response to a youth in crisis - must read

Rabbi Lazer Brody (website) has a simple agenda of increasing emunah in Hashem. Whether you agree with everything he writes or not, you have to admire (at least I do) his dedication to the apolitical agenda of simply getting people to have faith. This letter he wrote in response to a plea for help from an all too typical teen in the yeshiva system about to go off the derech haTorah is a must read.

eating seudas purim before giving mishloach manos and issues of shlichus

I lost track now of the comment someone posted recently referencing the machlokes between the Rambam and Tur regarding shlichus. Whether the intent was to get me to find a way to do a post on it, I don’t know, but as coincidence would have it, the topic resurfaced. The machlokes in a nutshell: a husband appoints a shliach to deliver a get to his wife and goes insane before the get is actually delivered. Is the get valid? The Rambam (Geirushin ch 2) holds that min haTorah it is valid. Once the shliach is appointed and given charge of the get, he stands in the husband’s place and the “real” husband is no longer in the picture (the get is, however, pasul mderabbanan). The Tur disagrees and holds that such a get is invalid min haTorah. The shliach is not a surrogate husband or a replacement husband; the shliach’s actions are merely attributed to the original husband as if he had performed them. Since the original husband cannot divorce his wife while insane, the actions of the shliach done on his behalf are of no consequence. (See Ketzos 188:2 for more on this topic.)

What does this have to do with Purim? Apparently there is a shortage of chumros in the world, so someone reasoned as follows: since it is prohibited to start a meal when a mitzvah performance is pending, perhaps one is not permitted to start one's seudas Purim until the mitzvah of mishloach manos and matanot la'evyonim have been fulfilled. The fact that such an idea is not mentioned in earlier poskim is not a problem - it was simply so obvious (so the argument goes) that mentioning it would be redundant. (The obvious catch is that seudas Purim is itself a pending mitzvah – why should mishloach manos come first? Let’s leave that aside for now.)

But how long must one wait before eating? Is it OK to hand off one’s mishloach manos to a shliach and then sit down to eat, or must one wait until the recipient actually takes delivery?

Had you asked me that question (and I was willing to take the chumra seriously) I would have said it depends on whether one holds like the Terumas haDeshen or the Manos haLevi that we discussed yesterday. If the purpose of mishloach manos is to foster friendship (like the Manos haLevi suggests), then the act of giving alone seems to suffice even if it never reaches the recipient (the Rama even writes that one fulfills the mitzvah of mishloach manos if the recipient is mochel). However, if the purpose of mishloach manos is to enhance a neighbor’s seudas Purim (like the TH”D suggests), then until the recipient gets the food the goal has not yet been accomplished.

Looking to find something more lomdish to say, a talmid chacham wrote to R’ Binyan Zilber (Shu”T Az Nidberu 6:65) that this issue depends on the machlokes Rambam and the Tur. According to the Rambam, the shliach becomes a surrogate for the giver, removing the giver from the picture. The shliach therefore cannot eat Purim seudah until he completes delivery, but the sender definitely can. However, according to the Tur, the shliach is merely acting on behalf of the sender, but is not the sender’s substitute. Until the manos are actually given, the sender is not allowed to eat. R’ Binyam Zilber was not convinced… maybe more on this later after some thinking time.

mishloach manos using issurei hana'ah

The Mishna in Kiddushin tells us that a person cannot be mekadesh a women using issurei hana’ah, as these items have no value. The Mishne l’Melech (Ishus perek 5) raises an interesting question: if a person is mekadesh a women who is deathly ill with issurei hana’ah that she needs for her illness, is the kiddushin valid? On the one hand, for this particular woman the issur hana’ah does have value; on the other hand, for the mekadesh and for the rest of the world, the prohibition of using such an item renders it valueless.

Achronim raise a similar question with regards to mishloach manos. If one were to give an item which is assur b’hana’ah to someone who is deathly ill, has one fulfilled the mitzvah of mishloach manos? Does mishloach manos need to be something of value to begin with (and if so, how much value)? Can it have to be something which the recipient alone values, or something of value to the sender as well?

Shu”t L’Horos Nasan (vol 2 # 54) suggests that this question may hinge on a famous dispute between the Terumas haDeshen and the Manos haLevi regarding the purpose of mishloach manos. The TH”D holds that the purpose of mishloach manos is to add to and enhance seudas Purim. Therefore, if a person is deathly ill and is permitted to eat a seudah of issurei hana’ah, these foods can serve as mishloach manos. The Manos haLevi, however, holds that the purpose of mishloach manos is to create a sense of friendship and camaraderie. Support for such an idea can be found in the Ritv”a’s chiddush (Meg 7) that if one gives a mishloach manos of insignificant value to a wealthy important person, one has not fulfilled the mitzvah. Since the gift makes no impression on the recipient and does not foster any feeling of friendship, it cannot count as mishloach manos. Perhaps one can apply the same chiddush in reverse to our case. Since giving away issurei hana’ah costs nothing and is something the giver would want to get rid of anyway, it does not convey that feeling of friendship that mishloach manos is supposed to foster and would therefore not fulfill the mitzvah.

more lessons from Parshas Amalek

Further thoughts on Parshas Amalek:

1) Unlike, for example, the war against Yericho, where Chazal interpret the pasuk “vayalan b’toch ha’eimek” to mean that Yehoshua “lan b’omko shel halacha” and devoted his time before battle to learning, here the Torah focuses on Moshe's tefilah as an integral aspect to the battle. I think this reinforces the Shem m’Shmuel’s point with respect to understanding “rifyon yadayim” for Torah as a lack of proper anticipation for kabbalas haTorah. The tikun for lack of learning is more learning. The tikun for lacking anticipation for learning and eagerness for learning is not through more learning (a disinterested student will not be more responsive to two hours of shiur than he will be to one), but requires tefilah.

The Rishonim ask why Ta’anis Esther is commemorated the day before Purim when nomally fasting is prohibited the day before and the day after any holiday mentioned in Megilas Ta’anis. The Ohr Gedalyahu explains based on the Ra’avad (Ta’anis 7 in RI”F) that Ta’anis Esther is different because tefilah and fasting is an integral part of the celebration of destroying Amalek.

2) The parsha ends with Moshe being told to write down what occurred and “sim b’aznei Yehoshua”, relate it to Yehoshua. This is the first place in the Torah that Moshe is told to transmit Torah to his talmid – to create a mesorah of Torah passed from Rebbe to student. Why here? The content of learning can often be transmitted through books or other means, just like any other body of knowledge. What it means to be mekabeil Torah, to have that enthusiasm and desire that Amalek tried to extinguish, can only be transmitted through personal interaction.

3) I would have expected this charge of writing the parsha and teaching it to Yehoshua to be followed by a pasuk telling us “vayichtov Moshe…” or “vaYomer Moshe l’Yehoshua…”. Instead, the next pasuk tells us that Moshe built a mizbeiach and offered another tefilah. Shouldn't that pasuk follow immediately after the story of the battle? What is it doing here after Moshe was told to teach Yehoshua? The Seforno in a few words has an amazing insight: וְשִׂים אֵיזֶה זִכָּרון בְּאָזְנֵי יְהושֻׁעַ. וְזֶה עָשָׂה משֶׁה בְּבִנְיַן הַמִּזְבֵּחַ (פסוק טו) וּבִתְפִלָּתו Moshe did impress the lesson of Amalek upon Yehoshua – he did it through his tefilah.

Parents all the time try to “sim b’aznei” their children various messages, most of which are usually ignored. There are obviously more important messages, and less important messages. If you ask someone what they learned from their parents and they say “To pick my dirty socks up off the floor”, they are missing something. True, their mother may have repeated that message 5000 times, but that is a less important message. How can we tell what are the more important messages and what are the less important one's? By listening to what our parents, our Rebbeim, our leaders daven for. No mother davens that her kid pick his dirty socks up, no matter how many times she may repeat it. “Sim b’aznei Yehoshua” by showing him what you are davening for.

Amalek and kabbalas haTorah - banishing "sipuk"

The gemara (Shabbos 87) tells us that Hashem coerced the Jewish people to accept the Torah at Sinai and only after the events of Purim was the Torah willingly embraced and accepted. Why was this acceptance achieved davka after the events of Purim and not at any earlier historical point? As discussed previously, the Shem m’Shmuel identifies the “rifyon yadayim” that led to the battle with Amalek not as a lack of Torah study, but a lack of intensity and preparedness for kabbalas haTorah. By definition, the defeat of Amalek during Purim is one and same as achieving kabbalas haTorah with full vigor.

The gemara (Meg 7) brings various proofs that Esther was written b’ruach hakodesh. Rava adds that all the proofs can be refuted except for the derasha of “kiymu v’kiblu – kiymu l’ma’alah mah she’kiblu l’matah”. Only b’ruach hakodesh could Esther and Mordechai have known that Hashem accepted their enactment of Purim. Yet, asks Tosfos, this proof also can be refuted, as Rava elsewhere (Shabbos 87) uses the same pasuk to darshen that that the Jewish people had a “kiyum” duing Purim of the kabbalas haTorah which had occurred at Sinai – “kiymu mah shekiblu kvar”. The Shem m’Shmuel in his last piece on Purim writes that these are not contradictory derashos, but complementary points (see the Kedushas Levi on this same gemara for a beautiful explanation). Because there was a deeply felt “kiyum” of kabbalas haTorah on the part of Bnei Yisrael, there was a complementary acceptance of all that was enacted as being a part and parcel of Torah, inspired by ruach hakodesh. In other words, the kabbalah is not simply a passive act of acceptance, but actualizes the Torah and creates the cheftza of Torah in the process.

What is the biggest obstacle to feeling this anticipation for Torah and having a kabbalah filled with hislahavus and intensity? Lots of people say derashos about Amalek being equal in gematriya to safeik=doubt. I would like to suggest that the gematriya is right, but they are misreading the word. It’s not safeik=doubt, but sipuk, satiation, feeling fulfilled (see the Koznitzer Maggid on the Mishna in Avos “histaleik min hasfeik” who suggests the same reading there). If a person feels fulfilled and satisfied where he or she is holding, then there is no expectation for change and certainly no desire for change. Banishing Amalek requires removing that feeling of sipuk and rekindling the desire to accept and grow.

responses to tragedy at merkaz harav

The Belzer Rebbe's tremendous personal caring and concern for those involved in the tragedy at Merkaz haRav has been publicized in many places already, but this article I think is one of the most moving.

