A lack of hisbonenus

Despite being given the opportunity to receive nevuah and despite seeing the spiritual greatness of Klal Yisrael -- "mah tovu ohalecha Yaakov" -- Bilam remains unchanged as a person from the start of the parsha through its end.  When the plan to curse fails, it does lead to a change of heart, a re-evaluation and reconsideration, but rather it leads to a new wicked plan and the episode of bnos Moav.  The kabbalists link Bilam with Lavan; some claim they were one and the same person.  Much like Lavan, who despite years of exposure to Yaakov Avinu simply goes back to being his old self, "Vayelech vayashav Lavan lmkomo," (32:1) after Yaakov's departure, so too Bilam, who, after experiencing prophecy simply goes back to being his old self, "Vayakam Bilam vayelech vayashav limkomo," (24:25) with no change in attitude or character.

The Chofetz Chaim noted the interesting fact that the entire story of Bilam's prophecy appears as one long parsha stuma in the Torah with no breaks -- something not too common.  Rashi writes at the beginning of parshas Vayikra that the breaks between parshiyos served to allow Moshe time to reflect on what he was learning, to be misbonein.  Even if a person is given the gift of nevuah, without hisbonenus, without taking time for  contemplation to internalize the message and its meaning,  the person will remain unchanged like Bilam and never grow like Moshe.

Bnos Moav

Rashi writes (25:1) that it was Bilam who advised Moav that the Jewish people would be susceptible to the temptation of znus and instigated this form of attack. 

What elicited this comment of Rashi?

Mizrachi explains that we find in general that Bnei Yisrael were careful not to engage in znus.  Rashi in parshas Emor (24:11) writes that the Torah reveals the identity of the mekalel's mother because she was the only one in Mitzrayim who was mizaneh.  Rashi in next week's parsha (26:5) again writes that while the Egyptians were able to enslave us and force us to work, they were unable to force our women into having any relationship with them.  So how suddenly did things fall apart in this episode with Bnos Moav? It must be that there was some outside influence that pushed Moav at us -- namely, the plot of Bilam.

Gur Aryeh adds that Rashi's comment may have been prompted by a textual issue.  The Torah specifies that it was the "bnos Moav" who were mizaneh.  If this was a case of simple lust, then any / all women should have been involved -- not only the bnos.  It must be that what happened was not the result of normal temptation alone, but rather was a deliberate plot -- the bnos alone were directed to purposefully go out to Bnei Yisrael and instigate trouble.

The two approaches may reflect a larger methodological question.  Does Rashi comment only when there is a particular textual point that needs explanation, or is Rashi interested in larger issues like motivation, morals, etc. that have to do with the story as a whole?

Be that as it may, al pi pashtus perhaps one might say that in Mitzrayim the relationship of master to slave that existed between the Egyptians and Bnei Yisrael served as a deterrent to znus, at least any that might have been initiated by a Jew.  For a lowly slave to dream of having a relationship with beyond their social station would have been unthinkable.  However, fast forward 40 years and in our parsha we are speaking about a Bnei Yisrael that is a free nation, a people that has flexed it's muscles against Sichon and Og and can compete with anyone.  Under those circumstances, the temptation to become involved in illicit relationships with members of other nations, now seen as peers on the world stage, is far more dangerous.

The lesson for our times is obvious.

haTzur tamim pa'alo - Aharon's death

The Torah tells us that upon reaching Hor HaHar, on the boundaries of the land of Edom, Hashem told Moshe to prepare Aharon for death, "al asher m'risen es pi l'mei meriva," (20: 24) because of their failure to obey Hashem at Mei Meriva. 

Why does the Torah need to give us the geographical detail that Hor HaHar is on the border of Edom?  Rashi explains that it was the fact that Bnei Yisrael came under the influence of Edom which diminished their merits and caused this great tzadik Aharon to be taken from them.

The obvious question: the Torah itself tells us why Aharon died -- "Al asher m'risen es pi l'mei meriva" -- because of episode of Mei Meriva, the hitting of the rock.  Why do we need another explanation involving the influence of Edom to account for his death?

I think the simplest answer is that Aharon died for the sin of Mei Meriva, but why here and why now?  Rashi comes to answer that second question.

Sefas Emes offers another answer that touches on a yesod I thought I wrote about before, but can't find where, so it's good to visit or revisit it.  "HaTzur tamim pa'alo" -- G-d's judgment is perfect.  If a person commits a crime and is thrown into jail, it's not only they who suffer, but it's also their wife, their children, etc. who suffer as well.  There is "collateral damage," if you will, caused by the punishment meted out.  Not so G-d's judgment.  If a person is guilty of sin and needs to be punished, then Hashem does so in such a way that avoids causing pain to the person's wife, children, etc. who don't deserve it.  Everything is precisely measured out and meted out.

Aharon had to die because of the sin committed at Mei Meriva, but what did Klal Yisrael do to deserve to suffer the loss of such a tzadik?  Why should they have to deal with a tragedy like that?  The Torah therefore tells us that Aharon died on the border of Edom, where we fell under foreign influence -- our merits did not measure up, so we deserved to suffer as well.  

Maybe this yesod explains another Rashi as well.  At the end of Ha'Azinu, (32:48) Hashem told Moshe to go "b'etzem ha'yom ha'zeh," this very day, up to Har Nevo to look out over the Eretz Yisrael and then to die.  Rashi comments that the Torah uses the expression "b'etzem ha'yom ha'zeh," right in the middle of the day, when everyone can see what is happening, because Klal Yisrael thought that they would cling to Moshe and stop him from dying.  G-d therefore said I'm going to do this in public, right in front of you, and go ahead and see if you can stop me.
What kind of crazy hava amina is it to think you can stop someone from dying?  

Perhaps the answer is "ha'tzur tamim pa'alo," that if we did not deserve to lose Moshe, then irrespective of his sin of Mei Meriva, he would still be with us.  It is only our failure to rally ourselves to a higher level of ruchniyus to deserve his still being with us that let him be taken.  (See this post for a different answer that connects to our parsha as well.)

Not a chip off the ol' block

1) Rashi writes that Yaakov davened that his name not be connected to  the yichus of Korach. What difference does not mentioning his name make -- we all know  Korach came from Yaakov?  Maharal in Gur Aryeh (discussed back in 2009) explains that with great yichus comes great responsibility -- you have to live up to the privilege you have been afforded.  Had any Ploni started a rebellion, it would be bad, but when you are "ben Kehas ben Levi" and start a rebellion, it's even worse.  Yaakov did not want to be associated with condemning any Jew, even Korach.  Therefore, he asked that his name be omitted from the chain of yichus that served to highlight the severity of his sin.

R Baruch Sorotzkin has a different hesber.  Eisav was born first and should have been the bechor charged with the responsibility for avodah. Yaakov realized this would have been a disaster and therefore, when the opportunity presented itself, he demanded  that Eisav sell his birthright.  Under the guidance of Rivka, Yaakov later went ahead and took the brachos that Eisav might have gotten.  Korach might have been thinking to himself that he was a chip off the old block of great grandpa Yaakov -- he too would seize the privilege of avodah from his relatives and restore it to himself, to the person most worthy.  Yaakov davened that the kochos he used in his struggle against Eisav not be taken and perverted and used improperly by Korach.

