more on yediya and bechira - the fate of Shimshon

R’ Elchanan Wasserman in Koveitz He’Oros points out a different sugya in Sota that also seems to suggest (as discussed yesterday) that Divine foreknowledge poses no contradiction to free choice. The gemara (9b) writes that Shimshon was punished by being blinded because he was led astray by his eyes by being taken in by the sight of Delilah. The gemara asks: we see from the pasuk “v’aviv v’imo lo yad’u ki mei’Hashem hu” that this entire episode was part of the Divine plan to allow Shimshon to strike at the Plishtim – how could Shimshon be punished for what was bound to occur anyway? The gemara answers: “ki azil basar yashrusei azal”; when Shimshon acted, he was following his own desires. Even though there was Divine foreknowledge of events, even though there was a Divine plan for Shimshon to be taken by the Plishtim and ultimately to attack them, Shimshon was not privy to these plans and acted out of free choice.

Using my analogy from yesterday: just as if someone had theoretical foreknowledge of what I will eat for breakfast, it would not prevent my opening the breakfast cabinet and freely choosing which cereal to eat, so too, G-d’s foreknowledge of Shimshon’s actions does not contradict his freedom to act of his own volition.

R’ Elchanan considers this approach to be so sensible that he wonders why it was not suggested by the Rishonim. I assume he is alluding to Rambam in Hil. Tshuvah 5:5 who writes that the entire topic of free will vs. foreknowledge is irreconcilable within the limits of human intelligence. However, it seems to me that his approach is exactly what the Ra'avad meant in his critique of the Rambam when he refers to knowledge of the astrologers having no effect on freedom of action.

like sand and like stars: more kamus vs. eichus

The Jewish people are compared to the stars in the sky and the sand of the earth. The Shem m’Shmuel on this week’s parsha points out that there is a difference between the two analogies. The comparison to sand highlights kamus, the quantitative numerical population explosion that the Jewish people will merit. The comparison to stars highlights eichus, the qualitative greatness to which the Jewish people can rise.

eidus, chazakah, and rov: halachic forms of proof

Just to finish up a topic from yesterday (and please read that post first to understand this one): For any type of halachic proof we need to analyze whether that proof tells us something about the metziyus, the facts of the case, or whether the proof tells us something about the din, the halachic conclusion that we should draw. R’ Elchanan (Kovetz He’oros, Yevamos #71) distinguishes between proof that is derived from eidus and proof that comes from rov.

Eidus establishes fact. If two witnesses tell us that Reuvain is dead and we conclude that his wife is permitted to remarry, we have a big problem if Reuvain shows up a few days later alive and well. The halachic conclusion drawn on the basis of eidus is no better than the underlying metziyus it rests on; if our facts are wrong, our conclusion is erroneous.

Contrast that with rov. If a nice trief steak gets mixed up in a display case with two kosher steaks, according to some Rishonim you can actually eat all three steaks. How can that be – the metziyus, the reality, is that one steak is definitely treif!? The answer is that rov does not tell us anything about reality; it tells us about the halachic system. Within the halachic system the definition of kosher is based on rov; if a majority of the meat is kosher, all the meat is considered acceptable.

I would interpret Tosfos in Nazir 58a using this same idea. The rule of safeik tumah b’reshus hayachid helps determine metziyus. Where that determination would lead to two mutually exclusive possibilities being simultaneously true, the rule cannot apply. If a witness testifies that one nazir among two became tamei but he cannot identify which one it was, declaring both nezirim tamei or tahor would contradict realtity. However, the rule of chazakah operates differently; it determines halachic rules, not metziyus. Even where contradicted by reality, chazakah still allows us to declare both nezirim tamei or tahor.

yediya vs. bechira: how shidduchim and zivugim are made

The first daf of Sota has an interesting piece of shakla v’terya which is hard to understand because there seems to be too many pieces in the jigsaw puzzle. The gemara presents a statement of Reish Lakish saying that one’s choice of spouse is influenced by one’s personality; a righteous person will have a righteous spouse, while a wicked person will end up with a wicked spouse. This is followed by R’ Yochanan’s declaration that arranging zivugim is as difficult as splitting Yam Suf. The gemara then asks a kashe: we learned that before a child is born, there is a declaration in Heaven announcing “bas ploni l’ploni”, whom that child will marry. Who is this teaching meant to challenge? Is it a question on Reish Lakish who says that zivugim depend on a person’s deeds and personality traits which cannot be pre-ordained? If so, why does the gemara mix in R’ Yochanan? Is it a question on R’ Yochanan, i.e. why is it so hard to make zivugim when things have been set up beforehand? If so, why mix in Reish Lakish?