At the opposite extreme, and I hate to even mention it in the same post, this report is simply mind boggling.

how often to hear parshas zachor

The Chasam Sofer (Even haEzer #119) writes that the amount of time that elapses before forgetfulness sets in is one year. Assuming the reading of parshas zachor from a Torah text is a din d’orasya, it therefore must be repeated once a year to fulfill the obligation of “zachor – lo tishkach”, not forgetting Amalek. How then do we fulfill the mitzvah in a leap year when more than 12 months have passed since the last reading of zachor? The Ch”S answers that the shiur is one year, not 12 months. During a leap year, the shiur extends by a month.

My impression is that this Ch”S is relatively well known, but less well known is the Sefer haChinuch who addresses this same issue. Pointing to the fact that the minhag in Eretz Yisrael was to lein the entire Torah over three years instead of one, the Sefer haChinuch writes that there is no obligation to hear zachor on an annual basis. How often must one hear the parsha? The Minchas Chinuch suggests that perhaps even hearing it once a lifetime would fulfill the obligation.

the battle with Amalek in Refidim

When one studies history it may be important to know who did what when and where, but the Torah is not history. There must be some reason relevant to our moral education for the Torah to tell us that the battle with Amalek took place in Refidim. Chazal do offer such a reason: the name of the place hints at the cause of Amalek’s attack, namely “rafu y’deihem min haTorah”, there was a weakness and lack of intensity in Torah.

The Shem m’Shmuel asks: the battle with Amalek took place en route to Sinai, before the Torah was given. There were only a few halachos that had been taught at Marah, and even with respect to these laws there was no mitzvah of talmud torah, to study torah as an end in itself. How then can the Jewish people at this point be criticized for “rifyon yadayim” in Torah?

The answer the Shem m’Shmuel suggests opens a door into understanding the whole parsha of Amalek and Purim. True, there was not yet Torah to study, but the Jewish people knew that kabbalas haTorah was the end goal of the entire process of the exodus from Egypt. They had been counting days of sefirah in eager anticipation of that end goal. They should have been filled with anticipation and longing for that end goal. Yet, they hit a Refidim. “Rafu y’deihem”, the zeal and eagerness hit a road bump, the preparation and anticipation lost some steam, and a little voice told them that maybe they should maybe slow down, maybe think a little more about this kabbalas haTorah idea and consider if they are really ready for it. That’s Amalek in a nutshell.

Road bumps or setbacks in a life of learning are inevitable, but if that initial commitment is not strong and suffers from “rifyon yadayim” the danger is far more serious.

what attracts people to shul?

I was recently thinking about this question and am curious as to others' opinions. What attracts you to a shul and why? The building? The cholent served at the kiddush? The derasha of the Rav? The social crowd? The chazzan? For those of you out there who are practicing Rabbanim, do you throw everything you can out there and hope you hit the magic trigger that will turn people on to your shul, or is there one particular quality that you work on to distinguish your message?

Have you given your answer some thought? I am curious if anyone else included in their answer a factor that I rank as being of primacy importance. The magic word: stimulation. Maybe it’s just me, but unless my brain is working, I just get bored, lose interest, and start getting impatient. Stimulation can come in a lot of different forms, e.g. a new melody incorporated into tefilah, a different dish at the kiddush, etc. but for me those items sit on the periphery. For a different food I can go to a restaurant, for a different nigun I can go to a concert, for a social outing I can go to a Mets game. What being in a makom torah can give that those experiences can’t is one thing: Torah. By that I don’t mean a stale vort that has been passed around for 200 years and is delivered with the usual platitudes about the importance of chessed, torah, etc. I mean Torah in the sense of a meaningful insight that challenges me to think, to evaluate, to learn and grow. In other words, Torah that stimulates.

kallahmagazine blog address

If you have been looking for my wife's blog the past few days, the address has changed to http://kallahmagazine.blogspot.com Her old ISP had too many issues and outages so she pulled the plug and switched; in the process, she abandoned wordpress and is now on blogger. The web address www.kallahmagazine.com remains the same. And while on the topic, the latest issue of her magazine just came out - look for it in the 5T, Queens (being delivered today), Baltimore, Teaneck, and it should hit Brooklyn soon.

purim meshulash - seudah, parshas zachor

The Yerushalmi (mentioned in yesterday’s post) writes that the simcha of Purim established by Sanhedrin cannot be celebrated simultaneously with the simcha of Shabbos, which was established by G-d, and therefore if Purim falls on Shabbos, the seudah is pushed off until Sunday. The Bavli does not mention such an idea; whether that silence indicates disagreement or not is a subject of major debate. The Ran already is uncomfortable with the whole idea of celebrating seudas Purim on the 16th when the megillah explicitly tells us “lo ya’avor”, that the date of the celebration cannot extend beyond the 15th. Another problematic element of the Yerushalmi is the assumption that Shabbos is not just a day of oneg, but includes an obligation of simcha as well. Tosfos in M.K. (23b d”h “man”) writes that the reason a Yom Tov cancels aveilus and Shabbos does not (i.e. if a Yom Tov falls out in the middle of shloshim or shiva, one does not resume mouring after Y”T) is because Y”T is a time of simcha and Shabbos is not. Even if one grants the assumption that Shabbos is a day of simcha, whether we apply this idea of “ain m’arvin simcha b’simcha”, not celebrating two simchas simultaneously, to this type of simcha is debatable (see M”K 8). No one would suggest, for example, that a pidyon haben needs to be rescheduled until after chol hamoed so as to not mix the two elements of simcha.

Is there any explicit gemara in the Bavli that we can point to as being in disagreement with the Yerushalmi? The Bavli (Meg 30a) quotes an argument between Rav and Shmuel when to read parshas zachor in a year such as this one where Purim falls on a Friday. Rav says to read zachor the week before Purim, as we do, so that the reading precedes the Purim. Shmuel, however, argues, and says zachor should be read on the Shabbos of the 15th so that “zechira v’asyia b’hadei hadadei”, the reading of zachor and the celebration of Purim for those in walled cities will be simultaneous. The simple reading of the gemara clearly implies according to Shmuel that the celebration of Purim is not pushed off until Sunday, but occurs on Shabbos itself, the same day that zachor is read. The Pri Chadash and others attempt to refute this proof, but certainly at first glance it seems very convincing.

For those with a hearty appetite, it probably is not such a big deal to make a seudah on Shabbos and a seudah on Sunday to be yotzei all opinions. However, you still can’t completely escape the debate, because one must decide on which day(s) to say “Al haNissim”. For those with a hearty appetite for learning and want a fuller treatment of this topic, R’ Ovadya Yosef in the first volume of Yechaveh Da’at has a nice review of the issues involved in a "Purim meshulash".

seudas Rosh Chodesh on Shabbos and Purim meshulash

I meant to post this on Friday but did not have time... better late thane never. The Yerushalmi writes that if Purim falls on Shabbos, seudas Purim is pushed off and held after Shabbos rather than earlier. This creates the phenomenon known as "Purim meshulash". If you are in Yerushalyim this year for Purim, you will hear megillah and do matanos l'evyonim on Friday, then have Shabbos, and have your Purim seudah on Sunday, creating a three day celebration.

Why, asks the Yerushalmi, is the Purim seudah not held on Shabbos? The Yerushalmi answers by quoting the pasuk from the megillah, "la'asos oso y'mei mishteh v'simcha", that Purim involves turning an ordinary day into a special day of simcha, as opposed to Shabbos, which is already fixed since creation as a day of simcha. You can't mix celebrations of G-d-imosed simcha and man-made simcha on the same day. The fact that we never find such a derasha in the Bavli already should make us suspicious that perhaps this Yerushalmi is not unanimously accepted, and sure enough, from Rishonim to Achronim, there is debate as to whether this conclusion is accepted l'halacha. Maybe more on that later in the week.

Even though this Yerushalmi is much discussed in the context of Purim, it actually applies to a halacha that came up this Shabbos, which coincided with Rosh Chodesh. The Shulchan Aruch writes (O.C. 419) that there is an obligation to mark Rosh Chodesh with a special seudas Rosh Chodesh (this halacha is not too popular in practice; see the Aruch haShulchan). We don't find a clear statement in the Bavli that such an obligation exists, but the Taz points to the same Yerushalmi above as a source. The Yerushlami writes that not only seudas Purim, but also seudas Rosh Chodesh is delayed until after Shabbos. QED from the fact that the two seudos are discussed in the same context that just like there is an obligation for a seudah on Purim, there is a similar seudah obligation on Rosh Chodesh. The MG"A writes that on Shabbos one needs to find some way to add something to one's seudah to make it more special and indicate that it includes this added kiyum of seudas Rosh Chodesh. However, if one accepts the Yerushalmi at face value, then in reality the seudas Rosh Chodesh cannot be fulfilled on Shabbos and needs to be celebrated after Shabbos. The Mishna Berura (Sha'ar haTziyun #5) quotes R' Ya'akov Emden's psak, based on the Yerushalmi, that one can fulfill the seudas Rosh Chodesh by having a special melaveh malka, even though Motzei Shabbos is not longer Rosh Chodesh.

building a mizbeiach on Yom Tov (II)

The Minchas Yitzchak’s explanation of the hava amina to think binyan mikdash might be doche Shabbos or Y”T follows along the same lines suggested by Chaim M. in a comment yesterday. The M. Y. just adds an additional twist which to help explain why the Mechilta illustrates the issur of building the mikdash using a case of fixing the mizbeiach and not with a case of building the actual walls of the mishkan.

As we discussed once before, Tosfos holds that the aseh of Yom Tov is zman gerama and women are obligated only in the lav. This opens the theoretical possibility of saying that the aseh of binyan mishkan could be doche the lav of Yom Tov, as Chaim M. suggested. However, the gemara (Shavuos 15) writes that the mitzvah of binyan mikdash cannot be done at night. If so, it should be classified as a mitzvas aseh she’hazman gerama and not apply to women! (We actually discussed this one about a year ago as well, and my son spoke about it at his bar mitzvah, last year P’ VaYakhel-Pekudei.)

The Minchas Yitzchak brilliantly rescues the sevara for the hava amina by pointing to a suggestion in achronim that even though the building of the actual miskhan could not be done at night, the building of kelim could be done at night. If so, perhaps women could fulfill the mitzvah of binyan mikdash by building kelim at night, and one might have thought they could even do so on Yom Tov, kah mashma lan our pasuk that they may not. Based on this analysis it is also meduyak that the Mechilta offers an example of building the mizbeiach, a kli, and not building the walls of the mishkan itself.