2) Last post we discussed Ramban's view that even though there is an issur of offering ketores outside its proper place, and even though Moshe was not commanded by G-d to do so, Moshe took the initiative of suggesting it as a test to prove that Korach and co. were wrong. It could be that Moshe did so as a horaas shaah, similar to Eliyahu offering a korban outside the Mikdash in order to prove the prophets of Baal false.  The gemara (Sanhedrin 89) writes that you should obey a Navi who tells you to do something wrong as a horaas shaah only if that person is muchzak as a true Navi.  The very fact that the 250 people accepted Moshe's horaas shaah suggestion in effect validated him as a Navi and undermined Korach's argument (Chasam Sofer).

3) Why was the punishment of Korach's followers that they descend "chaim she'ola," to gehenom while still alive?  See Maharal in Tif Yisrael ch 18.  The second Belzer Rebbe suggested that Moshe, like Yaakov, as we discussed above, did not want any Jew to suffer at his behest.  So long as a person has life in him, there is the possibility of teshuvah.  Therefore, Moshe asked that the rebellious plotters remain alive even as they had to go to gehenom, so as to keep the possibility of repentance open.

Ramban or printer's error / addition?

Where did Moshe get the idea that Korach and co. should offer ketores as a test?

Ramban writes:

והנה משה מעצמו חשב המחשבה הזאת ורצה בקטרת יותר משאר קורבנות, כי ראה כבר בנדב ואביהוא כי
בהקריבם קטרת זרה לפני ה' נשרפו, והתיר לאהרן להקטיר אותה לצורך השעה

Ramban says Moshe thought of the idea himself (he has another answer as well, ayen sham.)

Ramban says it a second time later in the parsha.  When the people complained to Moshe that he was the cause of the death of those who rebelled, Ramban explains their argument:

יפתור, כי יאשימו אותם על שנתנו העצה הזאת להקטיר קטורת זרה לפני ה', מדעתם שהמקריבים אותם נשרפים. כי השם לא אמר למשה להקריב הקטורת הזאת, והוא לא אמר לישראל בשם ה' לעשות כן, אם כן מעצמם נתנו העצה הזאת אשר מתו בה העם, והיו יכולין לתת אות ומופת אחר במטה או בזולתו. 
The people blamed Moshe because it was his idea to offer the ketores -- it's not something that he was instructed to do by G-d.

In the sefer Kol Rom, thoughts on chumash from R' Moshe Feinstein that were collected and written up by someone else, R' Moshe is quoted as saying that this Ramban is inexplicable.  How could Ramban say Moshe acted of his own volition?  We know that "Shechina m'daberes mi'toch grono," that Hashem "spoke" through Moshe. When Moshe gave a command, it was as if G-d himself was speaking, albeit using Moshe's voice to communicate.  If Moshe said to offer ketores, it was if G-d himself said to do so. 

Furthermore, later, when Aharon, at the behest of Moshe, offered ketores to bring to a stop the plague that had broken out in the camp, there was no command from G-d to do so.  Rashi writes that Moshe heard the secret that ketores stops the plague from the Malach ha'Maves.  Offering ketores outside the Mishkan, outside it's proper time and place, is an issur.  How could Moshe have done so?  We don't find any other case where ketores was offered to stop a plague. e.g. David haMelech did not suggest doing so when there was a plague in his time.  Why did only Moshe Rabeinu come up with this idea?  It must be because only he was commanded to do so; only he had a hora'as sha'ah to do so. 

According to the sefer, R' Moshe was so convinced that this pshat cannot be correct that he thought it was a printers error!  Ramban never said it.  

Amazing -- Ramban says it two times in the parsha, yet because of his kashe, R' Moshe gets rid of the whole thing.  

(P.S. Should I ask whether Artscroll includes this Ramban in their edition, given their treatment of Rashbam in Braishis?) 

(P.P.S. Another interesting idea from that sefer on this week's parsha: R' Moshe said that just like we finish reading Torah sheb'ksav annually, one should ideally keep one's Torah sheba'al peh learning in sync and finish sha"s annually as well.

Huh?  We don't really finish Torah sheb'skav annually -- we finish the first 5 books.  And what does that have to do with Torah sheba'al peh?  I'm missing something here.  )

Chazak hu mimenu

Rashi quotes an unbelievable derasha from Chazal that when the meraglim said "chazak hu mimenu" their intention was "kavyachol k'lapei maalah," as if to say the Canaanim were stronger even kavyachol than Hashem and therefore could not be defeated.  To think that the dor dei'ah who witnessed the miracles of yetzias Mitzrayim, kri'as Yam Suf, etc should think that the Canaanim could stand up to G-d defies understanding.

Rav Chaim Hirschensohn has a very clever reading of Rashi that gives it the exact opposite meaning of how it sounds k'peshuto.  The meraglim understood that everything is in G-d's control.  If a nation has power, it's because G- d grants it to them.  When they saw the tremendous might of the Canaanim, the meraglim said "chazak hu" -- this strength is -- "mimenu," something that comes from G-d himself. "Ain Baal habayis yachol l'hotzi misham es keilav," G-d will not withdraw his "kelim," the power and might he has given the Canaanim, for our sake.

Shem mShmuel (see also Meshech Chochma, Netziv at the  beginning of the parsha) writes that the meraglim's plot needs to be seen in context of the nevuah of Eldad and Meidad at the end of last week's parsha that Moshe would die and Yehoshua would be the one leading the nation into Eretz Yisrael.  Moshe was a conduit for the miraculous, but with Yehosha in charge a b'derech ha'teva war would be required.  Recall that when Amalek attacked and Yehoshua led the people in battle, there were no overt miracles -- it was a war, plain and simple.  On the level of derech ha'teva, would people who had sinned in the misonenim episode, who had sinned at kivros ha'taavah, deserve special treatment from G-d?  

Chazal here are not coming to add more criticism on top of the sin of the meraglim, but rather to temper their sin.  The meraglim were truly acting lshem shamayim, as they felt that Hashem himself had enabled  the nations to remain in control of Eretz Yisrael. The meraglim felt that they were unworthy of geulah at this time.  

Rav Hirschensohn ends his piece with a comment no less true today than 100 years ago: "v'zeh yihiyeh mussar l'kol misnagdei hatzionus afilu ha'miskavnim lshem shamayim." Sadly, the lesson still has not penetrated.

Rambam's understanding of ptil techeiles

The Rishonim debate how many strings of techeiles one is required to have in tzitzis.  Rashi and Tos hold there need to be 2 white strings and 2 techeiles strings; Raavad holds that 1 of the 4 strings must be techeiles; Rambam holds 1 of 8.  Rashi and Tos (see Menachos 38 d"h ha'techeiles" base their view on the gemara's derasha on the word "gedilim" being written in plural -- gedil = 2, gedilim= 4. They interpret this to mean not just that 4 strings are required, but that 2 of each variety are required.  Raavad's view is easy to understand -- "ptil techeiles" = 1 ptil, or 1 thread of techeiles.  The hardest position to explain is that of the Rambam.  What is the logic in requiring only 1 of 8 strings -- IOW, half of one fo the 4 whole strings -- to be techeiles?  It is not a gedil, and not even a whole ptil?

The Mishna in Menachos tells us that lavan is not m'akeiv techeiles and techeiles is not m'akev lavan.  The simple pshat in the Mishna is that if you don't have white string you can make tzitzis entirely out of techeiles string; if you don't have techeiles, you can use all white strings.  The Rambam, however, formulates the Mishna's law a little differently (Hil Tzitzis 1:4):

והתכלת אינו מעכב את הלבן והלבן אינו מעכב את התכלת. כיצד הרי שאין לו תכלת עושה לבן לבדו. וכן אם עשה לבן ותכלת ונפסק הלבן ונתמעט עד הכנף ונשאר התכלת לבדו כשר:

When it comes to techeiles not being m'akeiv, the Rambam writes, like we said above, that you can make tzitzis entirely of 4 white strings, but when Rambam quotes the din of lavan not being m'akeiv, he does **not** say you can make tzitzis out of all techeiles string.  What he says is that if you had tzitzis made with white string which then broke so that all that is left is techeiles, the tzitzis are still kosher. 

