led astray by G-d??? (II)

The most glaring example of being led astray comes from our parsha. G-d at first tells Bilam to stay away from the Jews, but then acquiesces to Bilam’s going. How can we blame Bilam for accepting the job of going to curse the Jews if G-d appeared to him in a dream and gave the OK?

Chazal (cited by Rashi) say “b’derech she’adam rotzeh leilech bah molichin oso” – G-d will lead a person in the direction he/she wants to travel. AddeRabbi beat me to the punch (at least once a week I seem to be writing about something he touched on once before) in citing an amazing R’ Tzadok (Tzidkas haTzadik #64), but after reading his piece I think I interpret R’ Tzadok slightly differently than he does (AddeRabbi – any feedback?).

Just like an ordinary person can marshal tremendous physical energy and invest it in an incorrect cause, a great person can marshal tremendous spiritual energy even to the point of causing miraculous occurrences, but it may all be in the name of a misguided mission. G-d does not lead people astray – people lead themselves astray. A bully who beats people up cannot complain that G-d gave him strength and that caused his downfall; a spiritually great person cannot blame G-d for granting him prophecy.

I think R’ Tzadok means even more than that. Asking why a person would receive nevuah or be able to perform a miracle if they are wrong presupposes that there is some objective definition of “wrong” out there that stands in the way of attaining a deep religious experience like nevuah, and an objective “truth” that opens the door to these experiences. I think R’ Tzadok does not see things that way (see Tzidkas haTzadik #90) – there is no objective truth “out there”; truth is a construct we create as part of our own religious experience. Bilam was sincerely committed to the truth of Torah as he interpreted it, and that sincere commitment gave rise to the power of prophecy.

I’ve been mulling this R’ Tzadok over for 2 days and still am not sure I captured the essence of the idea. It is not easy to digest, and is worth reading in the original.

explaining hasidic judaism to the average american joe

A non-Jewish coworker who lives near Kiryas Joel asked me yesterday why Hasidic Jews have “the curls”. He thought it is so G-d can pull them up to heaven. Another coworker who moved to the same neighborhood told me he and a friend from Pennsylvania who knows nothing about Jews spent the weekend “Jew watching” at Home Depot in complete confusion as to the whole lifestyle (I think I am the most “Jewish” person this non-native-NYer has ever had contact with, so K.Y. is pretty much another planet to him).

Next question was whether Hasidic Jews have TVs. He thought they do, but I dispelled that myth and when asked admitted to not having one myself. To the average American, living without a TV is tantamount to saying you live in a log-cabin and read by candlelight near your wood burning stove, because you obviously are not part of the real 21st century world.

How to explain Kiryas Joel in a few simple sentences to your average American Joe is quite a challenge… Anyone have suggestions?

led astray by G-d???

The famous “tanur shel achna’i” gemara (B.M. 59) relates that R’ Eliezer called on G-d the perform miracles to establish the correctness of his argument – a tree moved location by itself, a stream reversed course, the walls of the Bais Medrash curved inward, a bas kol testified affirmed his position. Nonetheless, the Chachamim dismissed all these proofs – “lo bashamayim hi”, the halacha is given to human courts to decide and is not subject to Heavenly interference.

If in the end the consensus of the Chachamim was that R’ Eliezer’s position was wrong, why would G-d perform miracles on his behalf? From a legal perspective we might dismiss miracles as inadmissible evidence, but from a theological perspective, how can we fault R’ Eliezer for standing firm in his position when G-d himself appears to be on his side!

The Radomsker (Tiferes Shlome) asks a similar question regarding Korach. Rashi tells us that Korah was led astray because he saw a prophetic vision that his descendent would be the great Shmuel haNavi. Why would G-d offer such a prophecy to Korach if it would lead him down the wrong path? True, Korach still had free choice to not lead a rebellion, but that does not really address the question – given the seeming justification of his position by G-d himself (as the prophetic vision suggested), how can we fault Korach for not acting on his impressions?