Rashi d”h zivug sheni solves this problem by merging the statements of R’ Yochanan and Reish Lakish so the question challenges both: because zivugim must be tailored to each individual’s evolving personality, their occurrence is as miraculous as the splitting of Yam Suf.

Interestingly, the same shakla v’terya appears in Sanhedrin 22a, yet there the statement of Reish Lakish is omitted entirely. R’ Elazar Landau (his comments are right under the Gilyon Maharasha in the back of the gemara) suggests that Reish Lakish appears in our sugya because he was presenting an introduction to the topic of sota, but his statement has nothing to do with the ensuing shakla v’terya that relates only to R’ Yochana’s statement.

There a subtle philosophical point to the chiddush here aside from the textual diyuk. R’ Landau explains that there is no contradiction between Reish Lakish’s statement that zivug is determined based on deeds and personality and the statement that zivugim are declared in Heaven beforehand. Put another way, there is no philosophical contradiction between the Divine foreknowledge of who a person will marry (yediya) and that person’s free choice to select a fitting spouse (bechira). Since man remains blissfully unaware of what has been foretold, his actions are not performed under compulsion or duress.

By way of analogy, if someone had ruach hakodesh and yesterday afternoon knew that I would eat Cheerios for breakfast this morning, that would in no way influence my behavior when I entered the kitchen and selected the box of Cheerios from the others sitting in the breakfast cabinet. As far as I was concerned, foreknowledge did not deprive me of the right to choose the cereal I like best.

This issue is another deep well with lots of good torah. Maybe more down the road…
(My first article for Kallahmagzine touched on the Rambam's approach to this issue - article is archived here.)

"v'hishbati chaya ra'ah"- danger and hashgacha

The Ramban (Parshas Bechukosai) quotes a machlokes Tanaim regarding whether the bracha of “v’hishbati chaya ra’ah min ha’aretz” means wild animals will disappear completely (R’ Yehudah’s opinion) or that wild animals will become domesticated (R’ Shimon). Just an aside, my wife noted that expending so much money to save wild endangered species seems a waste according to R’ Yehudah, as these animals will become extinct anyway. Be that as it may…

A few weeks ago we visited this machlokes in the context of eichus vs. kamus. The Rogatchover explains that R’ Yehudah holds “v’hishbati” means a quantitative elimination, l’shitaso of his understanding of the mitzvah of “tashbisu” as demanding that chameitz be burned. R’ Shimon interprets “v’hishbati” as including even a qualitative change. Nafka minah: if chameitz is bateil in a ta’aroves, does that fulfill the mitzvah of tashbisu? The same quantity of chameitz exists, but the mixture does not have the qualitative halachic nature of chameitz.

The Meshech Chochma connects this machlokes to a different debate. The gemara (Brachos 35) has a machlokes how to interpret the contradictory pesukim of “v’asafta deganecha” and “lo yamush”. R’ Yishmael’s approach is to compromise – plant in the planting season, plow in the plowing season, harvest in the harvest season, the rest of the time devote to learning. R’ Shimon bar Yochai’s approach is either/or – if the Jewish people serve G-d properly, then they will be blessed with the ability to learn all day and their work will be done by others; if the Jewish people are lax in observance, then they will be forced to spend time toiling in the field.

Hashgacha pratis works to the degree we trust in Hashem and are aware of His presence. R’ Shimon (stam R’ Shimon in the Mishna is Rashb”i) l’shitaso holds that for some (at least), it is possible to attain the goal of complete and constant immersion in Torah, meriting in turn constant and complete protection of hashgacha pratis. Wild animals need not be eliminated, as hashgacha affords protection from harm -- these animals are no different than domesticated animals. R’ Yehudah, however, like R’ Yishmael, holds that complete dedication to Torah is impossible. Man must break from his learning to plant, plow, and engage in the normal mundane activities of life. If wild animals remained, they would pose a danger during these periods of mundane activity when there is no protection of hashgacha. Therefore, the only way to guarantee bracha is to eliminate them.