Why did the Rambam reinterpret the Mishna this way rather than read it k'peshuto?

The answer becomes clear if we look a little earlier in the same perek, to the Rambam's description of how to tie techeiles:

ענף שעושין על כנף הבגד ממין הבגד הוא הנקרא ציצית מפני שהוא דומה לציצית של ראש. שנאמר ויקחני בציצית ראשי. וזה הענף הוא הנקרא לבן מפני שאין אנו מצווין לצובעו. ואין לחוטי הענף מנין מן התורה:
ולוקחין חוט צמר שנצבע כעין הרקיע וכורכין אותו על הענף וחוט זה הוא הנקרא תכלת. ואין למנין הכריכות שכורך חוט זה שיעור מן התורה:

The Rambam in this halacha defines tzitzis as the strings attached to the corner of the garment, and then defines techeiles as the colored string wrapped around those strings.

Implicit in this halacha is a chidush: techeiles is defined not just by its color, but also by its function: it's the string you wrap around the other strings.  The Rambam must have understood that ptil is not a string, but means something wrapped. 
To make tzitzis entirely out of techeiles string would make no sense because by definition techeiles is something wrapped around other strings -- if there are no other strings to wrap around, then your techeiles is not techeiles.  Lavan is not m'akeiv if it is cut off, but it's presence is certainly m'akeiv in order to have something to wrap around.

(Why not wrap techeiles around techeiles?  It seems that techeiles would not fit the Rambam's definition of tzitzis as "min kanaf" as a garment is not usually made entirely out of techeiles.  Korach is next week's parsha -- we're not there yet : )

(See the article by R' Shabtai Rappaport on the ptil techeilet website who spells out this understanding of the Rambam).

Temunas Hashem yabit

What Miriam and Aharon did not appreciate about Moshe Rabeinu is that "temunas Hashem yabit." Netziv explains that Moshe Rabeinu did not see things the way an ordinary person sees things.  There is a way if looking at things that is G-dly, that is special.

I think that is the connection between the parsha of Miriam speaking against Moshe and the parsha of the meraglim. It's not just that both spoke badly.  It's that the meraglim failed to take heed of the fact that there is a way to look at things that goes below surface impressions.  When you look at something holy like Eretz Yisrael you need to put on the glasses of "temunas Hashem yabit" or you may miss the picture completely.

If you don't see the kedushas ha'aretz, the singularity of the land, it is a pgam in your vision, not in the land.

Miriam speaking out

My wife suggested that Miriam speaking out against Moshe separating from Tziporah is consistent with Chazal's portrayal of Miriam being the one who told her father Amram that his separating from Yocheved in Mitzrayim is worse than Phraoah's gezeirah.  (Later found the same idea in Shvilei Pinchas.)

Miriam reached out specifically to Aharon as he was the oheiv shalom v'rodef shalom who was known for restoring shalom bayis. 

Even the best intentions, however, did not immunize Miriam from the danger of lashon ha'ra.  

The grass is always greener

Sivan Rahav Meir quoted a beautiful thought from R Moshe Tzvi Neriah on our parsha: Many people think that if only they lived in some other place, at some other time, had gone to some other school, had a different teacher, different parents, etc then they would be able to excel in their avodas Hashem and their learning.  What do we see from our parsha?  We have the dor de'ah who experienced yetzias Mitzrayim, kri'as Yam Suf, maamad Har Sinai, people who had the zechus of learning Torah directly from Moshe Rabeinu while eating mon and having G-d take care of their every need, and despite all that they complained "mi yaachilanu basar," there's not enough meat in the cholent, and as Rashi explains, that was just an excuse anyway -- in truth, they just wanted out from religion.  They had the best teacher, the best environment, the best of everything, and it did not make a difference.

The environment can't make you into an oveid Hashem or a talmid chacham.  It can only nurture the drive that starts from within.

lock them up

The gemara (Sanhedrin 17) quotes three opinions as to what Eldad and Meided prophesized: 1) that Moshe would die and Yehoshua would lead the people into Eretz Yisrael; 2) that slav birds would come; 3) the future war of Gog and Magog.  The gemara then asks: b'shlama according to the view that they prophesized that Moshe would die, we understand Yehoshua's reaction of "Adoni Moshe kila'eim," lock them up, but according to the other views of what their prophecy was, why did Yehoshua get so agitated?  The gemara answers that Yehoshua held that Eldad and Meided prophesizing in the presence of Moshe was a violation of moreh halacha b'fnei rabbo (see Meg 14b as well and post here) which disrespected Moshe.

Why did the gemara accept Yehoshua's harsh reaction to the prophecy that Moshe would die as justifiable even without the sevara of it being moreh halacha b'fnei rabbo?  If it is a true prophecy, then no matter how uncomfortable the message, Eldad and Meided would have to transmit it and Moshe would have to accept it.  Plenty of nevi'im unfortunately for us were given the job of delivering unpleasant messages to Klal Yisrael.  Why did Yehoshua demand that they be silenced? 

The gemara (Shabbos 30) writes that David haMelech knew that he would die on Shabbos, so every Shabbos he would immerse himself completely in learning so that the malach ha'maves would not be able to overcome him.  R' Zev Hoberman z"l in his sefer Ayeles haShachar writes that if the torah of David could keep the malach ha'maves at bay, kal v'chomer the torah of Moshe Rabeinu.  This is what bothered Yehoshua.  How could the prophecy of Eldad and Meidad be true?  Moshe meis?  Moshe Rabeinu is kulo Torah, his entire being was dedicated to giving over Torah!  Eldad and Meided must be silenced because there is no way their prophecy could be true.

The Maharal In Gevuros Hashem writes that the Torah's explanation for Moshe's name, "ki min ha'mayin mishi'sihu," is not just a reference to the isolated event of his being drawn from the water by Pharoah's daughter.  Water represents chomer, unformed matter.  Water has no shape of its own; it will take on the shape of whatever container you put it in.  The opposite is pure tzurah, something that transcends the chaos of physical matter.  Moshe's name reflects the essence of who he is -- "min ha'mayin mishi'sihu," completely removed from chomer.  Moshe is pure tzurah, pure spiritual essence.  

Rav Hoberman uses this approach to defend the Shach (Y.D. 242), who paskens that one is not allowed to call one's rebbe by name in their presence even if preceded by an honorific, e.g. Rabbi Ploni.  How then could Yehoshua uses Moshe Rabeinu's name?  When Yehoshua used Moshe's name he was not using it as an appellation for Moshe the person, like Joe or Bob or Ploni, but rather he was using it as a description of who Moshe was, someone completely divorced from chomer, like the Maharal explains.  Death is something that can effect only chomer, the physical world.  But Adoni **Moshe** -- ki min ha'mayin mishi'sihu -- pure tzurah, is surely immune to such a fate.
 
 

Proper pronunciation

There is a din of "amor lahem" in birchas kohanim that requires the kohen to articulate the bracha. The Beis haLevi writes that there is no din of shomea k'oneh by birchas kohanim-- it must be spoken and heard (Chazon Ish disagrees.)

