you've done the akeidah -- now what?

וישב אברהם אל נעריו ויצחק היכן הוא רבי ברכיה בשם רבנן דתמן שלחו אצל שם ללמוד ממנו תורה משל לאשה שנתעשרה מפלכה אמרה הואיל ומן הפלך הזה התעשרתי עוד אינו זז מתחת ידי לעולם כך אמר אברהם כל שבא לידי אינו אלא בשביל שעסקתי בתורה ובמצות לפיכך אינו רוצה שתזוז 
מזרעי לעולם 


After the akeidah the Torah tells us that Avraham returned to Eliezer and Yishmael, but no mention is made of what happened toYitzchak.  The Midrash fills in the gap: Yitzchak did not return with Avraham, but rather was sent way to yeshiva to Shem to learn Torah.  Avraham said, “All I have accomplished has been achieved only through Torah; therefore, I do not want my offspring to ever be separated from Torah.” 


There's a lot I don't understand here.  You mean Yitzchak did not learn Torah until this point?  And would he really learn more in the yeshiva of Shem than home with his father?  Furthermore, what does the mashal add to the point?  (Parenthetically, the Tanchuma mentions that Avraham needed to tell Sarah something -- he needed some excuse to leave on his journey -- so he told her he was taking Yitzchak to yeshiva.  True to his word, he did so.)


On a simple level I think the Midrash is telling is that the response to a remarkable event like the akeidah is not to step away, breathe a sigh of relief that it's all over, and then go to Disneyworld.   Rather, those newly found kochos have to become the impetus to build on.  In particular, the spiritual high of avodah needs to be brought into the limud haTorah of the day to day and not remain an isolated experience.  For example, there are lots of programs that will take kids to a retreat and run a kumsitz and everyone will feel all holy and good, but there has to be a next step of then learning a Ktzos and showing up for a regular seder day in and day out.


Perhaps the Midrash also means that Yitzchak acquired an additional impetus in learning davka through the akeidah.  Make no mistake about it, the akeidah was unique; it defies all comparison.  That being said, the midah of mesirus nefesh which became ingrained in Jewish genes through the akeidah is part and parcel of the commitment to Torah.  "Pas b'melach tochal" means a life of sacrifice.  "Adam ki yamus b'ohel" -- a person has to kill himself in learning to succeed.  


And after all is said and done, I don't think I've even scratched the surface of what Chazal mean here.  Ideas?

a sight to behold

Sight seems to play an awfully large role in our parsha: 

1) The parsha opens with Avraham seeing guests arriving -- this one counts as a double: "Vayar... Vayar vayaratz likrasam." 

2) "Erdah na v'ereh" -- Hashem goes down and see what is going on in Sdom. 

3) The people of Sdom are struck blind, they lose their ability to see, when they attempt to break into Lot's house. 

4) Lot's wife looks back to see the destruction of Sdom and gets turned into a pillar of salt. 

5) Avimelech's gift to Sarah is described as a "ksus eynaim," a covering for her eyes. 

6) Hagar does not see the well she needs to get water for Yishmael till a Malach points it out to her (21:19)  She names the place "Be'er Lachai Ro'i." 

7) "Vayar es hamakom mei'rachok," we are told that Avraham sees Har HaMoriah, the spot of the akeidah, from a distance. 

8) Avraham sees a ram which he had not noticed before and uses it as a korban in place of his son. 

9) Avraham names the place "Hashem Yireh," the place where Hashem is seen. 

Anything I miss?  What is especially interesting is the multiple examples of people not seeing things that are there in front of them.  The gemara says that Avraham sent Eliezer out to look for orchim, but Eliezer didn't see any; Avraham then went out himself and saw the three guests.  The well Hagar found was there all along, yet until the malach pointed it out she was unaware of it.  The ram which took Yitzchak's place must have been there, yet it seems from the language of "vayisa es einav," that Avraham at first did not notice it.  The Sefas Emes and others play up this theme and write that everything we need in life is here for us, all the opportunities, all the kochos to take advantage of them, but we walk around blind to what is in front of our eyes.  Commenting on the question of how the sons-in-law of Lot could mock the angels' threat of destroying Sdom when they had already seen the power of the angels to strike blind the unruly mob who came to assault Lot, the Shem m'Shmuel writes that there is a blindness of the soul as well as physical blindness.  The sons-in-law of Lot could physically see, but like the other inhabitants of Sdom, they could not process the fact that there is a din v'dayan in the world; they lacked inner vision.   (Adam and Chavahs eye-opening experience of eating from the eitz ha'da'as ["Vatipakachna einei she'neihem"] midah k'negged midah blinded their spiritual eyes.)  I'm not sure else to make of all these examples or even whether there is anything else to make of it -- something to think about. 

it's the thought that counts

Rav Zevin points out an interesting parallel between the opening of Parshas VaYeira and its closing.  The parsha opens with the story of Avraham's hachnasas orchim.  No detail is spared in trying to convey to us the zerizus and exemplary manner in which Avraham performed and personified the trait of chessed.  Except for one small problem: None of the guests Avraham entertained needed his chessed at all.  The angels who came to visit were not in need of food; they needed no tree to sit under to hide from the sun; they needed no water to wash.  Apparently that is all irrelevant -- it is the burning desire of Avraham to do chessed which the parsha wants to highlight, irrespective of whether the need was real or not. 

Turning to the end of the parsha, k'lapei shemaya the plan was never for Avraham to actually sacrifice Yitzchak during the akeidah, but Avraham did not know that.  "Vayikach es ha'ma'acheles..."  The Kotzker explains that when it came to doing mitzvos, Avraham's limbs acted of their own accord (the Midrash elsewhere tells us that David haMelech's feet carried him to the Beis Medrsah each morning even if he thought to go elsewhere).  When it came time for the akeidah, since there really was no mitzvah to be done, Avraham's limbs did not react -- he had to push them to respond.  And he did so -- because in his mind he was carrying out the ratzon Hashem and nothing would stop him.  Again, the reality of whether Yitzchak was to be a korban is irrelevant, as the test Avraham faced was a measure of his ratzon and desire. 

Whether our best intentions actually get translated into action and reality is more often than not not in our hands (if I recall correctly, R' Tzadok suggests that bechira is limited to the act of deciding; whether something gets accomplished is b'ydei shamayim).  Nonetheless, the thought and desire to do good is perhaps even more important. 

do ethics and law always coincide?

You and a friend are trapped in the desert and you only with one jug of water between you.  Do you split the water, in which case neither one of you will have enough to make it out of the desert, or do you keep the jug for yourself and leave your friend to perish?  The gemara (B"M 62) has a machlokes: Ben Petura holds that loving your neighbor as yourself means splitting the water.  R' Akiva, however, holds that "chayecha kodmin", a person's own life takes precedence.   

Superficially understood, the central point under dispute is what the ethical solution to this dilemma is.  However, and I'm not sure who he is quoting, Rav Moshe Kasher in his Perakim b'Toras haChassidus (p. 5-6) learns otherwise.  In his interpretation, everyone agrees that the ethical ideal is to split the water -- the sevara of ben Petura is accepted as valid.  R' Akiva's argument is that in spite of the ethical ideal, there is a gezeiras hakasuv of chayecha kodmin that determines how to act.   

I thought this was a fascinating approach to the sugya in that it puts the din, the legal solution, at odds with (and in fact superior to) the moral ideal.  I'm not sure what to make of seperating the two -- food for thought. 

flesh and soul

1. Rav Amiel has an interesting insight in his Higyonot El Ami.  Pre-Parshas Lech Lecha, human beings were called "basar," flesh, as in "Keitz kol basar ba lifanei...," or "Lo yadon ruchi b'adam b'shagam hu basar."  Things change in Parshas Lech Lecha.  In referring to the people Avraham converted to his cause, the Torah uses the expression, "Es hanefesh asher asu," the souls which Avraham made.  Avraham taught that a human being is not just an animated slab of meat, but is a spiritual creature.  Not only did Avraham's attitude impact those close to him, but it even had an effect on the King of Sdom, who begs Avraham after the war against the four kings, "Tein li ha'nefesh," let me keep the souls that live in my city even if you choose to take all the property.  


2. Avraham refused to take anything from the spoils of war lest that give the King of Sdom the opportunity to say, "Ani he'esharti es Avraham," I made Avraham rich.  What kind of crazy hava amina claim is that to be worried about?  Surely everybody knew that Sdom and his compatriots had lost the original war, and if not for Avraham's intercession, they would have been wiped out.  The King of Sdom himself was almost killed in the battle and escaped only by virtue of a miracle.  He admitted that he deserved nothing and would have been happy to get back his people alone.  


It could be that the lesson here is that kiddush Hashem in the fullest sense is only when something cannot be questioned even by the most biased observer.  A kiddush Hashem in the fullest sense is not when it's lauded in the Wall Street Journal; it's when it's lauded in the NY Times.  Avraham wanted to pass the sniff test of even those with the most warped sense of justice (see R' Y. L. Chasman in Ohr Yahel).


