aninus and aveilus (II)

We left off yesterday with a question on the Rambam. Given that aveilus is a begins at kevura and aninus ends at kevurah, it seems that there is no overlap between the two. How then can the Rambam use the pasuk of “V’achalti chatas ha’yom,” from which we learn hilchos aninus, namely that an onein may not eat kodshim, as the source for a chiyuv of aveilus d’oraysa?

Rav Soloveitchik (Shiurim l’Zecher Aba Mori vol 2) answers this question by first setting down the following yesod: aveilus, though primarily demarcated by restrictions on the aveil, is actually a kum v’aseh, a positive kiyum mitzvah. Not wearing shoes, not bathing, not sitting on a chair, etc. are not ends in themselves, but are primarily designed to elicit a certain mindset of mourning.

Though nihugei aveilus, the prohibitions that the aveil must observe, do not apply until after kevurah, that does not mean a person is an onein and not an aveil to that point. A person has a shem aveil, he wears the hat of onein/aveil simultaneously, from the moment of his relative’s death. However, just as aninus exempts the mourner from all other positive mitzvos, it also exempts the mourner from the positive kiyum of aveilus as well.

Kevurah is not the mechayeiv of aveilus; the mechayeiv is misah, exactly like aninus. Kevurah merely brings to a close the state of aninus, which exempted the mourner from practicing nihugei aveilus, and m’meila those obligations set in.

Rav Soloveitchik has a number of proofs that the shem aveil applies earlier than kevurah. 1) Under certain circumstances (see M"K 22) where the body is shipped of for burial, aveilus sets in immediately for those mourners who stay behind and do not travel with it. Kevurah has not yet happened, but nihugei aveilus begin because the period of aninus comes to a close at that point. 2) The view of the SM”K (which we do not accept l’halacha) is that although we do not begin counting shiva until burial, nihugei aveilus begin from the time of the relative's death. Why do these days not count for shiva if nihugei aveilus apply? Because, answers the Rav, the prohibitions of nihugei aveilus do not make for a positive kiyum.

aninus and aveilus (I)

Those learning the daf this past Shabbos (Zevachim 1010) got a taste of the sugya of aninus. The d'oraysa halachos of aninus can basically be summarized on one sentence: a person who is an onein is not allowed to eat kodshim or ma'aser sheni. The gemara learns from the pasuk, "V'achalti chatas ha'yom?" that Aharon Hakohen could not eat kodshim after the deaths of Nadav v'Avihu. (I guess on a d'oraysa level that we can also throw in the exemption from positive mitzvos as well if it is based on oseik b'miztvah patur min hamitzvah.)

The halacha of aninus is completely different than that of aveilus. Aninus is d'oraysa; aveilus according to most Rishonim is derabbanan. An aveil is allowed to eat kodshim; an onein is not. Aninus begins when a person finds out that his relative has passed away and ends with burial; aveilus begins at burial and extends through the shiva period. An aveil doesn't wear shoes, sit on a comfortable chair, launder his clothes, etc., none of which is practiced during aninus.

The Rambam opens hilchos aveilus by saying that observing the first day of aveilus -- the day of death and burial -- is d'oraysa, based on this same pasuk of "V'achalti chatas ha'yom" that the gemara learns the issur of achilas kodshim for an onein from. The Rishonim and Achronim all ask how the Rambam could mix together these two very different sets of halachos. When a person is an onein he is not an aveil; when he is an aveil he is not an onein -- never the twain shall meet. To be continued bli neder...

Shushan Purim Katan?

Kiddush in shul this morning was given in honor of Shushan Purim Katan, which I thought was interesting because I never knew there was such a thing as Shushan Purim Katan. I told me wife afterwards that I guess it really doesn't matter, because, as the Rama says, "Tov lev mishteh tamid," so what's one more day of partying.

Truth be told, the Rama may actually address this issue. Rama (O.C. 697:1) writes, "Yesh omrim she'chayav l'harbos b'mishteh v'simcha b'14 Adar Rishon..." Notice that the Rama says nothing about making a party on 15 Adar Rishon -- he only mentions 14 Adar. And remember the gemara (Meg 6b) that we quoted last week -- "There is no difference between 14 Adar Rishon and 14 Adar Sheni except for reading of megillah and matanos l'evyonim" -- no mention again of 15 Adar. Of course you could argue that the gemara, and perhaps the Rama, are speaking in a general sense, as most people observe Purim on 14 Adar. However, the Pri Megadim for one is convinced that the diyuk of 14 to the exclusion of 15 is correct, and the Mishna Berura follows suit -- there is no chiyuv to make a party on Shushan Purim Katan. (Since 15 Adar was on Shabbos this year things may be a little different, as, at least according to the Yerushalmi, even if Purim itself fell on Shabbos the din of having a party is pushed off to another day. ) Shu"T Minchas Yitzchak (vol 10 #58) is less convinced, and he cites a Levush that argues in favor of celebrating both days.