In Rav Shteinman's sefer Ayeles haShachar on the parsha 6:23 he quotes a first hand account from someone who learned by the Chofetz Chaim when the yeshiva in Radin was first started.  The CC had to travel to Warsaw after Pesach to take care of the publication of the Mishna Berura and en route, he remarked to this individual that he was worried about being stuck over Shavuos because he was mesupak how to recite birchas kohanim in Poland: must he pronounce the words in Polish accented Hebrew, the way everyone else in Warsaw speaks, or can he pronounce the words in his Litvishe accented Hebrew?  Apparently the CC assumed that the bracha being spoken means pronouncing the words the way everyone else does.

The individual relating the story added that he quoted to the CC from some unnamed sefer that claimed that the Polish pronunciation was erroneous and should be disregard, but the CC paid this no heed.  Later, he learned that the author of the unnamed sefer (any guesses?) was a maskil and that's why the CC, he assumes, ignored it.  Rav Shteinman then adds icing on the cake and claims that he heard from R Zak's, the CC's grandson, that the CC would often deliberately mispronounce the word "atah" as mil'eil instead of milra "l'hotzi mi'lev hamaskilim."

So let me get this straight: the CC deliberately introduced errors into the way he pronounced words in davening just because the maskilim were the one's doing the right thing?  Since when do we deliberately do something wrong "l'hotzi mi'lev...?"

End of the story: the CC duchened using the Litvishe pronunciation.  Adds R Shteinman, it is well known that the Litvishe pronunciation is close to the Teimani pronunciation.

Not sure what he means by that final comment.  Does R Shteinman think the Yemenite pronunciation is most exact and therefore whatever is closest to Yemenite is more correct?  So why not simply duchen using the Yemenite havara?  Or does he mean that since the Litvishe and Yeminite pronunciations are close (are they really?), it is like having 2 eidim that they are the correct havara?  Should we all make sure to read krias shema in a Teimani or Litvishe accent to make sure we are pronouncing the words lichatchila correctly?

Obligation of blind person in mitzvos

R Yehudah holds that a blind person is patur from mitzvos; however, R Akiva Eiger (shu"t 169) qualifies this view and says that even R Yehudah agrees that a blind person is obligated to keep lavim.  His proof: Tos (R"H 33) writes that a blind person can recite a bracha on mitzvos because even though according to R Yehudah a blind person is exempt mdoraysa from mitzvos, he still has a chiyuv mederraban to do them.  The source for the obligation to keep dinim derabbanan (and the source for reciting brachos) is the lav of lo tasur, the lav of not disobeying beis din.  If a blind person is exempt even from lavim, what would obligated him to keep a derabbanan?  How can he recite vi'tzivanu on them?  QED there is a chiyuv in lavim.

There seems to be a Yerushalmi against this view.  The Yerushalmi (13a in vilna pages, end of second perek in sota) darshens from "vne'elan mei'euney isha" that the wife of a blind person does not drink sota water.  The gemara then writes that this follows R Yehudah's view that a blind person is exempt from mitzvos.  

What the Yerushalmi seems to be saying is that since the blind person is exempt from mitzvos, even issurim, there is no problem with him living with his potential sota wife (see Korban Ha'eidah.  The Ohr Sameiach does not understand the Yerushalmi this way, but I don't understand what he is saying.)

So it could be that R Akiva Eiger's chidush is a machlokes Bavli and Yerushalmi.  (Other Achronim take issue with the proof itself.  As we've discussed before, there are reasons other thsn lo tasur that might obligate a person to keep dinim derabbanan.)

Torah as a mitaheir

Imagine you are going out to a great steak restaurant.  You are looking forward to that delicious steak, but decide to start with an appetizer to whet your appetite.  You ask the waiter to recommend something, and he suggests... a steak.  You want a first course before the main dish?  The waiter recommends more steak.  By the time you get to the main dish, you don't even want to see a steak!

We want to appreciate kabbalas haTorah that takes place Shavuos morning, so what do we do?  We stay up all night learning.  Steak before the steak!  By the time the baal koreh gets to aseres hasibros half the shul is asleep, not sitting in excitement and anticipation.

The Zohar writes that on the night of Shavuos the goal is l'natra dachya ila'ah -- one can have great taharah on this night (see post from 2013).  How does one achieve tahara?  Sefas Emes answers: through torah. There is limud hatorah that is done for the sake of knowledge, and there is limud hatorah which purifies and elevates the person.  

Our first course is limud hatorah which is a mitaheir.  That meal, that experience, is completely different than the limud hatorah of the rest of the year.  It transforms a person and makes the rest of learning possible.

Make it a habit

I am not such a big fan of Shavuos all nighters. Rambam writes in Peirush Hamishnayos that it's better to give $1 to tzedaka 100 times than to write one check for $100 because the former inculcates giving as a habit while the lattter does not.  If Shavuos is one and done, then its value (there certainly is some value to spending hours learning even once) is minimized.  If it is something done to be mechazek a regular learning routine, then it makes more sense.

Let's be real: how many shuls have a vasikin minyan on day one of Yom tov, but on the second day davening is scheduled for 9:00, too late to even make zman krias shema?  And how many people show up at 9:15 or 9:30 or later for that minyan?  

And how many shuls get a crowd to sit and listen to lectures for a few hours Shavuos night, but next day and next Shabbos afternoon etc there is not even a minyan (and maybe not even a zimun) of people who have a seder in beis medrash on these long shabbos afternoons?

The spiritual energy of Yom Tov is something that has to be incorporated into everyday life, part of a consistent  routine, not be an oasis in a desert.  

"Yom chasunaso -- zu mattan Torah," the mishna in Taanis tells us.  Imagine a chassan and kallah who have a great wedding, are so happy for a few hours, but then don't talk to each other for weeks afterwards except for maybe a few sentences.  Shavuos is the chassunah and Torah is the kallah.  You can have a great wedding party Shavuos night, but if you then ignore your kallah, if you don't connect with Torah but instead go back to your pre-chasunah routines, what kind of marriage is it?

Toldos Aharon u'Moshe

Rashi (3:1) writes that Aharon's children count as "toldos Aharon **u'Moshe**" because since Moshe taught them Torah it is as if he was their father.

The meforshei Rashi all ask: Moshe taught Torah to all of Klal Yisrael.  What was special about his teaching Torah to Aharon's children that created a father-son relationship?

Maharal in Gur Aryeh answers that without Klal Yisrael to teach to, Torah would never have been given to Moshe.  Moshe was obligated to teach them.  However, what Moshe taught to bnei Aharon was above and beyond what was demanded of him.

What does Maharal mean?  There is no shiur to the mitzvah of talmud torah saying you have to teach others up to point X and no more. There is no point which is above and beyond one's obligation.  So how could what Moshe taught bnei Aharon be above and beyond what was required?

See R Gifter's answer in his Pirkei Torah. 

I would suggest as follows: last night I posted R Wahrman's chidush that for something to be defined as part of the cheftza shel torah it is not enough for Moshe to have received it from Hashem -- it also has to be passed on to others.  A kabbalas hatorah without mesorah of Torah is by definition incomplete.

The chovas hagavra of what one is obligated to teach others has no bounds.  However, perhaps not every detail need be taught before one can say a halacha is part of the cheftza shel torah. As an analogy, it's fair that say someone who knows shulchan aruch with Shach and Taz etc knows basar bchalav, but that doesn't mean they are exempt from continuing to learn those sugyos, as Torah is endless.  What Maharal may mean is that Moshe had to transmit some basic level of Torah to all of Klal Yisrael for there to be a cheftza shel Torah.  However, when it came to the chovas hagavra of limud Torah, the endless depths of learning, he devoted his energies in particular to teaching Aharon's children.