It could also be that the word, "he'esharti" has nothing to do with the money.  Avraham was not afraid of being accused of growing rich off Sdom; he was afraid of being accused of being enriched by Sdom.  Avraham was the paragon of chessed, yet he found himself enmeshed in war.  He could hear the voice of Sdom whispering in his ear that chessed may be nice, but sometimes you need to compromise a little -- war means fighting, looting, pillaging, not playing nice.  Of course, Avraham would always be Avraham, but maybe there was just a little truth to that voice in his ear?  Avraham said no -- he would fight, but he would not benefit from battle; he would not even in war become to the slightest degree influenced by the thinking and methods of Sdom (Shem m'Shmuel).

Nimrod the villain or Nimrod the hero?

1) It's getting late in the week, so I'm going to not be fair -- I'm going to give you the question of R' Leibele Eiger, because it's a great kashe, but I'm not going to give you his answer because I can't find a way to do justice to it. You'll can look it up here -- it's the shalosh seudos torah). Rashi in P' VaYeira (18:32) writes that Avraham did not daven to spare Sdom for less than 10 tzadikim because Noach had 8 tzadikim in his family, plus Hashem, and that wasn't enough. R' Leibele Eiger asks: But Noach did not daven! Perhaps if he had davened (and the Zohar criticizes him for not doing so), Hashem would have spared the world for even less than 10 tzadikim. How was Avraham's conclusion justified?

2) I asked one of my kids whether Nimrod was a bad guy or a good guy, and the answer was pshita he was a bad guy, why would I ask such an easy one. I don't ask easy ones unless there is a catch. The catch here is that I noticed a Targum Yonasan that had never before caught my attention. The Torah tells us that Nimrod had a four-land kingdom of Bavel, Erech, Akad, and Kalney (10:10). Then the Torah tells us that from his land Ashur went out, and he built Ninveh, Rechovot Ir, Kalach, and Resen. Who does the pronoun "he" in the previous sentence refer to? Rashi fills in the gaps: It refers to Ashur, who left Nimrod's kingdom because he wanted no part in the tower of Bavel plot, which was instigated by Nimrod. Seforno adds that the Torah tells us of the cities Ashur built because the Torah wants us to know the reward Ashur got for not going along with the plan. Ramban interprets the pasuk differently: The "he" is Nimrod, who spread out over the land of Ashur and built these four additional cities -- no rebellion by Ashur, no reward. The subject of both pesukim is one person only: Nimrod. Targum Yonasan bridges both interpretations with a twist: Like Ramban, he reads the pesukim as referring to Nimrod alone, but like Rashi/Seforno, he adds a moral dimension -- it was Nimrod who fled the dor haflagah plot, and as a reward, Nimrod got to built four new cities to replace the four he had previously ruled over. Nimrod the hero instead of Nimrod the villain! Before you give him too much credit, the Targum Yonasan later in the parsha does quote the Midrash about Nimrod throwing Avraham into the furnace. Why would Nimrod refuse to join the dor haflagah's plot but rebel against Avraham's monotheistic teaching? I guess evildoers have to draw the line somewhere ; )

a bite from the lion

There are different views in Chazal as to how to understand the pasuk of "VaYisha'er ach Noach," that Noach alone was left -- what does the extra word "ach," which is usually a miyut, add to the pasuk? Rashi explains that tending to the animals took a lot out of Noach -- "ach" is a miyut of Noach's energy. The Midrash Tanchuma, however, writes on this pasuk that Noach suffered not from the animals, but rather from the cold. Some ask: Would it have been too hard for Hashem to add a space heater into the teivah? Couldn't Hashem have found a way for Noach to be warm as well as dry? I don't like the question -- hakol b'yedei shamayim chutz m'tzinim u'pachim, so in this area Noach did have to fend for himself -- but perhaps the Midrash is teaching us a moral lesson as well. The story is told that when there was once a fire in Brisk that burned down many homes, R' Chaim refused to sleep in his bed. Even though R' Chaim's own house was not damaged, he would not rest in comfort while others did not have a place to go. Noach was insulated from the dangers outside the teivah -- he had a dry bed, he had food, he had a means of escape. Chazal are telling us enjoy the food, enjoy the bed, but when the world is being destroyed, at least skip the extra blanket -- be mishtatef in the tzarah of the tzibur; feel the pain the community is going through even if it doesn't directly affect you.

All the little kids are taught the Rashi that "ach" tells us that Noach was injured when the lion took a swipe at him for one time bringing his food late. Did Noach deserve to be punished just because he was late once -- did the 364 other days of the year he served the lion's food on time count for nothing? Again, lots of people talk about this, but I don't like the question. The lion cannot change its spots, or its roar and bite. Let your guard down for one day, one instant, and the 364 days go out the window pretty fast. Perhaps lion is a metaphor for the yetzer ha'ra, which needs constant minding, as in a second it can undo hours of mussar.

But why specifically do Chazal attribute Noach's injuries to the lion and not any other wild animal? The Ostrovze has a remarkable insight. Chazal (Yoma 21) tell us that during Bayis Rishon the fire on the mizbei'ach crouched like a lion; during Bayis Sheni it crouched like a dog. The AR"I explains that the smoke and fire of the mizbeiach served as a protection against aveioros. What's the difference between a watch-lion and a watchdog? If a lion is protecting you, it takes care of everything -- you can go to sleep and it will eat or scare off whatever is coming. A watchdog, however, will just bark it if sees an intruder -- you to wake up and take action. During Bayis Rishon, Hashem took care of everything; we could sit back and watch. During Bayis Sheni, the smoke and fire was there to wake us up, but it was up to us to do teshuvah and ellicit rachmei shamayim and yeshuah.

The Zohar is critical of Noach for failing to at least daven for those around him. If someone happened to see him building the teivah and took note, great -- if not, Noach didn't go out of his way to knock on the doors of his neighbors or knock on the gates of Heaven on their behalf. Noach emulated the dog; he barked a little, but he didn't bite. He lacked the quality of the lion, the courage to protect others from harm even if they themselves failed to act.

This is the lion which Chazal tell us overcame Noach.

The gemara (Meg 15) tells us that when Esther was about to take the fateful step of going to see Achashveirosh without being called for, she suddenly sensed her ru'ach hakodesh had vanished. "Perhaps it is because I called Achashveirosh a dog -- 'Hatzilah...m'yad kelev...'," Esher said to herself. She therefore changed her tefilah and called him a lion instead -- "Hoshi'aynu m'pi aryeh." What difference does it make if Esther called Achashveirosh a dog or a lion? Chazal tell us that Achashveirosh's threat to Klal Yisrael was a greater motivator to teshuvah than all the words of the Nevi'im. Esther wasn't happy about that -- Klal Yisrael should sink to such depths to need waking up by an Achashveirosh?! She therefore davened that Hashem should intervene, that the yeshu'ah should come from Him and not through the kelev-barking hisore'rus of Achashveirosh. Esther's ruach hakodesh vanished; her tefilah was too optimistic. Klal Yisrael indeed were unworthy at that moment -- they needed that outside wake up call of Achashveirosh. So Esther tried again. She asked, "If the hisorerus must come from Achashveirosh, at least Hashem save me from the lion," i.e. let Achashveirosh not be like the lion that gets all the credit for doing the job; let the yeshuvah of Klal Yisrael come at least partially through Hashem's hisoreus and intervention as well.

Why do we say Hallel on Pesach? Because the yeshuah came from Hashem alone, not through our acting or re-acting to a wake up call -- during the geulah from Egypt, "Lo yecheratz kelev l'shono." On Purim there is no hallel, as "Akatei Achashveirosh anan," we owe a measure of our redemption to Achashveirosh's wake up call as well.

(If you are not blown away by the torah of the Ostrovze after this piece, maybe you need to check your pulse.)

what is the ma'aseh merkava doing in mes. chagiga?

It is said in the name of the GR"A (R' Tzadok also has it in many places) that every aggadita in sha"s fits exactly to the masechta it is placed in. The description of the churban habayis appears in Mes. Gittin, because at the time of churban we became k'almanah, waiting for Hashem to take us back. The aggadita that speaks of mattan Torah appears in Mes. Shabbos because according to all opinions the Torah was given on Shabbos and relates to the day of Shabbos. Why does the topic of ma'aseh merkava, the mystical vision of the Heavens as shown to Yechezkel haNavi, which is incomprehensible except for those on a very high spiritual level, appear in Mes. Chagigah, which deals with aliya la'regel and Tom Tov?

I heard from R' Naftali Jeger, R"Y of Sho'r Yoshuv, in the name of Rav Hutner, that on Yov Tov a person can receive amazing aliyah in Torah and ruchniyus. When a person finds himself in such a position, why think small? You have to seize the opportunity -- reach for the stars and aspire for the most lofty ideals and ideas, as represented by the ma'aseh merkava. Don't let the Yom Tov go to waste!

