Tuesday, August 07, 2007
Queen's grandson barred from marrying a Catholic - calling Noah Feldman!
The UK Timesonline reports that the Queen’s grandson, Peter Phillips, 10th in line to the throne, based on the 1701 Act of Settlement could be disqualified from the line of succession if he marries his Roman Catholic fiancé . Noah Feldman, this calls for an editorial!
l'ma'an yirbu ymeichem al ha'adamah - are there not old people in Bavel?
The Torah promises “l’ma’an yirbu y’meichem al ha’adamah”, a reward of long life in the Land of Israel for those who keep mitzvos. The gemara (Brachos 8) records that R’ Yochanan wondered how there could be old people living in Bavel – the promise of “long life” is given only “In the Land”, not in exile. When he heard that these old people rise early to come to shule and end their day by going to shule, he understood that this was the source of their special reward.
The Maharasha explains the gemara’s conclusion based on a gemara in Megillah which teaches that the batei kneysiyot and batei midrashot of Bavel will in the future be removed from exile and relocated to Eretz Yisrael. It is as if these locations are pieces of Eretz Yisrael in exile – embassies of the Land. Therefore, the old people who spend time in shule receive the same reward which is promised to those in Eretz Yisrael proper.
However, it remains difficult to understand what R’ Yochanan was initially so awe struck by. Was he not aware of old people living outside Eretz Yisrael? Did he not think there were non-Jewish old people in the world? The Kli Chemdah (P’ Bechukosai) explains that the term “zakein” is explained by the gemara (Kiddushin 32b) to mean “zeh shekanah chochma”. Age without wisdom is not a value; the promise of a long life must be understood to mean a promise of a life of knowledge and learning as well. R’ Yochanan at first thought that this combination of years and wisdom was possible to achieve only in the spiritual environment of Eretz Yisrael. When he heard that the old of Bavel also prioritized ruchniyus in their lives, he acknowledged that this too was a kiyum of the bracha of “zikna” the Torah promises.
The Maharasha explains the gemara’s conclusion based on a gemara in Megillah which teaches that the batei kneysiyot and batei midrashot of Bavel will in the future be removed from exile and relocated to Eretz Yisrael. It is as if these locations are pieces of Eretz Yisrael in exile – embassies of the Land. Therefore, the old people who spend time in shule receive the same reward which is promised to those in Eretz Yisrael proper.
However, it remains difficult to understand what R’ Yochanan was initially so awe struck by. Was he not aware of old people living outside Eretz Yisrael? Did he not think there were non-Jewish old people in the world? The Kli Chemdah (P’ Bechukosai) explains that the term “zakein” is explained by the gemara (Kiddushin 32b) to mean “zeh shekanah chochma”. Age without wisdom is not a value; the promise of a long life must be understood to mean a promise of a life of knowledge and learning as well. R’ Yochanan at first thought that this combination of years and wisdom was possible to achieve only in the spiritual environment of Eretz Yisrael. When he heard that the old of Bavel also prioritized ruchniyus in their lives, he acknowledged that this too was a kiyum of the bracha of “zikna” the Torah promises.
Monday, August 06, 2007
dealing with non-observant family - good book by Azriela Jaffe
I recently finished reading “What Do You Mean, You Can’t Eat in My Home?: A Guide to How Newly Obervant Jews and Their Less Observant Relatives Can Still Get Along” by Azriela Jaffe and highly recommend it. The author was raised in a Reform family, but over a period of years after her marriage, motivated by the desire to raise her children as observant Jews and motivated by her husband’s choice to become more observant, she became observant. Jaffe offers a very straightforward approach to explaining Torah and mitzvos without apologetics – in each chapter she offers questions that an observant person inevitably is called upon to answer by those less observant, and I would add, by non-Jews curious about what we do. I was hooked by page 7 where she boils down kashrus to the simple fact that “G-d said so” – for an observant Jew this is the point at which the buck stops, all the rest is commentary. I was also moved by the author’s reflections about her preconceptions and life changes and choices, but the real focus of the book is her advice and reflections on her relationship with her parents and family now that she is observant and they are not. Instead of high-sounding platitudes, Jaffe offers concrete suggestions on how to make things work if both parties want to be accommodating. For example, if your parents do not keep a kosher kitchen and want you to visit, she reminds the reader that koshering a self-cleaning oven is fairly easy, and if you bring pots or disposable pans, or even buy a set to keep at that parent’s home, you can make your visit that much smoother. Some of her answers sound a bit too pat, but she does not hide that these problems are difficult to deal with and have taken her years of work to address in her life.
While the answers are well thought-out and the advice is practical, the book I think dwells a bit too much on symptoms without striking at root causes. As I blogged once before, even within the Orthodox community there is a great difference between those who aspire to the vacation in Aruba, albeit with a glatt kosher meal, and those for whom a Torah lifestyle means eschewing the values of materialism and popular culture, even if the kosher meal is included. For those who fall into the latter camp, and it strikes me that Jaffe does, the issue is not just kashering the kitchen, but kashering the values, or at least finding a way to share some mutual interests even though other values will remain in conflict. If your house is like mine, when you sit around your Shabbos table, the “family time” of your week, you discuss divrei torah, thoughts on the parsha, events in the Jewish world – it is much more difficult to find common ground when these items that matter most are removed from the conversation. Someone recently commented on my wife’s blog regarding their attendance at a Reform wedding: “We went, in the name of not offending anyone, and of maintaining family peace. After carefully enduring the many halachic and etiquette trials of that evening, I understood why it might have been more conducive to family peace if we hadn’t attended.” I think that comment sums up the emotional clash that exists for many people and I would have liked to see more about it in the book.
I am aware of a number of books written by ba’alei tshuvah telling their story (though I think Jaffe’s take is unique). I have found only one title on Amazon by non-observant parents describing their child’s turn to observance and how they coped. Is anyone aware of other books written from this perspective?
While the answers are well thought-out and the advice is practical, the book I think dwells a bit too much on symptoms without striking at root causes. As I blogged once before, even within the Orthodox community there is a great difference between those who aspire to the vacation in Aruba, albeit with a glatt kosher meal, and those for whom a Torah lifestyle means eschewing the values of materialism and popular culture, even if the kosher meal is included. For those who fall into the latter camp, and it strikes me that Jaffe does, the issue is not just kashering the kitchen, but kashering the values, or at least finding a way to share some mutual interests even though other values will remain in conflict. If your house is like mine, when you sit around your Shabbos table, the “family time” of your week, you discuss divrei torah, thoughts on the parsha, events in the Jewish world – it is much more difficult to find common ground when these items that matter most are removed from the conversation. Someone recently commented on my wife’s blog regarding their attendance at a Reform wedding: “We went, in the name of not offending anyone, and of maintaining family peace. After carefully enduring the many halachic and etiquette trials of that evening, I understood why it might have been more conducive to family peace if we hadn’t attended.” I think that comment sums up the emotional clash that exists for many people and I would have liked to see more about it in the book.
I am aware of a number of books written by ba’alei tshuvah telling their story (though I think Jaffe’s take is unique). I have found only one title on Amazon by non-observant parents describing their child’s turn to observance and how they coped. Is anyone aware of other books written from this perspective?
safeik shtar mukdam (II)
I did not get a chance last week to finish the topic of safeik shtar mukdam. Tosfos proved from Sanhedrin 32 that if eidim are challenged that they were not around on the date in a shtar we assume the shtar was post-dated rather than assume they are eidim zomimin. Based on this premis, Tosfos asks why we need a takanah to establish a rosh hashana to count years of a king’s reign. The worst case scenario (according to Rashi) is we won’t know whether the shtar is pre-dated and pasul or post-dated and kosher - just like we don’t assume eidim are zomimim if the shtar might have been post-dated, so too, in Rashi’s case, why assume the shtar is pasul if it might have been post-dated?
The simple answer to Tosfos question is that while it is true that we can validate the shtar even in a case of doubt, it is far better to avoid such a situation. Therefore , Chazal made the takanah of a set date to count years by.