More on shemiras hamikdash

V'atah hafkeid es halevi'im... v'saviv lamishkan yachanu (1:50)

V'halevi'im yachanu saviv lamishkan... (1:53)

Why the repitition?

Earlier in the week I pointed out that the inclusion of the din of shmiras hamikdash in Mes Midos shows that it is a din in the tzuras habayis, not a chiyuv avodah incumbent upon the levi'im.

The Brisker Rav says it's both, and that's why we have 2 pesukim.  

In the first pasuk the din of camping around the mishkan appears in the context of "heim yis'u es hamishkan v'heim yisharsuhu" -- the avodah of leviim.

In the second pasuk it appears In the context of "v'chanu Bnei Yisrael..." -- the tzurah of the encampment.

Similarly, there are two different halachos in the Rambam.  In Beis haBechira 7:11 the Rambam describes the 3 machanos in the midbar and he quotes the pasuk of "saviv la'mishkan yachanu" as the source for establishing a machaneh levi'ah.  This is a din in the tzurah if the encampment. 

In Klei haMikdash 3:2 the Rambam writes "avodah she'lahen hi she'yi'hiyu shomrim es hamikdash" -- shemira is an avodah job assigned to the levi'im.

kabbalas haTorah and mesorah

The Pnei Yehoshua points out a seeming contradiction between the following two gemaras:

1) The gemara (Megillah 2) writes that nevi'im instituted using final letters mem-nun-tzadi-pey-kaf that are different than the regular letters.  Asks the gemara: we have a principle that a navi is not allowed to create a new law; how could they invent this new din?  Answers the gemara: the concept of final letters existed in the past but was forgotten.  The nevi'im were not instituting a new law, they were just re-establishing past practice.  (See Sukkah 46 for a similar idea.)

2) The gemara (Temurah 16) writes that 3000 halachos were forgotten in the days of mourning following Moshe's death.  Asks the gemara: why didn't Yehoshua or Shmuel use nevuah to rediscover those lost laws?  Answers the gemara: a navi has no right to be mechadesh new halachos.  The laws were only restored through the brilliant pilpul of Osniel ben Knaz.

The sugya in Megillah allows for a navi to use the power of prophecy to re-establish laws that were previously known and forgotten, yet the sugya in Temurah tells us that nevuah could not be use to rediscover the halachos forgotten upon the death of Moshe.  How do you resolve the contradiction?

Rav Wahrman in his She'eiris Yosef vol 4 suggests that the two sugyos are addressing two different problems, as the principle of ain navi rashay l'chadesh davar is two dinim in one: 1) the navi cannot use prophecy to rule on halacha; 2) prophecy is not a cheftza shel Torah, but is in a category of knowledge all its own. The gemara in Megillah is addressing the second problem only.  Since final letters existed in the past as a cheftza shel Torah, the navi is not creating new law.  The gemara in Temurah is addressing the former issue, and dealing with the right of the navi as a gavra to pasken using nevuah.  Whether or not these halachos existed in the past is irrelevant to this question, as it is an issue of process, not outcome.

Rav Wahrman (link) in a few parenthetical lines snuck into the middle of the piece offers a possible second answer, which is the one I want to focus on.  He writes  that in order for something to be a cheftza shel Torah it is not enough for it to have simply been received by Moshe Rabeinu.  Torah = mesorah.  For something to become a cheftza shel Torah it has to be passed on to future generations.  The nevi'im who lived generations after kabbalas haTorah were restoring a tradition that had existed once upon a time, but been lost over the years.  However, the halachos that were forgotten immediately upon the death of Moshe were too new, too fresh, to have yet been incorporated into the mesorah.  They were lost right out of the starting gate, at generation 1 after kabbalas haTorah.  When there is no mesorah to start with, a navi has to right to create a new one.

In light of this chiddush I would suggest that the Mishna in Avos that tells us "Moshe kibeil Torah m'Sinau u'mesarah l'Yehoshua" is not telling us about two events, namely 1) kabbalas haTorah and 2) its transmission to Yehoshua, but rather is telling us about one event only: kabbalas haTorah.  What the Mishna is telling us is that a kabbalas haTorah is a true kabbalah only when there is a "mesarah..." that follows -- when the kabbalah impacts and effects the future.

Rashi in Pesachim (68) writes that the chiyuv simcha of Shavuos is  "...l'har'os she'noach u'mekubal yom zeh l'Yisrael she'nitna Torah bo."  R' Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (posted here) was medayek from Rashi that the simcha of Torah that we celebrate on Shavuos is something that we have to show to others, to demonstrate.  Perhaps if kabbalas haTorah is complete only if Torah is given over to others, the simcha of kabbalas haTorah is complete only if we give it over to others as well.

More on aliya laregel

Just to clarify a bit as a follow-up on yesterday's post:

The problem with learning that the Rambam understood that the mitzvah d'oraysa of "yeira'eh kol zechurcha" includes bringing one's children to the Mikdash is that the Rambam himself writes in Hil Chagiga 2:3 that bringing children is "kdei lchancho b'mitzvos" -- a din in chinuch.

You could say the Rambam in Mishne Torah recanted on his position in Sefer Hamitzvos if you like, but that is a bit of a dochak.

To be fair, the Rambam in Mishne Torah continues and adds after "kdei lchancho... she'ne'emar yeira'eh kol zechurcha." So we have to fudge something here-- either the "kdei lchancho" is lav davka or the pasuk is lav davka.

The tzad to say the quote of the pasuk is a lav davka is the fact that the gemara 4a quotes a braysa that uses the same pasuk to explain why a katan is chayav but then reinterprets the braysa to be an asmachta.  The Rambam is simply echoing the braysa's language with the gemara's interpretation (Lechem Mishne).

My son pointed out a piece from R Dovid Soloveitchik in which he argues that this cannot be a regular din of chinuch because the katan does only half the mitzvah -- he comes to the Mikdash, but does not have to offer korbanos (see the meforshei haRambam who point out that this is a machlokes Rashi and Tos).  How can you have chinuch to do half a mitzvah?  He therefore concludes that the words "kdei lchancho" cannot be taken at face value and ketanim come so that their father fulfills the d'oraysa din of "yeira'eh kol zechurcha." Note to that the Rambam does not just say "chayav l'ha'aloso" but adds "l'haros bo," implying a chiyuv on the father to appear with his children.

Sof kol sof: no simple conclusion here.

Shemiras hamikdash

The first mishna in Midos tells us that kohanim stood guard in three places in the Mikdash (leviim stood guard in another 21 locations).  This din is derived from our parsha where Aharon and his sons are told to be "shomrim mishmeres hamikdash" (3:38).  Torah Temimah explains that some varient of the word "shemira" occurs 3x in the pasuk (shomrim, mishmeres, l'mishmeres) and hence we learn that a kohen guard is needed in three locations.

From the placement in our parsha in the context of the discussion of who camps where and the placement of this din in Midos, it seems that this din is not a chovas hagavra obligation on the kohanim, but rather is part and parcel of how the camp should be arranged and how the Mikdash should be setup and built (see Tiferes Yisrael).

According to most Rishonim the chiyuv of shemira is only at night.  Even though the purpose of shemira is to honor the Mikdash -- this is an honor guard, not  a guard to catch thieves -- and therefore there should be no difference between day or night, nonetheless, the tzurah of the mitzvah of shemira matches what would be done if the guards were there for protection.  A shomer by day when not needed does not have a shem shomer.