Does G-d (chas v'shalom) lead people astray? One more example later... stay tuned.

R’ Chaim Brisker and Wittgenstein - intellectual spoilsports

I’m too lazy to track down a source for this story, but as I recall the general outline, the Bais haLevi once was asked to describe the difference between his derech in learning and that of R’ Chaim Brisker. He explained that when someone asked him a question, both he and the questioner walked away happy - the questioner was happy for having thought of a good question, and he was happy for thinking of a good answer. When someone asked R’ Chaim Brisker a question, neither walked away happy. R’ Chaim would invariably show that the question was never a question to begin with, leaving the questioner displeased, and since the question was never a question R' Chaim could never claim to invent answers.

Richard Rorty's recent death spurred me to try to read a little of his work, so I started on “Achieving our Country: American Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America” (easier than a heavy philosophical work). In a footnote to the essay “The Inspirational Value of Great Works of Literature” (this entire essay is online) he notes that Wittgenstein and others in analytic philosophy have been more inclined to dissolve problems rather than to solve them, which does not make for happy colleagues. “Such innovators are always viewed with some suspicion: those brought up on the old problems would like to think that their clever solutions to those problems are permanent contributions to human knowledge. Forty-odd years after its publication, Philosophical Investigations still makes many philosophers nervous. They view Wittgenstein as a spoilsport.”

R’ Chaim Brisker and Wittgenstein – spoilsports of the most intellectually pleasing variety : )

reasons behind doing mitzvos (ta'amei hamitzvos) - part 4

Some final thoughts:

I think the value of the Rambam/Ramban’s position is especially significant for those involved in kiruv. The truth of Torah becomes justified because of its correspondence to other already accepted values, e.g. our society accepts humane treatment of animals as a value, and if it can be shown that the Torah subscribes to the same value, Torah is validated. Precisely because the system is reductionist it is easy to “sell”. The only caveat I have is I am not sure how one distinguishes explanation from apologetics; believers often use the former label and skeptics the latter for the same ideas.

A comment asked why I take such a dim view of reductionism – don’t we need health, ethics, social law, etc.? A Torah that fulfilled those needs is one whose necessity is proven! I find that argument very hard to swallow because the same ends can be achieved via different means. The US Constitution does a good job of setting up an ordered society – why are the Torah’s laws better? The movement toward organic food shows great concern with what and how we eat – why do I need the details of kashrus? In fact, this is precisely the argument of reformers, e.g. see this article. Using the ends to justify the means only begs the question of why we cannot satisfy those same ends using more “modern” or appealing methods.

One critique that runs through the comments is that I am painting extremes – wouldn’t the Maharal agree that there is an economic utility to usury laws, or wouldn’t the Rambam agree that there is a spiritual dimension to certain mitzvos? I agree! But the question is what is cause and what is consequence.

The question of defining women’s role in Judaism illustrates another significant difference between these approaches. An example: Why are women exempt from mitzvos aseh she’hazman gerama? Some (Avudraham) argue that the duties of the home come first; women are freed from mitzvos to devote themselves to household chores. That rationalization presupposes a specific role for women as a value even higher than the service of G-d and reads that into the halachic structure. Going back to the Maharal’s analogy to a tree, one might suggest that just as there are oak trees and maple trees with different botanical needs, the same holds true of the spiritual needs of our different souls, and hence the differing obligations in mitzvos. If the Torah wanted to define social roles, it could have taken a much more direct route to doing so. My wife prefers the latter type of explanations as it removes halacha from externally imposed social values, yet, many a person has been drawn to Judaism precisely because they see strongly defined social roles as “family values” that they can identify with. Chacun a son gout!

