sefer recommendation - Tiferes Yosef

My son is a big R' Yosef Engel fan so we bought him the sefer Tiferes Yosef, a collection of R' Yosef Engel's chiddushim organized by topics relating to the parshiyos. As far as I know there is a single volume on Braishis out and vol 1 on Shmos (which coveres half the sefer). Whether you like R' Yosef Engel in particular or lomdus in general, these seforim will make your oneg Shabbos on a ruhcniyus level that much more enjoyable. The biography in the back of vol 1 is also fascinating. I wish I had time to write over some of the pieces, but instead of waiting for me and missing out, look for a copy in your local seforim store. (The problem in my house is we only have 1 copy and I have to sneak it away from my son to look at : )

the conflict between Avraham and Lot (part 1)

This week I wanted to take a closer look at the rift between Avrah[ha]m and Lot and the lessons we can draw from it. At the beginning of chapter 13, which is the chapter which tells us of Avra[ha]m's dispute with Lot and Lot's departure, the Torah tells us, "VaYa'al Avram m'Mitzrayim hu v'ishto 'chol asher lo v'Lot imo haNegba", Avra[ha]m went up out of Mitzrayim with his wife and all his belongings and Lot with him to the Negev. We can debate just how much significance to place on chapter divisions another time, but I don't think we can overlook the fact the departure from Egypt is presented not in closure to the previous chapter which discussed the conflict with Pharoah, but as a part of the opening to a new chapter, a prelude to the episode with Lot. In fact, looking at the Chumash, it is noteworthy that no new parsha marks a division between the episodes of Mitzrayim and Lot -- one flows right onto the other, with no break. This interweaving of the two stories is the key to unlocking their deeper significance, but before we get there, we need to look more closely at the text.

1) If we look back just one pasuk to end of chapter 12 we read that, "...VaYishalchu oso v'es ishto v'es kol asher lo", Avra[ha]m was evicted from Mitzrayim by Pharoah and sent on his way with his wife and all his belongings. The statement in 13:1 that Avra[ha]m went up out of Egypt with his wife and belongings seems identical to this pasuk. Why the repitition?

Other more subtle difficulties and observations:

2) Notice that the closing pasuk of chapter 12 mentions Avra[ha]m, his wife, and his possessions, but omits any mention of Lot, who only appears in the first pasuk of chapter 13.

3) Notice as well that the ending of chapter 12 does not mention a destination while the first pasuk of chapter 13 does.

4) The first pasuk of chapter 13 tells us of travels to the Negev, but interestingly, instead of saying, "VaYa'al Avram haNegba hu v'ishto...v'Lot imo", which would make clear that it was Avra[ha]m directing the journey and everyone else tagging along, the pasuk places the destination at the end of the clause next to Lot, "...v'Lot imo haNegba", as if the place of Negev is associated specifically with Lot's travels and not with Avraham's journey.

Why was there a dispute between Lot and Avra[ha]m? At first glance, the cause of strife seems obvious. Here we have two large herds of sheep grazing in the same area. Given that the amount of pasture land is limited, it would be natural for disputes to arise as to who found which pasture first and whose sheep get to graze where. If this was the cause of the breakup, it is also clear why conflict broke out only at this point and not earlier in Avra[ha]m's travels with Lot. It was only after Pharoah bestowed wealth and flocks of sheep and herds of cattle on Avra[ha]m that grazing land for such large flocks became an issue. A simple explanation, and a satisfying explanation, but for five little words...

"...v'haKena'ani v'haPrizi az ba'aretz" -- There was a dispute... and the Kana'ani and Prizi nations were then in the land.

What relevance could the tribes which dwelled in the land have to this private family conflict over grazing land between Lot and his cousin Avra[ha]m? Why should the text of the pasuk join these two issues? Beyond the textual question (which perhaps motivated Rashi to offer a different interpretation to the dispute than the simple one suggested above), a practical question begs asking: if two entire nation-tribes could peacefully find room to pasture in the same area, need there have been a conflict between the shepards of Lot and the shepards of Avra[ha]m over grazing area? Was there really such a shortage of land as to make a fight inevitable? (Kli Yakar)

It seems safe to conclude that a land dispute may have served as the superficial trigger, but without other issues brewing beneath the surface, the breakoff between Avra[ha]m and Lot might not have occurred. To discover what those other issues were we need to return to Avra[ha]m's departure from Egypt and the questions we raised earler. Stay tuned... bl"n will finish this up later.

source for the age of bar mitzvah

The Tziyun Yerushalayim to the Yerushalmi Sotah 21 points out that the Rishonim differ as to the source for the shiur gadlus for a boy or girl being age 12 or 13. Rashi (Nazir 29) writes that Levi is called an "ish", a mature adult, when he was 13 years old, as we see in the pasuk describing the battle of Ya'akov's children against Shechem: "Vayikchu shnei Bnei Ya'akov, Shimon v'Levi, ish charbo..." (Braishis 34). The Tshuvos haRosh, however, writes that shiur of gadlus is a halacha l'Moshe m'Sinai without a textual basis.

The T"Y suggests a possible nafka minah between these views could be whether the shiur gadlus is constant or variable. According to Rashi, 12/13 is a constant. According to the Rosh, perhaps in earlier generations in Sefer Braishis where the life cycle was different and the mind matured earlier, the shiur gadlus was younger as well.

I am not sure I fully understand why the T"Y assumes that if the shiur gadlus is a hllm"s, it follows that it is a relative number. I would suggest a different possible nfk"m. Achronim debate whether this shiur of 12/13 applies to bnei noach or only to Bnei Yisrael. Perhaps the answer hinges on this debate between Rashi and the Rosh. If the shiur gadlus is rooted in halacha l'Moshe m'Sinai like the Rosh suggests, hllm"s is binding only on Bnei Yisrael. If the shiur gadlus is derived from the age of Levi like Rashi suggests, then if one assumes the children of Ya'akov did not fully emerge from having the status of bnei noach pre-mattan Torah (as discussed by the Parashas Derachim and others) there is room to suggest that this shiur is universal.

lessons of the raven

My daughter came home last Shabbos with a dvar Torah about the raven sent out by Noach. According to the Midrash, the raven accused Noach of having designs on its mate. Instead of flying off in search of land, the raven hovered around the ark lest Noach try anything. As a result of its refusal to accept the mission of Noach, it was the raven which became destined to be a messenger to Eliyahu in a time of drought.

My wife asked my daughter (who is 13) what she made of this story -- do ravens talk, and can people like Noach really marry birds? My daughter said that in fact someone in her class has asked the teacher these very questions (good for that student!), to which the teacher answered that the animals in those days were different than our animals (bad for that teacher!).

I sympathize with the teacher's motive. How can she preserve the child's emunas chachamim when presenting a story that smacks of the fantastic and unbelievable? It's the approach that is faulty. Instead of trying to convince the child that ravens once did talk (trying to make the fantasy more palatable), the teacher should have used the opportunity to explain that Chazal sometimes teach through allegory and fable (see Rambam in Peirush haMishna beg of Perek Cheilek). Perhaps younger children will accept the image of Noach as Dr. Doolittle (though I can't imagine what they make of the biurd-human relationship part), but at some point children mature enough to realize this is not how the world works. Trying to preserve this image will not just cause a loss of credibility in the teacher, but c"v a loss of credibility in Torah as a sophisticated set of beliefs.

So what are Chazal trying to teach us here? I pulled out a Gur Arye and this is the lesson I drew:

The marriage relationship is sacrosanct. Even in the animal kingdom, there are species that stay with one spouse for an entire lifetime (and, no, I did not check if that applies to ravens). Part of that relationship undoubtedly involves the desire to protect one's partner and not to abandon the nest (in the figurative sense). So we should laud the raven! Instead of flying off into the sunset and abandoning the coup for greener pastures, it hung beside the ark, protective of its spouse.

But we don't laud the raven. There are times when even spouses must go in separate directions. Modern TV brings to our living room the image of soliders leaving home to serve their country in battle, of firemen who rush into burning buildings at great risk to their lives despite having a family at home, etc. We don't view these as breaches of familial duty, but as acts of couage and bravery to serve a greater good. When the services of the raven are needed to benefit the entire ark, hovering close by to look after one's own nest places personal good above the needs to society and is wrong.

Perhaps one can go even a step further. The purpose of marriage ultimately is for the sake of yishuv ha'olam. It is the institution of marriage and family that causes the world to grow in population, causing new regions to be explored, settled, and developed. For an entire year Noach's world consisted of the narrow dimensions of the ark. The key to unlocking that prison was finding land, and the raven was charged with the task. What greater yishuv ha'olam could there be than this mission!? By clinging to its nest the raven revealed that its motivation in staying by its spouse was not for this greater good of yishuv ha'olam, but instead, for its own personal selfish satisfaction. Not only does this trait of selfishness undermine the greater purpose of marriage in society, but it also undermines the very marriage bond itself. If one's concerns cannot rise above the selfish self-serving needs of one's own nest, one cannot begin to properly appreciate and care for the needs of another, even if that other is one's own spouse.

Chazal tell us (Sanhedrin 108) that the raven was one of only three creatures that broke the ban against having marital relations in the ark. The raven indulged in selfish pleasure while ignoring the fact that those around him were suffering and the world itself was being destroyed. In the ultimate ironic twist, who does the raven accuse of selfish motivations, of sending it away only to take its spouse? Noach -- the same Noach who for an entire years gave his every waking moment to selfless dedication to feeding and caring for the entire menagerie on the ark.

The raven's refusal to accept Noach's mission was not a sign of protective love of its mate -- it was a sign of selfishness and self-indulgance when needed by others. The Midrashic story is a lesson in placing the greater good above one's own needs, of selfish love and selfless sacrifice.

some interesting parameters of gezeiros

Among the differences between a kohein and kohenes listed by the Mishna in Sotah is the fact that only a kohein is prohibited from becoming tamei meis but not a kohenes. The Yerushalmi (Sotah 18a in Vilna ed) quotes Rabbi Dosa as saying a chiddush that a kohenes is also not included in the gezeirah not to leave Eretz Yisrael to go to other lands (eretz ha'amim).

The Yerushalmi asks why R' Dosa's chiddush is needed. The whole reason for the gezeirah not to enter eretz ha'amim is because of potential tumas meis. If a kohenes is not prohibited from becoming tamei meis, obviously the gezeirah is moot.

The Yerushalmi answers that one might have thought that since women are generally bound by gezeiros, here too, even though the reason does not apply, one mighty assume the gezeirah is still binding.

Why don't we accept such a sevara? The Yerushalmi answers, "nimtzah matche parshas tumos" -- obligating women to observe the gezeirah would undermine the pasuk's explicit exemption from the laws of tumas meis.