Koznitzer Maggid on Shmini Atzeres

Hashem tells us in P' Ha'azinu, "Ya'arof ka'matar likchi," that his words of Torah should flow down to us like dew. The gemara (Ta'anis 7) based on this pasuk writes that a rainy day ("yom ha'geshamim") is as great as mattan Torah, or perhaps even greater, as the lesser event, in this case mattan Torah, is always compared to the greater event, the rain. What's the common denominator between these ideas? When Hashem opens the skies and bestows his gifts on the world, those gifts can in the form of material blessing, geshem = gashmiyus; those same gifts can come as spiritual blessing, mattan Torah.

The Koznitzer Maggid teaches that this "yom ha'geshamim," the day of rain the gemara refers to, is a hint to the day of Shmini Atzeres when we start saying mashiv ha'ruach u'morid ha'geshem. Our focus on this day is not only on the spiritual rain that we want to fall, but also on the "spiritual rain" we want to fall as well.

In reality Shmini Atzeres should be 50 days after Sukkos just as Atzeres (Shavuos) occurs 50 days after Pesach. But, says the Midrash Tanchuma, Hashem does not want us to leave our homes in the winter to make aliya la'regel, so he tacked on Shmini Atzeres right after the seven days of Sukkos. The association between Shmini Atzeres / Simchas Torah (in chutz la'aretz we seperate off Simchas Torah as an added day; in Eretz Yisrael there is only one day of Yom Yov) and Shavuos underscores the connection between this Yom Tov and the idea of mattan Torah. Hashem gave us Pesach even though we were bereft of mitzvos and zechuyos; it therefore took 7 weeks for us to earn the right to stand at Har Sinai. After a holiday of Sukkos replete with the mitzvos of sukkah, of lulav and esrog, we earn the right to Atezres in only 7 days. Sefas Emes writes that Shavuos is the holiday of Torah sheb'Ksav; Shmini Atezers is the Torah we have earned of our own accord, the holiday of Torah sheBa'al Peh.

the bracha of Moshe Rabeinu

Before Zos HaBracha gets into the meat and potatoes of Moshe Rabeinu's bracha to the shevatim, it opens with praise of Hashem (Rashi 33:2) -- "Hashem m'Sinai ba... Mimino aish das lamo..." etc. as lawgiver and as having a special bond with Bnei Yisrael. As much as this introduction is about Hashem, it is also about us. Commenting on the pasuk, "Torah tzivah lanu Moshe...," Ramban explains that it is the acceptance of the Torah on our part which makes us worthy of receiving a bracha. In other words, you can't just walk up even to a Moshe Rabeinu with no desire to change, to grow, to come closer to Hashem, no commitment, and expect him to drop a bracha in your lap and give you whatever your heart desires. A bracha has to be earned. A bracha requires a kabbalas haTorah as a pre-requisite.

The parsha presents the brachos of Moshe one by one to each sheivet -- "Yechi Reuvain...," "V'Zos l'Yehudah...," etc. Yet when it comes to sheivet Yisachar, rather than start a new pasuk with his bracha, instead the Torah tacks it on to the bracha of Zevulun, almost as an afterthought: "Smach Zevulun b'tzesecha v'Yisacha b'ohalaecha." The parsha then goes right back to Zevulun, "Amim har yikra'u..." Why doesn't Yisachar get his own spot in the sun, his own individual moment of attention? Furthermore, Chazal tell us that Zevulun and Yisachar made a partnership: Zevulun was a merchant who used his wealth to help support Yisachar, who dedicated himself to talmud Torah; together they shared the reward of talmud Torah. Shouldn't the focus be on Yisachar, who was doing the actual learning, and not on Zevulun, who just enabled Yisachar's talmud Torah? Why is the bracha directed at Zevulun as the primary recipient with Yisachar tacked on secondarily?

R' Chaim Kanievski in his Ta'ama d'Kra writes that the reason Zevulun is the focus of attention for this bracha and Yisachar is tacked on secondarily is precisely because Yisachar was the one who was totally immersed in talmud Torah. When one's life is Torah, one doesn't need an added bracha -- Torah itself is the biggest source of bracha a person can have.

Maybe that's what we are supposed to get out of Simchas Torah. The lulav is put away, we don't have to eat in the sukkah anymore, there is no particular mitzvas ha'yom -- so why do we have a Yom Tov? Perhaps the idea is that those items are just props, accoutrements, albeit very important and meaningful ones, but if one has Torah, then one can have simcha and bracha even if one has nothing else at all.

when to do shenayim mikra on braishis

I had this same question in other years but don't remember if I posted it. In theory you have until Shmini Atzeres / Simchas Torah to finish shenayim mikra on Zos HaBracha. Does that mean you can't start shenayim mikra on Braishis until after that? Usually you can start the upcoming week's parsha from after mincha on Shabbos the week before but not earlier -- but is this week's parsha Zos HaBracha, or Braishis?

Obviously, if you can only start Braishis on Simchas Torah, that doesn't give you a lot of time...

who's on first?

The Midrash Rabbah writes that in the merit of our fulfilling, "U'lekachtem lachem bayom harishon..." we can merit that Hashem appears to us "rishon", makes the "rishon", the first born Eisav, pay his dues, builds the Beis haMikdash, which is called "rishon", and brings Moshiach, who is also in Tanach called "rishon."

Just because the word "rishon" appears in the context of lulav does not mean there is a connection with every other place the word "rishon" appears -- it's not a word game that the Midrash is playing. What Chazal are telling us is that the geulah, i.e. the defeat of Eisav, the building of Mikdash, the coming of Moshiach, all hinted at by that word "rishon," is already latent and part and parcel of the mitzvah of 4 minim on Sukkos. You want to taste the geulah and know what it is all about? Pick up a lulav and esrog.

Perhaps this is why Chazal tell us (Avodah Zarah 3) that when the geulah comes and the nations will complain that they want another chance to earn redemption as well, Hashem will challenge them to fulfill the mitzvah of sukkah. Why this mitzvah and no other? Because if you can celebrate Sukkos properly, if you can experience the mini-geulah of this chag, then you have proven yourself worthy of geulah on a greater scale. But if you kick the sukkah and are disgusted by it, as the nations reacted, then certainly you don't deserve geulah on a greater scale.

What does it mean that Hashem appears to us "rishon?" The Shem m'Shmuel explains that Chazal discuss a "machlokes" between Bnei Yisrael and Hashem: Hashem asks of us, "Shuvu alai v'ashuva aleichem...," that we take the first step towards teshuvah and he will respond; we ask of Hashem, "Hashiveinu Hashem eilecha v'nashuva...," that Hashem take the first step to bring us closer to him and then we will respond. On Sukkos Hashem breaks the standoff. All we need to do is take a lulav and esrog and Hashem says, "I'll be the rishon -- I'll make the first move and help you come back."

But the mitzvah is not really only about taking a lulav and esrog. "U'lekachtem lachem..." explains the Chiddushei HaR"IM means you have to take "lachem", take yourselves, i.e. pick yourselves up from where you were and be willing to move. We move into the sukkah, we move around the lulav and esrog, and hopefully we will be moved a little bit as well.

sukkah-ing in the rain

Rain is in the forecast in NY, so you may want to take a look at this old post on the topic.

when an issur derabbanan negates a kiyum d'oraysa

We once discussed (link) the chiddush of the Pri Megadim that when Chazal qualify how a mitzvah d'oraysa should be performed, the failure to meet the derabbanan criteria negates even the kiyum d'oraysa of that mitzvah. For example, there is a din derabbanan that one cannot sit in a sukkah and eat off a table that remains inside one's house. Even though this qualification was instituted by the derabbanan and has nothing to do with the din d'orasya of sukkah, Tos (Sukkah 3) holds that failing to fulfill the din derabbanan negates the kiyum d'oraysa of yeshivas sukkah.

At first glance this chiddush seems to be a machlokes Tana'im later in the masechta. R' Meir allows a sukkah to be made on top of an animal; R' Yehudah does not. The gemara (23a) explains that we learn from the pasuk, "Ba'sukkos teishvu shivas yamim," that a sukkah must be usable for the entire seven day duration of the chag. R' Yehudah holds that since one is not allowed to climb on an animal on Shabbos and Yom Tov, a sukkah built on top of an animal is not usable for seven days. R' Meir counters that the prohibition of climbing on an animal is only a din derabbanan; you can't say a sukkah does not meet the d'oraysa criteria of being usable for seven days just because of a derabbanan disqualification. Apparently, R' Yehudah holds othewise -- the din derabbanan that prevents one from using a sukkah built on an animal does in fact negate the d'oraysa kiyum of sukkah, exactly like the chiddush of the Pri Megadim.

Yet maybe things are not so simple and one can be mechaleik. The requirement of having a table within the sukkah is a din in hilchos sukkah. Perhaps in principle even R' Meir agrees that failing to meet a derabbanan criteria of hilchos sukkah can negate the kiyum d'oraysa of sukkah. However, the prohibition of climbing on an animal is a general din in hilchos Yom Tov. R' Meir perhaps holds that a din derabbanan of hilchos Yom Tov cannot negate a kiyum d'oraysa of sukkah.