chazakah vs. eidus

Last week I touched on Tosfos Nazir 57 but missed an important point. To recap: the Mishna (Nazir 57) describes a case of a witness who sees one of two nezirim become tamei and is not sure which one it was. The gemara asks why there is a safeik - since this case involves 2 nezirim + the observer, it should be considered safeik tumah in reshus harabim and both nezirim should be tahor. The gemara answers that the case must be where the observer was not immediately proximate to the two nezirim but just saw tumah thrown in their direction. Tosfos asks: If the observer is not proximate to the nezirim, then this should be a case of safeik tumah in reshus hayachid and both nezirim should be tamei? Tosfos answers that the rule of safeik tumah b’rechus hayachid tamei, which is derived from the parsha of sota, does not apply where we are forced to draw two mutually exclusive conclusions. The fact is that only one nazir became tamei. The halachic rule of safeik tumah b’reshus hayachid would force us into the counterfactual conclusion that both nezirim are tamei.

If we throw out the rule of safeik tumah b’reshus hayachid, then why not also throw out the rule of safeik tumah b’reshus harabim? What then was the gemara’s question to begin with? Tosfos answers that the rule of safeik tumah b’reshus harabim is not based on a gezeiras hakasuv from parshas sota but is based on chazaka. Each individual nazir has a chezkas tahara. Even if both chazakos mutually exclude each other, until we can prove which nazir became tamei, the chazakos still stand.

I never explained (and it did not dawn on me until Shabbos) why this distinction should be true. Why is it that the rule of safeik tumah derived from parshas sotah cannot be applied where factually there is no way both nezirim are tamei, but the rule of chazakah can be applied even though we know factually both nezirim cannot be tehorim? I'll leave this one unanswered for now...

career vs. family: does halacha demand women make a choice?

I have noticed that simply avoiding reading Jewish magazines, periodicals, and opinion blogs leads to a much more positive feeling toward Judaism. Chazal and halacha are far more reliable sources about what Judaism is about than the latest _____ Magazine or newspaper editorial. Nonetheless, I fell victim last week to reading two pieces, and I will just extract two quotes as representative sampling (who said them is irrelevant, as similar statements can be found in many, many publications):

The Jewish woman's career is tending to the needs of her family as a loyal wife, mother and homemaker; and, if she must go to work, the purpose is to help support the family, and not to look for a career outside her home.

The second author has an even bigger soapbox and is far more grim:

But pretending that men and women are identical and interchangeable in their life-roles – the much-cherished “egalitarian” approach – not only offends Jewish tradition, it may bode demographic disaster…Jewish women can choose to embrace
contemporary society’s game-playing in the guise of egalitarianism and squander their specialness. Or they can answer life’s “role-call” with a resounding, Abrahamic, “Here I am!”

The problem with these approaches is that they assert a false dilemma, a tactic I discussed once in the context of Zionism, but which rears its logically fallacious head over and over. The argument assumes that there is a necessary contradiction between career and home and then forces the reader into making a choice. Yet, even those who espouse this view are forced to confront reality: many women have careers (and yes, even teaching kindergarten in Bais Ya’akov is a career of sorts) and still maintain Torah-true homes. Rather than abandon the argument, instead, these folks claim that motive rather than deed is the true measure of (wo)man. As long as our veiber pledge allegiance to the home, the reality of working 9-5 and having the kinder watched by a babysitter need not concern us.

I don’t know about you, but I don’t know of any issur for a woman to pursue a career. One of the follow-up comments argued that of course the husband must work because he is bound by the kesubah to support his wife. Ironic choice of proof, because Chazal actually legislate that a wife has the express right to say “aini nizones v’aini oseh”, I will forgo being supported by my husband and take charge of my own finances! Sure, the Torah emphasizes the importance of the home and family, but who does the chores and who goes to work is not subject to halachic mandate. Even if one must make a choice between career and home, working out a proper balance is a topic that must addressed by a husband and wife together in the context of their individual relationship, taking account of their joint responsibility to home and family as well as their individual career aspirations. There is no one cookie-cutter answer that halacha directs every couple to follow.

These attitudes make their way into our children’s world of chinuch. To quote another blogger’s post, her daughter was told by a well-meaning teacher, "Your daughter is smart, but you don't have to worry. She's not so smart that she'll have a problem getting a shidduch." After all, one would not want to risk having a girl who might be more intelligent than her husband, or who might want to use that intelligence to pursue a career or even to take a leadership role in Judaism. Best to squash this notions from the beginning and dumb down our daughters.

