You are probably better off reading a blog like Orthonomics rather than mine for discussions of the financial crisis in the Jewish community, but I want to rant about a recent event in my community which I thought illustrative of some of the larger problems. Two newspaper stories that appeared about a week apart: the first about a Rebbe from Boro Park who was hosted for a fundraising breakfast widely endorsed by askanim and Rabbanim on behalf of his yeshiva, the second about a local girls' high school which the board of directors overseeing it decided this week to shutdown ostensibly because of financial difficulties. Question: how can it be that in one of the wealthiest Jewish communities in the Unites States, a community that has the resources to fund yeshivos far afield of its geographical location, yeshivos which will not have kollelniks saying shiurim in that community, which will not have graduates moving back to that community, will not even have graduates who teach in that community's schools, how can this community allow a high school which services its own to collapse? How does this make sense?
But who am I to dictate how tzedaka should be spend -- who indeed can set such terms? The answer is the Torah can. Is there not a halacha of "aniyei ircha kodmin", that the poor of your city take precedence? Is there not a halacha that when hundreds of boxes are being packed on Thursday night for Tomchei Shabbos because people in the community literally need help putting food on their table and there is a shortage of funds and manpower to make that happen that fixing that need should be a priority vastly more important than insuring that a Rebbe from some other community can keep his yeshiva running? I guess you need to be a semi-anonymous blogger to get away with saying these things.
In my not-humble opinion the primary tzedaka directive of any community should be to make sure people have food and shelter. The second most important tzedaka is to make sure there is a place to daven, a mikvah, and schools. Only when those needs are met should members of the community be pouring funds into outside charities, which I have no doubt are worthy and important, but must take a back seat to the community's own needs.
And when I say needs I mean needs. A shul can get by without stained glass windows and a high school can exist without offering 10 AP courses and having a full gym program. A school cannot function without paying teachers and a shul cannot get by without paying its electric bill.
Just like the meaning of "needs" has been forgotten the meaning of the word "community" has been lost. It would perhaps require a miracle for the directors of a shul to say to a person giving a check for those beautiful stained glass windows, "Thank you, but that yeshiva really needs to make its payroll more than we need that window, so maybe you would like to give your check over there..." It is very hard to do that even if that school is just blocks away from the shul... after all, how many of our mispallelim really send to that school? And doesn't that school have its own supporters? And who is managing the money there? etc. etc. And let's face reality: your name looks really nice in stained glass, but no one really knows who helped the yeshiva make payroll.
Even if the community pooled its resources effectively, institutions need to become leaner and better run. The tuition at one local high school is posted at $24,000. Question: when the average wage in the United States is about $42,000, how does it make sense to expect a parent who may have 2 kids in high school to have $48,000 in excess income just to cover both tuitions? It's just not possible. A more affordable program may require sacrifices in terms of courses offered and extra-curricular programming, but it must be done or that school deserves to fail.
The first steps to remediating issues like these are obvious. How about audits by a community va'ad of rabbanim and professionals, much like annual reports issued by public companies? How about schools sharing resources to garner the savings of economies of scale? How about handling tzedaka through a pool which then is distributed to local institutions based on proven need rather than the whim of individuals? How about reconsidering whether a new shul or new kollel is really needed and can be sustained or whether it amounts to being poreish min hatzibur from existing institutions and robbing them of funding? There are many other good ideas out there which need to be explored.
I'm too cynical to hope discussions about these issues will do much good because the people with deep pockets who have political and financial power will determine their own course of action. We are communally headed off a cliff -- that's the real crisis.
Friday, July 10, 2009
Thursday, July 09, 2009
what makes a great Jewish leader: the transition from Moshe to Yehoshua
The Chasam Sofer (Shu"t O.C. 12) discusses whether a Rabbinic should be inherited by a son after his father's passing. He cites a Midrash from our parsha:
יפקד ה' מה ראה לבקש הדבר הזה אחר סדר נחלות? אלא, כיון שירשו בנות צלפחד אביהן, אמר משה: הרי השעה שאתבע בה צרכי, אם הבנות יורשות, בדין הוא שירשו בני את כבודי. אמר לו הקב"ה (משלי כז): נוצר תאנה יאכל פריה, בניך ישבו להם ולא עסקו בתורה, יהושע הרבה שרתך והרבה חלק לך כבוד, והוא היה משכים ומעריב בבית הועד שלך, הוא היה מסדר את הספסלים והוא פורס את המחצלאות, הואיל והוא שרתך בכל כחו, כדאי הוא שישמש את ישראל, שאינו מאבד שכרו. קח לך את יהושע בן נון, לקיים מה שנאמר: נוצר תאנה יאכל פריה:
Then Midrash explains the relationship between the adjacent parshiyos of Bnos Tzlafchad and the appointment of Yehoshua. When the parsha of inheritance was taught Moshe thought that it would apply to his position as well and his own children would inherit his role. Hashem responded that Moshe's role would pass to Yehoshua who toiled in learning and shimush for years to deserve it, but not his children. A Rabbinic position belongs to the most worthy candidate, not to the offspring of the previous occupant of the position (other Achronim take issue with the Chasam Sofer's conclusion).
The Chasam Sofer's interpretation sheds light on Moshe's hava amina. It was not nepotism that motivated Moshe; it was a halachic concern based on the laws of inheritance.
I would like to suggest another possible approach. Moshe Rabeinu must have known that Yehoshua was the only true possible successor to his position of Rabban of Klal Yisrael. However, Moshe also knew that after his death the people would need to wage a war of conquest. What they needed in a leader, he assumed, was not a Rosh Yehsiva, but rather a general -- a charismatic commander who appreciated the real art of war, not just milchamta shel Torah. Moshe perhaps felt that that role could be filled by his own children.
If I am right about the hava amina, what is the maskana? One can read the conclusion simply as revealing that Moshe's assumption about the changed role of leadership was wrong; a Rosh Yeshiva and not a general as the primary leader was still necessary. Yet, one can also read the conclusion as accepting Moshe's premise that the nature of leadership would change; a general, not a Rosh Yeshiva, would lead the people. However, the Midrash teaches that a general of the army of the Jewish people should be no less steeped in the values of Torah than a Rosh Yeshiva.
Reading the debates in responsa literature regarding whether a Rabbinic position is like the title of king and may be inherited strikes me as odd and naive given the way modern shuls are run. If anything, it is the shul president and board of directors who wear the crowns -- maybe things were different in the old days. Given the reality of our circumstance, I think the lesson of our Midrash is even more compelling. As Moshe anticipated, our organizational leadership is concerned with practical details: who is getting food for the kiddush? Do we have enough in the bank for the air conditioning bill and if not, how can we raise it? What kind of youth program can we run? etc. Even though these roles do not demand the genius of a talmid chacham to fill, I think there is a danger in turning them over to people who are not of the world of the beis medrash and do not necessarily share its values. Dollars certainly are needed to run any organization, but too often they become the raison d'etra instead of just a means to an end. The Midrash highlights not just Yehoshua's learning, but notes that he straightened the chairs and made sure the beis medrash was in order; he was concerned with the practical as well as the other-worldly. Organizational leadership demands the vision to meet the necessities of this world while never losing sight of more spiritual goals.
יפקד ה' מה ראה לבקש הדבר הזה אחר סדר נחלות? אלא, כיון שירשו בנות צלפחד אביהן, אמר משה: הרי השעה שאתבע בה צרכי, אם הבנות יורשות, בדין הוא שירשו בני את כבודי. אמר לו הקב"ה (משלי כז): נוצר תאנה יאכל פריה, בניך ישבו להם ולא עסקו בתורה, יהושע הרבה שרתך והרבה חלק לך כבוד, והוא היה משכים ומעריב בבית הועד שלך, הוא היה מסדר את הספסלים והוא פורס את המחצלאות, הואיל והוא שרתך בכל כחו, כדאי הוא שישמש את ישראל, שאינו מאבד שכרו. קח לך את יהושע בן נון, לקיים מה שנאמר: נוצר תאנה יאכל פריה:
Then Midrash explains the relationship between the adjacent parshiyos of Bnos Tzlafchad and the appointment of Yehoshua. When the parsha of inheritance was taught Moshe thought that it would apply to his position as well and his own children would inherit his role. Hashem responded that Moshe's role would pass to Yehoshua who toiled in learning and shimush for years to deserve it, but not his children. A Rabbinic position belongs to the most worthy candidate, not to the offspring of the previous occupant of the position (other Achronim take issue with the Chasam Sofer's conclusion).
The Chasam Sofer's interpretation sheds light on Moshe's hava amina. It was not nepotism that motivated Moshe; it was a halachic concern based on the laws of inheritance.
I would like to suggest another possible approach. Moshe Rabeinu must have known that Yehoshua was the only true possible successor to his position of Rabban of Klal Yisrael. However, Moshe also knew that after his death the people would need to wage a war of conquest. What they needed in a leader, he assumed, was not a Rosh Yehsiva, but rather a general -- a charismatic commander who appreciated the real art of war, not just milchamta shel Torah. Moshe perhaps felt that that role could be filled by his own children.
If I am right about the hava amina, what is the maskana? One can read the conclusion simply as revealing that Moshe's assumption about the changed role of leadership was wrong; a Rosh Yeshiva and not a general as the primary leader was still necessary. Yet, one can also read the conclusion as accepting Moshe's premise that the nature of leadership would change; a general, not a Rosh Yeshiva, would lead the people. However, the Midrash teaches that a general of the army of the Jewish people should be no less steeped in the values of Torah than a Rosh Yeshiva.
Reading the debates in responsa literature regarding whether a Rabbinic position is like the title of king and may be inherited strikes me as odd and naive given the way modern shuls are run. If anything, it is the shul president and board of directors who wear the crowns -- maybe things were different in the old days. Given the reality of our circumstance, I think the lesson of our Midrash is even more compelling. As Moshe anticipated, our organizational leadership is concerned with practical details: who is getting food for the kiddush? Do we have enough in the bank for the air conditioning bill and if not, how can we raise it? What kind of youth program can we run? etc. Even though these roles do not demand the genius of a talmid chacham to fill, I think there is a danger in turning them over to people who are not of the world of the beis medrash and do not necessarily share its values. Dollars certainly are needed to run any organization, but too often they become the raison d'etra instead of just a means to an end. The Midrash highlights not just Yehoshua's learning, but notes that he straightened the chairs and made sure the beis medrash was in order; he was concerned with the practical as well as the other-worldly. Organizational leadership demands the vision to meet the necessities of this world while never losing sight of more spiritual goals.
parshas nachalos
Following the request of the Bnos Tzlafchad to inherit their father, the Torah records the order to be followed in distributing a person's estate (27:8-11): sons come first, followed by daughters if there are no sons, followed by brothers, followed by a father. The Mishna in Yeish Nochlin (Baba Basra 118) elaborates on this order and includes other relatives not mentioned explicitly by the pasuk, e.g. a nephew who is the son of a sister can inherit in a case where a person passes away and has no sons, no brothers, but had a sister who passed away and left a son -- the dead sister has primacy over other remaining relatives and through the halachic process of mishmush her descendants inherit through her.
