best intentions that lead to tragic errors: the Ibn Ezra on 'shema yigrom hacheit'

One last point on “shema yigrom hacheit”: the Ibn Ezra addresses the question of why Ya’akov feared when he had a promise from G-d and answers that Ya’akov was concerned lest he had sinned “b’machshava”, in thought, and become undeserving of G-d’s protection. What does the Ibn Ezra mean by a sin in “thought”? He gives us another example: when Moshe was commanded to return to Egypt as the redeemer of the Jewish people, he set out immediately at the cost of delaying the bris of his son. As a result, an angel attacked him along the way and almost killed Moshe before Tziporah came to the rescue and did the milah. Moshe certainly had acted with the best of intentions and undoubtedly considered his decision carefully before starting on his journey before performing the milah. Yet, whatever his calculations and thoughts were proved wrong.

Ya’akov Avinu had not consciously done any sin and undoubtedly had also planned his every move to be a fulfillment of what he took to be the ratzon Hashem. But, what one thinks is the ratzon Hashem may be completely in error. Perhaps we need look no further for an illustration than this upcoming week’s parsha, where the brothers of Yosef think they are doing good by eliminating Yosef and only years later realize their tragic error.

This approach of the Ibn Ezra is very discomforting. Does this really mean that a person can make cheshbonos and try to live l’shem shamayim with great sincerity and sacrifice only in the end to discover that misplaced intentions and sincerity cannot compensate for unforeseen (and perhaps unforeseeable) mistakes? R’ Chaim Shmulevitz in his Sichos Mussar accepts this approach at face value and counsels that the only thing a person can do is daven and hope for siyata d’shemaya. I prefer to read the lesson here in a bit more contextualized way based in part on the Shiurei Da’as (see the essay on Omek haDin). On the one hand, a person cannot be faulted for acting l’shem shamayim but somehow misreading the ratzon Hashem despite his/her best efforts. But on the other hand, “best effort” is itself a subjective bar. Perhaps a person has reached the correct conclusions in halacha and hashkafa based on where they are holding in life and how they read the ratzon Hashem, but had he/she pushed themselves to a higher level or been a greater or better person, he/she might have come to a different conclusion or not faced the dilemma at all. Problems exist only because we provide the context for them to crop up. We cannot be faulted for acting according to our best judgment to resolve them, but we can be faulted for providing the context for them to arise in the first place. Bottom line: this Ibn Ezra is a tough standard to live up to.

can worry and trust in G-d co-exist? - a realistic model of bitachon

Brachos 4 raises the question of why Ya’akov feared Eisav when Hashem had promised “u’shmarticha b’chol asher teileich”, protection in all circumstances. Surely Ya’akov did not lack bitachon! The gemara answers “shema yigrom hacheit”; Ya’akov trusted in G-d, but feared that he might have sinned and become unworthy of receiving G-d’s protection.

My wife showed me a beautiful Abarbanel on this issue. Abarbanel writes that there is no contradiction between Ya’akov’s fear and his trust in G-d’s promise. Trust in G-d cannot make a person impervious to the natural emotional reactions of worry and fear – that is not what bitachon demands. Bitachon means that despite having worries, one must be guided by Torah reason and knowledge, not by those worries. Ya’kov did fear Eisav, as any person would, but in his mind he never lost sight of the fact that G-d’s promise would protect him.

I think this Abrabanel provides a realistic model of bitachon. Most people think of true bitachon as some sort of state of nirvana through which one escapes life’s worries. I can’t deny that this idea is out there in seforim, e.g. the Chovos haLevavos seems to equate bitachon with “menuchas henefesh”, but at least speaking for myself, such a goal is so far removed from what I consider achieveable as to be of little practical relevance or value. I see the modern religious persona as a conflicted, tormented soul struggling to make sense of the world, not existing in a peaceful state of self assurance. The Abarbanel’s model of bitachon does not demand that we deny our worries and fears, our conflicted thoughts and emotions, but rather that we fulfill our religious duty despite those emotional doubts and turmoil.

yosef: dreamer or prophet?

The Rambam asks: why was Ya’akov afraid “shema yigrom hacheit”, that he might have sinned and be unworthy of G-d’s protection in his encounter with Eisav (Brachos 4), when we know that even a conditional promise of G-d for good is always guaranteed to be fulfilled (Brachos 7)? The Rambam answers that there is a difference between G-d’s promise which is given to a Navi to articulate, which is guaranteed to be fulfilled, and a promise which is privately told to a Navi, which can be revoked if the recipient proves unworthy (see previous post here).

I thought perhaps this was Rambam may explain a point of disagreement between Yosef and his brothers. Yosef insisted on telling over his dreams to his brothers. Later, when the brothers plot against Yosef, they remark, “Now we will see what will become of his dreams.” The Ramban (37:20) elaborates – “If Yosef can escape from our plan, then surely he will rule.” This seems like an unwarranted conclusion; just because he might escape death, why does that prove Yosef would rule? I would suggest that the brothers did not doubt that Yosef’s vision was more than a chance dream – there was an element of prophetic insight to what he saw. However, prophetic insight is not always meant to be expressed verbally as nevuah. It was not the dreams per se which the brothers objected to, but rather they objected to Yosef’s relating the dreams, transforming his private insight into formal nevuah which carries with it the guarantee of fulfillment. The brothers thought Yosef’s dreams were a private vision which they held he was unworthy of seeing fulfilled, but if he emerged from their plot unharmed, not only would it prove their judgment of Yosef faulty, but it also would imply that his dreams were indeed a nevuah which would come to complete and guanateed fruition.

Could Shlomo haMelech have invented the telephone?

I was learning the Shu”t Mahartz Chiyus and came across his suggestion (#11) that Bar Kamtzar who the Mishna (Yoma 38) says could write all the letters of the Shem Hashem in one shot was actually using a printing press. “On the Main Line” mentioned the tshuvah a few weeks ago, but in the section he scanned he left out the beginning sentences. The Mahartz Chiyus is not just saying a cutesy pshat in a Mishna, but is making a more general point about technology. He writes: “Is it possible that Moshe Rabeinu who spoke with Hashem face to face, or Shlomo haMelech who is described as the wisest of all men, could not have invented a printing press before one of the gentile nations did centuries later?” One could make the same argument about any innovation, e.g. do you think Alexander Graham Bell was smarter than Shlomo haMelech? Of course not. It’s just that the world did not need telephones in Shlomo’s lifetime or he would have invented it.

I have actually seen similar arguments in mussar seforim . I don’t have an exact mareh makom but vaguely remember an Ohr Yahel writing that the Rishonim could have advanced science as far as we have in our time but they instead devoted themselves to Torah. Anyway, this Mah”C is the first time I have seen it in a more traditional halachic work.

"Life on the Fringes": Haviva Ner David and Jewish feminism

I discovered at my local public library Haviva Ner-David’s book “Life on the Fringes: A Feminist Journey Towards Traditional Rabbinic Ordination” and could not resist reading it. Ner-David is a feminist activist who aspires toward creating gender-equal Judaism within the framework of halacha (or her interpretation of halacha). It would take hours to comment on all the issues raised in this book, but for now I just want to highlight two points. First, a positive of sorts. I cannot but respect Ms. Ner-David’s commitment to learning and wonder if perhaps it is not even greater than my own. You see, when I open a gemara I view the Rabbis whose thoughts I encounter as people who have ascended to heights of greatness that I cannot even begin to fathom. I believe they possessed transcendent insight into the eternal human condition and that their writing was Divinely inspired. Ms. Ner-David has quite a different take, as she writes (p.155): “In order to be able to face these texts each afternoon, I had to reconcile myself to the fact that despite the misogyny and the lack of accurate understanding of female anatomy on the part of the Rabbis of the Talmud (as well as medieval and later Jewish scholars), we still use these texts today to determine the laws of taharat hamishpachah.” To be committed to the study and observance of laws created by misguided misogynistic authorities and rooted in errors uncorrected over centuries of study is truly an act of faith which defies my rational ability to understand.

Secondly, though Ms. Ner-David avoids committing to any denominational label, the title of her book clearly indicates her desire for “traditional” ordination. Throughout the book she professes a desire to work within what she perceives as the framework of halacha, and repeatedly references "modern orthodoxy" as her inspiration. Yet, apparently this committment has its limits. Given a choice between bowing to the authority of halacha or following one’s personal value judgment, Ner-David seems to clearly favor the later. She writes (p.155), “There are, however, halachot to which I simply cannot reconcile myself, and I advocate changing them in practice and on the books. These laws clash with fundamental ideals of what is moral and good and sully our religious tradition.” How Ner-David can square this approach with “traditional” ordination and halacha is never really explained. Is G-d's will to be obeyed only when we judge it sensible or when it makes us comfortable? For example, I guess whoever ordains her will not bother to include in her farher in hilchos nidah questions on bedikos, harchakos, proper time for tevilah, number of days to wait before tevilah, or proper mikveh supervision, all halachos found in shulchan aruch that she either does not observe, advocates leniencies in which have no traditional basis, or feels should be abolished.

There is some value to reading the viewpoint of those with whom one disagrees, so it was worth picking up the book. Her name dropping of authorities like Rabbis Avi Weiss, Emanuel Rackman, and Saul Berman, among others, does not convince me that these people share her understanding of the halachic system or would welcome her under the umbrella of their flavor of modern orthodoxy, but does raise the question in my mind as to whether certain flavors of modern orthodoxy have given too much weight to social forces as catalysts for halachic change given that someone like Ner-David can make a superficial case for legitimacy within their shadow.

There are women today who embrace greater shmiras hamitzvos and torah study within careful halachic boundaries and without substituting their own moral judgment for that of centuries of tradition. I believe much of the opposition, especially in more right-wing circles, to these feminist advocates acting l’shem shamayim, stems from a false association of their motivations and actions with the more radical agenda Ner-David advances. Ner-David dismisses opposition to her views that have been voiced even with Orthodox feminist circles as being more political than ideological, but I think she naively fails to recognize just how far outside the boundaries of tradition her thinking has carried her. Read the book and decide for yourself.

women reciting brachos on mitzvos she'hazman gerama (II)

I should note as a follow up to yesterday’s post that the Rosh rejects the opinion that allows women to say a bracha on a zman gerama mitzvah precisely because the wording of “v’tzivanu” does not apply to them.

Tosfos (R”H 33) discusses whether one can bring proof to the position that women may say brachos on mitzvos she’hazman gerama from the fact that a woman can theoretically get an aliya (if not for the reason of kavod tzibur) and recite birchas hatorah. Since birchas hatorah recited before an aliya does not contain the term “v’tzivanu”, it would appear that more is involved in this debate than issues of language. Those who oppose women reciting the bracha may hold that Chazal simply never instituted a concept of bracha recitation for those not obligated in the mitzvah.

