lo yuchal levaker: cannot or may not?

Less than 2 weeks ago we discussed the pasuk in Parshas Re'eh "lo tuchal l'echol b'she'arecha ma'aser degancha..." (12:17). Although "lo tuchal" means you cannot, i.e. it is impossible to do, the pasuk means b'pshuto (as Rashi explains) "you may not", i.e. there is a prohibition of doing so. (In the previous post we discussed why the pasuk did not simply word it as a prohibition.)

The strange construction of "cannot" appears again in our parsha -- "lo yuchal l'vaker es ben ha'ahuva", you cannot give first-born rights to the more beloved son who was born second. The Ramban counts this as a mitzvas aseh which prohibits transferring inheritance from the bechor to another son (see his additions to the Rambam's count at the end of Sefer haMitzvos, #12).

How to interpret the pasuk sheds light on a discussion in the Yerushalmi Baba Basra (8:4, 23b in Vilna ed.): R' Lo gave the bechor an equal portion as the other sons. R' Chagai asked: what of the pasuk "lo yuchal levakeir"? R' Elazar then responded, "yachol v'aino rashai".

The Pnei Moshe makes the assumption that everyone agrees that if the father (in his lifetime) makes a gift of his assets to a son other than the firstborn he can circumvent the prohibition of "lo yuchal levaker". R' Chagai only questioned what R' Lo did because he did not know the facts of the case. This reading is a bit difficult because R' Elazar's statement does not add anything that was not known at the start of the sugya.

The Tzion Yerushalayim, however, reads the the give and take of the sugya as debating how to understand the pasuk of "lo yuchal levaker". R' Chagai understood the pasuk to mean what it says: one cannot transfer assets; i.e. it is impossible to do. To which R' Elazar replied that "lo yuchal" does not mean it is impossible, but rather it means (as Rashi in P' Re'eh and the Ramban understood) that if done incorrectly there is a prohibition of making such a transfer.

amira l'aku"m vs. gerama: which is the lesser issur?

Given the choice, which is the lesser issur: violating Shabbos (or some other issur) through an amira l'aku"m, or violating Shabbos through a gerama? The difference between the two: amira l'aku"m involves doing a full act of issur, but it would be done by someone else who is not a bar chiyuva; gerama is not a full ma'aseh issur. I stumbled across a R' Akiva Eiger (Tos. RAK"E to Bechoros 5:3) which claims that amira l'aku"m is the lesser issur, but I do not understand his proof (he simply says see the Rosh to B.M. 7:6), so make of it what you will.

measurement for eglah arufa -- machshava

Yesterday we discussed the halachic question of whether measuring to the closest city for purposes of eglah arufah is a birur, to determine where the victim came from, or simply a hanhaga. Support for the Rambam's view that it is a hanhaga can be gleaned from the fact that a measurement must be done even if it is obvious which is the closest city and from the fact that we ignore the actual closest city and measure only to a city which has a Beis Din. If the measurement is not for the purpose of gaining insight into where the victim came from, what meaning is there to this ceremony? And why must it be personally done by members of the Sanhedrin and not their agents (Sotah 45a)?

The Rambam's view certainly fits l'shitaso (see Ramban 21:4) of his explanation that the eglah arufah ceremony was designed for publicity. By having a public gathering involving members of the Sanhedrin, news of the murder would spread, increasing the likelihood that a witness might step forward. Determining the exact city the victim came from is secondary to spreading the word.

I think there is more to it than that. Why is it that the Beis Din of the closest city must perform the ceremony of eglah arufah and declare themselves innocent of spilling blood? As Chazal already ask, is it conceivable that Beis Din are murderers? Rashi cites Chazal's answer: Beis Din required atonement for perhaps not seeing to the stranger's hospitality in their city, leading to his/her wandering the dangerous roads and being attacked. Ibn Ezra offers a different, more remarkable answer: had Beis Din not been guilty of a similar crime, the murder of this innocent victim would not have occurred. I am not sure if Ibn Ezra means this in a mystical way or he simply means that where community leaders are lax even in a small way in a certain area that attitude seeps into the community and can have far greater and more dangerous repercussions. Either way, what emerges from Ibn Ezra is that members of Beis Din do not merely share the passive guilt of perhaps creating a situation ripe for crime to occur, but rather the members of Beis Din are themselves culpable in some way for the very crime of murder.

The parsha of eglah arufa demands the personal participation of members of Sanhedrin and calls for measurement specifically to a city with a Beis Din because the parsha is teaching is that leaders in particular bear direct responsibility for the actions that happen in their community. A city without a Beis Din is simply a city which relies on the next closest Beis Din for guidance, direction, oversight, supervision, because there is no city and community which can exist on its own unsupervised and without leadership. The measurement for eglah arufah is not only about attracting publicity to the crime, but is also about the public re-assertion of leadership and demonstration of responsibility by the Beis Din.

Read in this light, the opening and closing of Parshas Shoftim perfectly balance each other. The parsha opens with the charge to the community to appoint judges over themselves and accept their leadership. The end of the parsha calls upon judges and leaders to assert their leadership and act as models to the community or face devastating consequences.

measurement for eglah arufa -- halacha

Before Beis Din can perform the eglah arufa ceremony they must measure the distance from the murder victim's body to the nearby cities. Rashi (21:2) explains that the purpose of the measurement is to determine which city is closest. However, this explanation seems to contradict the gemara (Sotah 45) which states that even if the body is found right outside a city, the measurement must still be done -- even if which city is closest is obvious there is a mitzvah to measure.

How to understand this halacha of measurement is perhaps a dispute between the Rambam and Tosfos. Tosfos (Baba Basra 23b d"h bdleika) cites the halacha that we only measure to a cities which have a Beis Din. Asks Tosfos: if the purpose of measurement is to determine where the victim came from, why would we overlook the closest city just because it lacks a Beis Din? Tosfos leaves the question unresolved. It seems that Tosfos, like Rashi, held that the measurement was done for the purpose of birur, discovering which city was closest.

The context of Tos. question is a sugya in Baba Basra (23) which discusses whether rov or kurva (proximity) is better proof. The gemara challenges R' Chanina's view that rov is stronger from the fact that we measure distances and choose the closest city despite that fact that rov of the world does not live in any of the nearby cities. The gemara dismisses this proof and writes that the measurements are done when the cities are isolated from the rest of the world by mountains. However, when the Rambam cites this halacha of measurement (Rotzeiach 9:6), he omits to mention that it holds true only where the cities are isolated from an interfering rov. Apparently the Rambam held that even given the possibility that the victim came from some outside rov, there is still a mitzvah to measure to the closest city. According to the Rambam, measurement is not done to determine where the victim came from, but is simply a hanhaga, a necessary step in the eglah arufa process that has no bearing on discovering evidence. We might even go a step further and suggest that the Rambam felt free to ignore the conclusion of the sugya in Baba Basra because he read the the sugya in Sotah which demands measurement even if the closest city is obvious as proof that measurement cannot be for the purpose of birur.

For more on the issue of whether measurement is a birur or hanhaga take a peek at the sources collected in my BIL's sefer Bigdei Sheish on Baba Basra . Assuming the lomdus is correct, I think in part II of this post (to come sometime bl"n in the near future) we need to explore what possible purpose this hanhaga of measurement might have. Is there any reason for Beis Din to personally have to go out (Sotah 45 also tells us this cannot be done through shluchim) to take measurements that will tell us nothing about the murder victim or his attacker?

seeing the whole forest

The Rambam (Sanhedrin 4:8) writes that smicha can be given to a judge for a specific purpose, e.g. a judge may be given smicha to decide torts, but not for capital punishment. However, for a judge to receive any form of smicha he must be proficient in every area of halacha. In other words, even if that judge were receiving a smicha "license" only to decide torts, he must be an expert in capital cases and capable of deciding them.

The Minchas Chinuch notes that among the distinctions listed by the Mishna (Sanhedrin 32) between the requirements for courts judging torts vs. the requirements for courts judging capital cases is that a mamzer or ba'al mum may judge a tort case but not a capital punishment case. How does this make sense according to the Rambam? In order to receive smicha to judge even torts, a judge must be capable of receiving smicha and judging every type of case, even capital punishment cases. If a mamzer cannot judge capital punishment cases, he should be incapable of receiving smicha even to judge torts. The M.C. does not resolve this issue.

Why would a judge need to know everything if he is only pakening in one limited area?

The gemara (Kiddush 10b) records the challenge made to one of the Tanaim: "Baki atah b'kol chadrei Torah v'lidrsoh b'kal v'chomer ei atah yodeia?!" - "You are an expert in all areas of Torah and do not know how to darshen a kal v'chomer?!" At first glance this is a hard point to understand -- what does being a baki in shas have to do with drawing a logical inference? R' Elchanan (Koveitz Shiurim, see post here) quotes that R' Chaim Brisker explained that while an inference may be logically compelling when seen in the narrow context of one sugya, it may prove totally erroneous when measured against the larger background of kol haTorah kulah. There is no such thing as being an expert in dinei mamonos to the exclusion of all else, or paskening issur v'heter without knowing even kodshim sugyos. Truth in Torah can be arrived at only if one has a grasp on the breadth of Torah as a whole.