The Brisker Rav offers a deeper explanation. Recall that according to Rashi, a shtar mukdam is pasul only viz. collecting from lekuchos; the creditor is still able to collect from other assets of the debtor. Tosfos disagrees and says the testimony of the shtar is completely invalid. Perhaps Rashi can be explained l’shitaso. In the sugya in Sanhedrin, the issue is whether to reject eidim completely and assume they were zomimim or to assume a shtar was post-dated – given the choice of completely invalidating testimony or not, we grant the shtar a presumptive chezkas kashrus. However, in the case in Rosh haShana, the eidus of the shtar that a loan took place is valid whether we assume the shtar is mukdam or not. The only issue is whether the creditor has an additional right to collect from lekuchos. Since this added right is not part of the crux of the testimony inherent in the shtar which simply established that a loan took place, the question of whether the shtar is mukdam or me’uchar should be treated as a safeik mamom and the creditor would lose, if not for the takanah.
The simple answer to Tosfos question is that while it is true that we can validate the shtar even in a case of doubt, it is far better to avoid such a situation. Therefore , Chazal made the takanah of a set date to count years by.
The Brisker Rav offers a deeper explanation. Recall that according to Rashi, a shtar mukdam is pasul only viz. collecting from lekuchos; the creditor is still able to collect from other assets of the debtor. Tosfos disagrees and says the testimony of the shtar is completely invalid. Perhaps Rashi can be explained l’shitaso. In the sugya in Sanhedrin, the issue is whether to reject eidim completely and assume they were zomimim or to assume a shtar was post-dated – given the choice of completely invalidating testimony or not, we grant the shtar a presumptive chezkas kashrus. However, in the case in Rosh haShana, the eidus of the shtar that a loan took place is valid whether we assume the shtar is mukdam or not. The only issue is whether the creditor has an additional right to collect from lekuchos. Since this added right is not part of the crux of the testimony inherent in the shtar which simply established that a loan took place, the question of whether the shtar is mukdam or me’uchar should be treated as a safeik mamom and the creditor would lose, if not for the takanah.
Friday, August 03, 2007
"torah' chuppah, ma'asim tovim" - why good deeds come last?
Commenting on the last post, my wife asked:
"Now, why do maa'sim tovim come last in the wishe[s]. I know the girsa is standardized (and that some omit Torah for the girls who are rather encouraged to marry the Torah) but why would good deeds only follow chuppah?"
As usual, good question, but this time I have a good answer : ) which someone told me b'shem R' Mordechai Breur (if I recall correctly). Why do we invoke these items specifically in our bracha? The gemara (Kiddushin 29) lists the mitzvos which are incumbent upon a father to do for his child, and on the list (in order) are the mitzvos of talmud torah, marrying off his child, and teaching a child a profession. The bracha is a blessing for the parent to be zocheh to properly fulfill these obligations. Ma'asim tovim, which comes last, is simply another way of saying learning an honest trade, and does not being used here in the sense of manners or ethics. Proof of the pudding is that unlike what most people say at a bris, “k’shem shenichnas..ken tikanes”, which expresses this as a bracha for the baby, the Rambam’s (Milah 3:2) grammatical formulation is “k’shem shenichnasta…”, a bracha for the parent. And as most parents will sympathetically acknowledge, we can use all the brachos we can get when it comes to raising kids properly.
"Now, why do maa'sim tovim come last in the wishe[s]. I know the girsa is standardized (and that some omit Torah for the girls who are rather encouraged to marry the Torah) but why would good deeds only follow chuppah?"
As usual, good question, but this time I have a good answer : ) which someone told me b'shem R' Mordechai Breur (if I recall correctly). Why do we invoke these items specifically in our bracha? The gemara (Kiddushin 29) lists the mitzvos which are incumbent upon a father to do for his child, and on the list (in order) are the mitzvos of talmud torah, marrying off his child, and teaching a child a profession. The bracha is a blessing for the parent to be zocheh to properly fulfill these obligations. Ma'asim tovim, which comes last, is simply another way of saying learning an honest trade, and does not being used here in the sense of manners or ethics. Proof of the pudding is that unlike what most people say at a bris, “k’shem shenichnas..ken tikanes”, which expresses this as a bracha for the baby, the Rambam’s (Milah 3:2) grammatical formulation is “k’shem shenichnasta…”, a bracha for the parent. And as most parents will sympathetically acknowledge, we can use all the brachos we can get when it comes to raising kids properly.
mazel tov Dixie Yid!
Dixie Yid had a baby girl - mazel tov! Tizkeh l'gadlah l'torah l'chuppah ul'ma'asim tovim!
judging the morals of G-d's law - R' Lamm's response to Feldman (II)
Comments yesterday as well as a private e-mail focused on a passage of R’ Lamm’s article that gave me pause as I read it, but upon further reflection I did not find it as objectionable as others apparently have. Here is the passage (italics added by me):
I believe R' Lamm's approach is borrowed from a theme R' Wurtzberger z"l developed in his book on Jewish ethics (who in turn I think presents it as being R' Ahron Soloveitchik's chiddush) where he sets down how the Rambam views "m'shum eivah" as a philosophical imperitive to love all creatures, not just a pragmatic end. You may not be comfortable with R' Lamm's formulation, but examples of the approach abound, from Talmudic times - "Rav mangid a'man d'mekadesh b'biya" is a moral expression of dissatisfaction with a legally sanctioned heter - to our own times, where institutions like pre-nup agreements seek to restore equity where the letter of the law clearly favors the husband. When R’ Chaim Brisker allowed eating on Yom Kippur for the sick and declared that he is not lenient with respect to Yom Kippur, he is strict regarding the law of preserving life, that is as much a moral argument as a halachic statement. The “moral argument” which motivates these implementations is not rooted in a selfish judgmental approach to G-d’s law, but is rooted in an appreciation of the moral spirit and value system of the law itself. The law values Shabbos, but the law also values human life; the law values Yom Kippur, but the law respects the needs of the sick – the means to balance these axioms needs to be found in the technical details of the law itself. What might appear as a technical loophole is merely the application of the letter of the law to satisfy the spirit of the law itself. We have no right to judge G-d's law, but that we have a right to use our judgment to insure we meet its demands in spirit and in letter.
Surely you [Feldman], as a distinguished academic lawyer, must have come across instances in which a precedent that was once valid has, in the course of time, proved morally objectionable, as a result of which it was amended, so that the law remains “on the books” as a juridical foundation, while it becomes effectively inoperative through legal analysis and moral argument. Why, then, can you not be as generous to Jewish law, and appreciate that certain biblical laws are unenforceable in practical terms, because all legal systems — including Jewish law — do not simply dump their axiomatic bases but develop them. Why not admire scholars of Jewish law who use various legal technicalities to preserve the text of the original law in its essence, and yet make sure that appropriate changes would be made in accordance with new moral sensitivities?What does R’ Lamm mean by suggesting that our approach to Torah law be guided by “moral argument” – who are we to judge G-d’s law, and who are we to dismiss that law by using technical loopholes to circumvent it if it meets our moral disapproval?
I believe R' Lamm's approach is borrowed from a theme R' Wurtzberger z"l developed in his book on Jewish ethics (who in turn I think presents it as being R' Ahron Soloveitchik's chiddush) where he sets down how the Rambam views "m'shum eivah" as a philosophical imperitive to love all creatures, not just a pragmatic end. You may not be comfortable with R' Lamm's formulation, but examples of the approach abound, from Talmudic times - "Rav mangid a'man d'mekadesh b'biya" is a moral expression of dissatisfaction with a legally sanctioned heter - to our own times, where institutions like pre-nup agreements seek to restore equity where the letter of the law clearly favors the husband. When R’ Chaim Brisker allowed eating on Yom Kippur for the sick and declared that he is not lenient with respect to Yom Kippur, he is strict regarding the law of preserving life, that is as much a moral argument as a halachic statement. The “moral argument” which motivates these implementations is not rooted in a selfish judgmental approach to G-d’s law, but is rooted in an appreciation of the moral spirit and value system of the law itself. The law values Shabbos, but the law also values human life; the law values Yom Kippur, but the law respects the needs of the sick – the means to balance these axioms needs to be found in the technical details of the law itself. What might appear as a technical loophole is merely the application of the letter of the law to satisfy the spirit of the law itself. We have no right to judge G-d's law, but that we have a right to use our judgment to insure we meet its demands in spirit and in letter.