The Halichos Beisa quotes an interesting discussion among achronim: assuming there is no problem reciting a bracha, are women simply permitted to recite the bracha, or are they obligated to do so? In support of the later position the Halichos Beisa suggests that a birchas hamitzvah may be part and parcel of the mitzvah itself. Since women are permitted to perform mitzvos she’hazman gerama, that performance by definition includes the obligation of bracha as part of the mitzvah act. Perhaps this issue hinges on the debate in Rishonim (Rambam/Ra’avad, Milah 3:1) whether a bracha is recited when a mitzvah is performed to avoid a safeik, e.g. is a bracha recited over a milah of an andogynus.

women reciting brachos on mitzvos she'hazman gerama

R’ Elchanan Wasserman quotes a the Ran at the end of Kiddushin as explaining that women can say a bracha if they voluntarily perform mitzvos aseh she’hazman gerama because these mitzvos are obligatory on men and women receive reward for their performance. Why, asks R’ Elchanan, should it make any difference whether men are obligated in these mitzvos to the discussion of whether women can say a bracha? Furthermore, getting back to the Ramban’s chiddush (see post here) that the Avos did not observe the Torah in chutz la’aretz even as ainam metzuvim, R’ Elchanan asks why women should get schar for performining mitzvos she’hazman gerama in chu”l as ainam metzuvim? (R’ Elchanan obviously took the Ramban’s chiddush to explain Chazal’s derush very seriously!)

R’ Elchanan explains that receiving schar is not sufficient reason to recite a bracha – how does the language of “v’tzivanu” fit? The action involved must categorically be defined as a mitzvah. The Ran mentions the fact that men are obligated to indicate (a siman) that we are dealing with actual mitzvos. The only difference with respect to zman gerama between men and women is that the former would receive punishment for violating these mitzvos, the latter do not.

Based on this approach there is no question from the Ramban. The Ramban’s distinction applied only pre-matan Torah when the only issue involved was the degree of schar obtained for fulfilling ratzon Hashem – there was no concept of mitzvah which existed yet.

(R’ Elchanan’s chiddush suggests that there is a chovas hagavra on women to perform mitzvos which are zman gerama, which I found very interesting [please see it inside – I may be reading too much into it]. I would have suggested a Brisker-like approach: the command of Hashem is categorically defined as a mitzvah viz a viz men and women, i.e. the cheftza of the dvar Hashem is a tzivuy; however, the chovas hagavra is different. The problem with my idea is how can one say “v’tzivanu” when there is no chovas hagavra?)

the essentials of tefilah - words or thoughts?

The aside in yesterday’s post about Eliezer’s tefila being an improper request because his words could have led to a bad outcome even though his thoughts were in the right place has an upside as well. The gemara in Ta’anis (8) darshens the pesukim in Tehilim (78:36-38) “Vayefatuhu b’fihem u’b’leshonam yechazvu lo… V’hu rachum yechaper avon…” to mean that even though the tefilah of the tzibur may be no more than mouthing empty words, Hashem still promises kaparah. This idea needs explanation – the essential component of tefilah would seem to be the kavanah and ratzon halev. What good is mouthing empty words without thought behind them? Why even theoretically should Eliezer’s request have led to wrong – doesn’t Hashem know what he meant in his heart even if he didn’t formulate the request properly? Something to think about.

Ramban on Ya'akov marrying two sisters

The Ramban’s answer to the famous question of how Ya’akov could marry two sisters is that the mitzvos were kept by the Avos only in Eretz Yisrael. The Ramban elaborates on this theme in P’ Achrei Mos and writes that even for us the ideal of Torah can be realized only in Eretz Yisrael and our performance of mitzvos in Chu”l is merely practice so we retain our mesorah until the time when we can return to the Land.

R’ Elchanan Wasserman (Koveitz Shiurim end of Kiddushin) explains that there are two elements which motivate us to keep mitzvos: 1) the fact that mitzvos are G-d’s command; 2) the positive good which results from keeping mitzvos (see this previous post on yefas to’ar for a similar idea from the Shiurei Da’as). The good which results from shmiras hamitzvos can only fully be realized in a Torah society in Eretz Yisrael. Outside of Eretz Yisrael we still must keep mitzvos because of G-d’s command, but that fulfillment is a lesser accomplishment.

R’ Elchanan uses this approach to explain the Ramban. The Avos never were commanded in mitzvos, but they intuitively realized that fulfilling the will of Hashem is the ultimate good. That good could only be realized in Eretz Yisrael but not outside. More on this bli neder to come…

the avos pre-mattan torah and prohibited marriages

Ta’anis 4 relates that three people did not formulate their requests properly; in two of the cases things worked out anyway, and in one case it didn’t. The second case the gemara presents is Shaul’s promise to give his daughter to whomever killed Golyas without considering that a mamzer or eved might be the one to complete the task. The first case the gemara presents is Eliezer’s intent to give Yitzchak to whichever girl would draw water for him and his camels without thinking that the girl who does so may be blind or lame.

Tosfos asks why the gemara is concerned lest Shaul’s daughter be promised to an eved or mamzer but mentions only concern for physical features with respect to whom Yitzchak would marry. Tosfos answers in the name of Rashi that Yitzchak lived pre-mattan Torah and the issur of marrying a shifcha or mamzeres did not yet apply.

Rashi’s assumption seems to be that even with respect to laws of marriage the Avos behaved as bnei noach and not as if commanded in mitzvos, an assumption that seems slightly odd considering that Avraham specifically wanted a girl from his own family for Yitzchak. Remember as well that Rashi on chumash writes that Eliezer himself had a daughter which Avraham turned down as a match because Eliezer was an eved. The Maharatz Chiyus on the daf suggests that Rashi's chiddush might be true only with respect to marriage, as we see from Ya'akov marrying two sisters - an interesting idea, but it begs the question why. Be that as it may, I was very surprised that when I checked the index to the Parashas Derachim thay I have and thumbed through the first two derashos I could not find this Tosfos quoted in his discussion of the status of the Avos pre-mattan Torah.

A side point: Eliezer’s promise to take the girl who drew water first was stated in the context of a tefilah – he was asking Hashem for help in determining the right match. Even though his intentions were proper, since in formulating his tefilah he left open the possibility of a bad match occurring the gemara considers this an improper request. Just interesting that the particular words of tefilah carry such significance above and beyond the thoughts of one’s heart.

ashreichem yisrael - even in suffering

Kesubos 66b tells the tragic story of the daughter of the wealthy Nakdimon ben Guryon whose kesubah was worth millions of dollars, but at the time of the churban she was reduced to picking through animal dung to look for food. R’ Yochanan ben Zakai exclaimed, “Ashreichem Yisrael! When the Jewish people obey G-d’s will there is no greater nation, but when they fail to obey G-d's will not only are they subjugated to the lowest nation, but they are lower even than that nation’s animals”.

The Maharal asks: we understand why R’ Yochanan ben Zakai would exclaim “ashreichem yisrael” at the glory of Nakdimon’s wealth, but why exclaim “ashreichem yisrael” over the tragedy of the downfall of the Jewish people?

The human arm seems wonderfully resilient – you can bang it, bruise it, cut it, and it will usually repair itself and you go right on living. You can break a bone, need stitches, and still bounce back. An amputee can go right on living, albeit with limitations, even without an arm. But if a small scratch on the brain is a different story – even minor damage can lead to devastating injury. A minor heart defect can pose a risk of death. Paradoxically, the more essential the organ, the more delicate and susceptible to injury it is and the greater the trauma to the body when it suffers damage.

Ashreichem Yisrael that when we are hurting the trauma is great and painful, for that pain and trauma proves that we are indeed the mind and heart of this world.

(Since I don’t want to distort the Maharal by using my analogy, here’s how he puts it: tzurah can impose itself on chomer and mold it slowly, but chomer cannot impose itself on tzurah without completely destroying it. The fact that klal yisrael suffers so greatly proves that their essence is the more lofty tzurah, in comparison to the other nations which are merely chomer. In other words (again, at the risk of distorting the point): when American soldiers are killed we don’t say there is less liberty in the world as a direct result – the people and the national ideals are two separate entities. The Jewish nation, however, is the embodiment of ruchniyus, and when the world is spiritually damaged we suffer as a direct consequence.)

kibud av and talmud torah

The Shi’iltos at the end of P’ Toldos presents a dilemma of competing values: a person is obligated to honor his parents and must attend to their needs, but at the same time feels compelled to travel away from his parents for the sake of learning torah – which takes precedence? The Shi’iltos cites the gemara Megillah 16 which explains that the reason the Torah informed us of the age of Yishmael at death is so we could calculate the years Ya’akov spent away from home. Ya’akov spent 14 years learning before he came to Lavan’s house for which he was not punished for not fulfilling kibud av, indicating that talmud torah takes precedence over kibud.

The Netziv explains that the Shi’iltos understood the pasuk of Yishmael’s age as a gezeiras hakasuv which teaches this din; without the pasuk, kibud av would be doche the mitzvah of talmud torah. Interestingly, Yevamos 6 tells us that kibud av is a “hechsher mitzvah” and would ordinarily not be doche other mitzvos, but here, apparently it would if not for the gezeiras hakasuv.

chiyuv of mezonos

Kesubos 2 explains that if the wedding date arrives and for some reason of ones a postponement is necessary, the ba’al is still obligated to support his wife with mezonos from the original date onward. The Divrei Yezechkel poses the following chakira: is this obligation of mezonos because we create a legal fiction of the marriage having occurred, or is this a separate chiyuv of mezonos above and beyond that which applies in a normal wedding case?

the status of the Avos as bnei noach or yisraelim: midrash, halacha, or history?

While on the topic of the Avos’ shmiras hamitzvos, my wife has a post on her blog on the episode of Avimelech discovering Yitzchak and Rivka “mitzachek”. Chazal derive (cited in Rashi 41:50) from our being told that Yosef’s children were born before the Egyptian famine that one is prohibited from having relations during a famine. If so, shouldn’t Yitchak and Rivka who were driven to the Plishtim’s land by famine have refrained from relations at this time?

Mizrachi answers that the prohibition applies only to areas afflicted; the Plishtim did not suffer any shortage and so no issur applied. Perhaps the issur does not apply to leil tevila (see MG”A). However, the Ta”z (O.C. 675) dismisses the whole question. The Avos were essentially Bnei Noach and were not bound to keep Torah law. What Yosef chose to do as a personal middat chassidut (Tosfos writes there is no formal issur) was not binding on others.