Mashal l'mah hadavar domeh: A person can zoom in with google maps and look at one isolated few blocks and figure out within those few blocks the correct set of turns to take to get somewhere. This person will be 100% convinced that their "derech" is the correct one. However, someone else who sees the map as a whole may disagree. Looking at those isolated few blocks does not take into account the construction that lies further down the road, the detour that will be required later, the shortcut that comes up later on it you take the other fork in the road.

The reason a person should consult gedolei yisrael on questions of halacha and emunos v'deyos is because even if a person feels that he/she is an expert in a particular little 4 amos of the world of halacha, he/she is looking at no more than a single road on a much larger map. Even to decide between competing opinions and views in a limited area requires knowledge of what Torah as an organic whole means.

minuy dayanim

The Ramban (beg. Parshas Shoftim) cites the Rambam as holding that the mitzvah to appoint judges applies only in Eretz Yisrael. Ramban challenges this view based on a braysa (Makkos 7) that says that the mitzvah does apply in chutz la'aretz, albeit in a modified form: in Eretz Yisrael there is a mitzvah to appoint judges in every city and every district; outside Eretz Yisrael it suffices to have district judges alone.

Achronim dismiss the Ramban's question because the text we have of the Rambam matches the braysa exactly. However, the is reason to believe some other text of the Rambam (or a similar view in Rishonim) does exist in line with what Ramban quotes. The Sefer haChinuch, who usually echoes the Rambam, does write that the mitzvah of appointing judges applies only in Eretz Yisrael. Why should this be?

Even Ramban's position that there is an identical mitzvah of minuy in chutza la'aretz begs the question of why there is a distinction between Eretz Yisrael, where judges are needed in every city, and chutz la'aretz, where district judges suffice.

There may be two distinct components to the mitzvah of establishing courts: 1) As an end in itself, to fulfill the mitzvah of minuy dayanim; 2) As a necessary means to preserving a just and lawful society.

The mitzvah of minuy dayanim as an end in itself applies only in Eretz Yisrael. This is why the Rambam/Chinuch write that the mitzvah applies only in Eretz Yisrael and why every city must establish a court. However, there is still a need for batei din in chutz la'aretz to enforce justice on an ad hoc basis, as a means to preserving social order. Since the courts in chutz la'aretz are just a means to this end, district courts alone suffice. (See Avi Ezri, Hil. Melachim ch. 9 who applies this distinction to the mitzvah of dinim for ben noach.)

the danger of ta'aroves

I don't know why, but I just have not felt in the mood to write lately. Sometimes it seems that sharing divrei Torah on a forum such as a blog is a bracha l'vatala. The anti-torah material on the internet so greatly outnumbers the torah sites that rather than encourage people to read divrei torah on the 'net it is probably better to encourage people to just stop reading any jewish sites to avoid the pitfalls. I remember someone once telling me that his mashgiach told him that if he goes to college, he should go to someplace like Notre Dame. Can you imagine walking around on a campus filled with crosses? Why would a Jew put himself in such an environment? The answer is that the odds of a ben yeshiva falling prey to what he recognizes as treif are slim (which is not to say there is no danger at all!) But when you walk around on a campus filled with yalmukas, where there may even be a beis medrash, and amidst all that there is a "Tanach" lecture by someone who happens to deny the concept of Torah min hashamayim as most of klal yisrael understands it, then the danger is far greater. The ta'aroves of tov v'ra is a much harder challenge to respond to than the challenge of ra in its pure form. "Tocho achal v'klipaso zarak" demands both the knowledge to discriminate between the two and vigilance to engage in a constant war of being boreir.

The Tiferes Shlomo gives a mashal to a king who is locked away in a dungeon somewhere, his palace taken over by despots, his throne in danger of being lost. The king's son manages to sneak into the dungeon to meet his father. So what does the son talk about -- does he have a plan to escape, does he share his father's sorrow and worry, does he offer hope and pledge to get his father out? No, he starts telling over to his father a teirutz to a difficult Rambam!

The Tiferes Shlomo was not talking about the internet, but I'll steal his mashal anyway. You have hundreds of "jewish" sites written by even "orthodox" (or maybe "orthoprax") people which create a ta'aroves and destroy the palace of the king. While the king sits languishing in prison we should sit here writing up answers to difficult Rambams?!

My wife pointed out to me that a real Litvak would not be swayed by this Tiferes Shlomo. Yes, we should davka be saying over difficult Rambams, because that gufa is what strengthens the king and will lead to his release. Point granted with respect to the king, but what of the citizens of the empire who are swayed by the leaders of the coup and lost to their false propaganda?

Some will argue that we should seize the opportunity to engage in debate and prove the truth of our perspective. The Alter of Navardohk has a brilliant insight that shows why such an approach is doomed to failure. Hashem appeared to Avimelech and told him that he will die for taking Sarah; he must return her to Avraham. Hashem was not condemning Avimelech yet -- he was threatening punishment, but Avimelech had a way out by complying with Hashem's request. So how does Avimelech's answer make any sense -- "Hagoy gam tzadik ta'harog", Hashem, will you also punish the innocent? M'mah nafshach -- if Avimelech complies, then G-d will not punish him; if he does not comply, then he is not innocent, is he? The Alter explains in Madreigas ha'Adam that Avimelech was not arguing with the terms of the threat, but he was arguing with Hashem making such a threat in the first place -- since Avraham said Sarah was his sister, she was fair game! In other words, even though G-d himself came and told Avimelech that Sarah was offlimits, Avimelech defended his position based on his own corrupt reasoning and labeled G-d as the unjust one.

What proof are you going to offer to those who have their own agenda? What R' Chaim or R' Akiva Eiger held? But a person can just say that good for them, but I hold differently and I think I am right. What the Rambam said (and we all know that the Rambam is kodesh kodashim of Rishonim)? But who says the Rambam is right and not me? What R' Akiva held, what Moshe Rabeinu held, what Hashem himself holds? But you see, when you are arguing with an Avimelech, even G-d's word itself is not proof enough.

So much for this rant. Maybe a difficult Rashba later this week if I recover the urge to write.

the reminder not to forget the levi

Sandwiched in between the requirement of building a mikdash and offering korbanos therein (12:5-18) and the permissibility of eating meat elsewhere once the boundaries of Eretz Yisrael expand to the point that it becomes difficult to travel to the mikdash constantly (12:20-28) is a pasuk which warns not to forget about the Levi (12:19). Meshech Chochma writes that the connection between this pasuk and the context of the parsha may be explained based on the view of the Rambam (which we recently discussed here) that kohanim and levi'im do not collect terumos/ma'asros in lands conquered outside the promised boundaries of Eretz Yisrael. Terumos/ma'asros are meant to compensate for not receiving a portion in Eretz Yisrael. Since kohanim and levi'im do receive a portion of land conquered outside the boundaries of Eretz Yisrael, they cannot collect teru"m in that territory. Therefore, when the Torah speaks of the expansion of territory, land in which the levi is not supported by termuos and ma'asros, it reminds us not to forget or neglect the levi as he may still need our help and support.

a plea for proper davening

After describing the centrality of a Mikdash as the one place where korbanos should be offered after the conquest of Eretz Yisrael (12:6):
וַהֲבֵאתֶם שָׁמָּה, עֹלֹתֵיכֶם וְזִבְחֵיכֶם, וְאֵת מַעְשְׂרֹתֵיכֶם, וְאֵת תְּרוּמַת יֶדְכֶם; וְנִדְרֵיכֶם, וְנִדְבֹתֵיכֶם, וּבְכֹרֹת בְּקַרְכֶם, וְצֹאנְכֶם.
The Torah continues and relates that not only obligatory korbanos, but also ma'aser, bechoros, and other pledges should be brought to the Mikdash (12:17):
לֹא-תוּכַל לֶאֱכֹל בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ, מַעְשַׂר דְּגָנְךָ וְתִירֹשְׁךָ וְיִצְהָרֶךָ, וּבְכֹרֹת בְּקָרְךָ, וְצֹאנֶךָ; וְכָל-נְדָרֶיךָ אֲשֶׁר תִּדֹּר, וְנִדְבֹתֶיךָ וּתְרוּמַת יָדֶךָ.

The literal translation of this pasuk is "you cannot eat" ma'aser, bechoros, etc. wherever you please. However, as we all learned in English grammar, "cannot" implies something is impossible; "may not" is the proper term to use when an action is illegal or not permissible. Rashi apparently was sensitive to the difference and therefore cites R' Yehoshua ben Korcha: "You can eat, but are not permitted to." So much for the correct meaning of the pasuk, but it does not address the underlying question. Why does the Torah use the expression, "lo tuchal l'echol" -- "you cannot eat..." with the extra word "tuchal" connoting "cannot", instead of simply saying "lo yochal...", etc. -- "you may not eat..." as it does for all other eating prohibitions?

