tradition or traditionalesque

Rebecca Mead in her book One Perfect Day - The Selling of the American Wedding writes (p.58):

What is marketed as tradition by the wedding industry could better be called the traditionalesque -- a pleasing melange of apparently old-fashioned, certainly nostalgic, intermittantly ethnically authentic practices that may have little relevance to the past or future and are really only illustrative of the present in which they emerge. Tradition is one of those words like homeland or motherhood, that is most frequently invoked when what it represents is under threat, or is in abeyance; and the emphasis placed upon the notion of tradition by the wedding industry points
to a contradiction at the industry's core: The imperitive of economic expansion demands the introduction of new services and new products, but those services and products must be positioned not as novelties but as expressions of enduring values.

I have a hunch my reading audience is mostly male and not particularly interested in how bridal services are marketed , but I offer the quote because I think Mead's term (my wife and I were debating if she coined it or not) traditionalesque can also be used to describe the culture and practice in vogue in large parts of Orthodoxy today. I can walk into just about any synagogue in my neighborhood and find people engaged in an odd hodge-podge of practices and dress in an effort to capture some of the flavor of tradition they were either not brought up in (esp. in the case of BTs) or which they have morphed into something the grandparents or great-grandparents they are trying to emulate would only be confused at seeing. It's the quaint fuzziness of an imagined past that has been created and marketed as "frumkeit".

A local Rav who teaches in a girls' school recounted in a speech that he was once asked by a girl if wearing a certain dress or accessory was halachically permitted. His response, which drew approval from the audience, was that as far as he knew "the Chasam Sofer's mother" would not wear such a dress -- case closed.

If you close your eyes for a few seconds and allow your mind to wander you probably can conjur up some image of what you think the Chasam Sofer's mother looked like (let's be real -- it's probably something like your grandmother). Unless you are a very special person, if you close your eyes and allow your mind to wander I doubt you can conjur up the details in Shach and Taz that may address an issue in Yoreh De'ah.

The reality of halacha is tradition; "what the Chasam Sofer's mother wore" is traditonalesque.

Like the bride who overspends on her dress and accessories because the industry tells her that this is what "traditionally" brides have done, in our world the newly minted observant or newly more observant, the MO high school kid who "frums out" in Israel somewhere, the parents of girls in the shidduch circut who are under such pressure to conform and fit in -- in all these cases and more a manufactured set of do's and don'ts that are a fictitious (mis)representation of mythological past have become hallmarks of "tradition" that is a more cultural myth than a directive from Sinai.

mipnei seiva takum -- situations of safeik

R' Shteinman writes in his sefer Ayeles haShachar on Chumash regarding the mitzvah of standing for an elderly or wise person that 1) if one has a safeik if a person is 70 years old (the age at which one is considered elderly and must be stood for) or not one must treat this like any other safeik d'oraysa and perform the mitzvah; 2) if one has a safeik whether an individual is a talmid chacham and must be stood for or not one can rely on the fact that rov people are not talmidei chachamim (quoted in the name of Chazon Ish).

R' Ovadya Yosef has a long footnote in Yechaveh Da'at (III:70) where he addresses both of these questions in greater detail. Regarding the first point R' Ovadya notes that it could be argued that a person has a chazakah of not being old until proven otherwise -- e.g. Tosfos (Yevamos 68) writes with respect to a safeik whether a boy is 9 years old and capable of bi'ah or not that there is a chezkas katnus in addition to the chezkas kashrus of the woman which must be factored into the question. Achronim debate this issue at length, as a person ages by the minute -- is a chazakah he'asuya l'histanos, a situation constantly undergoing change, classifiable as a chazakah?

The same question may be raised regarding the second point as well. No one is born a talmid chacham, and it may be said that we all start with a chazakah of ignorance. Hopefully that situation is asuya l'hishtanos as we grow in learning throughout our lives.

bitul kibud av

I asked one of my children to do something on Shabbos and he dilly-dallyed for hours neglecting it (my parents would say I get what I deserve in this regard) so I began to wonder what the parameters of bitul kibud av are. Is kibud av violated only at the point that the the task becomes impossible to fulfill (or is no longer necessary, e.g. the parent does it him/herself) or is it a bitul of kibud av every second that the task remains undone? The child in question was umoved by my chakira; I assume he held like the first tzad despite my protestations that the second tzad seems far more sensible given the minute by minute accumulation of stress he was causing : )

I haven't thought of any mareh mekomos offhand -- Anyone have any ideas? (Same chakirah in Makos 16 kiymo v'lo kiymo vs. bitlo v'lo bitlo, but that's a different context. Rambam/Ra'avad seem to have a similar debate in hil. milah whether that mitzvah is violated every second it remains unfulfilled or only at death when it becomes impossible to fulfill.)

the command to be mechadesh -- for the right reasons

The Netziv understands the warning, "U'shmartem es chukosai v'es mishpatai asher ya'aseh osam ha'adam v'chai bahem" (18:5) not as a general exhortation to observe mitzvos, but as a specific command to be an "oseh", to create and innovate in Torah. We ask Hashem daily in Ahavah Rabbah to give us the ability to "lilmod u'lelameid, lishmor, v'la'asos, u'l'kayeim" -- "la'asos" is distinct from the shmiras hamitzvos of "kiyum" and is connected to the process of limud haTorah. Study, limud, must eventually lead to la'asos, creative insight and chiddush. The Mishna at the end of Kiddushin that tells us "Avraham asah es kol haTorah ad shelo nitna" may be interpreted to mean not that Avraham practically fulfilled every aspect of the Torah, but that he intuited and was mechadesh halacha even before it was given. Using this insight, the Netziv offers a brilliant answer to a famous question posed by the Rishonim. The gemara (Brachos 17) darshens the paskuk "seichel tov l'chol oseihem" to refer to those who are "osim lishma", because if one engages in Torah shelo lishma it would be better if he/she were never born. Rashi and Tosfos are bothered by this gemara's harsh critique of shelo lishma when Chazal tell us that l'olam ya'asok adam b'Torah u'mitzvos afilu she'lo lishma as that will eventually lead one to the higher level of lishma. Netviv answers that when Chazal tell us that she'lo lishma is acceptable, they are referring to the study of Torah, the accumulation of knowledge and wisdom. The gemara in Brachos, however, refers to those who are "oseihem" -- "osim lishma", meaning those who are engaged in new interpretation and insight, chiddush. Study can be pursued for any aim, but chiddush and change demand pure motive and intention. This novel interpretation of the Netziv is echoed by many poskim. R' Moshe Feinstein writes (Igros Moshe 4:49) regarding women innovating practices like wearing a talis, etc. in the name of equality that while there is nothing technically wrong with the action involved, it is a chiddush in the sense of departing from previous tradition, and therefore must be undertaken only with the purest intent and motive. Rabbi Arye Frimer quotes the policy of the Chief Rabbi of Britain in his paper on women's minyan: "The most important consideration, however is the motive underlying the request. If this is genuinely put forward by observant students seeking, as you write, "a religiously fulfilling experience," it is one thing... But if the true intention is to challenge the accepted by symbolic reforms, then clearly greater caution is called for. As a protest action, what begins with relatively minor modifications may well end with far more serious violations of accepted practices. . . . " Rav Hershel Shachter has similarly stated, "How much more so when one wants to be mechadeish to reverse an accepted position, we must be sure that the author of the original idea is not formulating his chidush shelo lishma - just to gain popularity or for some other ulterior motive. Although it is permissible, and even encouraged, for one to learn shelo lisham, for one to be mechadeish shelo lishma is not allowed (see pg. 26 in B'Ikvei Hatson)." Two final observations: firstly, because of this concern for motive I think in recent times we have seen a reactionary pull away from all chiddush, a la the Chasam Sofer's famous dictum "chadash assur min haTorah". Even where innovation is clearly called for and undertaken with the best intentions, there are those reject it in the name of preserving the status quo. This approach abrogates the ideal of "la'asos" entirely. Secondly, my wife has observed that the criteria of lishma does not seem universally applied. "Amein groups" and "amein parties" are widely accepted even by those who would frown at the thought of a women's "minyan", but there may be little or no difference in the motivation of the attendees. Nearly every week our inbox has an e-mail from someone advertising their efforts on a local e-mail list to try to get 43 women in total baking challah as a segulah for that week's needs for yeshua -- is this not a chiddush (I am not aware of any source for it in general, and in particular wonder why the modern orthodox community in which I live is so adopting of segulos and minhagim from outside sources) that should be communally adopted only with proper motivation? Yet, practices such as these pass unquestioned. A feminist or cynic would perhaps rightfully wonder if our concern for lishma only extends to areas where the male dominated heirarchy is at risk. In short, each situation demands careful evaluation. We must personally aspire to innovate and be mechadesh for the right reasons, but at the same time must be careful of crushing others creative insights by questioning their sincerity and motive. A very delicate balance indeed.

believer to atheist and back again

You definitely do not want to miss this powerful article by A N Wilson. Well worth the read.

stop waiting for angels

You will have to excuse me for being a few parshiyos too early with this vort, but it is inyana d'yoma...

Parshas Balak relates that as Bilam was travelling to carry out his evil plan to curse the Jewish people his donkey abrubtly veered from the path. Bilam responded angrily, taking a poke at his poor animal. The donkey started moving, but again it veered off the path, earning another smack. Yet again the donkey started to proceed, but again it veered off, smashing into a wall, and this time earning a good beating. Suddenly an angel appeared to Bilam. "Why have you hit your donkey!?" the angel demanded, explaining that the donkey only veered because it was frightened at the appearance of the angel that only it, and not Bilam, saw.

The Berdichiver asks a simple question. If Bilam did not see the angel, and indeed no one in his travelling party saw the angel, why is he blamed for hitting his mule? How else should he have reacted when his formerly reliable ride, the donkey that he probably rode day after day without problem, suddenly started crazily veering into walls for no apparent reason?

