goes so far that the gemara has a safek whether there is an issur me’ila for violating a neder! I think the answer (see Sm”S for a different approach) is that in essence no new kedusha is being created. The concept of neder is a recognition that beyond what meets the eye there is a level of kedusha already inherent in the reality around us - the Shechina already dwells immanently in the world. Sefas Emes notes that the first person in chumash to take a neder is Ya’akov Avinu. While the other Avos revealed G-d’s presence as similar to a mountain or a field, Chazal tell us that Ya’akov revealed G-d’s presence as the bayis, a dwelling. Chazal tell us that taking a neder is like building a bamah, an alter used outside the Mikdash. G-d metaphorically “dwells” in the Bais haMikdash – to create a sanctified space for him outside those confines is a task fraught with challenge. Perhaps in this light we can appreciate the response of BN"Y to the attack of Amalek in Parshas Chukas. Amalek disguised themselves as Cana’anim to attack Bnei Yisrael so BN”Y’s prayers would be ineffective. If Amalek recognized the power of tefillah, how could they dare challenge Hashem’s people? Amalek understood the concept of G-d in the same way other primitive people call on deities - a far off force that can interact and impose its will on the world, but only when called on or invoked. BN”Y responded with a neder; G-d is with us in th world in all that we do and is not subject to being deceived by petty masquerades. Nodrin b’eis tzara, one is permitted to make a neder during times of crisis, perhaps to underscore (as we discussed from the Ishbitzer in the past) that tzarah is just a result of our inability to see the Shechina which is kulo tov inherent in reality, the attitude which the parsha of neder corrects. At the end of Sefer baMidbar, BN”Y stand poised to enter Eretz Yisrael and engage in conquering, building, and farming of the land. It becomes imperative that Bnei Yisrael be taught to carry on the mesorah absent the voice of Hashem echoing from Ohel Moed. There is no command of vayidaber Hashem el Moshe leimor opening our parsha precisely to emphasize that Hashem dwells in the mundane reality and we need not look to a voice from shamayim giving instructions. The roshei hamatos have a right to declare “zeh hadavr asher tzivah Hashem” when they reveal his ratzon (see our past discussion on the mechayev of dinei derabbanan) and those words, as the Noam Elimelech writes, are tantamount to an actual expression of the Torah itself. If we want to find Hashem, we need not look "out there", but rather to his metaphorical dira which already exists in our world.
Chazak Chazak v'Nischazeik.

nidrei zerizus

A final note on this topic: we mentioned that the Ran interpreted R’ Gidal’s halacha of one who pledges to perform a mitzvah in order to motivate him/herself to action as a shevua and not a neder. Even though we have a rule that a shevua to perform a mitzvah does not have any effect (one shevua cannot rest on top of another, and one is already mushba v'omeid m'har Sinai, already bound by oath from Har Sinai to do mitzvos), the Ran writes that that simply means one is exempt from a korban but would get malkos. Ramban at the opening of Parshas Matos disagrees and says violating such a shevua carries no punishment. If so, asks the Steipler (Birchas Peretz), how can such a shevua serve its purpose of motivation? The person making the shevua knows full well that his words are meaningless! I think the simple answer is that this is nothing more than a psychological ploy, but the Steipler suggests something more. The person who is not zealous is carrying out the mitzvah is implicitly treating the act in question as a reshus, something not obligatory. If it is not obligatory, than the rule of ‘mushba v’omed m’Har Sinai’ should not apply and the shevua should work! The person is trapped between the mitzvah the Torah imposes and the personal pledge he has created, leaving no room to escape the force of obligation.

nezirus - nidrei gavoha or nidrei bituei?