I'll leave it up to you to take a peek at the commentaries on Rashi who explain the pshat; I want to share a thought of the Tiferes Shlomo. A person who comes to Yerushalayim to offer korbanos is not just there to have a steak. The experience of being in the Beis haMikdash, partaking of food which is from "shulchan gavoha", is a spiritual one which has no comparison. What happens after you walk away from such an experience? If the experience is authentic, real, something which penetrates to your soul, then there is no way you can walk away saying, "OK, I had my week vacation in the Mikdash, now back to the regular routine." It's just not possible -- "lo tuchal l'echol," you just can't go home and stop at the Kosher Delight for a hamburger and fries, you just can't even eat your ma'aser the same way, because you now know what eating really means, what it means to taste food with your neshoma and not with your guf, and it's that true eating which you will forever yearn to re-experience again.

A practical suggestion: We unfortunately do not yet have the opportunity to visit the Mikdash and eat korbanos, but we do have the opportunity to visit our local mikdash me'at, our shuls, and engage in tefilah, the substitute for korbanos. Let's be realistic: it is hard during the week, when there is so much going on, to daven with kavanah, to stay focused on every word, not rushing to blast out of shul. Even if you personally daven that way, odds are if you daven outside a yeshiva setting, the rest of the minyan is rushing out the door. I have even heard of a "matzah minyan" -- 18 minutes, start to finish. How can we improve the quality of our davening? I think the answer lies in how we daven on Shabbos, and if possible, on Sunday. On those days there is no rush, there is not a train or job waiting, there is nothing to stop anyone from making tefilah into the experience it should be. If davening on Shabbos and Sunday is a davening that takes you to spiritual heights, then during the week you will yearn to re-experience at least a taste of that same type of davening. You just can't experience tefilah like it was meant to be and then go back to the normal routine the rest of the week. Of course, there will always be the bus, the train, the job, but I think there will be a renewed appreciation and desire for tefilah that will make a difference.

Let me describe what I mean by a davening that is a spiritual experience because I am cynical by nature and was just amazed to find such a thing in real life. I was recently at a minyan where over 80% of the attendees were already seated and present before brachos. Once the shat"z started, if someone needed something from a neighbor, e.g. to squeeze by their seat, to get a sefer, etc. they simply gestured, motioned, etc., but there was no talking. There were no mishebeirachs between aliyos, but there was no talking bein gavra l'gavra of kri'as haTorah. There was not a sound during shmoneh esrei, and no one started a conversation if they finished early and were waiting for the shat"z to start chazaras hashat"z. It was simply quiet, except for the shared voice of tefilah. The Rabbi did not shush people, the gabay did not klap the bimah every two minutes for quiet, kids who were there sat reading or went out if they needed something. This is the yotzei min haklal which is melameid that my cynical attitude is wrong and the same achievement is possible even for the rest of the klal. Let's be real: there are people who simply do not see any purpose for coming to shul if they cannot speak to their neighbor, have kiddush whenever they feel like, drag their kids along for free babysitting for a few hours and lots of candy, walk out on the Rabbis derasha to do whatever, and generally turn a religious experience into a social experience (see, my cynical side is taking over again). But it is possible for things to not be this way, and baruch Hashem that some people do get it, because the difference is not just a difference in Shabbos davening, but is a difference that echoes through the week as well.

The month of Av is the month in which we lost the Beis haMikdash. The key to getting it back is to show that we can't live without it, without meaningful avodah as it should be.

achila + seviya: the Torah obligation of birchas hamazon

The Minchas Chinuch (mitzvah 430) writes that the mitzvah of bentching min haTorah is obligatory only when there is "achalta v'savata", a formal halachic act of eating (achila) after which one is satiated. Halacha defines eating as consuming at least a k'zayis of food within the time span of achilas pras (the time it would take to eat a small loaf, which is at most 9 minutes according to some poskim, as little as 2 minutes according to others). Therefore, if one nibbles slowly at a meal, one may not be obligated min haTorah in bentching (MG"A O.C. 210). The Minchas Chinuch extends this chiddush further and wonders if only a k'zayis must be eaten in the timeframe of k'dei achilas pras, or one must eat to the point of satiation during that time frame.

R' Tzvi Pesach Frank (Shu"T Har Tzvi) does not quote the M.C., but clearly disagrees. He cites the words of the Rambam (Brachos 1:1):
מצות עשה מן התורה לברך אחר אכילת מזון, שנאמר "ואכלת, ושבעת--ובירכת את ה' אלוהיך" (דברים ח,י). ואינו חייב מן התורה, אלא אם שבע, שנאמר "ושבעת--ובירכת"
and notes that the only condition the Rambam says which must be met to be Biblically obligated in birchas hamazon is feeling satiated. The Rambam does not say "achal v'sava" -- he just says "sava". (I am not 100% convinced. The Rambam mentions "achilas mazon" at the opening of the halacha and perhaps he is simply adding that satiation is a condition that must be met on top of achila, not that satiation is the only condition that must be met.)

One interesting nafka minah between these views is the famous chakira of R' Akiva Eiger (O.C. 186) regarding a boy who has a big meal just before the night of his bar mitzvah and bentches. When the sun sets the boy instantly becomes bar mitzvah and now counts as a gadol. Must this boy now bentch again because of his experience of satiation as a gadol, or is his bentching as a katan sufficient to exempt from the mitzvah?

Aside from the question of whether the mitzvah performance of a katan counts towards a gadol's obligation, one also needs to factor into the debate the fact that the experience of seviya as a gadol is not accompanied by a formal act of achila done as a gadol. -- whether the seviya of a gadol caused by the achila of a katan is enough to warrant birchas hamazon may depend on whether you take R' Tzvi Pesach Frank or the Minchas Chinuch's position.

endangered species?

I'm not talking about wildlife - I'm talking about us. No matter how you slice it, the latest American Jewish Identification Survey (AJIS) is sad. Take a look at this summary from the Washington Examiner. Some key points:

-- More than 1 in 3 of Jews describe themselves as thoroughly secular, as opposed to just 6% of the general population.

--The number of Jews describing themselves as not religious has risen from 20% to 35% in the past 20 years.

--The number of Jews affiliated in any way with Judaism as a religion went down from 4.3million 20 years ago to 3.3 million today.

I don't think you need to be a genius to see the cause-effect relationship the researchers found between intermarriage and lack of affiliation. Reform and Conservative movements, here is the fruit of your labor.

This reaction by "Rabbi" Michael Lerner from Tikkun Magazine is (surprisingly) exactly on target:

"What undercuts peoples' commitment to Judaism is the spiritual emptiness that has characterized much of the organized Jewish community," Mr. Lerner said. "The vacuity, the spiritual deadliness people experience growing up in many of America's synagogues leads them to a lack of interest in Judaism and to explore other spiritual traditions.

"People tell me, 'Yeah, I grew up in that system and the only values I learned were safety for the Jewish people, blind loyalty to the state of Israel and making it in America,' " the rabbi added. "The people who get most honored in the Jewish world are the Bernie Madoffs."

Could not have put it better myself.

GR"A on women's reward for Torah study

I found an interesting GR"A quoted in R' Shach's discussion (Avi Ezri, Hil. Talmud Torah) of why women should recite birchas haTorah. The Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 246:6) quotes the Rambam's statement that women who learn Torah receive reward just as anyone not obligated to perform a mitzvah receives reward if they do so anyway. Had you asked me I would have said the source for this din is R' Chanina's statement quoted in various places (e.g. Kid 31a) that "gadol metzuveh v'oseh", someone who is obligated to do a mitzvah receives greater reward for its performance than someone who is "aino metzuveh", someone who voluntarily performs the mitzvah, but the aino metzuveh does receive some reward.

The GR"A, however, points to a different source. GR"A cites Bava Kama 38 where we learn that even a non-Jew who learns Torah (the 7 mitzvos that apply to non-Jews) can become as great as the kohein gadol.

Why would the GR"A not refer to R' Chanina and instead send you to a gemara that speaks of the reward a non-Jew can receive for talmud Torah? Are we to infer that the reward of an "aino metzuveh" who studies Torah is special and distinct from the reward of an "aino metzuveh" who engages in other mitzvos (R' Chanina's din)?

rabim hagoyim ha'eileh - mimeni

The Yid haKadosh is quoted as saying that Sefer Devarim is the best mussar sefer. R' Tzadok writes that the words can be felt as if Moshe Rabeinu was directly speaking to each one of us. I think that feeling is especially strong when you read a parsha like Eikev.

You may ask when you come to Eretz Yisrael (7:17):
יז כִּי תֹאמַר בִּלְבָבְךָ, רַבִּים הַגּוֹיִם הָאֵלֶּה מִמֶּנִּי; אֵיכָה אוּכַל, לְהוֹרִישָׁם
"How can I conquer these nations which are so much greater than me?" The Torah answers to remember the events and miracles of Yetzitas Mitzrayim and you will realize there is nothing to fear.

Why does the Torah introduce this parsha by suggesting that a question or doubt will arise and need to be addressed? Why not simply command not to fear the enemy because you know G-d has the power to deal with them and you are not on your own? It sounds almost like there is a cause-effect relationship between the question and the promise of Hashem's help.