Fortunately, my depression was lifted slightly when I read an article about the new girls’ HS, Midreshet Shalhevet, opening in the 5Towns. The Jewish Star reports (p. 7) on the mentoring program the school intends to initiate to expose the girls to role models who manage to balance home, career, and family. Dr. Blau, the principal, is quoted, “We are here to… prepare women academically, professionally, and personally, and to install in them the confidence to do all they desire in the future. We want our girls to be Jewishly and secularly educated in a first-rate way, participating in Jewish communal life and taking on significant roles to fulfill their potential.” Rabbi Friedman, the head of Machon haTorah, the umbrella organization the school is under, further commented, “The whole world is open to them, within the framework of halacha.”

Of course, not every school fulfills the lofty intentions it sets out to achieve, but it is heartening to note that there is no false dilemma philosophy here, no artificial ceiling on success. One can only hope that these young women absorb the ideals of their chinuch and in turn can serve as role models for others.

ameilus b'Torah

The real Divrei Chaim (i.e. R' Chaim of Sanz) has a beuatiful vort which I guess I should mention on divreichaim.blogspot. Rashi famously explained "Im b'chukosai taileichu" as referring to "ameilus b'Torah", toil in Torah, as a prerequisite for receiving bracha. We usually assume ameilus has a positive connotation and attests to the degree of value one places on the task of learning. Yet, says the Divrei Chaim, the opposite should be true. When one truly loves what one is doing, one does not feel a sense of toil, but of enjoyment. We find that when Ya'akov worked for Rachel the days went by swiftly "bahavaso osah", because he was enraptured by his love of Rachel. I can't tell you how many Rebbes my son has had who express the desire for the class to get a "geshmack" from learning. Can you get a "geshmack" from something you think of as "toil"?

The Divrei Chaim explains that in hachi nami, for the student who gets a "geshmack" in learning, who loves Torah, it goes without sayng that he/she will receive bracha. The chiddush of the pasuk is that for the student who gets no "geshmack", the student for whom learning is ameilus and toil and frustration, if that student is not deterred but still keeps at it, that student will also receive bracha as well.

Not sure the vort fits the words of Rashi so well, but it is a nice idea.

lag ba'omer - freedom and individuality

The sefira period is a time for mourning the death of R’ Akiva’s students who were punished because they failed to respect each other properly. How could such giants fail in such a basic matter of middos? The Shem m’Shmuel offers an analogy: one’s hands do not show kavod to one’s feet for perambulation, and one’s feet do not show kavod to one’s hand for grasping. Kavod stems from the recognition of “otherness”. R’ Akiva’s students were so imbued with the idea of klal yisrael being one united entity that this notion of “otherness” was foreign to them. The mussar haskel is that unity should never cause us to lose sight of individual worth and distinctiveness. As opposed to counting shemita years, which is an obligation incumbent upon klal yisrael as a collective entity and carried out by beis din, “u’sefartem lachem” teaches that the count of sefira must be done by each individual.

The Shem m'Shmuel further explains that the date of La”g baOmer (or Lag laOmer, depending on your nusach) falls out three days after the man started falling (see Kiddushin 38). A recurrence of three times is normally sufficient to establish a chazakah. Until the man began, the Jewish people were sustained by the foods they brought out of Mitzrayim, food tainted with the taste of slavery. La”g baOmer is a celebration of the true start of freedom and break with the past.

I would combine these two ideas of the Shem m’Shmuel. The oppressor does not recognize the individual, but lashes out at the group, whether it is “the Jews”, “the blacks”, or some other collective. This is the mentality of Mitzrayim enslavement. Sefer Shmos opens with the names of individuals - Reuvain, Shimon…, but the new Pharoah refers only to “Am Bnei Yisrael”, forgetting Yosef, forgetting the relationship with the individual. Slavery depends on this depersonalization that causes the loss of respect for the worth of the individual. R’ Yonasan Sacks in Passaic once explained in a 9 Av shiur that the reason the sugyos in Gittin highlight vignettes that relate to the plight of individuals during the churban is because it is easy to lose sight of the scope and effect of tragedy when it is expressed only as the plight of masses. Until Lag baOmer we lived on the food of Mitzrayim, we retained some element of looking at the group instead of focusing on the individual. Even R’ Akiva’s students may have absorbed this mindset, albeit motivated by the positive goal of wanting to fully appreciate the bond of klal yisrael as a people. Lag ba’Omer is the time to break the mindset of Mitzrayim and to recognize the value of individuality.