The Minchas Yitzchak quotes an interesting Ksav Sofer (found in his commentary to Parshas Titzaveh) who suggests that since the whole point of mishloach manos is to contribute to and share in each others seudos Purim (the Briskers read the Rambam this way if I am not mistaken; others suggest that mishloach manos is just to enhance re'yus, the bonds of friendship between neighbors), there should be a din of mishloach manos on Purim Katan just like Purim in keeping with the Rama's psak to have a seudah in celebration of Purim Katan. Since no one delivered any mishloach manos to me before Shabbos, and I did not see anyone else out delivering to others, I am pretty confident this minhag has not taken off (unless, like the superbowl party, it's just me?)

So how do you decide between a diyuk of the Pri Megadim and a Minchas Yitzchak? Doesn't the Rama answer this one already? -- "Tov lev mishteh tamid!" which brings me right back to where I started.

Moshe's request to know G-d and the 13 midos

The Rishonim struggle to understand what Moshe's request for Hashem to reveal his presence to him, "Hodi'eini na es derachecha..." meant and why that request was made only following Moshe's tefilos to forgive cheit ha'eigel. Rambam (Yesodei haTorah 1:10) writes that Moshe was asking to know Hashem in a very deep way, with the same degree of certainty that a person has when he sees his friend he recognizes and knows that it can be no one else (the Rambam's analogy fits his idea that knowledge of G-d means knowing what G-d is not; we can never know anything about G-d or describe him as having any specific attribute, as the Rambam discusses in Moreh). Ra'avad on the spot asks two questions: 1) Didn't Moshe already attain this level of knowledge at har Sinai during mattan Torah? 2) How does Hashem's response - 'V'chanosi es asher achon v'rrichamti es asher aracheim" - relate to Moshe's request?

Ra'avad interprets Moshe's request differently. Hashem had told Moshe that because of the cheit ha'eigel, only an angel, but not Hashem himself, would guide Bnei Yisrael. Moshe's request of "Hodieini na..." was a demand to restore Hashem original personal hashgacha immediately, not only when Bnei Yisrael would get to Eretz Yisrael. Hashem partially consented. "V'richamtei es asher arachem," Hashem promised mercy to those who were worthy, but not all.

The Kesef Mishneh answers the Ra'avad's questions. 1) Moshe did not necessarily attain already at Har Sinai the level of knowledge he now sought. 2) Hashem meant that the knowledge Moshe requested could only come as a matanah, a gift from Hashem. V'chanosi es asher achon -- I, Hashem, decide who to grant that gift to. I wonder what the Rambam would make of this defense in his name. The Rambam is the champion of the intellect as the vehicle to come closer to Hashem. Does it make sense that the end game of the grand quest for intellectual dveikus is completely unattainable -- true knowledge of G-d on the highest level comes *not* from the mind, but comes from without, only as a gift?

What I also find interesting is that the Ra'avad's explanation implicitly answers a question that he conspicuously never articulates in his critique of the Rambam. How does the Rambam's interpretation fit the context of the parsha? Why would Moshe davka now ask for this supreme gift of knowledge? Granted, as the KS"M writes, there is no proof that this gift of knowledge was already bestowed at mattan Torah, but would not that have been the more appropriate time for Moshe to seek such knowledge? At least on a level of pshat in the parsha, the Ra'avad approach seems to have the advantage.

I want to leave off with an amazing comment of the Derashos haRan (in Derush #4) on the topic of the 13 midos. The Ran interprets Moshe's request, similar to the Ra'avad, as a supplication for Hashem's personal hashgacha in place of that of a malach. But what of the danger that hashgacha would bring? Sin done in the presence of the King is far more serious a crime than sin done in the presence of a mere angel. Therefore Moshe asked, "Hodi'eini na es derachecha," show me the path by which the people can be forgiven should they slip. Hashem responded, "V'chanosi es asher achon," I will forgive those who deserve forgiveness. Moshe still was not satisfied. Moshe wanted a guarantee of forgiveness for all, under any and all circumstances. This is the covenant of the 13 middos. Hashem promised that at this moment of creating this bris of the 13 midos that he will do a miracle unseen before by any nation or people. What is this great miracle that surpassed (so writes the Ran) even yetzi'as Mitzrayim and the splitting of Yam Suf? The Ran explains that as great as the exodus and the splitting of the sea was, both events were a reflection of G-d's will to save Bnei Yisrael. G-d's will is of course supreme and trumps all else. The 13 midos that elicit Divine forgiveness do not work because of G-d's will to forgive -- they work because of our desire to ask for forgiveness! Even if G-d is kavyachol angry, the 13 midos trump even the Divine will to punish and lead instead to rachmanus, forgiveness, reconciliation. A great idea to return to again in a few months when we get closer to Tishrei (someone remind me of this post ; )