The Sefas Emes explains that the first step to acknowledging Hashem is recognizing "rabim hagoyim ha'eileh m'meni" -- we do not have the power to go it alone against the obstacles in our way. Without a recognition of man's limits there is no room to recognize G-d's help, nor will that help be forthcoming.

Here's a different remarkable reading from the Igra d'Kallah: When you see that there are obstacles, that the world is not what it should be, "Rabim hagoyim ha'eileh", then the first step to do tshuvah is to say, "Mimeini," the problems stem from me and are mine to correct! With that acceptance of responsibility a person will merit Hashem's help even if he is not yet worthy, just as Hashem redeemed us from Egypt despite our lack of merit.

There are many people who respond to calamity by blaming G-d. It's His fault that the nations are so strong, that there we have so many problems of every sort, that the world is not the garden of Eden that it once was and should be. The "blame G-d" attitude is the opposite of "Mimeini," recognizing our own faults as a cause of harm and seizing upon the opportunity we have to be agents of change. We may not understand why bad things occur, but we can do our part to correct the problem.

The Chasam Sofer on our parsha explains the pasuk we say in bentching, "Na'ar hayisi v'gam zakanti v'lo ra'isi tzadik ne'ezav..." If we take this pasuk seriously, I doubt we could say it. Has no one seen a tzadik suffering, his children suffering? How could G-d do such a thing! The answer is that the pasuk is not talking about G-d, but about us. David haMelech says that he never saw a tzadik and his children suffering -- he didn't just see and walk away bemoaning the lack of justice in the world, but he saw and did something about it to alleviate that suffering! And for those who walk away blaming G-d, perhaps the reason G-d arranged for them to witness the problem was precisely to ellicit their intervention to correct it... "Mimeini"

are women *obligated* in birchas hatorah?

This is really a follow up to a comment to the previous post which questioned my use of the word "obligated" with respect to women reciting birchas hatorah. Shouldn't I rather have said that they are "entitled" to say the bracha?

The answer I think depends on why women can/should say birchas hatorah in the first place. Although women are entitled to perform mitzvos aseh she'hazman gerama like sitting in sukkah, hearing shofar, etc., the Beis Yosef paskens that they are not permitted to recite a bracha because they have no obligation to fulfill these mitzvos (the Rama disagrees). Why then does the Beis Yosef pasken (O.C. 47:14) that women may/should recite birchas hatorah when they have no obligation to learn? A number of theories have been suggested:

1) Women are obligated to learn the halachos which apply to them (Maharil, Agur, B"Y).
2) Women are obligated to recite pesukim as part of davening (ibid.)
3) Birchas hatorah is on the cheftza shel Torah, the subject matter, irrespective of whether there is a chovas hagavra to study (Brisker Rav, see this post)
4) Women must see to it that their husbands and children learn, which is part of being "oseik" in Torah (Chasan Sofer)
5) Birchas hatorah is a birchas hane'henin which a women must recite over the pleasure she gets in learning even if she is not obligated to study (R"Y Engel, Lekach Tov #11).

I'm not going to debate the merits of any one of these sevaros now. Our focus is this: is the Shulchan Aruch which prohibits brachos on other mitzvos she'hazman gerama simply allowing a bracha over limud haTorah, or obligating a bracha over limud haTorah? It seems to me that according to any of the reasons given a women in in fact obligated to recite birchas hatorah. Unlike zman gerama mitzvos where women have no obligation and hence may not recite a bracha, in some way women are included in the obligation of engaging in minimal Torah study, encouraging Torah study, they partake of the enjoyment of Torah study, or simply texts of Torah demand a bracha before being studied irrespective of whether the learner is obligated to study them or not -- therefore a bracha must be recited. It is that very distinction between obligation and lack of obligation which separates birchas hatorah from all other brachos on zman gerama mitzvos.

The GR"A comments on this din that women may recite birchas hatorah just as they may recite brachos on any other mitzvas aseh she'hazman gerama. The GR"A is clearly not explaining the Beis Yosef's position, because the Beis Yosef holds that women may never recite a bracha on zman gerama mitzvos. Rather, the GR"A is offering his own justification for the bracha. According to this approach, birchas hatorah, like other brachos over zman gerama mitzvos, would be optional, not obligatory.

Nafka minah: Can women be motzi men in birchas hatorah? Certainly according to some of the reasons used to explain the Beis Yosef there is room to argue that men and women have parallel chiyuvim to recite the bracha (though the parallel may not be exact according to all the reasons). However, according to the view of the GR"A, hands down there is no comparison between the option to recite the bracha and the obligation to recite the bracha and women may not be motzi men.

If you pull an all nighter Shavuos, can you wake your wife up to recite birchas hatorah for you because there is a safeik whether to recite a new bracha when you are up all night? No, because it would be rude and inconsiderate to wake you wife at 4:30 AM for this reason. But lets say she is up anyway... maybe you could argue sfeik sfeika: safeik whether you wife can be motzi you, and even if she can't, safeik whether you are obligated to make a new birchas hatorah in the first place.

While on the topic, an interesting mareh makom. R' Chaim Kanievsky writes (and I have not seen it inside, only quoted) in his "Sefer haZikaron" that women need not be careful regarding those items poskim mention are "kashe l'shikcha", which cause forgetfulness, because they have no obligation to study Torah. The Halichos Beisa (ch 28 footnote 14) argues. Even sans a formal chiyuv of talmud torah, women are obligated to know and study practical halacha (reason #2 above). Hence, they too must be mindful (excuse the irony here) of anything that would cause forgetfulness.

birchas haTorah after an interruption in learning

Why is it that if one recites a bracha on eating in the sukkah and then leaves the sukkah after finishing the meal, a new bracha is required at the next meal when one re-enters the sukkah; however, if one recites birchas haTorah on learning and then goes about doing other things, a new birchas haTorah is not required when one resumes learning?

Tosfos (Brachos 11b) answers that exiting the sukkah brings the performance of mitzvas sukkah to a close for that time period. However, the mitzvah of talmud Torah is an ongoing obligation which has no end. R' Soloveitchik compared it to a mother's relationship to her child: even when the mother is not actively engaged in taking care of the child, the child is still in the back of the mother's mind and a subject of her concern. There is no hesech hada'as from talmud Torah even if one closes the gemara to engage in other business.

I recently discovered (thanks to learning Halichos Beisa with my daughter) that the Tzlach writes that Tosfos' sevara is well and good for men who have an ongoing obligation of talmud Torah. However, women have no such obligation. Though they still are entitled to recite birchas haTorah (for various reasons discussed by achronim, e.g. they read and recite pesukim as part of tefilah), there is no mitzvah for them to remain engaged in thinking about Torah day and night. Therefore, the Tzlach posits that if a woman stops learning and then resumes study at a later point in the day, she would be obligated to recite a new birchas haTorah.
(I don't think this is the common practice, but you can ask your posek what he thinks.)

the loss of a gadol

Klal Yisrael this week lost one of its princes, the Rosh Yeshiva of Sha'ar haTorah, R' Zelik Epstein. What is amazing is what some focus on in their appreciation of the man. Maybe it's Wikipedia's fault for devoting 1 of only 5 paragraphs about the man to describing what R' Zelik held about various book bans. This is viewed as a "siman" that R' Zelik was "our type" of gadol, he was a "normal" gadol who understood the world, he wasn't one of those kano'i radicals of the far right, and therefore we should really be sad that he is gone. What is sad is that stuff like this becomes the measure of gadlus.
What we should mourn with the loss of any gadol is the loss of Torah that the person embodied. In R' Zelik's case we lost a link to the tradition of the great yeshivos of Europe, a link to the torah of R' Shimon Shkop, whose grandson R' Zelik was through marriage. If you want to know what we lost, open a Sha'arei Yosher and see the world that R' Zelik came from and lived.

birkas hamazon and birkas haTorah

There are only two brachos that we are Biblically obligated to say: birkas hamazon and birkas haTorah. The gemara even has a hava amina that we can derive the obligation of one from the other: if one must recite a bracha on material food, certainly we must recite a bracha on Torah which gives us spiritual sustenance. While such a hava amina perhaps points to a relationship between the two brachos, nonetheless there is a clear difference between them: birkas hamazon is recited after eating, while birkas haTorah is recited before learning. Why the distinction? The Sefer haChinuch explains that birkas hamazon gives thanks for a physical good; the physical enjoyment and pleasure from food comes only after it is consumed . Birkas haTorah gives thanks for an intellectual and spiritual good. Even before one beings to learn, the mind can appreciate and anticipate the joy of being engaged in studying the dvar Hashem.