Two quotes: 1) A critique a correspondant offered to my BIL: “What difference could it have rationally towards my moral refinement to discuss a stirah in rishonim in zevochim???? Or offer a lmudische disscetion of a machlokes.” 2) A response from another blog when I asked whether there was value to mitzvos performed in ignorance of their supposed reasons: "So in answer to your first question there is no value other than training or the idea of mitoch shelo lishma ba lishma." Whether you are sympathetic to the first critique or the second statement I think depends on whose side in this whole debate you are drawn to.

reasons behind doing mitzvos (ta'amei hamitzvos) - part 3

The final approach to ta’amei hamitzvot is that of the Maharal. I would call this the “segulah” approach, and it is the one closest to mysticism. The Marharal offers an analogy that I think captures the essence of his position: just like a seed produces a certain type of tree, and it makes no sense of ask why it produces specifically this type of tree and no other (at best we can explain what processes occur that lead to the result, but not why specifically those processes and no others exist), so too, the nature of a spiritual soul demands a certain type of behavior and attitude, and it makes no sense to ask why these elements are essential for the soul’s existence and nourishment and no others.

This does not mean that there are not benefits to mitzvos that meet our physical needs. However, those benefits are not external reasons for the mitzvos; those benefits are outcomes of the spiritual goodness which is inherent in the mitzvah itself. One need not wonder (as we asked on the Ramban) what value a mitzvah has if the doer is ignorant of the crucial didactic element – how does “bala matzah yatzah” work? – any more than one would wonder how an antibiotic cures an illness for someone who has no knowledge of science. Yes, that didactic element can result from doing the mitzvah, but it is not the reason behind the commandment.

The appraoch also avoids the reductionist elements of the Rambam and Ramban. The Torah is not a book of medicine or psychology alone – the Torah is a book of spiritual growth, sui generis, which may happen to pay dividends in other areas. It is understandable why one should not say “ee efshi b’basar chazir” because the prohibition against pig has nothing to do with it being an unhealthy animal or with inculcating certain ethical eating habits – it has to do with the interaction between the soul and the environment, something which is not reducible to simple rational rules that apply in other areas.

As an example of a debate that may depend on these issues, take a look at this exchange between by BIL, R’ Yosef Bechoffer, and a on whether mitzvos’ value is “salvic” (i.e. to save one’s soul, which sounds very Xstian), or to improve moral character.

So far I’ve set out the shitos with some argument, mostly in favor of the “segulah” approach because I find it appealing. But there is more to be said in defense of the other side, and some practical upshot which I’ll save for a summary. Stay tuned….

science and religion - an example from islam

This article in Discover Magazine (via Instapundit) on conflict between Islam and science is fascinating. Don't some people define the relationship between Judaism and science in much the same way? An example:

What about, say, evolutionary biology or Darwinism? I ask. (Evolution is taught in Egyptian schools, although it is banned in Saudi Arabia and Sudan.) “If you are asking if Adam came from a monkey, no,” Badawy responds. “Man did not come from a monkey. If I am religious, if I agree with Islam, then I have to respect all of the ideas of Islam. And one of these ideas is the creation of the human from Adam and Eve. If I am a scientist, I have to believe that.”

But from the point of view of a scientist, is it not just a story? I ask.

He tells me that if I were writing an article saying that Adam and Eve is a big lie, it will not be accepted until I can prove it. “Nobody can just write what he thinks without proof. But we have real proof that the story of Adam as the first man is true.”

“What proof?”

He looks at me with disbelief: “It’s written in the Koran.”

reasons behind doing mitzvos (ta'amei hamitzvos) - part 2

Before going on with the topic, a word in response to some of the comments on the previous post. The Rambam is still a shitas Rishonim which can undoubtedly be defended from attack. The question here is not “How do I answer up a shverrer Rambam” – the question is “Which of the varied approaches to ta'amei hamitzvot is most philosophically satisfying and/or fits best with the presentation of Chazal”. I wouldn’t start puting band-aids on the Rambam before hearing out some of the opposing views. And on that note, moving on.,.