The anonymous mifareish on MesTamid is the lone view that holds shemira must be done by day as well, and Achronim have such difficulty with this opinion that some claim it is not really what anyone holds.

I prefer conceptual questions to practical ones, but here is what Rashash on the mishnayos in Midos asks: when Moshe gave this mitzvah, there were only three kohanim in the world -- Aharon and his two sons.  If three kohanim were required to do shemira during the day, then who was left to do the avodah?

Aliya la'regel

The Rambam in Sefer Hamitzvos aseh # 53 writes that the mitzvah of aliya la'regel includes bringing along one's sons who can walk. 

This seems to be a strange formulation, as bringing one's sons along is not part of this mitzvah d'oraysa but rather is simply a kiyum of the mitzvah of chinuch.  The Rambam doesn't include the side kiyum of chinuch when he speaks about other mitzvos, so why mention it here?

See Ner Mitzvah in Chemdas Yisrael  (R Meir Dan Plotzki) who leaves this b'tzarich iyun.

Yeish sachar l'peulaseich

Next week we will IY"H read Boaz's blessing to Rus that in response to her having come out to the field to meet him "yishalem Hashem paaleich u'tehi maskurteiach shleima..." (2:12).

The GR"A explains that there is a difference between being paid for "paaleich" and getting paid schar, "maskurteiach." A worker gets paid by the day or by the piece - that's "paaleich" pay. At the end of the year the worker gets a bonus.  The bonus is not for any particular day of work or any particular project -- it's for the overall assessment of the gavra as a loyal and dedicated employee.  That's "maskurteiach," schar.

The Malbim says something similar.  Your dry cleaner is a poel.  He gets paid for doing the job of cleaning your clothes.  If your suit is still dirty when you pick it up, don't pay the cleaner.  Jabob De Gram is a sachir and gets paid schar.  Whether he wins another Cy Young award or whether the Mets have to send him down to the minors, his contract guarantees him the same pay.  Schar is not for the individual act, the individual game or pitch.  It's for being a member of the team.

What Boaz was telling Rus is that Hashem will pay her like a poel for each mitzvah that she does, but by joining the Jewish people, she will get much more than that - Hashem will give her schar as well.  We get paid simply because we are members of the team, we get paid a bonus just for being employees, irrespective of and above and beyond what we earn for each individual act that we do.

Our parsha promises all kinds of great rewards for "im bechukosai teileichu..." Everyone asks: schar mitzvah b'hai alma leika?  Reward is received only in olam ha'ba?

Based on the GR"A and Malbim we can answer that true, schar = the bonus pay, what you get just for being a member of the team, is reserved for olam ha'ba.  However, you still can still earn pay for being a poel in olam hazeh based on what work you complete successfuly.

"Anu ameilim umekablim schar..." we say at a siyum.  "Im bechukosai teileichu" - Rashi explains that the pasuk is referring to ameilus in Torah.  Schar is for your efforts, not for the results, the peulah.  Even if you don't complete the job, you get points just for being a good employees and working at it.

Now that we learned this GR"A and Malbim, I think we can appreciate a pasuk we all know in a deeper way.  Yirmiyahu (ch 31) describes our mother Rachel Imeinu crying for us as we were led into galus.  Hashem turns to Rachel and tells her not to worry.  "Yesh **sachar** l'peulaseich v'shavu meiEretz oyeiv." Hashem is telling Rachel that she and Klal Yisrael don't just receive payment based on whether we succeed in doing mitzvos or whether we manage to accomplish what we are meant to.  What we also get is "sachar." Even if we have to be sent to the minors for a tune up, the contract is still in place, we are still valued employees of the firm.

This is Yom Yerushalayim -- yesh sachar l'peulaseich v'shavu meiEretz oyeiv.  We've been in the minors a lot of years.  We did not earn much as poelim because the cleaner doesn't get paid for dirty clothes.  But we are still on the team and ultimately, the reward of schar, the reward for hanging in there for 2000 years of ameilus, gets paid.

A preface to the mitzvos

Emor el hakohanim bnei Aharon v'amarta aleihem...  There are two redundancies here: 1) the double emor... v'amarta 2) Kohanim = bnei Aharon, so why say both?

The Kohanim are about to get mitzvos that place more restrictions on them than on an ordinary person.  The Torah therefore prefaces the commandments with an introduction: Emor el hakohanim bnei Aharon, tell the Kohanim that they are the decendents of the great Aharon hakohen, they are the heirs to his legacy.  You have more restrictions not to make your life difficult, but because you are holy and special. (Chasam Sofer)

Chazal learn from the double emor... v'amarta the idea "l'hazhir gedolim al ha'ketanim." I would say this goes hand in hand with the Chasam Sofer.  The way to teach a child is to first make him feel special, make him feel privileged to be given mitzvos. That is the preface needed before anything else can be taught.

(Lzecher nishmas Eliezer been Meir)

subjective vs objective truth

Keitzad merkadim lifnei ha'kallah?  Beis Hillel hold that one can say "kallah na'ah v'chasudah" no matter what the kallah looks like; Beis Shamai holds that one must tell the truth.  (Kesubos 17)

One could learn that the point of disagreement here is whether one can bend the truth for the sake of shalom.  You don't want the chassan to feel bad, so no matter what the kallah looks like, you pay a compliment. 

R' Yaakov Kaminetzki explained the sugya differently.  The issue is not whether one has a license to bend the truth, but rather the issue is more fundamental -- what is truth?  Beis Shamai hold there is an objective standard of truth, and therefore, if the kallah is ugly, we have to call it like it is.  Beis Hillel, however, holds that truth is relative.  To the chassan, the kallah is the most beautiful girl in the world.  Relative to his way of thinking, one is being entirely truthful in saying "kallah na'ah v'chasudah."

R' Yaakov uses this yesod to explain another gemara (Eiruvin 14) l'shitasam.  Beis Shamai were sharper than Hillel's school, but Beis Hillel were more numerous.  Does the halacha follow smarts or rov?  A bas kol from Heaven declared that although eilu v'eilu divrei Elokim Chaim, the halacha follows Hillel.  Tosfos asks: "lo bashamayim hi" -- why should the bas kol carry any weight?

Hillel l'shitasam was interested in subjective truth.  Since the majority of people saw things their way, that defined the "correct" answer.  Shamai was interested in objective standards.  Therefore, l'shitasam they had to follow the bas kol, the objective voice of truth that stood outside the fray.

What does this idea of relative truth being truth come from?

The Midrash writes that Hashem took a poll among the angels to see whether He should create man.  It was a tie score among the different groups, with shalom and emes being opposed to man's creation because we are quarrelsome and can't be truthful.  To break the tie G-d took the angel of emes and cast him down to earth.

Why did G-d cast down the angel of truth and not the angel of shalom, since both were opposed?  And how does throwing the angel down to earth, removing him from the scene, address his objection?  It doesn't seem like a fair way to address the problem.

R' Yaakov explains that Hashem was not disregarding concern for truth.  What the Midrash is saying is that truth can be defined in different ways.  There is Heavenly truth, the truth of the bas kol and angels, objective truth -- man cannot live up to that standard.  But G-d revealed that there is also a truth based on human perception, a subjective truth.  Hashem said that to be fair to man we have to look at truth the way it appears on earth, through man's eyes.  That is a truth man can be held to and which he can live up to.  And if we go with that definition of truth, there will be shalom as well.  When all we know is subjectivity, then eilu v'eilu prevails because right and wrong can never be established with objective certainty.