The gemara tells us that one of the causes of the churban was that "lo beirchu baTorah techila," the Jewish people failed to recite a birkas haTorah before learning. R' Altusky, the Rosh Kollel of Darkei Torah in Far Rockaway, in a derasha on Tisha b'Av cited the Sefer haMakneh which notes that the gemara does not say birkas haTorah was omitted, but rather says it was not recited "techila", before learning. There was a lack of anticipation for learning, a loss of the distinction between material pleasure which is enjoyed after the fact and spiritual pleasure which must be yearned for and appreciated before one even begins the process of study.

a R' Tzadok thought for Tu B'Av

My wife did a series of posts (here, here, and here) on two variant readings of the Mishna/gemara which lists the groups of girls who would go husband seeking on Tu b'Av and what they would say. The text of the Bavli at the end of Ta'anis lists three groups of girls: those who were beautiful, those with yichus, and those who were ugly but asked their chassanim to marry for the sake of Heaven. The Ein Ya'akov divides the last group into rich girls who said to marry for money, and poor girls who had nothing.

R' Tzadok cites a Pri Eitz Chaim that sees this marriage dance as a hint to the relationship between the Jewish people, the kallah, and G-d, our prospective bridegroom and the 4 groups of girls as corresponding to the 4 letters of the Shem Havaya. While it is beyond our ability to fully understand these matters, there is one R' Tzadok-ish point worth taking note of. Had you asked me I would have said that the ugly, poor girls correspond to the last letter hey in the Shem Havaya. That last letter hey is a hint to this world, the lowest sefira of malchus, the furthest point from G-d's direct grace. Not so, says R' Tzadok. The ugly and poor girls are actually a hint to the letter yud, the most spiritual letter, hinting to the highest point of keser, the greatest experience of G-dliness.

The problem with religion is we get all caught up in the trappings, whether is a geshmak chiddush of R' Chaim or a tasty kugel and cholent, or even the beauty of certain mitzvos. When you strip away all of that, for many of us there is not much left. But the truth is that when you strip away all of that stuff, that's not the end of religion, but the beginning -- at that point all that is left is you and G-d, one on one. Pretty scary thought. But that's why when you are done talking about yichus, money, even who is a bigger talmid Chacham, when you don't even want to talk about that stuff or can't talk about that stuff because it just doesn't apply, then you are left with the first yud, the keser, the start of it all, the real ikar and real l'shem Shamayim of it all.

Maybe that's why Tu B'Av comes right after we complete our week of shiva which began on 9 Av (see R' Tzadok). When there is no more Beis haMikdash, when everything we had is taken away, only then can we begin to rediscover what is real and meaningful. And with that discovery will will hopefully be led to the dedication of a new mikdash, which as the Pesikta writes, will occur on Tu B'Av, b'meheira b'yameinu.

chasam sofer on "am chacham v'navon"

ו וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם, וַעֲשִׂיתֶם--כִּי הִוא חָכְמַתְכֶם וּבִינַתְכֶם, לְעֵינֵי הָעַמִּים: אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁמְעוּן, אֵת כָּל-הַחֻקִּים הָאֵלֶּה, וְאָמְרוּ רַק עַם-חָכָם וְנָבוֹן,
הַגּוֹי הַגָּדוֹל הַזֶּה.
ח וּמִי גּוֹי גָּדוֹל, אֲשֶׁר-לוֹ חֻקִּים וּמִשְׁפָּטִים צַדִּיקִם, כְּכֹל הַתּוֹרָה הַזֹּאת, אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי נֹתֵן לִפְנֵיכֶם הַיּוֹם.

These pesukim (Devarim 4:6-8) in last week's parsha relate how the nations of the world will come to recognize the wisdom of the Jewish people by observing the moral conduct engendered by observance of halacha. Pasuk 6 tells us that the nations will remark that we must be a great nation because we have such a remarkable ethical code; pasuk 8 echoes the same sentiment. Couched between these two sentences there is another pasuk that I left out:

"Ki mi goy gadol asher lo Elokim kerovim eilav k'Hashem Elokeinu b'chol koreinu eilav."

How does recognizing that G-d answers the prayers of the Jewish people fit the theme of pesukim 6 and 8 which speak of the rational appreciation of Torah law as a superior moral system?

The answer can be gleaned from a remarkable Chasam Sofer which highlights one word in pasuk 6 that changes the entire thrust of the parsha. Pasuk 6 starts: "U'Shemartem" -- guard yourself -- a word the gemara reads in many places as implying a prohibition. Turning the simple meaning of the pasuk on its head, Chasam Sofer writes that the Torah is warning, "u'shemartem", against thinking that Torah must be obeyed because even the nations of the world and secular scholars appreciate its rationality. Obeying halacha just because it "makes sense" and a Jew can be respected outside in the world for how he acts is a poor motivation, because what "makes sense" does not always accord with what the halacha actually demands.

Furthermore (and this explains pasuk 7), if a moral code that makes sense is all there is to Torah, then it makes no sense to daven by a sick person's bedside hoping s/he will get better. Can you explain to the nations how bacteria are affected by tefilah? Can you explain why G-d should save another person just because little you stand there and mutter a few perakim of tehillim? The wonder of Torah is not that "lo tignov" makes sense to any person who did not grow up in a jungle -- the wonder of Torah is that G-d actually listens to the tefilos of each and every one of us and responds in some way, "b'chol koreinu eilav."

[ I enjoyed this Chasam Sofer because of the way it subverts the pshuto shel mikra, but given recent events I'm a little worried lest the wrong impression be drawn. On the one hand, there is a need to be mindful of the temptation to mold belief and strip its mysteries to fit the perception of what others accept as "chacham v'navon". At the same time, there is a danger in losing sight completely of the impression one's actions make when viewed by the secular world. ]

wedding articles, links

Check out the NY Jewish Bridal Examiner for wedding related articles written by my wife:

http://www.examiner.com/x-18522-NY-Jewish-Bridal-Examiner

besoros vs. shemu'os

Sorry in advance for the little rant: The Mishna in Brachos 9:2 speaks about the bracha that needs to be said on "besoros tovos" (good news) and the bracha said on "shemu'os ra'os" (bad news). The meforshim ask: why does the Mishna switch its terminology? --either speak of besoros tovos and besoros ra'os, or shemu'os tovos and shemu'os ra'os, but be consistent! The answer is that "besora" means something told from one person to another. You have good news, you tell your neighbor and let the word spread. "Shemu'a" means something heard. Bad news is something you happen to overhear, not something your friend needs to tell you or you need to pass on to others.

There is a tremendous chilul Hashem when the wrongs of our community make it into the secular newspapers. But just because a story is out there in the NY Times doesn't mean it has to be the topic of conversation on every blog, on every so-called Jewish media outlet, bein gavra l'gavra of keri'as haTorah in shul, between your buddy to the left eating the cholent and your buddy to the right eating the kugel at kiddush, between courses at lunch, and brought up again at shalosh seudos for a news update in case anyone knows something else interesting. Not only do we have the stories themselves, we have the typical organizational responses, we have the critiques of the responses, the critiques of the critiques, and so on...

Where is the to'eles and constructive value?

nachamu nachamu

Everyone speaks about the double-language of "nachamu nachamu ami," a question made no less troubling by the Midrash's answer which speaks of a double-nechama for a double-punishment for a double-crime -- surely G-d's punishment is meted out in exact measure to the crime, no more, no less, and certainly not double what is warranted.

The Nesivos in his commentary on Eichah explains the first pasuk, "Eichah yashva badad ha'ir rabasi am" as a double source of distress. Being isolated without friend is objectively painful; being isolated when there once was an "ir rabasi am" is even more painful because of the relative distance from the glory that once was. Similarly, while any transgression is bad, doubly-bad is the transgression of a people who were singled out to be G-d's chosen nation (see the Maharal we discussed here). And perhaps it is these two dimensions which call for a double nechama.

The Shem m'Shmuel has a beautiful insight on the continuation of the haftarah, "Dabru el lev Yerushalayim v'kir'u eileha," where the Navi is told to call to speak to Yerushalayim and call to her. What is the meaning of "calling" to Yerushalayim? Why not just speak the words of nechama? The Avnei Nezer explained the difference between the word "vayikra" used when G-d spoke to Moshe and the word "vayikar" when G-d spoke to Bilam is that vayikra, calling, demands that the listener draw closer to the speaker, while vayikar means that the speaker simply encountered the listener and began his address. Anyone who has done public speaking knows that the first thing you need to do before launching into your message is call for your audience's attention -- issue a keri'ah to them. Speakers like to open with a story, a joke, a question. No matter what promise you deliver and no matter how beneficial what you are selling is to your audience, 'V'lo shamu el Moshe m'kotzer ruach..." unless people are prepared to listen, you can't communicate. The Jewish people in galus have their ears turned off to the positive message of Torah. They need to be called to, they need to be drawn out of their preconceived ideas and notions, and only then will words of nechama and words of Torah make a difference.

The Midrash opens P' VaEschanan: Aba Shaul says, "This is the siman of tefilah -- if a person's heart is attuned to his prayer (kavanas halev), then that prayer will undoubtedly be answered." The Midrash then continues that in Tanach there are ten different expressions which are used for prayer, and the Midrash lists them and offers examples from various pesukim. On the one hand the Midrash depicts prayer as kavanas halev, as rooted in a person's thoughts or heart; on the other hand, there are no less than 10 different ways to describe the external expression which constitutes the act of prayer. Based on the Shem m'Shmuel, there is no contradiction (see also Sefas Emes in the first piece on the parsha): these 10 expressions are the keri'ah to prayer, but are not prayer itself. The words of the siddur are meant to grab our attention, to arouse our feelings, to set the mood for prayer, but prayer itself is not the words uttered, but the feeling of the heart and thoughts of the mind which those words engender.