The Ramban bases his approach on a Midrash which asks the rhetorical question whether it makes any difference to G-d whether an animal is killed by having its neck cut (kosher shechita) or some other means – of course not. The purpose of mitzvos, says the Midrash, is to perfect human behavior. It is not because G-d is concerned with the cow’s welfare that he commanded shechita, or because he is concerned with a bird’s welfare that he commanded shiluach hakan. Rather, the reason for these commandments is because if one becomes accustomed to killing animals in an inhumane way, it desensitizes one to cruelty and leads to human moral failing.

Ramban still suffers from some of the difficulties raised earlier. For example, if the purpose of the mitzvah of shechita is to inculcate humane behavior, why the exceptions for ben pakua or melika? There is still a reductionist element to the whole approach, and there is still the difficulty of why not say “ee efshi” when behavior is inhumane or unethical. Nonetheless, the Ramban gets us out of other jams. It is far easier to argue that kosher laws are designed to create a psychology of restraint from gluttony than to argue the health benefits of refraining from pig. I think most of the rationalists writing blogs (no, I have not done a formal survey) who align themselves with the Rambam end up veering into the Ramban’s territory when they address ta’amei hamitzvot.

I think the best illustration of the difference between Rambam and Ramban comes from the mitzvah of tzedakah. A Rambam-centric view would claim that the reason for charity is G-d’s love for the poor. As the gemara itself asks, one could reasonably ask why a G-d who is benevolent to the poor created poor people in the first place! The Ramban’s approach avoids that pitfall. G-d’s will is a gezeirah – an unfathomable decree. We cannot say about G-d that he has cares, like, dislikes, wants, etc. However, what we can say is that G-d gave mankind the opportunity to achieve perfection. Instead of focusing on the benefit to the recipient of charity (Rambam view), the Ramban would focus on the giver – ethical people act with benevolence, and therefore G-d gave us a mitzvah of charity to perfect our ethical character. Mitzvos are didactic; they are designed to teach people a baseline of morality upon which the ethical person will build (Ramban on ‘v’asisa hayashar v’hatov’).

What I see as the biggest shortcoming to this whole approach (again, see Maharal) is that it is inconsistent with practical law. If mitzvos’ ultimate meaning stems from the didactic lesson they impart, why do mitzvos have any value if one is unaware of that didactic lesson? To take one example, “bala matzah yatzah” – if matzah is shoved down a person’s throat on Pesach night willy-nilly, he fulfills a mitzvah of achilas matzah even if unaware of the lessons of freedom behind the deed! According to the Ramban, isn't this awareness the raison d'etra of the mitzvah, the most crucial ingredient to fulfilling the commandment?

reasons behind doing mitzvos (ta'amei hamitzvos) - part 1

I was partially motivated to write this post by Matt’s musings last week on the nature of chok within the Rambam’s framework of ta’amei hamitzvot. I am generally unsatisfied with rationalism, and this is a good topic to delve a little deeper into why. Before getting to chukim, I want to start with a broader look at ta’amei hamitzvot – how do we answer the classic question of “why do you do that?” Are mitzvos an end unto themselves, or are mitzvos a means to achieve some higher order goal, such as philosophical perfection, good midot, or closeness to G-d?

The classic starting point for this issue is the Mishna in Brachos that prohibits including in our davening a plea for G-d’s mercy which is so vast that it extends to birds in the nest, referring to the Torah’s prohition against taking the eggs from under a mother bird while she is sitting on them. Why not invoke G-d’s mercy in this way? The gemara offers two explanations: 1) because G-d is merciful on all creation, not just on birds; 2) because G-d’s commandments are gezeiros, decrees, not acts of mercy.

The Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim explains the commandment of driving off the mother bird before taking the eggs as based on G-d’s concern and mercy for the baby birds. The Rambam himself notes that his explanation contradicts the second explanation of the gemara above, but says we have the right to rely on the first opinion and offer a philosophical explanation.