The Berdichiver answers that Bilam's hitting the donkey was symptomatic of a greater defect in his approach to life. A person who desires to fulfill Hashem's wishes needs first to open his eyes and ears to the messages that Hashem sends. When the ordinary becomes extraordinary and it makes no impression, when a person witnesses the inexplicable and ignores it and just pushes down the same old road, such a lack of hisbonenus is tantamount to deliberatly ignoring G-d. You don't need to wait for an angel to appear to hear Hashem's message! Instead of beating his donkey back on track, Bilam should have reflected on what was occurring -- why would the donkey that always proved reliable suddenly start acting strangely for no reason? -- and realized that these signs point to the fact that he should reconsider his mission. The failure to hear Hashem's message until delivered in an overtly supernatural way was Bilam's failure.

To those waiting for Eliyahu haNavi or some other angel to appear before they acknowledge an "aschalta d'geulah" and find something worth celebrating, all I can say is that maybe it's time to start listening to the lessons of the chamor/chomer; maybe the success that the "chomriyus" secularist pioneers who toiled to build a State have seen against the wildest most impossible odds heralds a lesson we need to hear. Tomorrow is a good day to reflect on what that lesson might be... without waiting for angels.

fear of hope - a review of Edgar Bronfman's book

I subjected myself to reading Edgar Bronfman's "Hope, Not Fear: A Path to Jewish Renaissance" and can summarize the book in a few sentences to spare you the effort. I agree with Bronfman that inspiring greater Jewish commitment requires a vision of hope and a demonstration that Jewishness adds to the richness of one's life. Fear that Judaism and Jewish culture will vanish is not sufficient to inspire commitment. So how do we communicate Jewish values to a generation of Jews quickly assimilating into secular culture? Here Bronfman fails miserably. His answer is simply to discard all those tenets of Judaism that one finds unappealing (e.g. kashrus, shabbos, no intermarriage) and lo and behold, the liberal secular humanism that one is left with is objectionable to no one. Of course not! -- it's not objectionable because it makes no demands, asks for no real commitment (even once a year synagogue attendance is not a must), and is essentially no more meaningful than a Seagram's sales slogan. If this is what the left has to offer it is no wonder that the intermarriage rate is skyrocketing and despite the millions that the likes of Bronfman can spend on funding programs, the results amount to less than what a Chabad house in Timbuktu achieves on a shoestring budget.

Using Bronfman's own reasoning I don't know why he stops with intermarried couples and does not take the next logical step. Plenty of people born to 2 non-Jewish parents appreciate the sort of secular humanism he espouses and would enjoying reading Biblical texts and using them as inspiration to think about life-choices. If having a tree in the house in December is not an obstacle for accepting the intermarried couple as fully Jewish, then why is having a tree in the house an obstacle for our accepting any of the millions of Americans who observe Christmas as honorary "Jews" as well? We can expand the flock by millions! All you need to do is pledge to try to be ethical and commit to make the world a better place and you can be as Jewish as anyone else -- we are the peace corps of the world!

A renaissance in Jewish life is deperately needed, but Bronfman's hope is not the answer.

Metzora -- how to turn a rochel into a talmid chacham

The Midrash tells us of the rochel, a peddler, who wanted through the towns near Tzipori calling out "Who wants life?" R' Yanai followed this rochel around to observe what this unusual hawker might be selling. When a crowd gathered the peddler finally revealed his secret -- "Mi ha'ish he'chafeitz chaim -- Netzor leshoncha me'ra..." The pasuk tells us that one who desires life need only avoid evil gossip.

True, the rochel taught the pasuk in a way that was engaging and caught people's attention, but at the end of the day is there any lesson in this Midrash that we would not glean from the pasuk itself?

The prohibition of talebearing is called rechilus because it was the rochel, the peddler who travelled from town to town, who was usually the bearer of the latest juicy news and gossip. The peddler in our story was travelling around Tzipori, perhaps hinting to the birds which are used in the purification of metzora because talebearers endlessly gabber like the chirping of birds. It stands to reason that the rochel who R' Yanai followed had what we might call a gossip problem.

How do you cure such a problem? Some would advocate a simple solution: stop speaking! If the rochel simply would learn to shut his mouth, then problem solved. The rochel might be told by well meaning individuals to "work on himself", to fight against his inclination. The battle would surely consume the rochel's mental and physical energy, but what a small price to pay to correct a midah.

There is, however, another approach. The rochel's problem is not speaking per se, but rather speaking gossip. Instead of fighting his natural inclination, the rochel can solve his problem by using his natural inclination for a positive goal. Speak -- but instead of gossiping, teach people a pasuk! Teach people that even a rochel can use the traits he was blessed with for a holy and positive end.

Chanoch la'na'ar al pi darko -- the lesson of the rochel teaches the often preached but seldom practiced educational methodology of channelling the child's natural inclinations and traits toward positive achievements instead of trying to break those traits and change the child into something he/she is not.

chezkas haguf

In the previous post we discussed a case where there is a safeik whether a baheres preceded the white hair growing from it (in which case the nega is tamei) or the white hair came first and then the baheres grew (in which case the nega is tahor). R' Yehoshua paskened tahor based on chezkas haguf, the assumption of status quo that a person is physically nega-free until proven otherwise.

Achronim ask why this is called a chezkas haguf. A chezkas haguf relates to physical status quo, as opposed to legal status quo, e.g. chezkas taharah. In this case the physical status quo has obviously changed -- both white hair and a baheres which had not previously been on the person's body are now present. The question is not whether the physical body has changed, but rather when and in what order that change occurred. You have a long Shabbos to think this one over... : )

safeik nega'im

A nega is only tamei if a white hair grows in an already existing baheres -- "se'ar lavan ba'baheres" -- but if the white hair grows first and then the baheres develops around it the nega is tahor. Where there is a safeik as to which developed first, the white hair or the baheres, the braysa (Kesubos 75b) tells us that the Tana Kama rules the nega is tamei and R' Yehoshua ruled tahor. What is the reasoning behind the Tana Kama's view in this case? Every person has a chezkas tahor until proven otherwise, so why, absent incontrovertible evidence to the contrary, should we declare a person tamei just because of a safeik alone?

Rabeinu Tam explains that the case being debated must be where there is already an existing nega on the person's body -- the person had a chezkas tumah, not a chezkas taharah, when this additional nega developed. R' Yehoshua nonetheless declared the person tahor because counterbalancing the chezkas tumah is a chezkas haguf, a physical chazakah that the body is free of nega'im until proven otherwise. The debate between the Tanaim boils down to which chazakah carries more weight: the legal chazakah status of tumah or the physical chezkas haguf status of purity.

The obvious difficulty with Rabeinu Tam's view is that it requires assuming that the braysa is addressing only a very specific scenario and leaves us to deduce the details. The Rash (Negaim ch 4) therefore explains that the Tana Kama disagrees because in most cases the baheres done indeed precede the emergence of the white hair. Tosfos (Nida 19a) presents a simialr view that we are dealing with a lopsided safeik because usually white hairs emerge from the baheres and not vica versa.

The common denominator between Rabeinu Tam and the Rash is that they assume the Tana Kama held that the nega in question is definitively tamei. The Rambam (Tumas Tzara'as 2:9) interestingly writes "v'yireh li she'tumaso safeik". Yes, the nega is tamei, but not because we resolved our doubts, but rather because when in doubt, be strict. Apparently the Rambam must have held that the fact that the baheres usually precedes white hairs is not an absolute rov -- it provides only enough weight against our chezkas haguf and chezkah taharah to call this a 50-50 safeik (Chazon Ish Negaim 5:20. This issue is addressed by numerous other Achronim as well.)

shaving for Rosh Chodesh / Yom haAtzmaut

Rav Aviner's psak on shaving on Yom haAtzmaut -- I am not endorsing or disagreeing; make up your own mind. Of course, you can avoid the rush and just shave today since it is Erev Shabbos - Rosh Chodeh (see Jewish Worker's post).

counting sefira early -- sfeik sfeika l'chumra

Tosfos (Menachos 66) writes that since sfiras ha'omer is derabbanan one is permitted to count during bein hashemashos based on the principle of sfeika derabbanan l'kula (interesting to note that Tosfos clearly holds that sfeika derabbanan l'kula does not just mean that ex post facto one may be lenient when faced with the potential uncertain violation of a Rabbinic prohibition, but one may even create such a situation of uncertainty and take advanatge of it). According to the view of the Rambam that sfira is a din d'oraysa, counting during bein hashemashos would involve the uncertain fulfillment of a mitzvah and therefore not be acceptable.

On a practical level, while we pasken like Tosfos, there is still another factor that needs to be accounted for. When exactly is bein hashemashos? According to the GR"A (explaining the view of the Geonim), bein hashemashos begins immediatly after what we refer to as sunset. However, Rabeinu Tam holds that there are two twilight bein hashemashos periods. The bein hashemashos of the GR"A which begins at sunset according to Rabeinu Tam is still considered day. It is not until 50 minutes later that a second bein hashemashos period begins that ia called twilight and it is that 12 minute period which is a safeik day/night.

(I am using the 72 minute standard for simplicity's sake, but the actual time between sunset and nightfall both according to GR"A and R"T may be a variable measure depending on one's location and the time of year.)

If one wishes to count immediatly after what we call sunset, one is faced with a sfeik sfeika l'chumra as follows: 1) safeik whether the follows the Rambam and one can never count during twilight; 2) even if the halacha is like Tosfos, safeik whether Rabeinu Tam is right and bein hashemashos does not start until much later.

Usually the principle of sfeik sfeika is used as a leniency -- here it results in a stringency!