R' Akiva, torah sheba'al peh, galus and geulah

The last gemara in Makkos tells the famous story of Rabban Gamliel, R' Yehoshua, and R' Elazar ben Azarya who broke out in tears when they saw foxes running in the ruins where the Mikdash had once stood. R' Akiva on the other hand laughed. R' Akiva explained that now that he has witnessed the fulfillment of the prophecy of destruction and sees that G-d's anger has been vented fully on the stones of the Mikdash, he is confident that the prophecy of the rebuilding of Yerushalayim awaits fulfillment.

Why was R' Akiva able to see the silver lining in tragedy where no others could? R' Tzadok haKohen (Pri Tzadik, Devarim) cites the gemara "chacham adif m'navi" (Baba Basra 12) -- wisdom can discern what even prophecy cannot reveal. R' Akiva is portrayed in many places as the exemplar of the ability to derive secrets and halachos of Torah through learning, as opposed to Moshe Rabeinu who received halacha strictly through Divine revelation (Menachos 29).

I would suggest that part of the answer lies also in R' Akiva's background. R' Nissim Gaon (Brachos 28) writes that R' Akiva was a descended of Sisra, the great enemy of the Jewish people defeated by Devorah. The footnotes to the new edition of the Minchas Chinuch, mitzvah #425, cites a variant reading of Gittin 57 from manuscript which identifies one of "the grandchildren of Haman who learned Torah in Bnei Brak" as R' Akiva. Not only did the Jewish people succeed in escaping the danger posed by Sisra and Haman, but these very people who were bent on our destruction gave rise to the personality which led a renewed flourishing of Jewish learning. R' Akiva's very existence is a testimony to the great good that can come out of what appears to be a world of darkness.

In truth, these are not really two seperate answers. A little Shem m'Shmuel: The original plan was for the Jewish people to receive a Torah on 17 Tamuz with everything contained within it. Just as when we read "lo tignovu" we understand the words to mean "Thou shalt not steal" (or kidnap, if you know Rashi), had we received Torah on 17 Tamuz we would have understood from those words every sugya in Bava Kamma right down to every machlokes Ketzos and Nesivos. There would be no intermediary of "interpretation", Torah sheba'al peh, required to tease out extra details -- it would all be clear from the text itself. But because we failed that test, we need a Torah sheb'al peh.

In other words, the original luchos and Torah were for a world where the relationship between G-d's will and our reality is obvious for all to behold. But the sin of the eigel proved that that world does not yet exist. Evil distorts our ability to perceive G-d's plan and his goodness in the world, hiding the Divine intention. Our job is to restore it -- our job is to interpret, to engage in a Torah sheba'al Peh, to dig below the surface of tragedy and heartbreak we see in the world and recognize that there is a Divine guiding hand.

"B'machshakim hoshivani" (Eichah 3) -- zu Talmuda shel Bavel (San 24a). On the one hand, Talmud Bavli, with its intricate sugyos and hairsplitting interpretation, is a result of the darkness of exile which muddled the clarity of Torah. But at the same time, it is that power of interpretation of the Bavli, the ability to see beyond surface meaning and discover greater depths, which can reveal plan, purpose, and goodness where none are superficially apparent.

R' Akiva was the champion of Torah sheba'al Peh because only a soul which was trapped in the darkness of Sisra or Haman and then revealed itself has the power to release the meaning of Torah hidden behind the veil of the smallest tag on top of the smallest letter.

Only a soul like R' Akiva's could teach how to interpret reality correctly so that in what appears superficially to be the bleakest moments we also see through torah sheba'al peh that there is a Divine plan behind everything.

Only a soul like R' Akiva's could look at the ruins of Mikdash and unlock the meaning of destruction as a prelude to a greater geulah.

meshech chochma on the lesson of the ayal

The gemara (Shabbos 119) explains the pasuk in Eichah (1:6) which compares the leaders of the Jewish people to "ayalim (antelopes) without a place to graze" as a hint to one of the causes for the churban. The gemara says that Yerushalayim was destroyed because of the lack of rebuke given for wrongdoing -- just as each ayal travels with "its head in back of the tail of the next ayal" in sequence, so too, there was a "see no evil" attitude in Yerushalayim which caused a blind-eye to be turned toward corruption and prevented anyone from rocking the boat with rebuke.

The Meshech Chochma (P' Devarim) adds an additional insight to this analogy. Tochacha need not come from Rabbis and leaders -- it can come from observing a simple fellow Jew. When you see the poor person who is scrupulously honest in his business dealings even at the cost of financial gain, or the shadchan who is meticulous not to speak lashon hara, or the person burdened with personal responsibility who still takes time to learn -- these are opportunities to learn from the example shown and should inspire a person to improve his/her own behavior.
However, when your "head faces the tail of the ayal" in front of you, if all you see is the negative and poor behavior of others, the bottom rung of their actions instead of what is great and inspirational, then there is very little reason to try to improve.

Unfortunately, we are surrounded with tales of the "tails" of Jewish behavior. It's up to us to not be like the ayal and to look for role models of greatness.

missing the point of what's wrong with the protests

A spokesman for a major Orthodox organization begins an op-ed with the following observation:

Yes, yes, there is a media double standard when it comes to haredi Jews. That’s nothing new.

And so, when thousands of Iranians poured into Tehran’s streets in protest of what they saw as a fraudulent presidential election, the press emphasis was not on the protesters who threw rocks, set trash bins aflame and vandalized public property. The focus, rightly, was on the bulk of the crowd, peaceful protesters of what they believed to be a fraudulent election.

When tens of thousands of haredim, though, demonstrated in reaction to a decision by the Jerusalem municipality to open a public parking lot on the Jewish Sabbath, increasing traffic in the heart of the Holy City and disturbing the peacefulness of the day of rest, the main coverage was not of the overwhelming mass of the crowd, peacefully standing up for the sanctity of the Sabbath – but rather of the tiny fraction of the crowd that… threw rocks, set trash bins aflame and vandalized public property.

Drawing a comparison between the Iranian protesters and the chareidi protesters blatantly misses the entire point of why the chareidim are criticized. Chareidim define themselves as adherents to the highest standards of religious observance. Destruction of property and vandalism are wrong, but that alone is not what irks the public about the behavior of the chareidi protesters. What is irksome is the hypocrisy of wrapping oneself in the mantle of religious piety while at the same time performing acts which any decent person recognizes as wrong. That element of hypocrisy is what separates the chareidim from the Iranians. Indeed, we should hold ourselves to a higher religious standard -- both bein adam l'chaveiro, in terms of respecting others rights and property, and not just bein adam laMakom.

tears of galus, tears of geulah

The Yalkut Shimoni (Braishis 152) sees the tears shed by Yosef and Binyamin when Yosef reveals himself to his brothers as an allusion to tears of grief for the destruction of the Mishkan and Beis haMikdash. Yosef cried to his brothers as well -- "vayitein es kolo b'bechi" -- as a means of comforting them. The Yalkut concludes that Yosef's tears of comfort portend the tears which with bring about the future redemption, as Yirmiyahu haNavi says, "b'bechi yavo'u" (Yir. 31:8).

Chazal tell us that the seeds of exile were planted when the Jewish people cried upon hearing the report of the spies. Because we cried needlessly, for a lack of bitachon that we could conquer Eretz Yisrael, we were punished and given a reason to cry.

Perhaps galus and geulah are all about why we cry and what we cry for. I would like to suggest that the tears of our matriarch Rachel (also in Yir. 31) which we mentioned yesterday are not simply an expression of grief, but as tears shed for the right reason, tears shed for love of Eretz Yisrael and for love of the Jewish people who are suffering, they serve as an instrument to bringing is closer to geulah.

The gemara (Brachos 32b) relates that after the destruction of the Beis haMikdash all the gates of prayer to Heaven have been closed with the exception of one -- the gate of tears.

the tefilos of our matriarch Rachel

As the Jewish people headed into exile after the destruction of the Beis haMikdash, they passed the grave of our matriarch Rachel. The Midrash poignantly captures the image of Rachel's spirit weeping as she watches her children departing from Eretz Yisrael (incidentally, it is my daughter Rachel's Hebrew birthday). Why specifically is it Rachel who cries more than any of the other matriarchs? There is a small sefer "Reshimos" containing thoughts of R' Noson Wachtfogel and in the volume on tefilah he addresses this question. We know that Leah is described in the Torah as having "soft eyes" (einey Leah rakos), which Chazal attribute to her crying. Leah knew she was destined to marry Eisav, but through her tefillah and crying she changed that decree and merited to marry Ya'akov. We never find Rachel similarly described as crying. The crying of Rachel for her children is to make up for the crying she was spared in her lifetime.

R' Wachtfogel adds that we see another remarkable insight from this episode. Leah suffered perhaps a few years of crying in her lifetime, but Rachel has been crying for generations for the return of all her children from galus! We learn from here the tremendous power of tears and tefilah while one is alive and grappling with the challenges of this world.