According to the Rambam, there is an inherent “good” to performing mitzvos based on some understandable (rational) end – in this case, it is mercy for the birds. A similar example would be the prohibition of killing a mother cow and its baby in the same day – again, G-d wishes to show mercy on his creatures.

There are a number of weaknesses with this line of reasoning, some stronger than others, but combined, they make a devastating case (for more detail, see Maharal’s Tiferes Yisrael ch 6-8):

1) The Rambam’s approach is reductionist – mitzvos have no inherent value other than as a means to some other goal. The Torah thus becomes a health manual (e.g. the command to eat kosher), or a manual for ethics, or psychology, etc.,
2) The Rambam admits that he has swept aside one opinion of the gemara, an opinion quoted elsewhere (Meg 25) as a stam statement
3) The mitzvos themselves seem to have exceptions and details which often undermine their (supposed) intented aim, e.g. if a mother cow and baby cow may not be killed in the same day because of G-d’s mercy, how can one explain the permissibility of killing the mother 5 minutes before shkiya and the baby 5 minutes later after shkiya? If shechita is a humane form of slaugher, why is it not required for the ben pakua?
4) Chazal say that one should not say I dislike pig, but rather even though I may like it, since it is prohibited by G-d it cannot be eaten. If there is a rational reason for not eating pig, e.g. pig is bad for one’s health (Moreh ch 48), why invoke G-d’s command as the justification for the mitzvah when one can offer a reasonable explanation for disliking pig?
5) The principle of mitzvos lav le’henos nitnu implies that the only benefit accrued by doing mitzvos is religious in nature. According to the Rambam, the telos of religion is the many benefits like good health and ethics that it inculcates – isn’t this the greatest form of hana’ah?

The Ramban in discussing the mitzvah of sending away the mother bird offers a very different philosophy of ta’amei hamitzvot than the Rambam’s – stay tuned…

using "metziyus" as halachic proof - shabbos 63b

Gemara (Shabbos 63b) records the opinion of Tanna Kamma that the tzitz had written on one line “Yud-kay” and on a second line “Kodesh-L”. R’ Eliezar B”R Yosi disagrees and holds that “Kodesh l’Hashem” was written on one line. The proof – R’ Eliezar says that he was in Rome and saw the actual tzitz! Pretty convincing – except we pasken l’chatchila (Rambam Klei Mikdash 9:1) like the Tanna Kamma and ignore what R' Eliezer claims was the metziyus.

Rabbi Mark Angel on "cultic" Modern Orthodoxy

I have no idea what to make of this Jewish Week story about Rabbi Mark Angel’s remarks on the need for more Modern Orthodox Rabbis who feel confident to pasken shaylos. Sounds good to me! But I’m afraid that’s about all I can agree with Rabbi Angel about. My concern is that psak should be more accessible to laypeople who might not call a Rosh Yeshiva to discuss an issue. Rabbi Angel, on the other hand, is concerned that Roshei Yeshiva are robbing Modern Orthodoxy of “intellectual dynamism” and we are crossing the fine line between “true religion and cultism”. Rabbi Angel is giving up the pulpit to start an organization “to focus more on ideas than action and to develop religious responses to questions that have not been adequately addressed in the existing Orthodox legal literature.” What sort of issues does Rabbi Angel have in mind that can better be addressed by Rabbis than Roshei Yeshiva?

“I know there are plenty of good Orthodox Jews who go to the opera,” Rabbi Angel said. “How do we understand kol isha [a woman’s voice]? What are its parameters, what does it include and not include?”

Huh? It seems that the attendance of “good Orthodox Jews” at the opera is in-and-of-itself evidence enough for Rabbi Angel to throw out the prima facie meaning of “kol isha” and open the issue for examination. In fact, the conclusion seems to have already been reached – opera must be permitted because “good Orthodox Jews” attend, and the only question is coming up with a justification. If Roshei Yeshiva seem unable to square these deeds of “good Orthodox Jews” with halacha, then rather than question whether the nominal Orthodoxy of these Jews is all it should be, R’ Angel directs his ire at the Roshei Yeshiva who just aren’t understanding enough.