Had you asked me I would have said that counting right after sunset should therefore be prohibited, but there are smarter people than myself who know that R' Akiva Eiger clearly writes that one can be lenient on a Rabbinic prohibition even where there is a sfeik sfeika l'chumra. The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 248) writes that travelling on a boat on Shabbos outside the techum would be prohibited, but if there is even the possibility that the boat sits higher than 10 tefachim off the sea bottom one can be lenient. R' Akiva Eiger points out the the issue of whether the prohibition of techumin applies 10 tefachim off the ground is an unresolved safeik. Therefore, the S.A.'s case should be a sfeik sfeika l'chumra: 1) a safeik whether the boat is within 10 tefachim of the sea bottom and therefore there is a definite techum violation; 2) even if the boat is above 10 tefachim there remains a safeik whether the issur of techumin applies above 10 tefachim or not. Yet, we see in this case that the Shulchan Aruch paskens that we may be lenient. The same applies to our case of sefiras ha'omer (see Yechaveh Da'as I:23).

Now we have a source, but the question remains why this should be so. Sfeik sfeika is usually understood as a type of rov -- I start with a 50-50 safeik and then add an additional doubt that further tips the balance. You flip a coin once and the odds of heads vs. tails are 50-50; flip the coin twice and the odds of getting heads twice in a row is cut down to only 25%. In our case the rov works l'chumra -- the odds are 75% in favor of waiting until real nightfall and there exists only a 25% chance that the two leniences of Tos. and the GR"A are both right and counting early is permitted. I don't know of any source that says that we disregard rov when it comes to a question of whether a Rabbinic prohibition is being violated -- so why is this scenario different? Something to think about (seems to me there is more than one good answer...)

hashgacha on animals

I don't know why, but I don't feel in the mood to write any lomdus now (a fact which may actually increase the readership here : ) The Rambam famously writes (Moreh Nevuchim III:17) that there is no Divine hashgacha on animals and plants and he explains why -- there is no place in Tanach where we find any hint to such a concept. The Navi Chabakuk compares the wanton destruction of Nevuchadnezer to the killing of animals and beasts in order to illustrate that it was seemingly without rhyme or reason, without a plan (an idea the Navi subsequently rejects as wrong), reinforcing the idea that Divine plans are reserved for humans alone.

There appears to be clear proof against the Rambam from a Yerushalmi cited by Tosfos (Avodah Zarah 16b d"h dimus). The Yerushalmi records that when R' Shimon bar Yochai exited his cave he saw a hunter trapping birds. With each attempt, RSB"Y heard a bas kol declare whether the bird would be caught or not. Apparently the Yerushalmi and Tosfos would agree with Shakespeare's Hamlet that quite literally, "There is special providence in the fall of a sparrow."

If hashgacha is all encompassing, why is it that the only allusion we find to it is this isolated Yerushalmi -- as the Rambam argues, isn't the absence of any mention of such a concept in Tanach telling? The Divrei Chaim (i.e. the Sanzer Rav, Parshas Mikeitz) answers that this is no proof at all. The purpose of creation is to utilize what we find in the world to serve G-d. It is not the fall of the sparrow as an end in itself which is G-d's concern, but rather it is the success or failure of the hunter of sparrows which is His concern. Everything in creation has a purpose relative to man's service of G-d, and it is through Divine hashgacha over man's service and purpose that the rest of creation is watched as well.

Yom HaShoah -- was the Holocaust unique among Jewish tragedies?

Last year I raised the question of whether the Shoah was unique among Jewish tragedies or "just" one more event on the long list of Jewish tragedies that began with the churban and continued through crusades, inquisitions, pogroms. Those who would argue against establishing a seperate Yom haShoah would most likely take the latter view, e.g. R' Soloveitchik held that 9 Av is the day of mourning for all Jewish tragedies down through the ages and the Shoah should be mourned in that context. Before this year I had not been aware that the Piecezna Rebbe, R' Klonamus Kalmish, who died in the Warsaw Ghetto, clearly took the former position. He writes in Aish Kodesh (Chanukah 1942) that he cannot understand why a Jew who learned in gemara or Midrash of the great Jewish tragedies and was untroubled by questions of faith now finds himself in religious crisis, "for those who say that suffering like ours never happened to the Jewish people are mistaken, as in the Churban and destruction of Beiter there was similar suffering..." That line is footnoted with the following -- "This applied to the sufferings we saw until 1942, but based on my knowledge of Chazal and Jewish history, the abnormal suffering, the abnormal and evil death which the evildoes have created and brought upon the Jewish people from 1942 onward, is unprecedented. May G-d have mercy and save us speedily." The footnote is dated Erev Shabbos Kodesh, 18 Kislev. The fact that this appears as a footnote, that there is a "hava amina" and a "maskana" to this discussion, is itself fascinating, but more over, we should not forget the context of the quote -- are questions of faith justifiable in light of the Holocaust? The Piecezna in the body of the text does not offer easy answers to the question of theodicy -- the comfort he offers is the historical lesson that our people have survived and outlived past suffering in many other circumstances with unwavering faith. The footnote is an acknowledgment that this faith which stood us in good stead in coping with past suffering is perhaps alone insufficient when considering the unique persecutions of the Holocaust.

isru chag -- the transition from yirah to shirah

"Vayir'u ha'am es Hashem...", the awe of G-d captivated Bnei Yisrael on the banks of Yam Suf and gave rise to "Az yashir", the desire and thought to sing shirah in the future (hence, as Rashi explains, "yashir" is in the future tense). The Berdichiver elaborates on this transition between the past and future tenses in the two verses. Encountering G-dliness is overwhelming; it leaves a person literally at loss for words. It is only after the encounter has ended, after the experience has passed, that a person can find the means to give voice to the emotions that were part of that moment. The splitting of the sea was a moment of overwhelming yiras shamayim during which speech was impossible. "Az yashir" -- the song of praise to G-d arose in thought, but could only be voiced in the future after that awesome moment had passed.

Isru chag of Pesach. Sometimes we become so entrapped by the experiences of the Chag in every sense, be it the seder or the chol hamoed outing, that we cannot really formulate or articulate what those experiences mean. It is only after the chag, after that encounter with ruchniyus has passed, sometimes long after, that we can pause to reflect and give voice to some of the meaning those moments had. Isru chag starts the transition from "vayir'u ha'am es Hashem" to the song of "Az yashir".

she'hechiyanu on the last days of Pesach

Rogatchover-ish chakira found in the Likutei Sichos of the Lubavitcher Rebbe: Is the reason we don't say she'ehechiyanu on the last days of Pesach because --

1) Since these days are not considered a new Y"T there is no new obligation of she'hechiyanu.

or

2) Every second of Y"T, right through the last days, creates a new obligation to say she'hechiyanu, but that obligation is fulfilled through the she'hechiyanu recited on the first day.

(Compare with the machlokes in Chagigah 9 whether each day of Yom Tov is a new chiyuv of aliya la'regel or the chiyuv is fixed on the first day and each of the following days is just an opportunity for tashlumin.)

Here is the language of the Rambam (Shabbos 29:23) --

ובשביעי של פסח, אין מברכין שהחיינו, מפני שאינו רגל בפני עצמו, וכבר בירך על הזמן בתחילת הפסח

Notice that the Rambam does not just say the last days are not a new Y"T, but the Rambam adds that the bracha of she'hechiyanu was already recited at the start of the chag, implying that it is that original she'hechiyanu on the first days which is what exempts the final days from a new bracha.

Would a katan who becomes bar mitzvah in the middle of Pesach recite a new bracha of she'hechiyanu on the last days?

new meaning to the term "aliya la'regel"

This report in science daily gives new meaning to the term "aliya la'regel".

"Foot-shaped" structures have been revealed in the Jordan valley and are among the earliest sites that archeologists believe were built by the ancient people of Israel. The structures are thought to be symbolic of the biblical concept of ownership....

"The discovery of these 'foot' structures opens an entirely new system of linguistic and historical perceptions," Prof. Zertal emphasizes. He explains that the meaning of the biblical Hebrew word for "foot" -- "regel" -- is also a "festival" or "holiday". As such, the source of the Hebrew term "aliya la-regel", literally translated as "ascending to the foot" (and now known in English as a pilgrimage), is attributed to the "foot" sites in the Jordan valley. "Now, following these discoveries, the meanings of the terms become clear. Identifying the 'foot' enclosures as ancient Israeli ceremonial sites leads us to a series of new possibilities to explain the beginnings of Israel, of the People of Israel's festivals and holidays," he stated.

More in the article -- follow the link.

the hardest mitzvah of Pesach

What is the hardest mitzvah to do on or for Pesach? Is it the cleaning? Stuffing multiple k'zeisim of matzah down your throat? Maror? I think the real answer is none of the above.

The Shem m'Shmuel asks why is it that the Torah devotes a seperate command to Bnei Yisrael to take the korban Pesach on the 10th of the month -- we usually do not find in the Torah that the preparation for a mitzvah is itself a command in addition to the mitzvah itself. He answers by quoting his father, the Avnei Nezer, that although seyagim are normally only derabbanan, there is one exception to the rule -- "md'var sheker tirchak". Here the Torah specifically warns against even coming close to sheker in any form whatsoever. The Shem m'Shmuel explains that taking the korban Pesach involved forsaking any committment to avodah zarah, the ultimate form of sheker. "Mishchu u'kechu -- mishchu y'deychem min avodah zarah." Therefore, not only is the act of the korban pesach itself a mitzvah, but every detail of preparation and everything associated with that act is also counted as a mitzvah just as the harchakos and seyagim of avoiding sheker are all counted as mitzvos d'oraysa.

The Divrei Chaim explains that Hashem "introduces" himself in the Aseres haDibros as G-d who took us out of Egypt as opposed to the creator of the world to emphasize that although we were not deserving of redemption, Hashem nonetheless did redeem us; though we may be unworthy of having a relationship with Hashem, "Anochi Hashem Elokecha", G-d is with each of us no matter on what level we may be at.

Let's be realistic and honest -- do any of us really believe in these few remaining days until Pesach that G-d is sitting and ready at a moment's notice to extricate us from galus? I mean, look at the world, look at our own 4 amos -- are we the people who you think deserve geulah? Al yish'u b'divrei sheker!

Now you know the hardest mitzvah of Pesach. To really believe that no matter how bad things look we can all be sitting in Yerushalayim together in a few days is even harder than swallowing a chunk of maror. And to deny that this is true not only confuses the real emes with sheker, but is a form of avodah zarah. If G-d is the only power in the universe, can it be beyond his ability to rescue his children no matter how far they have fallen?