I thank Anonymous for pointing me to a letter the Rav wrote to R’ Hutner upon receiving advanced copy of R’ Hutner’s Toras Nazir – see Igros haGRI”D p 278. The Rav addresses the question of which box – nidrei gavoha or nidrei issur – a neder of nezirus fits into. As we have seen earlier in the week, the Ramban defines nidrei hekdesh and tzedaka based on the hischayvus, the obligation such a neder creates. Nidrei bituei do not create a hischayvus to do something, e.g. giving tzedaka or offering a korban – they create issurim. At first glance one would suspect that nezirus is a form of nidrei gavoha, as one who becomes a nazir accepts the obligations of bringing the korbanos of nezirus. However, the Rambam opens hilchos nezirus with the statement “Hanezirus hi neder bichlal nidrei issur”, nezirus is in the category of nidrei issur! The Rav explains that the neder of nezirus is not an acceptance of korbanos obligations, but an acceptance of the shem nazir. Once one is defined as a nazir, it naturally follows that certain obligations stem from that chalos.

nidrei tzedaka - shibud mamon or not?

The gemara in Bava Kama36b tells the story of an individual owed ½ a zuz in damages who decides, in light of it being such a small amount, to donate the money to tzedaka in the presence of R’ Yosef. At some later point the individual changed his mind and asked for the money back from R’ Yosef. R’ Yosef said the gift was irrevocable - ‘kvar zachu bah ani’im’, the poor have already taken possession of the gift, because even if the poor are not present, ‘anan yad ani’im anan’, we, the court, serve as the agents of the poor and already hold the funds. The Geonim and Rishonim struggle mightily with a number of issues in the sugya, one of which relates to our previous discussion of nidrei tzedaka. Why does the gemara need to invoke the principle that R’ Yosef or the court acts as the agent of the poor to accept ownership on their behalf in order for the gift to be irrevocable - was the person who pledged the money not bound anyway to give it to the poor by virtue of his pledge, nidrei gavoha, or by virtue of amiraso l’gavoha k’mesiraso l’hedyot? The simplest answer is that nidrei tzedaka constitute a promise on the part of the giver to fulfill a pledge, but do not constitute a shibud or kinyan on the funds (Ba’al HaMaor, R’ Hai Gaon, cited by the RI”F). However, many Rishonim disagree. R’ Chananel (cited in Tosfos) writes that the individual who pledged the funds did not wish to retract, but simply wanted to borrow the funds temporarily for his own use; R’ Yosef, however, held that one collected by the gabai, the funds cannot be lent out. It is clear from R’ Chananel (and the Ramban in Milchamos) that the pledge to charity (the neder) did indeed create a shibud mammon, meaning the poor had ownership rights by virtue of the neder – the only reason the gemara invokes zechiya on the poor's behalf is to prevent the giver from even having temporary use of the money. The RI"F (and Tosfos explaining why amiraso l’gavoha does not apply here) also writes that although tzedaka creates shibudei mammon, here the money in question had not yet been paid to the individual making the pledge. Kinyanei hekdesh cannot apply to something that is not in one’s reshus or that is not yet ba l’olam. The Rambam cites this opinion in the name of the Geonim, but rejects it l’halacha. R’ Chaim Brisker (Hil Mechira ch 22) asks: even though the funds themselves are not in the hand of the individual making the pledge, there exists an obligation, a shibud, for those funds to be paid. According to many Rishonim, a shibud is treated like any other asset and theoretically can be bought and sold. If so, why is the obligation, the shibud, not considered something which can be transferred through amira l’gavoha or nidrei tzedaka to the reshus of hekdesh? I think I might leave this one hanging, or take a look at the R’ Chaim!

nidrei reshus vs. nidrei gavoha - the case of a pledge to tzedaka

Nedarim 8 cites R’ Gidal’s halacha that a person can accept an oath as a motivator to mitzvah performance, e.g. the gemara uses the example 'ashkim v’ashaneh perek zeh', a vow that 'I shall arise and learn this perek'. The Rosh writes that this oath is a neder, similar to a neder which one makes to give tzedaka. However, the Ran argues and writes that R’ Gidal’s oath is a shevua, because a neder can never take the form of ‘kum v’aseh’. This fits well with the Ramban discussed yesterday who argues that nidrei bituei can never be b’kum v’aseh. Why, however, did the Ran (like the Rosh) not categorize this vow as nidrei gavoha, just like giving tzedaka, which can be forumulated b'kum v'aseh? Based again on the Ramban, we can draw a distinction. Tzedaka creates a monetary shibud, an obligation, similar to hekdesh. Promising to learn a perek of gemara is a personal obligation, but has no dinei mamomos component. Therefore, it falls under the domain of nidrei reshus and not nidrei gavoha. (Based on R’ Reichman’s Reshimos Shiurim of R’ Soloveitchik).
This lomdus rests on the assumption that a pledge to tzedaka is not just a commitment to give money, but the pledge transfers ownership of the money to the poor. This is a major issue in Rishonim - stay tuned.