Purim Katan

The Mishna (Meg 6b) writes that the only difference between Adar I and Adar II is that the reading of the megillah and matanos la'evyonim must be done in Adar II. The implication is that the day of 14 Adar I still counts as a holiday and should be celebrated as such, e.g. have a seudah. Tosfos, however, rejects this idea. The gemara writes that the two 14 Adar dates are identical with respect to hesped and ta'anis, meaning you cannot fast or deliver a eulogy on either one. Sounds like only with respect to the issur of hesped and ta'anis are the two dates identical, but not that one is required to have a full celebration on 14 Adar I just like 14 Adar II.

Tosfos seems to be splitting hairs a little too finely. How do we know that one cannot deliver a hesped or have a ta'anis on Purim? Because, as the gemara darshens (5b), the day is described as one of "mishteh v'simcha," partying and celebration. How can one say that a full holiday celebration is not required, i.e. 14 Adar I is not a day of "mishteh v'simcha," but at the same time say ta'anis or hesped are not permitted? Either it is a day of mishteh v'simcha or it's not, but you can't straddle the fence. Something to look into over Shabbos.

what budget crunch?

In the past I've wasted my time writing about the proliferation of luxurious Pesach getaways, which continue to increase in number. I keep telling myself, "kein yirbu!" as obviously it means a good measure of acheinu Bnei Yisrael are not suffering from any budget crunch whatsoever and all those kollelim and yeshivos that are on the verge of closing will be thriving again. Yes, I am being sarcastic. Even cynical me did a double-take when I saw an ad last week for "Lizensk VIP - -"First class, first time ever!" Four star hotels, gourmet catering, new coach buses so you can travel between hotel and R' Elimelech's kever in comfort. And on the side of the ad, in little letters: "Parnasa, shidduchim, yeshu'os v'refu'os." I guess after you plunk down whatever this trip costs, you better hope for that parnasa bracha. Am I the only one who sees any irony in an ad promoting luxury, comfort, etc. for a trip to R' Elimelech of Lizenk's kever? Is this really what R' Elimelech wanted people thinking about?

Just open to this week's parsha: "P"sol lecha..." Chazal darshen that the p'soles, the leftover scraps from the carving of the luchos, were "lecha," given to Moshe. The Noam Elimelech explains that Hashem was telling Moshe that the "lecha"'s is life, what we think we need for our own parnasa, our own comfort, our own needs, are to be looked looked at as p'soles, unimportant, something to be pushed aside, certainly not something that should motivate us in our avodas Hashem. Is this the Reb Elimelech that you go to visit because you are reassured you will be put up in a four star hotel and served gourmet meals (chassidishe shechita, of course)!?

It's a bracha l'vatalah to discuss these things, so maybe I'll take this post down later. I shouldn't rant. Ads like this are why I am completely opposed to so-called Jewish newspapers. At least when I read a secular newspaper I have no pretenses about why I am reading it and the newspaper makes no pretense about who it is aimed at. What is far more dangerous is the ta'aroves of tov v'ra in so-called Jewish papers, where you can delude yourself into thinking there is some value to reading them and becoming exposed to a warped version of Judaism that is portrayed as mainstream.

Instead of travelling to Lizensk, open a Noam Elimelech and learn a little. It will bring far more nachas ruach to R' Elimelech in shamayim as well as to your own neshoma.

chinuch lessons from Parshas Titzaveh

I meant to post this earlier for Titzaveh - better a little late than never:

"V'atah t'daber el kol chachmei lev asher mileisev ruach chochma..." (28:3). Chasam Sofer explains that Moshe was told to tell the "chachamei lev" that they are already, "asher mileisiv ruach chochma," endowed with the wisdom, knowledge, the capacity to do the job of building the Mishkan. Nothing else is needed except for them to make full use of talents they already have. This vort should be plastered on the walls of every yeshiva classroom in the world. "Asher mileisiv ruach chochma," you have what it takes to learn and succeed, even if you make mistakes along the way.

Talent alone is not enough to produce results. It also takes hard work. Chasam Sofer interprets the light of the menorah symbolically as representing the wisdom of Torah. That light comes from oil that must be "kasis," crushed and pounded to the finest consistency -- without grinding away at learning, without effort, nothing can ever be accomplished.