The Ropshitzer taught "t'chila mikraei kodesh" -- the first step of becoming holy is "zecher l'yetziyas Mitzrayim" -- remembering that a yetziyas mitzrayim that can rescue a person from the 49th abyss of tumah is but a moment away.

a sampling of Rogatchover chakiros on inyanei pesach

With apologies for not elaborating on these ideas, here is a quick sampling of Rogatchover chakiros on inyanei Pesach from the haggadah:

1) zman -- A) does the start of pesach create an issur on chameitz for eight days, or does each second of pesach create a new shem issur? (Rambam paskens that one gets malkos for buying chameitz of Pesach -- it is not a lav hanitek l'aseh because each second is a new shem issur and one cannot correct the issur which has already passed). B) shetach vs. nekudah -- is there a chiyuv matzah year-round which we can only be mekayeim on pesach, or does the zman of pesach create the chiyuv anew each year.

2) chomer/tzurah -- is the idea of biyur chameitz to nullify the tzurah of chameitz or the chomer of chameitz (machlokes R"Y and Chachamim whether sereifah is required).

3) poel/nifal/peulah -- A) achilas korbanos: there is a mitzvah in the act of eating (peulah), for the meat to be consumed (poel), and for the effect of avoiding nosar (nifal); B) mitzvas milah: there is a mitzvah in the act of cutting (peulah), in the person becoming mahul (poel), and in avoiding the smel areil (nifal) -- nafkah minah: hatafas dam bris for someone born mahul, or would a person who is moshech orlaso need another milah; C) achilas matzah/ maror -- balah matzah yatzah because although there is a requirement for ta'am matzah, the act of eating is an end in itself; swalling maror is not a mitzvah because the halacha of feeling the taste is not in the act of eating but in the effect (nifal) that must be produced.

4) peulah hanimshechet -- food cannot be consumed after afikoman because the eating is a peulah hanimshechet; the act recurrs continuously as a result of the taste that lingers.

5) issur atzmi -- is chameitz a cheftza shel issur or is it the zman of pesach that places it off limits (nafka minah: machlokes R' Shimon and other Tanaim whether chameitz she'avar alav haPesach is an issur d'orasya).

6) klal vs. ribuy pratim -- A) is the mikdash a single klal inclusive of its keilim or is each kli a seprate prat that is required to create the klal of mikdash (see Rambam/Ramban in Sefer haMitzvos whether the menorah, shulchan, etc. are counted a seperate mitzvos or are included in the general mitzvah of binyan mikdash; B) is a zimun or tzibur a quantity of pratim or a seprate new qualitative klal (this is the machlokes Tanaim in Brachos 4:5 whether the nusach of zimun changes with the addition of more people or not [i.e. if zimun is a qualitative entity, one cannot have more or less of it]).

Some other ideas that you Briskers may be familiar with:

6) gavra/cheftza -- is chameitz an issur gavra or an issur cheftza (interesting nafka minah: is a chatzi shiur chamietz created before pesach mitztaref with a chatzi shiur created on pesach; nafkah minah as well whether there is bal yer'ah on a ta'aroves chameitz -- is the ta'aroves a cheftza of chameitz or a seperate issur gavra to eat).

7) two dinim: hallel of chanukah and purim is a mitzvah derabbanan of keriah; hallel of pesach night is hallel of shirah and a chiyuv d'oraysa.

If I whet your appetite you still have a few days to get to the seforim store...

pesach absurdities

My wife asks what is the most absurd product or service you have seen advertised for Pesach. Submit your thoughts here.

The Rogatchover haggadah

My wife Ariella was nice enough to buy me the Rogatchover haggadah this week and I just by chance discovered the Rogatchover in the previous post that related to the two previous posts I had done. A few thoughts on that haggadah: There are so many haggados and new ones keep coming out because all it takes to produce one is the ability to complie from a classic text or texts. However, the Rogatchover haggadah is more than a compilation. The editor actually rewrites each issue the Rogatchover discusses, explaining in clear modern Hebrew what the focal point of the chakira is, citing and explaining the relevant Rambam or gemara, and adding some footnotes to other sources that reference the Rogatchover's chiddush. If you are unfamilar with the Rogatchover, this is a good place to start. The editor sometimes throws in multiple versions of the same chiddush, so the haggadah is somewhat repetitive (Rabbi Kasher in Mefa'aneyach Tzefunos points out that there is a development and refinement of certain ideas in the Rogatchover's writings so a chiddush quoted in a later work may vary slightly from the way it is expressed in an earlier work; the haggadah does not delve into these type of nuances.) I can't tell whether without prior exposure to a work like Mefa'aneyach Tzefunos one's appreciation of the haggadah would be lessened -- my sense is that anyone with a love of lomdus would enjoy it and it would entice the reader's to perhaps approach more of the Rogatchover's works at least through R' Kasher's seforim.

On a different note, why is there no R' Yosef Engel haggadah with a compilation of his chiddushim? This is my son's favorite acharon! Whoever is putting out the Tiferes Yosef on chumash (of which only 2 vol have appeared so far) needs to get cracking on this : )

the relationship between mishkan and korbanos - dayeinu!

The Rogatchover points out that the issue of whether the Mishkan served simply to enable hakravas korbanos or whether it had an independent function as the dwelling place of the Shechina may underly a dispute in the Yerushalmi (Shekalim 4:2 - 16b):

א"ר חזקיה תנא רבי יהודה נדנניות השלחן והמנורה והמזבחות והפרוכת מעכבים את הקרבנות דברי ר"מ וחכ"א אין לך מעכב את הקרבן אלא הכיור והכן בלבד

According to R' Meir all of the kelim of the Mikdash must exist and be in place before korbanos can be offered; a completely functional Mikdash is a necessary ingredient of hakravas korbanos. The Chachamim disagree -- the building of Mikdash and the offering of korbanos are two completely seperate functions.

We end the song of dayeinu with the hope of the rebuilding of Mikdash "l'chapeir al kol avaonoseinu", to atone for our sins. Technically it is not the Mikdash which serves as a kaparah, but the korbanos in the Mikdash. This line of the piyut seems to support the view that the Mikdash is itself necessary to bring korbanos properly, similar to the view of the Rambam.

the realtionship between mikdash and korbanos (II)

1) The Rambam writes in ch. 1 of Hil. Chagigah:

ומי שבא לעזרה ביום ראשון, ולא הביא עולה--לא דייו שלא עשה מצות עשה, אלא שעבר על מצות לא תעשה: שנאמר "לא ייראו פני ריקם"

If one fails to make aliya la'regel and bring a korban to the Mikdash one has violated both a mitzvas aseh as well as a lav. The Turei Even (Chagiga 7) asks: with respect to the lav of "lo yeira'u panei reikam" the prohibition is clearly defined as coming to the Mikdash emptihanded; however, with respect to the mitzvas aseh of aliya la'regel the Torah never says that anything has to be brought -- the Torah simply says three times a year to come to the Mikdash. Why according to the Rambam if one comes emptihanded has one not at least fulfilled the mitzvas aseh of aliya la'regel?

Putting aside how to answer this question (see the Minchas Chinuch's discussion at the end of parshas Re'eh), on a philosophical level I think the Rambam makes sense l'shitaso. The Rambam views Mishkan/Mikdash as simply an intrument necessary for bringing korbanos. There is no point to coming to the Mikdash just to be there. Coming to the Mikdash, like the Mikdash itself, serves a functional need to enable korbanos to be offered but is not an end in itself.

2) R' Yitzchak (Megillah 10) says one may offer korbanos in Beis Chonyo, a temple that was built in Egypt. The gemara deduces that R' Yitzchak must hold that kedusha rishona of Mikdash was temporary and after the destruction of the Mikdash it became permissable to offer korbanos anywhere. However, the gemara continues that R' Yitzchak backed out of his chiddush and even denied saying it. The sugya concludes with a machlokes Tanaim whether kedusha rishona was permanent or temporary.

Tosfos quotes Rabeinu Chaim's question [parenthetical aside: my son and I were trying to see how many Tosfos we remember that quote Rabeinu Chaim -- we are up to 4 so far. Hint: 2 in Kesubos, 1 in Kiddushin, 1 here in Megillah. I'm sure we haven't exhausted the list -- any others you know of?]: why did R' Yitzchak retract his statement when his underlying assumption is supported by at least some Tanaim?

Tosfos answers that the Tannaitic debate over kedusha rishona is simply whether korbanos can be offered at the spot of the mizbeyach even though no Mikdash stands. No Tanna, however, would allow korbanos to be brought in Beis Chonyo outside Eretz Yisrael.

If the kedushas Mikdash evaporates after its destruction, why is it that korbanos can only be offered in the place of the Mikdash? If the Mikdash no longer functions as the place of korbanos, why can they not be offered anywhere? It sounds to me like R' Chaim Kohen's approach fits better with the approach of the Ramban that sees the Mishkan/Mikdash as having inherent keduash above and beyond its functional sanctity as the place in which korbanos are offered. It is this special sanctity of the Mikdash as the place of the Shechina which remains even after the physical Mikdash is no longer present and it is this kedusha which prevents sacrifices from being offered elsewhere.