Thursday, August 02, 2007
R' Norman Lamm responds to Feldman
OK, so I’m probably one of the only people unimpressed with Noah Feldman’s self-serving navel gazing and castigation of Modern Orthodoxy for taking umbrage at his intermarriage and rejection of faith (“I reject your value system and way of life but please don’t be offended or reject me” sums up in a sentence what Feldman took 5 pages to say), but the response of Rabbi Dr. Norman Lamm in this article in the Forward is worth taking a look at.
safeik shtar mukdam - why is there a need for a "rosh hashana" for kings?
My son started learning Rosh haShana which forces me to try to keep pace with him. The first Mishna tells us that Rosh Chodesh Nisan was set as the Rosh haShana for kings. Documents used to be dated based on “year X of the king’s reign”; instead of using the king’s inauguration date, Chazal tell us to use Rosh Chodesh Nisan as the date to being counting a new year for all kings.
Why was there need for such a takanah? Some background: The gemara tells us that a post-dated shtar is acceptable, but a shtar dated before a loan occurred is pasul. A shtar creates a lien against all the debtors property; the creditor can even take property from a third-party who purchased it from the debtor after the loan occurred. A pre-dated shtar would give the creditor a lien against far more property than he is entitled too, and is therefore pasul. Tosfos holds such a shtar is completely invalid; Rashi holds it cannot be used to collect a lien, but it can be used to collect from free cash the debtor may have on hand. A loan post dated releases the debtor from part of the lien, so it is not a problem.
Rashi gives the following example to explain the need for the Mishna’s takanah: Reuvain has a shtar that says he loaned money to Shimon in Kislev of year 2 of the King’s reign. The witnesses testify that in reality the loan in question took place in Tamuz of year 2 of the King’s reign. Is the shtar a valid shtar or not? If the King’s reign were counted from his inauguration date, then if the King had been inaugurated in Tishrei (for example), then the shtar in pre-dated and pasul; if the King had been inaugurated in Adar (for example) the shtar is post-dated and OK. To remove the need to keep track of this variable and avoid confusion, Chazal said to use Rosh Chodesh Nisan as a uniform date.
Tosfos asks: in Rashi’s scenario we at worst have a doubt as to the validity of the shtar. Why would we reject such a shtar just because of a doubt? The gemara in Sanhedrin (32) writes that one cannot prove that witnesses are eidim zomimim because they signed a document dated for a time they could not possibly have seen a loan on (e.g. even if the shtar says the loan took place on Yom Kippur!) because we assume such a document is simply postdated – given the choice of rejecting the witnesses or assuming a shtar is postdated, we give them the benefit of the doubt. In Rashi’s scenario as well, given the choice of assuming the shtar is invalid or assuming it is postdated, why not simply give the creditor the benefit of the doubt? More to come…
Why was there need for such a takanah? Some background: The gemara tells us that a post-dated shtar is acceptable, but a shtar dated before a loan occurred is pasul. A shtar creates a lien against all the debtors property; the creditor can even take property from a third-party who purchased it from the debtor after the loan occurred. A pre-dated shtar would give the creditor a lien against far more property than he is entitled too, and is therefore pasul. Tosfos holds such a shtar is completely invalid; Rashi holds it cannot be used to collect a lien, but it can be used to collect from free cash the debtor may have on hand. A loan post dated releases the debtor from part of the lien, so it is not a problem.
Rashi gives the following example to explain the need for the Mishna’s takanah: Reuvain has a shtar that says he loaned money to Shimon in Kislev of year 2 of the King’s reign. The witnesses testify that in reality the loan in question took place in Tamuz of year 2 of the King’s reign. Is the shtar a valid shtar or not? If the King’s reign were counted from his inauguration date, then if the King had been inaugurated in Tishrei (for example), then the shtar in pre-dated and pasul; if the King had been inaugurated in Adar (for example) the shtar is post-dated and OK. To remove the need to keep track of this variable and avoid confusion, Chazal said to use Rosh Chodesh Nisan as a uniform date.
Tosfos asks: in Rashi’s scenario we at worst have a doubt as to the validity of the shtar. Why would we reject such a shtar just because of a doubt? The gemara in Sanhedrin (32) writes that one cannot prove that witnesses are eidim zomimim because they signed a document dated for a time they could not possibly have seen a loan on (e.g. even if the shtar says the loan took place on Yom Kippur!) because we assume such a document is simply postdated – given the choice of rejecting the witnesses or assuming a shtar is postdated, we give them the benefit of the doubt. In Rashi’s scenario as well, given the choice of assuming the shtar is invalid or assuming it is postdated, why not simply give the creditor the benefit of the doubt? More to come…
Wednesday, August 01, 2007
can doing a mitzvah lead to chilul Hashem? - the Chinuch on tefillin
The Sefer haChinuch on last week’s parsha raises an interesting issue in his discussion of the mitzvah of tefillin. He cites a view that the idea of “guf naki” means that a person who does aveiros should not don tefillin as that would lead to a greater chilul Hashem than simply not doing the mitzvah. For example, the Yerushalmi relates that a person gave money for safekeeping to someone who was wearing tefillin on the assumption that such a person could be trusted; unfortunately, the money was stolen by the person who was entrusted with it. Such behavior disgraces the mitzvah of tefillin, and it would be better for the criminal to simply not perform the mitzvah. The Sefer haChinuch disagrees with this view, and argues that every good deed has merit even if the person performing it might in other ways be a sinner. Who knows if this one mitzvah of tefillin might not one day trigger the person to reform his behavior in other areas?
What came to mind in reading this piece is the image of Chabad shluchim standing near the subway grabbing anyone who admits to being Jewish and trying to get them to put on tefillin. hough those grabbed may be otherwise very distant from religious observance of any type, the good deed of tefillin, as the Chinuch writes, is still theirs to observe given the opportunity. On a more cynical note, the example of the Yerushalmi is also often all too real as we read newspaper stories of Jews superficially “religious” who are led off to prison for assorted crimes. Again, while we should condemn their wrong actions, should we necessarily discourage the good deeds that these people may do? Somehow the latter case seems more objectionable than the former…
What came to mind in reading this piece is the image of Chabad shluchim standing near the subway grabbing anyone who admits to being Jewish and trying to get them to put on tefillin. hough those grabbed may be otherwise very distant from religious observance of any type, the good deed of tefillin, as the Chinuch writes, is still theirs to observe given the opportunity. On a more cynical note, the example of the Yerushalmi is also often all too real as we read newspaper stories of Jews superficially “religious” who are led off to prison for assorted crimes. Again, while we should condemn their wrong actions, should we necessarily discourage the good deeds that these people may do? Somehow the latter case seems more objectionable than the former…
Tu b'Av - chag ha'ilanot?
Is it too late for a Tu b’Av post? The first Mishna in Rosh haShana tells us that 1 Tishrei is the new year for netiyos, plantings. Assuming chodesh echad bashanah chashuv shanah, a plant must be around for one month in the year for it to count as a year, the plant must exist from Elul. On top of that one month, it takes (according to some Tanaim) 2 weeks for a plant to root. The Bartenura therefore writes that to count as a year of growth before Tishrei, planting must occur no later than Tu B’Av.
Achronim ask: the Bartenura’s cutoff point seems to be off by a day, as miktzas hayom k’kulo would allow one to plant on 16 Av and still make it!
The Noda b”Yehudah (II: O.C. 84) answers: miktzas hayom k’kulo only applies when counting days, i.e. it is a din in the shiur of what constitutes a "yom". When it comes to planting, the shiur is not 14 days, but rather is two weeks, which is not the same thing - you can’t use miktzas hayom to complete the shiur of required weeks.
Achronim ask: the Bartenura’s cutoff point seems to be off by a day, as miktzas hayom k’kulo would allow one to plant on 16 Av and still make it!
The Noda b”Yehudah (II: O.C. 84) answers: miktzas hayom k’kulo only applies when counting days, i.e. it is a din in the shiur of what constitutes a "yom". When it comes to planting, the shiur is not 14 days, but rather is two weeks, which is not the same thing - you can’t use miktzas hayom to complete the shiur of required weeks.
Tuesday, July 31, 2007
chacham lev yikach mitzvos: tzidkus and struggle (II)
To get back to the gemara in Sota, one other yesod is needed to answer the questions. Chazal in many places take note of the strong influence of environment on a person’s thinking, and they therefore encourage us to live in a makom torah and to be surrounded with talmidei chachamim. When I told this vort to my wife she brought up the idea of “group think”, the tendency of people to not stray from the consensus, By no means are leaders immune from this phenomenon, and if anything, they can be more susceptible to being dragged along by the masses.