There is one other ingredient needed for success, and that is a rebbe or morah. There is a tremendous Ksav Sofer that caught my eye. The Ramban asks why the Torah places so much emphasis on Moshe's personal participation when it comes to making the oil for the menorah: "Atah tetzaveh... V'yikchu eilecha..." etc. Ramban suggests that Moshe had to make special effort to get proper oil, as it was not readily available, and he personally had to supervise its pressing to make sure it was done properly. It is difficult to understand why Moshe had to personally serve as mashgiach here; however, as the Ksav Sofer writes, it teaches an important lesson in light (excuse the pun) of the symbolism of oil as chochmas haTorah. You can't delegate Torah learning; you can't delegate chinuch. If you want the light of Torah to burn, you have to personally make sure that it happens. Yes, I know must of us pay good money for yeshiva tuition and are not personally involved in every step of our children's education, but that does not mean we get a free pass on all our responsibility and involvement.

the term kiddushin

We left off yesterday with a question: Tosfos says the term kiddushin applies to a woman because through the kinyan of kiddushin she becomes off-limits to all other suitors. Tosfos, however, says the term kiddushin cannot apply to an object, e.g. you can't say, "This talis is mekudeshes to me." Why not? Doesn't the talis become similarly off-limits to all others (there is now an issur gezel for them to take it) through the kinyan?

Those of you who are Telzers probably were thinking something like this: the act of kiddushin is the cause (sibah - the magic word behind half of R' Shimon Shkop's sefer) of two independent halachos: 1) a woman becoming one's wife; 2) the prohibition of her marrying anyone else. It is this second aspect which allows us to invoke the term "kiddushin," excluded from others. The same is not true with respect to other kinyanim. The issur for others to use an object is not an independent halacha, but is simply an extension of the definition of ownership. An easy proof that this distinction holds water can be brought from the question Achronim ask of why not apply to every case of safeik in dinei mamonos the rule of sfeika d'oraysa l'chumra - safeik gezel - and force the money to be turned over. Where do we get this idea of "hamotzi m'chaveiro alav ha'araya" from? R' Shimon Shkop explains that gezel is a function of faulty/false ownership. You can't claim someone is a gazlan or even a safeik gazlan unless you can first raise doubts about their ownership rights. Gezel is simply the absence of ownership, not an independent halacha. (For more on this idea, see previous post here.)

My son intuitively liked this idea, but I wanted a Brisker answer. Here's my two cents (the more I think about it the more I convince myself it's not that different than the first answer): the issur for others to be with a married woman is a function of the woman's status; it's an issur cheftza. The issur gezel on an object is an issur gavra on others -- the Torah wants you to not be a thief, not for objects not to be stolen. It's not kinyanim which "create" the issur gezel -- kinyanim merely create the metziyus, the practical context in which people can either ability to curb their desire to steal or to exercise power to take what belongs to others.

My son's rebbe had a different pshat in Tosfos that I don't understand. If I get a chance to ask him maybe I will update this.

14 Adar and Moshe Rabeinu

1) The Chasam Sofer quotes from R' Ya'akov Emden that Moshe Rabeinu was born on 7 Adar on Shabbos, making his yom hamilah on Shabbos 14 Adar. Since Moshe was born mahul, all that was required was hatafas dam bris, which was done on 15 Adar (the hatafah in this case is not doche Shabbos). Therefore, these two days of 14/15 Adar are days of simcha for all future generations.

The C"S is not completely happy with this idea -- why should 14 Adar should be a special day if no milah was done? You can't celebrate a non-event! He therefore suggests a different reason why that day is special. In Parshas Nitzavim, the last day of Moshe Rabeinu's life, Moshe gave a sefer Torah to sheveit Levi. The other shevatim complained -- why was Levi alone worthy of such a gift? It was about that day that Moshe said, "Lo nasam Hashem lachem lev lada'as ad hayom ha'zeh," which Rashi explains to mean that the people finally arrived at an understanding of da'as rabbam. This was a day of kabbalas haTorah, a true cause for celebration! The problem was that it is also the day of Moshe Rabeinu's petirah. Before the celebration could begin, aveilus set in. A week later, when the period of shiva ended, on 14 Adar, this kabbalas haTorah could be properly commemorated. The reverberations of that simcha were felt generations later -- "hadar kiblu'hu b'ymei Achashveirosh." (The C"S further ties this in with the parsha's opening -- take a look.)