I am still a bit puzzled. Unless I am mistaken, even Tosfos who holds women are not obligated in the aseh of Yom Tov still holds that one cannot be doche the lav of Y"T to fulfill a different aseh (yes, we discusssed this one as well in the past.) Doesn't that shoot down the hava amina here?

the mizbeiach built on Yom Tov

Rashi in P’ VaYakhel writes that the pasuk “sheishes yamim ta’aseh melacha” teaches that the Mishkan can only be built during the 6 weekdays but not on Shabbos. Rashi’s interpretation is based on the Mechilta, which learns from this pasuk that even fixing the broken corner of a mizbeiach is prohibited on Shabbos.

According to most opinions of Tanaim (see Shabbos 87) the Torah was given on Shabbos, the 51st day after Pesach. The MG”A famously asks why we refer to the holiday of Shavuos, which we celebrate on the 50th day of the sefira count, as “zman mattan Toraseinu”, when the Torah was actually not given until the day after the holiday of Shavuos. You have until Shavuos to work out a good answer to that one, but for now, I want to focus on a different point. After working through the calculations of the dates, the Minchas Chinuch (#309) notes that Moshe was commanded to build a mizbeiach on the day before mattan Torah. If mattan Torah was on day 51 of sefira, the mizbeiach would have been built on day 50, which was the Yom Tov of Shavuos. How could Moshe violate the issur of building a mizbeiach on Yom Tov? True, the Torah had not yet been given, but Moshe, like the Avos, would certainly have observed halacha even before the formal mattan Torah.

The Minchas Yitzchak (Kuntres Divrei Cheifetz, end of vol 3) offers two answers: 1) the mizbeiach was not a permanent structure and therefore did not violate the d’oraysa prohibition of binyan; 2) two people worked on building the mizbeiach and each was “aino yachol” and therefore not in violation of a d’oraysa.

These answers each have debatable points, but I’ll leave that for another time. One final question worth thinking about: why is a limud necessary to teach us that building a Mishkan cannot be done on Shabbos? We know that a mitzvas aseh cannot be doche a lav + aseh, so why would we think that the Mishkan could be built on Shabbos? The Minchas Yitzchak has a beautiful pilpul to answer this question. I may try to post it later, but if I don’t get to it, it is worth the effort to look up.

nedarim 72 - shlucho shel adam k'moso

As part of the discussion of whether a husband must actually hear the neder he is being meifer, the gemara Nedarim 72b presents a machlokes R’ Yonasan and R’ Oshiya whether an apotropus can be appointed by a husband to absolve his wife’s nedarim. R’ Yonasan takes the position that “shlucho shel adam k’moso”, but R’ Oshiya argues that the pasuk of “isha” excludes shlichus for hafaras nedarim. The gemara suggests that the possibility of the husband delegating the right of hafarah to someone else proves that the husband’s hearing the neder is not a prerequisite for hafarah.

The Rishonim ask an obvious question on this proof: if the delegate can serve as a shliach for hafarah, doesn’t the delegate hearing the neder also count as if the husband heard it by virtue of this same principle of “shlucho shel adam k’moso”?

The Ran and Rosh offer two solutions. Ran explains: a necessary condition for appointing a shliach is having the ability and right to personally perform the same act. If hearing a neder is a prerequisite to hafarah, the husband must fulfill that prerequisite before he can appoint a shliach to do hafarah on his behalf. The Rosh answers by asserting a chiddush in where shlichus applies. Shlichus, writes the Rosh, only empowers an agent to perform an action on someone’s behalf. Since hearing is passive and involves no action, is it not subject to delegation.

This Rosh is one of the proofs of the Ketzos (182:1) to his famous answer to the Tosfos RI”D’s question of why a person cannot appoint a shliach to put on tefillin for him or perfom other similar mitzvos on his behalf. If Reuvain acts as Shimon’s agent to don tefillin for him, true shlucho shel adam k'moso would mean it is as Shimon homself performed the act of putting on tefillin. However, the body those tefillin were placed on is Reuvain's, not Shimon's! Shimon's mitzvah of tefillin can only be fulfilled by putting tefillin on his own body, not someone else's. As the Rosh writes, shlichus only extends to actions - it does not mean that the agent who hears a neder functions as the ear of the husband, and it does not mean that Reuvain's body upon which tefillin are wrapped can be considered like Shimon's.

netziv on vayakhel

Two insights of the Netziv you can take home to your Shabbos table:

1) Why specifically are those who made the tent fabrics of the Mishkan described as “chacham lev”? The Seforno answers that making the fabric required special skill, as there were separate designs visible on either side. The Netziv uses this issue as a way to explore the halachic question of whether hidur takes precedence over zerizus. Building the Mishkan entailed many projects, from tent fabric to keilim. One might have thought it better not to jump into the first project, but to delay until work was needed on kli, as the kelim had more kedusha than the tent walls. The “chacham lev” was the person who realized that the potential hidur of working on an item with greater kedusha is less significant than the value of demonstrating zerizus by immediately contributing. (A thought: perhaps this same issue of hidur vs. zerizus underlies the criticism of the Nesi’im cited by Rashi 35:27.)

2) The Netziv notes that the lists of items made for the Mishkan follows the pattern of naming the materials used and then describing the work process. A few examples: “VaYa’as es hamenorah zahav tahor, miksha asah….” (37:17); “VaYa’as es mizbach haketores atzei shitim…” (37:25); “Vaya’as es mizbach ha’olah atzei shitim…” (38:1.) The one exception to the rule is the curtain which hung at the Mishkan’s entrance, which is first described as “ma’aseh rokeim”, made using a professional embroidery process, and then the colors and fabrics used follow (38:18). The Netziv writes that the Torah reversed the order to stress the beauty of the embroidery, which surpassed the beauty of the other tent walls. Why is this significant? Even though the entranceway was far removed from the kodesh kodashim and other more sanctified areas of the Mishkan, it was the first thing that a person noticed when he/she approached the Mishkan. It is not enough for a person to enter the Mishkan and only then become sensitive to being in a makom kadosh; that sensitivity to kedusha, that preparedness and expectation for the beauty and holiness of the Mishkan must be imparted at the entranceway, before one crosses the threshold. One simple mussar haskel: sharing the beauty of what will be accomplished before a project starts is one way to build enthusiasm for the work ahead.

machatzis hashekel and kinyanim by ketanim

Even though women and minors are exempt from machatzis hashekel (as discussed in yesterday’s post), they are permitted to donate if they so choose. The only catch is that the money must be donated to the public; a korban tzibur cannot be bought from money over which an individual retains private rights of ownership. The Minchas Chinuch quotes a question raised by the Sha’ar haMelech and Ktzos (235:4): We are familiar from the laws of sukkos with the din that a katan cannot make kinyanim. One should not give a lulav to a katan on the first day of Yom Tov (before one has fulfilled the mitzvah) because the lulav must be owned (“lachem”) and a katan can acquire the lulav but has no ability to be makneh the lulav back to its adult owner. By that same token, a katan should have no ability to be makneh his own machatzis hashekel to the public!

Perhaps the simplest solution to this question (which the Minchas Chinuch rejects) is to accept that the kinyan of the katan is in fact invalid, but considering that there are thousands of other shekalim in the public store, the few shekalim contributed by ketanim are bateil b’rov. Another possible approach stems from the fact that the Rishonim debate whether the obligation of machatzis hashekel begins from age 13 or from age 20. Perhaps the ketanim spoken of are halachic adults above the age of 13 who have not yet reached the age of 20. The Ketzos denies the whole premis of the question and uses this problem to bolster his contention that a mitzvah d’oraysa can be fulfilled using kinyanim derabbanan. One of the classic cases of this genre is the question of whether kiddushin using a ring purchased though a kinyan derabbanan has any validity on a d’orasya level.

rabbi meir the peacemaker

After telling a story of how R’ Meir interceded to help yesomim in his town, Gittn 52 recounts how R’ Meir was passing through another town where every erev shabbos two of the ba’alei batim got into a fight. R’ Meir spent three weeks there, and through his intercession the fights ended. The gemara concludes with the upset yetzer hara being left without a home.

Sometimes the details of a story can be so revealing. Unlike the first story in the gemara, this episode did not occur in R’ Meir’s hometown. He was just a visitor, maybe a “scholar in residence”, yet he felt obligated to intercede to make peace. Not only that, but these fights occurred on erev shabbos, when even talmidei chachamim are personally involved in preparing for shabbos (kiddushin 42) and time is short, yet R’ Meir made it his business to address the situation. This was also not a one time event, but it took three weeks of R' Meir's time to reslove the problem. Lastly, I think it’s not by accident that the gemara juxtaposes the story of the fight with the story of R’ Meir helping yesomim. It goes without saying that it would be unconscionable for R’ Meir to say, “Why do I need to get involved in the mishegas of these ba’alei batim? – I have important shaylos like whether a chicken is kosher or not to pasken,” and even more unconscionable for him to divest himself of the problem and go back to his learning. But lest one think that R’ Meir would avoid the issue because he was involved in other important communal needs like tending to yesomim, kah mashma lan that this is equally an important issue to tackle.

do women have to give a machatzis hashekel?

A quick look around at some of the Rishonim seems to confirm the psak of the MG”A that women are not obligated in machatzis hashekel. Although it is not an aseh she’hazman gerama, there are other reasons to exempt women, among them: the mitzvah is given to “kol ha’over al hapekudim” which does not include women; the mitzvah is directed to “bnei Yisrael” to the exclusion of “bnos yisrael”; the mitzvah is to give “ish kofer nafsho” to the exclusion of “isha”. However, the language of the Mishna in Shekalim seems to suggest that there is a chiyuv. The Mishna (1:3) writes that we do not take a mashkon (collateral) from women for the machatzis hashekel, implying only that no coercion is used to get them to pay, but they are still obligated to donate. The She’arei Korban in the Yerushalmi takes issue with the MG”A based on this diyuk, but does not explain what he does with the Rishonim.

I noticed an interesting Alshich quoted in the footnotes to the Halichos Beisa to explain why a half-shekel and not a whole shekel is donated. The purpose of shekalim is a kaparah for the cheit haeigel, “ish kofer nafsho”. Since the women did not sin with the eigel, they are exempt from the need for kofer. Ishto k’gufo means a husband and wife count as one unit and would be required to donate one full shekel. Since only half of that unit sinned, the kofer amounts to only half a shekel.

how long must a woman's skirt be?