parshas sotah and safeik k'vaday

The Mishna (Sota 7) writes that when a husband brought his wife to Yerushalayim to drink the sotah waters, he was accompanied by two talmidei chachamim who could give him hasra’ah should he be tempted to have relations with his wife. What purpose this hasra’ah served seems to be a debate between Rashi and Tosfos. Rashi on the Mishna writes that the husband would be warned that the sotah waters would be ineffective if he has relations with his suspect wife. Tosfos (Yevamos 11b – see R’ Akiva Eiger in the gilyon as well) explains that husband is given hasra’ah for the punishment of malkos. Even though there is no explicit lav in the Torah for relations with a sotah, since the Torah teaches us with respect to sotah to treat safeik k’vaday, i.e. there is a presumption of guilt even though the facts remains uncertain, the lav of having relations with a vaday adulteress applies.

The point of debate between Rashi and Tosfos seems to parallel the debate between R’ Chaim Brisker and Tosfos discussed in yesterday’s post. Even though the facts of whether the sotah is guilty or not remain uncertain, the Torah declares her prohibited to her husband. Does this din mean that we assume factually that the woman did commit adultery until proven otherwise, or does it mean that although the facts of the case remain in doubt, the Torah created a categorically new prohibition that puts this case of doubt off-limits? According to Tosfos in Yevamos, the sotah is assumed factually to have committed adultery, and therefore the lav of relations with an adulteress applies equally to a sotah. According to Rashi, a sotah is a categorically new prohibition that leaves the uncertainty of the situation unresolved. The lav of relations with a proven adulteress does not apply to this indetermined situation.

safeik tumah b'reshus hayachid

The Mishna (Nazir 57) describes a case of a witness who sees one of two nezirim become tamei and is not sure which one it was. Putting aside for the moment what the nezirim faced with this safeik should do, the gemara discusses why there is a safeik in the first place. The rule of thumb when it comes to sfeikos is that safeik tumah in a reshus hayachid is tamei, safeik tumah in a reshus harabin is tahor. Since this case involves 2 nezirim + the observer, it should be considered safeik tumah in reshus harabim and both nezirim should be tehorim. The gemara answers that the case must be where the observer was not immediately proximate to the two nezirim but just saw tumah thrown in their direction.

Tosfos asks: If the observer is not proximate to the nezirim, then isn’t this a case of safeik tumah in a reshus hayachid and both nezirim should be tamei? Tosfos answers that the rule of safeik tumah which is derived from the parsha of sota does not apply where we are forced to draw two mutually exclusive conclusions. The fact is that only one nazir became tamei. The halachic rule of safeik tumah b’reshus hayachid being tamei would force us into the counterfactual conclusion that both nezirim are tamei.

Tosfos’ pilpul is not over. It we throw out the rule of safeik tumah b’reshus hayachid being tamei, then why not also throw out the rule of safeik tumah b’reshus harabim being tahor? What then was the gemara’s question to begin with? Tosfos answers that the rule of safeik tumah b’reshus harabim being tahor is not based on a gezeiras hakasuv from parshas sota but is based on chazaka. Each individual nazir has a chezkas tahara. Even if both chazakos mutually exclude each other, until we can prove which nazir became tamei, the chazakos still stand.

Tosfos repeats in many other places this idea that safeik tumah b’reshus harabim is not derived from a gezeiras hakasuv and it really deserves a separate discussion (most of ther first section of Shev Shamytza deals with this topic). For now, I just want to point out that R’ Chaim had a different approach to this whole question. R’ Chaim reportedly answered that Tosfos is right – based on the gemara’s answer this should be a safeik tumah b’reshus hayachid. So why does each nazir not do a tiglachas tumah? Let’s say the safeik is whether these nezirim came in contact with a dead body – why is each one not assumed to be tamei meis?

There are two ways to understand safeik tumah b’reshus hayachid being tamei. One way is to assume that the rule reveals the facts on the ground: each nazir actually touched the dead body in question. Tosfos took this approach and rejected the rule of safeik in this case because it leads to two mutually exclusive outcomes. R’ Chaim suggested a different approach. In actuality we remain uncertain whether either nazir touched the dead body. However, the halacha has created a categorically new type of tumah that applies to situations of safeik. What is gained by this approach is that the new rule can encompass even circumstances that lead to mutually exclusive outcomes. However, since the tumah we are dealing with is a categorically new entity, it is not related to tumas meis or any of the other tumas which a nazir must do tiglachas for. That is why the Mishna's conclusion is that neither nazir must do a tiglachas.