(This second idea is admittedly less convincing than the first. See the Meshech Chochma on VaYikra for a different approach to understanding Tosfos in Megillah.)

the relationship between Mishkan and korbanos (I)

There are two ways in which the relationship between Mishkan and korbanos can be understood: 1) the Mishkan exists so that there is a special designated place in which to offer korbanos -- korbanos are ikar and Mishkan is tafeil; 2) korbanos are instrumental to the Mishkan -- Mishkan is ikar and korbanos tafeil. The formulation of the Rambam at the opening of Hil. Beis haBechira: מצות עשה לעשות בית לה', מוכן להיות מקריבים בו הקרבנות, וחוגגין אליו שלוש פעמים בשנה suggests that the Mishkan is merely instrumental to the offering of korbanos. Yet, the Ramban has a striking line in his intro. to sefer VaYikra that suggests just the opposite: כי כאשר היה ספר אחד בענין הגלות והגאולה ממנו, והשלימו בענין אהל מועד וכבוד השם אשר מלא את המשכן, צוהו בקרבנות ובשמירת המשכן, שיהו הקרבנות כפרה להן ולא יגרמו העונות לסלק השכינה The Mishkan serves as the place in which the Shechina dwells and korbanos are merely instrumental in bringing about kapparah to ensure that Hashem's presence does not depart because of our sins. I would like to suggest two nafka minos in halachic contexts to this philosophical debate... stay tuned.

burning chameitz (II)

I hate to leave off the night with topics like the previous one, so let's get back to some Torah. The Sha'agas Arye (#87) asks the same question we raised here in slightly different form. The Chachamim dismiss R' Yehudah's requirement that chameitz be disposed of by burning (Pesachim 27) by arguing that such a stringency leads inevitably to a leniency -- if one has chameitz but not firewood, one cannot fulfill the mitzvah of disposing of chameitz.

Recall that according to the last mishna in Temurah the ashes of issurei hana'ah which must be burned may be used, but the ashes of issurei hana'ah which can be disposed of in any way may not be used if these items are burned.

If chameitz comforms to the same rule, then why should the Chachamim draw attention to a potential leniency caused by a lack of firewood when there is a a far more glaring leniency inherent in R' Yehudah's opinion -- according to R' Yehudah who demands that chameitz be burned the ashes of chameitz would be permitted while according to the Chachamim these ashes would be prohibited.

Since the gemara does not raise this possibility it suggests that even the Chachamim would permit the ashes of burned chameitz -- but why is chameitz different than other issurei hana'ah?

a strange defense - part II

The second critique of Rabbi Slifkin is that R’ Kanievsky and R’Shternbruch and others from their world do not retain the exclusive right to speak on matters of mesorah. In that I fully agree, and as I wrote last post look forward to Rabbi Slifkin producing haskamos from R’ Hershel Shachter or someone of that ilk to bolster his views. Until that happens, the point is academic.

It is with respect to his third critique that it is ludicrous to disallow disagreement with an authority because he is a great Torah scholar that I find myself most strongly disagreeing with Rabbi Slifkin. Once again, he knocks down an easy strawman rather than deal with the real issue.

The issue is NOT whether there can be legitimate disagreement on Torah issues. Anyone who deals with a machlokes Rambam and Tosfos or Shach and Taz knows this. The issue, and I will put it bluntly, is given the overwhelming criticism of Rabbi Slifkin’s views by gedolei yisrael and Roshei Yeshiva, who is he to disagree?

The Pri Megadim can disagree with Rabbi Akiva Eiger, but no matter how well I learn a sugya it indeed would be ludicrous for me to disagree. At best I can say R' Akiva Eiger is tzarich iyun to me. In one of the biographies of R' Baruch Ber it is related that when R' B.B. would say a shiur and answer a question RAKE left b'tzarich iyun he would say the shiur is just a hava amina but not a real answer or surely RAKE would have thought of it!

Not only does Rabbi Slifkin think he is a bar plugta of the gedolei hador, he writes quite confidently that "virtually none of them knew about the sources in Rishonim and Achronim on which I was relying". Indeed! I find my eyebrows raised reading rhetoric like this, but maybe it's just me.

The question R' Slifkin raises as to why Rav Hirsch's writings should not be expunged from Torah texts because of some of the non-traditional views Hirsch held just as his [Slifkin's] works have been banned shows a shortsightedness as to why and how works become part of the canon of great Torah texts and why certain people become enshrined by history as great Torah leaders. One can point to the writings of any Torah great and find views that are sometimes difficult to understand -- the fact that you may not have an answer for Tosfos' critique of Rashi in no way diminishes Rashi's greatness. It is the totality of vision, thought, and character that makes a gadol, and given that totality of personality, we assume there must be logic and justification even behind writings that strike us as perplexing. Does Rabbi Slifkin truly believe he has shown a mastery of the totality of Torah literature that would demand we give his writings the same benefit of the doubt we might give to a Rav Hirsch even in the face of the staunchest opposition?

Rabbi Slifkin "defends" his opponents by suggesting that they adhere to a different understanding of mesorah than the one he subscribes to and within that framework their opposition in understandable. Putting aside for a moment whether the fact that so many Torah giants subscribe to a different viewpoint itself should give one pause (see part 1), it does not seem to dawn on Rabbi Slifkin that disagreement with his views may not stem from an alternate framework of mesorah, but simply because the understanding of sources he is so confident even gedolim are ignorant of is either 1) wrong; 2) only partially correct; 3) perhaps defensible as an "..v'od yesh lomar" but not the best approach; 4) not for public consumption for other reasons. (See R' Daniel Eidensohn's blog who made these same points here.)

Would a person in their wildest dreams think of saying they "choose" to pasken like a Magen Avraham against a Ta"z even though the greatest poseki hador say otherwise? Does that fact that in previous doros other poskim might have paskened like that Magen Avraham make any shred of difference? I think not. So why in areas of emunos v'deyos do the same rules not apply? Unless there are gedolei yisrael on whose shoulders you sit, "Torah archeology" of past views and your personal interpretation of whether or not they agree with your views carries little weight.

Rabbi Slifkin argues that just as one can be part of the chareidi community without necessarily following the gedolim's advice as to who to vote for in the Israeli elections, so too, perhaps one can be chareidi and still agree with his views as opposed to those of gedolim. Does Rabbi Slifkin see no difference between what gedolim advise in a non-halachic context and what they teach with respect to fundemental emunos v'deyos?

For the final time let me reiterate: R' Slifkin's books are of little interest to me. I am far more interested in R' Elchanan's chakira of whether psik reisha assumes an implicit kavanah or needs no kavanah than whether chickens can really live without heads; I am far more interested in the geder of kinyanim than whether elephants can jump. What I find far more troubling than a few books is the attiutude toward gedolei torah this controversy has engendered. R' Slifkin claims "thousands" in the chareidi community agree with his approach but "virtually nobody dares say so." I am reminded of Hillary Clinton's famous remark about a "vast right wing conspiracy" -- is this really how we should think of gedolei yisrael? Is the public lack of support just a product of societal pressure and politics reaching even the hallowed halls of the Beis Medrash, or could it be, just maybe, that when push comes to shove, gedolei yisrael from the right and left (as I noted before, I have not read a single haskama from the YU Roshei Yeshiva either) plain and simple do not think these ideas should be taught or supported publicly?

a strange defense - part I

It was by chance that I noticed on Parshablog that R' Slifkin quoted me in an essay in "defense" of his opponents. I don't think I have mentioned R' Slifkin directly on this blog and my original post, which he attibutes to an explanation of the banning of his books, was nothing of the sort. My post was written in reaction to what I view as a corruption of the entire meaning of mesorah that has resulted in part as an outcome of R' Slifkin's approach, but also in part due to other forces at work in contemporary Orthodoxy.

In for a penny in for a pound, so let me just respond to a the three errors that R' Slifkin claims that I make (as an aside, my original post is here):

1) R' Slifkin charges that I interpret the mesorah to be monolithic-- THE mesorah, meaning the views accepted as mainstream by the chareidi world, and therefore am dismissive of interpretations that may be legitimate. If anyone looks back at my original post (and esp. if one is a regular reader of this blog) I think it is more than clear that this strawman has nothing to do with me. I can only wonder how a paragraph in which I cite R' Soloveitchik can be read as advocating respect only for chareidi viewpoints (do other chareidi blogs have siderbar links to R' Aviner)?!

The point that R' Slifkin missed is that whether chareidi, dati-leumi, or Centrist, the mesorah has boundaries and those boundaries are defined by gedolei yisrael. Just because one denies that Judaism is a free-for-all where you can pick and choose from a grab back of historical shitos and hashkafos (my original point) does not mean one advocates a monolithic view of hashkafa. But it does mean aseh lecha rav -- there must be some tradition taught and lived by gedolei yisrael to which one subscribes. If not for R' Soloveitchik's approval of secular education, if not for R' Kook's defense of Zionism, the dati-leumi and Torah u'Madda camps would be intellectually diminished as valid Torah hashkafos. It is not enough, for example, to say that we look to the Rambam as an exemplar of a synthesis of Torah and secular wisdom and therefore reject the advice of contemporary gedolim to steer clear of secular literature -- "Torah archeology" of past viewpoints without guidance on what theoretical conclusions may be drawn or practically implemented is a dangerous game to play with great and grave intellectual pitfalls (more on this important point to come).

Rabbi Slifkin claims that "the rationalist view" finds contemporary support in the "Torah u'Madda" community. Here is a simple way to end this controversy: Rabbi Slifkin, just publish your works with a haskama from the leading Roshei Yeshiva of the mesorah you affiliate with, i.e. Rav Hershel Shachter, R' Mordechai Willig, etc. Ikkar chaseir min hasefer quite literally! I know of no such haskamos that have been printed. Why rely on questionable speculation of what R' Soloveitchik might have held when his greatest talmidim are a phone call away? -- and who so far as I know have written nothing in your support.