A few thoughts on the give and take of the gemara:

The idea that a gezeirah can be binding even if the underlying reason is inapplicable which the hava amina highlights is found in other areas as well. For example, R' Elchanan Wasserman points out that according to the Ran (Nedarim 52) the reason a davar she'yesh lo matirin is not bateil is because there is insuffcient contrast between the potential-heter item to be bateil and the mixture of real heter which it falls into. However, the application of the din extends beyond the world of ta'aroves to encompass any situation of safeik which will ultimately come to resolve itself (see Beitzah 3).

The conclusion of the Yerushalmi does not (I think) seem to retract this premis, but instead follows a line of reasoning popularly attributed to the Taz (Y.D. 117). The Taz writes that although Chazal have the power to extend prohibitions by creating gezeiros, no gezeirah can encroach on what the Torah itself explicitely permits. For example, Chazal created a gezeirah to prohibit blowing shofar on Shabbos. There is no such similar gezeirah prohibiting milah on Shabbos. Why the difference? Rishonim explain that the Torah explicitely commands that milah be done even on Shabbos; no such explicit command exists with respect to shofar (see Gilyon Maharasha to Y.D. 117 for other examples). It sounds like the Taz's chiddush is anticipated by this Yerushalmi: "Nimteis madche parshas tumas" implies that a gezeirah cannot infringe on the explicit permissability for women to become tamei set out by the pasuk.

Noach - an ark of words

There is a short vort of the Tiferes Shlomo on this week's parsha that needs some background elabortion to appreciate. The countless essays, books, poems, and blog posts composed by the great minds of the ages all share the aim of trying to explain, describe, and understand a reality that exists "out there". The intellectual world of words and ideas is a representation of this reality -- a means of grasping some small measure of the larger picture which lies outside the mind.

The B"esht taught exactly the opposite. "B'dvar Hashem shamayim na'asu" -- the true reality is the reality of words; what is "out there" in the physical word is the mere physical representation of deeper truths. G-d uniquely enpowered humankind over this dimension of words and granted us the ability to be a "ruach m'malela" (as the Targum puts it), a creature endowed with the power of speech, or, in other words (excuse the pun), a creature endowed with the power over words.

The beautiful landscape causes the poet to reflect and put words to paper; the tzadik's words of Torah and tefilah that draw G-d into the world cause the beautiful landscape.

Of course, it would be nice to know how to make beautiful landscapes and other beautiful things out of words. Is there some celestial scrabble board with letters that we can re-arrange to get the desired results? Unfortunately, that discussion will have to wait. It's enough for now to appreciate the basic shift in perspective.

Before jumping into the Radomsker's torah on the beginning of the parsha let me just throw in my own two cents with an observation on the end of the parsha. If the physical world is impacted by the power of words, the relationship between the ultimate failure of the dor hapalagah (--for you language purists; dor haflaga for others) to build their castle to Heaven and the devolution of language becomes that much more poignant. The failure of language is not just a practical impediment to building, but reflects an existential failing of mankind to be builders in a positive sense.

Getting to the opening of the parsha, Noach's charge to build a teivah taken on a double-meaning -- teivah means ark, but it also means "word". The Tiferes Shlomo comments on "tzohar ta'aseh la'teivah" that Noach's true task was to transform words, to make "tzarah" to "retzeih" -- meaning, to transform the presence of G-dliness manifest in the world from a force of punishment to a force of munificense. Noach unfortunately failed at that task. He could only transform "tzarah" into "tzohar", which Rashi explains to mean a diamond or window that allowed light into the ark. Noach could draw the light of G-d into his own life, but could not use that light to influence and benefit others.

Rashi describes Noach as "m'ketanei amanah", of little faith, a description seemingly at odds with the Torah's praise of Noach as a tzadik. The Radomsker explains that Noach the tzadik did not lack for faith in G-d, but he lacked faith in himself. He transformed himself, but did not believe he could influence the words and world around him.

This play on words reveals something of Noach's character and his mission, but it is not the complete story. Noach is described as a "tzadik… b'dorosav", which Rashi explains that some interpret to mean that his righteousness stood out only in his generation, but had he lived in Avraham's time he would be thought of as nothing. Chazal teach that "Yiftach b'doro k'Shmuel b'doro", that we must accept each leader on his/her own merits irrespective of their rank compared with other leaders in other generations. What purpose is there in engaging in such speculative comparisons of which tzadik is greater, Avraham or Noach? Is there a ranking system that we need to formulate?

Here too, a torah of the Radomsker sheds light on Rashi's meaning. Rashi does not mean to compare Noach to Avraham, but to reveal Noach's inherent potential. For all the greatness of Avraham, even after the test of the akeidah, he as able to say to G-d that he was "afar v'eifer", dust and ashes -- the embodiment of humility. Had Noach lived in Avraham's time he would indeed have been nothing -- not because of any ranking or comparison, but because he would also have been able to achieve that height of tzidkus and embody the same trait of nothingness!

I think putting these two torahs of the Radomsker together gives a more of a complete picture of Noach. Noach's lack of belief in his ability to rescue his generation, or at least ask G-d to mitigate punishment, was not a mark of humility. Quite the contrary. Noach did not lack a sense of self-worth; he did not think of himself as nothingness in the way that Avraham did. I would suggest that it is precisely because Noach did not have this trait of "afar v'eifer", he was not the most humble of men in the way Avraham was, that led to his failure to speak out. Who but someone who is completely self-effacing would be willing to stick his/her neck out for the sake of the residents of Sdom or the generation of the flood?

Noach was certainly a tzadik, but his words were directed inward more than outward perhaps because he believed that only he was capable or worthy of hearing those words. The teivah closed to the outside world may have kept the rains out, but it also kept in the light that might have dispelled some of the outside gloom.

What does this all mean for us? A few things:
1) An ark of words, concepts, ideology is what keeps the physical ark afloat -- not vica versa. You can lock yeshiva students in an ivory tower ark for 16 hours a day, but unless they absorb the words of Torah, physical barriers against secular culture are of little use.
2) G-d's presence is always immanent. It is up to us to determine whether it is manifest as ratzah, tzarah, or something in between.
3) Even if Torah permeates your life through your tzohar, your job is not done until the outside world shares those values.
4) The lack of belief in one's ability to help others may be a mask for a simple lack of belief in other's potential for redemption. The best cloak for ga'avah is the mantle of humility.

hachanos for mitzvos - how NOT to buy an esrog or build a sukkah

The Sefas Emes quotes a question from the Ta"z that I have been unable to find, but here it is anyway: the Midrash writes that when Hashem sees us building our sukkah and preparing lulav and esrog he promptly forgets all our past sins. Only with the start of the actual first day of Sukkos, when our preparations have ended, do our sins start to count against us. This is why the Torah calls this day "yom harishon", the first day [of Sukkos], as it is the first day "l'cheshbon avonos", for counting transgressions. How can it be, asks the Taz, that during these intervening days between Yom Kippur and Sukkos, when we are engaged in mere preparations for mitzvos, we are protected from sin, while during the actual days of Yom Tov when we are engaged in the mitzvos themselves we are prey to aveiros?

The yesod that we see from here is that hachanos, preparations, are even more valuable than mitzvos themselves. A mitzvah is like lulav or sukkah has its week or day of performance, but the preparation for the mitzvah has no shiur limiting it in time or duration. It is an endless bounty of schar available for the taking.

Last night I went to do my hachanos and buy a lulav and esrog. Standing in front of me was a man maybe in his upper-20's, with a beard, peyos, nice black yalmukah and white shirt, and he was assisting his father, a slightly older clean shaven man wearing a little cap, a man who did not seem to be a baki in hilchos lulav, which is maybe why he had his son along. The conditions were crowded, it was late, and everybody seemed to be in a rush. So this young man quickly looked over every esrog out on display, grabbed the one he wanted, and then thrust it toward the seller and yelled, "Now make me a lulav to go with it" (or something along those lines), whereupon his father added in a loud voice, "Please". The son was "nishtomem k'sha'ah chadah" and then in a slightly abashed voice added, "Yes, please".

Baruch Hashem we live in times where a clean-shaven working man from the previous generation who knows he needs a lulav but perhaps never learned or never had an opportunity to learn the halachos of lulav can have a son who grows up to be a yeshivishe-looking Jew who is yodei'a sefer. But shouldn't that growth in yediyas haTorah also mean a growth and greater sensitivity in the realm of derech eretz [which is kadma laTorah!]?

So why do we do often witness the opposite?

It is relatively easy to find an esrog which meets the criteria of mehudar at least according to some shitos Rishonim. And when you walk around in shul with an esrog that everyone admires because of your eye for hiddur and the fact that your wallet can tolerate it, or when your guests admire the beauty of your sukkah, by all means feel proud of your mitzvah observance.

But there is a much harder hiddur to fulfill, and that is the hiddur of derech eretz. Did you buy a lulav without pushing the guy next to you in line (assuming there is a line and not a chaotic mob scence)? Did you build your sukkah without screaming at your kids who are tossing parts and decorations all over and are underfoot while you are dangling from a ladder? Did you decide to pull out your power tools at 11:30PM to work on your sukkah enhancements irrespective of your neighbor's desire to get some sleep (thank you to which ever one of my neighbors was doing construction around that time last night)?

If you are makpid on these hiddurim, your neighbors may not know, your buddy in shul may not know, your sukkah guests may not know. In fact, let's not pretend otherwise - by being Mr. Nice Guy you may get pushed to the back of the line and get a less than perfect esrog yourself! And then you come home and your wife says, "This is what took 2 hours in the seforim store for?". And in shul everyone thinks you cheaped out on a chinuch set or something, or maybe you grew that wilted thing in your own backyard.

But it seems to me that if these hiddurim are the ones you are makpid on, if this is how you are medakdeik in the hachanos for your mitzvos, then you can rest assured that your "yom harishon" will indeed begin with a clean slate, with all aveiros forgotten. Indeed, your lulav and esrog is a chinuch set -- an sterling example that will educate your children and grandchildren as to how a Jew should live with derech eretz and middos tovos, an esrog with a hiddur so beautiful that it cannot be purchased for any money in the world.

Gmar chasimah tovah

Gmar chasima tova and easy fast to all. If anyone was offended by posts during the year, please do me a favor and have me in mind in your tefilah zakah when you get to the part about forgiving everyone.
Hashem should give me and you and everyone in klal yisrael koach and ability and time to learn more and more Torah in the coming year and to share it via blogs, e-mail, or maybe even to meet in person in Yerushalayim b'bias goel tzedek and to talk in learning there.

how does tshuvah undo the past? - amazing chiddush of the Sefas Emes

The Rishonim ask how the process of teshuvah can undo the past -- e.g. the Sefer haIkkarim writes that if you smash an object into pieces, no amount of regret will cause the object to reconstitute itself, so how does the regret of tshuvah cause our past mistakes to be wiped away?