nidrei reshus vs. nidrei gavoha and nidrei mitzvah

The Rambam (Sefer haMitzvos 94) lumps all forms of nedarim – whether it be a simple personal pledge or a neder to being a korban or give tzedaka - together under one mitzvas aseh of ‘motza sefasecha tishmor’. The Ramban, however, disagrees, and divides nedarim into two distinct categories: nedarim that are personal in nature, ‘nidrei reshus’ or ‘nidrei bituei’, which we are commanded in parshas matos to fulfill, and ‘nidrei mitzvah’ or ‘nidrei gavoha’, which is the mitzvah of ‘motza sefasecha tishmor’. Ramban in S”haM writes that nidrei gavoha are binding even if one does not use the term 'neder', e.g. if one says ‘beheima zu korban’, one is obligated to bring the animal as a korban; however, nidrei reshus are binding only if one uses the formula of neder (or some equivalent of a yad or kinuy), e.g. ‘konam ochel zeh alai’ - just saying ‘hareini nosein beheima l’ploni’ is not a valid neder. Another nafka mina between these two categories is with respect to the issur of bal t’acher – nidrei hekdesh must be fulfilled within the time span of 3 regalim or one violates an issur; this requirement does not apply to nidrei bituei.
Ramban reiterates his position in the opening to Parshas Matos. Rashi (30:3) gives an example of a neder as ‘hareini oseh davar ploni’, I will do action X. Ramban writes that no where in masechet Nesarim do we ever find a case of nidrei bituei b’kum v’aseh, nedarim which require one to take action. A neder by definition is an issur cheftza, a prohibition on an object, and therefore must relate to something concrete, not actions. The Ramban challenges his own thesis: don’t we find cases of nedarim which demand action, e.g. ‘beheima zu yehei korban’, I will bring this animal as a korban? The Ramban answers l’shitaso that this example is from the realm of nidrei gavoha, which is a different domain than nidrei bituei. Since amiraso l’gavoha k’mesiraso l’hedyot, pledging a korban creates a kinyan to hekdesh, it is as if the animal in question has already been transferred to the ownership of hekdesh by virtue of the verbal neder and therefore the pledge is binding. (See Ramban for a second reason why such a neder works.) It seems from the Ramban that the definition of nidrei gavoha are nedarim which effect not just a prohibition, but which have an immediate financial impact, a dinei mamomos component. Homework: do all cases of nidrei gavoha indeed fit that mold?

psak and sha'as hadechak: R' Shachter's article (II)

The second chiddush in lomdus R' Shachter quotes is cute. Why is it that in halacha (especially in Yoreh De'ah) we often have a base psak but then have kulos that allow for leniency b'sha'as ha'dechak? If the psak is 'assur', why should pressing need make any difference? R' Moshe Soloveitchik is quoted as saying that in terms of dinei yoreh de'ah, m'ikkar hadin the halacha is in accordance with the lenient opinion. However, we defer to the views of the stricter opinion because of the halacha demanding that we show kavod harav. One is not required to incur grave losses or be placed in an tenuous situation simply because of someone else's kavod, so in those cases we revert back to the base yoreh de'ah law and its leniency.
It strikes me that this approach suffers from the same weakness that the Ramban notes in the Rambam's reduction of all dinei derabbanan to the d'oraysa law of lo tasur - by doing so one has effectively obliterated the source to distinguish between different levels of chiyuvim. Every derabbanan issue should be paskened l’chumra because it relates to a d’oraysa issue. Here too, once we introduce the issue of kavod harav as a factor in practical psak, every issue should be paskened l’chumra because of kavod harav. How can one justify the right to pasken l'kula when faced with a safeik in a din derabbanan - the factor of kavod harav should always demand adherence to the stricter opinion? Why in fact should rov be a tool of hachra'ah - kavod harav should demand we respect the minority opinion even in place of the majority (assuming the views are not in direct conflict)?
R' Shachter himself suggests what I think is the more obvious approach here. Psak is not a definitive yes/no that determines right opinions from wrong - we consider all opinions theoretically valid, but must make some choice as to how practically to act. Where possible, we try to conduct ourselves so we satisfy most views, but where necessity interferes, we have a right to call on the validity of more lenient views to base our conduct upon. The GR"A's hachra'ah does relfect an absolute determination of certain opinions as right and others as wrong, but it seems quite a stretch to superimpose this approach on the Shulchan Aruch - one wonders why R' Moshe Soloveitchik did not opt for the more straightforward answer here.