Whether R’ Chaim’s model or Tosfos’ model of how safeik tumah brh”y works is correct seems to be debated by the ba’alei haTosfos in other sugyos, but enough for now.

ain ona'ah l'karka'os

My son is learning Kiddushin and is familar with the rule of "ain ona'ah l'karka'os", there is no issur ona'ah by a sale of land. I asked him on Shabbos how this makes sense when the issur ona'ah appears in the Torah davka in the context of selling land - the Torah tells us that the buyer and seller must calculate the number of years until shemita to determine the fair price of land and avoid ona'ah.

The Ramban on that pasuk offers a few approaches to resolve this question. When buying and selling metaltilin, if the discreprency between what was charged/paid is too egregious, the buyer or seller has a right to rescind the sale. "Ain ona'ah l'karka'os" may simply mean that the buyer and seller may not rescind the sale, but the issur of ona'ah still applies.

Book recommendation: Turbulent Souls

Just finished reading Stephen Dubner's Turbulent Souls: A Catholic Son's Return to His Jewish Family. Go out and read it and you won't be disappointed. Dubner's parents were born Jewish, converted to Catholicism, and raised their children as Catholics. Dubner ends up stumbling on his Jewish ancestry and being drawn to it. In the process he delves into his parent's history in an attempt to discover what motivated their conversion, but ends up (I think) discovering more about himself than his parents. Aside from the view of Judaism from an outsider's perspective which the book provides, the writing is excellent.

One point which struck me is that the Jewish personalities which Dubner makes connections to in his life are intellectual-types who come across as deep thinkers not afraid to question or to doubt. His parents were deeply committed to the Catholic faith, but that committment never led to substantive intellectual inquiry. One of the trends in Orthodoxy today that I find disappointing is the fear of intellectual inquiry that has taken root, the dumbing down of education lest students be led "off the derech" by the world of ideas. I doubt Dubner would have been as attracted to Judaism if he experienced it as a world of intellectual stagnation.

ones vs. derech rechoka: the obligation to bring Pesach Sheni

The Rambam (korban pesach ch. 5) writes that a peson who missed Pesach Rishon b'ones and then b'meizid skips Pesach Sheni is chayav kareis. Yet, a person who was b'derech rechoka, too far from Yerushalayim to offer Pesach Rishon, and then skips Pesach Sheni b'meizid, is not chayav kareis. Ra'avad asks: why should there be any difference between these two cases?

Lomdus fans will like this one. Apparently the Rambam held that the ptur of ones and the ptur of derech rechoka are categorically different. Someone who was ones had a chiyuv to bring Pesach Rishon but was exempt due to circumstance; failing to make-up the chiyuv on Pesach Sheni renders one liable kareis for missing that original chiyuv. Someone who was b'derech rechoka is considered to have had no obligation whatsoever to bring Pesach Rishon. The opportunity to offer Pesach Sheni is a new obligation which does not carry the penalty of kareis.

safety-nets and bitachon

כה) כִּי-יָמוּךְ אָחִיךָ וּמָכַר מֵאֲחֻזָּתוֹ וּבָא גֹאֲלוֹ הַקָּרֹב אֵלָיו וְגָאַל אֵת מִמְכַּר אָחִיו
כו) וְאִישׁ כִּי לֹא יִהְיֶה-לּוֹ גֹּאֵל וְהִשִּׂיגָה יָדוֹ וּמָצָא כְּדֵי גְאֻלָּתוֹ
כז) וְחִשַּׁב אֶת-שְׁנֵי מִמְכָּרוֹ וְהֵשִׁיב אֶת-הָעֹדֵף לָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר מָכַר-לוֹ וְשָׁב לַאֲחֻזָּתוֹ

If a person sells property, a relative has the right to redeem it on behalf of the owner. A person without relatives, the parsha continues, will find funds and redeem his own land. The Netzi"v is medayek: 1) Why not simply state that a person has the right to redeem his own land - why must this idea be couched in the context of someone who has no relatives? 2) The pasuk states as a matter of certainty that "he shall obtain funds", not "if he obtains funds..." Shouldn't this be a conditional clause?