I saw a comment of the Sefas Emes (in the likkutim at the end of the sedfer) that perhaps opens a new approach to answer this question. The S.E. quotes Rashi's famous statement that Hashem's judged Yishmael "ba'asher hu sham", based on his conduct up until that historical point in time, irrespective of his future actions or those of his descendents, which were undoubtedly already known already to G-d. The S.E. extrapolates an amazing chiddush. From Hashem's perspective past and future are one and the same. If Hashem chooses to ignore the future and judge a person based only on the facts of the moment, the same principle should dictate that Hashem ignores the past and judges based only on the facts of the moment! So what are we klapping al cheit for?!

The Sefas Emes explains that events of the past leave a roshem, an impression, a mark that is part of who we are at the present moment. We are not judged on past events, but we are judged based on the roshem that remains and is part of who we are at the present moment.

Based on this, I would suggest that tshuvah need not undo the past -- the question is misplaced, as the past has no bearing on how Hashem judges us. What needs to be undone in the roshem past events have had on our neshomos, a roshem that is part of our existance in the present but which can be cleaned though the process of viduy and charatah.

standing for viduy and shome'a k'oneh

The Mechaber 607:3) paskens that if you are present when the shat"z says viduy you have to stand. Rama adds that you have to recite viduy with the shat"z. The implication is that the Mechaber holds that even if even if you are not saying anything along with the shatz you still have to stand (which is how the mishna berura explains it). Why should that be true? If you are not saying viduy, why do you have to stand?

I don't think it is a din in shome'a k'oneh, and nothing to do with any chovas hagavra to say viduy or stand while saying it. It's a seperate din in the definition of viduy -- the cheftza of viduy is something recited in the context of a tzibur which is standing.

Speaking of shome'a k'oneh and viduy, the Rosh in the last perek of Yoma (#25) quotes the view of Rav Amram Gaon that on Erev Y"K the shat"z should recite viduy out loud in chazaras hashat"z to be motzi someone who is aino baki and does not know how to say viduy him/herself. The Rosh and most opinions disagree. I would guess that shome'a k'oneh does not work to be motzio somepne in viduy because although the ma'aseh mitzvah of viduy is a recitation of sins, the kiyum mitzvah is only effective if there is a corresponding sense of regret in one's heart. Shome'a k'oneh does not work where there is a ma'aseh mitzvah but no kiyum. For example, one cannot rely on shome'a k'oneh for the mitzvah of kri'as shema (see Shnos Eliyahu of the GR"A on the first Mishna in Brachos) because the recitation alone is not the full mitzvah; it must be accompanied for a kabalos ol malchus shamayim which is done b'lev.

kilkul b'shir and the ideal of a makom mikdash

The Mishna in R"H tells us that one time the witnesses who saw the new moon came late in the day, after the usual time at which the afternoon korban tamid was offered, and this led to niskalkilu haLevi'im b'shir, there was some confusion in the Beis haMikdash as to what to do -- the gemara discusses whether the shira accompanying the korban was omitted, or the wrong shirah was recited -- whatever happened, something was wrong. In response to this event a takana was made that if the witnesses arrive too late, even though their testimony would mean that the day should be declared the beginning of a new month and year, we do not accept their late testimony and instead hold the witnesses over and declare the new year as starting from the next day.

Over Yom Tov I heard an insightful comment in the name of R' Chait, the R"Y of Yeshiva Bnei Torah. R' Chait explained that it was davka because this kilkul, this confusion ,took place in the Mikdash itself, that caused the need for a legislative intervention and creation of takanos. The Mikdash is supposed to inspire all who enter within its walls and serve as a model of holiness and an example of the Torah ideal. For confusion and halachic uncertainty to exist in the very place we hold up as a model of perfection is intolerable. If our model of perfection has such flaws, what impression does that give of the Torah system as a whole? Therefore, the situation demanded remediation.

There is a natural mussar haskel from here (which I did not hear b'shem R' Chait, but I will say it anyway): in each of our little mikdash me'ats that we learn in and daven in every day, in our shuls and shteibelach and batei medrash, what takanos do we need to put in place to insure that these oases are models of perfection? What do we need to do to insure that someone who steps into a makom Torah feels insipred, feels drawn to Torah and its beauty, and does not witness kilkul b'shir?

R' Yosef Engel on "b'ficha u'b'levavcha la'asoso"

“Ki karov elecha hadavar me’od b’ficha ubelevevcha la’asoso”

1. The gemara (Nedarim 51) writes that if one took a neder from food which is “yoreid l’kedeirah” one cannot eat food cooked in an ilfas – the ilfas is used for the finishing stages of food preparation for items that were already “yoreid l’kedeirah”, previously cooked in a kedeirah, and therefore this food is prohibited. However, one who takes a neder from food “na’asah b’kedeirah” is allowed to eat food which is “na’asah b’ilfas”, and if one takes a neder not to eat “na’asah b’ilfas” one is allowed to eat food “na’asah b’kedeirah”. Why here don’t we say that food prepared in an ilfas was previously “na’aseh b’kedeirah” and therefore also prohibited?

Ran answers that the key here is the word “na’aseh”, which refers specifically to the final stage of food preparation. Food prepared in an ilfas was already cooked in a kedeirah, it was “yoreid l’kedeirah”, but it cannot be described as “na’asah b’kedeirah” because the finishing touches were done in an ilfas, not a kedeirah.

2. The mitzvah of tshuvah is multifaceted. Kiddushin 49 tells us that a rasha who is mekadesh a women on condition that he is a tzadik has accomplished effective kiddushin because we assume that a thought of tshuvah passed through his heart -- that fleeting thought of regret means he can no longer be called a rasha. Yet, on the other hand, the Rambam seems to define viduy, a verbal confession as integral to tshuvah if not the very definition of the mitzvah – “viduy zeh mitzvas aseh” (Hil Tshuvah 1:1). Rabeinu Yonah in Sha’arei Tshuvah goes into more detail describing many steps to the tshuvah process.

3. If we consider the many steps involved in complete tshuvah it becomes hard to understand how the mitzvah can be described as ki karov elecha, easy to do. It becomes hard to understand “Tashev enosh at dakah – at dikdukah shel nefesh”, how even till the last breath one can do tshuvah, when tshuvah emands "b'picha", a verbal expression of viduy to be effective.

Therefore, explains R’ Yosef Engel, the pasuk ends “b’levavcha la’asoso”. True, tshuvah with viduy done b’ficha is the ideal, but if we look at what is the most essential ingredient of tshuvah, the final, most crucial step in tshuvah, the “la’asoso” of tshuvah, as the Ran explain, the finishing touch, then we need only focus on the lev, "b'levavcha la'asoso".

"brisker" shevarim: reflections on chumra and minhag

The Mishna (R”H 33) tells us that a tekiya is the same length as a teru’ah is and a teru’ah is 3 beats long. Rashi explains that the total length of the entire tu-tu-tu of a teru’ah is 3 beats; each individual tu sound is 1 beat long. According to Rashi one could blow a very short tekiya lasting only 3 beats long. Tosfos explains that each tu-tu-tu is 3 beats for a total of 9 beats, which is what our tekiyos and teru’os for the most part sound like. For more detail, see Jewish Worker’s post, but this nutshell suffices for the issue I want to discuss.

The issue gets thorny when it comes to blowing shevarim because the opinions of Rashi and Tosfos seem mutually exclusive. According to Rashi, each tu-tu-tu of the shevarim must be less than 3 beats, otherwise each would be the same length as a tekiya. According to Tosfos, since tekiya and teru’ah each need a minimum of 9 beats, three short shevarim just don’t cut it.

Rashi’s short shevarim would sound strange to most of our ears. When I lived in Passaic, R’ Sacks had the ba’al toke’ah blow the last 10 kolos with very short shevarim to be yotzei Rashi’s view, but all other shevarim were blown according to the usual practice.

There is another way to try to fulfill both views, and the way I heard it in yeshiva, this was R’ Soloveitchik’s chiddush that R’ Chaim approved of. There is no inherent reason why one is limited to blowing three blasts tu-tu-tu for shevarim and not more. R’ Soloveitchik suggested that one can blow short shevarim of about 2 beats each to fulfill Rashi’s view, but blow enough shevarim (i.e. 5 shevarim) to add up to more than 9 beats in total and thereby fulfill Tosfos’ view as well (just saw that Nefesh haChaim has a post on this also).

This R”H was the first time I actually heard this chiddush implemented in practice. To be fair, the minyan I daven at implements other Brisker / RYBS chumros, so this is just one more to add to the mix. I asked my son if he understood the logic of what was being done (either the rest of the minyan is used to this or not attuned to it) and he told me that in yeshiva the menahel had presented this view as a Brisker shita which they recently adopted for some of the tekiyos in the yeshiva minyan. Apparently Brisker chumros are getting more popular every day!

I’m not sure what to make of this development. The chiddush is wonderful in an academic way, but somehow (maybe I am just losing some Brisker-ness) it strikes me as anti-traditional to actually implement. Tekiyas shofar has been going on for centuries. If your grandparents asked their grandparents what a shevarim sounded like, I have little doubt that the answer would be the usual tu-tu-tu, not 5 shevarim and not really short shevarim. Leaving aside whatever mystical effect blowing these precise kolos may have, if this custom was good enough for centuries of G-d fearing Jews who knew how to learn a little gemara too, why should we change it because of a shtickel lomdus? Admittedly, my reaction here is emotional rather than intellectual, and inconsistant with my own acceptance of Brisker chumra in other areas.

Haym Soloveitchik in his essay “Rapture and Reconstruction” writes with respect to newly adopted chumros of larger shiurim for achilas matzah:

It was perfectly clear to all concerned that Jews had been eating matzot for thousands of years, and that no textual analysis could affect in any way a millennia-old tradition. The problem was theoretically interesting, but practically irrelevant.

And then a dramatic shift occurs. A theoretical position that had been around for close to two centuries suddenly begins in the 1950's to assume practical significance and within a decade becomes authoritative. From then on, traditional conduct, no matter how venerable, how elementary, or how closely remembered, yields to the demands of theoretical knowledge. Established practice can no longer hold its own against the demands of the written word.