Eid echad on psak halacha - R' Shachter's latest article in Beis Yitzchok

The latest article of R’ Hershel Schachter that appeared in Beis Yitzchak has been posted online by Menachem Butler. Apparently this article is a write up of a speech given in commemoration of the yahrtzeit of the Rav and contains many interesting stories, but also contains 2 chiddusim in lomdus that are of more concern to me.
The Shulchan Aruch paskens (Y.D. 188:2) that a woman who has a mareh (a stain on a bedika cloth) and says a Rav was matir a similar mareh for her, or tells her friend that she does not have to worry about a particular mareh because a Rav was matir a similar case, is not believed. Why is this not a case of eid echad ne'eman b'issurim? R’ Shachter explains in the name of the Rav that the content of the woman's testimony relates to conveying a psak halacha. Issues of psak halacha must be determined solely by experts who are chachamei hamesorah - an eid echad has no ne’emanus when it comes to this domain. This becomes a springboard for R’ Shachter to bemoan the many Rabbis who incorrecly cite psak in the name of the Rav based on their own misunderstanding. R' Shachter claims that the Rav himself enjoined others not to accept halacha cited in his name because an eid echad is precluded from ne'emanus regarding psak. Leaving aside the pragmatic question of who is a member of the chachamei hamesorah, and the criticism of incorrectly cited psak not withstanding, the basic lomdus here seems difficult to understand.
The source for this halacha is a braysa in Niddah 20b. The gemara tells us that a women who shows a mareh to a Rav and says "I saw a similar mareh but lost it" is believed - a Rav can pasken assuming the mareh which was lost indeed matches the one before him based on the woman’s testimony. However, if a women has a mareh that is available and not lost, or says about a mareh of her neighbor’s that "Ploni Chacham paskened a similar mareh is tahor", we do not believe her. Clearly, as the first case indicates, we accept a woman's expertise to compare two maros accurately, so why in this second instance do we not believe her that Ploni Chacham was already matir some similar case? R’ Shachter’s reading is that the second testimony concerns itself with a conclusion of psak and is categorically excluded from the parsha of eid echad. However, the Rishonim explain the case quite differently. The more obvious difference between the cases is that in the second case, the mareh in question is available before us for examination, while in the first case it is not. The Rashba writes that the physical evidence of a questionable mareh casts doubt on the accuracy of the woman’s ne'emanus to say that Ploni Chacham saw an identical case and paskened unequivically tahor. It is the physical evidence of a safek before us which throws into doubt the accuracy of the eid echad's comparison. Rashi is even sharper in his formulation, writing about the second case ‘hacha d’isa Kaman nechzei anan’ – if the mareh is here and not lost, let us examine the physical evidence! There is no need to rely on the weaker evidence of eid echad to resolve the issue. It is not the content of the eidus (psak vs. other areas) which removes the ne’emanus of the witness, but rather we simply hold physical evidence leads to a more accurate conclusion (see the Aruch haShulchan's citation of this halacha).
If we take Rashi’s formulation to its extreme conclusion, every single mareh must be shown to someone for psak because physical evidence precludes ne’emanus. However, the achronim write that this was true only in the days of Chazal where chachamim made fine differentiations between different shades of red. Today, we do not draw such fine distinctions, and a women has a right at least to draw gross comparisons between maros. This caveat fits nicely if one works with the understanding that the physical evidence is the barrier to ne’emanus – where the physical evidence is clearly in accord with the eid, there is no reason to require psak. But according to R’ Shachter’s understanding, why should this be true? No one other than the chachamei hamesorah can ever draw any halachic conclusions, so a posek should have to address everything, even the most obvious maros. Is this not a reduction ad absurdum?
I do not know the answers – maybe one of R’ Shachter’s talmidim can offer some insight.