Sifrei chassidus develop this relationship between leader and community further. Leaders are not just psychologically influenced by the moods, tendencies, and desires of their followers, but also embody the neshomos of their followers. The psychological pull to follow the crowd is not just a response to external social stimuli, but is a response to the inner voice of the neshoma which echoes the voice of the masses because to some degree it is the voice of the masses.
We asked on the gemara in Sota why proof is needed from the episode of Moshe gathering Yosef’s bones to establish that he loved mitzvos, and why this good deed cannot stand on its own right without being contrasted with Bnei Yisrael’s gathering of spoil. In light of the mashal of the Yismach Moshe and the yesod above, both questions can be answered. Of course Moshe Rabeinu loved mitzvos, but going back to our analogy, it is not surprising that the person who has billions in capital can create tens of thousands of dollars in revenue. It is not surprising that Moshe could love mitzvos when surrounded by the dor dei’ah seeking Hashem. When you see a tzadik who has tremendous kavanah in shabbos kiddush while sitting at tisch with hundreds of Chassidim expecting no less, or when you see a rosh yeshiva who can say a brilliant shiur surrounded by the best chaburah in the beis medrash, neither takes us by surpise.
Chazal credit Moshe because Moshe alone had the ability to rise to the challenge of loving mitzvos even when faced with difficulty. When the rest of Bnei Yisrael was out looting Egypt, the effect of the “group think” pulled even at Moshe Rabeinu (this itself is a tremendous mussar haskel – even Moshe Rabeinu is not immune to such effects!). Precisely at this moment when the tide was moving against being involved in mitzvos, Moshe collected the bones of Yosef. Doing mitzvos when it is socially encouraged and fits one’s schedule and needs is valuable; doing mitzvos when we feel the pull to be doing other things and overcome that challenge is “chacham lev yikach mitzvos”.
Sifrei chassidus develop this relationship between leader and community further. Leaders are not just psychologically influenced by the moods, tendencies, and desires of their followers, but also embody the neshomos of their followers. The psychological pull to follow the crowd is not just a response to external social stimuli, but is a response to the inner voice of the neshoma which echoes the voice of the masses because to some degree it is the voice of the masses.
We asked on the gemara in Sota why proof is needed from the episode of Moshe gathering Yosef’s bones to establish that he loved mitzvos, and why this good deed cannot stand on its own right without being contrasted with Bnei Yisrael’s gathering of spoil. In light of the mashal of the Yismach Moshe and the yesod above, both questions can be answered. Of course Moshe Rabeinu loved mitzvos, but going back to our analogy, it is not surprising that the person who has billions in capital can create tens of thousands of dollars in revenue. It is not surprising that Moshe could love mitzvos when surrounded by the dor dei’ah seeking Hashem. When you see a tzadik who has tremendous kavanah in shabbos kiddush while sitting at tisch with hundreds of Chassidim expecting no less, or when you see a rosh yeshiva who can say a brilliant shiur surrounded by the best chaburah in the beis medrash, neither takes us by surpise.
Chazal credit Moshe because Moshe alone had the ability to rise to the challenge of loving mitzvos even when faced with difficulty. When the rest of Bnei Yisrael was out looting Egypt, the effect of the “group think” pulled even at Moshe Rabeinu (this itself is a tremendous mussar haskel – even Moshe Rabeinu is not immune to such effects!). Precisely at this moment when the tide was moving against being involved in mitzvos, Moshe collected the bones of Yosef. Doing mitzvos when it is socially encouraged and fits one’s schedule and needs is valuable; doing mitzvos when we feel the pull to be doing other things and overcome that challenge is “chacham lev yikach mitzvos”.
Monday, July 30, 2007
chacham lev yikach mitzvos: tzidkus and struggle
The gemara (Sota 13a) darshens the pasuk “chacham lev yikach mitzvos” as referring to Moshe: “Come see how beloved mitzvos were to Moshe, for when the Jewish people were involved in demanding spoils from their Egyptian former-slave masters, Moshe involved himself in collecting the bones of Yosef [for burial in Eretz Yisrael]”.
Diyukim to ponder:
1) Without reference to this episode would we not know that Moshe Rabeinu loved mitzvos?!
2) Why must the gemara contrast Moshe's behavior with that of the Jewish people to prove its point - can't Moshe's behavior stand on its own as proof?
I want to preface the answer with a mashal of the Yismach Moshe that is fantastic in its own right. Three friends were discussing the fortune of Ploni, the well known billionaire. One remarked that he is amazed that Ploni’s revenue is in the tens of thousands of dollars every day. His friend retorted that is no kuntz, because if you have a billion dollars in capital you too could generate huge amounts of revenue; the chap is how Ploni was able to start out with nothing and amass such a fortune to begin with. The third friend chimed in that this is no kuntz either, as over 30 or 40 years anyone might hit a luckyt stretch and emerge with a fortune. The real genius of Ploni is that it looked like he was bankrupt and out of luck just a few years ago and in no time he rebuilt his fortune again.
The nimshal: some people are impressed with the deep avodah of a tzadik or the genius of a lamdan and wish that their avodah and learning could match. A more intelligent person realizes such attainments do not come overnight but are the product of decades of hard work; if only we put in the same effort we would perhaps also attain reward. But a still more insightful person realizes that the tzadik or lamdan’s ability goes even beyond that. No one can achieve a plateau in avodah and then coast; we each have ups and downs. Life intrudes; the mundane is inescapable, and even the greatest tzadik and biggest lamdan must emerge from the Bais Medrash and have a hefesk. Those decades of work are not a smooth line upward, but involve countless ups and downs - small steps forward, perhaps a step back, but always that step back is followed by a greater effort to make the next step a positive one forward. It is not smooth upward sailing which is the hallmark of greatness, but consistent upward sailing, despite the frequent bumps in the road.
I was very taken by this mashal and think there is a lot of truth to it. There is a danger of dismissing the model of a tzadik or lamdan as irrelevant because we see their lives as idyllic and without struggle. The real lesson is not that they don't have struggles, but that they don't get stuck by their struggles. The mashal also answers the kashes raised, but I’ll leave that for next post.
Diyukim to ponder:
1) Without reference to this episode would we not know that Moshe Rabeinu loved mitzvos?!
2) Why must the gemara contrast Moshe's behavior with that of the Jewish people to prove its point - can't Moshe's behavior stand on its own as proof?
I want to preface the answer with a mashal of the Yismach Moshe that is fantastic in its own right. Three friends were discussing the fortune of Ploni, the well known billionaire. One remarked that he is amazed that Ploni’s revenue is in the tens of thousands of dollars every day. His friend retorted that is no kuntz, because if you have a billion dollars in capital you too could generate huge amounts of revenue; the chap is how Ploni was able to start out with nothing and amass such a fortune to begin with. The third friend chimed in that this is no kuntz either, as over 30 or 40 years anyone might hit a luckyt stretch and emerge with a fortune. The real genius of Ploni is that it looked like he was bankrupt and out of luck just a few years ago and in no time he rebuilt his fortune again.
The nimshal: some people are impressed with the deep avodah of a tzadik or the genius of a lamdan and wish that their avodah and learning could match. A more intelligent person realizes such attainments do not come overnight but are the product of decades of hard work; if only we put in the same effort we would perhaps also attain reward. But a still more insightful person realizes that the tzadik or lamdan’s ability goes even beyond that. No one can achieve a plateau in avodah and then coast; we each have ups and downs. Life intrudes; the mundane is inescapable, and even the greatest tzadik and biggest lamdan must emerge from the Bais Medrash and have a hefesk. Those decades of work are not a smooth line upward, but involve countless ups and downs - small steps forward, perhaps a step back, but always that step back is followed by a greater effort to make the next step a positive one forward. It is not smooth upward sailing which is the hallmark of greatness, but consistent upward sailing, despite the frequent bumps in the road.
I was very taken by this mashal and think there is a lot of truth to it. There is a danger of dismissing the model of a tzadik or lamdan as irrelevant because we see their lives as idyllic and without struggle. The real lesson is not that they don't have struggles, but that they don't get stuck by their struggles. The mashal also answers the kashes raised, but I’ll leave that for next post.