Based on some of our previous discussion, I don’t think it is out of bounds to suggest that the middat chassidut of refraining from relations is ascribed to Yosef as a form of asmachta to the later halachic standard, but not meant to be taken as a historical description of Yosef’s behavior. It therefore makes no sense to ask why Yitzchak did not behave in the same way. Makes sense?

One final point, which I made in passing before: do you really need to choose sides in terms of what approach you like better? I don’t see a problem is donning different hats at different moments and enjoying each approach on its own terms.

Were Chazal concerned with "hsitorical sense" in derash?

One comment to the previous posts raised the possibility that Chazal were not concerned with "historical sense". I don’t think that’s quite true and would like to focus on a sugya daf yomi learners may remember from a few weeks ago to make my case. The shakla v’terya: In Kesubos 10b the gemara suggests the term “almanah” is derived from the “manah” an almanah receives in her kesubah. Asks the gemara: the Torah’s use of the word “almanah” long predates the valuation of a kesubah as a manah – the term cannot possibly derive from a takanah which does not occur until hundreds of years later.

Two few points:
1) The gemara’s question shows an awareness of anachronistic reading.
2) I get the impression that some would dismiss all anachronistic reading as derash, and somehow that label renders all questions become moot. I do not understand that approach. The gemara’s reading can’t be pshat – the word “almanah” must have had some meaning to readers of the Torah before the takanah of 100 manah for an almanah was instituted (as the Rishonim on the sugya point out). Yet, despite it being derash, the gemara is still not willing to dismiss the anachronism.
3) Is this sugya an anamoly? We don't find this type of question raised elsewhere to the best of my knowledge. What to make of that - I don't know. I'm just raising the question.

anachronistic readings and literalness of midrash

This is not a fully formulated idea, but as I wanted to seperate it as a seperate post (it came up in the comments to the previous post). I highlighed Rashi's statement that Lot celebrated Pesach as an example of Rashi's use of anachronism, and while that example can be explained away perhaps using a thematic reading, it is by no means an isolated occurance in Rashi. Look at one chapter in our parsha - 27:3 Rashi refers to Yitzchak commanding Eisav to use a sharp knife so his meat would not be neveila; 27:9 Rashi refers to Yitzchak eating korban pesach; 27:9 Rashi refers to Rivka's kesuba. I am sure a thorough review of Rashi can bring to light many other examples. To dismiss all these as non-literal takes Rashi out of his role as interpreter of local textual problems. It also simply does not work when we move beyond Rashi, e.g. what is one to make of a question like how the sale of bechora worked when it is a davar she'lo ba l'olam? Aren't we imposing later halachic standards of kinyanim that may not yet have existed onto the text? Nonetheless, some meforshim have no problem raising such a question.

What I would suggest is that Rashi and many achronim approached the text of Chumash and Midrash as a discrete and self-contained system. Limud haTorah to these parshanim is like working on a mathematical equation; kashes of historical context or practical concerns simply do not come into play. Just like 2+2=4 is true in all possible times and places, once halacha declares lo ba l'olam an invalid kinyan it cannot exist **as a unit of text** in a Torah which is true at all times as places. In other words, the issue is not how historically a sale of something which is lo ba l'olam could occur, but rather how Torah as a timelessly true could text contain such a phenomenon.

By way of analogy, logical positivists say that issues of theology or metaphysics are not cognitively meaningful because they cannot be investigated. When one learns gemara, one looks for consistancy within the text; questions like whether "tav l'meisav" is sociologically accurate or how Chazal came to these umdenot are outside the purview of the Bais Medrash. A Mishna is a unit of text, not a historical statement.

Of course, Ramban, Rashbam, and so many others do not read the Chumash in this way. One can undoubtedly dismisses a kashe like "How could Yitchok eat from Eisav's meat without concern for shechitas mumar - hashta behemtam shel tzadikim ein HKB"H mavi takalah al yadam, tzadikim atzaman lo ksh"k" as taking a midrash too literally or being too anachronistic. However, given that such a question was oleh al shulchan shel melachim (see the Yismach Moshe) forces an acknowledgement that some meforshim had a different way of looking at things.

I appreciate the difficulties with this approach raised in the comments, but I don't see another model that would explain what these meforshim are doing. I'm open to ideas - any other suggestions? Final point: even if one rejects their approach to parshanut, the pilpul and of these meforshim is often valuable in a larger context and is an excellent way to stretch one's thinking. Oneg Shabbos for some is a piece of kugel, for others it's a Yismach Moshe, a Parashas Derachim, etc. Not so terrible : )

anochi vs. Anochi

Sorry for the lack of posting this week... I have a bad cold.

The Berdichiver brings a kabbalah from AR"I that women who are tzidkaniyos suffer no pain during childbirth because they are excluded from the onesh of Chavah. The word Anochi is representitive of the 1st dibra of Aseret haDibrot, which (as R' Tzaddok writes in many places) subsumes within it all positive good and mitzvos that Hashem desires of us. Rivka complained of her pain, "Im kein lamah zeh Anochi", if I am suffering from the onesh of Chavah, what in my relationship to that ideal of Anochi is missing?

My wife noticed that aside from its mention at the opening to the parsha, "anochi" is a recurring theme. Eisav's constantly uses the term "anochi" in describing his shortcomings - "ayef anochi", "hinei anochi holeich lamus". Ya'akov on the other hand is "anochi ish chalak", and has to disguise his "anochi" to become Eisav - "anochi Eisav bechorecha".

There is also an interesting contrast later in 28:15/16 - Hashem reveals to Ya'akov "hinei anochi imach"; Ya'akov replies"v'anochi lo yada'ti". Does Ya'akov's anochi refer to himself, or is Ya'akoiv perhaps saying that he has not been aware of the presence of Hashem as revealed through Anochi, capital A for that first dibra and its middos?

(For the pashtanim who have grimaced through reading this, a question - I am not aware of a rule as to where the term "ani" is used and where the term "anochi" is used. Any sources?)

rashi and anachronistic reading: did Lot really eat matzah?

It may be easier to come to grips with the question of anachronism with a concrete example. When the Angels come to Lot we are told that he served them matzos. Rashi comments (19:3): “Pesach haya” – it was the holiday of Pesach.

Rabbi Maroof commented on an earlier post – “Is it really rational to assume the Avot commemorated events that had not yet occurred? Most ritual mitsvot revolve around Yetsiat Mitsrayim which was centuries after their deaths.”

Fair point, but then what do we make of Rashi? Rashi seems to be addressing a simple textual question – why mention the seemingly insignificant detail of what bread was served. If you dismiss Rashi as “derash” and not pshat, what does that mean? – did Rashi waste his time composing “fictional” answers to explain troublesome details in the text? Or to put it another way, if Rashi knew it was irrational or improbable for Lot to have really kept Pesach and eaten matzah, then hasn’t Rashi failed to answer the textual question he posed?

literalism, midrash, and anachronistic readings of chumash

One of my favorite Shabbos reads used to be the Parahas Derachim, and some of the comments to a recent post brought the sefer to mind again. The sefer is a series of essays, each opening with a Midrashic theme which is used as a springboard to construct elaborate twists of pilpul by trying to impose the halachic system onto the chumash. You have essays explaining the “machlokes” Moshe Rabeinu and Pharoah, explanations of how the Avos kept mitzvos (a ben noach cannot keep shabbos), etc. When I would say over one of these my wife would almost always ask whether it really makes sense to say things like Pharoah held like the Ra’avad while Moshe held like the Rambam, etc.? Isn’t that anachronistic? By the same token, isn’t asking whether the Imahos observed non-zman gerama mitzvos (as discussed in a previous post) surrendering too much to literalism and anachronistically imposing the halachic system on past events?

But if one dismisses these approaches as overly literalistic, as anachronistic, as pilpul shel hevel, what is one to make of seforim like the Parashas Derachim… the Chasam Sofer… the Hafla’ah… the Netziv…the Yismach Moshe… the Meshech Chochma… and so many others which engage in these type readings?

In the same vein, what is one to make of Chassidic seforim which impose an entire system of meta-halachic concerns for tikunim and birurim on the acts of the Avos? Isn’t this an anachronistic reading as well, an imposition on the text which could not possibly be pshat or inherent in a “rational” understanding of the text?

I’m holding my cards for now and simply raising the question for comment.

short daf yomi highlights

A few items worth noting on recent daf yomi pages:

1) Kesubos 60a TD”H M’ma’achan – Tosfos holds that there is an issur of mar’is ayin by issurei derabbanan, but maris ayin b’chadrei chadarim applies only to issurei d’oraysa (perhaps extending the din that far by issurei derabbanan would constitute a gezeirah l’gezeirah). The Rama at the beginning of Hil Basar b’Chalav writes that if a milk-like product made from nuts is served with meat (e.g. non-dairy creamer), the nuts should be left on the table to avoid mar’is ayin (e.g. serve the non-dairy creamer in its container with the pareve label). The Shach (67:6) cites our Tosfos as proof that mar’is ayin still applies even though the Rama is speaking of basar b'chalav derabbanan (uncooked). If I recall correctly the Yerushalmi holds l'halacha that mar’is ayin never applies b’charedi chadarim, but I do not remember the last time this came up – anyone doing the daf yerushalmi remember?

2) Kesubos 61a TD”H Machlifa – Rashi’s opinion (quoted in Shulchan Aruch) is that passing objects, even without touching, is a harchaka. The language of the S.A. seems to indicate that this is not an independent din, but is a concern lest the husband and wife come in contact (e.g. passing a key), but most of the sources I have seen seem to be strict with regards even to large objects (e.g. moving a piece of furniture together).

3) Kesubos 57a RASHI d”h Ha KM”L – Rashi holds that we do not say “eilu v’eilu” if two Amoraim disagree as to what a Tanna. You cannot debate historical facts; “eilu v’eilu” applies only where multiple interpretations are possible.

Great editorial on Reform movement's new prayer book

Great editorial in the Wall Street Journal on the Reform Movement’s new prayer book. The Journal writes:

But seeing prayer books as a means to satisfy, and thereby validate, this diversity begs the question of whether the function of prayer is to affirm the individual's personal religious outlook. Perhaps worshipers should be encouraged to wrestle with traditional texts, even problematic ones, rather than edit them out of existence…. It is, of course, important that prayer resonate with a person's core beliefs. But the cost of achieving such a resonance, in an era when the colors of belief come in near-infinite shades, is high.

did the Imahos do mitzvos aseh she'hazman gerama?

I noticed the Netziv at the end of Chayei Sarah writes that the Imahos did not keep mitzvos aseh she’hazman gerama. I never really thought about it before, but why should this be so? The fact that women are not commanded to do these mitzvos is irrelevant because the Avos and Imahos had not been commanded to do any mitzvos.