2) The opening of the parsha is replete with difficulties and diyukim. The command to take oil to light the menorah seems out of place, sandwiched here between the construction of the mishkan and the making of bigdei kehunah. The format of parsha -- Hashem telling Moshe that he will teach a mitzvah to Bnei Yisrael -- is unique; in all other places Moshe simply relates the mitzvah or is commanded (i.e. the imperative is used, as opposed to the future tense, the way it is used here) to instruct Bnei Yisrael. The special emphasis on Moshe's personal role -- "atah titzaveh," "v'yikchu eilecha" -- is striking. Hopefully I've piqued your curiosity and you have some time to dig through the meforshim this Shabbos. Since it is not yet Shabos I haven't had time to do all my digging, so I just want one to share with you one beautiful remez of the Maor v'Shemesh.

"Titzaveh" is related to the same root as the word "tzavsah," to connect, to join -- Moshe was commanded to join with, to connect with Bnei Yisrael. It goes without saying that the closer our leaders are to us, the greater our benefit. But it's not only we who benefit. "V'yikchu eilecha" -- the people also bring something to Moshe, namely, "shemen zayis zach," pure oil, symbolizing refined knowledge and wisdom, "kasis la'maor," made from beaten olives, symbolizing humility. Just as we grow from our leaders, they in turn grow from our attention and dedication.

the term kiddushin

Tosfos (Kiddushin 2b) writes that the term "kiddushin" in the context of marriage means that a wife is designated as being permitted only to her husband, just as an item of "hekdesh" is designated for the use only of the Beis haMikdash.

What if a person uses the term of "kiddushin" to refer to an object? Can a person say, "This talis is mekudeshes for me," meaning designated only for that individual's use? Tosfos says not. Designating a wife to be one's partner precludes her having a relationship with any one else (b'mah she'meyuchedes li hi ne'eseres...). The same cannot be said with respect to an object.

Why not? What does Tosfos mean? If a talis is lying in the street, anyone can take it. If I designate it as my talis and acquire it, this creates a prohibition of gezel which precludes anyone else from taking it. Why does the term kiddushin work with respect to a wife but not with respect to the talis -- in both cases other parties are precluded from having access?

Maybe I'll update with my thoughts later, but first I'll give you a chance to think it over.

bekiyus

In the footnotes to the Chofetz Chaim al haTorah on last week's parsha it records that the C"C asked R' Yisroel Salanter whether it was better to learn one topic b'iyun or to cover ground. R'YS answered with a mashal: learning only one topic in depth to the exclusion of all else is like buying a beautiful tie but not having any other clothes. Moral of the story: stock up on bekiyus. (The note adds that psak halacha, however, requires specialized in depth knowledge. RY"S himself had the idea of talmidei chachamim specializing in specific areas so as to best be able to pasken in those domains.)

too much mesirus nefesh?

The Meshech Chochma devotes his closing comments on last week’s parsha (Terumah) to the topic of the gates of Nikanor that stood in the Beis haMikdash. The gemara (Yoma 38a) tells us that all the gates of the Mikdash were gold plated except for the gates donated by Nikanor, which remained in their original bronze. The gemara offers two explanations why. The first explanation has to do with the history of those gates. Nikanor obtained the gates from Alexandria and needed to ship them back to Yerushalayim. On the return journey a typhoon threatened his ship and he was forced to toss one of the gates overboard. The sea still raged, and the sailors demanded that the other gate be tossed as well. Nikanor refused, and declared that they should throw him into the sea with the remaining gate. The storm stopped, he made it to shore, and miraculously the gate tossed overboard was discovered floating below the boat. In remembrance of Nikanor’s mesirus nefesh, the gates remain exactly the way he presented them and are forever known as Nikanor’s gates. The gemara gives a second explanation: the bronze of the gates shone like gold and there was no need for added gold plating.

I would have assumed that the gemara is simply presenting two equally plausible explanations as to why the gates were not covered with gold. Not so says the Meshech Chochma. He writes that the two views are actually in disagreement as to whether Nikanor’s self-sacrifice should be memorialized. Proof that not everyone would celebrate Nikanor’s actions comes from B”K 61, where the gemara teaches that if someone risks his life for the sake of a din Torah, e.g. a soldier travels through enemy lines to go ask a shayla to the Sanhedrin, the halacha is not said over in that person’s name. Excessive mesirus nefesh is not rewarded! According to the second answer of the gemara Nikanor should not have been so willing to jump into the sea after his gates, and his deeds should not be celebrated.

By coincidence, the Shem m’Shmuel opens this week’s parsha of Tetzaveh with a vort that casts that proof text of the Meshech Chochma in a completely different light. In Parshas Ki Tisa, Moshe Rabeinu pleads with Hashem to forgive the cheit ha’eigel or to erase his name from the Torah (we discussed this in previous years; see the Ki Tisa archives). The absence of Moshe Rabeinu’s name in our parsha is understood to be a result of Moshe’s demand.