One can only wonder what Haym Soloveitchik would make of his father’s 5 shevarim, or of those who follow in his holy footsteps. But perhaps it is my own concerns which are "theoretically interesting but practically irrelevant", to echo R' Haym's words, as for better or worse, academic chiddush has left its imprint on the world of halacha l'ma'aseh.

atem nitzavim hayom kulchem - the totality of each person

The Radomsker asks why the pasuk seems to repetitively tell us "atem nitzavim hayom kulchem", you are all standing here before Hashem, and then after enumerating all the varied socio-econimic strata of people present concludes the section by again saying "kol ish yisrael", all people were present. What I think the essence of the Radomsker's answer means (stripping away the kabbalstic ideas) is that the opening phrase referring to "kulchem" does not really mean all the people in the sense of every member of the group -- that is what the last phrase, "kol ish yisrael" refers to. The opening phrase of "kulchem" means each individual in his/her totality of being. What does that mean? We all wear varied hats in life. We at various times might function as a parent, a sibling, a son/daughter, an employee, an employer, a friend, a talmid chacham, a ba'al chessed, etc. When we are at work wearing the hat of employee or employer and doing business, we might put out of our mind the persona of ben Torah that we wore for davening in the morning. Or when we are wearing the hat of a ben Torah we might forget that we also have responsibilities to a wife and children and need to care for them and give them time that could be spent learning. Sof kol sof it is very difficult to juggle all these hats and never run into a problem, or to feel completely at ease in all of them all of the time. So you might think on Rosh haShana (the day which according to the Midrashic reading of the pasuk is the day which we stand before Hashem) when we step into shul we might cling to that hat which fits best -- put the best foot forward. The pasuk tells is that Hashem will have none of that. When we stand before G-d, it is "kulchem", all the differnet varied personas we adopt are standing before Him, as Hashem judges our actions in every role we play, based on every facet of our personality.

Hopefully we will each be judged for a good and sweet year - kesiva v'chasima tova!

tekiya-teru'ah-tekiya: three notes or one unit?

The Mishna (Sukkah 53) tells is that no fewer that 21 chatzotzros blasts were blown daily in the Mikdash as part of the process of offering nesachim, but the gemara cites R' Yehudah's opinion that the minimum number of blasts was 7. Explains the gemara that there is no argument. The blowing had to be done in units of three: tekiya, teru'ah, tekiya. The Tanna of the Mishna countes 21 blasts in total; R' Yehudah counts 7 units of three.

The Rogatchover explains the machlokes as follows -- for any series of items that must go together, e.g. 4 minim on Sukkos, 4 kosos on Pesach, tekiya-teru'ah-tekiya, one can make the following chakira: are these seperate independent units which must go together, or does that fact that they must always go together prove that they are not independent units but are parts of some larger whole? Is there a single note called tekiya-teru'ah-tekiya, or are these three seperate notes which must always be played together?

The gemara explains that R' Yehudah learned from the pasuk "u'tekatem teru'a" that the terms tekiya and teru'ah are interchangable; they are one and the same unit and go together. The Tanna of the Mishna holds that the blasts are seperate units based on the pasuk which describes the blowing done to gather the camp in the desert, "tiski'u v'lo tari'u" -- if tikiya and teru'ah together form one unit, says the gemara, how could the Torah tell Moshe to do half a mitzvah?

The Aruch laNer is bothered by the gemara's logic and develops his question through an analogy to the mitzvah of zerikas hadam by korbanos. Some korbanos require 4 sprinklings of blood; some require only one. If a korban requires only one sprinkling of blood, we wouldn't call that 1/4 of the mitzvah of zerikas hadam -- viz a viz that korban, 1 sprinkling of blood is 100% of the mitzvah, not 25%! So too with respect to blowing chatzotzros. If the Torah requires a single tekiya in some circumstances, in those circumstances that single tekiya is 100% of the mitzvah, not 50% of the mitzvah that appears in other circumstances. What does the gemara mean?

Based on the Rogatchover, we can perhaps distinguish between the case of zeikas hadam and chatzotzros. With respect to korbanos, how many sprinkles should be are done is a function of the chovas hagavra, i.e. what action the person must take to fulfill the mitzvah. R' Yehudah and the Tanna are not arguing about what the act of blowing shofar entails or how many sounds must be blown. Their argument is regarding the cheftza shel mitzvah of a tekiya -- what is a shofar note in its simplest form: a three note tekiya-teru'ah-tekiya, or 1/3 of that series. What a person must do can change in different contexts depending on the requirements of the mitzvah, but the definition of an object is something that remains constant -- either a tekiya (or teru'ah) alone is a note, or it is not. But something can't both be a note and not be a note at the same time.

If we consider notes as one unit, it makes sense that they should be blown together, without even a breath in between. Some Rishonim suggest this nafka minah between R' Yehudah and the Tanna. This brings us to the practical question of the shevarim-teru'ah which we blow - is it one note or two notes that go hand in hand; one breath or not? Fortunately there are enough kolos to cover all the bases and not have a safeik.

Kesiva v'chasmima tova to all!

u'bacharta bachaim

Commenting on “u’bacahrta ba’chaim”, the Netzi”v cites a Sifri in Parshas Re’eh which illustrates the lesson of the pasuk with a comparison to a fork in the road where one path is covered with thorns and brambles and one path looks smooth and passable. Although the clear road appears to be the better route, in actuality the path which appears impassable will become a smooth highway further along and the smooth path will become clogged with obstacles. Taking the easy road is sometimes a shortsighted error. Similarly, when one comes to a fork in the road of life, choosing the path of torah and morality may appear to make the going more difficult, but will ultimately prove more rewarding.

The Netzi”v is not satisfied with this simple lesson alone as the moral of the Sifri's analogy. In the analogy, both paths ultimately lead to the same destination. In the choices faced in life, the choices of the saint and choices of the sinner carry them to quite different destinations. How does the analogy fit?

The message of the Sifri is that our assumption about the destination of the sinner is wrong. No soul is lost forever. A person may have to undergo suffering in this world and the next to purge the soul of its sins, but ultimately every Jewish sould can be and will be rehabilitated and restored to its splendor and rightful place close to Hashem. Precisely because no soul can ever be lost are we exhorted "u'bacharta bachaim". Why take a circituitous and long route to one's destination that requires suffering and punishment when one can choose the correct path and arrive at one's destination with ease?

which side of his mouth does a lefty blow shofar from?

A little halacha from the Mishna Berurah l’kavod the C”C’s yahrtzeit:

The Rama (585:3) writes that it is best (“tov”) to blow shofar from the right side of the mouth.

The Mishna Berurah quotes two explanations from the Magen Avraham for the minhag: 1) to counter the influence of the satan who stands to the right, as the pasuk says, “v’hasatan omeid al y’mino l’sitno”; 2) the left is already protected by the tefillin worn on the left hand (quoted in the Sha’ar haTziyun). The Biur Halacha adds another explanation which the C”C heard in the name of R’ Meir Simcha (I am far from a baki in M”B, but for what it's worth, I don’t recall other quotations from RMS in the MB): the gemara derives tekiya from the blowing of chatzotzros in battle; in the description of the battle fought by Gidon in Nach we learn that the chatzotzros were held in the soldiers’ right hand and torches in the left.

Since my son is a lefty I am somewhat more attuned to halachos that emphasize right-handedness and have come to expect debate as to whether things are reversed for leftys. This is no exception. Whether a lefty should blow out of the left side of his mouth should at first glance depend on which reason above is paramount: according to reason #1 and the reason given by RMS, both a righty and a lefty should blow out of the right side of the mouth. However, according to reason #2, a lefty who wears tefillin on his right arm should blow shofar out of the left side of his mouth because the “protections” would be reversed.

The M”B in the Sha’ar haTziyun rejects this nafka minah (and therefore he tucks reason #2 in the Sha’ar haTziyun where most people won’t see it and get confused). When we speak of the protective power of tefillin, we are not speaking viz a viz the particular ba’al toke’a, but viz a viz ba’alei tekiya in general. Since the majority of people are righthanded and wear tefillin on their left arm, the shofar is blown from the right by all.

(R' Menashe haKatan in Mishaneh Halachos Mh”T O.C. #480 was asked halacha l’ma’aseh how a lefty ba’al toke’a should hold the shofar. He replied by quoting this M.B. B’dieved, one is yotzei either way.)

kedusha outside the ivory tower of the beis medrash

Some belated Torah on the parsha:

Among the brachos promised if we do the right thing is, “Y’kimcha Hashem lo l’am kadosh ka’asher nishba lach ki tishmor es mitzvos Hashem Elokecha v’halachta b’derachav” (28:9) – Hashem will sustain us as a holy people on the condition that we observe the mitzvos and "walk in His ways". The Netzi”v (and many others) asks: the list of brachos is prefaced in the very first pasuk of the chapter with the condition that they would be fulfilled only if we observe Hashem’s mitzvos, "V'haya im shamo'a..."; why is that condition repeated here again in pasuk 9 in the context of the bracha of "y'kimcha lo l'am kadosh"?

The key to understanding the pasuk lies in the words, “v’halachta b’derachav”, which Chazal interpret to mean that a person’s behavior should conform to the model of gemilus chessed demonstrated by Hashem, e.g. Hashem visited Avraham to heal the sick, Hashem helped bury the dead, etc., and therefore we should visit the sick, help bury the dead, and do other acts of chessed. A person may rightfully object that the social interaction that these mitzvos demands carries with it a price. A person who sits secluded in the Bais Medrash in private contemplation, locked in the ivory-tower of Torah, can rise to great heights of holiness and dveikus. However, once a person steps foot into the public domain, inevitably there is a hashpa’ah that the outside world has on a person’s dveikus and intensity.

Our pasuk answers that ta'anah. “Ki tishmor…v’halachta b’derachav” is not a condition – it’s a promise; not “if you observe… you will be holy”, but “when you observe… you will be holy”. Even though the observance of “v’halachta b’derachav” entails sacrificing the ivory tower of Torah, if done properly Hashem guarantees that “y’kimcha Hashem l’am kadosh”.

tshuvah and kochi v'otzem yadi

I rescued a nearly new copy of Chayei Mohara"N that I saw deposited in sheimos (I know what you Litvaks are thinking... ) and in the back there are a few pages called Sheva Amudei Emunach composed by R' Yitzchok Breiter which taken by themselves would have been worthy of rescue. One yesod which he writes regarding the idea of tshuvah is startling. When we think of tshuvah we imagine a person coming to the realization that he/she has not been acting as the Torah requires , deciding to improve his/her behavior, and in turn, assuming this change for the better will draw him/her closer to Hashem. Says R’ Yitzchok Breiter, such thoughts of tshuvah contain mixed within them the essential germ of all kefira, which is thinking “kochi v’otzem yadi”. Lack of success in avodas Hashem is not only because a person is not trying hard enough, and conversely success in avodah is not just about changing behavior to conform to a higher standard. These assumptions in effect say we are the ba’alim of Hashem’s relationship with us, whether for good or bad - kochi v'otzem yadi controls the entire dynamic! Tshuvah means accepting that we are not the ba’alim. Yeridos and obstacles are part of Hashem’s plan, and the reason we might not be successful is because (for whatever) reason Hashem has chosen not to give us success at this moment. In addition to changing our behavior, tshuvah demands heartfelt tefilah asking that Hashem, the true ba’alim, bring about a change in His relationship with us and allow us to draw closer.