What the formulation of the pasuk suggests, writes the Netzi"v, is that only the person who has no relatives upon whom to rely will find the funds to redeem his own land. When there is a safety net in life, be it relatives, be it some other means, a person's natural instinct is to place his/her trust in that safety net, lessing his/her trust in G-d (and I would add, lessening his/her self-reliance). When all the safety nets have been stripped away and one's full trust is placed in G-d alone, only then does Hashem guarantee with certainty that one will find one's own means of redemption (and I wouldn't take that in the financial sense alone).

kohein vs. nazir - who should become tamei for meis mitzvah (nazir 47)

One more word on the machlokes (Nazir 47) R' Eliezer and Chachamim regarding when no one else is available except a kohein and nazir, which should become tamei to bury a meis mitzvah. Both approaches suggested in the previous posts share the common denominator of approaching the Mishna as a debate over who ranks higher in the heirachy of kedusha, the kohein or the nazir. The debate is similar (to use R' Akiva Eiger's comparison) to the debate over which takes precedence, tadir or mekudash.

R' Yosef Engel suggests a radically different approach to the Mishna that is as equally brilliant as the others. Recall that R' Eliezer's argument in favor of the kohein becoming tamei stems from the fact that if a nazir becomes tamei he is penalized by having to offer a korban. We had understood that to mean that the kohein, who suffers no penalty, is heiarchichly on a lower level of kedusha than the nazir. Perhaps not, says R' Yosef Engel. Perhaps everyone agrees that the kohein ranks higher on the heirarchical scale of kedusha. However, R' Eliezer argues that since the nazir must offer a korban, it proves that he suffers more severly by the desecration of his kedusha. Should the kohein whose kedusha is greater avoid becoming defiled, or should the nazir, who despite having a lower kedusha suffers more greatly by its loss, avoid being defiled? That is the crux of the argument between R' Eliezer and Chachamim.

more on nazir vs. kohein (Nazir 47), kamus and eichus

Yesterday’s post focused on the dispute in the Mishna (Nazir 47): where no one else is available except for a kohein and nazir, which one should become tamei to bury a meis mitzvah. R’ Eliezer argues that the nazir should not become tamei. Since the nazir must bring a korban if he becomes tamei, it proves his kedusha greater than that of the kohein. The Chachamim disagree and hold that the nazir should become tamei. The kohein has “kedushas olam”, a permanent and constant kedusha, which is more significant than the temporary kedusha of the nazir. R’ Yosef Engel explained the focal point of the debate revolves around the following abstract question: given that X is greater than Y, if Y endures longer, does that make up the difference? In our case, even if the kedusha of a nazir is more stringent, perhaps the fact that the kedusha of a kohein endures longer lends it greater significance.

R’ Akiva Eiger comments on the Mishna (pointed out by Anon1 yesterday) that the dispute in Nazir parallels the machlokes in Zevachim whether a korban which is tadir (offered regularly) is more or less significant than mekudash, a korban of greater sanctity. Using R’ Yosef Engel’s matrix, tadir vs. mekudash boils down to the same basic abstract idea: can a lesser kedusha which endures longer, or is more constant, be considered more significant than something which has a greater quality of kedusha?

I think one could argue that the two cases are different (and R’ Yosef Engel retracts the comparison later in his essay). Recall the case of kamus vs. eichus which we started this discussion with earlier in the week: if a sick person needs meat on Shabbos, is it better to shect an animal and violate Shabbos once to obtain kosher meat, or to eat non-kosher meat, violating a separate issur with each bite? Everyone agrees that eating non-kosher meat is the lesser issur – the point of debate is whether the fact that it is violated repeatedly lends it greater significance. This issue of tadir vs. mekduash parallels this type of debate. Tadir is obviously of lesser kedusha than mekudash, as the label itself indicates. The debate is whether the fact that tadir recurs lends it greater significance. The debate in Nazir 47 is not whether the kohein’s lesser kedusha is given more significance by virtue of being permanent – the debate is whether permanence is itself not indicative of the kohein having the greater level of kedusha to begin with! Who says the nazir is greater just because if he becomes tamei he must bring a korban - maybe the kohein is greater because his kedusha is “kedushas olam”?! This is a different question entirely.

Infinity and the Pardes story

An interesting post by my wife here.

does kamus outweigh eichus when time is on its side?