Brachos 24 tells us that the exposed “shok” of a woman is considered ervah in the presence of which kri'as shema cannot be read (see Shulchan Aruch O.C. 75). What is the part of the body known as the “shok”? The Pri Megadim, based on the Rambam’s description of the parts of an animal (Ma’aseh Korbanos 9:10), writes that the “shok” is from the knee and above. The Mishna Berura cites the PM”G and notes that as long as the common practice is not to cover the body below the knee it is no different than the hands, face, etc. (Just a note to avoid confusion: the "shok" is an ervah regardless of whether people in society expose that area or not. Outside that area is dependent on social norma).

The discussion does not quite end there. Even though in the context of ervah it may seem reasonable that the term “shok” refers to the upper leg, the Shulchan Aruch elsewhere seems to use the term to refer to the lower leg. The S.A. writes with respect to chalitzah that the shoe is tied on the “shok” (E.H. 169:28). The proof of the PM”G from animal parts is also not so clear cut, as Tosfos (Menachos 37) writes that the terminology that is applied to animal parts is not necessarily analogous to corresponding parts of the human body. The Chazon Ish raises these issues as a matter of discussion, but does not go far as to say the Mishna Berurah is wrong. Others, such as the R' Shmuel haLevi Wosner (in the first tshuvah in his sefer), are adamant that the entire lower leg must be covered.

Nafka minah l’dina and l'shopping: are your daughter’s skirts supposed to drag to the floor, or just cover the knee?

min b'mino aino chotzeitz

The Tiferes Yisrael (Zevachim ch 13) raises the following question: there are many examples in halacha of the principle that min b’mino aino chotzeitz. The Mishna in Zevachim (13:5) writes that with respect to the issur of offering korbanos outside mikdash, the meat of an animal attached to the eimurim are not a chatzitzah between the eimurim and the mizbeiach; placing a hunk of meat + eimurim on an outside mizbeiach would be assur. Another example is the halacha that the leaves of a hadas which fall off are not a chatzitzah between the hadas and the lulav. Yet, the halacha is that if a person goes to mikveh and presses his/her lips together tightly, he/she has not properly done tevilah. Even though the lips are part of the body, i.e. lips are min b’mino with respect to the body, they are considered a block to proper tevilah. Why do we not invoke the principle of min b’mino aino chotzeitz in this case? The lips should still be considered ra’uy l’biyas mayim so long as the only block comes from the body itself. Nu, what do you think?

all concerts assur?

I don’t own a single Lipa CD, I can’t recall the last Jewish music concert I attended (it may have been an Uncle Moishy with my kids a few years ago), and so none of the ban news is of much interest to me except as a sociological phenomenon. Nonetheless, this quote reported in Yeshiva World News b’shem Lipa is a bit chilling:

“People should know that this Kol Koreh and ban against The Big Event was not directed at me personally, but at all concerts in general. The Rabbonim felt the need to put their foot down and attempt to stop all future concerts in NY.” [empahsis mine]

halachic paradox revisited: ksav al gabei ksav

I wrote about halachic paradoxes a few months ago, but since my son came across this sugya in his learning, I wanted to revisit the topic and mention a case which came up in a comment to the earlier post (thanks AddeRabbi). (My son attends a very nice Shabbos chaburah in Esvan d’Oraysa by a talmid chacham who told the boys who attend that when he was a teenager he had a notebook where he jotted down the many paradoxes raised by the Minchas Chinuch. Not a bad idea.)

Gittin 19 raises the question of “ksav al gabei ksav” – is one traces over letters which have already been written, is that tracing considered an act of writing (or erasing the existing letters) or not? Among the issues this impacts is 1) whether a get written shelo lishma can be traced over to create a new ksav done lishma; 3) whether tracing over existing letters is an act of chilul Shabbos. The Minchas Chinuch (in meleches koseiv) asks what the din would be if someone traced over a get on Shabbos to make it lishma? If ksav al gabei ksav is considered writing, then the writer, in his attempt to create a valid get, has been mechalel shabbos. However, if the writer is a mechalel shabbos, then he is not an acceptable sofer to write gitin and the get is pasul. If the get is pasul, then the second ksav has not accomplished anything, and it is not an act of writing. But if it’s not an act of writing, the sofer is not a mechalel shabbos, back to square 1 and the circle repeats.

chilul shabbos for cha'yei sha'ah

There is a wild Ohr haChaim in last week’s parsha. The Torah warns “ach es shabsosai tishmoru”; why the need to repeat “v’shamru es hashabbos…la’asos es hashabbos”? Explains the Ohr haChaim that pikuch nefesh is doche shabbos only if the person being saved will live and continue “la’asos es hashabbos”, to observe the shabbos. But to save someone for chayei sha’ah, to save someone who will die on that same day before shabbos is even complete, to break shabbos so someone can have just a few more minutes or hours of life, this is not permitted. The halacha is quite the opposite – one is permitted to break shabbos even for chayei sha’ah, even to extend someone’s life for a few moments longer. The Ohr haChaim seems to be built on the idea (thought he does not explicitly reference it) that the heter for pikuach nefesh stems from the sevara “chalal alav shabbos achas k’dei she’yishmor shabbosos harbei”, it is permissible to break one shabbos to extend a person’s life for the sake of the many future shabbosos that the person can observe. If the person will die within hours of being saved, the basis for the sevara doesn’t work. See Shu”t Minchas Eluzar I:9 which one of the new Mikraos Gedolos editions mentions in a footnote.

10 year old's impression of gadol biography

One of my daughters is doing a school report on Eretz Yisrael which involves writing about some of the mekomos hakedoshim, some of the mitzvos teluyos ba'aretz, and selecting two "gedolim" who lived in Eretz Yisrael to write about. One of my daughter's choices of a gadol to write about is R' Arye Levin (the other, at my suggestion, is Rav Kook.) She has yet to read the R' Ayre Levin bio (A Tzadik in Our Time by Simcha Raz), but last night asked me what R' Arye Levin's favorite color was. She explained that if someone were to write a bio about her she would want it to include her favorite color, so of course R' Arye Levin must have a favorite color included in his bio as well. My daughter clearly has a long way to go on this project : )

Seriously, there is a real mussar haskel here to think about. When we evaluate a gadol's life, do we project our standards about what is important or significant onto them, fitting them into our preconceived framework, or do we change our thinking about what is important and significant in response to what we learn about their life?

a stool of only one leg vs. a stool of three: nationhood and the Avos

Chazal (Brachos 32) record Moshe Rabeinu’s argument against Hashem threat to rebuild the Jewish nation from him alone (32:10): if a stool of three legs, meaning a nation built on the legacy of the three Avos, cannot not stand in a moment of G-d’s wrath, kal v’chomer a stool of one leg, a nation built on the legacy only of Moshe, will not stand.

The kal v’chomer invoked by Moshe seems to have an obvious flaw. The new stool will not have one leg, but four – Moshe plus the legacy of the Avos, as he is obviously their descendent!

R’ Elchanan explains (in “aggados al derech hapshat” at the end of Koveitz He’Oros) that we invoke the zechus of Avraham, Yitzchak, and Ya’akov not merely because we are physically descendent from these great people. There are other tzadikim who lived before the Avos from whom we are also descendent, e.g. Noach and Shem, but we do not invoke their zechuyos. What makes the Avos unique is not their status as our physical forefathers, but their status as our national forefathers. Just like we use the term “father of the nation” for George Washington even though he is not anyone’s physical father, so too, the Avos are the forefathers of the Jewish people as a distinct national entity. Only based on that status do we invoke their zechus.

While the lineage to the Avos would remain even if a nation were built from Moshe’s progeny alone, the Avos’ unique status as “fathers of the nation” would be lost. The new nation would be rooted in Moshe as its forefather, and would hence be a stool of only one leg.

I think this vort is interesting because we have discussed in the past in other contexts at what point geirus into a Jewish nation becomes a meaningful concept. R' Elchanan's sees the change of Avraham's name to "av hamon goyim" as reflecting a change in his status from just a family unit among the clans decendent from Shem into an indepedent nation. Yet, R' Elchanan elsewhere places tremendous emphasis on Torah as the sole binding force holding together the Jewish nation. I wonder how he squares this idea with Avraham being an independent nation even pre-mattan Torah. Of course, one could point to the Midrashim that opine that Avraham observed the Torah... just thinking out loud.

does the mitzvah of tzedaka require a kinyan by the recipient?

Can the mitzvah of tzedaka be fulfilled by nesina, giving, if the recipient cannot do a kinyan to accept? Nafka minah if the recipient is a katan, a shoteh, or even a woman (mah she’kansa isha kanah ba’aleh means everything you give to her would revert to her husband’s possession and he might not need the money). R’ Elchanan raises this chakirah in the end of Koveitz He’Oros in the aggadita section.

A am a bit confused as to why he cites this sugya as relevant. Nedarim 34b raises the question of whether a neder of “kikarei elecha” would prohibit the mudar from eating the kikar of bread if it is given to him by the madir as a gift – do we say that once the kikar leaves the madir’s possession it is not longer “kikari”, his kikar, and it becomes permitted? The gemara first argues that it is obvious that the kikar is assur even if given as a gift. While in the madir’s possession and under his control, there is no need for a neder to prevent the mudar from eating the loaf. The whole point of a neder is to prohibit the kikar from being eaten even after it leaves the madir’s possession. However, the gemara rejects this reasoning. Perhaps the neder may have been taken to prevent the mudar from eating the kikar even while it remains in the madir’s possession, e.g. the mudar is invited for a meal.

I am not sure why R’ Elchanan needed to cite this gemara to prove what seems to be a simple point: one can give benefit to someone without actually being makneh anything to the recipient. What remains unclear (and R’ Elchanan acknowledges that this gemara does not resolve the dilemma) is whether such benefit fulfills the mitzvah of tzedaka or whether (though it may be a chessed) the mitzvah of tzedaka requires a formal act of kinyan.

dinim derabbanan - Rabbinic will or G-d's will?

Some of R’ Elchanan’s proofs that takkanos derabbanan are not rooted in a pasuk but are rooted in Chazal’s ability to intuit or interpret the ratzon Hashem:

1) Takanos existed before matan Torah introduced “lo tasur”. One example is Moshe interpreting Hashem’s command to include an extra day of preparation before mattan Torah (“hosif yom echad m’da’ato”). The license to interpret Hashem’s command preceded any formal granting of authority to do so. We also find various references in Midrashim to takanos of Shem v’Eiver.

2) The Rambam (Hil Shabbos ch 24) writes that Chazal instituted the laws of muktza to limit weekday activities and enforce the idea of Shabbos as a day of rest, as taught in the pasuk “l’ma’an yanuach”. Someone who violates a law of muktza is certainly not guilty of violating a Biblical commandment of “l’ma’an yanuach”. The commandment is not the source for the specific laws of muktza, but is the source for the fact that G-d desires Shabbos to be a day of rest, which in turn is the impetus behind the Rabbinic muktza laws.