Now we can get back to the question from yesterday's post: given that chazakah is proof even for dinei nefashos, why is it a chidush to say that a kohen can become tamei for his father, who we identify based on rov/chazakah, any more than his mother, who we can identify with certainty? 

R' Yaakov suggests that the Torah's allowance for tumah is tied to the emotional need to mourn for the loss of one's closest relatives (My 2 cents: see Rambam Hil Aveil 2:6 "kamah chamurah mitzvas aveilus she'harei nidcheis lo ha'tumah... k'dei she'yisasek imahem v'yisabel aleihem."  Note that the Rambam does not say that tumah is allowed in order to *bury* the dead, but rather he says that it is tied to *aveilus.*)  Therefore, what matters is not the objective definition of paternity, but rather what matters is the subjective emotions of the mourner. In that regards, a mother b'toras vaday trumps a father whose identity is established only by rov and chazakah.  These may be objective proofs, but that is not sufficient when the question on one of subjectivity and emotion.

revisionism?

Last week I called your attention to an edition of the derashos of R' Teichtel that seems to be missing the section where he expresses his support for a Torah/avodah combination in order to settle Eretz Yisrael.  This week I present you with this link that will take you to last week's edition of "Yabi'a Omer," a parsha sheet devoted to the teachings of R' Ovadya Yosef.  On the last page you will find an excerpt they print from a teshuvah in Shu"T Yabi'a Omer vol 6 in which R' Ovadya expresses his pain at the religious failings of the State of Israel, and concludes that because of these failings many still perceive that "Shechinta b'galusa" and therefore (here the editors bold the words to make sure you get the message) they refrain from saying hallel on Yom ha'Atzmaut.

The only problem is that if you look up the actual teshuvah  (I don't believe it is available online so I can't give you a link) you will discover that R' Ovadya continues and writes that there is much good that can be found in the State as well.  The State is the Torah capitol of the world, with thousands of people now learning Torah, thousands more who have come closer to Torah, and religious and spiritual growth constantly increasing. Therefore - and this is how R' Ovadya concludes the teshuvah - if one wishes to say hallel on Yom ha'Atzmaut, one is permitted to do so after davening, albeit without a bracha. 

I think it is fair to say that R' Ovadya's opinion of the State is a bit more complex than the quote taken out of context would lead one to believe, and the editors bolding of the text suggests a conclusion that is probably unwarranted. 

Am I wrong?

tumas kohanim

In listing the relatives which a kohen can/should (machlokes Rishonim whether it is a chiyuv or a reshus) become tamei to bury, the Torah firsts lists his mother and then father.  Yet when it comes to listing who the kohen gadol may not become tamei for and who the nazir may not become tamei for the Torah places the father before the mother.  Why here does the Torah place the mother first? 

The Ibn Ezra gives what I would call an actuarial answer: men outlive women.  Women, in this case the mother, are listed first because they die first.  I believe the modern metziyus is that women in fact live longer, but maybe that was not true in the past given the higher chance of death in childbirth.  

Meshech Chochma points to the Rambam's view (Aveil 2:7) that m'd'oraysa a husband may not become tamei to bury his wife, but the Chachamim allowed it.  How can they uproot a doraysa prohibition?  Rambam answers that the Chachamim treated the wife as a meis mitzvah. A meis mitzvah means there is no one responsible for burial.  When it comes to a wife, the Chachamim defined the husband as the only one with a close enough relationship to feel responsible to bury her.  

The Torah lists mother first in the pasuk because one might have thought that if a person's father is alive, the father is responsible for the mother's burial and the kohen son should not make himself tamei, kah mashma lan that he can, and according to the Rambam, must.

The Toras Kohanim seems to say that the pasuk lists the mother first and father second because while we know exactly who a person's mother is, absent a DNA or paternity test we only know who a father is based on rov/chazakah.  If two people are married, we assume that the father is the mother's husband, but an assumption cannot outweigh certainty.

Aside from the technical detail that this is not much of a chiddush (beis din can administer the death penalty based on rov and chazakah, so it surely is a good indicator or paternity), the Rishonim and Achronim ask an even more basic question on the Toras Kohanim: any doubt as to the paternity of the "kohen" is MORE of a reason to allow him license to become tamei, not less!  If the father in question is not the true father of this individual, then odds are that he is not an kohen and there is no issur in him becoming tamei in the first place.

In other words, m'mah nafshach: either this is the son of a kohen and he can become tamei for his father, or he is not the son of a kohen and there is no issur on him becoming tamei.  What hava amina can there be to say otherwise that would cause us to think there is some chiddush here?

So hopefully I will have more time to write and get to an amazing yesod of R' Yaakov Kaminetzky's.  Stay tuned, and see the Malbim as well. 

The joys of technology

I am reading a book about the medieval period and the author makes an interesting point: even though by our standards, or by any standard, really, life was miserable - disease, malnutrition, poverty was the norm - that does not necessarily mean people were unhappy.  People had strong social bonds, strong religious affiliation, and everyone basically was in the same boat, which gave them comfort. When everyone in your social network is poor and miserable, then being poor and miserable doesn't seem that bad.

Contrast that with a news report I saw yesterday on Marketwire.com which claimed "social media makes 61% of millennials... feel inadequate about their own life and what they have, with 88% comparing themselves to others on social media..."

Technology is great, isn't it?

On one leg

The gemara tells the story of a ger who came to Hillel and asked to be taught the Torah on one foot.  Hillel responded with a reformulation of v'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha -- don't treat others in a way that you would not want to be treated yourself.

Was this idea of  "standing on one foot" just a random crazy idea to test Hillel's patience?

The Aish Kodesh (in Derech haMelech) writes that in fact we find the idea of standing on one foot in halacha.  The difference between people and angels is that angels stand on "regel yishara," one single foot, but we have two legs.  When we daven we are supposed to put our feet together so that we look like angels standing on just one leg.

An angel has no yetzer ha'ra.  It fulfills its mission with single minded purpose, like a computer.  There is only one leg moving it in the single direction it can go in.  Not so human beings.  We have one leg that wants to move us in the direction of ratzon Hashem, like the angels, but we also have a second leg that often wants to take us places that we shouldn't be.  

When a person stands before Hashem to daven, he needs to forget about that second leg. Tefilah is not a time to struggle with or focus on one's failings -- it is a time to focus on coming close to Hashem.  At that moment we can be like angels with one leg because Hashem will listen to us despite our struggles and despite our failings so long as we aspire to move in the right direction.

That's great when we are davening, but our ger had a tremendous question for Hillel: how do we make this part of our life?  How do we incorporate this into the way we observe and learn all of Torah?  How can a person feel all the time that Hashem loves him and listens to him and values him and doesn't care about the failings and struggles that we all go through?  How do we stand on one leg?

The answer is if you want to feel valued and have self worth, then treat others that way.  If you see all those around you as having just a single "regel yishara," you see people as moving in the right direction, then that becomes part of how Hashem will always see you as well.

Missing pages

Yesterday I quoted Rav Teichtel's derush on the parsha of orlah where he argues that for yishuv ha'aretz we need people who are learners who will work the land.  The same idea appears in Aim HaBanim Smeicha.  

I wanted to double-check what he said before posting it, so since I wasn't home I looked up the derashos on hebrewbooks.org.  Lo and behold, the copy of the derashos posted there is missing that entire section.  

I hate to jump to the conclusion that it was censored out to as avoid the obvious Zionist message.  Anyone who knows Rav Teichtel's work knows he wrote Eim HaBanim Smeicha and was a Zionist.  So why take out that section?