Let me put it this way – is a woman who voluntarily does a zman gerama mitzvah, e.g. she listens to shofar, fulfilling the ratzon Hashem? If the answer is no, then why can she say a bracha and get schar, and if the answer is yes, then why would the Imahos have not done these mitzvos?

the Rambam's definition of nesu'in

I should have added to the previous post a further difficulty with the Rambam based on Kesubos 12: a woman who has had chuppah but no yichud is treated as an almanah (if her husband died and she remarries) and receive only a 100 zuz kesubah. According to the Rambam who holds that nisuin=yichud, the first marriage done without yichud was never completed. Why does this woman not deserve a kesubah of 200 zuz?

The upshot of all these sources is that acc. to the Rambam you have to posit different definitions of nesuin in different contexts. When speaking about rights or entitlements, mesira l’ba’al suffices for a woman to be considered married, both to her benefit, e.g. achilas terumah, as well as to her detriment, e.g. she would henceforth receive a kesubah only of 100 zuz and her property can be inherited by the husband. However, rights and obligations alone do not define marriage – nesu’in is incomplete until the marriage can be consummated, and in that context the Rambam demands yichud hara’uy l’bi’ah otherwise “harei hi k’arusa adayin”, meaning the couple cannot yet live together.

This resolves (I think) the Ran’s question from the din of chupah l’pesulos (Yevamos 57). Chupah in that context must refer simply to the legal status of nesu’in; a husband can never have a legal right to live with pesulos. The chiddush of the Rambam is that even chupas nidah, where there will be a heter to live together, is still invalid as a matir to live together so long as at the time of chupah there was an issur yichud.

the Rambam's definition of marriage - yichud or mesira l'reshus

The Rambam famously defines chuppah as yichud – “yichud zeh hu hanikra knisa l’chuppah v’hu hanikra nisu’in” (Ishus 10:1) – and requires that a women be “re’uya l’biya” for marriage to take effect, to the exclusion of a nidah. The Rishonim point to two gemaras as possible sources for the Rambam's opinion:

1) Kesubos 56a discusses whether a women who had chuppas nidah is koneh tosefes kesubah despite the fact that the marriage is unconsumated. Does this mean that chupas nidah is not a full marriage? The many Rishonim who disagree with the Rambam understand the gemara to simply be saying that an unconsumated marriage is insufficient reason for the women to collect the money the husband added to the kesubah specifically for the sake of marriage. The very fact that the gemara raises the issue only in the context of tosefes kesubah and not as a general question of whether chupas nidah is koneh would seem to underscore their point.

2) Kesubos 2a debates whether a women has a right to mezonos (support) if due to some ones, such as nidah, the wedding date has to be postponed. The Rishonim again reject this proof - the gemara does not mean that chupas nidah is invalid, but simply that it constitutes a valid ones claim if the parties do not wish to go ahead with a chuppah on that date.

The great difficulty in the Rambam raised by the Ran is that chuppah works for psulos (Yevamos 57), women who are forbidden to their partner because of an issur lav, so why should it not work for niddah as well? What is more troubling is that the Rambam seems internally inconsistant. The statement that chupah is yichud and that is what defines marriage seems contradicted by a gemara we discussed previously. Kesubos 48 writes that once a father gives his daughter to her husband or his emissaries, she is legally his wife. The Rambam himself paskens that after this mesira has occurred the husband has the right to inherit (Rambam Ishus 22:1-2) and to absolve his wife's nedarim (Rambam Nedarim 11:22). Why then is a chupas nidah invalid? Even if the husband cannot have relations with his wife, it should be no worse than if a father hands his daughter over to the husband's emissaries?

Har HaMoriya = Har Sinai??

We know from the story of the akeidah that Yitzchak was brought to Eretz HaMoriya (Braishis 22:2). Where is this land or mountain? Rashi notes that Har HaMoriya is identified elsewhere as the Har haBayis; Shlomo is described (Divrei haYamim II 3:1) as building the Mikdash “b’Yerushalayim b’Har haMoriya”. The Rambam codifies l’halacha (Bais haBechira 2:1) that the place of the mizbayach in the Mikdash is identical with the location of akeidas Yitzchak.

Given that background, there is a very difficult Tosfos in Ta’anis 16a . The gemara darshens the name Moriya as “the place which caused fear (=morah) to the Nations”. Tosfos writes that Har haMoriya is Har Sinai and the fear is the fear of mattan Torah. How could that be? Har Sinai is not in Eretz Yisrael, and certainly not near the makom mikdash! Meforshim struggle with this one… My son suggested that there are two places names Har haMoriya. Though Tosfos sometimes suggests answers like this (e.g. Gittin 2a d”h Ashkelon), it would be quite a chiddush.

Eliezer's mission: using difficulties as motivation

Getting back to Eliezer (see part I and II) , we need to remind ourselves that aside from the uncertainty inherent in choosing a suitable match for Yitzchak, Eliezer is about to encounter two of the trickiest villains in Tanach. The Lavan of our parsha is the same Lavan who “bikesh la’akor es hakol”, worse than Pharoah.

Explains the Shem m’Shmuel, it’s not by accident that Hashem, b’hashgacha, saw to it that Eliezer would have a daughter of marriageable age. What better way to ensure Eliezer set out with his guard up? Just like forcing Yehudah to take full responsibility for Binyamin, even for ones, drew out all his kochos henefesh, having a daughter forced Eliezer to struggle against personal negiyos and not set out on his task lightly.

This naturally explains Eliezer's haste and desire for certainty. Eliezer knew that if he deliberated over who the right girl should be and began dismissing shidduch offers, he would always wonder – “Is that girl really unworthy, or am I perhaps just motivated to keep Yitzchak for my own daughter?” Eliezer davened to Hashem for help, asked for the right girl to immediately be shown to him, and asked for Hasehm to remove all any need for deliberation. Furthermore, he put his own daughter completely out of his mind, so that we only find out about her after he completes his job and Rivka has been chosen. And in the end, these efforts not only cleared his conscience, but left Lavan and Besuel with incontrivertable proof that Rivka was meant for Yitzchak.

Are our difficulties there to make us fail, to trip us up, or to provide the impetus to force us to grow and discover our hidden kochos?

devarim sheb'lev ainam devarim

A person sold his home planning to make aliya and unfortunately didn’t make it. Can he now demand the sale be rescinded? No, says the gemara (Kid 49b), because “devarim sheb’lev ainam devarim” – what you might have been thinking when you signed the contract carries no weight.

R’ Naftali Trop’s chakira: are “devarim sheb’lev” meaningless because we have no way of knowing what a person is thinking, or “devarim sheb’lev” are meaningless because even if we know what a person is thinking only words or deeds, not thought, carry legal weight?

how to tap into all one's hidden kochos

An approach to the parsha of Eliezer’s shlichus can he developed from a yesod the Shem m’Shmuel quotes from his father. In the middle of the episode of Yosef and his brothers, Yehudah offers to serve as an areiv to guarantee Binyamin’s return from Mitzrayim. Ya’akov agrees, but only if Yehudah agrees to take responsibility for anything which happens, no excuse even for “ones”. What was the point of this condition? If an “ones” happens, Yehudah’s couldn't do anything about it. Why cause Yehudah to sacrifice his olam haba and further suffer for events outside his control? The Sm”S’s father answered that when there is no pressure to succeed, a person has an excuse to give up and throw in the towel at the first sign of problems. Every difficulty can become an excuse to drop the mission, any problem can be called "ones". But if a person is challenged to succeed, he will persist and somehow manage against the odds. President Kennedy in 1962 explained the goal of sending a man to the moon by saying, “We choose to go to the moon… and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard, because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills…” Working at easy things means never having to fail, but it also means never fully exercising one’s potential. When a person is forced to work at something hard he uncovers all kinds of hidden “kochos hanefesh” that can make the impossible into the doable. If Yehudah was just charged with the task of being responsible for Binyanim, he still might not have felt under pressure because the excuse of “ones” always provided an out. But when charged with returning Binyamin, no excuses allowed, Yehudah knew he must rise to the challenge. The added responsibility served to bring out those hidden kochos that otherwise might have gone untapped and ensured that Yehudah would find a way to succeed. So what about Eliezer’s mission?… I’m getting there : )

Eliezer's search for a wife for Yitzchak

My son needs a dvar torah on Chayei Sarah by mid-week, so I suggested he look into the parsha of Eliezer’s shlichus to find a wife for Yitzchak. Considering that Eliezer was representing one of the most noteworthy people of his time, a man who had proven himself as a warrior, a man of renowned wealth, a man of renowned piety, one would have thought that his serving as Avraham’s messenger to choose a wife for Yitzchak could not have been easier. One might imagine that all Eliezer needed to do was to announce his presence in Charan as Avraham’s representative and he would have been besieged by families desirous of a shidduch with such an illustrious family. He could spend a few weeks reviewing the candidates, choose the best one, and report home. Yet, Eliezer’s actions seem to convey a surprising sense of worry, a hurried urgency that suggests he was unsure of success and wanted to get his mission over as soon as possible:

1) Not satisfied that he is backed by the tefilos of Avraham, the tzadik hador, Eliezer davens to Hashem for help with this shidduch as if it depended on his efforts alone.

2) Instead of interviewing many girls over time and deliberating over his choice, Eliezer davens that Hashem should present him on the day of his arrival with absolute proof of the right girl. Why not consider the candidates and think things over?

3) Eliezer benefits from “kfitzas haderech” and a journey that should have taken a long time was done in a single day. When he arrives his tefilos indicate that he wants Hashem on the spot to help him resolve the issue. What’s the hurry?

4) Strangely enough, the only obstacle that should have weighed on Eliezer’s mind goes unmentioned. Only when Rivka was already chosen and Eliezer begins speaking to Besual and Lavan do we learn that he too had a daughter who might have married Yitzchak, who he indeed hoped might marry Yitzchak, but which Avraham did not allow. Why is this fact not mentioned until after Eliezer had already chosen Rivka? And looking at the larger picture, why did Hashem arrange things in such a way that Eliezer should have a daughter of marriageable age who was rejected – wouldn’t it have been better if he did not have this temptation in his way?

book recommendations

Some secular book recommendations –
I previously recommended Dr. Jerome Groopman’s “How Doctor’s Think” and found his book “The Measure of Our Days: A Spiritual Exploration of Illness” equally worth reading. This is a heart-wrenching book that deals with illness, death, recovery, and finding meaning in life’s closing moments. Very moving.