3) R’ Elchanan presents an interesting spin on the Bila’am story. Since G-d did not explictely tell Bila’am not to go with Balak (see the meforshim who offer various suggestions on how to read Hashem’s warning to Bila’am so that it was not an explicit command), why is Bila’am blamed for acting based on his own desire? R’ Elchanan answers that it is not the command of G-d alone which we should heed, but G-d’s will. Since Bila’am recognized G-d’s desire to protect the Jewish people, even sans an explicit command not to harm them he should not have gone with Balak. What comes out of this discussion is a powerful moral lesson: a legal technocrat may skirt the law by taking advantage of existing loopholes, but the goal of halacha is not simply obedience to technical statutes but obedience to G-d’s will.

The Nesivos famously writes that an issur derabbanan violated b’shogeg requires no kaparah because the entire basis for dinim derabannan is to prevent a rebellion against the authority of Chazal – “lo tasur”; an act done b’shogeg cannot be called a rebellious act. However, according to R’ Elchanan’s thesis, Chazal’s role is to reveal the ratzon Hashem; the reason for obedience is not just to respect their authority, but because the laws they enact reflect what is inherently right/wrong. Lack of intention to disobey common sense does not preclude getting burned while touching a hot stove. Similarly, lack of intention when violating a din derabbanan may not preclude the need for kaparah for performing that which is wrong. (My son asked me over Shabbos based on a shiur he attends whether eating an issur derabbanan b’shogeg is metamtem halev. Perhaps the question hinges on this issue).

Midrash on why Kosel remains standing for eternity

Does anyone know the source for the Midrash that the Kosel remains standing because it was built with gifts from the poor? My wife raised the same question here. I have found Midrashim that associate west with the place of the Shechina and give that as a reason for the wall escaping destruction, but have not found the source associating it with gifts from the poor.

lo tasur and dinim derabbanan

Returning to R’ Elchanan’s Kuntres Divrei Sofrim, I am going to do some jumping rather than slavishly follow the order of the sefer point by point. Continuing with the topic of zakein mamrei, the Rambam writes that one can become a zakein mamrei by challenging Bais Din even on a din derabbanan provided it is a detail of an issur which is categorized among those which can lead to a punishment of kareis. The Ramban disagrees. The prohibition of zakein mamrei stems from the pasuk of “lo tasur”, which (Ramban writes) could not possibly refer to dinim derabbanan. If every derabbanan was included in the prohibition of “lo tasur”, why should there be any difference between dinim d’oraysa and dinim derabbanan? Why is it that s’feika d’oraysa l’chumra, but sfeika derabbanan l’kula? One could perhaps say that the rabbanan legislated that one need not be stringent in cases of doubt, but that approach seems forced and only begs the question of why there was a need to make any distinction.

Implicit in the Ramban’s attack is a rejection of “lo tasur” as the basis for obeying Rabbinic law. But if the need to obey a din derabbanan is not rooted in some pasuk, why indeed are we bound to obey? R’ Elchanan suggests a chiddush: a Jew is bound to obey the will of G-d. That will can be expressed in the form of a Biblical command, but it also might remain for us to intuit without an explicit command. The basis for all Rabbinic law is our trust that the Rabbis successfully intuited the will of G-d and revealed it to us.

I already did some posts in the past on this chiddush (here, here, here, and here) and will just bli neder just briefly review some of REW’s proofs. One point to ponder which R' Elchanan comes back to: granted that according to Ramban there is no pasuk in which dinim derabbanan are rooted, but given that dinim derabbanan are as much the will of G-d as a Biblical command, why (as the Ramban himself asks!) do they not carry the same stringency?

missing letters on the choshen mishpat

The gemara (Yoma 73b) asks how the U'rim v"Tumin could answer questions of Bnei Yisrael when there was no letter tzad"i in the names of the shevatim inscribed upon it (Rashi: if the question asked required an answer of "tatzil" [save], how could it be given?). The gemara answers that in addition to the names of the shevatim there was also inscribed "Avraham, Yitzchak, v'Ya'akov". The gemara further asks that the letter te"is was also missing, and the gemara answers that the words "Shivtei Yeshurun" were inscribed as well.

The Chasam Sofer has an elaborate pilpul (quoted in many likut seforim on the parsha) to explain why the gemara first was bothered by the missing letter tzad"i and only afterwards by the missing te"is. Following the order of the aleph-beis, one should first notice the missing tei"s before the missing tzad"i!

I'll leave it to you to look up the Chasam Sofer and will just present my own answer here. The gemara's shakla v'terya does not follow the sequential order of the aleph-bes; rather, it follows the degree of usefulness of the letter. The gemara first asked about the missing tzad"i because tzad"i seems necessary for meaningful responses. I would suggest that Rashi deliberately gave us an example of the use of tzad"i in the world "tatzil" and no example of the use of tei"s to emphasize this point. We could of course think of our own example of the use of tzad"i without Rashi. Rashi is not just providing an arbitrary illustration of the letter's use, but Rashi is telling us that the usefulness or need for the letter is what motivated the gemara's question. Only after this issue was addressed does the gemara move to ask about the missing letter tei"s, a letter far less useful, as evidenced by Rashi offering no example of a response which would be impossible to formulate without a tei"s, but a letter which the gemara at this point still things should have been available if needed.

priviledge vs. egalitarianism: why children of talmidei chachamim do not become talmidei chachamim

Nedarim 81 tells us that talmidei chachamim usually do not produce children who are talmidei chachamim “shelo yomru yerushah hi lahem”, so that it should not be said that the Torah is an inheritance for them. Ran and Rosh offer two very different interpretations of this line. Ran explains that the children of talmidei chachamim feel a sense of entitlement in their learning and do not strive as hard as others. In the end, this lack of effort catches up with them. Torah is not genetic; it is not an inheritance - without work and toil, one cannot succeed. According to the Ran, the gemara’s lesson is directed at the children of talmidei chachamim to not rely on their pedigree as a guarantee of success.

Rosh (and Tosfos) on the other hand explain that children of talmidei chachamim do not become talmidei chachamim themselves lest all others who do not come from a lineage of scholars simply give up hope of ever succeeding in learning. The lesson of the gemara is directed at the hoi polloi: scholarship is not for descendents of the intellectual elite alone, but is within reach of all.

I do not fully understand this Rosh. According to the Ran, the gemara is simply expressing a rule of thumb about human behavior: when we think we have something coming, we work less to achieve the desired goal. But according to the Rosh, the behavior of the children of talmidei chachamim has nothing to do with the outcome. It is not their lack of effort which prevents the children of talmidei chachamim from becoming scholars in their own right, but it is G-d’s intervention, done for the sake of demonstrating egalitarianism. Doesn’t this intervention interfere with the bechira (free will) of children of talmidei chachamim to achieve what they can on their own merits? Or to put it another way, is it fair to take away the achievements of a minority for the sake of levelling the playing field and creating a more egalitarian distribution?

more on birthdays and double Adars

Getting back to the halachic issue of the double-Adar, the MG”A paskened that a child born in Adar I of a leap year does not become bar mitzvah until Adar II if his bar mitzvah also occurs on a leap year. However, R’ Akiva Eiger and others disagree. If a child is born in a regular Adar, then his birthday is celebrated in the “real” Adar, Adar II of a leap year. But a child born in Adar I of a leap year was not born during the month of Adar! The child was really born in the month of “tosefes” Adar. Therefore, he does not need to wait until “real” Adar to become bar mitvzah, but he becomes bar mitzvah once that same month of "tosefes" is reached.

(I happen to have a nephew whose bar mitzvah is upcoming in a few weeks during Adar II. If I am not mistaken, 1995 was a leap year as well, but I have no recollection if he was born in Adar I or Adar II.)

What remains a bit confusing to me is how to deal with the proof of the MG”A. The Yerushalmi in Kesubos does say that a three year old girl with an Adar birthday who is niveles during Adar will retroactively not be considered be’ulah if the year is made a leap year. The assumption seems to be that the girl’s birthday is postponed until Adar II. Why doesn’t the Yerushalmi in Megillah take this case as proof that the “real” Adar is Adar II? Is there anything gained by using the need for a korban less than a year old as a test for the “real” Adar vs using this well known case? The Ridba”z asks this questions and offers an answer, but after re-reading it a couple of times I still can’t make heads or tails of what he is saying. I will just note that interestingly the GR”A (O.C. 57) cites the Kesubos case as the source for the din in S.A. and does not cite the Yerushalmi in Megillah.

While not directly relevant to this topic, I have to mention a fantastic chakira which my wife thought of, which goes to show you what can happen after years of living with someone who tries to brainwash you into thinking in "lomdish" categories. Yesh lackhor: is Feb 29 of a leap year the last day in February, or the day after Feb 28? Nafka minah: if you are born on Feb 29 of a leap year, when do you celebrate your birthday? If Feb 29 is the last day in Feb, then on a non-leap year your birthday would be on Feb 28. But if Feb 29 is the day after Feb 28, then on a non-leap year your birthday would be March 1. I think this must be a discussion in achronim somewhere : )

double Adar and the yahrzeit of Moshe Rabeinu

This morning I came home from shul and told my wife that there was no tachanun because of 7 Adar. She responded, “What about Adar Sheni?” I honestly never thought about it, but since the whole issue of yahrzeit’s in a double-Adar is a matter of debate (see O.C. 568) , I propose we skip tachanun during both months : )

Yesterday I posted the safeik of the Yerushalmi whether which month, Adar I or Adar II, is the “real” and which is the addition. There is more to be said on the halachic issue, but for today I want to focus on what the debate might teach us for our avodas Hashem. The Shem m’Shmuel writes that the number 12 is symbolic of the natural order, teva; e.g. 12 constellations in the sky, 12 months in a regular year, 12 hours in a halachic day. The number 13 is symbolic of transcending the natural order; e.g. 13 middos harachamim are used to ask G-d to extend his mercy beyond what we deserve. There is something to be said for living within natural boundaries – go to work, have a regular seder in learning, take care of chores around the house, repeat. This is the world of the number 12. But sometimes a person needs to make a jump into the world of 13, a world without limits or boundaries, a world where a person can be inspired by ideas that transcend the practical routine even while knowing that the world of 12 will ultimately pull one back to reality. The world of 13 provides the boost, the vision, without which a person could not sustain himself day after day in the world of 12.