Tosfos asks why the Mishna and Torah need to explicitly tell us that brothers inherit. Once we know that a father inherits his son and sons inherit their father and we understand the process of mishmush, we can deduce that brothers inherit as well -- a brother inheriting amounts to a son collecting through mishmush the inheritance of his father received from his other brother.
R' Akiva Eiger (Shu"T Mh"K 138) reads Tosfos' answer as concluding that since the Torah and Mishna do spell out that a brother inherits a brother it implies there is a direct brother-to-brother relationship between them, not just mishmush of son to father and then father to his other son. Other Rishonim disagree and do see brother-to-brother and nothing more than mishmush in action.
A practical difference between these views may be a case where a person stipulates that if his children die before him some other party should inherit (see Kesubos 69b). No stipulation can override the right of children to inherit, and in turn their relatives and descendents can claim that right in their place. However, the Beis Yosef C.M. 243"33 writes that the children's uncle would not have a claim if the children are dead. An uncle does not directly inherit his nephew directly, but only has a claim through mishmush by virtue of being the brother of their father. Since the father stipulated that he wishes the money to be transferred to another party, mishmush would not work and the money would go to that party. The Rama in Darkei Moshe disagrees, implying that there is a direct relationship between a nephew and uncle and we do not invoke mishmush.
Tosfos asks why the Mishna and Torah need to explicitly tell us that brothers inherit. Once we know that a father inherits his son and sons inherit their father and we understand the process of mishmush, we can deduce that brothers inherit as well -- a brother inheriting amounts to a son collecting through mishmush the inheritance of his father received from his other brother.
R' Akiva Eiger (Shu"T Mh"K 138) reads Tosfos' answer as concluding that since the Torah and Mishna do spell out that a brother inherits a brother it implies there is a direct brother-to-brother relationship between them, not just mishmush of son to father and then father to his other son. Other Rishonim disagree and do see brother-to-brother and nothing more than mishmush in action.
A practical difference between these views may be a case where a person stipulates that if his children die before him some other party should inherit (see Kesubos 69b). No stipulation can override the right of children to inherit, and in turn their relatives and descendents can claim that right in their place. However, the Beis Yosef C.M. 243"33 writes that the children's uncle would not have a claim if the children are dead. An uncle does not directly inherit his nephew directly, but only has a claim through mishmush by virtue of being the brother of their father. Since the father stipulated that he wishes the money to be transferred to another party, mishmush would not work and the money would go to that party. The Rama in Darkei Moshe disagrees, implying that there is a direct relationship between a nephew and uncle and we do not invoke mishmush.
17 tamuz - bein hametzarim
A few simple thoughts for 17 Tamuz and the start of bein hametzarim:
1) Maharal writes (beg. of Netzach Yisrael) that galus is an unnatural state; it's like a rubber band stretched to its limits waiting to spring back to its normal shape. The Jewish people were meant to live in Eretz Yisrael according to Torah law -- not in Boro Park, not in the 5 Towns, not in Baltimore, Los Angeles, or Melbourne either. It's wonderful to live in a neighborhood with seven kosher pizza stores (I wish I were exaggerating) and other kosher amenities, but those niceties tend to make us forget that this is just our temporary home until we merit to make aliya to Eretz Yisrael.
2) The list of 5 things which occurred on 17 Tamuz listed in the Mishna in Ta'anis are not recorded for historical trivia. On a public ta'anis one should focus on identifying with the historical plight of the Jewish people and the tragedies suffered. Simply skipping a few meals without an awareness of why one is fasting is a lack in the kiyum mitzvah.
3) Zecharya haNavi tells us that in the future the fasts will be transformed into days of Yom Tov. The Shem m'Shmuel connects this idea to the Maharal's explanation of why chol hamoed is a partial Yom Tov: since the days of chol hamoed are sandwiched between days of kedusha, they take on the characteristics of kedusha. So too in the future, these days of mourning will be sandwiched historically between our election as Hashem's people and our complete redemption and at that point they will become holidays. The lesson here is that history read forward is incomplete. Sometimes it is only in retrospect that we appreciate events or change our interpretation of them. With the coming of mashiach will we have the perspective necessary to see how even these days of tragedy contain simcha, but until then we must patiently wait with bitachon.
1) Maharal writes (beg. of Netzach Yisrael) that galus is an unnatural state; it's like a rubber band stretched to its limits waiting to spring back to its normal shape. The Jewish people were meant to live in Eretz Yisrael according to Torah law -- not in Boro Park, not in the 5 Towns, not in Baltimore, Los Angeles, or Melbourne either. It's wonderful to live in a neighborhood with seven kosher pizza stores (I wish I were exaggerating) and other kosher amenities, but those niceties tend to make us forget that this is just our temporary home until we merit to make aliya to Eretz Yisrael.
2) The list of 5 things which occurred on 17 Tamuz listed in the Mishna in Ta'anis are not recorded for historical trivia. On a public ta'anis one should focus on identifying with the historical plight of the Jewish people and the tragedies suffered. Simply skipping a few meals without an awareness of why one is fasting is a lack in the kiyum mitzvah.
3) Zecharya haNavi tells us that in the future the fasts will be transformed into days of Yom Tov. The Shem m'Shmuel connects this idea to the Maharal's explanation of why chol hamoed is a partial Yom Tov: since the days of chol hamoed are sandwiched between days of kedusha, they take on the characteristics of kedusha. So too in the future, these days of mourning will be sandwiched historically between our election as Hashem's people and our complete redemption and at that point they will become holidays. The lesson here is that history read forward is incomplete. Sometimes it is only in retrospect that we appreciate events or change our interpretation of them. With the coming of mashiach will we have the perspective necessary to see how even these days of tragedy contain simcha, but until then we must patiently wait with bitachon.
Monday, July 06, 2009
what happened to Bilam's horse
The officers of Moav who accompanied Bilam were surprised that such an important person was riding a donkey and not a horse. Bilam at first made excuses and said his horse was out in the pasture, but his donkey spoke and blurted out that in fact Bilam always kept it around because he was was committed bestiality with it (Sanhedrin 105b).
What kind of silly excuse is it to say the horse is in the pasture -- so go get it!
I heard in the name of the Pnei Menachem of Ger a bekiyus fact that answers this question. Chazal (Sota 11) tell us that Iyov, Bilam, and Yisro were all advisers to Pharoah. After Moshe warned of the plague of barad, the Torah relates that the servants of Pharoah who feared Hashem took their animals in, while those who did not pay heed and ignored Moshe left their animals out to be killed. Targum Yonasan explains that "HaYarei es dvar Hashem" who took his animals in refers specifically to Iyov, while "Asher lo sam libo el dvar Hashem" who left his animals out refers specifically to Bilam.
That's what Bilam meant when he said he left his horse out in the pasture -- he left it out in makkas barad and it got killed, while the donkey which he kept inside with him was spared.
What kind of silly excuse is it to say the horse is in the pasture -- so go get it!
I heard in the name of the Pnei Menachem of Ger a bekiyus fact that answers this question. Chazal (Sota 11) tell us that Iyov, Bilam, and Yisro were all advisers to Pharoah. After Moshe warned of the plague of barad, the Torah relates that the servants of Pharoah who feared Hashem took their animals in, while those who did not pay heed and ignored Moshe left their animals out to be killed. Targum Yonasan explains that "HaYarei es dvar Hashem" who took his animals in refers specifically to Iyov, while "Asher lo sam libo el dvar Hashem" who left his animals out refers specifically to Bilam.
That's what Bilam meant when he said he left his horse out in the pasture -- he left it out in makkas barad and it got killed, while the donkey which he kept inside with him was spared.
Friday, July 03, 2009
zechor-na: the mitzvah to remember balak and bilam
The gemara (Brachos 12b) tells us that the Chachamim considered instituting a daily recitation of Parshas Balak along with kri'as shema. The gemara explains the significance of Parshas Balak based on the fact that it contains the pasuk "kara shachav k'ari" as well as an allusion to yetziyas Mitzrayim. However, the Pnei Yehoshua writes that there is more to it than that. The haftarah tells us "Zechor-na mah she'ya'atz Balak...u'meh ana bo Bilam...". From here we see that there is a mitzvah to remember the episode of Balak and Bilam. The Pnei Yehoshua writes that this remembrance must be done by verbally mentioning the parsha, hence the idea of instituting its reading along with shema.
Whether this chiddush of the Pnei Yehoshua is correct is debated by later achronim. Some note that though we do not read the entire Parshas Balak, we do hint to this episode by our recitation of the pasuk "Mah tovu..."
Why does the prophet Michah ask us to remember this parsha in particular? The explanation I once heard from R' Aharon Kahn is that unlike other episodes where the Jewish people knew that they faced grave danger and witnessed G-d's miraculous salvation, in this case the Jewish people would have not known at all that Bilam stood somewhere in the distance plotting their downfall until thwarted by Hashem. This parsha in particular teaches us that there is hashgacha operating behind the scenes saving us from dangers that we may not know about or anticipate.
Whether this chiddush of the Pnei Yehoshua is correct is debated by later achronim. Some note that though we do not read the entire Parshas Balak, we do hint to this episode by our recitation of the pasuk "Mah tovu..."
Why does the prophet Michah ask us to remember this parsha in particular? The explanation I once heard from R' Aharon Kahn is that unlike other episodes where the Jewish people knew that they faced grave danger and witnessed G-d's miraculous salvation, in this case the Jewish people would have not known at all that Bilam stood somewhere in the distance plotting their downfall until thwarted by Hashem. This parsha in particular teaches us that there is hashgacha operating behind the scenes saving us from dangers that we may not know about or anticipate.
Thursday, July 02, 2009
the difference between Yeshiva University and the chareidi world is...
I was tempted to just leave the body of this post blank to make the point.
A question was raised about whether I would stick to the views of "chareidi gedolim" if there was compelling evidence before my eyes that they were wrong. The problem with these type questions is that they can be asked without the word "chareidi" and the same answer would apply. In this case, let me cite the words of the great "chareidi" gadol Dr. Moshe Bernstein, a professor of Bible at that "chareidi" institution known as Yeshiva University -
"When we confront the problems raised by modern scholarship (and I do not deny that such problems ought to be confronted), we answer those that we can, and allow the rest to remain with tzarikh iyyun gadol, hoping that in the long run, with continued study, investigation and analysis, more and more answers, solutions and resolutions will be found."
There is no substantive difference between YU's approach and that of the "chareidi" world or yeshiva world. Both accept as a matter of course that no matter how compelling the evidence lined up against fundamental beliefs, our commitment to those beliefs remains intact and unwavering. Emunah trumps evidence. The only difference between the YU and chareidi world may be which beliefs are labelled fundamental and which allow for more "wiggle" room -- an important point, but nonetheless a detail against the broader background.
A similar hypothetical -- "If the "Divine truth" is in the pocket of the Charedi, why are they so afraid to teach their students Biblical criticism, the results of archaeological research, and to teach them whether their faith passes the test of reasonable critique?"
Once again, the word "chareidi" is a red herring. R' Aharon Soloveitchik spoke to a packed audience in Lamport auditorium (I was there) on the application of Torah u'Mada (the address is reprinted in "Logic of the Heart, Logic of the Mind") and categorically prohibited studying Biblical criticism. Is YU afraid that the faith of its secularly educated and intellectually sophisticated students will not stand the test of reasonable critique? Apparently intellectual freedom has its limits even in the ivory tower of Yeshiva University, as well it should, given the prohibition to study minus.