R' Akiva Eiger writes that even though Chazal disallowed blowing shofar on Shabbos lest one come to carry the shofar, if one went ahead and blew, one fulfills the mitzvah d'oraysa of shofar, albeit at the expense of an issur derabbanan. Against the Pri Megadim? Again, maybe not. The issur of carrying is a general din in hilchos Yom Tov, not a din in hilchos shofar. A violation of a din in hilchos Yom Tov does not have the power to negate a kiyum d'oraysa of shofar or sukkah.

hana'as garon and chatzi shiur -- a clever l'shitaso

It's only a little after Yom Kippur, so I can still post this. The gemara at the end of Yoma

quotes a machlokes R' Yochanan and Reish Lakish whether chatzi shiur is an issur d'oraysa or derabbanan. By coincidence, the daf yomi recently discussed the machlokes R' Yochanan and Reish Lakish whether achilah means hana'as garon or hana'as mei'ayim -- is eating all about the mouth or the stomach? Nafka minah: what if a person swallows a chatzi shiur, regurgitates it, and then eats the same chatzi shiur? The mouth has chewed threw a full shiur, but the stomach only got half.

R' Tzvi Pesach Frank (Shu"T Har Tzvi) quotes someone who suggested that these two arguments work l'shitasam. The gemara in Yoma explains that according to R' Yochanan chatzi shiur is assur because it is chazi l'itztarufei, the half shiur has the potential to combine with another half to make a whole issur. R' Yochanan is l'shitaso that when a half shiur is swallowed, regurgitated, and then re-eaten, the second eating combines with the first because hana'as garon is what counts. Reish Lakish looks at hana'as mei'ayim and therefore a half shiur can never recombine with itself to add up to a whole, which is why he holds chatzi shiur is permitted.

The weakness with all this (as R' Tzvi Pesach Frank explains) is that chazi l'itztarufei means a half shiur can be combined with other pieces, not necessarily that it can combine with itself. Nonetheless, it's clever and inyana d'yoma. (I always like hearing l'shitaso arguments because I find it really hard to think of them myself and usually there is some clever twist involved.)

when a derabbanan is not a derabbanan

When I was learning Rosh HaShana with my son over Rosh HaShana, he noticed that Rashi (22a) seems to say that asmachta lo kanya (e.g. gambling is a form of theft) is a din derabbanan, contrary to the position of many Achronim. My son is in good company, because the Rashash noticed the same thing. Rashash tries to read Rashi as consistent with the other views -- when Rashi says, "Amur Rabbanan asmachta lo kanya..." Rashi doesn't mean that the Rabbis instituted the din of asmachta lo kanya; what Rashi means is that the Rabbis publicized and taught the din d'oraysa of asmachta lo kanya.

It seems strange that the statement, "The Rabbis said..." refers to a din d'oraysa -- where do you ever have such a thing? Actually, in a few places. The Mishna in Sukkah (41b) tells us that, "Amru Chachamim ain adam yotzei y'dei chovaso b'lulavo shel chaveiro b'Yom Tov rishon," that the Rabbis taught that a person does not fulfill his mitzvah on the first day of Yom Tov using someone else's lulav. The Mishna uses the term "amru Chachamim" for what is a din d'oraysa; the Mishna simply means that the Chachamim publicized the din. Rashash gives a few other examples to make the point.

Although it is not the exact same expression, a similar idea is found in another Mishna in R"H and Sukkah. The Mishna (R"H 30, Sukkah 41) says that R' Yochanan ben Zakai "hiskin" that new wheat could not be eaten on 16 Nisan. The gemara explains that hiskin here does not mean that R' Yochanan made a takanah derabbanan, but rather "darash v'hiskin," he publicized and taught what he held to be a din d'oraysa.

hevel pi'hem untainted by sin

Chazal tell us (Shabbos 119b) that the world exists for the sake of "Hevel shel tinokos shel beis rabban," the Torah study of the young. Rav Pappa asked Abaye, "But what about our learning?" Abaye answered that words from the mouths of those untainted by sin [i.e. children] is superior to words from the mouths of those tainted by sin.

The Kozhiglover Rav, Rosh Yeshiva of Chachmei Lublin before WWII, writes that the Torah learned in these few days between Yom Kippur and Sukkos is even more precious than the Torah learned at any other time during the year. The Midrash writes that Sukkos is, "Rishon l'cheshbon avonos," the beginning of a new count of aveiros for the new year (see his hesber of what this means). Until then, we have a completely clean slate. The merit of our learning is more than equivalent to the untainted hevel pihem of tinokos shel beis rabban because not only are we also untainted by cheit, but we have the additional zechus of being metzuveh v'oseh.

There is a lot to do this week: a sukkah to build, lulav and esrog to buy, helping the wife with the shopping and cleaning. Still, it's critical to try if at all possible to squeeze in some extra learning to make these days count.

mitzvos b'teilos l'asid lavo

I cannot recall in which parsha it appeared, but somwhere in Rav Copperman's notes to the Meshech Chochma he has a nice hesber of the machlokes whether mitzvos beteilos l'asid lavo or not (will mitzvos apply after techiyas ha'meisim?) He boils the issue down to a philosophical question: Are mitzvos a means to overcome the inherent frailty / imperfection of the physical, material body, or do mitzvos have inherent value as an end in their own right? If mitzvos are just a means to help the neshoma cope with its physical partner (the body), then in the spiritually refined era of techiyas ha'meisim, mitzvos will no longer be necessary. However, if mitzvos serve a valuable end in their own right, they will still apply in the future. (R' Elchanan in Koveitz Shiurim II:29 has a different approach.)

Even the view that holds mitzvos b'teilos l'asid la'vo makes an exception for Yom Kippur, which will be celebrated for eternity (Midrash Mishlei). Why? Using Rav Kooperman's dichotomy, I think the answer is obvious. On Yom Kippur we don't eat, we don't drink, we avoid other pleasures -- the day has nothing to do with the body; it is devoted even now to the completely spiritual. The mitzvah of Yom Kippur is the one time a year when we enter the kodesh kodashim within ourselves and transcend the constraints of the guf. (See Shem m'Shmuel who quotes a different explanation from his father).

Wishing you all an easy fast and a true gmar chasima tova for the upcoming year.

shuva yisrael ad Hashem Elokecha -- ad v'ad b'chlal or not?

1. Chazal debate (Yoma 86) whether "Shuva yisrael ad Hashem Elokecha," means ad v'ad b'chlal or ad v'lo ad b'chlal. What does the machlokes mean?

A few days ago I was driving along a quiet street when a police car pulled out from the curb and came up behind me. I pulled to the side to let him pass, but then realized it was me he wanted to pull over. I hadn't run a light, I wasn't on my phone, I had bucked my seat belt, so I had no idea why he was pulling me over. It turns out my rear brake light was out (something you can't see while you are driving). The police officer wrote up a summons, but explained that as long as I get the light fixed within the next 24 hours, I wouldn't need to pay anything -- I could just mail in a note from a mechanic and would be off the hook.

My wife, who was in the car with me, took this in stride (she also got the car fixed the next day) and suggested it is a good mashal for teshuvah: Hashem writes up a summons, but as long as we fix the problem in the Aseres Y'mei Teshuvah, we are off the hook.

I thought the mashal doesn't quite fit: The dispensation based on getting the brake light repaired is a tnai built into the ticket that automatically voids the offense. Teshuvah, however, doesn't work that way -- there is no automatic out. Teshuvah is like an extra-judicial dispensation above and beyond what the law allows, akin to appearing in court and being let off due to the mercy of the judge.

My wife's mashal is the ad v'ad b'chlal model: Teshuvah means we have complete control over whether that ticket gets cancelled or not -- it's built into the system. My approach is the ad v'lo ad b'chlal model: Teshuvah can take you most of the way there, but you still need the judge's intervention and mercy to get off.

2. While on the topic of teshuvah, one other point. Chazal say teshuvah is so great that it brings refuah to the entire world. The Shem m'Shmuel asks: So how is it that the churban havayis happened right under the nose of Yirmiyahu haNavi, with Yechezkel haNavi around as well? Surely these giants did teshuvah -- where was the effect on the world?

The answer is that teshuvah did effect the world of Yirmiyahu haNavi, of Yechezkel haNavi -- but we chose to live in our own world instead of theirs.

Everybody talks about "the yeshivishe velt" and this velt and that velt. There is a facebook velt and now a google+ velt. Teshuvah does bring refuah l'olam -- it's just a matter of whether you want to be part of that world or not.

Have an easy Tzom Gedalya today.

a clean slate

Last week I mentioned R' Leibele Eiger's explanation of there being no kiddush hachodesh for Tishrei because, unlike all other months, Tishrei was not preceded by a kedushas Shabbos -- Shabbos only came into existance after Rosh HaShana/Rosh Chodesh Tisrei. I should have given that idea more thought and explained it better. Putting aside the mysticism, what R' Leibele Eiger means (and it's also in the Shem m'Shmuel) is that what makes, for example, Kislev into Kislev is that fact that it comes after Cheshvan (or to be technical, after the last Shabbos in Cheshvan); what makes Teves into Teves is that it comes after Kislev. The flavor of each month comes from the accumulation of the past that preceded it. Stores can have a Chanukah sale in August (you know what I mean), but we can't really experience Chanukah in August or Kislev in August because the accumulated experiences of the preceding days and weeks that lead up to those dates haven't happened yet.