So which is the ikkar and which is the tafeil, which is the “real” world and which is the “tosefes”? The world of 13 is inspiring, but unless it impacts the day to day world of 12, its platitudes are meaningless. On the other hand, the world of 12 has no meaning without the goal and vision of the world of 13 to sustain it. Which Adar is the “real” Adar – the 12th month, or the 13th?

There is an opinion in Chazal that the day baby Moshe was thrown in the Nile was the last day of Pesach (see previous post which discussed this gemara). The gemara asks how this can be, as we know Moshe was hidden for three months, and we know he was born on 7 Adar – there are not three months between 7 Adar and 21 Nissan! The gemara answers that Moshe was born in a leap year, and the three months consist of part of Adar I, Adar II, and part of Nissan. The Shem m’Shmuel notes that even the opinion which holds that Moshe was thrown into the Nile on 6 Sivan also agrees that the year he was born was a leap year (although that assumption is not necessary to work out the date calculation). Just a coincidence? Or, as the Shem m’Shmuel suggests, does this perhaps tell us something about Moshe, about being born with the sensitivity to a that world of 13 which transcends the regular boundaries of teva?

Just want to note that if the Shem m’Shmuel is right that everyone agrees that Moshe was born in a leap year, one can infer that the second opinion in the gemara must hold that Moshe was born in Adar II and not Adar I (he does not discuss this point). Since the year Moshe died was not a leap year, and we assume the date of his birth and death coincide, might that not have a bearing on the halachic question of which Adar is the “real” Adar? Just throwing out the idea – need more time to think about it.

Update: this article makes a similar point, but I am not sure what to make of the idea that Moshe was not born in a leap year.

which Adar is the "real" Adar?

Sorry for the delay in posting – lots of work and other issues have come up. The Yerushalmi (Meg 7 in Vilna ed) raises a safeik which month of Adar is the “real” month of Adar and which month is the tosefes, the added month. The gemara writes that the nafka mina would be for the daily korban tamid (acc to girsa of Korban Eidah), which must be no more than one year old. Let's say an animal was born on 15 Adar. If the next year is a regular year, on 20 Adar the animal would be pasul for a korban because it is over a year old. If the year is declared a leap year, then if Adar I is the “real” Adar and Adar II is a “tosefes”, the animal is pasul. However, if Adar I is a “tosefes” and Adar II is the “real” Adar, then the animal is still kosher.

The S.A. paskens that if a child is born in a regular year, his bar mitzvah will be during Adar II of a leap year because Adar II is the “real” Adar. What if the child is born during a leap year on Adar I - would his bar mitzvah be in Adar I or Adar II? The MG”A (O.C. 56) paskens that the bar mitzvah should still be in Adar II, as the bar mitzvah always must occur in the “real” Adar. One of the MG”A proofs comes from a well known Yerushalmi in Kesubos. Chazal assume that a girl’s besulim will grow back if she is niveles before age three. If a girl’s birthday was on 15 Adar and she was niveles on 20 Adar, she is assumed to have lost her besulah status. However, if even on 29 Adar Bais Din declares the year to be a leap year, the girl would retroactively retain her besulah status because she has not yet reached her third year. (Many interpret this Yerushalmi to mean that B”D’s declaration does not just change the girl’s legal status, but changes reality and causes the girl’s besulim to return – this is a discussion for another time.) Just like the besulah is assumed to have not yet reached her third year until the date of her birthday in Adar II, so too, reasons the MG”A, a bar mitzvah boy does not reach the age of gadlus until his birthday is reached in Adar II.

Many Achronim (see R’ Akiva Eiger) disagree with the MG”A… IY”H more to come, and IY”H I will get more time to write : )

issur hana'ah: practical use or permissability to use

The Ran (Nedarim 85a) cites the Rashba’s psak that if a person takes a neder not to benefit from his/her own property, others are permitted to help themselves to the nodeir’s goods. Since the property is assur b’hana’ah to the one who took the neder, it has no value; the nodeir suffers no loss. However, if the nodeir was to be matir neder, the neder is retroactively considered non-existent (chacham okeir neder m’ikaro), and those who took the property of the nodeir must now pay for the goods.

R’ Shimon Shkop (Sha’arei Yosher I:9) writes that this Rashba is a clincher proof to the chakira (raised by R' Elchanan) whether issur hana’ah is a function of not being halachically allowed to use something or the item practically having no value. If issur hana’ah is a function of whether something practically can be used, the fact that a neder is considered uprooted retroactively is irrelevant – the practical bottom line remains the same that the item was off limits until the chacham was matir neder. The Rashba only makes sense if one assumes that issur hana’ah is a function of legal status, of the halachic permissibility to use or not use an item. Once the chacham uproots the neder, the legal status changes retroactively. Therefore the items taken from the nodeir are retroactively considered valuable, and must be paid for.

kiddushei kesef and kiddushei shtar using issurei hana'ah

The Yerushalmi writes that neither issurei hana’ah d’oraysa or derabbanan can be used for kiddushei kesef. A shtar kiddushin, however, can be written on issurei hana’ah derabbanan but not issurei hana’ah d’oraysa. If a shtar must be written on something which has value, why are issurei hana’ah derabbanan acceptable? Why is there a difference between shtar and kesef?

As we learned in previous posts (see posts labeled KDS), R’ Elchanan suggested that there are two possible reasons why issurei hana’ah lack value: 1) metziyus - practically these items are worthless; 2) din – the halacha prohibits using these items. The difference between the two is with respect to issurei hana’ah derabbanan, which practically are off-limits, but on a d’oraysa level are halachically permissible to use.

With this distinction R’ Elchanan explains the Yerushalmi. Kiddushei kesef requires something that has real-world value, to the exclusion of even issurei hana’ah derabbanan. A shtar, however, does not have to be written on something that has value; it has to be written on something permissible to use. Since issurei hana’ah derabbanan are permitted to be used from a d’oraysa perspective, they are not disqualified.

brilliance: genius vs. hard work (II)?

More on hard work vs. genius from the NY Times (link to article):

…As humans, we want to believe that creativity and innovation come in flashes of pure brilliance, with great thunderclaps and echoing ahas. Innovators and other creative types, we believe, stand apart from the crowd, wielding secrets and magical talents beyond the rest of us.

Balderdash. Epiphany has little to do with either creativity or innovation. Instead, innovation is a slow process of accretion, building small insight upon interesting fact upon tried-and-true process. Just as an oyster wraps layer upon layer of nacre atop an offending piece of sand, ultimately yielding a pearl, innovation percolates within hard work over time.

interesting Abrabanel on aliya la'regel

My wife pointed out (see her post) an interesting Abarbanel that says the mitzvah of aliya la’regel is incumbent upon all males between 20 and 50 years old. I have no idea why he would be compelled based on pshuto shel mikra to say such a thing or what possible halachic explanation there could be. It seems pretty clear that all males (from bar mitzvah) are obligated in aliya la’regel, and even children are included as part of the mitzvah of chinuch (see Rambam, Hil Chagiga ch. 2). Any ideas?

is making someone a "goseis" an act of murder?

I discussed the following interesting Minchas Chinuch with my son over Shabbos: The halacha is that we pasken dinei nefashos based on rov (Sanhedrin 69). We also know that rov gosisin l’misah. It should therefore follow that if Reuvain makes Shimon into a goseis (and Shimon is subsequently killed by Levi, so we can’t just wait and see if he recovers or not), Reuvain would be chayav for murder. By way of analogy: if Reuvain pushed Shimon off a cliff and on the way down Shimon was shot by Levi so we don't know if he would have miraculously survived, Reuvain is guilty of murder (thanks R’ P.C. for the analogy).

The logic sounds right, but Tosfos (Sanhedrin 78a d”h b’goseis) writes that Reuvain is not chayav for making Shimon a goseis. Putting aside Tos’ proofs (which the Minchas Chinuch takes issue with), why does the principle of rov not apply in this case?

Tiferes Shlomo on why a slow conquest of Eretz Yisrael

It’s Friday, so how about a little Tiferes Shlomo? Hashem tells BN”Y that the Cannanite nations will not be conquered at once, but rather bit by bit, lest the land become desolate “v’rabah alecha chayas hasadeh”, and wild animals overcome the population (23:29). A strange pasuk - certainly, says the Radomsker, it is not outside Hashem’s power to find some way to thwart the danger of wild animals without extending the time needed to conquer the land. Why the deliberate delay?

I think perhaps there is room to read at least derech remez the phrase “chayas ha’sadeh” in the pasuk as perhaps not meaning “wild animals” in the sense of lions and tigers and bears (oh my!), but rather, as the phrase literally means, “lives of the field”. Building a new country demands the creation of new political, social, legal, and cultural structures and organizations that take time as well as effort to develop; there is a period of gestation and growth that marks the transformation from “life of the field” to a civilized nation. To allow that process to unfold in an orderly way, the Torah promises a slow conquest.

Perhaps this is something worth reflecting on when we look at the development of Eretz Yisrael in our time and witness the struggles to manage its growth and development.

(P.S. Since I have been quoting Tiferes Shlomo on and off, you will probably wonder why I seem to be missing the discussion of the klipos and chitzonim from the piece I am basing this on, or why the piece I quoted last week also did not match exactly. So here is my editorial disclaimer for all posts like this: I don’t pretend to be faithful to the Tiferes Shlomo’s vocabulary, which I doubt I could make understandable on a blog. Instead, I try to be faithful to his ideas, or at least what how I interpret them. Discussing the effects of chitzonim while being ma’aleh nitzotzos from klipos would definitely be more authentically Tiferes Shlomo, but I don’t think that sentence has meaning for most people. I would even say that if you just walk away from the Tif Shlomo with that pie-in-the-sky sentence and don’t think about what it means on a level that relates to your life, you are missing the point of learning sifrei chassidus. If my reworking of the idea does not resonate, by all means see the Tiferes Shlomo inside, as the sefer has tremendous depth and one should not be dissuaded from learning the original by my presentation.)

brilliance: genius or hard work?