Why is there such a penchant to label ideas and opinions "chareidi" as a means to marginalize their significance? "Chareidi" has come to mean something like country-bumpkin, as opposed to we "serious" intellectuals who have the "advantage" of having been exposed to more of the "modern" secular world. The Chazon Ish, the Brisker Rav, R' Ahron Kotler -- are these role models, poskim, gedolim only for the "chareidi" community, or do their words deserve attention by all of klal yisrael, whether you agree with them or not, whether you pasken like them or have your own rav to heed? Of course, other communities who marginalize people like R' Soloveitchik, R' Kook, etc. deserve to be criticized for their small-minded attitude as well, but dwelling on other's wrongs is not an excuse for our own.
A question was raised about whether I would stick to the views of "chareidi gedolim" if there was compelling evidence before my eyes that they were wrong. The problem with these type questions is that they can be asked without the word "chareidi" and the same answer would apply. In this case, let me cite the words of the great "chareidi" gadol Dr. Moshe Bernstein, a professor of Bible at that "chareidi" institution known as Yeshiva University -
"When we confront the problems raised by modern scholarship (and I do not deny that such problems ought to be confronted), we answer those that we can, and allow the rest to remain with tzarikh iyyun gadol, hoping that in the long run, with continued study, investigation and analysis, more and more answers, solutions and resolutions will be found."
There is no substantive difference between YU's approach and that of the "chareidi" world or yeshiva world. Both accept as a matter of course that no matter how compelling the evidence lined up against fundamental beliefs, our commitment to those beliefs remains intact and unwavering. Emunah trumps evidence. The only difference between the YU and chareidi world may be which beliefs are labelled fundamental and which allow for more "wiggle" room -- an important point, but nonetheless a detail against the broader background.
A similar hypothetical -- "If the "Divine truth" is in the pocket of the Charedi, why are they so afraid to teach their students Biblical criticism, the results of archaeological research, and to teach them whether their faith passes the test of reasonable critique?"
Once again, the word "chareidi" is a red herring. R' Aharon Soloveitchik spoke to a packed audience in Lamport auditorium (I was there) on the application of Torah u'Mada (the address is reprinted in "Logic of the Heart, Logic of the Mind") and categorically prohibited studying Biblical criticism. Is YU afraid that the faith of its secularly educated and intellectually sophisticated students will not stand the test of reasonable critique? Apparently intellectual freedom has its limits even in the ivory tower of Yeshiva University, as well it should, given the prohibition to study minus.
Why is there such a penchant to label ideas and opinions "chareidi" as a means to marginalize their significance? "Chareidi" has come to mean something like country-bumpkin, as opposed to we "serious" intellectuals who have the "advantage" of having been exposed to more of the "modern" secular world. The Chazon Ish, the Brisker Rav, R' Ahron Kotler -- are these role models, poskim, gedolim only for the "chareidi" community, or do their words deserve attention by all of klal yisrael, whether you agree with them or not, whether you pasken like them or have your own rav to heed? Of course, other communities who marginalize people like R' Soloveitchik, R' Kook, etc. deserve to be criticized for their small-minded attitude as well, but dwelling on other's wrongs is not an excuse for our own.
rambam's view of ma'aseh braishis and ma'aseh merkava
In a comment to yesterday's post someone mentioned the view of a contemporary Rosh Yeshiva that the Rambam's understanding of ma'aseh Braishis and ma'aseh merkava is erroneous. It is a mistake to think that the approach of this Rosh Yeshiva is a new discovery or a chiddush of "chareidi gedolim" when in fact it has a long history. The Rishonim already took the Rambam to task for interpreting ma'aseh braishis as natural sciences. R' Tzadok haKohen in his discussion of the mitzvah of yichud Hashem in Sefer haZichronos summarizes:
והרמב"ם (פרק ג' וד' מהלכות יסודי התורה) שפירש ענין מעשה בראשית הוא חכמת טבעי הנבראים, מצא בו מבוא תועלת לעבודת השם יתברך לאהבתו ויראתו. ואמנם אם היה זה אמת אצלו אינו אמת לרוב המתעסקים בחכמות אלו, ולא היה ראוי לו לקבוע ידיעת ענינים כאלה בהלכות יסודי התורה שלו כלל, [שהם] דברים שאינם צריכים למאמיני התורה לידיעתם, וכל שכן שהרבה מדבריו אינם אמת כפי דעת חכמיהם היום: והכלל, מה לדברי חכמי אומות העולם עם דברי התורה שמן השמים לעשות דבריהם יסודות לתורה, וכל מה שאסף שם הם מדברי חכמי אומות העולם וראויה להם, שכל חכמתם בחכמה השייכת בעולם הזה וידיעת נבראי העולם הזה מצד טבעם, שהוא כידיעת כל מיני אומניות שאין בזה שייכות לתורה. אבל חכמת מעשה בראשית שזכרו רבותינו ז"ל, שהשיגוה מתוך ספור התורה במעשה בראשית, הוא ידיעת חכמתו יתברך בבריאה זו:
R' Tzadok explains that 1) The Rambam's view that ma'aseh braishis means science is rejected by most of those who study these areas of Torah thought; 2) Knowledge of the type the Rambam provides in Hil Yesodei haTorah regarding the universe has no relevance to those who believe in Torah and should not have been included in his Yad; 3) Much of the knowledge the Rambam records has been proven false by secular scholars. In short: the world of science and philosophy, like all secular disciplines, tells us only about the physical world but not about the theological and mystical secrets which only Torah contains.
R' Tzadok writes earlier in the same chapter regarding ma'aseh merkava:
וכבר מפורסם אצל כל ישראל דברי חז"ל וכל קדושים מחכמי האמת, עניני מעשה מרכבה מה הם. [ואין צורך להשיב כאן על דברי המתפלספים הקדמונים, בפירוש מעשה מרכבה (גם כן) שהוא בהשגת חקירות הפילוסופים בחכמת הטבע ושלאחר הטבע, שכבר תמהו עליהם חכמי הדורות דאם כן כבר נגלו לקטני אומות העולם המסתכלים בספרי חכמיהם, יותר ממה שנתגלה לגדולי הנביאים ברמזים וחידות: ואין צורך להאריך מזה לכשרי ישראל עתה שנתפרסמה חכמת האמת בעולם, מוסכם בפי כל חכמי ישראל האמיתים. וכל הכופר בה הוא מכלל האפיקורסים, וכמו שיתבאר במצות לא תסור, וכמו שכתב בתשובות הב"ח הישנות (סימן ה') דהמלעיג על דברי חכמים ומדבר דופי על חכמת הקבלה, שהיא מקור התורה ועיקרה וכולה יראת שמים, פשיטא דאין לך מזלזל בדברי חכמים גדול מזה שחייב נידוי, עיין שם]:
The Rambam was challenged by earlier authorities, but R' Tzadok adds that with the spread of the study of "chochmas ha'emes" (i.e. mysticism) a consensus has formed among chachmei Yisrael that the Rambam is certainly wrong. Just as in halacha there can arise a consensus of opinion as to what views of Rishonim and Achronim are accepted, so too in the area of hilchos deyos and machshava there can arise a similar consensus. One who denies the truth of mystical teachings is simply mocking the words of Chazal, denigrating fundamental truths of Torah.
והרמב"ם (פרק ג' וד' מהלכות יסודי התורה) שפירש ענין מעשה בראשית הוא חכמת טבעי הנבראים, מצא בו מבוא תועלת לעבודת השם יתברך לאהבתו ויראתו. ואמנם אם היה זה אמת אצלו אינו אמת לרוב המתעסקים בחכמות אלו, ולא היה ראוי לו לקבוע ידיעת ענינים כאלה בהלכות יסודי התורה שלו כלל, [שהם] דברים שאינם צריכים למאמיני התורה לידיעתם, וכל שכן שהרבה מדבריו אינם אמת כפי דעת חכמיהם היום: והכלל, מה לדברי חכמי אומות העולם עם דברי התורה שמן השמים לעשות דבריהם יסודות לתורה, וכל מה שאסף שם הם מדברי חכמי אומות העולם וראויה להם, שכל חכמתם בחכמה השייכת בעולם הזה וידיעת נבראי העולם הזה מצד טבעם, שהוא כידיעת כל מיני אומניות שאין בזה שייכות לתורה. אבל חכמת מעשה בראשית שזכרו רבותינו ז"ל, שהשיגוה מתוך ספור התורה במעשה בראשית, הוא ידיעת חכמתו יתברך בבריאה זו:
R' Tzadok explains that 1) The Rambam's view that ma'aseh braishis means science is rejected by most of those who study these areas of Torah thought; 2) Knowledge of the type the Rambam provides in Hil Yesodei haTorah regarding the universe has no relevance to those who believe in Torah and should not have been included in his Yad; 3) Much of the knowledge the Rambam records has been proven false by secular scholars. In short: the world of science and philosophy, like all secular disciplines, tells us only about the physical world but not about the theological and mystical secrets which only Torah contains.
R' Tzadok writes earlier in the same chapter regarding ma'aseh merkava:
וכבר מפורסם אצל כל ישראל דברי חז"ל וכל קדושים מחכמי האמת, עניני מעשה מרכבה מה הם. [ואין צורך להשיב כאן על דברי המתפלספים הקדמונים, בפירוש מעשה מרכבה (גם כן) שהוא בהשגת חקירות הפילוסופים בחכמת הטבע ושלאחר הטבע, שכבר תמהו עליהם חכמי הדורות דאם כן כבר נגלו לקטני אומות העולם המסתכלים בספרי חכמיהם, יותר ממה שנתגלה לגדולי הנביאים ברמזים וחידות: ואין צורך להאריך מזה לכשרי ישראל עתה שנתפרסמה חכמת האמת בעולם, מוסכם בפי כל חכמי ישראל האמיתים. וכל הכופר בה הוא מכלל האפיקורסים, וכמו שיתבאר במצות לא תסור, וכמו שכתב בתשובות הב"ח הישנות (סימן ה') דהמלעיג על דברי חכמים ומדבר דופי על חכמת הקבלה, שהיא מקור התורה ועיקרה וכולה יראת שמים, פשיטא דאין לך מזלזל בדברי חכמים גדול מזה שחייב נידוי, עיין שם]:
The Rambam was challenged by earlier authorities, but R' Tzadok adds that with the spread of the study of "chochmas ha'emes" (i.e. mysticism) a consensus has formed among chachmei Yisrael that the Rambam is certainly wrong. Just as in halacha there can arise a consensus of opinion as to what views of Rishonim and Achronim are accepted, so too in the area of hilchos deyos and machshava there can arise a similar consensus. One who denies the truth of mystical teachings is simply mocking the words of Chazal, denigrating fundamental truths of Torah.