I wonder if Rabbi Angel ever asked one of the "good Orthodox Jews" attending Carmen how they prima facie justify their actions in light of the prohibition of kol isha. I think the answer would be revealing.

when is chumra justified? - GR"A

Aside from the question of whether and when appropriate to teach a shitas yachid or chumra, the more fundamental question is whether or when a person should taken upon him/herself such a chumra. Chazal in the Yerushalmi call one who is patur but does a mitzvah anyway “hedyot”, and some chumros are placed off limits as acts of yuhara. So when is chumra acceptable? The Mishna in Brachos (1:3) records a dispute between Shamai and Hillel over whether one should lie down to read shema at night. R’ Tarfon acted in accordance with Shamai and is criticized in the same Mishna, and the gemara debates whether one who acts in accordance with Shamai even gets credit for fulfilling the mitzvah of shema. Why should Chazal express such ire at someone who simply goes the extra mile to fulfill Shamai's view by lying down even though it is not required by Hillel? The GR”A in Shnos Eliyahu rounds up a number of sources and draws a basic distinction between cases where a stricter opinion is rejected as an invalid interpretation and cases where a stricter opinion is a justified interpretation but was never imposed as obligatory. In the former cases there is no reason to adopt the stricter view – it has no theoretical value or justification. In the latter cases, adopting the stricter view is justified, as the validity of the stricter view is acknowledged, it was just never adopted in practice by the masses or imposed as an obligation.

Torah im Derech Eretz and Lithianian Chareidi Orthodoxy

This post is in response to a series of comments to this post at Mishmar. It is very hard to fathom a movement which publicly espouses a certain position but privately tolerates actions which contradict and even undermine that selfsame position. The RW/Chareidi/Lithuanian yeshiva (the exact label is irrelevant) reaction to Hischian Torah im Derech Eretz is well documented. R’ Baruch Ber and three other gedolim (I forget all the names offhand) were asked their opinion of secular studies and the unanimous response was negative. R’ Dessler (Michtav vol III p 353) wrote that the Lithuanian yeshivos follow a different path than those of Frankfurt; it is better to sacrifice 999 bachurim who won’t make it through the system in order to produce one gadol b’yisrael through torah-only immersion. Plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose. R’ Shteinman in a recent visit to the US reiterated, “In his concluding words, he spoke about the terrible danger of treif studies, including university studies, saying that this trend must be combated. He also spoke out against the ambition to educate youth for "tachlis." He said, "I've met rich people. They hadn't studied much and they did not study towards `tachlis.' Rather they merited siyata deShmaya."” Even R’ Schwab, the leader of the Breur’s kehillah, originally opposed TIDE, and later in life when he retracted still acknowledged that it was a separatist movement not adopted by Easter European Jewry or its educational institutions. It goes without saying that the major yeshivos like Lakewood, Mir, Chaim Berlin, and certainly yeshivos in Eretz Yisrael do not officially allow any secular studies by their students. I would challenge anyone to find statement of public disavowal for R’ Shteinman’s remarks or to produce an essay written by a gadol from a Lithuanian yeshiva that is at odds with the sources I cited above.

But, argue some, don’t we find tacit back-door unofficial OK to attend college? Don’t many turn a blind eye to those who train for a parnasa? This strikes me as a very strange argument. Usually, public disavowal of a philosophical position while privately embracing its fruit is called hypocrisy. If you believe secular studies are OK, then come right out and say so, even at the cost of social or political position (Isn’t that YU’s attitude?) The psychological result of this contorted thinking is evident – who wants to be the bachur who is embracing the b’dieved position? The fact that a program is labeled as being for those “at risk”, or is never publicly touted, or never given a formal haskama, speaks volumes about the attitude towards it, and speaks volumes about the social stigma that is associated it. And even if we acknowledge this tacit back-door acceptance, it amounts to no more than a pragmatic utilitarianism for the sake of “parnasa”, not an intrinsic acknowledgement of the value of the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake or the need for “y’geiya kapecha” as an ideal of avodas Hashem.