Bavli vs. Yerushalmi on chatzi shiur

The gemara asks why the Mishna at the end of Yoma refers to eating on Yom Kippur as being "assur" and not "chayav", as one who eats on Y"K is chayav kareis. The gemara explains that the Mishna is dealing with a case where one ate a chatzi shiur which, according to Reish Lakish, is only an issur derabbanan but not a chiyuv kareis.

What is amazing is that the Yerushalmi at the beginning of the 6th perek of Terumos presents Reish Lakish as holding exactly the opposite view. According to the Yerushalmi, although Reish Lakish in other areas holds that chatzi shiur is only an issur derabbanan, davka by Yom Kippur he agrees with R' Yochanan that chatzi shiur is an issur d'oraysa.

The reasoning of the Yerushalmi actually seems to be as follows: When the Torah uses the term "achila" it implies a minimum shiur of a k'zayis. However, the Torah never uses the terms "achila" with respect to the prohibition of eating on Y"K -- it uses the term "inuy". Even eating the smallest amount of food diminishes the feeling of inuy.

What are we to make of these two versions of Reish Lakish completely at odds with with each other? The Tziyun Yerushalayim on the Yerushalmi quotes R' Ya'akov Emden as offering a creative way to reconcile the two. According to the Mishna, the chiyuv kareis for eating on Yom Kippur applies only if the amount of a k'koseves hagasah, a large date (larger than a k'zayis), is eaten. R' Y"E suggests that perhaps there are actually two levels of chatzi shiur. If less than a k'zayis was eaten on Y"K, both the Bavli and Yerushalmi agree that Reish Lakish would hold that the issur is only derabbanan -- since this amount does not constitute what the Torah usually calls achila, there is no Biblical chiyuv. The Yerushalmi Terumos is adding an additional chiddush that applies only where one ate more than a k'zayis on Yom Kippur but less than a k'koseves hagasah, i.e. less than the amount that would generate a chiyuv kareis. Although technically this achila can also be called a chatzi shiur with respect to Yom Kippur, since this achila surpasses the normal threshold for what constitutes achila in other areas, even Reish Lakish would hold it is Biblically prohibited on Yom Kippur as well.

bowing in the mikdash

Among the miracles of the Bais HaMikdash which the gemara describes (Yoma 21) is that when everyone came to Yerushalayim for aliya la'regel there was standing room only in the Mikdash, but miraculously there was sufficient space for everyone to bow. Why was this bowing necessary and why was extra space needed? Rashi explains that the miracle was needed so there could be 4 amos of space between each individual when reciting viduy (done while leaning over) so no one would overhear his/her neighbor's confession. The Maharasha offers a different reason for the extra space. Bowing in Mikdash was done as a response to hearing the Shem Hashem pronounced by the Kohein Gadol during the avodah of Yom haKippurim, just as we bow on Yom Kippur when we read the re-enactment of that avodah during Mussaf. This type of bowing entailed prostrating oneself on the floor, which takes up much more space than standing erect. The focus of Rash as well as the Maharasha seems to be on acts which we associate with Yom Kippur depsite the fact that the gemara refers to the miracle as occuring on aliya la'regel.

The Brisker Rav suggests that bowing was not a function of viduy or of hearing the Shem Hashem, but was a separate obligation incumbent upon anyone who visits the azarah. The GR"A comments on the pasuk in this week's parsha, "v'histachavisa lifnei Hashem Elokecha", that bowing is not as part of the halachic procedure of delivering the bikurim, but part of the ceremony of entering or leaving the Mikdash. Similarly, the Brisker Rav explains that this is why we say in our davening on the shalosh regalim we ask Hashem for the opportunity, "v'na'aleh v'nera'eh v'nishtachaveh lefanecha", to go up and appear in the Mikdash and bow there.

credit crunch

People usually call on hashgacha to explain the seemingly miraculous good that sometimes happens, e.g. in your typical chassidishe ma'aseh a person in need of a dowry for a daughter or some other tzorech will do some good deed and then happen upon a business deal or a lost wallet that contains precisely the sum of money needed. What are the odds of coming upon a lost wallet containing exactly the right sum, or finding a deal that results in exactly the needed gain at the right moment given the natural course of events? Such coincidence (it is claimed) can only be the result of Divine intervention.

I won't try to dissuade anyone from thinking along these lines, but the sword is double-edged. I don't know what it says about my personality, but I always find it easier to apply the same reasoning to negative outcomes rather than positive. Sometimes a ma'aseh turns out so badly that it seems only Divine intervention can explain what happened. When you consider a 158 year old company (Lehman Bros.) drive to bankrupcy in the course of weeks, insurance giants (AIG) reduced to nothing, banks one after the other on the verge of failure, one is faced with either assuming the best minds in business simultaneously have all been overtaken by a bout of very contagious stupid disease, or someone up there is pulling the strings in ways that are just out of everyone's control.

R' Elchanan in one of his ma'amarim, which if I recall correctly has no date attached but must have been written in the '30s, writes that the failing of the economy (at the time of his writing) was not caused by a lack of money, as plenty of people still had fortunes and great wealth. The economy failed because of a loss of confidence in the institutions of finance - a loss of faith in the economic system. What was true then is certainly true today, as the credit crunch is primarily a loss of confidence and trust. The key to understanding this phenomenon is the principle of middah k'neged middah. R' Elchahan writes that a loss of faith in worldly institutions comes about because of the greater loss of faith in our spiritual institutions - a failing of emunah. And only through the strengthening of emunah can we find the tools to emerge from such a crisis.

I am not a big fan of prophetically trying to attribute specific outcomes or events to specific sins, but I pass on R' Elchanan's insight for whatever it's worth. It's certainly worth spending a minute thinking about as the Dow and S & P find their way to lower and lower depths.

new issue of Kallah Magazine

The new issue of Kallah Magazine (www.kallahmagazine.com) put together by my wife came out today. You can already find copies in Queens and the 5 Towns -- NJ, Brooklyn, and others will have to wait until after Shabbos/next week.

homewoner mitzvos - ma'akeh and mezuzah

"Ki tivneh bayis chadash v'asisa ma'akeh l'gagecha". The Torah presents the mitzvah of ma'akeh, the command to build a fence around a roof or dangerous obstacle, as a necessary task when building a new home. However, the halacha is that even if one remodels an old home, or moves into an old home that lacks a proper fence, one is still obligated in the mitzvah of ma'akeh. Why does the Torah place the mitzvah specifically in the context of building a new home? The Netziv explains that the Torah is sending us a mussar lesson. Building and moving into a new home is an auspicious occasion, and it is only fitting that such an occasion be used not just move furniture and the appliances, but to do mitzvos. Ma'akeh is a way to seize the opportunity to lay such a mitzvah foundation.

But why teach this lesson using the example of ma'akeh? I would guess that only a small minority of homeowners have actually had the opportunity to perform the mitzvah of ma'akeh. Yet, every single owner of a new home has the opportunity to perform a different mitzvah -- the mitzvah of mezuzah. Why does the Torah not make the point that a new home should be established through performance of mitzvos by using the illustration of mezuzah?

The Netziv switches hats to halachic analysis to answer this question. He suggests a fundemental difference between ma'akeh and mezuzah: there is a prohibition of living in a home which does not have a ma'akeh installed; however, there is no prohibition of living in a home without a mezuzah. Such an argument is easy to digest if one accepts that ma'akeh is a lav while mezuzah is only a mitzvas aseh (as the Rambam holds) , but the Netziv goes a step further and makes his argument even according to Tosfos (Kiddushin 36) who holds that the lav of ma'akeh can be avoided so long as one intends to build one at a later time. Given that both ma'akeh and mezuzah are mitzvos aseh, why should there be a distinction? The Netziv explains (and further elaborates in Ha'amek Sh'eilah 126:7) that the mitzvah of ma'akeh is a prerequisite to moving into a home. However, the mitzvah of mezuzah is incumbent upon the resident of a home, i.e. the mitzvah does not take effect until after one has moved in. Ideally, one should perform the mitzvah of mezuzah immediately afterwards, but if one is prevented from doing so for whatever reason, one is not required to move out. In a nutshell, fulfillment of ma'akeh is a necessary condition of setting up residence; setting up residence is a necessary condition of becoming obligated in the mitzvah of mezuzah. Similar words, but very different outcomes. Moving in without a ma'akeh is an active violation of a mitzvah. Moving in before affixing a mezuzah merely establishes acondition of residence; the contination of that state of residence without a mezuzah is a passive violation of the mitzvah which should be performed.

This chiddush of the Netziv helps answer a question raised by R' Akiva Eiger (Shu"t Mh"K #9). R' Akiva Eiger asks why is it that every person who goes on an extended trip (e.g. spending the summer in a bungalow colony) does not make a bracha on the mitzvah of mezuzah when re-establishing residence in one's home? The implication of the question is that the act of taking up residence is what generates the obligation to affix a mezuzah, and hence when that act recurrs, a new obligation and new bracha is required. According to the Netziv, this is not the case at all. The act of taking up residence is not a mitzvah act; it is just a means to establishing a condition necessary for the mitzvah of mezuzah to then take effect. Once residnce is re-established, one cannot remain in a passive state without a mezuzah affixed to one's door, but since the mezuzah is already up, such a condition is automatically avoided. No new mitzvah occurs, and no new bracha is required.

minuy melech and binyan hamikdash

In a comment to the last post Anon1 referd to a statement by R' H. Shachter based on a Ramban in P' Korach that the requirement of the mitzvah of malchus is to establish a Jewish government, not necessarily a Jewish monarchy. I do not have this sefer of R' Shachter's to check the source, but my guess is that the Ramban in question is 16:22 (if not, this post can stand on its own.) The Ramban writes that Bnei Yisrael were guilty of delaying the building of Mikdash because they failed to seize the opportunity to start construction in the days of the shoftim. Instead, they waited until David HaMelech took the initiative. The Ramban's comment seems puzzling in light of Sanhedrin (20) which which presents the order of mitzvos Bnei Yisrael must perform upon entering Eretz Yisrael. The gemara writes that first the mitzvah of appointing a King must be fulfilled, and only afterwards can the mitzvah of building a Mikdash begin. If so, during the days of the shoftim, when no king had yet been appointed, there did not yet exist the possibility of starting construction on the Mikdash. How could BN"Y be accused of delay? QED, some (possibly R' Shachter) would argue, according to Ramban the shoftim were considered a fulfillment of the mitzvah of malchus by virtue of being a Jewish government.