But what happens if there is no past experience to draw upon, or what happes if the past that is there is something a person would rather leave behind and discard rather than carry with him/her as a defining part of their future? That's the chiddush of Tishrei. There is no Shabbos mevorchim, there is no past that needs to get carried into Tishrei -- everyone has the opportunity to create a kedushas hachodesh, a kedushas ha'shana, from scratch -- all are welcome to apply, literally no prior experience necessary.

This idea lies at the heart of what teshuvah is all about. The Rambam writes (Teshuvah 2:2) that the ideal of teshuvah is to reach that point that Hashem himself testifies about the person that, "She'lo yashuv l'zeh hacheit l'olam," the sinner will not return to this aveirah ever again. Lechem Mishna asks how such a thing is possible -- a person has bechira! He/she always has the choice to repeat the same offense or to not do so.

Both the Steipler (in Karayna D'Igresa vol 2) and the Kozhiglover (Eretz Tzvi p.19) give similar answers. If even a small stain of an aveira remains behind, that aveira has the power to cause other aveiros -- aveirah gorreres aveirah. It's like weed in your garden -- if you cut off the top but don't dig down after the roots, the same weed will sprout all over again. What the Rambam means is if that if the original aveira is truly fixed, if the weed is uprooted completely, it's gone -- the same aveira, "ZEH hacheit," will never return. Sure, the garden may grow other weeds in the future -- a person still has bechira -- but these are new problems; they are not part of the aveirah gorreres aveirah cycle of the original flaw.

New beginnings with a clean slate -- that's Tisrei and Rosh haShana in a nutshell. Kesiva v'chasima tova.

the response of hester panim

1. Every Shabbos brings into the world the potential for all that will unfold in the upcoming week. R' Leibele Eiger writes that this Shabbos is therefore the last real day of the year, as all that will happen during the upcoming week until Rosh haShana will be set on this day.

(Similarly, the Shabbos before Rosh Chodesh is when we usually recite birchas hachodesh as the potential for the upcoming month comes into the world on that Shabbos. The exception is te Shabbos before chodesh Tisrei where we do not bentch rosh chodesh because bri'as ha'olam was not preceded by a Shabbos.)

2. The meforshim struggle to make sense of the rasha's response to the tochacha: "Shalom yi'hiye li ki b'sherirus libi eiliech..." M'mah nafshach -- if the tochacha means something to the rasha, then why will he think he will have shalom? And if the tochacha had no effect, then what good will the threats in the rest of the parsha do?

The sefer l'Horos Noson explains the pasuk in light of Chazal's teaching that "Gadol hashalom," as Hashem promises to go easy even on idolators so long as there is peace among them. The rasha who hears the tochacha is scared, but he thinks he has an out: "Shalom yi'hiye li," I'll play nice with others and foster shalom and achdus, but I'll do it for the purpose of, "Ki b'sherirus libi eiliech," because I want to continue to be a rasha and not be punished.

Hashem is willing to ignore everything else when shalom is truly valued; however, if making peace is just being used as a "matir" to try to get Hashem to overlook other problems, then no dice.

3. The Torah in VaYeilech descibes how the idolator will finally come to recognize, "Al ki ain Elokai b'kirbi metza'uni kol ha'ra'os ha'eileh." Sounds like we are dealing with someone who is engaged in teshuvah or at least on the road to teshuvah, someone who realizes that Hashem does not approve of what he is doing. Yet, Hashem's response (31:17) seems far from welcoming: "V'anochi haster astir panei... al kol ha'ra'ah asher asah." Why is this ba'al teshuvah or potential ba'al teshuvah met with even more punishment, with Hashem hiding? Why slam the door in his face?

Ramban answers that the teshuvah here is incomplete -- it's a teshuvah b'lev, an introspective realization, but not a teshuvah that is accompanied by any verbal commitment, viduy, or action. That teshuvah is enough to stop the harsh punishments of the tochacha, but not enough to cause Hashem to come out of hiding (kavyachol) and reveal the light of geulah.

Yet the question is still troubling. The gemara (Kid 49) says that if a rasha is mekadesh a woman on the condition that he is a tzadik, the kiddushin is chal (m'safeik) because perhaps a thought of teshvah passed through the rasha's mind and that is enough to change his staus to tzadik. Why not apply the same standard here?

R' Tzadok says a pshat that you have to be R' Tzadok to say, and it all hinges on the one little word "al" in the pasuk. R' Tzadok says the pasuk does not mean that Hashem will hids his face because of the evil done by this rasha. Aderaba -- the pasuk means that Hashem will hide his face from the evil done by the rasha and refuse to look at it! Despite the rasha having only a hirhur teshuvah b'lev, Hashem is willing to overlook and hide himself from seeing the misdeeds.

I would answer for the Ramban that perhaps once a person has come to the point that they recognize that they had been on the wrong path, they already have a hirhur teshuvah, continuing to remain in that state of hirhur teshuvah without translating it into some concrete action or change is indeed a further indictment. The gemara in Kiddushin is speaking only about the immediate effect this first step of hirhur has on the individual's status. The Ramban is speaking about what happens when this first step is never more than a first step.

4. One final halachic point. The Rambam has an interesting din describing hakhel (Hil Chagiga 3):

אפילו חכמים גדולים שיודעים כל התורה כולה, חייבין לשמוע בכוונה גדולה יתרה.

Super-kavanah (kavanah gedolah y'seira)! Do you find such a din anywhere else? And where did the Rambam get this from?

the transition to Yehoshua's leadership

In P' VaYelech Moshe charges Yehoshua with the mission of conquering Eretz Yisrael, but then the Torah switches gears and discusses Moshe's nevuah that Bnei Yisrael will end up serving idolatry, will ultimately do teshuvah, and then discusses Moshe's writing sifrei Torah. Finally, Moshe again (31: 23) speaks to Yehoshua, charging him, "Chazak v'amatz..." Why interrupt the narrative concerning the appointment of Yehoshua with these other topics?

The Oznayim laTorah offers two answers. Firstly, Moshe was telling Yehoshua not to think his job was only to be a great general, a great administrator, a great political leader. The Torah reiterates the bris of teshuvah and the kesivas sefer Torah to demonstrate the responsibility of leadership to promote Torah -- that was Yehoshua's primary mission. Secondly, Moshe was preparing the nation to accept Yehoshua. As much as we respect and admire giants like R' Akiva Eiger, the Chasam Sofer, etc. it pays to remember that there are enough stories of gedolim who, in their own time, were literally run out of their towns by elements of the populace. Yiftach b'doro k'Shmuel b'doro -- the respect accorded to the greatest giants in Torah in our time is sadly not universal. Moshe had to ensure that Yehoshu'a "ba'alei batim" would be committed to the same ideals as he was, and therefore before charging Yehoshua with the task of leadership, he reminded the people of the commitment that was necessary on their part.

ahavas chessed and hatzneya leches

One of my daughters called home from her school the night before last with an interesting shayla. Her school (I should say in advance that I do think she gets a pretty good education there, despite my little criticism here) was running a program billed as a "chessed dinner," consisting of a banquet and auction where girls got to bid on prizes, ostensibly for the purpose of raising funds for various causes. My daughter planned to use ma'aser from money she earned as a camp counselor and babysitter to participate in the auction bidding, but when she got there and saw the prizes and what the money was going for, she had a change of heart. She realized that most of the money was not going to charity or chessed, but was being used simply to cover the cost of the prizes or to go back to her own school. What types of prizes are we talking about? Example: A Shopping trip to Woodbury Common (for those not from NY, it's a collection of stores which bill themselves as outlets about an hour outside the city -- think of an entire village that is one big shopping mall). Another example: A manicure. Enough said.

I don't want to discuss hilchos nedarim and whether her intent to pledge meant anything. The far more important point is that even a thirteen year old (one who happens to love shopping herself) can recognize the difference between true chessed and using chessed as an excuse to throw away hundreds of dollars on indulgences and materialistic pursuits. My daughter made me realize that when the pasuk speaks of "...Ahavas chessed v'hatzenya leches im Elokecha," it's perhaps not two different values the Navi is addressing, but one -- the way we do chessed ideally has to be b'tzeniyus.

I've rewritten this post from what I originally had in mind but still am wondering if it is too harsh -- it's not meant to be. It is just frustrating as a parent to realize just how much you are up against if you want to battle the commercialism and materialism that poisons our culture. I'll try to end on a positive note. Nechemya tells the Jews of his time to celebrate Rosh haShana by giving food and gifts to those who don't have anything -- chessed is a kiyum of the mitzvas hayom of R"H. Why? Because, "Olam chessed yibaneh." The creation of the world is the first and ultimate act of chessed, and so we celebrate the anniversary of the br'iah by participating in acts of chessed ourselves (see Pachad Yitzchok for a little deeper thought on this).

bikkurim, kiddush levana -- zman gerama?