Wednesday, July 01, 2009
Ramban on how Chazal knew so much about the world
Braishis Rabbah 20:4:
A certain philosopher wished to know how long the gestation period of a snake was. When he saw two snakes having intercourse he trapped them in a vat and would feed them, watching to see when they would give birth. When the Zekeinim came to Rome, [the Romans] asked Rabban Gamliel how long the gestation period was and he could not answer them. When Rabbi Yehoshua met Rabban Gamliel he saw that his face was sickly looking [because he was unable to answer]... "The answer is seven years," said Rabbi Yehoshua... " A dog is a chaya temeiya and gives birth after 50 days, a beheima temieya gives birth after 12 months, and the snake is described in the pasuk as "more cursed than all animals and chayos of the field." Just as the beheima's gestation period is 7 times longer than the chaya's, so too the snake's gestation is 7 times longer than the beheima's, hence seven years... When the philosopher heard this he began to bang his head against the wall. He said, "All I have labored to discover in seven years this Chacham was able to give me with the flick of a reed."
The message of the Midrash lies not in the particulars of the case, but in the contrast between the methodology of the "philosopher" or scientist and the methodology of Chazal. Ramban in his essay "Torah Hashem Temima" (p. 158-159 in the Chavel edition) writes that the meaning of the story of "ma'aseh braishis" is hidden and he does not understand it. However, Chachamim did understand the parsha. They were able to intuit from it the order of creation, the measure of the world and knowledge of astronomy and the universe, the calculation of the molad and tekufos, and all sorts of other knowledge which is hinted at in the count of letters, gematriyos, and their secrets. R' Yehoshua's knowledge of a snake's gestation did not require seven years of laborious scientific experimentation to discover but was obtained from Torah alone, based on his interpretation of the pasuk "arur atah...".
Clearly not even every Tanna possessed such knowledge -- Rabban Gamliel did not know the answer to the philosopher's question and admitted as such. And we know that Tanaim and Amoraim tell us that they went to doctors, consulted gentile experts about farming, etc. But that does not mean that such knowledge is not inherent in the Torah and accessible to those who can decode its secrets.
A certain philosopher wished to know how long the gestation period of a snake was. When he saw two snakes having intercourse he trapped them in a vat and would feed them, watching to see when they would give birth. When the Zekeinim came to Rome, [the Romans] asked Rabban Gamliel how long the gestation period was and he could not answer them. When Rabbi Yehoshua met Rabban Gamliel he saw that his face was sickly looking [because he was unable to answer]... "The answer is seven years," said Rabbi Yehoshua... " A dog is a chaya temeiya and gives birth after 50 days, a beheima temieya gives birth after 12 months, and the snake is described in the pasuk as "more cursed than all animals and chayos of the field." Just as the beheima's gestation period is 7 times longer than the chaya's, so too the snake's gestation is 7 times longer than the beheima's, hence seven years... When the philosopher heard this he began to bang his head against the wall. He said, "All I have labored to discover in seven years this Chacham was able to give me with the flick of a reed."
The message of the Midrash lies not in the particulars of the case, but in the contrast between the methodology of the "philosopher" or scientist and the methodology of Chazal. Ramban in his essay "Torah Hashem Temima" (p. 158-159 in the Chavel edition) writes that the meaning of the story of "ma'aseh braishis" is hidden and he does not understand it. However, Chachamim did understand the parsha. They were able to intuit from it the order of creation, the measure of the world and knowledge of astronomy and the universe, the calculation of the molad and tekufos, and all sorts of other knowledge which is hinted at in the count of letters, gematriyos, and their secrets. R' Yehoshua's knowledge of a snake's gestation did not require seven years of laborious scientific experimentation to discover but was obtained from Torah alone, based on his interpretation of the pasuk "arur atah...".
Clearly not even every Tanna possessed such knowledge -- Rabban Gamliel did not know the answer to the philosopher's question and admitted as such. And we know that Tanaim and Amoraim tell us that they went to doctors, consulted gentile experts about farming, etc. But that does not mean that such knowledge is not inherent in the Torah and accessible to those who can decode its secrets.
hafrashas terumos and ma'asros and nesina l'kohein: seperate mitzvos or not
Yesterday we learned the Parashas Derachim's chiddush that there are two aspects to the mitzvah of terumos and ma'asros: 1) a mitzvah of hafrasha, seperating a portion to remove the issur of tevel; 2) a mitzvah of nesina, giving the seperated portion to a kohein. The truth is that I had in mind to discuss this idea last week in the context of the mitzvah of challah. The shiur of challah which must be seperated and given to a kohein is 1/24 of the dough for a regular person and 1/48 for a baker. This amount was set by Chazal -- what is the minimum requirement on a d'oraysa level? The Noda b'Yehudah (Mh"T 201, see Minchas Chinuch 385:12) is mechadesh that the minimum shiur depends on whether we are speaking of the mitzvah of hafrasha or the mitzvah of nesina. To remove the prohibition of tevel seperating even the smallest piece of dough suffices; however, to fulfill the mitzvah of nesina requires giving the kohein an amount equal to 1/24 of an isaron (no matter how much dough is kneaded).
Achronim (see Shu"T Shiurei Sheivet haLevi, and apologies because I do not have the sefer at home and I did not jot down the siman) suggest that this chiddush of the Noda b'Yehudah may depend on a machlokes between the Rambam and Ramban. The Rambam counts hafrasha and nesina together as one mitzvah (aseh 133). However, Ramban, disagrees and writes that they should be counted as two distinct mitzvos (see shoresh 12 of Sefer haMitzvos). One of Ramban's many proofs is the fact that we recite a bracha on hafrasha, not on nesina -- if nesina is the culmination of the mitzvah, why would we not recite the bracha at that point?
The Parashas Derachim's reading of the Ra'avad fits nicely with the Ramban's approach -- since kohanim and levi'im can receive a portion of conquered lands, it removes the requirement to give them terumos and ma'asros but does not excuse the mitzvah of hafrasha. At the same time, perhaps the Rambam fits l'shitaso as well. Since hafrasha and nesina go hand in hand, one cannot dismiss one without dismissing the other (though by the same token, since they go hand in hand if hafrasha cannot be dismissed perhaps neither should nesina be, which may be what Ra'avad is driving at).
Achronim (see Shu"T Shiurei Sheivet haLevi, and apologies because I do not have the sefer at home and I did not jot down the siman) suggest that this chiddush of the Noda b'Yehudah may depend on a machlokes between the Rambam and Ramban. The Rambam counts hafrasha and nesina together as one mitzvah (aseh 133). However, Ramban, disagrees and writes that they should be counted as two distinct mitzvos (see shoresh 12 of Sefer haMitzvos). One of Ramban's many proofs is the fact that we recite a bracha on hafrasha, not on nesina -- if nesina is the culmination of the mitzvah, why would we not recite the bracha at that point?
The Parashas Derachim's reading of the Ra'avad fits nicely with the Ramban's approach -- since kohanim and levi'im can receive a portion of conquered lands, it removes the requirement to give them terumos and ma'asros but does not excuse the mitzvah of hafrasha. At the same time, perhaps the Rambam fits l'shitaso as well. Since hafrasha and nesina go hand in hand, one cannot dismiss one without dismissing the other (though by the same token, since they go hand in hand if hafrasha cannot be dismissed perhaps neither should nesina be, which may be what Ra'avad is driving at).
Tuesday, June 30, 2009
v'halachta b'derachav -- why only through gemilus chassadim?
Why is it that v'halachta b'derachav, imitating G-d, applies only to his acts of mercy? We are told (Sota 14) that G-d visits the sick, buries the dead, acts charitably, and we are expected to do the same. But no source suggests that just as G-d smites the wicked we should do the same -- a thought that undoubtedly occurred to many who were listening to the Madoff sentencing yesterday. Why not?
The Maharal (Nesiv Gemilus Chassadim) explains that when a person faces a situation that cries out for justice, s/he is forced by circumstance to respond. The same may be said for many types of charity. Giving a quarter to the homeless guy begging for change just to get him to stop annoying you or putting a coin in a pushka to avoid feeling guilty is also just a response to a situation, an means to avoid a negative feeling rather than a desire for constructive good. Situation and circumstance, not a person's inner character, is what motivates these behaviors.
G-d "has" everything; he does not suffer needs and is not compelled by circumstance -- and still he gives. We too can only claim to imitate G-d when we act not because of personal needs or circumstance, but simply because it is the right thing to do. In a word, imitating G-d demands altruism -- a selflessness that motivates one to do good for its own sake alone.
The Maharal (Nesiv Gemilus Chassadim) explains that when a person faces a situation that cries out for justice, s/he is forced by circumstance to respond. The same may be said for many types of charity. Giving a quarter to the homeless guy begging for change just to get him to stop annoying you or putting a coin in a pushka to avoid feeling guilty is also just a response to a situation, an means to avoid a negative feeling rather than a desire for constructive good. Situation and circumstance, not a person's inner character, is what motivates these behaviors.
G-d "has" everything; he does not suffer needs and is not compelled by circumstance -- and still he gives. We too can only claim to imitate G-d when we act not because of personal needs or circumstance, but simply because it is the right thing to do. In a word, imitating G-d demands altruism -- a selflessness that motivates one to do good for its own sake alone.
land for a piece (of terumah)
In Parshas Korach we learned that Kohanim and Levi'im do not receive a portion in Eretz Yisrael; instead, they are supported by terumos and ma'asros. The Rambam (Shmita 13:11) writes that this is only true of Eretz Yisrael proper, but if a Jewish king were to conquer lands beyond the boundaries promised to the Avos, then Kohanim and Levi'im would receive a portion. Ra'avad disagrees and argues that if Kohanim and Levi'im did receive land it would mean that they forfeit teru"m. While the Ra'avad viewed such an exemption as a reductio ad absurdum, the Kesef Mishne comments that the Rambam may indeed have held that there can be Jewish controlled land which is exempt from terumos and ma'asros. As proof, he points to the example of Surya, land conquered by David haMelech which was exempt.
The Parashas Derachim (derush 6) writes that the Ks"M erred in his reading of the Ra'avad. There are two seperate mitzvos involved in terumos and ma'asros: 1) seperating the ter"m from the tevel wheat; 2) giving the kohein the seperated portion. The Ra'avad meant that if Kohanim received a portion of land, they could not collect the tithed portion of the crop -- mitzvah #2 would not apply. But without question the farmer would have to still perform mitzvah #1 to remove the prohibition of eating tevel.
The example of Surya, writes the Parashas Derachim, is a red herring because crops in those lands are exempt from both mitzvah #1 and mitzvah #2, a clear indication that the exemption has nothing to do with Kohanim receiving a portion of those lands. The gemara tells us that Surya was a special case because David conquered those lands out of order (he should have conquered Yerushalayim first) and hence they had an incomplete kedusha.
The Parashas Derachim raises an interesting question: is the seperation of teru"m an independent mitzvah from giving teru"m or are they two parts of the same coin? For those who were not reading three years ago when we first discussed this, maybe a quick review with some new points next post.
The Parashas Derachim (derush 6) writes that the Ks"M erred in his reading of the Ra'avad. There are two seperate mitzvos involved in terumos and ma'asros: 1) seperating the ter"m from the tevel wheat; 2) giving the kohein the seperated portion. The Ra'avad meant that if Kohanim received a portion of land, they could not collect the tithed portion of the crop -- mitzvah #2 would not apply. But without question the farmer would have to still perform mitzvah #1 to remove the prohibition of eating tevel.