Does it make that much of a difference if Moshe's name is explicitly mentioned or not? The Shem m'Shmuel explains that a person’s name refers to the individual’s body/soul combination. Your name – Moshe, Chaim, Sarah, Rivka – refers to the physical "you" as well as the spiritual "you" that appears in the body with that name. What happens if a person so transcends this world that they no longer have a real physical presence? Then their name no longer applies -- you can’t give a name to something that isn’t there.

By making the extraordinary demand of “M’cheini na,” by demonstrating complete selfless mesirus nefesh for the sake of Klal Yisrael, Moshe Rabeinu completely transcended his physical self – he lost his name.

When Chazal say that we do not say over halacha in the name of someone who endangers his life for the sake of Torah it is not because that person is undeserving, but to the contrary – that person has attained such great heights that to associate a physical name with their presence diminishes who they are.

4 amos of halacha

Sorry, I could not think of anything original to say this week. A bit of a likut instead:

"Li hakesef v'li hazahav," says Hashem -- so what can we bring to the table for the building of the Mishkan? What can you give the King who literally has everything? The answer is, "Hakol b'ydei shamayim chutz m'yiras shamayim." "M'eis kol ish asher yidvenu libo tikchu es terumosi" -- R' Yosef Shaul Natahanson explains that the gift we can give is our nedivus lev, our decision to be generous, because that is completely under our own control.

“Ain lo l’HK”H elah 4 amos shel halacha.” (Brachos 8) Where did Chazal come up with this number of “4 amos” from? The Iyun Ya’akov explains that the aron measured 2.5 amos x 1.5 amos – add the numbers together you get four. (The length of the aron represents bekiyus, the width, iyun. Since sinai tops oker harim, bekiyus is more valuable than iyun, it is the larger side. The gemara does not take account of the aron's height because it represents sisrei Torah, of which we have no conception. Why do all the measurements have halves? To emphasize the need to view oneself as always no more than halfway to achieving success, to emphasize that there is always more to grow towards completion.)

The badim, the polies used to carry the aron, were not permitted to be removed from their rings. This halacha is unique to the aron; there is no similar prohibition with respect to the shulchan and mizbeiach, also carried with poles. The Meshech Chochma explains that the poles of the aron remained in place even when the aron was at rest to demonstrate that these poles were not functional in nature -- they were not really needed to carry the aron. Chazal teach that the aron was “nosei es nos’av,” it carried those who carried it – it floated along by itself and did not really require physical exertion or support to be moved. These staves used for carrying the aron represent those who support Torah. Torah carries along its supporters – they get credit for expending their wealth and effort for the sake of Torah, but it is really the Torah which supports them.

The menorah is the symbol for pilpula shel Torah, in depth learning. “Mikshah hi” – it was made of one solid block of gold. The many differing views of poskim and talmidei chachamim come from the same source, they are all part of the same solid block of gold.

The flowers and adornments of the menorah were also chiseled from that same solid block and not added on. Chasam Sofer explains that the interpretation and exposition of Torah, which is the beauty and glory of Torah, must be minei u’bei, from within the framework of Torah itself, not the product of other wisdoms and viewpoints grafted onto the body of Torah.

Though Moshe was unable to figure out how to fashion the menorah from that solid block and it had to make itself, which is why the pasuk uses the passive voice, “te’aseh es hamenorah,” the Torah in the same parsha later commands, “v’kein ta’aseh,” that we must make it. Learning is “yagata u’matzasa” – we must put in the effort, even though at the end of the day it is a metziya, our success is a gift from Hashem, above and beyond what our own efforts could produce.

Moshe was told by Hashem to make a Mishkan "k'chol asher ani mareh oscha," exactly as I saw you. Why the extra word "oscha" in the pasuk? The real Mishkan, the dwelling place of Hashem, is in the heart and soul of tzadikim. By looking at oscha, at Moshe himself, Klal Yisrael would understand what a true Mishkan is. We lack a Mikdash/Mishkan, but hopefully, if not by looking at ourselves, by looking at great people, we can catch a glimpse of what it means to have a hashra'as haShechina in our midst.

odds and ends and some chizuk

A few odds and ends:

1) A short while ago a fellow blogger put up a post, since taken down, about people introducing sports team cheer song melodies into nusach hatefilah. I don’t know why he took the post down, because I would expand the point further. Why is every kosher takeout in my neighborhood now offering super bowl halftime party packages? Is everyone having a party except me? Maybe subconsciously I'm writing this post because I'm jealous that no one has invited me to their party (...yet - there’s still time!) Rather than emphasizing greater heights of kedusha, modern frumkeit often amounts to nothing more than finding ways of being matir and machshir the lowest elements of modern culture. On Rosh Chodesh Adar the Beis Din would make announcements about shekalim and kilya'im. R' Ahron of Karlin explains that the shekelim used for the purpose of korbanos, to come closer to Hashem, go hand in hand with the birur of avoiding kilayim, a mixture of ideologies, tov and ra.