1. What does R' Chaim Kanievski mean in his Ta'ama d'Kra when he writes that since the Torah uses the term "pri ha'adamah" to describe fruits of bikkurim, it proves that you are yotzei saying a borei pri ha'adamah on fruit? If this proof was so clear cut, how could there be a machlokes Tana'im in Brachos on this very point?! Perhaps R' Chaim simply means the pashtus of the pasuk is like one tzad (I haven't learned enough of Ta'ama d'Kra to know if this is his style of thing to do.) The Chasam Sofer already asks in the name of the Hafla'ah how to deal with this proof and says a pilpul to answer it.

2. A few years ago we mentioned (I, II) R' Akiva Eiger and the Turei Even's sevara that although bikkuim are brought only between Shavuos and Chanukah, the mitzvah is not classified as an aseh she'ha'zman gerama because that's simply the time period when the cheftza shel mitzvah of fruit is available -- it's not a limitation on the duration of the chiyuv. (This is similar to R' Chaim Brisker's explanation as to why milah is not categorized as zman gerama [see Tos. Kid 29a] -- the baby is simply not a proper cheftza shel mitzvah until day 8, but there is no time limitations on the chovas hagavra.)

It seems that the MG"A takes a different view, as he (O.C. 424) quotes the SHL"H that women are exempt from kiddush levana because it is a zman gerama mitzvah. R' Shlomo Kluger asks: Why is kiddush levana any different than bikkurim? There is no limitation on the chiyuv -- it's just that the cheftza shel mitzvah, the new moon, is available only certain times during the month. It's a metziyus, not a din.

I know it's a dochak, but this is only a blog, so I'll try out a chiluk. R' Elchanan in the Koveitz Shiurim at the beginning of Pesachim has a chakirah whether the emergence of three stars is a siman that it is night, or the emergence of stars is the sibah of it being halachic night. I want to go a step further and say that when the Torah tells us that the passage of the sun and moon and stars are "l'yamim v'shanim," it means not only are they the means of marking time, but they are the sibah for time changing. Bikkurim are a phenomenon that takes place within the envelope of time; the passage of the moon is the phenomenon of time, and is therefore directly related to zman.

Parenthetically, the Halichos Beisa quotes a beautiful kashe in the same of R' Isser Zalman Meltzer -- whether it's zman gerama or not, why are we referring to kiddush levana as a "mitzvah"? There is no mitzvah to go out and find the moon -- there is just a din that if you see the new moon, you are obligated to say a birchas ha'shevach. See his answer (end of ch 16) in the name of the Chazon Ish.

don't count your bikkurim before they hatch

1. Ki Savo opens with the parsha of bikkurim, the mitzvah to bring the first fruits to the beis hamikdash, followed by the parsha of viduy ma'asros, the mitzvah to declare after a a three year cycle that all terumos and ma'asros have been properly distributed and disposed of (see Seforno who explains why this declaration is called viduy). The parsha then continues, "Hayom hazeh Hashem metzavecha la'asos es hachukim ha'eileh v'es hamishpatim..." (26:16). Rashi comments that this pasuk is a bracha: just like on this day -- hayom hazeh -- you have fulfilled the mitzvah of bikkurim, so too next year you should be zocheh to fulfill the mitzvah again. If that's what the pasuk means, then shouldn't it appear immediately after the parsha of bikkuim, not here, after the parsha of viduy ma'asros?

In a biographical sketch of Rashi I was reading the author noted that while there seems to be a consensus as to the date of Rashi's death, there is some ambiguity as to when he was born. The reason why is simple -- news of the great Rashi's death reverberated around the Jewish world and made headlines; news of his birth was of interest only to family and friends, as at that point in time he was not yet the great Rashi! The Torah here is giving us a similar message. The bikkurim are not just the "reishis," the first of fruits to be harvested, but they are the first steps of a process of treating one's crops, one's income, as something that is a gift from Hashem, not the natural result of "kochi v'otzem yadi." It's only after the farmer finishes the cycle and has distributed terumos and ma'asros properly that "igla'i milsa l'mafre'a" that the gift of bikkurim was one of significance that merits bracha.

2. The parsha of bikkum contains a mitzvah for the farmer of, "V'samachta b'chol hatov asher nasan lecha Hashem Elokecha u'beisecha.." (26:11) I am willing to assume that the farmer this mitzvah is directed to is not a total Litvak -- mistama he is overjoyed at seeing his crops finally bear fruit; he doesn't need a pasuk in chumash to tell him to be happy. Why does the Torah need to command the farmer to be happy?

A few possibilities:
1. The Torah commands a specific type of simcha, one that comes along with a recognition that the crops are, "...Nasan lecha HASHEM ELOKECHA," gifts from Hashem, not merely the product of the farmer's own hard work.
2. The mitzvah comes to teach us the midah of histapkus (see Tiferes Shlomo). There will always be another farmer that has nicer fruit, that has a nicer basket, etc. Nonetheless, be happy with what is given to you, "Asher nasan... LECHA."
3. Along similar lines, it's possible that the farmer has a great crop of olives, but the grapes that year were not so good, or vica versa -- seldom does everything go right in sync. The Torah is telling us to look at the bigger picture and be happy, 'B"CHOL hatov" -- don't nitpick on the details and use them as an excuse to complain.
4. Finally, as the end of the pasuk indicates, don't be selfish with simcha. Spread it to "Beisecha.. halevi.. v'ha'ger..."

where your charity dollars go

Thanks to the charitynavigator and the like you can check up and see whether the organization you plan to donate to uses your dollars wisely. It goes without saying that people who spend their day running a charity as a full time job need to be compensated for their work. However, it's also fair to say that in an age of declining wages and massive unemployment, that salary should be commensurate with the going rate in other industries. When I see that the administrator of a charity makes upwards of two hundred and even upwards of three hundred and fifty thousand dollars, how can I feel motivated to write out a check to that tzedaka? When I receive a phone call from that organization describing their difficult financial plight, do I have a right to perhaps question whether that plight is one of their own making?

Maybe these are bad questions to ask during Elul, or maybe davka during this time of year when every organization is asking for your support it pays to make sure you are getting the most bang for your charity buck.

Rav Gifter's letters

I don't know why, but I have no cheishek to write. General malaise.

Hebrewbooks.org has a collection of Rav Gifter's letters here. Three quick points:

1. For those of you learning the daf, he has a kashe on the Mishna in Chulin 81 here.

2. All the gedolim yell about the slow pace of learning that has taken root in yeshivos -- you can find this in R' Shach's letters, in the Steipler's letter, and in many other places going back even earlier, and I see R' Gifter echoes the same (a sharp example on p. 35). There is a point he mentions that I have not seen elsewhere. He writes (p. 84) that many gedolim had a seder learning just gemara & Rashi, without the Tosfos. This is why many times R' Akiva Eiger hints to a kashe in the gilyon ha'shas that Tos. right on the page already asks -- R' Akiva Eiger was learning gemara / Rashi and noted the kashe, but he did not want to slow down to dig through the Tosfos at that point. Interesting.

3. Rav Gifter quotes (p. 80-81) the AB"D of Telz (I am assuming he means R' Leizer Gordon here, unless it's R' Bloch?) as saying that if in Telz they don't eat butter made of cholov aku"m, in Paris they will be careful and not eat pig meat, but if in Telz they are meikil on butter, in Paris they will eat tarfus. I have seen the same idea quoted in the name of R' Yisrael Salanter, and I had assumed it reflected the notion that Klal Yisrael is a unified entity, and where the head goes, the tail will follow, albeit a few steps behind. However, R' Gifter quotes R' Daniel Movshovitz of Kelm (R' Simcha Zisel's SIL?) who understood the idea far more broadly. He says that GR"A's delving into the deepest truths of Torah in his little hidden kloiz in Vilna caused the light of truth to shine more brighly into the world, and because of that Immanuel Kant sitting a world away in Berlin was able to formulate his categorical imperative. (I don't know yiddish -- hope I'm right in assuming based on the context that it's the categorical imperative he is referring to. And just agav urcha, maybe I'm too cynical, but are the days when a gadol might refer to an insight of Kant as a "he'ora nifla'ah amukah" gone forvever? Just asking.)

v'nishmarta m'kol davar ra and wikileaks

1. The pasuk, "Ki teitzei machaneh al oyvecha v'nishmarta mkol davar ra," (23"10), which appears at the beginning of the parsha which tells us the halachos of keeping a battle camp sanitary and tahor, is used by the Yerushalmi (Pe'ah 4b) as one of two sources for the issur of lashon ha'ra, the other being the pasuk, "Lo teilech rachil..." (VaYikra 19). The Yerushalmi is a play on the word association of "davar" with "dibbur." What is the azhara for lashon ha'ra doing here in the middle of a parsha about war? The Meshech Chochma explains that the Torah is warning against the lashon ha'ra of revealing state secrets, battle plans, and the like to the enemy -- the Torah has an issur directed specifically at the pentagon papers and wikileaks!