Are brilliant talmidei chachamim blessed with some sort of genius gene, or is success in learning as much a matter of hasmadah and hard work as raw intelligence? From Complications, by Atul Gawande:

Surgeons as a group adhere to a curious egalitarianism. They believe in practice, not talent…Nonetheless, attending surgeons say that what’s most important to them is finding people who are conscientious, industrious, and boneheaded enough to stick at practicing this one difficult think day and night for years on end…

And it works. There have been many studies of elite performers – international violinists, chess grand masters, professional ice-skaters, mathematicians, and so forth – and the biggest differences researchers found between them and lesser performers is the cumulative amount of deliberative practice they’ve had. Indeed, the most important talent may be the talent for practice itself. K. Anders Ericsson, a cognitive psychologist and expert on performance, notes that the most important way in which innate factors play a role may be in one’s willingness to engage in sustained training. He’s found, for example, that top performers dislike practicing just as much as others do. (That’s why, for example, athletes and musicians usually quit practicing when they retire.) But more than others, they have the will to keep at it anyway.

kufra kaparah - eidim zomimim who testify someone is chayav misah b'ydei shamayim

Jumping back into things, I just want to mention an interesting Ramban that I saw when learning Makkos with my son, which is sort of apropos of parshas hashavua (but then again, so is most of choshem mishpat). Eidim zomimim who testify that Ploni’s muad ox killed someone and Ploni must pay kofer do not get punished in turn by having to pay kofer; instead they receive malkos. The gemara (2b) explains that kufra kaparah, the payment is exculpatory for the person whose ox murdered; since the eidim zomimim do not have an ox which killed anyone, the payment is not applicable to them.

This is not the only place that we find that money paid as a kaparah takes on a different character than other payment. Tosfos (Kesubos 30b d”h zar) writes that mechila by the recipient does not exempt an obligation to pay kaparah.

The Ramban adds an interesting lomdus to the gemara’s explanation which sounds almost like something an acharon would say. The Ramban writes that kofer is a substitute for the ox's owner receiving misah b’ydei shamayim. It makes no sense to say that eidim zomimim through false testimony attempted to cause someone to be chayav a misah b’ydei shamayim – k’lapei shemaya, from Hashem’s perspective, the truth is always known, and no one can ever receive a misah b’ydei shamayim unjustly! (Compare with the Ramban’s explanation on chumash as to why if the nidon was killed, eidim zomimim are also exempt – Ramban explains that since Elokim nitzav b’adas K-el it is impossible for Beis Din to kill someone who does not deserve death.)

What makes the Ramban interesting is that he directs us to look at the mechayeiv, the root cause behind the payment, instead of just looking at the consequence (very R’ Shimon Shkop-ish). R’ Akiva Eiger points out based on the Ramban that the gemara’s chiddush is not just true of kofer, but would be true of any attempt of zomimim to be mechayeiv misah b’ydei shamayim.

a meal of korbanos or simple bread - a lesson in kedusha from Yisro

Administrative note: I’m going to be away from my computer for the first few days of next week, so no postings.

Yisro rejoins Moshe and “Vayikach Yisro chotein Moshe olah u’zevachim l’Elokim”, he offers a korban olah and other korbanos; the pasuk continues, “VaYavo Ahron v’kol ziknei yisrael l’echol lechem im chotein Moshe lifnei haElokim,” Ahron and the rest of the elders joined Yisro to eat bread.

The Radomsker (Tiferes Shlomo) notes that the pasuk’s opening sets our expectation for a banquet of korban meat to be served, yet it seems Yisro was joined by Ahron only for a simple meal of bread. It’s almost like the frum Jew at the office party who takes the fruit plate and ignores the steak dinner everyone else is eating. Was there something wrong with the korbanos that caused the switch to bread, or is there something else going on here?

The danger in making the sort of life-changing commitment Yisro undertook is that a person may whiplash from one extreme to another. I don’t need to point to the not-uncommon image of the ba’al tshuvah who one day is clothed in T-shirt and spiked hair and overnight is found wearing bekeshe, beard and peyos. I can even point to my own world, as my son, who had once been an avod reader, now scarcely opens a book as his immersion in gemara has increased. This is the world of “olah u’zevachim l’Elokim”, where one’s only desire is for dveikus and spirituality, where fulfillment comes through separating from the mundane, rejecting the world of the past, and clinging only to pure holiness.

Ahron and the Zekeinim did not hesitate to join Yisro, but their meal had a different flavor. A person is simply deluding him/herself if he/she thinks life will be an endless stream of uninterrupted “olah u’zevachim”. The challenge a Yisro must eventually confront is how to remain engaged in that high level of spiritual commitment even while eating mundane bread, “le’echol lechem”, while engaged in the daily routine. It is almost ironic that Ahron haKohein, perhaps the paradigm of a person whose life was dedicated to avodas hakorbanos, here sits down davka to eat bread, as if to underscore to Yisro that he too, despite his lofty role and position, remains a simple man of bread.

The Radomsker notes, the eating of “lechem” is described as “lifnei haElokim”, suggesting an even higher level than the korbanos offered “l’Elokim”. The ability to remain engaged in a life of kedusha even while baking the bread or making the donuts on a daily basis is perhaps a far greater achievement than withdrawal into the cocoon of korbanos. It is a challenging lesson to absorb.

the seven names of Yisro

The Ishbitzer teaches that a person’s name reflects his/her essence – the Hebrew word shem has the same numerical value as the word ratzon (written chaseir), a person’s innermost desires. The fact that Yisro had seven names tells us that he was a complex person, an individual with multifaceted interested, desires, and drives. Seven always represents a complete unit in olam-hazeh terms (e.g. 7 days of a week); seven names reflects the maximum potential of curiosity and ratzon. Yisro tested every avodah zarah in the world, yet his soul was not quenched. Avodah zarah is a one-dimensional fix. Think of the pantheon of Greek “gods”, each one individually incapable of addressing all needs. Think of the person is driven by the desire for money who must sacrifice family life for that goal, or the person who is passionate about art and as a result abandons a career. The one-dimensional person can find his/her fix in a particular avodah zarah, but a complex person who wants to balance many drives and interests will not have it so easy. Hafoch bo v’hafoch bo because only in Torah can one find everything, a complete balance that can fulfill every aspect of a person’s soul.

why issurei hana'ah have no value: din or metziyus?

To address the issues raised last post, R’ Elchanan poses a chakira: why is it that issurei hana’ah have no value – is it a din or a metziyus? Meaning, is value simply a practical function of whether or not something can be used, or is it a halachic / legal function of whether it is permissible to use an object? If value is simply a function of practical use, it makes no difference whether an item is assur b’hana’ah mederabbanan or m’doraysa. However, if value is a function of the halachic right to use an item, then an item may on a d’oraysa level be classified as having value, but mederabbanan be off limits and valueless.

If value is a function of the halachic right to use an object, it becomes easier to understand why Rashi (Pesachin 7) resorts to the mechanism of “afk’inu rabbanan l’kiddushin” to explain why kiddushin using chameitz derabbanan is invalid. Practically, chameitz which is assur b’hana’ah mederabbanan is useless and valueless. However, legally, halachically, that chameitz on a d’oraysa level is permissible to use and does have value. Rashi defines value based on the legal rights to use an object. If m’doraysa an object has use, it has value, and m’doraysa the kiddushin is valid. Rashi therefore introduces “afk’inhu l’kiddushin” to explain how the Rabbanan can dissolve kiddushin which is effective on a d’oraysa level.

R' Elchanan writes that this approach also explains why according to the KS”M (and some Rishonim) kiddushin may work using a double derabbanan (chameitz derabbanan during a time period where the issur applies only mederabbanan). Since value is measured by halachic rights, there is room to distinguish between an item excluded from use by one derabbanan vs. two.

For more on this issue, see R’ Shimon Shkop in Sha’arei Yosher I:9-10.

kiddushin using chameitz derabbanan

Chameitz derabbanan includes two categories of prohibitions: 1) items not defined Biblically as chameitz, but which Chazal prohibit; 2) items which the Torah defines as chameitz eaten during the early hours of Erev Pesach when the issur applies only mederabbanan. The Kesef Mishne (Ishus 5:1) holds (as previously discussed) that chameitz is the only issur hana’ah derabbanan which cannot be used for kiddushin. The KS”M infers from the Rambam that this is true only in the two scenarios above. However, if one combines the derabbanan aspects of both scenarios, i.e. using for kiddushin an item classified as chameitz mederabbanan during the time period where chameitz is prohibited only mederabbanan, the kiddushin is chal. R’ Elchanan asks: If chameitz derabbanan is categorically excluded from use for kiddushin, why should compounding multiple derabbanans make any difference?

With respect to chameitz derabbanan, Rashi (Pesachin 7a d”h afilu b’chiti) explains that Chazal dissolved the kiddushin based on the principle of “afk’inhu rabbanan l’kiddushin”. The implication of Rashi is that the kiddushin is valid min haTorah. R’ Elchanan notes that a far simpler explanation of why the kiddushin is invalid is possible. For kiddushin to be valid the husband must give an item valued at at least a perutah to his kallah. Since issurei hana’ah – whether d’oraysa or derabbanan – have no value, they cannot be used for kiddushin. The kiddushin should therefore have no validity min haTorah. Why does Rashi need to invoke the principle of “afk’inu l’kiddushin” instead of using this simpler explanation?

R' Elchanan answers both questions with one principle... stay tuned.

an anonymous "kinah" over inter-denominational MLK Day commemorations

There was a ceremony last evening in honor of MLK day held at a local Reform temple and attended by a mixed gathering of Reform, Conservative, and some Orthodox Rabbis along with non-Jewish clergy and politicians. I don't take the bunch of fliers sitting around in the local shule I was in last night as of evidence of anything other than the fact that someone found a convenient dumping ground, not necessarily that the Rav or shule in question supports the sentiments conveyed, but here is the poetic lament of some anonymous author:

אוי נא לנו כי חטאנו
כשחשובי אנשט שלומינו
משתתפים באסיפה גדולה בעירנו

בתערובת רפורמים קונסרבטיבים ונוצרים
בה״טעמפל״ של הרפורמים
עם מקהלה של ילידי נוצרים

שלא כדת ושלא כדין
אפילו כשיטת ה״רב״ זצ״ל מבאסטן

מתקבצים לשמוע הספדים
על אחד מגדולי השחורים
שנהרג לפני כמה שנים

זמירות אומרים אבל קינה מבעים
לאלה שראתה זאת ולא מוחים

פורצים פרצות בגדרנו
אוי לנו כי חטאנו

The reference to the Rav is footnoted with a comment in small print the bottom of the page that refers to the Rav's psak that it is prohibited to enter a Refrom shofar to hear shofar, "al achas kamah v'kamah" it is prohibited to go to an "asifas kofrim im komer". I don't know what the "al achas kamah v'kamah" kal v'chomer is (while one may wish to avoid recognizing Reform practice as a valid kiyum mitzvah, there is no similar danger of anyone perceiving a MLK gathering as anything other than a political event), but in any case, I'll avoid any other comment on this and let you make of it what you will.

