Wednesday, February 20, 2008

dinim derabbanan - Rabbinic will or G-d's will?

Some of R’ Elchanan’s proofs that takkanos derabbanan are not rooted in a pasuk but are rooted in Chazal’s ability to intuit or interpret the ratzon Hashem:

1) Takanos existed before matan Torah introduced “lo tasur”. One example is Moshe interpreting Hashem’s command to include an extra day of preparation before mattan Torah (“hosif yom echad m’da’ato”). The license to interpret Hashem’s command preceded any formal granting of authority to do so. We also find various references in Midrashim to takanos of Shem v’Eiver.

2) The Rambam (Hil Shabbos ch 24) writes that Chazal instituted the laws of muktza to limit weekday activities and enforce the idea of Shabbos as a day of rest, as taught in the pasuk “l’ma’an yanuach”. Someone who violates a law of muktza is certainly not guilty of violating a Biblical commandment of “l’ma’an yanuach”. The commandment is not the source for the specific laws of muktza, but is the source for the fact that G-d desires Shabbos to be a day of rest, which in turn is the impetus behind the Rabbinic muktza laws.

3) R’ Elchanan presents an interesting spin on the Bila’am story. Since G-d did not explictely tell Bila’am not to go with Balak (see the meforshim who offer various suggestions on how to read Hashem’s warning to Bila’am so that it was not an explicit command), why is Bila’am blamed for acting based on his own desire? R’ Elchanan answers that it is not the command of G-d alone which we should heed, but G-d’s will. Since Bila’am recognized G-d’s desire to protect the Jewish people, even sans an explicit command not to harm them he should not have gone with Balak. What comes out of this discussion is a powerful moral lesson: a legal technocrat may skirt the law by taking advantage of existing loopholes, but the goal of halacha is not simply obedience to technical statutes but obedience to G-d’s will.

The Nesivos famously writes that an issur derabbanan violated b’shogeg requires no kaparah because the entire basis for dinim derabannan is to prevent a rebellion against the authority of Chazal – “lo tasur”; an act done b’shogeg cannot be called a rebellious act. However, according to R’ Elchanan’s thesis, Chazal’s role is to reveal the ratzon Hashem; the reason for obedience is not just to respect their authority, but because the laws they enact reflect what is inherently right/wrong. Lack of intention to disobey common sense does not preclude getting burned while touching a hot stove. Similarly, lack of intention when violating a din derabbanan may not preclude the need for kaparah for performing that which is wrong. (My son asked me over Shabbos based on a shiur he attends whether eating an issur derabbanan b’shogeg is metamtem halev. Perhaps the question hinges on this issue).

11 comments:

  1. I have a question that is a little off topic but I think relevant.

    Why do we believe that the goal of Halacha is follow G-d's will? The famous Tanur Shel Akhnai story tells us that we can paskin Halacha when it is against the express will of G-d. It seems that the purpose of Halacha is for human beings to expound on Divine principles even if their conclusions go against what G-d originally intended. G-d's will and our understanding of what Halacha requires can overlap, but they are not necessarily coextensive.

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  2. tanur shel achan'i was a debate over what G-d's will is, and we follow the majority even if the minority conjurs miracles to prove its case.

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  3. tanur shel achan'i was a debate over what G-d's will is, and we follow the majority even if the minority conjurs miracles to prove its case.

    But it's clear from the story that G-d's "interpretation" of Halacha accorded with R' Eliezer's understanding. So we seem to have a conflict between two aspects of G-d's will. The first is G-d's will is regard to the Tanur and the second is what to do in situations where there is no universal human agreement.

    G-d wants us to follow the majority in cases where there are disputes. But is that rule epistemic or constitutivue? Do we follow the majority because we can't know what G-d's intent is with certainity, or does the majority actually determine the objective Halacha despite G-d will? If it's the former, then a bas kol should be pretty clear evidence of G-d's will. Why follow the majority in that case? But if it's the latter, then man isn't really looking for G-d's will per se, he is looking for the best understanding of Halacha. Like I said before, the two might overlap, but they aren't coextensive.

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  4. >>>But it's clear from the story that G-d's "interpretation" of Halacha accorded with R' Eliezer's understanding.

    it's only clear if you assume G-d chooses to express his will through miracles (or a bas kol) and not through inspiring rov chachamim to come to agreement.

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  5. 1- It's unclear that Hashem actually agreed with R' Eliezer in this particular pesaq. It's also unclear that the norm is set by the tanur shel akhnai case, and not by the bas qol that said "halakhah kebeis Hillel". See Encyc Talmudit "bas qol", or at least my blog entry. This is a wide machloqes rishonim.

    2- The will of G-d could well include all valid extrapolations of halakhah, and it's a matter for us to determine which of the paths He offered we choose to follow. His will is thus the destination, even if the choice of route isn't fully determined. This would be some of the model of machloqes suggested by the Rambam, the Ritva or the Ran, that pesaq is a matter of extrapolation or construction from Hashem's WIll to the new.

    As for RCB's original entry, the question of whether rabbinic legislation is pragmatic or reflects/creates supernatural realities seems to be a machloqes between the Meshekh Chokhmah (pragmatic help to aid in following Ratzon haBorei) and Rav Elchanan Wasserman and the SA haRav (reflect Ratzon haBorei itself).

    -micha

    PS: The majority of this comment is behind the links to my blog.

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  6. it's only clear if you assume G-d chooses to express his will through miracles (or a bas kol) and not through inspiring rov chachamim to come to agreement.

    The implication of the story is that the Bas Kol is Divine. There was no skepticism on the Chachamim's part. So if the bas kol was a genuine reflection of G-d's will, how can some form of Divine inspiration (which is not alluded to in the story itself) trump an express statement of G-d's will? Meaning if you're arguing that rov Chachanim serves an evidentiary function by telling us what G-d thinks, what can possibly be greater evidence than G-d's statement himself?

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  7. >>>what can possibly be greater evidence than G-d's statement himself?

    There are giluyim of ratzon Hashem on different madreigos (bas kol, nevuah, da'as torah, etc.) and versions of truth that exist on these corresponding madreigos all of which represent ratzon Hashem.

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  8. >>>Meaning if you're arguing...

    Just want to clarify one point lest I be held to defend this position at a later point. I am not saying your interpretation is necessarily wrong, just that I am not convinced it is muchrach and a counterargument is impossible.
    (IOW, I don't have a final opinion one way or the other, I'm just playing devil's advocate and think the issue is not so cut and dry.)

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  9. There are giluyim of ratzon Hashem on different madreigos (bas kol, nevuah, da'as torah, etc.) and versions of truth that exist on these corresponding madreigos all of which represent ratzon Hashem.

    I don't really know what this means, but in any hierarchy, a bas kol would have to be pretty close to the top of the list.

    Thanks to R' Micha for his summary of the Bas Kol article. I'll have to think about this issue more.

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  10. >>>a bas kol would have to be pretty close to the top of the list.

    I do not know why you are convinced this is so. The tanur she achna'i story would lead you to the opposite conclusion.

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  11. I do not know why you are convinced this is so. The tanur she achna'i story would lead you to the opposite conclusion.

    Assuming the bas kol was trying to indicate G-d's will in that specific case, if the goal of Halachic interpretation is discover G-d's will, what can possibly be a better means than G-d telling you his will himself?

    So if my premises are true (and they are certainly debatable as R' Micha post indicated), the Tanur story must be teaching something else.

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