The example of Surya, writes the Parashas Derachim, is a red herring because crops in those lands are exempt from both mitzvah #1 and mitzvah #2, a clear indication that the exemption has nothing to do with Kohanim receiving a portion of those lands. The gemara tells us that Surya was a special case because David conquered those lands out of order (he should have conquered Yerushalayim first) and hence they had an incomplete kedusha.
The Parashas Derachim raises an interesting question: is the seperation of teru"m an independent mitzvah from giving teru"m or are they two parts of the same coin? For those who were not reading three years ago when we first discussed this, maybe a quick review with some new points next post.
Friday, June 26, 2009
b'derech she'adam rotzeh lei'lech
How could the Jewish people still think that Moshe was following his own agenda after they witnessed the earth swallow Korach? R' Tzadok haKohen (Tzidkas haTzadik #64) explains:
פעמים שרואה בבירור שהשם יתברך מסייעו ומסכים עם מעשיו, עם כל זה אינו ראיה כי מעשיו ישרים באמת, ועל זה נאמר ישעיה מ"ח י"ז) מדריכך בדרך תלך ודרשו חז"ל (מכות י' ב) בדרך שאדם רוצה לילך מוליכין אותו. [ואמר בדרך דרצה לומר בספר משלי דרך התורה כמו שכתבתי לעיל (אות מ"ח), כי אין השם יתברך מסייע אלא כשהוא על פי דעתו הולך בדרך התורה. ומה שלמדו מבלעם גם לפי דעתו של בלעם כפי סיטרא דיליה היה דרך זה ישר לו כפי מה שהוא,
. . וזה היתה גם כן התלוננות בני ישראל (במדבר י"ז ו') אתם המיתם את עם ה', אף על פי שראו הפלגת הנס באבדם, מכל מקום חשבו על זה כי לא בשמים הוא ואין לסמוך על זה שהדין עם משה ואהרן נגד קרח ועדתו, רק אתם רציתם לילך בדרך זה וזכותכם גדול ולכך המיתם וגו'
Hashem will assist a person along the path he thinks is "derech haTorah" even to the point of performing miracles on his behalf -- but that is no proof that the person is correct!
This same idea is found a few parshiyos earlier. Chazal (Shabbos 87) tell us that Moshe seperated from Tziporah of his own volition, based on his understanding of his role as Navi, and Hashem affirmed his assessment and choice of action. Why then was Miraim critical of this move? Tosfos answers that Hashem may have approved because "b'derech she'adam rotzeh leilech molichin oso", Hashem assists a person achieve what he thinks Torah requires even if objectively speaking he is misguided.
Looking back at last week's parsha, Rashi writes that the choice to send spies was Moshe's decision and not commanded. Ramban disagrees -- 'shlach' is a command, notwithstanding the extra word 'lecha'. In defense of Rashi perhaps we can say that 'shlach' indeed is a command, but such a command originated in Moshe or the people's perception that such a mission was necessary.
פעמים שרואה בבירור שהשם יתברך מסייעו ומסכים עם מעשיו, עם כל זה אינו ראיה כי מעשיו ישרים באמת, ועל זה נאמר ישעיה מ"ח י"ז) מדריכך בדרך תלך ודרשו חז"ל (מכות י' ב) בדרך שאדם רוצה לילך מוליכין אותו. [ואמר בדרך דרצה לומר בספר משלי דרך התורה כמו שכתבתי לעיל (אות מ"ח), כי אין השם יתברך מסייע אלא כשהוא על פי דעתו הולך בדרך התורה. ומה שלמדו מבלעם גם לפי דעתו של בלעם כפי סיטרא דיליה היה דרך זה ישר לו כפי מה שהוא,
. . וזה היתה גם כן התלוננות בני ישראל (במדבר י"ז ו') אתם המיתם את עם ה', אף על פי שראו הפלגת הנס באבדם, מכל מקום חשבו על זה כי לא בשמים הוא ואין לסמוך על זה שהדין עם משה ואהרן נגד קרח ועדתו, רק אתם רציתם לילך בדרך זה וזכותכם גדול ולכך המיתם וגו'
Hashem will assist a person along the path he thinks is "derech haTorah" even to the point of performing miracles on his behalf -- but that is no proof that the person is correct!
This same idea is found a few parshiyos earlier. Chazal (Shabbos 87) tell us that Moshe seperated from Tziporah of his own volition, based on his understanding of his role as Navi, and Hashem affirmed his assessment and choice of action. Why then was Miraim critical of this move? Tosfos answers that Hashem may have approved because "b'derech she'adam rotzeh leilech molichin oso", Hashem assists a person achieve what he thinks Torah requires even if objectively speaking he is misguided.
Looking back at last week's parsha, Rashi writes that the choice to send spies was Moshe's decision and not commanded. Ramban disagrees -- 'shlach' is a command, notwithstanding the extra word 'lecha'. In defense of Rashi perhaps we can say that 'shlach' indeed is a command, but such a command originated in Moshe or the people's perception that such a mission was necessary.
R' Tzadok haKohen on Korach's rebellion
Does a garment entirely dyed with techeiles still need a single string of techeiles on its tzitzis?
Does a house filled with seforim still need a mezuzah?
According to the Midrash these are the questions Korach used to make his point. Does a people perfect in yirah, represented by the techeiles which alludes to Heaven, and perfect in knowledge of Torah, represented by a house filled with seforim, need a single leader or kohein to rule over them?
R' Tzadok haKohen (Pri Tzadik, Korach 2) explains that Korach's error was not misjudging the level of the people's religiosity -- had there been no truth to his claim that "the entire nation is holy" it would never have been incorporated into the Torah's narrative. Rather, Korach's error was in assuming that this pinnacle of spiritual perfection is a self-sustaining safe landing point after which no further leadership or direction is needed.
Korach's punishment was to descend "chaim she'olah", into the depths of hell while still remaining alive. The lesson: Without leadership establishing safeguards a person can be spiritually "alive", perfected, "bshleimus hakedushah", as R' Tzadok writes, yet still find himself in gehenom.
Does a house filled with seforim still need a mezuzah?
According to the Midrash these are the questions Korach used to make his point. Does a people perfect in yirah, represented by the techeiles which alludes to Heaven, and perfect in knowledge of Torah, represented by a house filled with seforim, need a single leader or kohein to rule over them?
R' Tzadok haKohen (Pri Tzadik, Korach 2) explains that Korach's error was not misjudging the level of the people's religiosity -- had there been no truth to his claim that "the entire nation is holy" it would never have been incorporated into the Torah's narrative. Rather, Korach's error was in assuming that this pinnacle of spiritual perfection is a self-sustaining safe landing point after which no further leadership or direction is needed.
Korach's punishment was to descend "chaim she'olah", into the depths of hell while still remaining alive. The lesson: Without leadership establishing safeguards a person can be spiritually "alive", perfected, "bshleimus hakedushah", as R' Tzadok writes, yet still find himself in gehenom.
Thursday, June 25, 2009
maharal on why is Ya'akov not mentioned in Korach's lineage
The Torah introduces Korah by recounting his lineage -- "ben Yitzhar ben Kehas ben Levi". Rashi asks why the Torah did not go one step further and trace Korach's ancestry back to Ya'akov Avinu. He answers that Ya'akov davened that his name should not be joined in partnership with evil.
The Torah usually does not trace back the lineage of heroes or villains all the way to the Patriarchs. Why here does Rashi see the omission of Ya'akov's name as significant? And even if Ya'akov's name is not mentioned, don't we all know that he is the father of Levi and therefore the great-great-grandfather of Korach?
Maharal explains that the Torah here is not simply introducing Korach, but condemning him. Because Korach was a descendant of a prominent family within the prominent tribe of Levi, his guilt is that much worse. Korach had excellent role models to learn from and failed to follow their example. That failure might have been further emphasized by highlighting Korach's failure to live up to the model of Ya'akov Avinu. However, Ya'akov did not want to be associated with the condemnation of his descendants, and therefore he is not mentioned.
How does a Korach come out of such an illustrious family? The Maharal explains that every tzadik has elements of "psoles" -- there are imperfections, however slight, in the character of even the greatest people. Children absorb everything, and flaws in a parent can be magnified many times over when passed to the next generation. Korach's parents and grandparents in this way all contributed in some way to shaping his flawed character. The only exception is Ya'akov Avinu, who reached a degree of perfection that did not allow for defects to pass to his children. The lineage which shaped Korach stops at Levi, for Ya'akov had no part in the flaws which later emerged.
Lost opportunities and the failure to live up to expectations can create a devastating burden of guilt. Yet, beneath those layers of failure there always remains the pure spark of Ya'akov Avinu that does not condemn. There is always a point within each person that remains disassociated from past failure which -- if the person chooses -- can be the foundation for new growth.
The Shem m'Shmuel (1910) writes that each of our Shabbos meals and tefilos correspond to one of the Avos: Friday night=Avraham; Shabbos morning=Yitzchak; Shalosh Seudos=Ya'akov. Unlike Avraham, who was the father of Yishmael as well as Yitzchak, and Yitzchak, who was the father of Eisav as well as Ya'akov, Ya'akov Avinu had no offspring who were outside the fold of Klal Yisrael -- there is no "psoles" that remained in Ya'akov which could corrupt any of his offspring. As a Jew goes through Shabbos, h/she reaches deeper and deeper inside him or herself to connect back to the spritual roots which the Avos planted within each and every Jew. On Friday night a person reaches into him/herself and connects with Avraham; at lunch he/she connects with Yitzchak. In each of these stages there is still something missing, there is still "psoles", there is still the taste of "chol" that interferes with Shabbos. But by Shabbos afternoon a person has absorbed enough kedushas Shabbos so that he/she can reach deeper still and connect to Ya'akov Avinu, a level of spirituality that is untainted and uncorrupted by whatever may have transpired in the previous week. Even though grammatically the third meal should properly be called "seudah shlishis", we refer to it as "shalos seudos", three meals, because this third meal can perfect and correct whatever was missing in the previous seudos and bring us to a mindset of "kulo Shabbos", without "psoles".
The Torah usually does not trace back the lineage of heroes or villains all the way to the Patriarchs. Why here does Rashi see the omission of Ya'akov's name as significant? And even if Ya'akov's name is not mentioned, don't we all know that he is the father of Levi and therefore the great-great-grandfather of Korach?
Maharal explains that the Torah here is not simply introducing Korach, but condemning him. Because Korach was a descendant of a prominent family within the prominent tribe of Levi, his guilt is that much worse. Korach had excellent role models to learn from and failed to follow their example. That failure might have been further emphasized by highlighting Korach's failure to live up to the model of Ya'akov Avinu. However, Ya'akov did not want to be associated with the condemnation of his descendants, and therefore he is not mentioned.
How does a Korach come out of such an illustrious family? The Maharal explains that every tzadik has elements of "psoles" -- there are imperfections, however slight, in the character of even the greatest people. Children absorb everything, and flaws in a parent can be magnified many times over when passed to the next generation. Korach's parents and grandparents in this way all contributed in some way to shaping his flawed character. The only exception is Ya'akov Avinu, who reached a degree of perfection that did not allow for defects to pass to his children. The lineage which shaped Korach stops at Levi, for Ya'akov had no part in the flaws which later emerged.