It is possible (see Margoliyas haYam Sanhedrin 20:20) to salvage the Ramban without necessarily being forced to such a sweeping conclusion. Perhaps we can distinguish between the need for malchus as a prerequisite for binyan Mikdash, for which any form of Jewish government suffices, and the mitzvah of establishing a monarchy as an indepedendent goal in its own right, which might demand specifically the appointment of a king.

the mitzvah to appoint a king - is democracy assur?

One the one hand, Chazal teach us that appointing a king is one of the 613 mitzvos, yet on the other hand, the Torah presents the idea of appointing a king as a response to the demands of the people, "V'amarta asima alay melech…", implying that where there is no demand, there is no requirement to appoint a king. The Netziv explains that there is no contradiction. The mitzvah of appointing a king does not require imposing a monarchy willy-nilly. There is a built-in condition to the mitzvah that calls it into effect only should the people demand a monarchy. In some countries a democracy may be the preferred form of government, in other countries other systems may work. However, should the people demand a king, the Sanhedrin is commanded to then act on that demand and put in place a monarchy which conforms to the principles set down in our parsha.

[This post has been updated - the idea of an issur aseh which I mentioned originally is in fact rejected by the Netziv.]

beis din of the city which performs eglah arufah

If a murdered body is found and the crime cannot be solved, the city closest to the body must perform the ceremony of eglah arufah found at the end of our parsha. The Netzi"v quotes a machlokes Bavli and Yerushalmi regarding the meaning of the declaration by the Zekeinim that "eineinu lo ra'u". The Bavli interprets the pasuk to mean that the Zekeinim were not aware of the victim; they did not knowingly ignore a stranger in their midst and send him off wandering alone in the wilderness without offering proper hospitality and a place to stay. The Yerushalmi, however, interprets the declaration to mean the Zekeinim were not aware of the murderer; they did not knowingly ignore a criminal in their midst and allow him to continue to prey on the innocent.

The Netziv suggests a nafka minah between the two approaches. The measurement to determine which city is closest only takes into consideration cities which have a Beis Din. What type of Beis Din is required? According to the Bavli, it would seem any Beis Din of three is sufficient. However, according the the Yerushalmi that reads the pasuk as addressing itself to Zekeinim who could punish a murderer, a Beis Din of twenty-three capable of carrying out capital punishment is required. The Rambam paskens that a B"D of 23 is needed.

The halacha is that the ir miklat city of refuge must have Zekeinim in residence. The Minchas Chinuch (410) questions what type of B"D is necessary and suggests the law of eglah arufah which requires 23 as a point of comparison. Based on the Netziv's approach one can distinguish between the cases. The requirement of B"D by eglah arufah according to the Yerushalmi is a function of the necessity of being able to administer capital punishment; the same requirement is not needed for ir miklat.

l'shichno tidrishu - nevuah as a requirement for binyan habayis

My impression from Rashi in last week’s parsha was that the halacha requiring a Navi to put a stamp of approval on the selection of the makom mikdash (Rashi on “l’shichno tidrishu”) was a one time event. The Navi was needed to identify the makom mikdash, but once selected, there is no requirement for further consent of a Navi to start building again.

R’ Ahron Soloveitchik in his sefer Perach Mateh Aharon is medayek in the Rambam otherwise. The Rambam prefaces his description of the mizbeiyach (Beis haBechira ch 2) with a historical overview – the mizbeiyach was the place from which the dust to create Adam was taken, it was the place Noach offered korbanos, it was the place of the Akeidah, and because of its great historical significance its location was known b’mesorah. Yet, continues the Rambam (based on Zevachim 62), the rebuilding of Bayis Sheni required that a Navi certify the location of the mizbeiyach. Even though there was no question as to where the mizbeiyach should be located, a stamp of approval from a Navi was still necessary.

I did a quick check of R’ Kalisher’s Derishat Tzion, which collects some of the correspondence between R’ Kaslisher and the Aruch laNer, R’ Akiva Eiger, and others regarding whether a mizbeiyach could be built to offer korbanos in contemporary times. The Aruch laNer raises an objection based on this gemara in Zevachim, but R’ Kalsiher seems to interpret the need for a Navi mentioned by the gemara as based on inexact knowledge of the makom mizbeiyach. Since we today have the kosel extant from Bayis Sheni (while those rebuilding Bayis Sheni had nothing), R’ Kalisher felt that we could figure out the makom mizbeiyach. I could not find any treatment of this Rambam in the letters, but I was skimming quickly.

shlichus and zechiya

I am admittedly biased in thinking of the Brisker derech as a the key to learning, but have been trying to push myself to appreciate and understand more of R' Shimon Shkop's derech. I haven't gotten down the Sha'arei Yosher enough to predict what he might say on a sugya, but at least I can say with some degree of confidence that the word "sibah" will appear somewhere in the explanation. My chavrusa has suffered though some of the first sha'ar with me, and my son has been a guinea pig for learning through some other scattered pieces. This almost led to the unintended consequence of my son coming to the conclusion that R' Shimon was brilliant and that this Brisker stuff did not have much to offer. Baruch Hashem, a few months more maturity in his learning has led him to see the light. This past Shabbos he told me that he found a R' Baruch Ber that addresses the exact gemara we had previously discussed in a piece in Sha'arei Yosher and (of course!) R' Baruch Ber's approach was far superior. Here is the sugya:

The gemara (Bava Kama 102b) discusses a case where a shliach charged with purchasing goods changes the order and purchases a different item. For example, Reuvain is charged with buying wheat for Shimon, and instead purchases barley. According to one braysa, if the price of barley goes up, Shimon still collects a share of the profit. Why? One explanation offered is that this braysa follows the view of R' Yehudah that shinuy eino koneh, and the shliach's change does not make him the owner of the barley.

The Bnei Ma'arava laughed at this explanation -- true, shinuy aino koneh, but the barley seller thinks he/she is selling barley to Reuvain (the shliach), not Shimon. How does Shimon come to own the barley if there is no da'as makneh to sell barley to him?

The gemara retorts: but even if Reuvain correctly carries out his shlichus and buys wheat for Shimon, there is no da'as makneh to sell wheat to Shimon -- the seller only knows about Reuvain and thinks he/she is selling to him!

R' Abahu replied that the point of the Bnei Ma'arava is valid. If Reuvain correctly carries out his charge, he fulfills the criteria of shlichus. Only if Reuvain changes the terms of his charge and is no longer acting as a shliach does the question of seller's intent (da'as makneh) come into play.

A little elaboration before getting to the heart of the problem: The halacha is that zachin l'adam shelo b'fanav, an person can aquire something on another's behalf without being officially appointed an agent provided there is no downside. In our case, even if Reuvain gets the order wrong, since there is only an upside gain, Reuvain should theoretically be able to act through zechiya as Shimon's agent even unappointed. The barley should belong to Shimon, who would share in the profit. So why do the Bnei Ma'arava assume that a lack of proper da'as makneh, the fact that the seller thought he/she was selling to Reuvain and not Shimon, is a fatal flaw in this theory of zechiya that allows Reuvain to act as Shimon's agent, but if Reuvain correctly fills the order as charged, acting as Shimon's appointed agent through the theory of shlichus, the issue of da'as makneh, who the seller thought he was selling to, is irrelevant ? In both cases Reuvain is acting on behalf of Shimon -- shouldn't the same rules of kinyan apply to both scenarios?

The punchline of the sugya and the distinction being drawn opens the door to explaining other issues, but you need this as a starting point. If you are a Telzer, see Sha'arei Yosher end of 7:7. If you are a Brisker, see Birchas Shmuel in Kiddushin 15:4.

hidur vs. zerizus

It's Sukkos morning and you are stuck with a non-mehudar esrog, but if you just wait until after davening, you will be able to obtain a mehudar esrog for the mitzvah of netilas lulav. Is it better to fulfill the mitzvah of lulav as soon as possible in a zerizus manner even with a non-mehudar esrog, or is it better to wait to obtain the nicer esrog and fulfill the mitzvah in a mehudar manner at the cost of sacrificing zerizus?


The Gilyon Mahrasha in Yoma quotes the following proof from the Shvus Ya'akov: If the members of a beis av of kohanim are tamei, the gemara (Yoma 6) quotes a machlokes whether tumah hutra b'tzibur and those kohanim can still offer korbanos tzibur, or tumah dechuya b'tzibur and other kohanim should be called to offer the korban in their place. Even though there will be a delay in calling in those substitute kohanim, the gemara assumes that a delayed korban offered b'taharah is preferable to offering the korban immediatly b'tumah. QED, says the Shvus Ya'akov, it is better to delay a mitzvah a fulfill it in a mehudar manner than to fulfill it immediatly b'zerizus in a less than mehudar fashion.

I am not sure I see the comparison between the two cases. If tumah dechuya b'tzibur, offering the korban b'tumah is not just a less than ideal kiyum mitzvah - it is not a mitzvah at all! To take a different example, if one assumes Shabbos is dechuya with respect to a dangerously ill choleh (and not hutra), accomplishing the task of pikuach nefesh by using fewer melachos is not just an ideal, but it is the only permissabel option - to perform more melacha than necessary would be chilul Shabbos. The same is not true with respect to the case of the esrog, where one fulfills the mitzvah of esrog whether done b'hidur or not. Hidur may be an ideal, but is it worth the delay where there is a kiyum mitzvah anyway?

arei miklat

The Torah in Parshas Eikev ascribes the burial of Yosef to the Jewish people even though it was Moshe alone who made sure Yosef’s bones were removed from Egypt and transported to Eretz Yisrael. Rashi explains that “mitzvah nikreis al shem gomra”, it is the completion of the mitzvah which garners credit, and since Bnei Yisrael and not Moshe completed the burial process, they earn the credit.

Someone in shul asked whether this Rashi does not contradict the Rashi in P’ VaEschanan (4:41) which explains that Moshe designated 3 cities of refuge / arei miklat in Eiver haYarden even though those cities would not serve as a refuge until after the additional three cities in Eretz Yisrael were also designated. Moshe wanted to do as much as he could of the mitzvah even if he could not finish the job.