existentialism vs.rationalism: perspective on an old debate on religious truth

Yesterday's post opened a pandora's box of interesting discussion regarding truth and ikkarei emunah, and the volume of comments leads me to wonder if some of you sleep with a keyboard by your pillow : ) I just wanted to step back a little and offer some perspective. We can type from today to tomorrow, but this whole issue ultimately comes back to some old philosophical debates that I doubt we are going to resolve anytime soon.
In this corner: Existentialism. To quote Wikipedia (not the best source, but short and too the point): "Kierkegaard argued that "truth is subjectivity", meaning that what is most important to an existing being are questions dealing with an individual's inner relationship to existence. Objective truths (e.g. mathematical truths) are important, but detached or observational modes of thought can never truly comprehend human experience." How does one know the truth? How did Avraham Avinu know that it was G-d telling him to sacrifice his son and not some imaginary voice? Shouldn't he have rejected that voice considering that it contradicted both his rational sense of ethics and his prior promise from G-d himself? You can read Kierkegaard's “Faith and Trembling”, but for now, a short summary from the Stamford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - "His sole justification is what Kierkegaard calls the passion of faith. Such faith is, rationally speaking, absurd, a "leap," so if there is to be any talk of truth here it is a standard that measures not the content of Abraham's act, but the way in which he accomplishes it... To say that subjectivity is the truth is to highlight a way of being, then, and not a mode of knowing; truth measures the attitude ("passion") with which I appropriate, or make my own, an "objective uncertainty" (the voice of God) in a "process of highest inwardness."
In the other corner: Rationalism. The rationalists (and empiricists) argue that this makes no sense. Just because I believe it, how does that make it so? This is akin to arguing the “correspondance theory of truth” – things are true only because we can determine that they correspond to something “out there” and not our imagination. If I imagine and passionately believe in little green folk, does that make them real?
One of the answers to this is that there is a difference between the private subjective truth and truth which has a correlation in the human condition. If you speak to anyone about the little green men out there, they will likely have no way of relating to that experience. If you speak to someone about your relationship to G-d, even if that person is an atheist, they do comprehend your meaning. Of course, this argument has a refutation as well, and further defenses – ad infinitum. Most of the arguments back and forth have been made by rabim u'gedolim in philosophy already, though I doubt most academics approach their field with as much fervor as the debators in the jblosphere.
So much for philosophy 101. Historically, sifrei machshava have long since abandoned the metaphysical fight of the middle ages – the concern is not with proving the truth of Judaism in relation to what is “out there” in reality, but in discovering meaning in the experience of faith. The Piecezna quotes the Koshnizer Maggid that the tisch of shalosh seudos is mamash like tzadikim yoshvim in gan eden v’atroseihem b’rosheihem – and many people experience it as such. But if you sit there staring at the walls and just see men in furry hats singing songs and eating, while you wait for “proof” that this is gan eden, I guess you have a different perspective. The question is which one makes for a more meaningful existence?

Rambam vs Maharal: is nevuah guaranteed? - the promise to Pinchas

Guaranteed not to have too many comments today, as I'm going back to more standard Torah dicsussion : ) Maybe more some other time - I would just encourage anyone interested to follow my snippits of quotes to the sources themselves. Reminder: please learn and daven as a zechus for Eretz Yisrael.