To reiterate, it's not just the books that are at issue here, but an entire hashkafa of Judaism. The controversy about books in many cases masks a far deeper controversy. Many fierce advocates of Rabbi Slifkin's books that I read in the blogosphere also espouse views such as orthopraxy, such as the belief that historical-scientific evidence trumps tradition, etc. (views that R' Slifkin himself may not espouse). R' Dr. Moshe Bernstein of YU recently reacted in the YU newspaper to the invitation by students to a speaker whose views undermine the belief in Torah m'Sinai. He wrote that fundemental traditions cannot be questioned even when all the evidence calls our beliefs into doubt; we must simply remain b'tzarich iyun. To those who belief scientific fact trumps belief, there are no tzarich iyuns and no need for haskamos for what the laboratory has proven. Based not only on the chareidi teachings of R' Kanievsky and R' Shternbruch, but also based as well on the view of Professor Bernstein (whose Intro to Bible class I enjoyed immensely) and others like him, I respectfully disagree.

how to clean for Pesach: a study in contrasts

Hat tip to Mother in Israel for her analysis of Mishpacha Magazine's guide to cleaning for Pesach in just one week (assuming the garage and attic are already done, mind you). All I can say is you never know when you will find a slice of bread stuck to a window, so do use the Windex. Compare that with R' Aviner's tips on how to clean for Pesach in one day. There is one point in particular I would highlight:

Question: Does a husband have to help his wife?
Answer: A husband does not have to help his wife nor does a wife have to help her husband. Rather, the two of them have to clean together since this is a shared home, and it is a shared life as well.

No time to write more -- I'm busy cleaning : )

burning chameitz

There are two manners to dispose of issurei hana'ah: through burning and through burial. The difference between these methods is that ashes of items which must be burned become permitted after the burning process is complete, but items requiring burial remain prohibited forever. The reason for the distinction is explained by Tosfos (Temurah 33b): once the Torah command to burn an item has been fulfilled, the mitzvah of disposal is finished and there is nothing more the Torah requires. Items that do not require burning have no proscribed method of disposal and therefore the task of eliminating them is never absolutely completed, hence these items never become permitted.

The Rambam paskens (Psulei haMukdashin ch 19 based on Temurah 34):

כל הנשרפין, לא ייקברו. וכן כל הנקברין, לא יישרפו: שאף על פי שהוא מחמיר בשריפתן, הרי הקל באפרן--שאפר הנקברין אסור.

While burning an item that requires only burial may seem like a great idea in that the disposal is more thorough, in actuality this may lead to mistakingly thinking the ashes are permitted. Therefore, only items which must be destroyed by burning should be burned and all other items should be disposed of in the appropriate way.

The Achronim point out that there is one Rambam that seems to contradict this rule of thumb. Writing in Hil. Chameitz u'Matazah (ch 3) the Rambam paskens:

כיצד ביעור חמץ: שורפו, או פורר וזורה לרוח, או זורקו לים; ואם היה החמץ קשה, ואין הים מחתכו במהרה--הרי זה מפררו, ואחר כך זורקו לים.

The Rambam clearly rules like the Chachamim, who allow chameitz to be disposed of by any means, and not like R' Yehudah, who required burning it. Yet, the Rambam still allows for chameitz to be burned. Why in this case is the Rambam unconcerned for the improper (and prohibited) use of the ashes of chameitz which have been burned? Why does chameitz not follow the general rule that items which do not require burning should not be burned?

Kallah Magazine

The latest edition of Kallah Magazine, edited by my wife, is out in various locations (5T, Teaneck, Queens, areas in Brooklyn). Help yourself to a copy (it will be online in PDF soon).

VaYakhel: leadership of the Nesi'im

Rashi (35:27) explains that the word Nesi'im is written missing a letter yud because the Nesi'im waited until all the gifts for the Mishkan had been given before donating their share, and, as the pesukim tell us, Bnei Yisrael did such a good job that there was nothing left to give except for the precious avnei shoham. When it came time to dedicate the Mishkan the Nesi'im learned their lesson and were the first to give before all others. Clearly the Nesi'im were not stupid people and their rationale in not donating first must have had some logic behind it. What was the hava amina here, why was it wrong, and what are we to learn from it? I grasped this Rashi thanks to my experiences at a new workplace. There are two types of mentoring and leadership that go on when you try to teach someone a new task. One type of mentoring involves letting the novice try his/her hand at things and then running around and filling in the gaps that are left. There is another type of mentoring that goes on when you step foward and model a new task start to finish for the novice and then step away and push him/her to do it. The difference between these two methods: the first approach is reactive, in that the mentor must respond and correct the failings of the novice as they occur; the second approach is proactive, in that the mentor first demonstrates and models what should be done and then works with the novice to meet those expectations. The Nesi'im initially had in mind the first model of mentoring and leadership, and with good reason -- they had little reason to expect that everyone could rise to the challenge of building a

Mishkan, and therefore figured that they would sit back and fill in the gaps. The ideal, however, is the second model. Instead of waiting for others to reach their limits and then start pushing and working to close gaps, a leader should be proactive and step up to encourage others to transcend their limits by demonstrating and embodying the ideal being promoted.

haseiba: independent mitzvah or not

The Rambam writes in ch. 7 of hil. chameitz u'matzah:

בכל דור ודור, חייב אדם להראות את עצמו כאילו הוא בעצמו יצא עתה משיעבוד מצריים, שנאמר "ואותנו, הוציא משם . . ." (דברים ו,כג). ועל דבר זה ציווה בתורה, "וזכרת, כי עבד היית" (דברים ה,יד; דברים טו,טו; דברים טז,יב; דברים כד,יח; דברים כד,כב), כלומר כאילו אתה בעצמך היית עבד, ויצאת לחירות ונפדית לפיכך כשסועד אדם בלילה הזה, צריך לאכול ולשתות והוא מסב דרך חירות. .

The Rambam places haseiba in the context of the requirement to demonstrate cheirus, freedom, implying that it is an independent obligation, not simply a detail in the fulfillment of the mitzvah of 4 kosos or matzah. The Rambam continues later:

ואימתיי צריכין הסיבה--בשעת אכילת כזית מצה, ובשתיית ארבעה כוסות האלו. ושאר אכילתו ושתייתו--אם הסב, הרי זה משובח; ואם לאו, אינו צריך.

The fact that there exists an obligation (at least ideally) to do haseiba outside the mitzvah of matzah or kosos would seem to underscore this point.

The Brisker Rav writes that the nafkah minah as to whether haseiba is an independent mitzvah or not is whether one would be obligated to re-drink if one forgot to recline (see Tosfos Pesachim 108). According to the Rambam, if one drinks without haseiba one has fulfilled the mitzvah of drinking a kos, but failed to fulfill the independent mitzvah of haseiba. One can only fulfill haseiba using a cheftza shel mitzvah -- since the mitzvah of drinking a kos was already fulfilled the first time around, the extra cup counts for nothing, therefore, there is no point to drinking again.

The Rosh disagrees and writes that if one drinks without haseiba one must re-drink. Haseiba according to the Rosh is not an independent mitzvah, but is part and parcel of the mitzvah of drinking a kos -- if one drinks without haseiba, one has failed to properly fulfill the mitzvah of that kos and must redo it.

women's donation to the Mishkan

Too much work, too little time to write... The Torah tells us that the women also donated to the Mishkan, expertly weaving while the wool was still attached to the sheep (35:26). Yet, we know the halacha that a women's handiwork actually belongs to her husband. Isn't it husbands and not wives who deserve the credit from the pasuk? I saw an answer quoted in the name of R' Chaim Volozhiner's mother (and yes, it is because of who said it that I am writing this). The reason a husband is entitled to keep his wife's handiwork is because he provides her with mezonos, food and support. Since in the desert the women did not need their husband's support, as the man fell equally for women as well as men, this takanah of ma'aseh yadayim belonging to the husband did not apply!

(Yes, according to pshat there was not yet in the midbar a din of kesubah much less a takanah of ma'aseh yadayim, but if that's your approach then please try to explain to me the Rashi about Yosef showing Ya'akov his wife's kesubah without diving into an abyss of allegorical mush. We discussed this before v'ain kan makom l'ha'arich.)

Update: "Rebbetzin Volozhiner" may get creativity points for her answer, but my wife prefers pshat to derash and when I mentioned this question on Shabbos she immediatly pointed out that who says the women who donated were married -- maybe they were the single girls and the whole kashe doesn't get off the ground.

haseiba and the mitzvah of 4 kosos

We ended the week with a kashe of the Mishne laMelech comparing krias hamegillah and the mitzvah of haseibah. To briefly summarize: Why in a case of safeik mukfaf / safeik not mukaf do we read the megillah only on the 14th and rely on sfeika derabbanan l'kula as an exemption for the 15th, but with respect to safeik of which set of kosos require haseiba we do not say that haseiba on the first set of kosos exempts haseiba on the last set based on sfeika derabbanan l'kula.

The Emek Bracha offers the following answer: with respect to the mitzvah of krias hemegillah, since one must read on at least one of the two days, either the 14th or the 15th, the 14th takes precedence based on rov or zerizus. Once there is at least a safeik that the mitzvah of krias hamegillah has been fulfilled, no further obligation exists (since sfeika derabbanan l'kula). The same cannot be said with respect to haseiba. Haseiba is not an independent mitzvah with a safeik whether it should be fulfilled using the first 2 or last 2 kosos -- rather, haseiba is a condition in the mitzvah of the kosos. Since each kos might be a kos that requires the condition of haseiba as part of its fulfillment, the fact that the first kosos were drunk with haseiba has no effect on the obligation to meet the same condition for the last kosos.

The issue the Emek Bracha's answer raises, namely, whether haseiba in an independent mitzvah or a detail in the mitzvah of drinking 4 kosos, may be at the crux of another debate among Rishonim, as we shall bl"n see.

delivering punishment with pure motives

Why did Moshe declare "Mi laHashem eilei" (22:26) before charging the Bnei Levi with the task of killing their bretheren (ish b'achiv) who worshipped the eigel? This could not be a clarion call for all those who were not idolators to gather because the vast majority of the Jewish people took no part in the eigel worship!

The Netziv answers that the task of putting down the uprising of eigel worshippers was dangerous -- who says that these people who submit easily to the sword and not fight back? We know the rule of thumb (Pesachim 7) is that one is not obligated to do in a mitzvah where there is a high risk of danger. Therefore, there was no explicit command from Hashem to kill the crowd of idolators and no obligation to do so. However, writes the Netziv, such calculations of risk / benefit apply only to regular people intent on performing the mitzvah to accrue reward. If a person is overcome with a love of G-d and performs a mitzvah motivated only by that love, no amount of danger will stand in the way -- such shluchei mitzvah ainan nizokin no matter what the degree of danger present. It was these people who Moshe called out to gather to him to perform the task of killing.