"shelo lishma" in mitzvah performance for an "aino metzuveh" and amein groups
The gemara (Sota 14) writes that Hashem responded to Moshe’s request to enter Eretz Yisrael by saying “If all you want is the reward of mitzvos hateluyos ba’aretz I will give them to you without your entering the Land”. The Yismach Moshe connects this response to a Midrash that Moshe involved himself with removing Yosef’s bones from Egypt only for the sake of schar mitzvah – midah k’neged midah, just as Moshe began the journey from Egypt to Eretz Yisrael by focusing on schar, this in the end prevented his entering the land. (As to why Moshe was motivated by schar and not lishma, ayen sham, or maybe more on that later).
The Maharasha makes an interesting point with regard to the motivation of schar mitzvah: since Moshe was not yet obligated to do any of the mitzvos hateluyos ba’aretz, there was nothing wrong with being motivated by schar to want to become obligated by entering the Land. Our wariness for performance “al menas l’kabel pras” extends only to someone who has an obligation and discharges it solely to receive reward; someone who has no obligation but wants to undertake greater obligations faces no such test of having proper intentions.
Apropos of the latest round of discussions (here, here) of amein/tefilah groups, I wonder why when it comes to women performing mitzvos or learning Torah there is an immediate suspicion of improper motive. Could one not argue based on the Maharasha that any cheshbonos of “al menas” apply only to someone who is already metzuveh; for someone who wants to undertake an extra obligation there is much less of a burden to insure and insist that motives be “lishma”.
The Maharasha makes an interesting point with regard to the motivation of schar mitzvah: since Moshe was not yet obligated to do any of the mitzvos hateluyos ba’aretz, there was nothing wrong with being motivated by schar to want to become obligated by entering the Land. Our wariness for performance “al menas l’kabel pras” extends only to someone who has an obligation and discharges it solely to receive reward; someone who has no obligation but wants to undertake greater obligations faces no such test of having proper intentions.
Apropos of the latest round of discussions (here, here) of amein/tefilah groups, I wonder why when it comes to women performing mitzvos or learning Torah there is an immediate suspicion of improper motive. Could one not argue based on the Maharasha that any cheshbonos of “al menas” apply only to someone who is already metzuveh; for someone who wants to undertake an extra obligation there is much less of a burden to insure and insist that motives be “lishma”.
Friday, July 27, 2007
final thoughts on psak, hashkafa, and ikkarei emunah
For some reason I really don’t enjoy writing about this topic so I’m going to make it brief. Some more (final?) thoughts on psak and hashkafa:
1) Shapiro writes, “I have said, and I repeat now, that no rishonim that I am aware of, and certainly not Rambam, believed that Principles of Faith can be decided in a halakhic fashion.” I’m really confused by this one: aren’t there dinim that tell us who is a min? Wasn’t that the whole point of the 13 ikkarim?
2) I assume Shapiro meant the more narrow claim that halacha cannot decide between different shitos of theology. His proof: since Rishonim critique the Rambam as having rejected views which were at one time espoused by Chachamim without considering that the Rambam chose to pasken against those views, QED psak is impossible. I don’t follow the logic here. These Rishonim assumed that an ikar must be axiomatic, not something over which there was different views (see Sefer haIkkarim 1:3). Even Rishonim like the Sefer haIkarim who do not have substantive disagreement with the Rambam still take issue with his labeling matters upon which there was disagreement as ikkarim. While Shapiro highlights these views, he seems to forget that the Rambam himself obviously disagreed with them! And, as Shapiro himself demonstrates in the first chapter of his book, most achronim accept the Rambam’s 13 ikkarim despite the critique leveled against them. This is no different than any other area where Rishonim stake out different position and tradition has accepted one view over the other, namely the view of the Rambam that labels an ikar as a significant belief even though views to the contrary may have once existed. Note as well that Rishonim like Albo do not disagree with the notion of deciding which beliefs are correct (e.g. Albo assumes one must believe in mashiach even though a Rabbi Hillel in the gemara did not hold of such a belief) - they disagree only with the semantic issue of labelling these beliefs as ikkarim.
3) There is a recurring claim in comments that belief is different than action, but no one has gone beyond stating this as a truism to adequately explain why or what source would indicate this. Furthermore, and this is a critical point: isn’t every statement about what to do implicitly a statement about belief? One cannot don Rashi’s tefillin every morning and simultaneously believe that Rabeinu Tam was correct in how the parshiyos should be ordered. If you put on Rashi’s tefillin it is because you believe that such an act fulfills the will of G-d. Actions are just expressions of our beliefs, So why the distinction?
4) With regards to paskening on a “metziyus”, e.g. as raised in the comments, how can we use the rules of halacha to determine the historical truth of who wrote the last 8 verses of the Torah. Answer: we are not defining a metziyus, but deciding that one version of the mesorah is more authentic than another version. For example, if most historians date the birth of Ploni to July 4 and one historian claims his birth was July 5, assuming that Ploni was born on July 4 is simply choosing to accept the consensus view as a good indicator of what is factually accurate. The Mahartz Chiyus explains Tos, in Yevamos (to finally get back to that!) as properly claiming Malachi was Ezra because the targum proves that version of the mesorah more reliable.
5) None of the places in Peirush haMishna where the Rambam says he cannot pasken deal with necessary beliefs. I don’t see why these statement have any bearing on ikkarei emunah, which are necessary beliefs - you can't just throw up your hands and say you have no idea, because by definition these are required beliefs. Nor do these statements contradict Tos, because Tosfos needed to decide a historical question for the sake of bolstering a halachic argument. Where there are equally valid sevaros and claims and there is no pressing need to choose one mesorah over the other, or where the debate is of such a nature that one cannot choose one over the other, why should one do so? That's all the Rambam was saying. Why has this simply rule become a mantra among those who want to claim halacha cannot decide ikkarim?
1) Shapiro writes, “I have said, and I repeat now, that no rishonim that I am aware of, and certainly not Rambam, believed that Principles of Faith can be decided in a halakhic fashion.” I’m really confused by this one: aren’t there dinim that tell us who is a min? Wasn’t that the whole point of the 13 ikkarim?
2) I assume Shapiro meant the more narrow claim that halacha cannot decide between different shitos of theology. His proof: since Rishonim critique the Rambam as having rejected views which were at one time espoused by Chachamim without considering that the Rambam chose to pasken against those views, QED psak is impossible. I don’t follow the logic here. These Rishonim assumed that an ikar must be axiomatic, not something over which there was different views (see Sefer haIkkarim 1:3). Even Rishonim like the Sefer haIkarim who do not have substantive disagreement with the Rambam still take issue with his labeling matters upon which there was disagreement as ikkarim. While Shapiro highlights these views, he seems to forget that the Rambam himself obviously disagreed with them! And, as Shapiro himself demonstrates in the first chapter of his book, most achronim accept the Rambam’s 13 ikkarim despite the critique leveled against them. This is no different than any other area where Rishonim stake out different position and tradition has accepted one view over the other, namely the view of the Rambam that labels an ikar as a significant belief even though views to the contrary may have once existed. Note as well that Rishonim like Albo do not disagree with the notion of deciding which beliefs are correct (e.g. Albo assumes one must believe in mashiach even though a Rabbi Hillel in the gemara did not hold of such a belief) - they disagree only with the semantic issue of labelling these beliefs as ikkarim.
3) There is a recurring claim in comments that belief is different than action, but no one has gone beyond stating this as a truism to adequately explain why or what source would indicate this. Furthermore, and this is a critical point: isn’t every statement about what to do implicitly a statement about belief? One cannot don Rashi’s tefillin every morning and simultaneously believe that Rabeinu Tam was correct in how the parshiyos should be ordered. If you put on Rashi’s tefillin it is because you believe that such an act fulfills the will of G-d. Actions are just expressions of our beliefs, So why the distinction?
4) With regards to paskening on a “metziyus”, e.g. as raised in the comments, how can we use the rules of halacha to determine the historical truth of who wrote the last 8 verses of the Torah. Answer: we are not defining a metziyus, but deciding that one version of the mesorah is more authentic than another version. For example, if most historians date the birth of Ploni to July 4 and one historian claims his birth was July 5, assuming that Ploni was born on July 4 is simply choosing to accept the consensus view as a good indicator of what is factually accurate. The Mahartz Chiyus explains Tos, in Yevamos (to finally get back to that!) as properly claiming Malachi was Ezra because the targum proves that version of the mesorah more reliable.