Dr. Atul Gawande’s “Better: A Surgeon’s Notes on Performance” is remarkably thoughtful and reflective. The focus is on what doctors can do to improve their performance, but the lessons apply equally to many others areas in life. The final chapter of the book was especially enjoyable. What do you do to keep medicine, or whatever job you do (I'm not a doctor either) from becoming a stale, mindless activity? What can a person do to feel like they are making a positive contribution? One of Gawande’s suggestions for becoming a “positive deviant” (a term I had not encountered before) is to write, as sharing ideas with others forces one to reflect. I knew blogging had redeeming value : )

are gezeiros and takanos irrevocable?

The Rosh (Kesubos 4:24) quotes a mesorah from the Geonim that they would no longer convene a Bais Din to pasken collection of kesubas banin dichrin. The whole purpose of the takanah of banin dichrin was to ensure that a father would give a proper dowry to his daughter; by instituting that the kesubah be inherited by grandchildren and not by the husband and/or his family Chazal felt a father would give more freely. The Geonim saw that in their times large dowries were freely given and the takanah was no longer needed.

Apparently the Geonim did not place much weight on the counter-argument (advanced by R’ Yonah) that a takanah remains in full force even if the reason behind it is no longer applicable. The idea that takanos are irrevocable is taken as common knowledge in yeshivos based on the rule that a later Bais Din cannot revoke the work of an earlier one. The usual explanation offered (I think based on GR”A) is that takanos are overdetermined - based on multiple reasons - some revealed to us, some hidden, so that even if the given reason is no longer applicable, others may still apply. In fact, there are probably as many exceptions to this rule as cases to illustrate it.

My son recently asked me about people clapping and dancing on Shabbos. I pointed him to Tosfos’ comment (Beitzah 30) that these gezeiros were formulated lest people come to make or fix musical instruments, and since the reason no longer applies, the gezeirah is no longer in effect. Achronim struggle to make sense of this Tosfos, as Tosfos clearly does not assume a takanah is binding if the reason behind it is not applicable. Again, the exception is striking only if you see the rule as absolute. In one of the Maharatz Chiyus’ essays he rounds up a collection of these cases and tries to come up with a pattern that fits - something to keep in mind when these cases come up.

sacrificing the intellect or questioning the world?: lessons from Avraham

There are two pieces in the Mei haShiloach of the Ishbitzer that I think need to be read side by side. The first piece concerns the Midrash which compares Avraham’s discovery of G-d to someone who observed a burning building and wondered where its owner was, whereupon the owner revealed himself. Similarly, Avraham’s observations of the world raised questions in his mind, whereupon G-d revealed himself. The Ishbitzer notes that G-d’s revelation was not predicated on Avraham developing a new philosophy, culture, or ethic – it was predicated on his sense of wonder and his asking questions. And indeed, this is the root of all religious experience.

The second piece concerns the parsha of the akeida, the command given to Avraham to sacrifice his son. The Ishbitzer explains (this shiur by my rebbe, R’ Blachman of KBY, discusses) that there was a certain ambiguity to the command given to Avraham, starting with G-d’s use of the term “ha’aleihu”, to bring Yitzchak up, but not the word “slaughter”. Had Avraham opened his mind to questions, he would certainly have wondered how a loving G-d of kindness could command him to sacrifice his son; he would certainly have seized upon the possibility of reading G-d’s command to mean something less than actual slaughter; his rational mind would have rejected the possibility of performing an unethical act in G-d’s name and reinterpreted the command. Yet, Avraham closed his mind and unquestioningly accepted the irrational with complete faith.

Two pieces of the Ishbitzer, two seemingly opposite messages. Is religion advanced through questioning and wonder, or through close minded and blind adherence to the discipline of faith? The answer, of course, is both. Our society has lost its sense of balance between these two messages: segments of the Jewish world have seized on “rational” questions as an excuse to reinterpret (or reject) the most basic truths of mesorah, while other segments remain so enveloped in their cocoon of faith that they have lost sight of the value and need to question and probe. There is a need for an “akeidah” of intellectual inquiry in the face of truths too great to be explored or explained by rational thought alone; there is also a need to think deeply, to inquire and explore, if one is to encounter the “ba’al habirah”. Avraham’s journey reminds us of both.

two stories about R' Moshe

While searching for the story in Igros Moshe mentioned in the post earlier this week two other stories caught my eye. The into relates that R’ Moshe viewed his life’s mission as being totally dedicated to Torah, with his wife a partner in that endeavor. He therefore refused to deal with housework, even refusing to hold a baby while his wife mopped the floor. M’mah nafshach, he argued to his wife – if it was important enough to be mevateil torah to have a clean floor than he would take the mop and do it himself, as his wife was not a servant, and if it was not important enough to cause bitul torah, then why disturb him by asking him to watch the baby? (My wife’s reaction to the story: his wife should have handed him the mop.)

At nine years old R’ Moshe learned the entire Mes. Beitzah on Shavuos night with his father. As a parent I appreciated the comment added to the story which notes that this accomplishment is not just a testimony to R’ Moshe’s abilities, but a testimony to the efforts his father invested in his chinuch. I don’t know if the first story is halacha l’ma’aseh, but this one certainly is.

P' Vayeira: "shalom bayis" is not just for newlyweds

My wife has a few parsha posts this week (see here and here), including one on shalom bayis, which brought to mind a beautiful insight from the Sichos Mussar of R’ Chaim Shmuelevitz. The angels who appear in Avraham’s home inquire “Ayeh Sarah ishtecha”, where is Sarah and how is she doing? The Torah is not interested in recording the idle chatter between guest and host, but, as Rashi notes, the question had a purpose – “k’dei l’chabiva al ba’aleh”; in asking about Sarah’s welfare and inviting Avraham to speak about her, Sarah would be further endeared to her husband.

Remember, points out R’ Chaim Shmuelevitz, Avraham at this point was 99 years old and Sarah 90. They probably were well past there 50th wedding anniversary, and may have been past their 75th wedding anniversary. After living with someone for so many years one would imagine that Avraham could anticipate every thought that entered Sarah’s mind. Yet, we see there is still an inyan of “l’chabiva al ba’alah”! There is still more love that Avraham could find in his relationship with Sarah. Shalom bayis is not just something for newlyweds to work on; it is something that needs to be constantly worked on and developed.

are women obligated in tosefes shabbos and yom tov?

Various achronim discuss whether women are obligated in the mitzvah of tosefes yom tov. A nice lomdish formulation of the question (which was discussed here before) was posed by a questioner to R’ Binyamin Zilber (Az Nidbiru vol 1): if tosefes yom tov is an extension of kedushas yom tov itself, then just as women are obligated in the mitzvos of yom tov, they are obligated in tosefes, but if tosefes is an independent mitzvah, then there is no source to obligate women.

While the lomdus sounds nice, the assumption behind it is questionable. Although the gemara explicitly states that women are obligated in tosefes yom hakippurim, there is no source that would indicate an obligation in tosefes yom vov. Recall Tosfos (Kiddushin 34) from yesterday’s post suggested in their question that women are exempt from the aseh of yom tov, and retracted that assumption only because the aseh is attached to a lav. Tosefes yom tov is not attached to any lav, and so the exemption of women should stand. (This of course begs the question of why tosefes y”k is different than tosefes y”t).

Daf Yomi learners, however, will recall Tosfos (Kesubos 47a d”h d’masar) which writes that women may not do work during the tosefes shabbos, indicating that they are chayavos. The Ksav Sofer (O.C. 56) suggests that perhaps women are exempt only from zman gerama mitzvos like tefillin, which demand a kum v’aseh action to perform; they are, however, obligated in issurei aseh, such as the aseh of yom tov, which is fulfilled by the passive avoidance of work. (see also the safeik of R’ Akiva Eiger on perek 5 of mishnayos shabbos re: the issur of shvisas b’heima).

don't aspire to be a beinoni!

Some short stories and observations R’ Melamed records (here) about haGaon R’ Avraham Shapira zt”l. The most notable line, in my opinion, is this one:

הרב זצ"ל הדגיש תמיד שלא להיות בינוני, אלא להתגדל בתורה עוד ועוד ולהמשיך להתגדל ולהתגדל

Don't aspire to mediocrity - aspire to be great in Torah, and then to grow still greater and greater.

Lot's daughters - a story from Igros Moshe

My son’s Rebbe last week told the boys to look in the intro to vol. 8 of Igros Moshe for a story that relates to P’ Vayeira. I’ll save you the search – this is a wild one. A man took gravely ill with some affliction of his tongue (this apparently was in Russia). R’ Moshe visited the man and he asked everyone to leave the room so he could tell R’ Moshe privately what had happened to him. The previous week was P’ Vayeira, and the man related how he had been speaking of the daughters of Lot and how foolish and wicked they were. That night two old women came to him in a dream and introduced themselves as Lot’s daughters. The man’s words had made such an impression in the olam ha’emes that they came to set the record straight. They explained that everyone knew they were saved miraculously from Sdom by G-d. Had they chosen to do so, they could have said that their children came miraculously from G-d as well – immaculate concption. This could have been the cause of a whole new religion of avodah zarah. But instead, explained Lot’s daughters, they chose to acknowledge that their children came from their father – they deliberately named them Mo-Av and Amon to indicate that yes, they mistakenly had these children through their father, but they were not immaculately conceived or a result of any miracle. As punishment for his speaking ill the man’s tongue was afflicted, and after telling this story to R’ Moshe he passed away.

a lav and aseh which work together - yom tov

To add one further point to the previous post, Tosfos quotes Shabbos 25 which prohibits lighting oil of terumah t’meiah on Shabbos or Yom Tov. Even though burning kodshim for disposal is a mitzvas aseh, an aseh cannot be doche Yom Tov which is an aseh + a lav. Asks Tosfos: why can’t women, who are not obligated in the aseh of Yom Tov because it is zman gerama, use this oil for hadlakas neiros – since they are only obligated in the lav of Yom Tov, we should invoke aseh doche lo ta’aseh. Tosfos’ question clearly assumes that the aseh and lav or Yom Tov are treated as separate independent elements.

Tofos answers that since the lav of Yom Tov is conjoined to an aseh, it indicates (is a siman) that this lav is stronger than other lavim and cannot be pushed off by an aseh. Not quite the sevara of the Ramban, but close. According to Ramban, the answer is much simpler: since the aseh is associated with a lav, the two function as a single unit. Since women are always obligated in the lav of Yom Tov, the aseh always tags along as well.

where a lav and aseh intersect

Kiddushin 34 gives examples of mitzvos aseh which are not zman gerama which women therefore are obligated to perform: hashavas aveidah, ma’akah, shiluach hakan. Tosfos asks why it is relevant whether these mitzvos are zman gerama or not - since each of these mitzvos also is linked to a lav which women are obligated in, women have to perform the action associated with the mitzvah irrespective of the aseh.