I think there is a difference between the question of who gets credit and the necessity of putting in maximal effort even if one's efforts go unrewarded and unacknowledged. On a deeper level, I think there is perhaps a lomdish distinction between the Rashis. The burial of Yosef called for the accomplishment of a single act; the mitzvah was incomplete until that act is concluded. True, the arei miklat would not serve as refuge until all six cities were designated, but the designation of each individual city was a discrete act and perhaps a mitzvah in its own right.

Carrying this logic a bit further, we can perhaps distinguish two different elements of arei miklat: 1) the shem ir miklat, a status which results from the city being designated; 2) the actual ability of the city to protect a murderer b’shogeg who flees there. The cities Moshe designated fulfilled the former characteristic but not the latter -- they had the status of arei miklat by virtue of Moshe's designation, but did not yet offer protection. Similarly, one might question with respect to other halachos of ir miklat whether they relate to the shem ir miklat or whether they relate to the functional ability of the city to offer refuge. For example, the halacha is that the city of refuge must contain zekeinim, a beis din of some sort (exactly what type is unclear). Is that a defining characteristic of the shem ir miklat, or a condition of the city serving as refuge? The Minchas Chinuch raises a safeik which may hinge on this question: if a murderer flees to a city with zekeinim but then those zekeinim leave, must the murderer now take refuge in a different city? If the presence of zekeinim are a condition of the city serving as refuge, then their absence opens the murderer to fatal harm. However, if the presence of zekeinim serve to establish the shem ir miklat, then perhaps their presence is necessary only at the time of the city’s establishment, but not forever after.

R' Chaim's yahrzeit

Today, 21 Av, is R' Chaim's yahrzeit. (My son half-humorously asked if we should skip tachanun). Just thought I would pass that along.

why shema has no time limit at night but does during the day

The mitzvah of reading kri’as shema at night which we learn from the pasuk of “b’shachbecha” can be fulfilled at any time during the night (on a d’oraysa level), but when it comes to the mitzvah of reading shema during the day, which we learn from the pasuk of “uvkumecha”, the mitzvah can only be fulfilled until the third hour of the day. Why is there a difference between the two?

The Sefer haChinuch explains that Chazal understood “b’shachbecha” to mean any time that people go to sleep. There are a great many night owls who keep late hours and who sometimes retire closer to what most of us consider morning than night. However, rarer still is the person who sleeps in all day. Therefore, Chazal understood “uvkumecha” to mean only the morning hours, when most people wake up.

The Kesef Mishna in Hil Krias Shema raises the same question and disagrees with the Chinuch. He writes that min hatorah there is no difference between day and night – krias shema can be recited all day as well as all night. It is only a derabbanan mandate to finish k.s. of the day by the third hour. His proof: even if one reads krias shema after the proper time, the brachos krias shema can stil be recited. If min hatorah there is no kiyum mitzvah, how could one say brachos? (It seems implicit in his argument that brachos k”s are birchos hamitzvah, an interesting (and debatable) chiddush for another time.)

The Magen Avraham attacks the KS”M. If the obligation of shema applies all day and all night, then there is never a moment during which the mitzvah does not apply. Why then is krias shema considered a zman gerama mitzvah from which women are exempt?

The Sha’agas Arye (siman 12) addresses this question in the midst of a discussion of whether women are chayavos in the mitzvah of zechiras yetziyas Mitzrayim or not. The Sha’agas Arye at first contends that women are chayavos, as the mitzvah can be fulfilled during the entire day and then again during the entire night – there is no time that the mitzvah of zechira does not apply, so it is not zman gerama. However, the S.A. then backtracks. From the fact that women are exempt from reciting shema, which is the means by which we fulfill zechiras yetziyas Mitzrayim, it seems that they have no mitzvah of zechira (otherwise we would expect at least a Rabbinic enactment formalizing some recitation). But why are they exempt? The S.A. concludes that the mitzvah of zechira must in the end be zman gerama. Although the obligation to remember yetziyas Mitzrayim is continuous, in fact, the mitzvah really consists of two separate obligations which happen to coincide and come back to back with each other – an obligation of zechira during the day, which can only be fulfilled during the day, and an obligation of zechira at night, which can only be fulfilled at night. Since each independent obligation is limited in scope to a set period of time, although the gavra, the person, remains under a continuous obligation to remember yetziyas mitzrayim, these are considered independent zman gerama obligations.

The same logic applies to the mitzvah of reading shema. True, a person at any given moment may fulfill the mitzvah of reciting shema - either the shema of day or the shema of night - still, these are two seperate obligations and each one is limited in scope to being fulfilled at only one set time period.

the text of aseres hadibros

On Shabbos my wife wondered about the fact that certain commandments in aseres hadibros are quite verbose, e.g. the mitzvah of Shabbos includes a wordy elaboration on the reason for the mitzvah, while other commandments are stated very succinctly, e.g. lo tignov, where the whole mitzvah consists of two words. My son mentioned that he heard from R’ Y. Perr, the RY of Yeshiva of Far Rockway, who heard from R’ Matisyahu Solomon quoting someone else who he didn’t remember, that the size of the letters on the two sides of the tablets of the aseres hadobros must have been unequal to preseve the physical balance in size. If the mitzvah of Shabbos was written in small writing and the mitzvos of “lo tignov”, “lo tirtzach”, etc. were written in large letters, even though the mitzvah of Shabbos contains more words, it would not take up more space on the tablet, and thus the two halves of the dibros could kept in symmetrical physical proportion.

My wife had an ingenious insight that helps not only explain how proprtion could be maintained despite the difference in word count, but also explains a difficult gemara in Bava Kamma. She suggested that the verbosity of certain commandments was perhaps an embellishment by Moshe Rabeinu (of course, as taught by Hashem, just like the rest of Sefer Devarim), but not actually written on the tablets of the dibros. Perhaps the mitzvah of Shabbos was written in some short, pithy form just like “lo tignov”, but Moshe Rabeinu was told to explain and expand on the mitzvah and provide the details which we read as part of the commandment.

This perhaps sheds light on the amazing dialogue between Amoraim in Bava Kama 54b. R’ Chanina ben Agil asked R’ Chiya bar Aba why the first instance of aseres hadibros does not contain the bracha of “ki tov” (i.e. “l’ma’am yiotav lach” by kibud av, as Rashi explains) while the second dibros do. R’ Chiya replied that before asking him why the dibros contain this bracha, first one must ask whether these words are actually in the pasuk, as he, R’ Chiya, is not sure that they are.

The entire discussion is a pliya. Tosfos (Baba Basra 113) makes the startling claim based on this gemara that the Amoraim did not always know the text of a pasuk in Chumash perfectly. Whatever Tosfos means, such an idea is very hard to swallow – we are, after all, talking about the aseres hadibros! How could R' Chiya not be sure what words are in or not in the pesukim?

Based on my wife’s suggestion, the gemara reads beautifully (see the Kli Chemdah who also suggests this possibility). The Amoraim knew full well what the text of the pesukim in Chumash said with respect to each list of the dibros. What the Amoraim did not know was whether the differences between the first iteration and the second reflect differences as to the actual text engraved on the physical tablets, or whether those differences were simply different nuances in Moshe Rabeinu’s explication, but the text of the tablets was identical. Before asking why “ki tov” appears in the description of one set of tablets and not the other, we have to first ascertain whether these words appeared on the physical tablets at all!

two parsha topics: lo tisaveh and siyagim d'oraysa; the mitzvah of yichud Hashem

Some quick he’oros (just in case any of you forget I’m still here : )

1. The Sefer haChinuch writes that the mitzvah of “lo tisaveh” (coveting that which belongs to another) is a protective safeguard; it ensures that a person will not be tempted to steal his/her neighbor’s property. This is not just an exegesis of ta’amei hamitzvos, but creates a nafka minah l’halacha: since theft is prohibited even for a non-Jew, the mitzvah of lo tisaveh applies to non-Jews as well. R’ Yosef Engel in his sefer Lekach Tov questions whether siyagim, prohibitions which exist to safeguard against more severe infractions, are all Rabbinic in nature, or whether a mitzvah or issur d’oraysa can be a siyag. This is a nice example of a siyag s’oraysa.

2. The Minchas Chinuch writes that the mitzvah of yichud Hashem applies to non-Jews as well. The Rama (O.C. 156) famously writes based on Tosfos in Sanhedrin 63 that there is no issur of shituf for a non-Jew, but achronim take issue with this reading of Tosfos. Be that as it may, with respect to the necessity of belief, the Sefer haChinuch writes that even if someone behaves with midos tovos and is otherwise observant, he/she receives absolutely no credit for his/her good deeds absent the foundation of belief. In other words, othopraxy is meaningless without orthodoxy. A footnote in the new edition of the M.C. cites a similar comment of Ramban in his introduction to Sefer Iyov. What is striking about the Ramban is the example he gives – his illustration of a non-believer is someone who believes in “kadmus ha’olam”, i.e. someone who thinks the world has always existed and was not created by G-d. We could get into a whole Moreh Nevuchim / Ramban debate here, but I don’t have time for it.

aninus, 9 Av mourning, and seudah hamafseket on Shabbos

On erev tisha b’Av we stop eating at shkiya (about 8:00 where I live in NY), but according to most Rishonim the prohibitions of aveilus such as not wearing leather shoes are not observed until nightfall. The Ramban, however, writes that the prohibition of bathing as beginning at shkiya and questions why the R”IF neglects to mention this halacha.

To explain this difference of opinion, the Brisker Rav suggested that mourning which we mark as we enter 9 Av and eat our final seudah hamafseket is patterned after the practices of aninus, the intense period of mourning between death and burial. Chazal poignantly describe how Tanaim would sit next to the furnace in their home, a lowly, isolated place, and eat in isolation, allowing themselves to become fully steeped in the somber mood of the day.

During the period of aninus the mourner is exempt from all mitzvos and is assumed to be completely involved in making the necessary preparations for the burial of the deceased. According to the Rambam the onein is exempt even from the obligations of mourning; the Ramban disagrees and holds that the negative prohibitions of mourning do apply.

The Brisker Rav suggests the dispute regarding bathing after seudah hamafesket as l’shitasam of this dispute regarding aninus. The Ramban who holds that even an onein is obligated in the prohibitions of mourning l’shitaso prohibits bathing from the moment seudah hamafseket concludes and the pseudo-aninus period of 9 Av begins. Rambam (and RI”F, according to the Brisker Rav’s understanding) who exempts an onein even from obligations of mourning does not prohibit bathing until nightfall. [Note: a similar analysis appears in the Keren Orah. The Brisker Rav's chiddush is actually a little different than what I presented here, so please see it in the original.]