5) None of the places in Peirush haMishna where the Rambam says he cannot pasken deal with necessary beliefs. I don’t see why these statement have any bearing on ikkarei emunah, which are necessary beliefs - you can't just throw up your hands and say you have no idea, because by definition these are required beliefs. Nor do these statements contradict Tos, because Tosfos needed to decide a historical question for the sake of bolstering a halachic argument. Where there are equally valid sevaros and claims and there is no pressing need to choose one mesorah over the other, or where the debate is of such a nature that one cannot choose one over the other, why should one do so? That's all the Rambam was saying. Why has this simply rule become a mantra among those who want to claim halacha cannot decide ikkarim?
Thursday, July 26, 2007
is halachic truth "historically conditioned"?
I “owe” getting back to Tosfos and the Rambam (previous post) on psak and hashkafa but haven’t had time to fully develop an approach, so I’m going to tackle things piecemeal. I want to start with a few comments on a point Dr. Marc Shapiro makes in an essay printed on the seforim blog in response to a review of his book, specifically his point #7. I do not want to make my post excessively long by quoting it in its entirety, so ayen sham.
Shaprio approvingly quotes Prof. Menachem Kellner, “Dogmas, it must be recalled, are beliefs taught as true by the Torah; is the truth taught by the Torah historically conditioned?” I don’t get it, and this seems to be a crucial point in their argument. To take one possible example: R’ Eliezer believed that the assertion that machshiri milah are doche shabbos was a Torah truth, and undoubtedly this was the halacha as practiced in his community. Today, we assume machshirei milah are not doche Shabbos. Why is Kellner not troubled in this case by halacha being “historically conditioned”? Why is he not troubled that the entire community under the leadership of R’ Eliezer may be classified as mechalilei Shabbos based on our definition of Torah truth?
A more radical example of "historical conditioning" is the recent daf yomi (Yevamos 77) regarding the debate over generations whether the derasha of “amoni v’lo amonis, moavi v’lo amonis” was true. Until Chazal determined that this halacha was rooted in a kabalah, there was room for the Bais Din of each generation to rule differently on the issue. Thus (as the Brisker Rav explains) Ploni Almoni did not question Boaz’s psak that Rus was a kosher convert, but he worried about whether a later B”D would overturn that psak and declare his grandchildren to be goyim.
In his review of Shapiro’s book, Kellner writes that Ikkarim cannot be decided as other psak halacha is because it leads to “weird” conclusions, “the weirdest of which is the idea that holding a certain belief at one time time could cause one to be excluded from the community of Israel and to lose his or her share in the world to come, while holding that belief at another time carries with it no such consequences.” Perhaps I am missing something, but I really don’t understand why that is any weirder than someone who is Sabbath observant by R’ Eliezer’s standards being considered chayav kareis (i.e. their soul cut off from Heaven) if they perform the same action in a different locale, or why it is any weirder than Rus being considered Jewish at one point in time and perhaps being labeled a goya in a different historical period. Ain lecha “exclusion from the community of Israel” gedola m’zu! Why is dogma in a different category than these questions?
Shaprio approvingly quotes Prof. Menachem Kellner, “Dogmas, it must be recalled, are beliefs taught as true by the Torah; is the truth taught by the Torah historically conditioned?” I don’t get it, and this seems to be a crucial point in their argument. To take one possible example: R’ Eliezer believed that the assertion that machshiri milah are doche shabbos was a Torah truth, and undoubtedly this was the halacha as practiced in his community. Today, we assume machshirei milah are not doche Shabbos. Why is Kellner not troubled in this case by halacha being “historically conditioned”? Why is he not troubled that the entire community under the leadership of R’ Eliezer may be classified as mechalilei Shabbos based on our definition of Torah truth?
A more radical example of "historical conditioning" is the recent daf yomi (Yevamos 77) regarding the debate over generations whether the derasha of “amoni v’lo amonis, moavi v’lo amonis” was true. Until Chazal determined that this halacha was rooted in a kabalah, there was room for the Bais Din of each generation to rule differently on the issue. Thus (as the Brisker Rav explains) Ploni Almoni did not question Boaz’s psak that Rus was a kosher convert, but he worried about whether a later B”D would overturn that psak and declare his grandchildren to be goyim.
In his review of Shapiro’s book, Kellner writes that Ikkarim cannot be decided as other psak halacha is because it leads to “weird” conclusions, “the weirdest of which is the idea that holding a certain belief at one time time could cause one to be excluded from the community of Israel and to lose his or her share in the world to come, while holding that belief at another time carries with it no such consequences.” Perhaps I am missing something, but I really don’t understand why that is any weirder than someone who is Sabbath observant by R’ Eliezer’s standards being considered chayav kareis (i.e. their soul cut off from Heaven) if they perform the same action in a different locale, or why it is any weirder than Rus being considered Jewish at one point in time and perhaps being labeled a goya in a different historical period. Ain lecha “exclusion from the community of Israel” gedola m’zu! Why is dogma in a different category than these questions?
Wednesday, July 25, 2007
what the Maharal or Brisker Rav adds to our understanding of 9 Av
Apparently I may have not explained the Brisker Rav in the previous piece as well as I should have. Someone (anonymous) in the comments (I am assuming his/her reference to Maharal was simply an error as no Maharal was cited) pointed to the explicit gemara in Ta’anis 29a that says that although R’ Yochanan wanted to fix the fast on 10 Av when the bulk of destruction took place, the fast was set on the 9th because “aschulei puranusa adifa”, the beginning of the destruction is a better point to commemorate. So who needs my post with its lack of knowledge of gemara and tanach (as the comment stated), and I guess the unstated point may be who needs this Brisker Rav when you have an open gemara?
In the Shiurei Da’as of R’ Bloch there is an essay called “Darcha Shel Torah” in which he says a fundamental yesod in learning (I have heard the same in the name of the Chofetz Chaim as well): in order to understand and appreciate any sevara, chiddush, idea, one must first be aware of what one thought before learning the new idea and understand how that prior knowledge proved inadequate. If you don’t see a kashe, you can’t appreciate a teirutz. On that note:
It seems from a prima facie reading of the gemara that the debate between R’ Yochanan and Chachamim is not about the historical question of when the bulk of destruction took place – the Chachamim seem to agree that the destruction took place on 10 Av, but argue that the "aschalta", the beginning of events, is “adifa” better, meaning more apropos a time to commemorate. But WHY should that be so? WHY is the beginning more apropose to commemorate than the date of destruction? Clearly R’ Yochanan did not think it was! Rather than close the issue, the gemara provides more food for thought –what exactly are these two views arguing about?
I can think offhand of 4 possible ways to explain the debate:
1) While the bulk of destruction took place on the 10th, the psychological blow of the mikdash being violated and the loss of religious autonomy which it symbolized took place on the 9th. The argument in the gemara is how to frame the tragedy: physical destruction (R’ Yochanan), or psychological trauma and loss (Chachamim). Other variations on this theme are possible, with the common denominator that the tragedy is multi-faceted and different focal points are possible.
2) Both opinions focus on physical destruction as the cause for the fast, but differ as to how to define the act of physical destruction. We already have a discussion in the gemara (B.K. 23) whether the responsibility for arson is equivalent to damage like shooting an arrow, or a form or negligence, like failing to watch one’s animal. Here too, the same nezikin issue may be in play: is the arsonist culpable for setting the blaze, or only culpable because of the eventual destruction? The Chasam Sofer (cited by R' Zevin in Moadim l'Halacha) is one source that goes down this road.
3) Rather than focus on theories of torts or on the scope of the tragedy, the issue may boil down to hilchos ta’aniyos. The fast on 9 Av is multi-layered in halacha, with elements of ta’anis and aveilus. While the theme of ta’anis and its emphasis on tshuvah is perhaps appropriate to reflect on at the moment destruction begins, the theme of aveilus seems more appropriate for the day on which the actual bulk of destruction took place. Which do we emphasize?