2) Jumping from low culture to high… (the amazing thing is that you can easily get a big glatt hechsher on your superbowl party hero, but art and literature are always treif gamur, but that's another discussion). For those in NY, the Met currently has on display two items of interest. One: a stone floor mosaic found in Lod in Eretz Yisrael dating from the third century and remarkably well preserved. Nice website here. Second: a 12/13^th century copy of the Rambam which happens to be open to the Rambam’s description of the bigdei kehuna, so it’s inyana d’yoma.

3) With all the bad weather (and yes, I know compared to Chicago we are getting off easy) I was wondering if rock salt is muktzah on Shabbos. It seems to be like stones/gravel, which would be off limits barring any preparation, but if you know the storm is coming and you have in mind before Shabbos that you need it, is there any reason why the rock salt should still be muktzah? My son mentioned to me that he saw in some English language book that you can salt because of sakanah, which I don't understand. Plenty of people rush off to work before salting their walk; no one rushes home from vacation to salt their walk -- what happened to the sakanah in these cases?

4) Last but not least, a little chizuk to get through mid-week: Eveybody asks why the pasuk says, “V’Yikchu li terumah m’eis kol is hasher yidvenu libo,” when it should say, “V’Yitnu” – you give terumah, you don’t take terumah. The Chasam Sofer explains that there were people who really wanted to give to the Mishkan – they were “nediv lev” – but they didn’t have what to give or what was needed. The Midrash says that when the man fell, these people discovered along with their portion that Hashem had also given them precious gems to donate. These are the people whom the pasuk is addressing: those who desire to give, “V’Yikchu,” should take these special gifts from Hashem, because he wanted to enable them to fulfill their desire to give back.

The obvious lesson here is that if one truly desires to be a nediv lev and give, whether it be to give charity, to give over Torah, to give in some other way, “V’Yikchu,” we will be able to take from Hashem the kochos and materiel we need and be able to fulfill that desire.

the haftarah that goes backwards

There is something interesting about the haftarah for parshas Mishpatim as printed in the standard chumashim. The haftarah consists of Yirmiyahu ch 34, until you get to the last two pesukim, which are taken from the previous perek of Yirmiyahu 33. Why does the haftarah tack on these extra pesukim from the previous perek? We always try to end off an aliya from the parsha, or end off the haftarah, on a positive note. Since Yirmiyahu 34 does not end on a positive note, the haftarah adds on a few extra pesukim to close on an uplifting theme.

The S.A. (O.C. 144) writes that one is not permitted to read a haftarah l'mafreiya, in reverse order from the text. The poskim (see M.B. #9) discuss where and when this din theoretically applies (some say it only applies when going backwards between two Nevi'im; the MG"A holds it applies even within the same sefer), but it seems that practically speaking, in our times when everyone follows the reading from a pre-printed text and there is no confusion caused and no pause caused while the reader jumps between chapters, this din does not apply (see M.B. #6).

However, why create a situation when one must jump backwards when there is no pressing reason to do so? It's not like there is some particular theme the end of our haftarah wants to echo that demands reading Yirmiyahu 33 -- the whole point is simply to end on a positive note. If so, suggests R' Chaim Kanievsky in his sefer Ta'ama D'Kra, the same goal can easily be accomplished by reading forwards, adding on Yirmiyahu 35 until the end. This would be preferable, in his view, to the standard practice.

seeing is believing

The experience of mattan Torah was one of synethesia, "ro'im es hakolos," Bnei Yisrael saw the voice of Hashem. Miracles have a purpose -- there must have been some reason for Hashem's voice to be not only heard, but also seen.

There is a famous story in which R' Chaim Volozhiner was recounting the greatness of his brother, R' Itzele, and remarked that he would be considered a talmid chacham even had he lived in the days of Amoraim and even Tanaim. The listeners were fabergasted, as surely R' Chaim Volozhiner was not given to saying empty praises. If this is how R' Chaim described his brother, what could he possibly say about his rebbe, the GR"A? R' Chaim Volozhiner explained the difference between the two as follows: if you ask a Jew to tell you the previous word in any pasuk in Ashrei, or the previous word in a sentence of Aleinu, he will know the answer in a second, but to get that answer he will have to say that pasuk or sentence in his mind from the beginning. R' Itzele knew kol haTorah kula by heart like Ashrei or Aleinu. The GR"A was different -- he knew the previous word without having to think of the pasuk from the beginning; he knew kol haTorah kula backwards as well as forwards.