This chiddush resolves R' Yosef Shaul Nathanson's question in his Divrei Shaul as to why the command of "V'nishmarta m'kol davar ra" appears in the context of war when it applies equally at all times and places. According to the Meshech Chochma, the pasuk's message is in fact one that applies specifically to battle.

Meshech Chochma adds that the Yerushalmi needs two pesukim for the issur of lashon ha'ra because the issur has two forms: There is the lashon ha'ra spoken amongst ourselves, "Lo teilech rachil," which is bad enough, but then there is the even worse lashon ha'ra of speaking about fellow Jews to others, the enemy or other outsiders, and creating a chilul Hashem. Airing Klal Yisrael's dirty laundry in public provides ammunition for our worst enemies.

I don't know why the M.C. doesn't quote it, but in light of this Yerushalmi I think we have a much better understanding of the Bavli's reading of the pasuk (Kesubos 5) in the same parsha, "V'yated ti'hiye lecha al azeynecha," as a hint that one's fingers should be placed in one's ears (a play on azeynecha / ozen) to avoid hearing gossip. The Bavli read the continuation of the parsha in a way that perfectly fits the theme of lashom ha'ra introduced earlier.

2. The Torah warns against having "eiphah v'eiphah," two different weights or scales. R' Shternbruch in his Ta'am VaDa'as homiletically interprets the pasuk as a warning against having two standards of behavior, one for the beis medrash, one for the outside. Perhaps the pasuk also means to tells us that we must use the same scale to weigh other's actions as we use to weigh our own. It's human nature to give oneself the benefit of the doubt, to take credit for success, to blame failure on other's lapses that got in the way, and of course to do just the opposite when evaluating the deeds of others. The Torah demands that we try to overcome that and evaluate others' deeds as we would our own.

3. Should we make anything of the fact that our parsha closes with a reminder never to forget Amalek just as we approach the 10th anniversary of 9/11? Who knows. In any case, aside from not forgetting that there is true evil out there out to destroy us, we should also remember the heroism of the NYPD and NYFD who are out there working to keep all us NYers safe.

4. Lastly, a bit of chizuk: The ben sorer u'moreh is nidon al shem sofo, he is punished severely because his gluttonous lifestyle will inevitably lead him to become a criminal. Rather than wait for the inevitable to unfold, the Torah assigns to him at the outset the punishment for the evil deeds that will follow. The Kozhiglover writes that midah tovah is greater than midah ra'ah. If a criminal can be punished for potential future acts because he already exhibits the desires that will lead him to that future life of crime, a person who exhibits the desire for kedusha and ruchniyus will be rewarded for attaining those values even if he has just begun to embark on the path to get there.

can everyone be a member of the "reading class"

I am in the middle of reading a delightful little book called "The Pleasures of Reading in an Age of Distraction" by Alan Jacobs and I want to share what the author calls "one of the most important arguments" (p. 106) he makes. The pleasure / skill / ability (I'm not sure which is the best word to use) of becoming immersed in a book and thinking deeply about it has been lost (assuming it ever existed, as we shall soon discuss) in our age of information overload -- the patience to digest a great novel of many hundreds of pages and to reflect on its message has little place in an age of "tweets". Jacobs suggests that our expectation that things should be different is perhaps unrealistic. Jacobs writes, "...It has to be admitted that much of the anxiety about American reading habits, and those in other developed nations to a lesser degree, arises from the frustration at not being able to sustain a permanent expansion of the "reading class" beyond what may be its natural limits." (p.107) "Rarely have young people been expected to have truly deeep knowledge of particualt texts. Instead, education, especially in its "liberal arts" embodiments, has been devoted to providing students with navigational tools -- with enough knowledge to find their way through situations that they might confront later in life." (112)

In other words, reading deeply, thinking about great literature, has never been a skill that belonged to the masses. Just as it would be ludicrous to expect everyone to be able to paint fine art or to play a musical instrument, it is ludicrous to expect everyone to read with attention and insight. Most reading is nothing more than an instrumental act, a means to collect data, best accomplished at the fastest pace in the least challenging format.

So how can we possibly expect bachurim to sit for 10 to 12 hours a day immersed in "reading" a sugya?

The simple answer is, "We can't." Just as the post-WWII boom brought with it a never before seen increase in university attendance, so that many more non-readers are now burdened with a task they are unprepared for and incapable of performing (with the result that university classes must be watered down, or with the equally unpleasant result of students cutting corners and feeling frustrated as they attempt to tackle the "great" books), so too we have created our own post-WWII kollel / yeshiva boom, with many more people sitting in yeshiva than historically ever was the case, but with no more people than existed in the past who truly can excel in such a system. We have created an expectation that everyone belongs to the "reading class" rather than accept that this designation belongs to precious few. Isn't that what Chazal themselves tell us when they speak of eleph nichnasim l'mikra but only one being yotzei l'talmud?

That being said, I feel I have to qualify things a bit, because I don't think the simple answer gives us the full picture. There is a difference between reading, which is primarily an activity done independently, privately, in quiet, and learning, which takes places in a social context, be it with a chavrusa, be it with in a shiur with a rebbe. Does that difference mean we can expect the masses to become accomplished talmidei chachamim and appreciate torah on a deep level even if they cannot lose themselves in a book in quite the same way? I wouldn't go that far. Tweedledee who has no attention span and no idea how to delve into the nuances of a text will not become that much better a learner if we sit him across from Tweedledum (who has a similar skill set) for 12 hours a day. I do think, however, that the process of discussion helps keep focus on the text for far longer periods than could be achived through isolated reading alone.

Does that mean learning cannot be loved by all? Of course not. Jacobs is speaking about reading in deeply reflective way; of learning on the highest levels. Even if one cannot read / learn on this level, all is not lost. If someone learns the daf and knows shas gemera & rashi well,that's still quite an accomplishment. So what if one cannot delve into every machlokes and understand the lomdus behind it? A person who knows where to find any din he needs in a Mishna Berura has still achieved much, even if he does not know the gemara, Rishonim, and Beis Yosef behind every din (is that not what the M.B. writes in his introduction as the raison d'etra of his work?) I have seen people waste precious time knocking themselves out trying to force questions and come up with something to say on a text rather than simply move on and cover ground, which would be a far better use of their time. Instrumental reading, collecting information and knowing it well, has an important place in talmud torah, and I think is far more accessible and realistic a goal for the masses. Perhaps we need to rethink our chinuch system so that instead of expecting every bachur to be able to formulate a new and insightful answer to a kashe of R' Akiva Eiger in the first few daf of Bava Kama we instead train them to master the skill of instrumental reading and apply it for all its worth.

can a din derabbanan be more chamur than a din d'oraysa?

The Minchas Chinuch has a paradoxical chiddush: Since every violation of a din derabbanan is a violation of both lo tasur and v'asisa al pi hadavar asher yorucha, it comes out that a din derabbanan is more chamur than a violation of a single lav d'oraysa (2 issurim vs. 1). Nafka minah: Where there is a choice between two prohibited foods, a choleh should always be given the less severe issur to eat -- ma'achilin lo ha'kal ha'kal techila. Given a choice between eating a food that is assur m'derabbanan and a food that is assur mdoraysa, the Minchas Chinuch suggests better choice would be to eat the food assur m'doraysa, as that would violate only a single lav instead of two.

The footnotes of the new Minchas Chinuch point you to a few places where R' Elchanan proves that the din d'oraysa is in fact more chamur. R' Noson Gestetner in his L'Horos Noson (the perusal of which makes for oneg Shabbos and which is available online here) explains why. The Rishonim discuss whether it would be better to shecht an animal on Shabbos to obtain kosher food or whether it would be better to feed a choleh neveilah. The Rosh writes that it is better to break Shabbos. Even though the punishment for breaking Shabbos is far more severe (misah) than the punishment for eating neveilah, the issur of Shabbos is extrinsic to the food itself - it's like a lion that blocks the way to a good meal. Neveilah, however, is like inedible, not merely inaccessible, food. Here too, issurei derabbanan are issurei gavra (see R' Yosef Engel in Esvan D'Oraysa who discusses this at length) that prevent access to the food. The issur Torah on the food taints the cheftza of the meal itself.

While the lomdus sounds nice, I don't understand what he means. The point of ma'achilin lo ha'kal ha'kal techila seems to me to be to minimize the issurim being done -- it's not a specific din in issurei achila, but is a more general concept: Don't be a big rasha when you can be a smaller one. What difference does it make if issurei derabbanan are issurei gavra or issurei cheftza -- bottom line remains that eating food assur mderabbanan entails violating two issurim while eating neveilah or some other food that is asur m'doraysa entails violating only one issur.