The Netziv also notes that the killing was done "ish b'achiv", to bretheren, to people who the Levi'im recognized and were related to. There is always a danger when imposing a punishment that a little bit of personal animosity may creep in, maybe a little bit of joy at another's downfall. Not only did Moshe seek out only those motivated by love of G-d, but he told the Levi'im to stike only at those who they otherwise felt brotherly love for so that the punishment was delivered only with the purest intentions.

safeik mukah chomah / safeik which kosos require haseiba

Time to start transitioning from Purim to Pesach, and what better way to do that than with a question of the Mishne laMelech. The Ran in Megillah says that a city which is safeik mukaf chomah / safeik not mukaf chomah and therefore in doubt whether to read megillah on the 14th or the 15th should read on the 14th with a bracha. Ran writes that you can't say safeik derabbanan l'kula on each individual day (and parenthetically, you see from this Ran that the chiyuv kri'ah which is m'divrei kabbalah is treated like any other safeik derabbanan) because then you would not end up reading on either day and then entire mitzvah would be uprooted. Therefore, since the first opportunity to read is the 14th, Ran says to read on that day, say a bracha because this is the day that most of the world reads on (rov), and then once the 15th comes you can assume that you already fulfilled the mitzvah the day before and apply safeik derabbanan l'kula.

There is another Ran that we discussed about a year ago (see here, here, here) that the M.l"M. suggests contradicts this Ran. The gemara in Pesachim tells us that only two of the four kosos we drink on Pesach night require haseiba but leaves unresolved as to whether it is the first two or the last two kosos. Therefore, concludes the gemara, we must do haseiba for all four kosos. The Ran asks: why not apply the rule of safeik derabban l'kula to this issue and not require haseiba at all? Ran answers that we cannot apply the rule of sfeika derabbanan where it would eliminate the mitzvah of haseiba entirely. Shouldn't there be more to the Ran than this? Based on the Ran's own reasoning in Megillah, shouldn't the logical conclusion to the gemara's question be to do haseiba on the first two cups, as that is the first opportunity to do the mitzvah of haseiba, and then rely on safeik derabbanan l'kula for the last two cups? Why does the Ran employ this line of reasoning with respect to megillah but not with respect to the mitzvah of 4 kosos?

"lo yarei Elokim": Brisker Rav on Amalek's corrupt ideology

Amalek is described as "lo yarei Elokim" (yes, I know some meforshim explain this to apply to Bnei Yisrael). The Brisker Rav asks why this designation is applied only to Amalek -- were the other nations any less lacking in yiras Shamayim?

The Brisker Rav answers by quoting Chazal's explanation (Bava kamma 79, daf yomi learners take note) as to why a ganav pays keifel but not a gazlan. A ganav tries to avoid being caught; he steals at night, or hides in the shadows because he is afraid of the police. A gazlan will rob you in broad daylight without inhibition. Therefore, explains the gemara, the ganav is worse than a gazlan -- the ganav shows that his fear of man is superior to his fear of G-d, while the gazlan does not.

Couldn't one argue, says the Brisker Rav, that the ganav deserves to be treated less stringently, because at least he shows some fear, as opposed to the gazlan who lacks any inhibition?

The answer is, says the Brisker Rav, that the gazlan makes no cheshbonos at all and therefore follows whatever his desires dictate. He does not intentionally disregard G-d; G-d is simply not on his radar screen. The ganav, however, does make cheshbonos -- he is afraid of being caught and restrains himself accordingly. Once you start making cheshbonos, then the question begs itself as to why that restraint is shown only in the presence of man and not in the presence of G-d.

The nations of Canaan are like the gazlan who makes no cheshbonos. They would have attacked any nation that appeared threatening to them -- the Jewish people just happened to be the ones who were in their line of fire. Amalek, on the other hand, had a deliberate cheshbon -- "atah ayeif v'yageiah", they deliberately plotted their attack for when the Jewish people were least prepared to fight and saw battle as an effort to undermine the singularity of the Jews as G-d's chosen nation. The lack of yiras shamayis the pasuk refers to is not hefkeirus lack of ideology, but rather refers to a deliberate anti-religious ideology that ignores and undermines spiritual values.

hard wired to believe

Interesting article in the New Scientist suggesting that our brains are innately hard wired to believe in G-d. Key quote:

Even so, religion is an inescapable artefact of the wiring in our brain, says Bloom. "All humans possess the brain circuitry and that never goes away." Petrovich adds that even adults who describe themselves as atheists and agnostics are prone to supernatural thinking. Bering has seen this too. When one of his students carried out interviews with atheists, it became clear that they often tacitly attribute purpose to significant or traumatic moments in their lives, as if some agency were intervening to make it happen. "They don't completely exorcise the ghost of god - they just muzzle it," Bering says.

Of course, the New Scientist has all sorts of theories to explain why the brain should behave in this way, and Richard Dawkins, who has suggested that religion is a product of cultural indoctrination, has his own way to spin these facts. It never seems to occur to the scientists that these explanations are like trying to explain why the mind construes it to be warm and sunny on a summer day -- maybe the mind accurately senses something about reality?

shushan Purim: finishing the job

Why are we all celebrating today just because in Shushan and in Shushan alone they had an extra day to take care of our enemies? I think the answer has to do with a failure that has dogged our people since time immemorial -- the failure to finish the job. Whether it was Shaul's failure to finish off Amalek or Tzahal's most recent venture into Gaza, we always seem to pull back before the job is done, overcome by either our own innate sense of (misplaced) rachmanus or because of outside pressure and constraints. The Jews of Shushan did not leave things half-done by using only the one day everyone else had to fight our enemies; they made sure to take an extra day to finish the job. Perhaps this is why not just Shushan, but walled cities from the time of Yehoshua are included in this celebration. Had Yehoshua finished the job of conquering Eretz Yisrael, who knows how the rest of Jewish history might have turned out. We are in a sense still struggling to finish that original mandate of kibush and yishuv Eretz Yisrael. Let's hope we one day soon figure out how to finally complete that task.

Toras Purim: Nothing Certain other than Taxes: Vayasem Achashveirosh Mas

“Vayasem haMelech Achashveirosh mas al ha’aretz…” (10:1)

The conclusion of the Megillah focuses on the establishment of the holiday of Purim and the rise of Mordechai to a position of power. Why would the Megillah insert into this climactic conclusion the seemingly irrelevant details of Achashveirosh’s fiscal policy of burdening his people with taxes?

The Alshich answers by pointing to the earlier episode at the beginning of the Megillah where we learned of the lavish parties Achashveirosh hosted in an attempt to pacify the inhabitants of Shushan and other lands and solidify his weak rule – clearly, the throne of Achashveirosh rested on a weak foundation. Yet, by the end of the story Achashveirosh’s political power solidified enough for him to impose taxes over his vast kingdom. The rise of Achashveirosh’s power and fortune must be understood, says the Alshich, in the context of Achashveirosh’s efforts, whether willingly and wittingly or not, to rescue the Jewish people. It was this merit of aiding in the salvation of the Jewish people that secured Achashveirosh’s reign.

Yet the question remains: why is it specifically the institution of “mas”, taxes, which the Megillah draws our attention to? What is the significance of “mas” as a symbol of Hashem’s bestowing might and power on Achashveirosh?

Commenting on the pasuk, “Vaya’al haMelech Shlomo mas m’kol Yisrael” (Melachim I:5:27), the Koznitzer Maggid explains:

The term “mas” alludes to that which is said in Ya’akov’s blessing to Yisachar, “Vayehi l’mas oveid,” meaning Yisachar bore the burden and yoke of malchus shamayim. The opposite of mas is s”am, the sitra achara, which blinds (sam=suma) a person’s eyes from his Creator and leads him to do as he pleases. This is the meaning of “Vaya’al Shlomo mas” – Shlomo transformed s”am to mas, meaning the people accepted the yoke of malchus shamayim.

Clearly mas is a very powerful concept, as v’nahapoch hu – s”am is changed to mas by Shlomo haMelech and a Beis haMikdash is built!

Perhaps a deeper insight into the power of mas can be derived from its component letters. Chazal tell us (Megillah 2b) that the two letters that spell mas, the mem and the samech, were miraculously suspended in the luchos, i.e. the middle of these letters have no connection to the surrounding stone and needed to miraculously hover in mid-air. What lesson are Chazal teaching through the miracle of these suspended letters of mas? The letters of Torah connect to stone; Torah connects to our mundane physical life and governs all that we do. Yet, there are different degrees of connection. A person may be very much immersed in this-worldly activity and have only a smattering of connection to Torah; a person can be so removed from the mundane that he seems to nearly exist outside the boundaries of physical existence. The mem and samech were those letters that represent the least connection to the physical – they do not even contact the stone, and only by sheer miracle remain suspended in the physical luchos without dropping out and leaving an empty space. The mem and samech of mas represent the complete immersion in kabbalas malcus shamayim that the Koznitzer speaks of to the point of barely clinging to any physical existence in this world.

We see this idea reflected in the gematriya value of these two letters. A drop of milk which falls into a pot of meat is considered non-existent if it is less than 1/60th of the volume of the pot. A fetus is considered non-existent until 40 days have passed from conception. Mem and samech are the boundary between physical existence and non-existence, part of the physical luchos and physical world, yet just barely so.