Lost opportunities and the failure to live up to expectations can create a devastating burden of guilt. Yet, beneath those layers of failure there always remains the pure spark of Ya'akov Avinu that does not condemn. There is always a point within each person that remains disassociated from past failure which -- if the person chooses -- can be the foundation for new growth.
The Shem m'Shmuel (1910) writes that each of our Shabbos meals and tefilos correspond to one of the Avos: Friday night=Avraham; Shabbos morning=Yitzchak; Shalosh Seudos=Ya'akov. Unlike Avraham, who was the father of Yishmael as well as Yitzchak, and Yitzchak, who was the father of Eisav as well as Ya'akov, Ya'akov Avinu had no offspring who were outside the fold of Klal Yisrael -- there is no "psoles" that remained in Ya'akov which could corrupt any of his offspring. As a Jew goes through Shabbos, h/she reaches deeper and deeper inside him or herself to connect back to the spritual roots which the Avos planted within each and every Jew. On Friday night a person reaches into him/herself and connects with Avraham; at lunch he/she connects with Yitzchak. In each of these stages there is still something missing, there is still "psoles", there is still the taste of "chol" that interferes with Shabbos. But by Shabbos afternoon a person has absorbed enough kedushas Shabbos so that he/she can reach deeper still and connect to Ya'akov Avinu, a level of spirituality that is untainted and uncorrupted by whatever may have transpired in the previous week. Even though grammatically the third meal should properly be called "seudah shlishis", we refer to it as "shalos seudos", three meals, because this third meal can perfect and correct whatever was missing in the previous seudos and bring us to a mindset of "kulo Shabbos", without "psoles".
3 Tamuz
Maybe m'mah nafshach you skip tachanun this morning -- life doesn't have to be either/or.
3 Tamuz - yahrzeit of R' Shneur Kotler zt"l
3 Tamuz - yahrzeit of the Lubavitcher Rebbe zt"l
3 Tamuz - yahrzeit of R' Shneur Kotler zt"l
3 Tamuz - yahrzeit of the Lubavitcher Rebbe zt"l
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
is a female kohein included in the issur of zarus
The Rambam defines a zar in hilchos bi'as mikdash ch. 9:
ב איזה הוא זר: כל שאינו מזרע אהרון הזכרים--שנאמר "וערכו, בני אהרון" (ויקרא א,ח), "בני אהרון" ולא בנות אהרון.
The Minchas Chinuch on this week's parsha (390) quotes the safeik of the Parashas Derachim whether a woman kohenet has the status of a zar and is included in the prohibition of "v'zar lo yikrav aleichem". Is the exclusion of "bnei Aharon v'lo bnos Aharon" a giluy milsa that women are also defined as zarim or is it a seperate din, an issur aseh? From the defintion of zar which the Rambam offers -- all who are not male kohanim -- it does appear that woman are included in the lav.
R' Yosef Engel (Esvan D'Oraysa #19) points out that the gemara (Zevachim 15b) derives from "v'yinazru m'kodshe bnei Yisrael" that there is a seperate prohibition of performing avodah which defiles korbanos. Even if a woman is not included in the prohibition of zarus, because her avodah is invalid she would be in violation of this lav of defiling kodshim.
ב איזה הוא זר: כל שאינו מזרע אהרון הזכרים--שנאמר "וערכו, בני אהרון" (ויקרא א,ח), "בני אהרון" ולא בנות אהרון.
The Minchas Chinuch on this week's parsha (390) quotes the safeik of the Parashas Derachim whether a woman kohenet has the status of a zar and is included in the prohibition of "v'zar lo yikrav aleichem". Is the exclusion of "bnei Aharon v'lo bnos Aharon" a giluy milsa that women are also defined as zarim or is it a seperate din, an issur aseh? From the defintion of zar which the Rambam offers -- all who are not male kohanim -- it does appear that woman are included in the lav.
R' Yosef Engel (Esvan D'Oraysa #19) points out that the gemara (Zevachim 15b) derives from "v'yinazru m'kodshe bnei Yisrael" that there is a seperate prohibition of performing avodah which defiles korbanos. Even if a woman is not included in the prohibition of zarus, because her avodah is invalid she would be in violation of this lav of defiling kodshim.
Tuesday, June 23, 2009
knowing the molad in advance of rosh chodesh
The Mishna in Sanhedrin says that if one witness says he saw an event on the third of the month and another says he saw the same event on the fourth of the month we assume they are testifying about the same thing and one of them got the date wrong. Determining the correct date requires knowing whether the previous month was 29 or 30 days; that knowledge was often not well known until mid-way through the next month.
The Yerushalmi (5:3, 25b in Vilna ed.) quotes R' Asa as saying that he never davened musaf on Rosh Chodesh without knowing the date with certainty. Meaning, R' Asa made sure to know in advance whether Rosh Chodesh was be day 1 of the new month or still day 30 of the previous month and there would be a second day of Rosh Chodesh. The Tzion Yerushalayim notes that this gemara is a source for the custom (which I honestly had not heard of before) of checking the molad in advance to be aware of the exact day of the new moon's appearance.
The Yerushalmi (5:3, 25b in Vilna ed.) quotes R' Asa as saying that he never davened musaf on Rosh Chodesh without knowing the date with certainty. Meaning, R' Asa made sure to know in advance whether Rosh Chodesh was be day 1 of the new month or still day 30 of the previous month and there would be a second day of Rosh Chodesh. The Tzion Yerushalayim notes that this gemara is a source for the custom (which I honestly had not heard of before) of checking the molad in advance to be aware of the exact day of the new moon's appearance.
Monday, June 22, 2009
difficulties and doubts
R. Johanan was sitting and teaching: The Holy One, blessed be He, will bring jewels and precious stones, each thirty cubits long, and thirty cubits high, and make an engraving in them, ten by twenty cubits, and set them up as the gates of Jerusalem, for it is written, And I will make thy windows of agates, and thy gates of carbuncles. A certain disciple derided him saying, 'We do not find a jewel even as large as a dove's egg, yet such huge ones are to exist!' Some time later he took a sea journey and saw the ministering angels cutting precious stones and pearls. He said unto them: 'For what are these?' They replied: 'The Holy One, blessed be He, will set them up as the gates of Jerusalem.' On his return, he found R. Johanan sitting and teaching. He said to him: 'Expound, O Master, and it is indeed fitting for you to expound, for even as you did say, so did I myself see.' 'Wretch!' he exclaimed, 'had you not seen, you would not have believed! You deride the words of the Sages!' He set his eyes upon him, and he turned in to a heap of bones.
Sanhedrin 100a, Soncino translation
Many persons are very sensitive of the difficulties of religion; I am as sensitive as any one; but I have never been able to see a connection between apprehending those difficulties, however keenly, and multiplying them to any extent, and doubting the doctrines to which they are attached. Ten thousand difficulties do not make one doubt, as I understand the subject; difficulty and doubt are incommensurate. There of course may be difficulties in the evidence; but I am speaking of difficulties intrinsic to the doctrines, or to their compatibility with each other. A man may be annoyed that he cannot work out a mathematical problem, of which the answer is or is not given to him, without doubting that it admits of an answer, or that a particular answer is the true one.
John Henry Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, Part VII
Sanhedrin 100a, Soncino translation
Many persons are very sensitive of the difficulties of religion; I am as sensitive as any one; but I have never been able to see a connection between apprehending those difficulties, however keenly, and multiplying them to any extent, and doubting the doctrines to which they are attached. Ten thousand difficulties do not make one doubt, as I understand the subject; difficulty and doubt are incommensurate. There of course may be difficulties in the evidence; but I am speaking of difficulties intrinsic to the doctrines, or to their compatibility with each other. A man may be annoyed that he cannot work out a mathematical problem, of which the answer is or is not given to him, without doubting that it admits of an answer, or that a particular answer is the true one.
John Henry Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, Part VII
Sunday, June 21, 2009
Friday, June 19, 2009
three quick lessons on parshas shlach
Three quick Maharal's worth your attention in Parshas Shlach:
1) Rashi (12:3) explains that the term “anashim”, men of importance, is used with respect to the spies because they were righteous people and not sinners. Yet, Rashi later (12:26) explains that the spies already had their evil plan in mind when they departed, implying that they were wicked from the start.
Maharal answers that the spies were righteous prior to accepting the appointment to act as the people's agents, but from that moment onward they were tainted. "Shlucho shel adam k'moso" -- even a righteous person can become corrupt and lose his identity once he becomes an instrument of others plans.
2) Rashi (15:41) comments on "Ani Hashem Elokeichem asher hotzeisei eschem mei'Eretz Mitzrayim l'heyos lachem l'Elokim..." at the end of parshas tzitzis: "al menas kein... she'tikablu gezeirosai". In other words, the pasuk should not be interpreted as an independent sentence, "I took you out of Egypt to be your G-d." Rather, the pasuk is a continuation of the previous idea, "Lma'am tizkeru v'asisem es kol mitzvosai." We are compelled to accept specifically G-d's "gezerios" and mitzvos because he redeemed us, but his dominion and existence are given notwithstanding.
There is a relationship with G-d shared by all mankind that stems from G-d's role as creator. Belief in the existence of G-d and his dominion over the world are not an exclusively Jewish ideas. However, there is a special relationship between the Jewish people and G-d forged through our unique historical experience. That particular relationship obligates us in the performance of mitzvos.
3) Part 3 can be read on the weekly-chizuk blog (reminder that it is still out there).
1) Rashi (12:3) explains that the term “anashim”, men of importance, is used with respect to the spies because they were righteous people and not sinners. Yet, Rashi later (12:26) explains that the spies already had their evil plan in mind when they departed, implying that they were wicked from the start.
Maharal answers that the spies were righteous prior to accepting the appointment to act as the people's agents, but from that moment onward they were tainted. "Shlucho shel adam k'moso" -- even a righteous person can become corrupt and lose his identity once he becomes an instrument of others plans.
2) Rashi (15:41) comments on "Ani Hashem Elokeichem asher hotzeisei eschem mei'Eretz Mitzrayim l'heyos lachem l'Elokim..." at the end of parshas tzitzis: "al menas kein... she'tikablu gezeirosai". In other words, the pasuk should not be interpreted as an independent sentence, "I took you out of Egypt to be your G-d." Rather, the pasuk is a continuation of the previous idea, "Lma'am tizkeru v'asisem es kol mitzvosai." We are compelled to accept specifically G-d's "gezerios" and mitzvos because he redeemed us, but his dominion and existence are given notwithstanding.
There is a relationship with G-d shared by all mankind that stems from G-d's role as creator. Belief in the existence of G-d and his dominion over the world are not an exclusively Jewish ideas. However, there is a special relationship between the Jewish people and G-d forged through our unique historical experience. That particular relationship obligates us in the performance of mitzvos.
3) Part 3 can be read on the weekly-chizuk blog (reminder that it is still out there).
tzitzis on shabbos (II)
I think the best answer to the question raised in the previous post (which I think Akiva aimed at in his comment) is that in the case of cotton the Chachamim declared the garment to be a garment which is obligated in tzitzis. In the case of sfeika d'oraysa l'chumra: 1) the Rabbinic mitzvah to fulfill a safeik Torah obligation is not a halacha in hilchos tzitzis, but an independent chiyuv on the person; 2) that obligation does not transform the status of the garment, as the safeik remains; it simply obligates the gavra.