I am waiting for the day when someone publishes an edition of Divrei Yoel with all the anti-Zionist propaganda removed so that those of us who disagree with that hashkafa can just read the torah without wasting time on the other stuff. 

Two types of planting

The midrash reads "ki tavo'u el ha'aretz u'nitatem kol eitz maachal" as a charge to learn Torah and cause the "eitz chaim" to grow and flourish in Eretz Yisrael.  The very same midrash goes on to interpret the pasuk as encouragement to plant literal trees in Eretz Yisrael.  Just like Hashem started the world off by planting gan eden, so too, we must imitate Hashem and plant as soon as we come to Eretz Yisrael.

So what are we supposed to pack in our carry on to grab as soon as we get to Eretz Yisrael -- a gemara, or a hoe and spade?  Do we first build greenhouses or first build yeshivos?  How do we reconcile the two interpretations of the midrash?

Rav Teichtel in Eim HaBanim Smeicha and in his derashos answers that there is no contradiction.  What Chazal are telling us is that to build a country we need people who wear multiple hats.  We need farmers who are bnei Torah who appreciate the spiritual value of the land; we need bnei Torah who are willing to roll up their sleeves to help plow the fields.

Ashrei doreinu that we have been zocheh to see a return to the land and the fulfillment of both types of planting.

The untaught and unspoken about in chinuch

One of the huge failures of our education system is that we spend so much time teaching nuts and bolts, curriculum topics, this perek of Chumash or that sugya of gemara, etc. that we forget to teach the big issues of what Judaism is all about and how to apply it to life.  I keep meaning to post a list of the top 10 issues / questions that anyone religious who comes in contact with secular society (even by just reading the news) must confront just to prove that our schools do not address any of them and leave our kids ill equipped to deal with them, but I'll leave that for another time.  For now, as we think about You HaShoah and the rising anti-Semitism around us and as we look forward to Yom HaAtzmaut, I just want to highlight one area: how many of our Rebbeim and Moros sit down with kids in high school or beyond and have a serious discussion with them about the benefits (I dare say the need) of planning to live in Israel as opposed to the US or elsewhere?  Why do we assume this idea will come to kids by osmosis instead of being mechanech them that this is the correct derech?   Isn't a discussion like that about what to do with the future of one's life at least as important as learning one more Ramban or one more Tosfos?  

don't just be civil and ethical

1) The Torah warns against our imitating the laws and customs of Mitzrayim and Canaan.  Rashi explains that these were the most barbaric societies to be found at the time.  Ksav Sofer, however, takes the opposite view -- these were cultured societies, (supposedly)governed by laws and morals. 

Sefer HaIkkarim writes that there is what is called "das tiv'it" and "das Elokit."  You can have a society that has laws, that has a moral code, that is civil, but has no religion -- those laws are "dat tiv'it."  On top of that, you can build a relationship with G-d through religious law and practice, which is "dat Elokit."  (See also Derashos haRan in his derasha on parshas shoftim).  Years ago when the j-blogsphere was more active you had a lot of people talking about "rationalist" forms of Judaism, which basically meant they wanted to turn everything into dat tiv'it.  Religion in their view was a means to a more just society, a more ethical lifestyle.  Hence, orthopraxy -- following the rules in deed because they made sense, but absent belief. 

According to Ksav Sofer, this is what the Torah is warning against.  Don't turn Judaism into ethics, into law, into a means for a civil society like you had in Mitzrayim, like you had in Canaan.  Judaism is far more than that.  "U'shamrten is chokosai v'es mishpatai... ani Hashem" -- observe the mitzvos in order to have a relationship with "ani Hashem," not just for the positive morals and ethics that are to be gained as well.

2) I have to mention a question of the Chasam Sofer that I don't understand, but which he feels is so strong that he leaves it with no answer and just says "mitzvah l'yasheiv."  From the words "v'chai bahem" the end off the parsha we were just discussing ("U'shamrtem is chokosai v'es mishpatai asher ya'aseh osam ha'adam v'chai bahem" (18:5) the gemara learns that a person should violate an issur rather than die.  For example, if a person is going to starve to death unless he eats McDonalds, then he should eat at McDonalds.  The three exceptions to the rule are arayos, murder, and idolatry. 

Chasam Sofer asks: the very next pesukim after "v'chaim bahem" talk all about the issurei arayos.  How can arayos be an exception to the rule when it is the very context in which "v'chai bahem" appears?

I don't get it.  "V'chaim bahem" is the conclusion to the parsha discussing the issur of chukos ha'aku"m and the command to keep our own chukim and mitzvos.  Arayos is the topic of the next parsha.  Who says one thing is connected with the other? 

In fact, see Ba'al haTurim who writes that the juxtaposition of "lo tikrivu l'galus ervah" to "v'chai bahem" is to make the very point that even though there is a "v'chai bahem," nonetheless, "lo tikrivu" to arayos.   
3) VaYidaber Hashem el Moshe achrei mos shenei bnei Aharon... VaYomer Hashem el Moshe...

Hashem spoke... and Hashem spoke.  Why the repetition with nothing in the middle?

Rashi explains that there was something in the middle.  "Achrei mos shnei bnei Aharon" is a message to be careful.  Rashi gives a mashal: a doctor who tells a patient not to do X will likely be ignored; the doctor who says not to do X or you will die just like so-and-so has the patient's attention.  Hashem wanted to make sure Aharon was on guard, so he warned that a mistake in doing avodah might lead to death, just as had occurred to Aharon's own two sons.

Is this not a great example of yiras ha'onesh?  Don't be bad or Hashem will give you a big potch!   Is this what it took to keep the great Aharon haKohen in line?  Not only a threat, but even that's not enough -- a threat accompanied by an example he could relate to in order to make it real. 

Wouldn't Aharon have listened to Hashem just because it was the dvar Hashem?

Two approaches:

The mussar approach (e.g. see Ohr Yahel, Chiddushei haLev) is that we see from here that no matter how great the person, a human being is still flesh and blood, and while the neshoma may soar to lofty places, flesh and blood will always struggle with tayva, with failings, with challenges.  No one is above the need for sometimes getting harsh mussar, the threat of a potch, because that is what our physical selves can relate to.

The approach of R' Tzadok and the Sefas Emes is quite different.  Hashem's warning needs to be taken in context.  As we discussed here, Nadav and Avihu were great people who aspired to a hisgalus of Hashem even greater than what Moshe merited.  They could not contain their enthusiasm, their fervor, and so they entered the Mikdash and offered ketores even though they had no permission to do so and even though it would cost them their lives -- what value is human life relative to the prize of greater closeness to Hashem?  (see Meshech Chochma in parshas Braishis on "V'h'yisem k'Elokim") For someone with that type of yetzer ha'ra, the threat of death is no deterrent -- the ends more than justify the cost.  And yiras ha'romemus, appreciation of Hashem's majesty, awe of Hashem, is no deterrent either, as the greater one's appreciation, the more one would desire to come close to Hashem.  In order to prevent Aharon from falling into the same trap as his children, Hashem had no choice other than to directly command Aharon and say that this is not the type mesirus nefesh that He sanctions, and it must be avoided.

For the ba'alei musar, the Torah is speaking to Aharon's frailties as flesh and blood like any one of us.  For the gedolei chassidus, the Torah is speaking to Aharon's greatness, because who but a great person would be swayed by the temptation to even sacrifice his life to come closer to the majesty of Hashem.