Martin Luther King Day

OK, I can't resist posting something on "inyana d'yoma". LBJ's "we shall overcome" speech following the racial violence in Selma in 1965 is a classic:

But rarely in any time does an issue lay bare the secret heart of America itself. Rarely are we met with a challenge, not to our growth or abundance, or our welfare or our security, but rather to the values and the purposes and the meaning of our beloved nation. The issue of equal rights for American Negroes is such an issue. And should we defeat every enemy, and should we double our wealth and conquer the stars, and still be unequal to this issue, then we will have failed as a people and as a nation. For, with a country as with a person, "what is a man profited if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?"

There is no Negro problem. There is no Southern problem. There is no Northern problem. There is only an American problem....

What happened in Selma is part of a far larger movement which reaches into every section and state of America. It is the effort of American Negroes to secure for themselves the full blessings of American life. Their cause must be our cause too. Because it's not just Negroes, but really it's all of us, who must overcome the crippling legacy of bigotry and injustice.

And we shall overcome.

kiddushin using chameitz d'rabbanan

[In case you missed last week's post, I've started a new series focussing on learning through R' Elchanan's 'Kuntres Divrei Sofrim'. You can sort by the label KDS on the post to see others in the series.]

Why does the KS”M use such elaborate reasoning to explain the Rambam instead of taking the more direct approach R’ Elchanan suggests? Furthermore, why would the Rambam use an example like chameitz when the KS”M’s approach would work with any issur hana’ah derabbanan?

The first question becomes a little weaker if one takes the KS”M in the context of the perek (Mamrim 4) as a whole, where the Rambam lists many other examples of halachos that fall under the zakein mamrei umbrella because they can have ramifications for questions of chalos kiddushin. For example, the Rambam writes:

וכן אם נחלקו בלקט שכחה ופיאה, אם זה לעניים או לבעל הבית--הרי זה חייב: שהרי לדברי האומר לבעל הבית--הרי זה גזל ביד העני, ואם קידש בו אישה אינה מקודשת

With respect to the second point, R’ Elchanan points us to the Rambam in Ishus 5:1

המקדש בדבר שהוא אסור בהנאה--כגון חמץ בפסח או בשר בחלב, וכיוצא בהן משאר איסורי הנאה--אינה מקודשת; ואפילו היה אסור בהנאה מדבריהם, כגון חמץ בשעה שישית מיום ארבעה עשר--אינה מקודשת.

Notice that when the Rambam speaks of issurei hana’ah d’orayasa, he uses two examples: basar b’chalav and chameitz. When he speaks of issurei hana’ah derabbanan, he uses only the chameitz example. Why? The KS”M writes that chameitz is the single case of issurei hana'ah derabbanan which compromise chalos kiddushin. Unlike other issurim which are a new cheftza shel issur derabbanan, chameitz derabbanan meets the Biblical definition of what chameitz is, and is simply an extension of the time period during which chameitz is prohibited.

The KS"M concludes that using a type of chameitz which is only defined as such m'derabbanan during this extended time period to effect kiddushin should not pose a problem. More on this to come bl"n.

Bobby Fischer and the longing for order

The NY Times headlines this morning refers to the death of Bobby Fischer, and by coincidence last week I finished reading Bobby Fischer Goes to War: How a Lone American Start Defeated the Soviet Chess Machine. Fischer has been insane for many years, and as far as his Jewishness, I believe he wrote a letter to Encyclopedia Judaica asking to be de-listed, denying his Jewish identity (aside from the many anti-semitic ramblings he vented during his life). But putting that aside, there has always been fascination with Fischer because of his tremendous genius on the chessboard.

I think chess perhaps satisfies some inner need to withdraw into a confined space where movement is restricted by precise rules, where logic and order reign supreme, but at the same time where creativity is not compromised. While Fischer was still sane he always carried with him a pocket chess set that he would pull out anytime and anywhere to study chess problems while ignoring his surroundings. I have been reading some other books on chess players and could not resist comparing their concentration and mindset to that which we use to approach learning. L'havdil, how many similar stories are told of gedolim who could have a gemara handy at all times and be learning no matter what was occurring around them. The yam hatalmud is a similarly confined space, with its own logic and rules (13 midos, what makes for a good kashe or teirutz, etc.), yet which also allows for brilliant creativity which can be aesthetically pleasing to behold as well as logically compelling. I wonder if enjoyment in learning, chess, or similar activites stems from some type of need to withdraw from the messy unpredictability of every day life into a world of ordered rules and logical calculation that we can mentally assert control over. Returning to this artificial world provides a safe harbor, and the greater the mastery of this artificial environment, the greater the almost addictive infatuation with it becomes.

(To avoid misinterpretation: I am not suggesting gedolim learn she'lo lishma, motivated only by psychological need. I am suggesting that chess and learning and math and other activities may be pleasurable in part because they satisfy a psychological longing for order.)

zakein mamrei and chameitz derabbanan

R’ Elchanan opens his Kuntres Divrei Sofrim with the Rambam Mamrim 4:3 –

וכן אם חלק עליהם בגזירה מן הגזירות שגזרו בדבר שיש בשגגתו חטאת ובזדונו כרת, כגון שהתיר החמץ יום ארבעה עשר בשעה שישית, או אסרו בהניה בשעה חמישית--הרי זה חייב מיתה; וכן כל כיוצא בזה

A zakein mamrei is a person who challenges Bais Din’s authority by disagreeing with a ruling of Beis Din relating to an issur kareis, or with gezeirah derabbanan that was instituted as an extension of an issur kareis. The Rambam’s example: challenging the gezeriah derabbanan against eating chameitz during the sixth hour of the day on Erev Pesach (the issur d’orasya takes effect after the end of the sixth hour).

How is this issur derabbanan of chameitz associated with a punishment of kareis? The Kesef Mishne explains that were a man to be mekadesh a woman during the sixth hour with chameitz, whether or not that chameitz is assur b’hana’ah m'derabbanan will effect whether the marriage is valid, which in turn effects whether a breach of that relationship is adultery (=chiyuv kareis) or not.

R’ Elchanan proposes a simpler reading of the Rambam (which I think is the one we intuitively arrive at without the KS”M): since the Biblical issur of chameitz is an issur kareis, the issur derabbanan of chameitz is categorically within the realm of issues one can become a zakein mamrei for objecting to.

There is a something to be said for the KS”M’s interpretation, but before we get to that, let’s sum up the nekudas hamachlokes, the point of disagreement: according to KS”M, it is the fact that chameitz derabbanan can lead to an actual chovas hagavra of kareis which is crucial; according to R’ Elchanan, it is the fact that the the lav of chameitz is categorically subject to kareis which is crucial, irrespective (in this case) of whether there is any actual kareis ramification for violating the derabbanan in question.

starting again

After some more thought I am going to pick up again. Going forward I am going to try to keep lomdish posts focused on a single sefer so you can follow along inside if you like, everyone will have a better idea as to the progression of topics, and the sugyos will hopefully provide some valuable yesodos. My choice for now is to work through the Kuntres Divrei Sofrim of R’ Elchanan (henceforth: KDS) found in vol 2 of the Koveitz Shiurim. I know some of the ideas touched on are popular topics, some I have written up here before, and some will be new ( to me at least). I will label the posts KDS to make sorting through them easier.

I will still try to do some machshava posts, etc. and other more varied topics as time allows. Also, I'm going to try to keep the posts a little shorter so they are more easily digestible (and less time consuming to write).

The blogpshere seems filled with so much trash and bad thinking that I'm skeptical whether good posts make any difference or are simply bateil to an overwhelming rov, but I'm putting the kashe aside for now.

taking a break

I am taking a break from blogging for a few days because I want to rethink the whole blog content and direction. Writing has gotten more tedious than fun, so I want to mull things over. Thanks for your patience. I'll bl"n post something before the week ends.

band-aid for the neshomo on winter vacation

A local newspaper (The Jewish Star) has an article about a letter that all our local yeshivos were going to send to all parents warning about the dangers of unsupervised behavior by teens during winter vacation. There have been some pretty ugly incidents in the past, and this was a noble attempt to be proactive and warn parents and teens to be on guard. The letter was to have been jointly signed by the principals from every single school - that is, until one of them balked and the plan fell apart.

My kids are not really old enough for me to have these nisyonos to deal with, so maybe it’s not fair for me to comment at all. On the one hand, great idea! Why can’t there be a try for unanimity on more issues. Why did this one fall apart and what can be done to make it work?
On the other hand, who are we kidding? A teen breaking his (or her) head over a gemara with enthusiasm and a desire for ruchniyus usually does not suddenly throw everything away and engage in a week of orgiastic pleasure seeking. That week of fun in the sun is a siman that there is a pervasive rot within that is not being addressed by our schools in an effective manner. Dear Principals – have you ever walked down Central Ave. on Motzei Shabbos or taken a peek in the many pizza places there? And those are probably the more innocuous of hangouts.

A letter may head-off the problem of the moment, but only a 365 day a year effort to create an environment in the school, the home, the community of kedusha and hislahavus is going to have a chance of success with most kids.

the big letter "yud" (III)

Now that we have the building blocks (see parts I and II), we can get to the punch line. Every Jew soul is a letter written on the parchment of Jewish destiny (sounds poetic, no? My wife would call it purple prose). How that letter appears is subject to our bechira. If a Jew chooses lives according to pnimiyus, the letter within him is revealed clearly and distinctly. But if a Jew c”v acts according to hi/her own machshava, taking pen in hand and scrawling his/her own message, than the ratzon Hashem of his/her neshoma remains hidden, that potential letter in the destiny of Klal Yisrael that he/she could contribute is erased. Every decision we face really boils down to one question: what’s my letter and where does it come from, machshavos b’lev ish or Toras emes?

The Sefas Emes explains: Had Reuvain realized that the urge to save Yosef came from within his pnimiyus, that it is letters of Torah, he would have seized the opportunity. But it’s not so easy to see to distinguish our own thoughts from the letters of Torah within, and even the shivtei K-h can err (compare with the Shem m’Shmuel discussed once before).

Shlomo haMelech thought that he could take as many wives as he liked – the “yud” of “yarbeh” was just not his letter, it did not radiate in his neshoma, it was erased from his book. But Hashem does not let letters get erased, his ratzon will come to fruition, even if we choose to ignore the message.

And to return to the starting line again, “Netei es yadcha al Eretz Mitzrayim” now also makes a bit more sense. Yad-cha – your "yud". "Yud" (as we explained) is the aspect of machshava; Moshe, the transmitter of Torah, represented the highest level of da’as and machshava a human can attain. The “yud” was Moshe’s letter. That “yud”, which we can all attach to, can either be constrained and confined in the meitzar, the narrow straits of galus, or it can transcend the highest Heavens.