Tosfos answers by devising cases where the aseh applies without the lav. The Ramban, however, offers a more fundemental argument. In these cases the lav does not function as an independent issur, but is the Torah’s way of strengthening the mitzvas aseh – if the aseh does not apply, the lav which goes hand in hand with it does not apply either.

The debate between Tosfos and Ramban seems to be how to understand intersecting lavim/mitzvos – do we treat each factor independently, or do the aseh and lav merge together and function as one unit either based on the criteria of the aseh (in these cases) or the lav (perhaps in other cases).

Returning to the question of the Maharatz Chiyus: how we can say oseik b’mitzvah patur min hamitzvah by tzedaka when the mitzvah carries with it two separate lavim? One might argue based on the Ramban that the lavim are not independent issurim, but only serve to strengthen the aseh. If the aseh is cancelled, the lavim do not apply either.

template update

I did a little housekeeping on the blog: upgraded and changed the template and added some options so you can subscribe via e-mail and the feed. We'll see if I keep it...

coercion to perform the mitzvah of tzedaka (Kesubos 49)

Kesubos 49b tells us that Rava coerced R’ Nasan bar Ami to pledge a certain sum to tzedaka. Tosfos asks: how did Rava have the right to coerce fulfillment of the mitzvah of tzedaka? Chulin 110 tells us that Bais Din cannot coerce someone to perform a mitzvas aseh which the Torah states an explicit reward for performing [it is as if the Torah designated the reward and only the reward be used as an incentive]. The Torah explicitly promises bracha for tzedaka, which would seem to exclude coercion.

Tosfos offers three answers:
1) The gemara in Chulin excludes coercion by force; Rava used “verbal coercion” to talk Rav Nasan into it.
2) The gemara in Chullin refers to voluntary pledges of tzedaka, but R’ Nasan lived in a city where there was a contractual agreement among all members to contribute a set monthly payment.
3) Tzedaka is different than other mitzvos in that there are two lavim that go with it – lo t’ametz and lo tikpotz. Coercion can be applied to force fulfillment of lavim.
4) A fourth answer not given by Tosfos but mentioned by other Rishonim: the gemara in Chulin means that Bais Din in these cases is not forced to coerce obedience, but it does not mean that Bais Din is prevented from doing so.

The Maharatz Chiyus in a number of places (e.g. Ateres Tzvi, Shu”t siman 13) questions Tosfos’ third answer. Bava Kama (56) tell us that someone watching/holding a lost article until its owner claims it has the status of a shomeir sachar because the object’s guardian receives the “payment” of being exempt from the mitzvah of tzedaka while watching the object – oseik b’mitzvah patur min hamitzvah. Oseik b’mitzvah patur min hamitzvah is an exemption from mitzvos aseh, but not lavim – e.g. travelers en route to perform a mitzvah are exempt from the mitzvah of sukkah (Sukkah 25), but cannot eat in a treif restaurant. If Tosfos is correct that the mitzvah of tzedaka carries with it two lavaim as well as the mitzvas aseh, how can oseik b’mitzvah exempt the shomeir from the lavim of tzedaka? How are those lavim different than the lav of eating tarfus?

There are a number of ways to approach answering this kashe…

avraham, lot, and the ishbitzer on mitzvas milah

I want to expand on the idea I threw out in an earlier post that the point of telling us that G-d visited Avraham davka “acharei hipared Lot”, after Lot had left, is not to stress the wickedness of Lot, but to highlight the charity of Avraham in giving up communication with G-d for the sake of trying to live in harmony with Lot. Only when Lot proved to be a danger to Avraham’s neighbors was Avraham forced to make a break with him but not before, and not for his own “selfish” religious development.

Why, asks the Ishbitzer, did Avraham wait for G-d’s command before performing the mitzvah of milah, as end of our parsha records? Why did he not take the initiative and do the mitzvah earlier, before receiving an explicit command? The Ishbitzer offers a unique answer to the classic question. Milah makes a statement: G-d created man in an imperfect state, and man must take action to remove the orlah and correct the defect. Such a statement can be seen as audacious, even sacrilegious – who are we to call G-d’s creation imperfect, flawed, in need of our correction?

The command of milah was preceded by the birth of Yishmael to show Avraham that indeed it would be audacious to charge G-d with creating an imperfect world if not for the fact that G-d himself creates Yishmaels even among the children of Avraham, if not for the fact that G-d himself told us the world is imperfect and in need of our repair.

I wonder, coming full circle, if perhaps Lot as a character is a symbolic “orlah”, an “orlah” which Avraham was loathe to abandon and forsake without a commandment to do so. Avraham had been told to abandon his home, "lech lecha m’artzecha, m’moldtecha, m’bais avicha" – could it be that this command was necessary to prevent Avraham from becoming bogged down by other potential “Lots” in his neighborhood and family, ultimately retarding his own growth? Is there perhaps a progression from “lech lecha”, Avraham having to be ordered to abandon a bad situation, to "acharei hipared Lot", G-d waiting until Avraham himself was forced to drive Lot away somewhat unwillingly, to G-d's finally showing Avraham that removing “orlah” is also part of the mission of religion and not every situation or person can be “saved”? I’m just thinking out loud – feel free to add your 2 cents.

Even if you don't buy the Lot connection, the Ishbitzer makes a powerful point. Every teacher today is told to make kids feel good, accentuate the positive, find something done right to focus on. Who does not like to hear that they are a great and wonderful person! But the reality is that true growth is possible only is we are willing to face up to the imperfections in the world and in ourselves and choose to do something about them.

omeir davar b'shem omro

The gemara (Kiddushin 54a) records a discussion that took place in the Bais Medrash reported by R’ Avin and adds that R’ Nachman did not hear whether this report was said by R’ Avin bar R’ Chiya or R’ Avin bar R’ Kahana – he simply heard stam R’ Avin’s name. The gemara asks what difference knowing the speaker's exact name makes, and answers that it is relevant in case a contradiction is found between the report and a statement by one of the other R’ Avins - is it really a question, or do we have the wrong R' Avin?

Why does the gemara not consider knowing the exact name of the speaker significant because of the need to be “omeir davar b’shem omro”, to give credit to the source of a statement? If when Esther reported the plot to assassinate Achshveirosh in the name of Mordechai (the source for omeir davar b’shem omro) Achashveirosh had thought she meant Mordechai the shoemaker or Mordechai the tailor instead of Mordechai his advisor, I imagine events might have taken a different turn.

the personality of Lot and Avraham's efforts at kiruv

I am a bit confused by the relationship between Avraham and Lot. We view Avraham as the paradigm of kiruv, yet for all his efforts, it seems that Lot remained somewhat estranged. Taking his leave of Avraham, Lot heads to Sdom, a city soon to be destroyed because of its immorality, perhaps indicating his total rebellion against the ways of Avraham. Yet, despite fleeing from Avraham, there is much apparently which Lot did absorb, as we see from his welcoming guests to his home, mimicking Avraham’s behavior (albeit to a lesser degree). Is Lot a rasha fleeing religiosity, a glutton looking no further than the satisfaction of his own desires, or a lost soul in need of more kiruv than even Avraham could provide?

In the prophetic revelation to Avraham at the end of ch 13 the Torah stresses that Hashem’s appearance occurred “acharei hipared Lot mey’imo”, only after Lot’s departure. Rashi writes that as long as “the rasha”, i.e. Lot, remained with Avraham, G-d did not appear to Avraham. I think this harsh condemnation of Lot also highlights Avraham’s extraordinary kiruv efforts. It could not have escaped Avraham’s notice that G-d had ceased to communicate with him while he was in contact with Lot. Yet, Avraham never acted to drive Lot away because of that. Only when Lot’s became a menace to others by engaging in theft did Avraham feel a need to part ways.

Not all the meforshim agree with Rashi’s approach. The Seforno writes that this prophecy occurred to Avraham only after Lot’s departure because the reiteration of the promise of all of Eretz Yisrael to Avraham would only embolden Lot to seize more of their neighbor’s land for himself. Lot is a man with a specific problem that cannot be fed or encouraged, an “addict” to a wrong philosophy, but that does not necessarily mean all prophecy from G-d had ceased because of his presence.

does the chosson need to own the chuppah or yichud room? - kesubos 48

Some mesadrei kiddushin have the practice of having the chassan do a kinyan on the yichud room and chuppah, the theory being that the kallah enters the state of marriage by coming into a reshus owned by the chassan (in R’ Cinamon's new sefer BeYom Chasunaso he quotes this as being the minhag of R’ Chait). R’ Hershel Shachter (Bais Yityzchak vol 20 “B’Inyanei Nisuin”) brings a convincing proof from tomorrow’s daf (Kesubos 48) that this is unnecessary. The gemara resolves a contradiction in braysos by concluding that even if the chassan and kallah enter the kallah’s private chatzeir they are married, provided that they have explicit intent for nesuin; if the chassan's chatzeir is used we assume such intent exists b'stama even if not explicitly declared.

Avraham and realpolitik

I was recently reading Walter Isaacson’s biography of Henry Kissinger, and Kissinger’s realpolitik came to mind when reviewing Lech Lecha. Avraham lived in the middle of a multi-kingdom war, yet if not for Lot capture it seems he would not have intervened, even though his military might had the power to turn the battle. Was Avraham motivated only by the practical expediency of saving Lot? Was there no moral reason to come to the aid of the kingdom of Sdom and the others who were vanquished? True, they were evil kingdoms, but G-d had not yet revealed that they would be destroyed - perhaps there were yet moral people worth saving. Or was there perhaps no clear moral reason to help one side of this fight over the other, if not for Lot’s capture?

mitoch - machlokes Bavli and Yerushalmi?

The Mishna in Beitza (12) records the famous machlokes Bais Shamai and Bais Hillel regarding the principle of “mitoch”. According to Bais Hillel, once the Torah permitted cooking food on Yom Tov, all acts of cooking and transferring fire are permitted. The gemara goes so far as to say that if a person cooked basar b’chalav on Yom Tov he would not be punished for breaking Yom Tov even though the food is inedible. Yet, the Yerushalmi (Beitzah 3b in Vilna ed) writes that there is a machlokes R’ Yochanan and Reish Lakish whether someone who cooks neveilah on Yom Tov would get malkos. Question: Why would we not apply mitoch to this case? I find it very hard to say that R”Y and R”L did not learn the Mishna as an issue of mitoch (though some Amoraim in the Bavli do try such an approach). Perhaps the Yerushalmi holds that the cooking, even if not for the sake of food, must still serve some need (similar to Tosfos’ sevara in explaining mitoch), which neveilah does not. Any other ideas?