With this background we can better appreciate the Noam Elimelech’s (Parshas Terumah) reading of the following Mishna: a person with an ayin yafeh will separate 1/40 of his crop for terumah while a person with ayin ra’ah will separate only 1/60. What is the meaning here of ayin yafeh and ayin ra’ah? -- if a person truly had an ayin ra’ah he would not give terumah at all! R’ Elimelech explains that Chazal are hinting at the two types of tzadikim who protect the Jewish people: tzadikim with ayin yafeh, who protect the Jewish people by looking only at their goodness and thereby drawing down chessed from shamayim; tzadikim with ayin ra’ah, tzadikim who have the power to nullify evil that comes into the world. Perhaps we might rename these two tzadikim as mem tzadikim and samech tzadikim based on the denominator of these two percentages 1/40 = mem, 1/60 = samech. The mem tzadikim of ayin yafeh are the tzadikim given charge of the birth of chessed; the number 40 corresponds to the 40 days needed for a child’s neshoma to come into the world, the 40 days for Torah to come into the world. The samech tzadikim are the tzadikim who eliminate evil, as 60 corresponds to the shiur bitul necessary to nullify.

Perhaps the influence of mem and samech can even be detected even in Parshas Titzaveh, which on most years is read immediately before Purim. This is the only parsha in chumash (after his birth) in which Moshe Rabeinu’s name is absent. Yet, writes the Vilna Gaon, if we look carefully, there is a hint to Moshe’s name even in this parsha. The number of pesukim in the parsha is 101. If you take the gematriya of only the hidden parts of the letters spelling Moshe’s name:

Mem = mem – mem : 40
Shim = shin – yud – nun: 60
Hey = hey – aleph : 1

The total comes to 101. The message of the GR”A is that Moshe may be absent if we look only at the surface, but b’pnimiyus his presence remains.

Purim allows for stretching a point and in that spirit it is worth noting that the GRA’s gematriya of the letters of Moshe’s name adds up to a mem (40) followed by a samech (60) and ending with a one. We might dismiss this extra one as a mispar kollel, but my wife Ariella suggested that perhaps 101 is deliberate. Chazal tell us the difference between an “oveid Elokim” and “asher lo avado” is the difference between learning something 100 times vs. learning it 101 times. 100, or mas, is drawing the yoke of malchus shamayim into this world; 101 is the role of Moshe, transcending the physical entirely.

Parenthetically, the GR”A’s gematriya methodology of looking at the hidden letters reveals another interesting aspect of mem and samech:

Mem = mem (40) + mem (40)
Samech = samech (60) + mem (40) + chaf (20)

The gematriya of the first part of the letter’s spelling matches the gematriya of the second part of the letter’s spelling: 40 / 40 and 60/40+20. Mem and samech are the only two letters that balance in this way (or so my cursory review suggests, but I may be wrong). If the inner spelling represents pnimiyus and the outer letters chitzoniyus, perhaps mem and samech are the two letters that most represent the ideal of tocho k’baro.

Perhaps I am seeing mem and samech in too many places, but a final gemara which came to mind when thinking about these letters of mas is the question of the gemara (Brachos 4) as to why there in no letter nun in the alphabetical acrostic of Ashrei. The gemara answers that nun is left out to avoid mentioning the idea of nefila. Is it just a coincidence that when nun is left out the two letters that become juxtaposed are mem and samech? Or perhaps it is the juxtaposition of mem and samech, the mas of kabbalas malchus shamayim which is what eliminates the nun of nefila?

What does all this have to do with the mas of Achashveirosh? Between the lines of the Megillah is the story of galus coming to an end and the attempt to rebuild the Beis haMikdash. Achashveirosh’s parties celebrated what he thought was the end of the 70 year exile period of the Jewish people without redemption occurring. He promises Queen Esther up to half the kingdom, which Chazal (Megillah 15) explain to mean up to that which will divide the kingdom in half, meaning rebuilding the Mikdash. Yet, it is precisely his descendent Koresh who eventually gives full permission for the rebuilding to start.

“VaYa’al hamelech Shlomo mas” was the necessary precursor to building the Mikdash; “Aicha yashva badad… hayisa l’mas” was the undoing of those efforts; “Vayasem Achashveiros mas” was perhaps the start of a new rebuilding.

As the Alshich teaches, the prosperity of the kingdom of Achashveirosh was only due to his efforts to help the Jewish people; his mas of tax was possible only because there had already been paid a mas of renewed kabbalas malchus shamayim during his reign.

Purim is the time of v’nahapoch hu, where we are each empowered to turn s”am to mas and in that way start a new rebuilding of Mikdash in our time.

Tetzaveh: R' Chaim's question on the menorah that kept burning

Speaking of Brisker torah... The Midrash Tanchma on this week's parsha cites R' Chanina Sgan haKohanim's testimony that a miracle occurred in the Mikdash and the menorah burned from one Rosh haShana to the next without needing to be relit. In R' Shternbruch's sefer "Ta'am v'Da'as" he quotoes that R' Chaim Brisker was puzzled by this Midrash. If the menorah burned without interruption, how did the Kohanim fulfill the daily mitzvah of hadlakas hamenorah?

The Imrei Emes answered this question based on a din in hilchos Shabbos. Adding oil to a lamp so that it burns longer violates the melacha of mav'ir. Therefore, explained the Imrei Emes, all the kohanim needed to do on a daily basis is add some oil to the already burning menorah and that is considered lighting!

R' Shternbruch adds that this may answer the question of how hadlakah was done, but it does not resolve how the daily mitzvah of dishun hamenorah, cleaning the wicks was done. Me thinks that R' Shternbruch gives up too much ground to the Imrei Emes. Those learning Bava Kamma are probably wondering (based on 60a) whether what constitutes mav'ir in the meleches machsheves world of hilchos Shabbos can also be called mav'ir in other domains as well. Be that as it may, there is another point missing in R' Shternbruch's discussion. Recall that we learned Chanukah time that R' Chaim holds that there is in fact no chovas hagavra to light the menorah; the mitzvah is for the cheftza of the menorah to remain lit. The Rambam paskens that even a non-kohein can light the menorah provided it is then moved into its proper location -- as long as the menorah ends up burning in its proper place who lights and where they light is just a hechsher mitzvah. When R' Chaim uses the word hadlakah, I would venture to say he employs he precisely the way the Rambam uses it (Hil. Temidim ch 3.), especially given that R' Chaim himself (GR"CH al haRambam) focusses on these very words -- "hadlakas haneiros hi hatavasam"! Given that background, it seems obvious that it's not the absence of hadlakah=lighting which troubled R' Chaim, but it is the absence of hadlakah=cleaning the burnt wicks and preparing for a new lighting, the absense of a process of hatavah, which R' Chaim found so troubling. That was the original intent of the question, and that point is not addressed by the Imrei Emes' otherwise clever answer.

a critique of Brisker lomdus

My son had an interesting critique of Brisker lomdus as it relates to the idea of something being categorized as having a certain "shem". As explained by R' Moshe Lichtenstein in his essay "What Hath Brisk Wrought":

In one common construct, an inquiry into the issue in question attempts to determine whether the law in a given case is linked to laws in other halakhic areas or whether it reflects the operating of an independent concept, often considering the inquiry to be satisfactorily concluded by proclaiming that the legal phenomenon under discussion reflects a “hallot shem (legal status or category) of X.” The categorization is taken as self-explanatory, and the question of why there should be such a category is dismissed without further ado.

I think an example would illustrate the point better than a definition. The Rambam paskens (Hil Tshuvah 1:1) that viduy, confession, is an integral part of the tshuvah process without which the mitzvah is incomplete. Yet, the Rambam paskens (Ishus 5:5) that if a man is mekadesh a woman on the condition that he is not a rasha we assume the kiddushin is valid because perhaps in his heart the mekadesh did tshuvah (Kiddushin 49). How can tshuvah be done in the heart if verbal confession is an integral part of the process? R' Soloveitchik answered (Igros haGRI"D) that tshuvah sans viduy removes the person from having a "shem rasha". However, there is an additonal level to the mitzvah of tshuvah whereby tshuvah itself serves as a kapparah. This additional kiyum is incomplete sans viduy.

My son argued that the whole idea of a "shem" anything makes no sense. Either something is X or it is not -- it makes no sense for something not to be X but to have a "shem X".

I think his critique is valid as a substantive and not just a semantic point. I think he is correct in understanding that the whole reason Briskers use the terminology of "shem" is precisely to split hairs in the way he finds discomforting -- Briskers do think that something can not be X but be labelled with a "shem X" nonetheless.

Rather than a shortcoming, this ultimately proves to be the genius of Brisk -- through categorization items that appear unrelated can be shown to have a common underlying conceptual root and items that appear similar can be finely distinguished. Retuning to the example I used, the creation of a "shem rasha" shifts the discussion of the status of the sinner engaged in tshuvah from a moral question of whether he/she is good or evil (tzadik or rasha) to a legal question of whether the individual falls into the category of rasha. A person may indeed still be shy of moral absolution yet no longer fall into the legal class reserved for the rasha.

I thought the critique showed good insight for a H.S. freshman and took some thinking about to formulate a clear answer to (which I may not have succeeded in doing). Something to think about.

stealing from theives: v'gunav m'beis ha'ish

The gemara (Baba Kamma 69b) writes that one who steals from a thief is exempt from paying keifel because keifel is obligatory only where "v'gunav m'beis ha'ish", when property is taken from its owner, not where property is taken from a thief.

Does the gemara mean that one is not labelled a thief for taking stolen property (Robin Hood?), or does the gemara mean that one is a thief but there is simply no penalty of keifel?

The Rama (C.M. 34:7) paskens that one who divides stolen goods with a thief is not disqualified as a witnesses. The Tumim asks why this should be so -- why is witholding stolen goods any different than denying possession of a pikadon left in one's care? Witholding a pikadon is viewed as theft and disqualifies the person from being an eid; shouldn't the same be true of witholding stolen property?

The Ketzos answers that there is a basic distinction between these cases. The pikadon left to be watched is considered in its owner's possession until the watchman falsely claims it as his own. It is the moment of denial which transforms the pikadon into stolen goods. However, in the case of splitting booty with a thief, the goods are stolen property once the thief makes off with them; the splitting of the spoils adds nothing to the crime of theft which has already been perpetrated. "V'gunav m'beis ha'ish" is not just a dispensation from keifel, but teaches that there is no crime in taking stolen goods. Therfore, splitting the booty does not disqualify one as an eid. (See the Nesivos who disagrees).