During the three weeks there is a special emphasis on reciting tikun chatzos, esp. the section for tikun Rachel, as we hope for the geulah which will bring Rachel's crying to a close.

hasra'ah and ain onshin min hadin

The gemara (Shavuos 20b) classifies vows into three categories:

1) An oath on something which occurred in the past, e.g. I swear I ate that piece of bread. Swearing this type of oath falsely is a violation of shavu'as shav.

2) An oath to do something in the future, e.g. I swear I will eat that piece of bread for lunch. Swearing this type of oath falsely is a shavua's sheker.

3) Taking a neder and violating it, e.g. This piece of bread is forbidden to me like a korban. Violating a neder is an issur of bal yacheil. (Tosfos adds that bal yacheil applies to the previous cases as well in addition to the particular issurim of shavu'ah.)

Rashi writes a chiddush that gives the gemara more meaning than just creating categories. A person must receive hasra'ah, a warning not to do what he is doing, before receiving punishment for violating an issur. It's not enough (says Rashi) to tell a person in general that what he is doing in wrong, but rather hasra'ah must mention the specific prohibition being violated. If a person is violating shavu'as shav, it does not good to warn him that he is violating a shavua'as sheker, or vica versa.

The Rambam makes no mention of the requirement to mention the specific lav being violated as part of the warning of hasra'ah. I asked my son what he thought the logic behind Rashi's opinion is, but the truth is I don't fully grasp it myself. Clearly hasra'ah must be more than a warning that something wrong is being done, or a simple "That is prohibited" would suffice. But why require mentioning the specific issur being violated?

On the same topic, my son quoted what sounds to me like a very strange sevara that his Rebbe heard from R' Zelig Epstein. Why is it that ain mazhirin min hadin, that the Torah warning not to do an issur must be spelled out in a pasuk and not derived from a kal v'chomer? R' Z.E. explained that were the issur derived from a kal v'chomer, there would be no way to formulate a proper hasra'ah on a specific lav. It sounds to me like R' Z.E. understood b'pashtus that hasra'ah is not a general statement, but must point to a specific lav -- I don't know why you would take that as a given when it is a chiddush of Rashi that needs explanation. Secondly, I think a simpler reason why ain mazhirin min hadin (assuming you even need to say a sevara instead of just accepting it as a gezeiras hakasuv, see Yevamos 24) is because there is always the chance that the kal v'chomer you use to derive a new issur is incorrect. I'm a bit baffled by the question and answer.

the limits of freedom of thought... for agnostics

A short while back the topic of the limits religion places on freedom of thought came up in the comments section with respect to the prohibition of studying idolatry or heretical works. What happens when the shoe is on the other foot? An article (link) in the New Humanist explores raising children in a "mixed marriage" between a religious Christian and a free thinking agnostic. When the agnostic parent discovers his child reading the Bible and taking the idea of G-d's existence at face value, he wonders what to do about it.

The dilemma remained: what if all the science and fantasy and comparative metaphysics fail to do the trick, and Christian literalism, despite my efforts, works its magic on my children's minds? Call me intolerant, but I'll admit it: I don't want to tell my children what to believe or not to believe, but I would be displeased and disappointed if they were to embrace conventional religious views. I just would be. Isn't there a more direct way, I thought, to militate against that outcome?

Heavens to Betsy! (though "heaven" is maybe the wrong word in the context of an agnostic's surprise) -- a child may actually take advantage of "freedom" of thought and turn towards religion, much to the chagrin of his parent(s), and we would not want to let that happen. In fact, we must take steps to ensure that it does not happen.

So who is the overprotective parent: the religious father or mother who does not want a child reading certain books or watching certain programs because of their negative influence, or the agnostic father or mother who fears his child actually believing in old time religion and therefore does their utmost to prevent that from happening? Narrowmindedness is really all in the eyes of the beholder, is it not?

cities for the Levi'im

A few weeks ago we discussed the dispute between the Rambam and Ra'avad (Shmita 13:11) whether Kohanim and Levi'im receive a portion in lands conquered by the Jewish people outside the boundaries of Eretz Yisrael. The Rambam holds that it is only in Eretz Yisrael that Kohanim and Levi'im cannot receive land, but they would share in other territory. The Ra'avad disagrees and holds that the Kohanim and Levi'im can never receive land because they receive terumos and ma'asros as a substitute.

In last week's parsha we read the mitzvah to set aside 48 cities as homes for the Levi'im. The Minchas Chinuch (mitzvah #408) questions whether there be a mitzvah to set aside additional cities if more land outside Eretz Yisrael is captured. The question raises two issues: 1) Is 48 the minimum number of cities which must be designated, but the total number may increase depending on population and availability of land, or is 48 the total number of cities required? 2) If more cities may (or should) be added as the amount of land governed grows, does this mitzvah to set aside cities apply even to territory in which, according to the Rambam, the Levi'im already receive a portion?

The Sefer haChinuch writes that the cities given to the Levi'im are a substitute for their not receiving their own section of land in Eretz Yisrael, implying that if they did receive an allocation of land, there would be no mitzvah to set aside designated cities. However, according to the Rambam, just like there is still a mitzvah to give Kohanim and Levi'im terumos and ma'asros even though they receive a portion in the expanded territory , so too, perhaps there is also a mitzvah to set aside cities as well.

run or fight: dealing with the challenges of a secular world

הלכה: מי שהיה נרדף מן הגויים או מן הליסטים מהו שיחלל את השבת

כך שנו רבותינו: מי שהיה נרדף מן הגויים או מן הליסטים מחלל את השבת, בשביל למלט את נפשו. וכך אנו מוצאין בדוד כשביקש שאול להרגו ברח ממנו ונמלט. אמרו רבותינו: מעשה שבאו לגדולי ציפורי כתבים רעים מן המלכות. הלכו ואמרו לר' אלעזר בן פרטא: רבי! כתבים רעים באו לנו מן המלכות, מה אתה אומר, נברח? והיה מתיירא לומר להם ברחו ואמר להם ברמז ולי אתם שואלים, לכו ושאלו את יעקב ואת משה ואת דוד. מה כתיב ביעקב? (הושע יב) ויברח יעקב וכן במשה: (שמות ב) ויברח משה. וכן בדוד: (ש"א י"ט) ודוד ברח וימלט. וכן הוא אומר: (ישעיה כו) לך עמי בא בחדריך.

אמר להם הקדוש ברוך הוא: וכאלו כל גדולי עולם יראו וברחו מן שונאיהם, כל אותן מ' שנה שעשיתם במדבר לא הנחתי אתכם לברוח אלא הייתי מפיל שונאיכם לפניכם, במה שהייתי עמכם. ולא עוד, אלא כמה נחשים וכמה שרפים וכמה עקרבים היו שם, שנאמר: (דברים ח) נחש שרף ועקרבולא הנחתי אותם להזיק אתכם, לכך אמר הקב"ה למשה: כתוב את המסעות שנסעו ישראל במדבר, כדי שיהיו יודעים מה נסים שעשיתי להם.

Sorry for the poor formatting. The Midrash on Masei starts with a halachic question: can one violate Shabbos to escape from bandits or an enemy? The Midrash then launches into an aggadic description of various leaders (e.g. David haMelech) who were forced to flee from their enemies. However, concludes the Midrash, during the 40 years of travel in the desert not only were the Jewish people never forced to flee from an enemy, but to the contrary, their enemies were crushed before them.

The Shem m'Shmuel asks: during the 40 years in the desert, what enemies did the Jewish people encounter? The only wars which we read about in the Torah are the battle with Amalek immediatly after leaving Egypt and the battles with Sichon and Og at the conclusion of the 40 years, but nothing in between.

The answer is that during those 40 years the Jewish people were fighting the toughest enemy of them all: themselves.

The Sefas Emes explains that the 42 stops in the desert + the 7 extra stops caused when they people retraced their steps after the death of Ahron = 49 stops. These 49 stops correspond to the 49 levels of tumah which the Jewish people fell to during their stay in Egypt which they had to work their way out of during their travels. Through special siyata d'shemaya the Jewish people were able to complete that task and merit entering Eretz Yisrael.

Speaking more practically, this Midrash is very relevant to questions that parents, educators, and every one of us must deal with. Internet, cell phones, certain types of books and literature -- should we run and flee from the encounter with these "enemies", or do we sit tight and trust that we can deal with the temptations and intellectual challenges thrown at us without coming to harm? Do we really need to create a tumult over these things and disturb our sense that all is well, our "shabbos", or should we start running and not look back before it is too late?

Two insights I take away from the Midrash: Firstly, even great people ran when they had to. Not every intellectual challenge or moral temptation needs a response or an answer -- sometimes the best approach is to simply avoid the encounter, even if it means abandoning the battle and appearing to lose the fight. Many sense a danger in not responding to the challenges posed to Judaism by outside society, but we also need to be sensitive to the danger of entering an intellectual tit-for-tat battle, especially when the fight is not necessarily waged on the fairest terms.