In his discussion of kamus vs. eichus, R' Yosef Engel factors in another dimension: time. If X is qualitatively more significant thatn Y, but Y continues for a longer duration than X, does the factor of time cause Y to now outweigh X? An example of a sugya which seems to weigh these factors: the gemara (Kesubos 34b) presents two cases where a ganav who kills an animal is patur - 1) where the theft took place on Shabbos; 2) where the theft took place in a machteres. The common denominator in both cases is that the thief is subject to the death penalty and therefore exempt from double-jeapordy financial liability. Why, asks the gemara, do we need two cases to illustrate the same principle? Because, answers the gemara, had I just had the example of Shabbos, I might have thought the exemption from payment is due to the unique stringency of Shabbos. Shabbos is an "issur olam", meaning at any point in time that witnesses testify that someone has desecrated Shabbos, he would be killed; someone tunneling in a machteres can be killed only if he if caught in the act. Similarly, had I just had the example of machteress, I might have thought the exemption from payment is due to the unique stringency of that case. An intruder intent on buglary may be killed with no warning (hasra'ah), while there is no punihsment for desecrating Shabbos if the violator is not warned. The principle of exemption from payment is illustrated using both cases to show the exemption is not due to some stringency unique to one case or the other.

The punishment in a case of machteres has a qualitative edge over the punishment for desecrating Shabbos because it comes without any warning to the thief. Yet, Shabbos perhaps is more stringent because it is an "issur olam", without time limitation. Time tilts the scale toward the qualitatively lesser issur.

If you read yesterday's post or are learning daf yomi you will have come across the case (Nazir 47a) of a nazir and kohein who discover a meis mitzvah - which one of the two should become tamei to do the burial? R' Eliezer holds the kohein should become tamei and not the nazir. Since a nazir who becomes tamei must being a korban while a kohein suffers no such penalty, it proves the kedusha of a kohein is less significant than that of nazir. The Chachamim disagree and hold that the nazir should become tamei. Since the kohein is permanently in a state of kedusha (see Tosfos and Rashas"h) while the kedusha of the nazir is temporary, it proves the kedusha of the kohein superior.

The focal point of the debate seems to center around R' Yosef Engel's chakrira. Is the qualitatively superior kedusha of the nazir outweighed by the lesser kedusha of the kohein by virtue of the fact that kedushas kehunah has time on its side? SeeR' Yosef Engel's essay in Lekach Tov where he suggests other approaches to explain the Mishna's debate, but this approach certainly seems compelling.

more issues in kamus vs. eichus

The gemara at the end of Yoma tells us that in a case of pikuach nefesh where one has a choice between which issurim to violate, one should choose hakal hakal techila – always, where given a choice, violate the least stringent issur. This opens a pandora’s box of discussion as to the hierarchy of issurim. The Rishonim debate the following case: a person is deathly ill on Shabbos and requires meat. Non-kosher meat is readily available. Is it better to feed the sick person that non-kosher meat, or to slaughter an animal on Shabbos in order to obtain fresh kosher meat? At first glance one would assume that Shabbos is a far more stringent prohibition than eating non-kosher food. However, the Ra’avad makes the counter-argument that every single bite of non-kosher food counts as a separate issur while slaughtering an animal for kosher meat is a single prohibited act. Perhaps it is better to perform a single prohibited act, albeit one as serious as violating Shabbos, than to violate a lesser prohibition numerous times over.

R’ Yosef Engel writes that this debate revolves around the issue of kamus vs. eichus which we raised yesterday. Shabbos is qualitatively the more stringent issur, but eating non-kosher violates a greater quantity of issurim. The debate in the Rishonim centers around which of these factors wins out.

Those learning daf yomi recently studied the Mishna (Nazir 47) regarding the case of a meis mitzvah which is found by a nazir and kohein gadol. The Tanaim argue as to which of these two, the kohein or the nazir, should become tamei to bury the body. The MaHaRaT”Z Chiyus cites a question raised by the Sha’ar haMelech that relates to the previous issue. A nazir who becomes tamei violates a greater number of issurim than a kohein who becomes tamei (remember, there is bal yacheil in addition to the issurei nazir). If so, according to the Ra’avad who argues that it is better to violate Shabbos than eat non-kosher because kamus overrides eichus, why is it not clear that the kohein and not the nazir should become tamei?