If you would like a chakirah that gets to the heart of the matter: is sfeika d'oraysa l'chumra a siman that extends the original chiyuv to cases of safeik or is it a new independent obligation.
If you would like a chakirah that gets to the heart of the matter: is sfeika d'oraysa l'chumra a siman that extends the original chiyuv to cases of safeik or is it a new independent obligation.
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
tzitzis on shabbos
1. The Rambam paskens that only wool and linen garments are chayav in tzitzis m'doraysa; cotton tzitzis (for example) are chayav only derabbanan (O.C. 9:1) . 2. One is allowed to wear kosher tzitzis on Shabbos because the string is bateil to the garment. Pasul tzitzis may not be worn because they serve no purpose and it is like carrying string. 3. One is allowed to wear cotton tzitzis on Shabbos. Even though the garment mid'oraysa does not need tzitzis, the chiyuv derabbanan of tzitzis makes them bateil to the garment. 4. The Shulchan Aruch (siman 10:7) writes that if there is a safeik d'oraysa whether a garment is chayav in tzitzis one must put tzitzis on the garments but it may not be worn in a public domain on Shabbos.
I asked my son this question (based on a Pri Megadim in O.C. 13): Why can a garment which is chayav only m'derabbanan in tzitzis be worn on Shabbos, but not a garment which requires tzitzis because of sfeika d'oraysa l'chumra? Even if sfeika d'orasya l'chumra is only a din derabbanan, why is this derabbanan obligation to put on tzitzis different than the case of cotton tzitzis?
I think there are at least two good answers...
I asked my son this question (based on a Pri Megadim in O.C. 13): Why can a garment which is chayav only m'derabbanan in tzitzis be worn on Shabbos, but not a garment which requires tzitzis because of sfeika d'oraysa l'chumra? Even if sfeika d'orasya l'chumra is only a din derabbanan, why is this derabbanan obligation to put on tzitzis different than the case of cotton tzitzis?
I think there are at least two good answers...
challah from tevel
Tosfos (Sukkah 35) writes that tevel is chayav in challah only if there is sufficient volume of dough to be chayav after terumos and ma'asros are removed. Since terumos and ma'asros belong to the kohein and levi, that portion of dough does not count as "arisoseichem". However, the Ras"h disagrees and holds that tevel is chayav based on the total volume of the dough without subtracting terumos and ma'asros.
The Minchas Chinuch (385) questions Tosfos' view. Dough which is owned in partnership by two people is chayav in challah and is considered "arisoseichem" even if each partner's portion is less the size which would be chayav in challah. Why is tevel different? Even if the kohein and levi "own" a portion of dough because of their terumos and ma'asros claim, the dough as a whole should still be considered "arisoseichem"?
R' Shmuel Rozofski z"l answers: the problem of a partnership is each party does not own a sufficient quantity of dough. In that case we say ownership of a part creates responsibility for the whole; therefore, dough is "arisoseichem". However, tevel poses a problem not just of quantity, but also of what is owned. Terumah is exempt from challah and therefore exempts the dough which it is part of from obligation.
The dispute between the Ras"h and Tosfos can be formulated in this way: does the terumah portion of tevel represent just a lack of quantity or is it an inherent exemption?
The Minchas Chinuch (385) questions Tosfos' view. Dough which is owned in partnership by two people is chayav in challah and is considered "arisoseichem" even if each partner's portion is less the size which would be chayav in challah. Why is tevel different? Even if the kohein and levi "own" a portion of dough because of their terumos and ma'asros claim, the dough as a whole should still be considered "arisoseichem"?
R' Shmuel Rozofski z"l answers: the problem of a partnership is each party does not own a sufficient quantity of dough. In that case we say ownership of a part creates responsibility for the whole; therefore, dough is "arisoseichem". However, tevel poses a problem not just of quantity, but also of what is owned. Terumah is exempt from challah and therefore exempts the dough which it is part of from obligation.
The dispute between the Ras"h and Tosfos can be formulated in this way: does the terumah portion of tevel represent just a lack of quantity or is it an inherent exemption?
Monday, June 15, 2009
restoring the "true" text of Tanach
On Friday I was reviewing the parsha with the whole discussion of looking only for "truth" irrespective of the consensus of tradition echoing in my mind when I found myself looking at a pshat of R"Y haChassid (quoted in Pardes Yosef p.457) explaining that Yehoshua told Moshe to burden Eldad and Meidad with community obligations so they would become sad and cease prophesying, for prophecy only occurs when a person is happy. R"Y haChassid proves this from Melachim II 3:15, where Elisha says to play music so he can overcome his anger and restore his mental equilibrium; immediately "vat'hi alav ruach Elokim."
The same pasuk is referred to by the Yerushalmi in Sukkah, by the Midrash Shocher Tov, the same limud and pasuk are cited by the Ramban (Braishis 25:34) and by R' Chananel (Shabbos 30b). Not only is it thematically relevant to our parsha, but the words that describe the prophetic experience of Elisha match the words used in our parsha -- "k'noach aleihem haruach" (11:25), "vatanach aleihem haruach" (11:26), "yitein Hashem es rucho aleihem" (11:29).
One little problem: there is no such pasuk. Melachim II 3:15 in our Tanach reads: "vat'hi alav yad Hashem."
The Pardes Yosef notes that not only is the pasuk cited by Chazal and Rishonim with the text "ruach Elokim", but in all the early printings that he checked except one the text appears that way (it should be possible to more exhaustively investigate this for those who have time).
Interestingly, the Chavel edition changes the text of the Ramban so it matches the text of our pasuk, but that is going about things backwards. The evidence in this case is clear and compelling: the text that was used by Chazal, that was used by the Rishonim, that was even used by the printers, all point to the fact that the pasuk should read "ruach Elokim". The term "yad Hashem" must be a corruption that arose relatively late in history. Why change the Ramban when the real mistake is in the text of our Tanach?
Is it time to start reprinting an "authentic" Tanach based on what the evidence tells us the text used by Chazal and the Rishonim was, what their mesorah was, or do we stick to the "traditional" text accepted by a consensus of Jewish communities for the past few generations, the mesorah which has emerged in our time?
The same pasuk is referred to by the Yerushalmi in Sukkah, by the Midrash Shocher Tov, the same limud and pasuk are cited by the Ramban (Braishis 25:34) and by R' Chananel (Shabbos 30b). Not only is it thematically relevant to our parsha, but the words that describe the prophetic experience of Elisha match the words used in our parsha -- "k'noach aleihem haruach" (11:25), "vatanach aleihem haruach" (11:26), "yitein Hashem es rucho aleihem" (11:29).
One little problem: there is no such pasuk. Melachim II 3:15 in our Tanach reads: "vat'hi alav yad Hashem."
The Pardes Yosef notes that not only is the pasuk cited by Chazal and Rishonim with the text "ruach Elokim", but in all the early printings that he checked except one the text appears that way (it should be possible to more exhaustively investigate this for those who have time).
Interestingly, the Chavel edition changes the text of the Ramban so it matches the text of our pasuk, but that is going about things backwards. The evidence in this case is clear and compelling: the text that was used by Chazal, that was used by the Rishonim, that was even used by the printers, all point to the fact that the pasuk should read "ruach Elokim". The term "yad Hashem" must be a corruption that arose relatively late in history. Why change the Ramban when the real mistake is in the text of our Tanach?
Is it time to start reprinting an "authentic" Tanach based on what the evidence tells us the text used by Chazal and the Rishonim was, what their mesorah was, or do we stick to the "traditional" text accepted by a consensus of Jewish communities for the past few generations, the mesorah which has emerged in our time?
Sunday, June 14, 2009
you can't argue with success
A short while ago I was in my son's yeshiva for their annual gala siyum. Close to 50 mesivta boys finished Baba Basra, another group finished Sukkah, and another group finished reviewing Gittin again (which the yeshiva learned the previous year). I am happy to say that my son was not the only 9th grader who managed to get through all 175 blatt of Baba Basra, the longest masechta in shas. The yeshiva he attends is not on the far right-wing of the chareidi world; it has a mix of boys from the Far Rockaway and the Five Towns. Many of these boys will go on to professional careers of one sort or another after their yeshiva years. Yet, it is still a "black-hat" yeshiva in the traditional mold.
For all the discussion of the importance of "rationalism" and the touting of modern orthodox hashkafa, the bottom line is talmud Torah k'neged kulam; the achievements in limud haTorah of the yeshiva world are unparalleled in the modern orthodox high schools. The same level of accomplishment is simply impossible in an environment of co-ed classes and a Talmud period of an hour a day.
Sure, there are problems with the yeshiva system. The cookie-cutter mold disenfranchises many students who are just not cut out for the system. Students' questions in many areas are not addressed properly and lead to superficial conformity without depth of commitment (i.e. towing the party line). But these problems are not solved by the modern orthodox education system and a good case can be made that they are even exacerbated. Greater openness to secular knowledge and culture has not proven itself to be a more effective barrier to assimilation in and of itself.
For all the talk of kids at risk and the weaknesses of our institutions, I think once in awhile we need to take stock of our successes as well.
For all the discussion of the importance of "rationalism" and the touting of modern orthodox hashkafa, the bottom line is talmud Torah k'neged kulam; the achievements in limud haTorah of the yeshiva world are unparalleled in the modern orthodox high schools. The same level of accomplishment is simply impossible in an environment of co-ed classes and a Talmud period of an hour a day.
Sure, there are problems with the yeshiva system. The cookie-cutter mold disenfranchises many students who are just not cut out for the system. Students' questions in many areas are not addressed properly and lead to superficial conformity without depth of commitment (i.e. towing the party line). But these problems are not solved by the modern orthodox education system and a good case can be made that they are even exacerbated. Greater openness to secular knowledge and culture has not proven itself to be a more effective barrier to assimilation in and of itself.
For all the talk of kids at risk and the weaknesses of our institutions, I think once in awhile we need to take stock of our successes as well.
the significance of the ikkarim
Based on the chiddush of R' Chaim Soloveitchik we can better explain the significance of the ikakrim. The problem with the Rambam's list (as noted by the Sefer haIkkarim) is that if it means to include only fundamental principles, it is too broad; if it means to include all necessary beliefs, it is far too narrow -- not everything a Jew is required to believe is included in the ikkarim. So what makes these 13 special?
R' Chaim held that the ikkarim must be affirmatively believed. It is not the sin of denial which makes one into an apikores (in which case context and cause would be valid considerations), but it is the lack of positive affirmation, which no excuse can substitute for, which seperates believer from heretic. Even if one does not affirm the ikkarim because of a misunderstanding or lack of knowledge, that failure practically sets one apart from the Jewish people. Other beliefs may be no less fundamental, but it is only the sin of intentional denial which would violate the prohibition against minus.
R' Chaim held that the ikkarim must be affirmatively believed. It is not the sin of denial which makes one into an apikores (in which case context and cause would be valid considerations), but it is the lack of positive affirmation, which no excuse can substitute for, which seperates believer from heretic. Even if one does not affirm the ikkarim because of a misunderstanding or lack of knowledge, that failure practically sets one apart from the Jewish people. Other beliefs may be no less fundamental, but it is only the sin of intentional denial which would violate the prohibition against minus.