Hashem instructs Moshe to SAY regarding Pinchas "Hininei nosein lo es brisi shalom", I am giving him my covenant or peace. Why does this have to be a public proclamation and not private news? Perhaps it was because of the rumbelings of disapproval that questioned how Pinchas could kill a leader of a sheivet, but perhaps there is something more. The Rambam writes in in into to Peirush haMishna that what Hashem privately promises a Navi is subject to not coming to fulfillment. We find that although Hashem promised to protect Ya'akov, he was nonetheless worried over encountering Eisav because he thought his sins would negate the promise. Yet, the Rambam writes with respect to nevuah, words that the prophet is instructed to deliver to the people, there is a gurantee that what is said will be unconditionally fulfilled (see Rambam Yesodei HaTorah ch 10 that a Navi can be tested by whether his words are fulfilled). The Meshech Chochma writes that Hashem asked Moshe to SAY that Pinchas receives the bris of shalom so that this promise would be unconditionally guaranteed for eternity and not subject to the personal zechuyos of Pinchas.
The Meshech Chocham cites this idea in many places, e.g. Why is it that Avraham laughs when told that he will have a son and nothing comes of it, but Sarah is chastised? M.C. distinguishes between the promise told to Avraham in private which depends on her merit for fulfillment, and the nevuah spoken to Sarah which was a guarantee.
What the Meshech Chochama does not tell you is that the MaHaRaL strongly disagrees with this Rambam - see ch 7 of Gevuros Hashem. The MaHaRaL argues that any nevuah by definition is guaranteed to occur. So why then was Ya'akov afraid? MaHaRaL writes that there is a difference between nevuah and a havtacha. The former reveals something fundemental about the nature of the beriya which is not subject to change. The latter is based on the personal relationship between the tzadik, prophet, or people and Hashem. If I had to offer an analogy: nevuah would be like predicting that my 5 year old daughter would grow from 4 feet to 5 feet as she gets older. A havtacha would be like promising to buy my 4 year old daugher an ice cream because she is a good girl - even if unstated, it is understood that if she misbehaves, all bets are off. The MaHaRaL develops a number of key concepts in that chapter - yosef chacham v'yikach lekach.

the limits of rational inquiry as a basis for faith

The superficially convincing argument for doubt and skepticism advanced in some other places is reducible to a syllogism: A) believe only what one can be rationally prove, B) one cannot rationally prove G-d, C) [rachmana litzlan]. My agenda is not to bash anyone who finds their derech to avodas Hashem in a way that differs from mine, including rationalism. But for those who absorb the dialy dish of doubt served elsewhere and reflect on the questions of faith raised by what is portrayed as the only 'intelligent' approach to Judaism, I think it is fair to offer some analysis of the assumptions and shortcomings of that rationalist school. If rationalism cannot lead one to G-d, that should not be accepted as a critique of belief, but as a critique of rationalism.

To recap yesterday's points: (1) rationalism chains religious observance to external causes and reduces it to instrumentalism; (2) rationalism by definition can derive from religion no inspiration or insight not already inherent in man’s own limited intellect.

R’ Soloveitchik goes a step further and denies rationalism even as a basis for elucidating mishpatim: “Stealing and corruption are the accepted mores in many spheres of life; adultery and general promiscuity find support in respectable circles; and even murder, medical and germ experiments have been conducted with governmental complicity. The logos has shown itself in our time to be incapable of supporting the most basic of moral inhibitions.” (Reflection of the Rav, p.105)

Contrast the daily deliberations of the skeptics over whether it is ‘rational’ to believe in G-d with R’ Soloveitchik’s poetic citation of Kierkegaard: "Does the loving bride in the embrace of her beloved ask for proof that he is alive and real? Must the prayerful soul clinging in passionate love and ecstasy to her Beloved demonstrate that He exists?"

The rationalist insists on knowing the “Why” and “How” – for proof, for understanding before committment. The Kierkegaardian answers - Is the love of the bride and her beloved reducible to a finite set of logical reason that we can map with an equation? The Rambam in fact formulates the mitzvah of love of G-d as comparable to the love of man for his beloved wife (Tshuvah 10:3). R' Soloveitchik observes, “To be a loyal Jew is heroic, and heroes commit themselves without intellectual reservations. Only one who lacks the courage of commitment will belabor the “Why”. (ibid, p. 103)

R’ Soloveitchik elsewhere (cited in Reflections of the Rav vol 2) writes that the white of the tzitzit represents that which man can clarify using reason and understanding, while the blue techeilet reminds of the kisai hakavod, the mystery of reality which stands outside our grasp. R’ Nachman similarly explains (L.M. 64) that the concept of ‘chalal panuy’ of tzimtzum teaches us that doubt is part of the existential reality – the proportion of what we know to what remains shrouded in mystery is elastic, but we can never completely remove that boundary that stands between our own limited knowledge and a full understanding of G-d and the universe.