Official Philosopher of Star Trek

My wife was recently grading an essay which referenced "Kirkigard". Was he the famous philosopher who piloted the Starship Enterprise?

punishing the person or the tools of crime: the dor haflagah

It is popular in many cases to argue that the gavra who does wrong should be punished without casting blame on the cheftza used for the crime. Examples: Criminals shoot people, not guns; people misusing the internet is a problem, but the ‘net itself should not be banned. Yet, when it comes to the episode of the Dor Haflagah, it seems that language itself is blamed for the sin of the tower-builders, and language itself suffers the consequences by being transformed into a hodge-podge of different dialects. Why not leave language alone and punish the people involved?

I think the answer is that language is not just a tool, like a gun or a computer - language is part of a person’s essence. The Torah stresses during the Creation story that it is the soul which gives man the capacity to speak. I once wrote a piece on Mishmar arguing, based on the Sapir-Wharf hypothesis, that the jargon of lomdus opened the door to greater conceptual understanding – language is not just a means of expressing thought, but language is the vehicle of thought, influencing how we cognitively map out the world. Changing language is a way to directly transform the people who use it.

why no bracha on mitzvas tzedaka and aseh doche lo ta'aseh

The Maharatz Chiyus has a long series of essays on the sevaros the Avudraham advances to explain why there are brachos on certain mitzvos but not others. The Avudraham quotes from other Rishonim that there is no bracha on the mitzvah of tzedaka because it remains in the hands of the recipient, not the giver, whether to accept the tzedakah and bring about the kiyum mitzvah. The potential to decline tzedaka distinguishes it from all other mitzvos.

The Maharatz Chiyus points out that this sevara depends on a recent sugya in daf yomi (Kesubos 40). The gemara questions why a rapist cannot marry an anusa if there is an issuer involved in the marriage – why not say aseh doche lo ta’aseh? The gemara answers that classically aseh doche lo ta’aseh applies where there is an unavoidable need to perform the aseh; in this case, if the anusa declines to marry her attacker there is no mitzvah on him to marry her. Rashi explains that we therefore encourage the women to decline marriage. However, the Rashba learns that the woman does not actually have to voice her decision to decline – the fact that the mitzvah potentially can be voided if she declines categorically distinguishes the mitzvah from other mitzvos.

The Avudraham’s approach parallels the Rashba – the potential of the ani to decline tzedaka categorically distinguishes the mitzvah of tzedaka. Whether any particular ani chooses to do so is irrevelant. According to Rashi, potential or categorical distinctions carry no weight – we look only at whether there is an actual mitzvah or not.

chiyuv to have an afro-puff hairstyle?

From the Detroit Free Press (LINK):

A Wayne County judge today ordered a Detroit charter school to temporarily readmit [a student] whose Afro-puff hairstyle violates the school's dress code.

"This young man has been out of school for more than a month," Wayne County Circuit Judge Kathleen Macdonald said before ordering Old Redford Preparatory High School student Claudius Benson II, 14, who hasn't had a haircut since he was 4 years old because of his mother's Old Testament religious beliefs. He was suspended on Sept. 6.

Ok, can someone please find me the Old Testament source that requires an “Afro-puff hairstyle”? Is this some type of kiyum of nezirus? (If you are as ignorant as I am as to what an Afro-puff is, the article has a picture).

religion and life's great questions

Earlier in the week I complained of the reduction of religion to flavor without substance, of speeches that resound in empty catchphrases but offer little insight. This conclusion of this report in the Wall Street Journal on a debate between Richard Dawkins and John Lennox about G-d caught my eye. The reporter calls attention to the biographical statement each opened the debate with:

…In a brief biographical statement at the beginning of the debate, Mr. Lennox described a childhood in Northern Ireland surrounded by "sectarian violence" in which his parents encouraged him to read everything and "develop an interest in
the great questions of life."

Mr. Dawkins, on the other hand, says he had a "harmless Anglican upbringing." As a teenager, he says he realized that his religion was merely an accident of his birth and soon thereafter gave up his faith. In some sense, it seems he was rebelling less against religion, per se, than against the kind of "harmless" worldview that simply glosses over "the great questions of life." And who can blame him? But if their interest in this debate is any marker, the people in this Birmingham audience did not come out of that tradition.

If religion is robbed of its meaning and intellectual content, what exactly is supposed to keep one committed?

tzadik b'dorosov - keeping up with life

Noach may have been a tzadik only relative to his peers, or in spite of his peers, but whichever nuance is correct, shouldn’t the pasuk have said he was a tzadik “b’doro” – why the plural, “dorosav”? Noam Elimelech writes that each generation has a particular mitzvah which it must perfect. Noach’s life spanned multiple generations, and he was able to master the particular mitzvah challenges unique to each of those doros.

I think there are two messages here. First, the obvious one: Don’t be the general constantly fighting the last war. Imagine a person who is a big tzadik and watches no TV, but then along comes the internet and he is glued to his browser 16 hours a day. That person was the tzadik hador, but not the tzadik b'dorosov – the world moved on to new challenges and he could not keep up. Second, the more subtle one: imagine a guy who works at perfecting his mitzvah of talmud torah, learning without interruption for 16 hours a day through yeshiva. Along comes marriage, job, child #1, child #2, etc. and the guy is still learning 16 hours a day while his wife gets no rest, his kids run wild, and he has no income or career. That person is working on the wrong mitzvah for his dor. He is putting all his kochos into talmud torah, while ignoring the opportunity and signs Hashem has given him that he should be working on perfecting the mitzvah of chessed (not to say he should ignore talmud torah k’neged kulum, but the experience must change). Again, such a person is the tzadik hador, but fails the test of being tzadik b’dorosov.

another reason to finish shnayim mikra before shabbos

The Mechaber (O.C. 139) writes that in places where the person called for an aliya leins the parsha from the Torah, he must prepare the parsha in advance or not go up for his aliya. The Rama notes that our custom is to have a designated ba’al koreh who is responsible for learning the parsha and leining all the aliyos. However, the Mishna Berura (s”k 3) writes that it is still “mitzvah min hamuvchar” for a person who gets an aliya to have prepared the parsha, and reviewing the parsha by doing shnayim mikra in advance is sufficient.
Another reason to try to finish shnayim mikra by Shabbos morning!

kim lei b'derabbah minei and tnai

I think I am losing everyone with this topic, so let me finish it off. Ritva asked: according to Rashi that a lav hanitak l’aseh is violated up front but punishment is pushed off until the aseh is negated, why do we apply kim lei b’derabbah minei to the moment the aseh is violated? The lav causing malkos, not the aseh, should have to be simultaneous with the chiyuv misah to exempt the doer from malkos?

R’ Shimon Shkop (Sha’arei Yosher 1:3) draws the inevitable conclusion – according to Rashi, kim lei b’derabbah minei does not require that issurim be simultaneous, it requires that the trigger of two punishments be simultaneous. Since without fulfilling the condition of the anusa being eliminated and killed (in the case discussed in the previous post) there is no punishment for divorce, it is meeting that condition simultaneous with the act of murder which effects klb”m.

This helps answer the Rambam (see previous post) as well. Once a cow is borrowed, the borrower is liable to return or replace the cow from that moment, which is why even if the borrower dies, his estate is liable. If so, why is a borrower who slaughters a cow on Shabbos exempt from payment because kam lei b’derabbah minei – the obligation for repayment occurrs when he borrowed the animal, not simultaneous with Shabbos? The answer is (see Ktzos 341) that when it comes to klb”m we don’t look at when the potential obligation of repayment occurred, we look at when the actual obligation of repayment is triggered. It is as if the obligation to pay exists on condition (tnai)– the lien is in effect from the moment the obligation is set, but klb”m applies to themoment the condition effecting payment is fulfilled.

For more on klb”m and tnai, see the Divrei Yechezkel who has a nice roundup of sources. These type topics are very hard to break into bite-size chunks and render into English. Sorry if the ride was a bit rought.

lav hanitak l'aseh - Makkos 16

I’m going to take a detour which will eventually lead back to the Rambam in yesterday’s post. The gemara in Makkos (15b) has a famous machlokes regarding how to understand lav hanitak l’aseh. One side of the debate argues kiymu v’lo kiymo – a person is chayav malkos the moment a lav hanitak is violated, and to avoid punishment must proactively be mekayeim, fulfill the mitzvas aseh the Torah commands to rectify that lav. The opposing view argues bitlo v’lo bitlo – its not the proactive performance of the aseh which removes punishment, but it is only the bittul and negation of the aseh which would cause punishment. Exactly how this second view works is debated in Rishonim: is the lav not complete until the aseh is violated (Ritva), or the is lav complete, but punishment held off (Rashi)?

Learners of daf yomi will be familiar with the scenario the gemara uses as a test case to determine whether the kiymo or bitlo model is correct. A rapist must marry his victim (assuming she doesn’t object); divorcing one’s victim is a lav hanitak to the mitzvah of marrying her. If the rapist fails to fulfill the aseh, he would potentially get malkos. Asks the gemara (Makkos 16): if one must proactively perform the aseh to be exempt from punishment, kiymo, then the possibility of malkos exists if the rapist refuses to remarry his victim and fulfill the aseh. However, if only the negation of the aseh leads to punishment (bitlo), how can one negate the possibility of fulfilling the mitzvas aseh in this case? – so long as his wife lives, there is the possibility of remarriage! And, continues the gemara, even if the rapist kills his wife, there is still no punishment of malkos that would be given – since he would receive the death penalty for murder, there is no double-jeapordy (kam lei b’derabba minei) and hence no malkos! Take a look at Makkos 16 if you want to know how the gemara answers, but that’s enough for my purpose.

The Ritva jumps in here with a brilliant comment (recall that bitlo is interpreted differently by Rashi and Ritva). The rule of no double-jeopardy applies only when two issurim occur simultaneously. According to Ritva's understand of bitlo as meaning a lav is not violated until its attached aseh is negated, the act of muder simultaneously completes the lav of divorce and violates the lav of murder. But according to Rashi, bitlo only means that potential punishment is held in abeyance until the attached aseh is negated - the lav itself is done and complete at the moment of divorce. Since the lav of divorce occurs earlier than the lav of murder, why is there an exemption from malkos based on kam lei b’derabba minei?