The problem with this approach is that it does not seem to fit the words of the Ramban. Ramban tells us why he prohibits bathing – he writes that if one were to shower immediately before the fast, one would inevitably enjoy that refreshing afterglow of feeling clean and refreshed on the fast itself. Therefore, bathing and bathing alone is prohibited from even before the fast starts.

Given the reasoning presented by the Ramban, we perhaps have a new insight into why the seudah hamafseket is limited to a sparse meal. Were a heavy meal to be ingested immediately before the fast, it would lead to the experience of satiation and enjoyment extending into the fast itself, interfering with our experience of aveilut.

R’ Shternbruch in Moadim u'Zmanin (vol 5) goes a step further and suggests that in light of this Ramban we perhaps have an insight into why even on Shabbos we might temper our eating at the conclusion of the day and eat a small seudah hamafseket. The seudah hamafseket is not in and of itself connected with aveilus, but is simply a way to avoid indulging in a way that would lead us to experience the pleasure of satiation after Shabbos is over.

Again, reading the Tur’s presentation of the Avi Ezri’s justification of eating seudah hamafseket on Shabbos (which R’ Shternbruch makes no reference to) does not seem to me to support this approach. The TUr's language seems to indicate that the Avi Ezri’s aim was in fact to mark aveilus in some way - “m’shum churban” - Shabbos notwithstanding. This seems to be part of a broader pattern of practicing aveilus of 9 Av despite it being Shabbos. Two other practices which come to mind: The Rama quotes the minhag to not wear Shabbos clothes on Shabbos Chazon (a practice the GR”A opposed), and the minhag of many communities is to sing “Lecha Dodi” with the kinos tune of “Ali Tzion”.

My hunch is that these opinions view obligations of aveilus as stemming from the character of the day, the kedushas hayom, so to speak, much like the character of Yom Tov creates certain obligations of simcha. Demonstrating aveilus on Shabbos is not just an issur gavra imposed on the individual, but stems from the recognition that the kedushas hayom of Shabbos inherently in antithetical to mourning and sadness. Shabbos is a day of bracha (see Tosfos M.K. 23a quoting Yerushalmi). However, Shabbos Chazon is an exception. The special name we give to this Shabbos is not just to remind us of the haftarah, but perhaps indicates that the kedushas hayom of this Shabbos is different, and is impacted by the mourning period that it falls within. Derech derush perhaps one could say that Shabbos itself is in morning with us.

If our mourning can impact the kedushas hayom of Shabbos, perhaps one might argue as well that the scale can be tipped in the opposite direction and the kedushas hayom of Shabbos can impact our mourning. Perhaps this Shabbos Chazon will be the Shabbos that we will once again experience v'techezeina eineinu b'shuvcha l'Tzion b'rachamim.

Kol hamisabeil al Yerushalayim zoche v'ro'eh b'simchasa...

seudah hamafseket on Shabbos?

The Tur (552) quotes the Avi Ezri as holding that on Shabbos immediatly before 9 Av starts(meaning, when 9 Av is on Sunday) the minhag is to eat a regular seudah shlishis and then to eat a seudah hamafesket like on any other erev 9 Av. Even though, explains the Tur, one is permitted to eat meat and drink wine "afilu k'seudas Shlomo" on Shabbos before 9 Av without restriction, who says one has to eat such a seudah? In keeping with the spirit of commemorating churban habayis, one can choose to forgo indulging oneself and instead end the day with a subdued and minimal seudah hamafseket.

The Tur disagrees based on the gemara’s din (Moed Katan 2b3) that a public display of aveilus is prohibited on Shabbos. If one sets out to eat a meal designated specifically to commemorate the aveilus of churban habayis, isn’t that a public display of mourning? The Tur ends the siman by quoting the minhag of his father the Rosh to not eat a seudah hamafseket on Shabbos.

How can one explain the position of the Avi Ezri? Perhaps the A”E considered seudah hamafseket, which the minhag is to eat privately, devarim sheb’tzina, rather than public mourning, and Shabbos does not suspend private mourning.

In a more lomdish vein, perhaps one might explain the machlokes based on the chiddush of the Emek Bracha that the day of tisha b’av is marked by two overlapping themes: aveilus and ta’anis (see Rabbi Maroof’s article here). Each of these halachic themes is demarcated by similar practices of avoiding eating, drinking, wearing shoes, bathing, and having relations (see the Emek Bracha for nafka minos between the two). Within this framework, we might ask how to categorize the seudah hamafseket preceding the fast – is it part of the obligations of a ta’anis tzibur, or is it a special aspect of 9 Av mourning? If seudah hamafseket is part of the obligations of ta’anis, then just as we stop eating while it is yet still Shabbos, we perhaps may eat such a seudah to culminate our preparation for the fast on Shabbos as well. However, if the seudah is part of the obligations of aveilus, it could not be held on Shabbos.

The lomdus sounds nice, but I don’t think it fits the words. The whole point of the seudah (for those Rishonim who opine that it should be eaten even on Shabbos) is to try to demarcate our mourning in some small way even on Shabbos itself. It is for the sake of commemorating churban and not just because of the chiyuv ta'anis.

pregnant / nursing women fasting

This article http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3575177,00.html cites R’ Nachum Rabinovitch of Yeshivat Ma’aleh Adumim as allowing pregnant (after 5th month) or nursing mother to eat on 9 Av because these women are categorically to be treated as cholos (hat tip to Mother in Israel).

A bit of background: the gemara (Pesachim 54) writes that on Yom Kippur and 9 Av all pregnant or nursing women must fast. The implication drawn by some some Rishonim is that pregnant or nursing women are exempt from fasting on other fast days. The Rishonim differ as to whether that amounts to a blanket dispensation, or whether these women should try to fast and only eat if necessary for their health or the health of the nursing child (see Bais Yosef siman 594).

Someone who is too ill to fast is permitted to eat on 9 Av because the Rabbinic enactment of fasting was never imposed upon someone who is sick.

Having not seen the sefer I am not sure how to understand this psak of R’ Rabinovitch. Does he assume that all women in our times who are pregnant or nursing are categorically defined as “cholos” for whom no obligation to fast exists? I would have thought that if fasting was not risky for pregnant or nursing women living 1500 years ago it, that the risk has declined, not increased, with the advent of modern standards of pre-natal care and nutrition. A more interesting possibility would be to argue that even if the actual risks of pregnancy have not increased, our sensitivities toward what constitutes acceptable risk and good health has changed. 1500 years ago, pre-natal care may not have recognized the risk of fasting, or associated those risks with birth or health complications. Today, we know better. Should we take Chazal’s statement obligating pregnant and nursing women to fast as binding irrespective of these changes in medical knowledge / practice, or should we look at the statement as sensible in the given context of medical knowledge of 1500 years ago, but which may change over time? In other words, in lomdish terms, is the gemara a din or a metziyus -- is it a legal rule that absolutely binds all women to fast, or is the gemara simply a statement about what Chazal assumed to be the lack of health risks in fasting? A legal umdena seems to me to be far more inflexible than a medical one (and even there, I'm not sure).

What do you think?

the Bnos Tzlofchad's marriage choice

Unless you were already privy to the interpretation of Chazal, I think you would read these pesukim (36:6-7) at the end of last week’s parsha
לַטּוֹב בְּעֵינֵיהֶם, תִּהְיֶינָה לְנָשִׁים אַךְ לְמִשְׁפַּחַת מַטֵּה אֲבִיהֶם--תִּהְיֶינָה לְנָשִׁים
to mean that the Bnos Tzlofchad could marry anyone they desired, provided that their chosen spouse was also a member of their sheivet (see Rashbam who presents this reading as pshat).

Chazal, however, interpret the pesukim to mean that the Bnos Tzlofchad were permitted to marry anyone whom they chose, without any limitation on which sheiveit their spouse was a member of. Only other women inheriting a portion were bound by the condition to choose a spouse from their sheiveit alone.

In light of Chazal’s reading, it is interesting to see how the Torah describes the actions of Bnos Tzlofchad:

כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה אֶת-מֹשֶׁה, כֵּן עָשׂוּ, בְּנוֹת צְלָפְחָד

What does it mean כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה – there was no command?! Yes, it might have been a good idea for the Bnos Tzlofchad to marry members of their own sheivet given that Hashem expressed this desire with respect to everyone else, but can we call that a “command”?

Apparently, we can! It reminded me of R’ Elchanan’s interpretation (see this post) that Bilam was punished even though G-d never explicitly commanded him not to go with Balak’s messengers because the will and desire of G-d was clear. The understanding of G-d's desire, even absent a verbel command, creates an obligation. (See the Netziv in his Harchev Davar on this pasuk.)

bas kol and "bais shamai aina mishna"

Tosfos (Yevamos 14) asks how to square the Chachamim’s rejection of the bas kol siding with R’ Eliezer with gemara that tells us that a bas kol was accepted as proof that the halacha follows Beis Hillel and not Bais Shamai. Tosfos explains (in one of the two answers given) that the bas kol in favor of R’ Eliezer was rejected because it contradicted the majority view. The bas kol which supported Beis Hillel’s view was accepted because Hillel’s view was held by the majority. The only debate was whether the view of Shamai should perhaps be given more weight because Shamai was known to be sharper that Hillel.

Apparently, according to Tosfos, all things being equal, we do accept the evidence of a bas kol to establish halacha. It’s only in the context of having a rov that a bas kol is rejected. Contrast that with the Rambam’s statement in Hil Yesodei haTorah ch 9 with respect to a Navi:
או שאמר בדין מדיני תורה שה' ציווה לו שהדין כך הוא והלכה כדברי פלוני--הרי זה נביא שקר
According to the Rambam, it’s not just that a bas kol has no weight relative to rov – a bas kol is completely invalid as proof of what halacha should be.

The question raised in the previous post – why a bas kol outweighs the probabilistic evidence of rov with respect to whether a person touched a frog or sheretz, but does not outweigh the opinion of rov with respect to establishing halachic precedent – is valid only within Tosfos’ model that accepts at least theoretically, all things being equal, the evidence of a bas kol to determine halacha. However, according to the Rambam, the question is moot. Nevuah or bas kol is simply an unacceptable form of proof when it comes to psak.

What remains unclear according to the Rambam (which R’ Elchanan, who suggests this approach, and others struggle with) is why the bas kol which declared the halacha in accordance with Beis Hillel was accepted. Be that as it may, R’ Elchanan has a cute point with respect to the gemara’s statement that “Beis Shamai b’makom Beis Hillel aino mishna”, Beis Shamai’s view is unworthy of consideration. Why don't we find a similar sentiment recorded with respect to any other rejected view of Tanaim? Perhaps the reason is because no other Tannaitic view other than Shamai's was rejected by no less than a bas kol.