Rabbi Meyer Schiller put it best. Writing in the Torah U’Mada Journal (1995), he notes (p.28): “Outside of those various segments of Orthodoxy who seek to recreate largely authentic models of Eastern European Jewish life either in Israel or America, every other approach within Orthodoxy embraces the pursuit of worldly knowledge, beauty, and experience to a certain degree. However, there is little in the philosophy which they have inherited from their Eastern Eurpoean predecessors that can legitimate these pursuits.”

I’m afraid that at heart I am still an idealist who does not see pragmatism as a justification for what is intrinsically “treif” and philosophically objectionable. I find it hard to understand the public applause for R' Shteinman's remarks even as those listening to them hold dinners for their institutions which honor "frum" doctors, lawyers, and professionals who obviously have indulged in the "treif" study of secular knowledge. I guess others are less troubled by these inconsistencies or have found better answers than I to resolve them.

birchos kriyas shema and smichas geulah l'tefilah

Rashi (Brachos 2a) writes that if ma’ariv is davened before dark one fulfills the mitzvah of kriyas shema by reciting it before going to sleep. Tosfos rejects this position, and among the objections raised is the fact that shema said before going to bed is said without the context of birchos kriyas shema and without fulfilling smichas geulah l’tefillah. Tosfos’ position underscores again the fact that the full kiyum of shema requires saying shema with its brachos (Rashi may disagree). Tosfos also assumes that smichas geulah l’tefilah is not just a din in tefilah, i.e. shmoneh esrei should be recited after the bracha of geulah of birchos shema, but it is a din in the mitzvah of kriyas shema, i.e. the mitzvah of shema is properly fulfilled only if it is followed by the bracha of geulah leading to shmoneh esrei (and again, Rashi may take the opposite position).

the avos feel pain after death

In this week’s parsha, the Jewish people request permission from the King of Edom to pass through his territory and make the case that although they descend from the same family the Jewish people alone bore the burden of Egyptian slavery, so in effect, they owe us one. Commenting on “Vayare’u lanu v’la’avoseinu” (20:15) Rashi explains that the deceased Avos feel pain when their children are persecuted. I have not had a chance to check the meforshei Rashi yet, but the point here seems hard to fit with Brachos 18b. The gemara describes how R’ Chiya’s sons were in grief because they forgot their learning and debated back and forth whether their deceased father was aware of their pain or not. Is it only the Avos which suffer when their children feel pain? Is it only the pain of persecution (like Egyptian slavery) which is felt, but the gemara was unsure whether it extended to other grief that children may suffer? Other possibilities?

birchos kriyas shema and tefilah b'zmana

I should mention with respect to R’ Chaim’s chiddush re: saying brachos kriyas shema b’zman being more important than tefillah b’tzibur that the Ramban writes that part of the celebration of “mikraei kodesh” involves gathering together for tefillah. One might argue that the enhanced kiyum of kriyas shema with its brachos should not outweigh the Ramban’s kiyum d’oraysa of tefilah b’tzibur on Shabbos and Yom Tov. I don’t buy this approach. Celebrating the day as “mikraei kodesh” is a chovas hagavra, not a din in tefillah; reciting birchos kriyas shema is a din in the definition of the mitzvah of shema. One can fulfill mikraei kodesh through some other means during the day, including by davening other tefilos b’tzibur, but one gets only a single chance to properly fulfill shema.

brachos kriyas shema and teaching kids halacha

To get back to brachos kriyas shema, since the brachos are part of the kiyum of kriyas shema itself, it is critical according to R’ Chaim to daven the brachos of kriyas shema with shema in its proper time, even if that means davening alone without a minyan. I usually daven at an 8:30 Shabbos minyan, and for the 2 or 3 weeks of the year that this is not early enough to make zman kriyas shema we will start a few minutes earlier. If you daven at 9:00, then you will not make zman kriyas shema I think about 85% of the time (e.g. this week the last time for shema was 9:09). Most shules simply announce that shema should be recited before davening, which only works if you do not accept R’ Chaim’s position.