4) Finally, as I quoted in the name of the Brisker Rav, one can explain the emphasis on aschalta d’puranusa based on the kedushas mikdash itself, which was violated on 9 Av. The gemara may be debating whether the fast commemorates physical destruction of the mikdash or the violation of its kedusha. Alternatively, R’ Yochanan may have held that the kedusha was not violated in fact until the 10th (and understanding such a position would require further research into the sugya in A.Z. 52). Other possibilites can be raised here as well, but the common denominator is that the focus of the debate is on kedushas mikdash.
I don’t mean to limit the possibilities to these 4 – aderaba, the deeper we think about the issue, the more possible explanations and variables we may uncover that may explain the issue. And thinking about the issue is what yesterday, and to a lesser degree today, is all about. I regret that a don’t really have time to always fully unpack my thinking about a gemara in every post and will sometimes just throw out a Brisker Rav or other chiddush, but I do have a day job and do the best I can here in a very limited amount of time. This blog does not even scratch the surface of a full analysis of any sugya, but hopefully in this case I have succeeded in shedding some more light on the issue.
In the Shiurei Da’as of R’ Bloch there is an essay called “Darcha Shel Torah” in which he says a fundamental yesod in learning (I have heard the same in the name of the Chofetz Chaim as well): in order to understand and appreciate any sevara, chiddush, idea, one must first be aware of what one thought before learning the new idea and understand how that prior knowledge proved inadequate. If you don’t see a kashe, you can’t appreciate a teirutz. On that note:
It seems from a prima facie reading of the gemara that the debate between R’ Yochanan and Chachamim is not about the historical question of when the bulk of destruction took place – the Chachamim seem to agree that the destruction took place on 10 Av, but argue that the "aschalta", the beginning of events, is “adifa” better, meaning more apropos a time to commemorate. But WHY should that be so? WHY is the beginning more apropose to commemorate than the date of destruction? Clearly R’ Yochanan did not think it was! Rather than close the issue, the gemara provides more food for thought –what exactly are these two views arguing about?
I can think offhand of 4 possible ways to explain the debate:
1) While the bulk of destruction took place on the 10th, the psychological blow of the mikdash being violated and the loss of religious autonomy which it symbolized took place on the 9th. The argument in the gemara is how to frame the tragedy: physical destruction (R’ Yochanan), or psychological trauma and loss (Chachamim). Other variations on this theme are possible, with the common denominator that the tragedy is multi-faceted and different focal points are possible.
2) Both opinions focus on physical destruction as the cause for the fast, but differ as to how to define the act of physical destruction. We already have a discussion in the gemara (B.K. 23) whether the responsibility for arson is equivalent to damage like shooting an arrow, or a form or negligence, like failing to watch one’s animal. Here too, the same nezikin issue may be in play: is the arsonist culpable for setting the blaze, or only culpable because of the eventual destruction? The Chasam Sofer (cited by R' Zevin in Moadim l'Halacha) is one source that goes down this road.
3) Rather than focus on theories of torts or on the scope of the tragedy, the issue may boil down to hilchos ta’aniyos. The fast on 9 Av is multi-layered in halacha, with elements of ta’anis and aveilus. While the theme of ta’anis and its emphasis on tshuvah is perhaps appropriate to reflect on at the moment destruction begins, the theme of aveilus seems more appropriate for the day on which the actual bulk of destruction took place. Which do we emphasize?
4) Finally, as I quoted in the name of the Brisker Rav, one can explain the emphasis on aschalta d’puranusa based on the kedushas mikdash itself, which was violated on 9 Av. The gemara may be debating whether the fast commemorates physical destruction of the mikdash or the violation of its kedusha. Alternatively, R’ Yochanan may have held that the kedusha was not violated in fact until the 10th (and understanding such a position would require further research into the sugya in A.Z. 52). Other possibilites can be raised here as well, but the common denominator is that the focus of the debate is on kedushas mikdash.
I don’t mean to limit the possibilities to these 4 – aderaba, the deeper we think about the issue, the more possible explanations and variables we may uncover that may explain the issue. And thinking about the issue is what yesterday, and to a lesser degree today, is all about. I regret that a don’t really have time to always fully unpack my thinking about a gemara in every post and will sometimes just throw out a Brisker Rav or other chiddush, but I do have a day job and do the best I can here in a very limited amount of time. This blog does not even scratch the surface of a full analysis of any sugya, but hopefully in this case I have succeeded in shedding some more light on the issue.
Monday, July 23, 2007
9 Av is not 9/11 - churban and chilul kedusha
I’m not in the mood to continue on the topic of ikkarei emunah and psak today, Erev 9 b’Av. Bl”n I’ll get back to it on Wed., but if you have a craving for the topic until then, take a look at David Guttmann’s posts.
To view 9 Av as a Jewish 9/11 I think misses the point. The gemara quotes and rejects R’ Yochanan’s view that the fast should be on 10 Av, the date when the majority of the destruction and burning of the Mikdash took place. Instead, we mark the churban on 9 Av when the fire was first set to the Mikdash. Why? The Brisker Rav explains the choice of date based on the concept of “ba’u bah pritzim v’chililuha”, once the enemy entered the Mikdash, its kedusha was removed (See Avodah Zarah 52b and the rishonim there). The fire of 10 Av may have been more intense and catastrophic than the fire which started on 9 Av, but that fire was a fire which “only” destroyed a building of wood and stone. 9 Av is not marked because of the physical destruction which took place, but because that is the day on which the greatest chilul kedusha occurred.
I don’t mean to minimize the events of 9/11 (I work a few blocks away) – loss of life is always tragic, especially so when it comes at the hands of an enemy intent on senseless violence. But I think the Brisker Rav reminds us that tragedy, loss, destruction has to be seen within the framework of chilul Hashem, chilul kedusha, and not just a sense of personal loss and suffering. In that respect, one cannot possibly compare the destruction of 9/11 to the destruction of the Mikdash.
R’ Dessler (Michtav m’Eliyahu) asks: if the Jewish people failed to fulfill their mission in Eretz Yisrael, in a makom kadosh, what sense does galus make as a punishment – kal v’chomer we are bound to fail when further removed from the protection of that makom kadosh? The answer underscores the point of the Brisker Rav. When we were in Eretz Yisrael our failings not only were our own undoing, but they also polluted and caused a chilul Hashem and chilul of the kedushas ha’aretz. In galus, there is the danger of further failure, but that failure is tempered by it not polluting the kedushas hamakom of Eretz Yisrael.
R’ Soloveitchik in a eulogy of the Brisker Rav noted that one could not call the Brisker Rav a Zionist, but that is not because he did not love Eretz Yisrael, but simply because the question of a State is political and not halachic. The Brisker Rav and R’ Chaim’s chiddushim are filled with torah that analyzes every aspect of kedushas ha’aretz, kedushas mikdash, kedushas yerushalayim; these giants were sensitive to every nuance of kedusha that manifests itself in Eretz Yisrael, and their great love for Eretz Yisrael sprang from that appreciation.
Simply rebuilding the makom mikdash or its kelim are not the way out of 9 Av. The physical mikdash is a reflection of the mikdash in our hearts (see Nefesh haChaim section 1). A physical building which we are not ready for will just be a building, not a Mikdash; kelim which we are not ready to use will just be utensils, not vehicles for avodah. The tikkun for 9 Av is not recreating a physical building – it is recreating the sense of hashra’as haShechina which once was, in removing the chilul Hashem and chilul kedusha.
While the process of tikkun may seem impossible, recall that while it took 2000 years for Klal Yisrael to deserve Eretz Yisrael again, it took just 20 (1948 to 1967) for us to once again deserve Yerushalayim once we had a State - the military victory is just a siman in chitzoniyus to what we reclaimed in pnimiyus. The kinyan of Eretz Yisrael itself, if appreciated properly, can strengthen our avodah and speed up the process, but the battle is far from over. Just walking down the streets of NY (just living in NY instead of Yerushalayim!) should give anyone with eyes in their head a sense of the chilul kedusha that we live with daily. That’s what we shed tears over tomorrow, and beg for a nechama from, b’meheira b’yameinu.
To view 9 Av as a Jewish 9/11 I think misses the point. The gemara quotes and rejects R’ Yochanan’s view that the fast should be on 10 Av, the date when the majority of the destruction and burning of the Mikdash took place. Instead, we mark the churban on 9 Av when the fire was first set to the Mikdash. Why? The Brisker Rav explains the choice of date based on the concept of “ba’u bah pritzim v’chililuha”, once the enemy entered the Mikdash, its kedusha was removed (See Avodah Zarah 52b and the rishonim there). The fire of 10 Av may have been more intense and catastrophic than the fire which started on 9 Av, but that fire was a fire which “only” destroyed a building of wood and stone. 9 Av is not marked because of the physical destruction which took place, but because that is the day on which the greatest chilul kedusha occurred.