Judaism is an existential reality, not a mathematical formula reducible to a logical set of equations. To search for truth using rational tools alone or to make rational discovery a precondition to belief is to limit the religious experience to constraints which by definition it does not conform to.

“Bichlal asur lanu limdod devarim halalu b’havanah enoshit she’rak man she’haish mavin emet hu v’lo zulat, kmo hashotim v’apikorsim r”l” – it is prohibited to measure [the truthfulness of] these things with human understanding, assuming only what man comprehends and nothing else is true, like the fools and heretics say. (R' Kalonymus Kalman, "the Piececzna", M'vo HaShearim).

Or as Hamlet put it - “There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.”

Is judasim the handmaiden of rationalism?

Some "out there" have concocted the following philosophy of Judasim: mitzvos and Torah are meaningful in so far as they lead us to a greater good - a means to an end. Mystical tikkunim are irrelevant; social and ethical norma are all that we should be interested in, and unless you understand it, don't believe it. Of course, not every mitvah will fit neatly into a rationalist box, but they argue that halacha wholistically creates a society that is more moral and ethical than would be possible without it. Is such a world view meaningful? Has it been espoused by talmidei chachamim who came after the Rambam (or even by the Rambam himself)? Should it be our approach to avodas Hashem?

R' Soloveitchik, "Halakhic Mind", pp. 92-93:
"The reluctance on the part of the Jewish homo religiousus to accept Maimonidian rationalistic ideas is not ascribable to any agnostic tendencies, but to the incontrovertible fact that such explanations neither edify nor inspire the religious consciousness. They are essentially, if not entirely, valueless for the religious interests we have most at heart…
In rationalizing the commandments genetically, Maimonides developed a religious instrumentalism. For example, should we posit the question: why did G-d forbid perjury? The intellectualistic philosopher would promptly reply, "because it is contrary to the norm of truth." Thus he would explain a religious norm by an ethical precept, making religion the handmaid of ethics. ...If the Sabbath is to be seen only against the background of mundane social justice and similar ideals, the intrinsic quality of the Sabbath is transformed into something alien. It serves merely as a means to the realization of a “higher” end. Maimonides’ efforts foreshadowed failure from the very outset of his “how” approach. "

Noam Elimelech, P' Pinchas:
"A person who serves G-d based on his own intuitiuon and understanding is constrained and cannot escape the limits of his own mind, his own nature, and his own understanding..."

Worship based only on what one rationally accepts is nothing more than self-worship. Because the human "I" recognizes a value as important, it ascribes that value to G-d and makes it a point of religious conviction. Defined as such, religion can never transcend human limitations, it can never cause man to aspire to levels of greatness beyond what he can see, and it is always the handmaiden to a subjective morality that fluctuates with the human perception of what is good and just. Far more meaningful is a religion which offers man a transcendent objective truth and challenges man to escape his own limitations of mind in discovering it. As discussed yesterday, intuition or ruach hakodesh can inspire a worldview not reducable to a positivistic list of equations or reasons, but is an nonetheless reveals a true vision of reality. Tzadikim and talmidei chachamim are those whose lives are infused with such perspective, but the Piecezna writes (Mavo She'arim ch 2) that each and every Jew can rise to such heights - such is the goal of avodah.
Two contrasting world views: the skeptical-rationslist, and the view of the "olam haTorah". Much more to be said on this topic, but enough for now...

(I am sorry for taking so much time away from lomdus to spend on these themes, but there are many voices offering "competing" perspectives and far fewer voices explaining basic hashkafa. If even one person gains some perspective and mareh mekomos , it's worth it.)