Saturday, June 13, 2009
chiyuv of chinuch on ikkarei emunah
R' Chaim Brisker held that according to the Rambam a denial of the ikkarim due to misunderstanding is still considered apikorsus -- it is not the crime of denial which defines one as a heretic (in which case the context and cause of the crime would be relevant considerations), but rather it is the affirmative belief in the ikkarim which defines one as a member of the Jewish people. Excuses cannot subsitute for the affirmation of belief.
My son is learning Perek Cheilek and I noticed an interesting chiddush in the Birchas Avraham (Sanhedrim 91) based on this approach. Since the ikkarim must be affirmatively believed, he writes that there is an obligation of chinuch to teach children before bar mitzvah the meaning of the ikkarim so they understand and accept these beliefs. Unfortunately, most schools do not have a curriculum designed to accomplish this goal (yes, parents can do it, but parents can also teach kids gemara, halacha, and Tanach and schools go over that). It would be a nice idea for someone to pull together a program aimed at elementary school age children to accomplish this goal.
My son is learning Perek Cheilek and I noticed an interesting chiddush in the Birchas Avraham (Sanhedrim 91) based on this approach. Since the ikkarim must be affirmatively believed, he writes that there is an obligation of chinuch to teach children before bar mitzvah the meaning of the ikkarim so they understand and accept these beliefs. Unfortunately, most schools do not have a curriculum designed to accomplish this goal (yes, parents can do it, but parents can also teach kids gemara, halacha, and Tanach and schools go over that). It would be a nice idea for someone to pull together a program aimed at elementary school age children to accomplish this goal.
Friday, June 12, 2009
Was Miriam a heretic?
The Rambam counts as one of his 13 ikkarim the idea that Moshe Rabeinu was supreme among prophets; there can never be a prohpet equal to Moshe in stature.
At the end of Parshas Beha'alosecha the Torah relates that Miriam criticized Moshe Rabeinu's separation from his wife, equating Moshe with other prophets who did not take upon themselves such "chumros". Hashem punished Miriam with leprosy and told her that Moshe is in fact not like everyone else, hence her criticism was unjust.
The Rambam writes (Tumas Tzara'as 16:8) that we see learn from this episode the severity of lashon hara. Even though Miriam had watched over Moshe as an infant, had only the best intentions when speaking, she was nonetheless severely punished.
R' Elchanan Wasserman asks (Koveitz He'oros, Agados al Derech haPeshat 12:7) how this parsha can be the basis for a moral lesson about everyday lashon hara. Miriam's offense was unique in that aside from being damaging speech, it also undermined the cardinal belief in the supremacy of Moshe as a prophet. R' Elchanan goes a step further and notes that it seems in fact inconceivable that Miriam should have not accepted one of the ikkarim, the rules that form the very fabric of Jewish belief. Was Miriam a heretic (chas v'shalom)!?
R' Elchanan answers that Miriam was of course not a heretic because it is only through G-d's response to her offense that we learn that Moshe cannot be equated with all other prophets. Miriam had no way of knowing this basic tenet of belief before it was revealed in response to her offense.
I don't know if this is a question or an observation; take it however you like it. The Sefer haIkkarim (I:3) writes that the belief that no prophet can be greater than Moshe goes hand in hand with the belief in the eternity of Torah (he does so far as to ask III:20 why the Rambam counts them as 2 principles when they really are one in the same). Belief in the supremacy of Moshe excludes the possibility of another prophet arising and undermining Torah law. It follows that if Miriam was unaware of the supremacy of Moshe as a prophet, she was also unaware of the immutable nature of Torah; her "sevara" allowed for the theoretical possibility of new laws transmitted through other prophets. I don't know why, but I find this hard to digest.
Still more difficult, the Sefer haIkkarim (III:20) writes that the supremacy of Moshe as a prophet is established much earlier in the Torah. Moshe asks G-d while praying on Sinai "V'niflinu ani v'amcha" (Shmos 33:16), that both he and the Jewish people should be granted a special unique relationship with G-d. The pasuk is a double-request: a request that the Jewish nation be forever unique, and a request that he, Moshe, forever remain unique among prophets -- "ani v'amcha", I, Moshe, and the people, should each be unique. In defense of R' Elchanan, perhaps G-d's answer to this request was not publicly known until Miriam's offense, but that begs the question of why Moshe would keep to himself until this episode knowledge of a cardinal belief that establishes the eternity of Torah.
At the end of Parshas Beha'alosecha the Torah relates that Miriam criticized Moshe Rabeinu's separation from his wife, equating Moshe with other prophets who did not take upon themselves such "chumros". Hashem punished Miriam with leprosy and told her that Moshe is in fact not like everyone else, hence her criticism was unjust.
The Rambam writes (Tumas Tzara'as 16:8) that we see learn from this episode the severity of lashon hara. Even though Miriam had watched over Moshe as an infant, had only the best intentions when speaking, she was nonetheless severely punished.
R' Elchanan Wasserman asks (Koveitz He'oros, Agados al Derech haPeshat 12:7) how this parsha can be the basis for a moral lesson about everyday lashon hara. Miriam's offense was unique in that aside from being damaging speech, it also undermined the cardinal belief in the supremacy of Moshe as a prophet. R' Elchanan goes a step further and notes that it seems in fact inconceivable that Miriam should have not accepted one of the ikkarim, the rules that form the very fabric of Jewish belief. Was Miriam a heretic (chas v'shalom)!?
R' Elchanan answers that Miriam was of course not a heretic because it is only through G-d's response to her offense that we learn that Moshe cannot be equated with all other prophets. Miriam had no way of knowing this basic tenet of belief before it was revealed in response to her offense.
I don't know if this is a question or an observation; take it however you like it. The Sefer haIkkarim (I:3) writes that the belief that no prophet can be greater than Moshe goes hand in hand with the belief in the eternity of Torah (he does so far as to ask III:20 why the Rambam counts them as 2 principles when they really are one in the same). Belief in the supremacy of Moshe excludes the possibility of another prophet arising and undermining Torah law. It follows that if Miriam was unaware of the supremacy of Moshe as a prophet, she was also unaware of the immutable nature of Torah; her "sevara" allowed for the theoretical possibility of new laws transmitted through other prophets. I don't know why, but I find this hard to digest.
Still more difficult, the Sefer haIkkarim (III:20) writes that the supremacy of Moshe as a prophet is established much earlier in the Torah. Moshe asks G-d while praying on Sinai "V'niflinu ani v'amcha" (Shmos 33:16), that both he and the Jewish people should be granted a special unique relationship with G-d. The pasuk is a double-request: a request that the Jewish nation be forever unique, and a request that he, Moshe, forever remain unique among prophets -- "ani v'amcha", I, Moshe, and the people, should each be unique. In defense of R' Elchanan, perhaps G-d's answer to this request was not publicly known until Miriam's offense, but that begs the question of why Moshe would keep to himself until this episode knowledge of a cardinal belief that establishes the eternity of Torah.
Thursday, June 11, 2009
why are you a rationalist?
My fingers are numb from responding to comments on Pesachim 94! Thank you all for the stimulating ideas and thoughtful feedback, and apologies if I have not responded to every detail. OK, granted that some of you are convinced that a great many of the Rishonim were rationalists and you find this view very appealing. Here is my simple question: Why? I have a Moreh Nevuchim on my shelf that I read once upon a time, but find so much more meaning in the world view of Nefesh haChaim or the Ishbitza (just to take random as examples) that I can't understand what is driving you people. And my impression is that not just the chassidic world or yeshiva ba'alei machshava, but even the modern orthodox world (I hate using labels, but it makes it easier in this case) has a preference for the mystical over the rationalist: the Young Israel closest to me hosts a Sefas Emes shiur, another modern orthodox shul hosts a Shabbos shiur in Zohar, one of the largest and most vibrant kehilos in the 5 Towns is R' Moshe Weinberger's Aish Kodesh, and among the neighborhood yeshivos certainly Sha'ar Yashuv is known for emphasizing chassidic style "machshava" as well as traditional gemara learning. Rav Kook emphasized the need to teach the "hidden" parts of Torah to our generation, and R' Soloveitchik critiqued Moreh in part IV of his Halakhic Mind. "Mysticism" does not mean belief in witchcraft or ghosts or new age healers or thinkers -- it includes a systematic way of looking at the world and one's relationship to G-d, as explained by seforim like the Ramchal, Maharal, Nefesh haChaim, Tanya, and others. What is so unappealing about these works?
To flip the question around: why reject rationalism? A few reasons off the top of my head:
1) Its explanations are not convincing -- do you think eating non-kosher is unhealthy? (Ramban VaYikra 11:13 cites the scientists to support this!) I can't have no way to know what is good or bad for my soul, but I can empirically test what is good for my body.
2) It makes religion the handmaiden to other values -- mitzvos are measured as "good" relative to other values (e.g. health, moral refinement, "justice") instead of being appreciated for their intrinsic worth.
3) Much in life seems mysterious and to defy rational explanation, and religion is no exception. The poet or painter speaks to us about deep human truths that the scientist or philosopher cannot capture or articulate.
4) Reducing Torah to a means toward moral or intellectual perfection alone robs it of its distinction from disciplines like law, philosophy, etc. which also stake a claim to these same goals.
5) Laws such as chukim are by definition inexplicable and point to a need for subservience to G-d without external justification - i.e. "because He said so".
This is not an exhaustive list, but a starting point. I'm not so much interested in responses to these critiques as much as an explanation from those who have both sampled Moreh Nevuchim or Ralbag or some other rationalist Rishon and also dabbled in the world of R' Tzadok and Maharal: Why does the former grab you and not the latter?
To flip the question around: why reject rationalism? A few reasons off the top of my head:
1) Its explanations are not convincing -- do you think eating non-kosher is unhealthy? (Ramban VaYikra 11:13 cites the scientists to support this!) I can't have no way to know what is good or bad for my soul, but I can empirically test what is good for my body.
2) It makes religion the handmaiden to other values -- mitzvos are measured as "good" relative to other values (e.g. health, moral refinement, "justice") instead of being appreciated for their intrinsic worth.
3) Much in life seems mysterious and to defy rational explanation, and religion is no exception. The poet or painter speaks to us about deep human truths that the scientist or philosopher cannot capture or articulate.
4) Reducing Torah to a means toward moral or intellectual perfection alone robs it of its distinction from disciplines like law, philosophy, etc. which also stake a claim to these same goals.
5) Laws such as chukim are by definition inexplicable and point to a need for subservience to G-d without external justification - i.e. "because He said so".
This is not an exhaustive list, but a starting point. I'm not so much interested in responses to these critiques as much as an explanation from those who have both sampled Moreh Nevuchim or Ralbag or some other rationalist Rishon and also dabbled in the world of R' Tzadok and Maharal: Why does the former grab you and not the latter?
new issue of Kallah Magazine
The new issue of Kallah Magazine is now available around the 5Towns, Queens, parts of Brooklyn, and it is on the way to Teaneck. Pick up a free copy at the local shopping places.
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