Hopefully no one is lost yet – one more post to wrap this up.

ny sports

First the Mets kill us with Glavine, now the Knicks want to bring back Allan Houston???

rabbi as toastmaster

My wife and I have been to some celebrations recently where the Rabbi was called on to say a few words. After hearing the same meaningless message a few times it dawned on me that some people use the Rabbi as toastmaster – called on to give an invocation, the goal is to stand up before an audience and look Rabbinic (beard and wearing a hat is always good), say nothing particularly meaningful, compliment the host, and sit down before anyone gets too bored or the festivities are disrupted. A sample speech goes something like this:

I would like to wish Mazel Tov to Mr. and Mrs.________ on the occasion of their child’s bris/wedding/bar mitzvah/bas mitzvah (choose one). We are all sure their son/daughter (choose one) will grow to be a fine ben/bas (choose one) Torah and follow in the footsteps of the parents and Bubby________/Zeidy_________/other significant relative (choose one), bringing much nachas to them and our community. Our congregation is proud of the wonderful chessed Mr. and Mrs._________ perform, their fine middos and character, and know they have been and will continue to be fine role models.
Insert one:
May they raise this child l’torah, chuppah, u’ma’asim tovim
May the couple be zocheh to build a bayis ne’eman
May the bar/bas mitzvah continue in the ways of Torah for years to come
Mazel Tov!

UGGGGHH! I can’t stand speeches like this. I hate it even more when a little ditty of a vort is thrown in just to add some flavor of Torah to it. Yet, it seems to make people happy. They expect the Rabbi to do this, and it makes them feel good and more “Jewish” by calling on him to do so. If I was a professional Rabbi in many of these congregations I would probably just write out the above on an index card and carry it with me as an all occasion speech. Why do more when no one really expects it or cares?

I know many Rabbis do try hard to impart some real wisdom and thought, but when I hear stuff like this I am reminded that for many people Judaism is a completely banal religion filled with empty platitudes and fluff designed to provide comfort for pain and make people feel more“Jewish” at “lifecycle events” that carry some traditional significance. Nothing of real intellectual significance or even deep emotional feeling. Are Rabbis doing people a service by offering them at least something of Torah flavor? I guess so. But at the same time I am bothered by flavor without substance.

boys do take years off their mother's life!

If your mother tells you that you are taking years off her life, she speaks the truth (if you are male)! Just see this Scientific American article - years are a bit of an exaggeration, but definitely a few weeks or months. Virpi Lummaa, an evolutional biologist, has found that "those who bore sons had shorter life spans than those who gave birth to daughters" and "the mothers of sons proved especially susceptible to endemic infectious disease". Jewish mothers certainly anticipated Lummaa's conclusion that, "Sons also are not as likely as daughters to stick around to help their mothers out later in life". : )

kesubos 34 - kam lei b'derabbah minei and borrwed cows

The gemara (Kesubos 34b) links two halachos as being dependent on the same underlying presumption:

1) Rav Papa holds if someone slaughters a borrowed cow on Shabbos, he is exempt from paying for the cow since he receives the death penalty for violating Shabbos – one cannot receive two punishments for the same crime (kam leih b’derabba minei). The gemara elaborates on what the chiddush of this case is. Double-jeopardy, kam leih b’derabba minei, exempts only payments of restitution, not fines (knas). One might have thought that the obligation of restitution takes effect when the cow is borrowed, which has nothing to do with the Shabbos violation; slaughtering only adds the additional obligation of paying a fine for tevicha, which the death-penalty does not exempt, leaving the borrower obligated on all counts. Rav Papa rejects this argument and holds that the obligation of restitution does coincide with the slaughter of the cow on Shabbos, not earlier. Since we cannot penalize a person to pay and receive death, the obligation to pay restitution is cancelled, and since a fine cannot be imposed unless a base obligation exists, the fine is also removed.

2) If someone borrowed a cow and died, and his heirs unwittingly killed the borrowed cow, the gemara assumes that whether the heirs must repay the lender from their father’s estate depends on the same question raised by Rav Papa’s previous case. If the obligation to make restitution for a borrowed animal (or return it) is incurred at the moment the animal is borrowed, a lien exists against the father’s estate from before his death; however, if Rav Papa is right, then the obligation to make restitution does not begin until the time the cow is slaughtered, at which point the father is dead and no lien is in place.

The Rambam breaks the link between these two laws and paskens (Gneiva 3:4) like Rav Papa that a borrower who kills a cow on Shabbos is exempt from payment, but against Rav Papa (Sh’eila 1:10) that heirs who slaughter a cow which their father borrowed must make restitution from their father’s estate. Leaving aside how the Rambam reads the gemara (the meforshim suggest a different girsa), how can the Rambam be explained as internally consistent? Stay tuned...

pidyon haben - financial obligation or mitzvah?

Following up the question raised in yesterday’s post, the Chazon Ish explains that although a person is usually required to spend no more than 1/5 of his wealth on any mitzvah, the mitzvah of pidyon haben is different. The financial obligation to buy an esrog or talis or other mitzvah item is itself not a mitzvah – it is just a means to an end. In these cases the Torah places a cap on the amount one is required to expend. However, the obligation to pay a kohen for pidyon haben is not just a means to an end, but is the mitzvah itself. Since in the world of dinei mamonos there are no limits on the obligation to pay back debts, e.g. one cannot tell a lender that the terms of payment exceed 1/5 of one's income and therefore one is exempt from payment, there are also no limits on the obligation of payment for pidyon haben.

By defining pidyon haben as working within the parameters of dinei mamonos, the Chazon Ish opens a pandora’s box of other issues, some of which we dicussed in the past (link)– e.g. can a kohen be mochel payment of pidyon haben money? If we treat the mitzvah purely as a financial obligation, the answer would seem to be yes, but if it is a mitzvah like other mitzvos, than not. (Daf Yomi learners: see Tosfos 30b d”h zar regarding whether a kohen can be mochel tashlumei terumah).

some random thoughts

Now that I got in some Torah, some other post-Yom Tov random thoughts:

After attending no NY Mets games this entire season, I planned to start Chol haMoed with a visit to Shea. Lo and behold I found myself with tickets to what most NYers assumed would be one of the great games of all time. Game over before we even made it from the parking lot to our seats. Please do not re-sign Glavine.

Why do people think there is a mitzvah to beat every leaf off their hoshanos and leave them scattered over the shule floor?

Parshas Braishis is too long to start shnayim mikra Friday afternoon after hakafos and finish before seudas Shabbos – or perhaps I should say I was not up to the task. When Tosfos (Brachos 8b) writes that shnayim mikra can be started from the mincha of the preceding Shabbos because we begin leining the next parsha then, did you think that applied to Braishis as well even though we leined Zos haBracha at the preceding mincha?

Regular readers here know that I sometimes like to write about thinking skills and problem solving. Just finished reading and highly recommend How Doctors Think by Dr. Jerome Groopman. The book discusses the heuristics and cognitive skills doctors use in diagnoses and deciding on treatment. Do other professions have a unique set of cognitive skills that successful practitioners master? My guess is yes – I wonder if research has been done on this.

My son asked whether during hakafos he should rest the Torah on his right shoulder as most people do, or on his left because he is a lefty. I thought he should follow everyone else – see Mishna Berura 134:14; right and left here have nothing to do with one’s stronger hand. If you are a lefty and disagree or have heard differently, please explain.

Are Cliff and Spark brothers, both members of the Notes family? Just wondering...

Yom Tov proves that it is possible to live without blogging. But that is pashut.

how much should one spend on a mitzvah?

Welcome back! Yom Tov of course went too quickly... how many days until Chanukah?
I have been learning Bava Kamma with my son and over Yom Tov pushed to get to the sugya of hidur mitzvah (daf 9). The gemara writes that one must add/spend 1/3 on hiddur mitzvah to obtain a more beautiful mitzvah object, e.g. a nicer esrog. Obviously if one spends 1/3 of one’s net worth on each act of hidur mitzvah, one will be bankrupt after doing only three mitzvos! – the gemara clarifies that adding 1/3 means adding 1/3 of the value of the particular mitzvah being performed, e.g. spending 1/3 more than other esrogim cost to buy a nicer one, or buying an esrog 1/3 larger than others (see Rashi, Tosfos).

While the gemara accepts that having to spend 1/3 of one’s total net worth to perform any given mitzvas aseh is ridiculous, it leaves ambiguous how much maximally one is obligated to spend. Tosfos suggests that the upper limit is 1/5 of one’s worth, based on the rule that one should not give more than 1/5 of one’s property to charity.

The Mishna Berurah in Biur Halacha points out that the gemara elsewhere (Kiddushin 29b) discusses a case of a man who has only 5 dollars and must choose between performing pidyon haben for himself or his son (see that sugya for details). If the maximum a person is obligated to spend on any mitzvas aseh is 1/5 of one’s total wealth, then the dilemma is moot as there should be no obligation of pidyon haben at all in this case! Why does the gemara call on a person to spend his last $5 on pidyon haben in excess of the requirement for lulav, esrog, or other mitzvos? Stay tuned for a lomdish Chazon Ish…

dirah vs. sleep in sukkah - beautiful diyuk in Rambam (II)

If I understand the Rogatchover correctly, the Rambams cited in the previous post represent two different dimensions of hilchos sukkah. In 6:5 the Rambam is describing the physical entity of sukkah. The Rambam deliberately does not mention sleeping in the sukkah here as the gemara in Eiruvin defines a person’s place / residence not as the location he/she sleeps in, but the location he/she eats in. The use of the term "dar" and not "yashein" in this context is precise.

In halacha 6:6 the Rambam is simply enumerating those activities which must be performed in the sukkah, and here the Rambam includes sleeping in the list.

(The Mefa'aneiach Tzefunos seems to suggest the Rogatchover intended to distinguish between dirah, which is a kiyum mitzvah, and not sleeping outside sukkah, which is a prohibition but not a chiyuv in and of itself, but in light of the citation of the gemara in Eiruvin I think this formulation fits better.)

sleeping/dwelling in sukkah - beautiful diyuk in the Rambam

I can’t let Chol haMoed pass without sharing this beautiful diyuk in the Rambam.
In ch six of hilchos sukkah, the Rambam in halacha 5 writes:
כיצד היא מצות הישיבה בסוכה: שיהיה אוכל ושותה ודר בסוכה, כל שבעת הימים בין ביום בין בלילה
What is the mitzvah of yeshivas sukkah? A person should eat, drink, and dwell in the sukkah all seven days [of sukkot] both by day and night…

In halacha 6 of the same chapter, the Rambam writes:
אוכלין ושותין וישנין בסוכה כל שבעה, בין ביום בין בלילה
We eat, drink, and sleep in the sukkah all seven days [of sukkot] both by day and night…

Two issues stand out: 1) Aren’t these two halachos identical – why does the Rambam repeat himself? 2) Why in halacha 5 does the Rambam refer to eating, drinking and dwelling (“dar”), but in halacha 6 he refers to eating, drinking, and sleeping (“y’sheinin”)? Have a look inside at the halachos and stay tuned for more...