Secondly, these challenges and difficulties are surmountable when living in a "midbar", when there is a degree of isolation that allows for development, introspection, and growth. The reality of our world is such that we cannot close ourselves behind ghetto walls and practice a self-enforced isolationism, nor are these ideals to be aspired to. Even for the generation which left Egypt, the miraculous life of the desert was temporary, not meant to be an ideal. However, that temporary travel through the desert was necessary to develop into the nation which could then conquer Eretz Yisrael. Do we afford our youth a similar training ground in a "midbar", a place separated from the challenges the world will eventually throw their way, a place where we can help them deal with and successfully learn to overcome the pitfalls of secular society? Or as soon as they can, are kids parked in front of a TV, a PC, given a cell phone? We can't live in a midbar for our entire lives, but we need the "midbar" experience of yeshiva, seminary, etc. as a source of inspiration to look back on years later.

"Kol Brisk"

I noticed a new sefer on the shelves of the seforim store called "Kol Brisk". It looks like it is a collection of chiddushim from the Rav (RYBS) and R' Moshe Soloveitchik and it is dedicated to R' Ahron (couldn't they find a better picture of him than the one on the inside cover?) There is a note on the bottom of the first page that the publisher is unaffiliated with any political group or movement and is putting this out just to share the chiddushim. With apologies if this sefer has been around awhile and I am slow to catch up on news -- does anyone know where these chiddushim come from? Are they from someone who learned by the Rav and R' Moshe, or were they collected from notes, and are they accurate?

michlal lav atah shome'a hein

The gemara (Nedarim 11a) tells us that whether a neder of "lo chulin she'ochel lach" ("what I eat of your is not chulin") is valid depends on whether you hold michlal lav atah shomea hein. The Mishna in Kiddishin (61) writes that Rabbi Meir learned from our parsha that when a tnei is made the condition must stipulate both the positive and negative consequences of its bring fulfilled. Moshe Rabeinu told the Bnei Reuvain and Gad that if they help in the conquest of Eretz Yisrael they will receive land on the west bank (positive); if they don't help in the conquest, they will not receive the west bank portion (negative). R' Yehudah disagrees and holds that implicit in the positive (if you go, you get what you want) is the converse negative consequence (if you don't go, you don't get what you want) -- it need not be formally articulated for a tnei to be work. Here too with respect to Nedarim, according to R' Yehudah "not like chulin" (not chulin) implies the opposite, "like hekdesh", while according to Rabbi Meir it does not.

All the seforim of the Roshei Yeshiva ask the same basic question on this gemara. If a person stipulates "If X is true you get Y", obviously his meaning is that "If X is not true then you don't get Y." The only reason Rabbi Meir holds that the converse must be spelled out when making a tnei is because tnei must conform to the exact specifications set down in our parsha. The meaning may be clear without the extra verbiage, but according to R' Meir tnei must follow a specific technical formula. But what does that formula derived from the parsha of tnei have to do with the topic of nedarim? Just because there is a formula the Torah sets down for tnei (even when meaning is otherwise clear) does not mean that formula must be adhered to with respect to nedarim or other areas of halacha!

The answer in a nutshell is that the common denominator between tnei and nedarim is that both require explicit speech. "Ish ki yafli lindor neder" -- hafla'ah means to articulate, to express in a clear form. It's not enough for the words of a neder to imply a certain meaning -- they must clearly express what is intended. The reason tnei requires such an elaborate formula according to R' Meir is that although the meaning is otherwise understood, the words must still explicitly and clearly state what is intended. Michlal lav atah shomea hein is not a halacha in da'as, but it is a halacha in dibur.

making a tnei on nedarim

The Mishna (Nazir 11a) says that a person cannot become a nazir on condition that he can drink wine or become tamei because that would be masneh al mah she'kasuv batorah, creating a condition that violates halacha, as it undermines the definition of nazir which the Torah formulates. Tosfos asks why the gemara used this reason to reject this type of nezirus when there is another reason for rejecting any tnai on nezirus: a tnai can only be made on an action that can be fulfilled through a shliach, as we learn from our parsha. The paradigm for all tnaim is the agreement between Moshe and the bnei Reuvain and Gad giving them land on the west bank on condition that they join in the conquest of the rest of Canaan. Since the distribution of land was done by Yehoshua and not Moshe himself, we learn that a tnai can be made only where an action can be carried out by an agent. Since a person must fulfill his/her own vow of nezirus and cannot appoint a shliach to do so, it would seem that no conditions can be set.

Tosfos answers that nezirus can in fact be fulfilled through shlichus as a nazir can appoint an agent to bring his korbanos to the Mikdash.

R' Akiva Eiger (Shu"T, Mh"K 48) points out that Tosofos' answer works only in the particular case of nezirus, but will not explain many similar cases, e.g. a person can take a neder that he will not bathe ever if (conditionally) he does not bathe today -- there are no korbanos involved in this case, no possibility of fulfilling the neder through an agent, yet a tnai can be made.

R' Akiva Eiger therefore offers a different answer to Tosfos' question. Every tnai in effect undoes an action; if some condition is not met, then action X becomes nullified and negated. Even without the chiddush of a parsha in the Torah to teach us the laws of tnei, we would assume that a verbal condition can negate a verbal declaration -- words can undo words. Obviously a tnai can negate the acceptance of nezirus or the acceptance of a neder. The parsha of tnei in the Torah which includes the criteria of shlichus applies only to actions -- without a parhsa to teach me the chiddush of tnei we would assume words cannot undo deeds. Therefore, only when we speak of making conditions on actions which is a special chiddush of our parsha are we required to meet the criteria of tnei set out in the parsha, including the criteria of being able to fulfill the action through a shlich.

(For a similar approach see this point from the past, and maybe we will also get to the R' Chaim quoted by the Brisker Rav in the beginning of Hil Nezirus, but if not, kareh makom hu lach.)

bal yachel for a ben noach

A ben noach is not permitted to offer an animal missing a limb as a korban. Tosfos (A"Z 5a) asks why this issur is not counted among the 7 mitzvos bnei noach and answers that the 7 mitzvos bnei noach are all prohibitions; in this case the ben noach has a positive commandment to bring a kosher korban. (I believe I once before posted my wife's suggestion in a moment of Brisker genius: the 7 mitzvos are all issurei gavra; an animal missing a limb is an issur cheftza, and hence not counted.)

What exactly is the positive commandment obligating the ben noach to bring a kosher korban? The Mishna laMelech (Hil Melachim 10:7) concludes from here that a ben noach is included in the commandment of bal yacheil... kol hayotzei m'piv ya'aseh, the command to fulfill one's pledges. The Yerushalmi (Nazir 9:1) debates whether a ben noach can have a vow absolved by a chacham, also implying as well that a ben noach's vows and pledges are binding. The Ml"M is incomfortable with his these, as the parsha of vows and pledges seems to have been given only to the Jewish people, but he does not offer an alternate answer.

The Avnei Miluim (1:2) suggests another way out. The halacha is "amiraso l'gavoha k'mesiraso l'hedyot", a pledge to the mikdash is like a finalized sale. Failing to deliver a korban is like failing to deliver goods after selling them to a vendor -- it is no different than theft, one of the seven ben noach laws.

The Ml"M makes another an interesting point. Even if keeping nedarim are not obligatory for a ben noach, it does seem from simply reading chumash that a ben noach must keep a shevu'ah. We find numerous examples in Sefer Braishis of shevous being made: Avraham asks Eliezer to take a shevu'ah, Avraham swears to Avimelech, etc. One could argue that the Avos kept the Torah and went above and beyond the requirement of other bnei noach, but that theory does not resolve every example he gives.

olas shabbos b'shabbato: each Shabbos is special

I do not want to end the week with a rant, so one quick idea on the parsha. Rashi comments that the words "olas Shabbos b'Shabbato" (28:10) teach that each Shabbos has its own musaf obligation and the korban missed one Shabbos cannot be made-up next week. The Sifsei Chachamim asks why this lesson is taught just with regards to the korban of Shabbos -- why is there no pasuk to teach that there is no makeup for the korban of Yom Tov on the next Yom Tov?

Sifsei Chachamim answers that it is obvious that the korban of Pesach is out of place on Shavuous, and the korban of Shavuos is out of place on Sukkos. Each Yom Tov has its own identity and needs to be celebrated in its own time, therefore there can be no make-ups. However, I might have thought that Shabbos is Shabbos -- there is no harm in offering the korban meant for this Shabbos a week later. Therefore, the pasuk tells us "olas Shabbos b'Shabbato" but not the next week.

The lesson in conclusion may simply be that although all Shabbosos are alike, we must respect the time boundary of korbanos. However, I think the conclusion is meant to tell us that in fact just like every Yom Tov is distinct, so too, every Shabbos is distinct. Shabbos Parshas Pinchas has a unique character that Shabbos Parshas Chukas-Balak or Shabbos Matos-Masei do not have. "Olas Shabbos b'Shabbato" -- you can't miss a Shabbos and make it up next week because the lessons and torah of that particular Shabbos are unique and special and belong only to that point in time.