I raise the issue because my son was invited to a bar mitzvah this past Shabbos where davening was scheduled to start at 8:45. I was unsure whether to tell him to daven earlier or not – do I have to impose R’ Chaim Brisker’s opinion on him because our minyan (and I) think it correct even though the majority of minyanim are either ignorant of the chiddush or follow other views and start later? L’ma’aseh, the question became moot because he knows this is what we do even if he does not understand the lomdus, so he got up early to daven at a hashkama minyan and then went over to the bar mitzvah. But the same issue has come up in other contexts – does chinuch mean teaching kids what the majority of “frum” Jews do, or does it mean teaching the views in halacha one thinks are correct, even if they be chumros that others ignore (or kulos that others reject), and even if these practices will not be understood unless or until the child matures and looks into the topic for him/herself?

french existentialism and the Lubavitcher Rebbe

I don’t know enough about the topic to even begin to think about it, but this posting on the Rebbe and French Existentialism is a fascinating read.

shakespeare for kids

Yesterday I took my kids to a pre-pay program for kids run by http://www.newyorkclassical.org/ where the actors introduced kids to what they do, what the Shakespeare play they would be performing later in the evening was about, and where they played some games with the kids to get them interested. Unfortunately, we could not stay through the play (I’ve had bronchitis the past week), but my youngest kids (the two older ones stayed home) loved it and wanted to stay. In our little group there was another family with 3 kids, two of whom were in their early teens, who had my wife and I amazed. A boy of about 14-15 remembered one of the actors from a performance of As You Like It he had seen the year before; the same boy suggested a symbolic interpretation of something that in the play; another early-teen kid volunteered a correct interpretation of a difficult line the actor read; when asked what they thought the end of the play would be, one kid guessed everyone had to get married because it was a comedy – in tragedies everyone dies at the end (so true!). It is so refreshing to see kids who actually know stuff – who appreciate art and literature for its own sake and not just for a grade at school. Of course, these kids’ parents obviously have taken their kids to other Shakespearean performances and encourage their reading and thinking. But my wife and I also were wondering what school these kids went to, because without formal education to reinforce the experience, parental influence is not enough. And the follow up question we thought about is considering the small fortune we pay in tuition, are our kids getting the type education that can produce these results? I was warming up for a rant on this, but it’s not worth it - you know the answer.

kriyas shema and its brachos

We usually assume that missing a bracha is not a fatal defect in the performance of a mitzvah; the mitzvah as a Biblical command stands by itself separate from the Rabbinic obligation to recite a bracha before its performance. However, R’ Hai Gaon (Quoted in Rosh sima 1 in 2nd perek of Brachos) opines that the mitzvah of kriyas shema is fulfilled only if the brachos of kriyas shema are also recited. A similar distinction between kriyas shema and other mitzvos may be inferred from the Rambam. If one has a doubt whether one fulfilled a mitzvah, the mitzvah is repeated but not the bracha – the weighty Biblical obligation demands that we strive for certainty, but the Rabbinic obligation of bracha does not. However, the Rambam writes (hil keriyas shema 2:13) that if one has a doubt if one has fulfilled the mitzvah of kriyas shema, not only must one recite shema, but one must also recite the brachos as well. R’ Chaim Brisker assumed that the brachos said before keriyas shema are not the same as other birchos hamitzvah that stand independently from the mitzvah itself, but are part and parcel of the fulfillment of the mitzvah of shema itself. Shema recited without its brachos is an incomplete fulfillment of the mitzvah of kriyas shema. So much for the lomdus - I bring this up for another reason, which I will get back to…