As for why violating Shabbos to obtain kosher food is less severe than eating neveilah, I seem to recall a Netziv which explains that issurei achilah have the added downside of corrupting the neshoma in a way other issurim (even with more severe punishments) do not. Those learning daf yomi may recall from early in Chulin that Hashem does not allow tzadikim to even inadvertently violate issurim. Tosfos holds that this special promise applies only to issureiachila, not to all cases. This underscores the special danger posed by foodstuff.

the "eyes" have it

When a body is found and the murderer is unknown, our parsha tells us that an eglah arufah ceremony takes place and the elders of the nearest town declare, "Yadeinu lo shafchu es ha'dam ha'zeh v'eineynu lo ra'u." Why do the zekeinim need to declare their innocence -- as Rashi, citing Chazal asks, "Do we really think the zekeinim could possibly be murderers?" Rashi and Chazal offer an answer, but the Ibn Ezra suggests an answer of his own that is a tremendous mussar.

When a body is found close to a city, mistama if the murderer was a member of the nearest city, he would be discovered by the police and apprehended. The eglah arufah scenario is a crime from out of the blue, with no clue as to who the culprit is. The zekeinin declare, "Yadeinu lo shafchu es ha'dam ha'zeh," -- "We know none of the people in our town did this -- so why is this on our doorstep?" Things don't just "happen" for no reason -- there must be something wrong that would ellicit Hashem sending such a tremendously disturbing wake up call. The pasuk is not a declaration of innocence, but rather of guilt.

Chasam Sofer adds an explanation of the end of the pasuk, "V'eineynu lo ra'u." The zekeinim are responsible for the oversight of their town. When inexplicable tragedy occurs, it means they have been remiss in their job, they have failed to see wrongdoing that they should have been aware of, and therefore, their failure to act has led to tragedy.

When terrible things happen, we hope and pray that they murderer is not from our community, our town (and as we know from the tragedy that happened in the summer, we can't even be sure these days that the murderer is in fact not living right under our noses). But that doesn't mean we aren't guilty. To ever hear of such tragedies, to have them happen in our own backyard, is a sign that something is rotten in Denmark.

I want to add two points. Most of us will hopefully never have to be part of an eglah arufah investigation -- we won't find a body lying on the doorstep -- but that doesn't mean the parsha doesn't apply to us. Ani chashuv k'meis -- Chazal tell us that a poor person is considered like someone who is dead. Thanks to the times we live in there is not one, but dozens of meisim out there that can be found and "no noda mi hikahu," no one knows what happened to cause such a situation. We need to ask why did this happen in our community, on our watch? What is the wake up call telling us? What did we fail to see that needs correcting?

And lastly, I would like to suggest derech derush a slightly different reading of the end of the pasuk, which, even if you don't like it, at least give me originality points. B'pashtus, "Yadeinu lo shafchu..." is a protestation of innocence. "We didn't spill innocent blood." I read "V'eineynu lo ra'u" the same way, with a little twist -- not, "We did not see anything wrong," but rather, "Our seeing did not cause anything wrong." What do I mean? Think of how cheap life must become for a murder to occur. How can such a thing happen? Easy. Think of how many murders and killings occur in a month of TV programs that you can just sit back and watch as if it is sport. Think of how many times you can shoot and kill the other guy in some online game. Newspapers every day now have full color pages so you can actually see the rishus described, not just be satisfied with a word filled description. When all this is in front of your eyes day in and day out, is it any wonder that an eglah arufah can happen?! The Torah is telling us that you can't feign shock and declare innocence unless you can honestly say, "eineynu lo ra'u," we have not created an environment when such things are absorbed by our eyes. If our eyes take in everything out there, then eventually it doesn't just penetrate our eyes, but it penetrates our minds and from there it penetrates our actions and attitudes.

makom goreim and lo tasur

The Rambam (Sefer haMitzvos 153) holds that kiddush hachodesh was done by either the sanhedrin or a beis din authorized by the sanhedrin; Ramban disagrees. His proof is as follows: We know that the sanhedrin was forced to leave its proper location next to the lishkas hagazis 40 years before the churban. From that point onward capital cases could no longer be judged, as the gemara learns from our parsha, "v'kamta v'alisa el hamakom -- melamed she'hamakom goreim," that beis din could judge such cases only when located in its proper place. Yet, says the Ramban, we know that kiddush hachodesh continued to be done for many years afterwards. QED that the sanhedrin was not necessary for kiddush hachodesh.

What does the din of "makom goreim" with respect to dinei nefashos have to do with kiddush hachodesh? Apparently the Ramban understood that "makom goreim" is a halacha in beis din, not in the particular process of dinei nefashos. When beis din is not located near the lishkas hagazis, they lack their full status and authority. Therefore, kiddush hachodesh, which was done even after the sanhedrin was forced to move, must not require the full authority of beis din hagadol to be carried out.

R' Zolti in his Mishnas Ya'avetz asks: If this is correct, why then according to Ramban is there a chiyuv to obey and not rebel against the sanhedrin even when they were sitting in Yavneh (as the Sifri darshens)? How could there be a chiyuv of "lo tasur... asher yagidu lecha min hamakom ha'hu" if beis din lacks full status/authority when not in lishkas hagzais?

He answers that Ramban follows the view of the Chinuch that lo tasur prohibits not just rebelling against beis din hagadol, but rebelling against any of the gedolei and chachamei hador of any time. Rambam l'shitaso that there is no diminuation of the chalos shem or status of beis din even if they are not sitting near lishkas hagazis disagrees and learns that lo tasur applies only to the sanhedrin, but not to every beis din or chacham.

It's interesting to compare the approach of R' Zolti, who was a Brisker, with that of another Brisker -- R' Soloveitchik (see Koveitz Ch. Torah). RYBS suggested that there are two roles of sanhedrin: 1) the supreme court; 2) the bearers of the mesorah of klal yisrael as their representatives. Kiddush hachodesh according to the Rambam is not a function of B"D's role as supreme judicial body, which, as Ramban correctly notes, came to a close long before the churban. Rather, it is a function of their role as bearers of the mesorah in their representative capacity. Based on this, there is no reason to align the Rambam against the Chinuch l'shitaso. When the Rambam mentions beis din hagadol in the context of lo tasur, he might be referring to beis din as transmitters of the mesorah of klal yisrael, a role that is fulfilled by the chachamim of each generation.

din on water

Well, the storm came, the storm went, and we made it baruch Hashem without damage. Just to give you a feel for the seriousness of the precautions, Rabbonim here advised those who live below Broadway in Lawrence that it was OK to evacuate on Shabbos as it was a situation of pikuach nefesh.

I saw this Meshech Chochma on Shabbos and thought it very apropos (and it's a good vort to remember for Sukkos): When it comes to the mitzvah of aliya la'regel on Pesach and Shavuos, the Torah in Re'eh writes to go to the place "asher yivchar Hashem l'shakein shemo sham." However, when it describes the same mitvzah of aliya la'regel on Succos, it says to go to the place, "asher yivchar Hashem," but it leaves out the words, "l'shakein shemo sham." Why the difference?

Meshech Chochma answers that on Pesach and Shavuos we are judged respectively on wheat crops and fruit. The Torah adds the words, "l'shakein shemo sham," to remind us that unlike what the other nations think, there is no power other than Hashem that can influence what will happen to these crops. On Sukkos, when we are judged on how much water and rainfall will occur, we don't need a similar reminder. Even the nations realize that Hashem and only Hashem controls rainfall and water (he brings a number of proofs from various gemaras).

the alarm clock is ringing

Those of us in the northeastern portion of the US experienced an earthquake earlier this week, which is rare enough. Now, we have the most powerful hurricane in decades headed our way. Is the alarm clock ringing to wake us up?

(Yeah, I know, once you start saying stuff like that people start looking at you a little strangely and you might as well get yourself a soap box in Times Square or strait jacket, but on the other hand the Rambam (Ta'anis 1:3) says:

אבל אם לא יזעקו, ולא יריעו, אלא יאמרו דבר זה ממנהג העולם אירע לנו, וצרה זו נקרוא נקרית--הרי זו דרך אכזרייות, וגורמת להם להידבק במעשיהם הרעים, ותוסיף הצרה וצרות אחרות

So make of it what you will.)

good things can't wait

After last post I have to do something a little more uplifting, so here's a really nice vort from R' Yehoshua Rokeach of Belz on the parsha of navi sheker:

Lo tishma el divrei hanavi ha'hu....
Acharei Hashem Elokeichem teilechu v'oso tira'u, v'es mitzvosov tishmoru v'oso ta'avodu u'bo tidbakun
V'hanavi ha'hu... yumas... (13:4-6)

Why does the Torah stick the long exhortation to follow Hashem, observe mitzvos, emulate Hashem's midos, etc. in the middle of the parsha, in between telling is not to listen to the navi sheker and the navi sheker's punishment? Why not complete the topic of navi sheker and then come back to what we should be doing instead of listening to false prophets?

The navi sheker is bound to cause confusion, to damage people's committment, to have a negative effect on the community. One might think that there could not be a worse time to start a new Torah endeavor than in the middle of dealing with such a terrible situation. Let the tzarah pass and then we can get to other things!

The Torah here is telling us not to wait. Even in the midst of calamity, one can spark a new positive beginning.