I don’t mean to minimize the events of 9/11 (I work a few blocks away) – loss of life is always tragic, especially so when it comes at the hands of an enemy intent on senseless violence. But I think the Brisker Rav reminds us that tragedy, loss, destruction has to be seen within the framework of chilul Hashem, chilul kedusha, and not just a sense of personal loss and suffering. In that respect, one cannot possibly compare the destruction of 9/11 to the destruction of the Mikdash.
R’ Dessler (Michtav m’Eliyahu) asks: if the Jewish people failed to fulfill their mission in Eretz Yisrael, in a makom kadosh, what sense does galus make as a punishment – kal v’chomer we are bound to fail when further removed from the protection of that makom kadosh? The answer underscores the point of the Brisker Rav. When we were in Eretz Yisrael our failings not only were our own undoing, but they also polluted and caused a chilul Hashem and chilul of the kedushas ha’aretz. In galus, there is the danger of further failure, but that failure is tempered by it not polluting the kedushas hamakom of Eretz Yisrael.
R’ Soloveitchik in a eulogy of the Brisker Rav noted that one could not call the Brisker Rav a Zionist, but that is not because he did not love Eretz Yisrael, but simply because the question of a State is political and not halachic. The Brisker Rav and R’ Chaim’s chiddushim are filled with torah that analyzes every aspect of kedushas ha’aretz, kedushas mikdash, kedushas yerushalayim; these giants were sensitive to every nuance of kedusha that manifests itself in Eretz Yisrael, and their great love for Eretz Yisrael sprang from that appreciation.
Simply rebuilding the makom mikdash or its kelim are not the way out of 9 Av. The physical mikdash is a reflection of the mikdash in our hearts (see Nefesh haChaim section 1). A physical building which we are not ready for will just be a building, not a Mikdash; kelim which we are not ready to use will just be utensils, not vehicles for avodah. The tikkun for 9 Av is not recreating a physical building – it is recreating the sense of hashra’as haShechina which once was, in removing the chilul Hashem and chilul kedusha.
While the process of tikkun may seem impossible, recall that while it took 2000 years for Klal Yisrael to deserve Eretz Yisrael again, it took just 20 (1948 to 1967) for us to once again deserve Yerushalayim once we had a State - the military victory is just a siman in chitzoniyus to what we reclaimed in pnimiyus. The kinyan of Eretz Yisrael itself, if appreciated properly, can strengthen our avodah and speed up the process, but the battle is far from over. Just walking down the streets of NY (just living in NY instead of Yerushalayim!) should give anyone with eyes in their head a sense of the chilul kedusha that we live with daily. That’s what we shed tears over tomorrow, and beg for a nechama from, b’meheira b’yameinu.
Friday, July 20, 2007
psak on hashkafa and formulating a torah theology
I have been trying for 3 days to complete a post on the subject of ikkarei emunah, hashkafa, and psak, and I keep putting off finishing it, but by coincidence Matt posted on the same topic yesterday and got me to crystallize my thoughts a little more (see comments to his post). Let me start with this: There is a notion of there being no psak in matters of hashkafa, leading in its most extreme formulation to the premis “out there” in jblogger velt which says that in areas of hashkafa one can basically formulate one’s own theology without any regard to mesorah, opinions of Rishonim, achronim etc. If there is no psak, then in a machlokes between me and the Rambam there can be no final world on who is right and who is wrong. (Just for the record: this is NOT Matt’s view!) All that psak halacha can determine is behavior, but in matters of belief, anything goes. Is such a view compatible with Judaism? I would have thought the answer "No" is obvious, but I underestimate the degree people can misinterpret Judaism : )
The first point to be made is that many people who point to the Rambam’s statement in a few places in Peirush haMishnayos that he cannot offer a “psak” on hashkafa and note that this position was adopted by R’ Aryeh Kaplan z”l in one of his essays seem to forget R’ Aryeh Kaplan’s other point made in the same speech: “So the first principle is that, in any question of hashkafah, one must go back to sources. If a person wants to develop a hashkafah, this is the way it must be. A person must be careful to make sure that the great gedolim of the past did not say the opposite.” Hashkafa is not a free for all. Hashkafa is not about what theology you choose to espouse and feel comfortable with, but what theology the giants of the Jewish people have espoused and said a Jew should be comfortable with and live by. There can be no machlokes between me and the Rambam in hashkafa any more than I can decide to read a gemara differently than the Rambam and think my version is correct. This is obvious and should go without saying, but I’ll just put it on record because there is a “yesh omrim” that doesn’t even get past this stage.
But now we get down to more serious business. The Rambam after all does say that in disputes among Tanaim in areas of emunah he cannot offer a psak where there is no practical ramification. Meaning, when there is a dispute among Tanaim, Amoraim, gedolim (not me vs. the Rambam!) involving matters of belief, there is no concept of being bound to one view over the other.
Tosfos (Yevamos 86b d”h mipnei) in the middle of a halachic discussion makes the passing comment (relevant to the construction their argument) that “kayma lan Malachi zeh Ezra”, we pasken that Malachi is the same person as Ezra (see Megillah 15 for other opinions). The Mahartz Chiyus asks: how can Tosfos possibly pasken on an issue like this? The entire discussion of who Malachi was is a historical fact, and the issue is one of aggadita, belief, not halacha. You can’t pasken an aggadita or pasken historical facts!
So what shall we say – do we want to turn this issue into a machlokes Rambam and Tosfos about whether you can pasken an issue like who we believe a historical figure was? Or is there a way to reconcile the two positions?
The first point to be made is that many people who point to the Rambam’s statement in a few places in Peirush haMishnayos that he cannot offer a “psak” on hashkafa and note that this position was adopted by R’ Aryeh Kaplan z”l in one of his essays seem to forget R’ Aryeh Kaplan’s other point made in the same speech: “So the first principle is that, in any question of hashkafah, one must go back to sources. If a person wants to develop a hashkafah, this is the way it must be. A person must be careful to make sure that the great gedolim of the past did not say the opposite.” Hashkafa is not a free for all. Hashkafa is not about what theology you choose to espouse and feel comfortable with, but what theology the giants of the Jewish people have espoused and said a Jew should be comfortable with and live by. There can be no machlokes between me and the Rambam in hashkafa any more than I can decide to read a gemara differently than the Rambam and think my version is correct. This is obvious and should go without saying, but I’ll just put it on record because there is a “yesh omrim” that doesn’t even get past this stage.
But now we get down to more serious business. The Rambam after all does say that in disputes among Tanaim in areas of emunah he cannot offer a psak where there is no practical ramification. Meaning, when there is a dispute among Tanaim, Amoraim, gedolim (not me vs. the Rambam!) involving matters of belief, there is no concept of being bound to one view over the other.
Tosfos (Yevamos 86b d”h mipnei) in the middle of a halachic discussion makes the passing comment (relevant to the construction their argument) that “kayma lan Malachi zeh Ezra”, we pasken that Malachi is the same person as Ezra (see Megillah 15 for other opinions). The Mahartz Chiyus asks: how can Tosfos possibly pasken on an issue like this? The entire discussion of who Malachi was is a historical fact, and the issue is one of aggadita, belief, not halacha. You can’t pasken an aggadita or pasken historical facts!
So what shall we say – do we want to turn this issue into a machlokes Rambam and Tosfos about whether you can pasken an issue like who we believe a historical figure was? Or is there a way to reconcile the two positions?
does mikveh before shabbos require kavanah?
The gemara (Chulin 31) writes that tevila in mikveh for kodhsim requires kavanah but for chulin it does not (discussed this back in Feb – see here). The Sidduro shel Shabbos writes that for those who follow the minhag to be toivel in mikveh before Shabbos (I don't), kavanah is required; nothing is accomplished by doing a “ma’aseh kof” and just dunking without any intent. The tevilah should bring to mind 1) that one is divesting oneself from activity of chol, and 2) that one is accepting the kedushas Shabbos (according to R’ Chaim Vital two tevilos are actually required, one for each goal).
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