What's the difference between these two types of knowledge? When asked for the previous word of a pasuk in Ashrei by heart, we rely on our auditory memory, and therefore have to recite the pasuk from the beginning. If we have a sidur open in front of us, we just look at the previous word and can answer without hesitation. The former is shemiya, the latter is re'iya. Kabbalas haTorah was an experience during which Torah was absorbed and accepted to the greatest degree humanly possible. That type of knowledge comes only through re'iya, seeing, not just shemiya, hearing.

Our parsha opens with the laws of the even ivri, the Jewish slave. If the slave chooses to remain indentured beyond six years, his ear is punctured. Why? Rashi cites from Chazal: "The ear which heard on Sinai that Bnei Yisrael are my [Hashem's] servants and not servants to servants," deserves to be punished. "Ain lecha ben chorin elah ha'osek baTorah" -- true freedom is through kabbalas haTorah, through learning Torah. A person who wishes to remain enslaved demonstrates that his kabbalas haTorah was done only with his ears, by hearing, but not by seeing -- his experience of kabbalas haTorah was lacking in some crucial element.

bitul b'rov and kol d'parish m'ruba

This past Shabbos' daf, Zevhacim 73, finished the gemara's discussion of why an animal is not bateil in a herd, the simplest reason probably being that an animal is a davar chashuv, it is significant. The gemara follows up with a different line of questioning. If an animal is mixed into a herd and you get the herd moving, any animal that jumps out should be permitted based on the principle of kol d'parish m'ruba parish. For example, if there are 100 animals in the herd and one jumps out, odds are that it is one of the 99 heter animals and not the one prohibited animal. The gemara ends up concluding that this is not an acceptable solution because of a gezeirah derabbanan.

It seems clear from the gemara's question that there is a difference between bitul b'rov and holchin achar ha'rov (or kol d'parish -- same thing) or the whole discussion makes no sense -- if rov doesn't apply to a davar chashuv, how can kol d'parish m'ruba apply? The answer must be that these are two different animals (no pun intended). Bitul b'rov doesn't just mean that when a piece of treif meat gets mixed up in a pot with kosher meat we assume that any piece selected is kosher based on the odds. It means much more than that -- it means the treif meat has halachically ceased to exist. Not so the rule of kol d'parish, which is strictly a matter of odds. We know one member of the group is prohibited, but we assume that any one individual item selected must belong to the majority. The sugya in Zevachim assumed that even if we can't go so far as to utilize bitul b'rov, we still might have a way out using kol d'parish (see Shiurei R' Dovid Lifshitz on Chulin 95).

(As an aside, the obvious question is how both of these principles stem from the same pasuk of 'acharei rabim l'hatos' -- see R' Chaim in the stencils.)

This leaves me perplexed by a comment of the Shita M'Kubetzet. The gemara at first is troubled by the use of kol d'parish here, because if animals keep jumping out, at some point a majority of animals have been used up and you know you've taken the asur one. For example, imagine a marble jar filled with 9 blue marbles and 1 red one. If one marble falls out, odds are it will be a blue one -- kol d'parish m'ruba. If marbles keep falling out, e.g. 9 marbles fell out, the odds now tilt against you and are in favor of you're holding the red one. The gemara rejects this objection, but doesn't explain why. Whatever the reason, the Shita m'Kubetzet (#3) writes that this gemara proves that in a case of ta'aroves, e.g. a pot with a bunch of kosher pieces of meat that one trief piece fell into, you can eat the whole pot (other Rishonim disagree) irrespective of the fact that you will definitely be consuming that one treif piece. I don't understand -- the gemara is discussing kol d'parish. What does that have to do with hilchos ta'aroves? Bitul b'rov and kol d'parish m'ruba are two different animals!

Perhaps the Shita means that if the whole collection becomes permissable in a case of kol d'parish, it is certainly permissable in a case of bitul. However, it doesn't sound like that's what he means -- it sounds like the Shita is drawing a direct comparison between bitul and the gemara's case of kol d'parish. I didn't spend time looking around for an answer and nothing struck me offhand. Maybe those of you learning the daf have some ideas?

using iron in the mikdash

Those of you learning the daf might be interested in taking a peek at the Ramban at the end of Yisro (the daf yomi learners I mentioned it to loved it). Rishonim offer various reasons why the Torah prohibits using an iron chisel to square away the stones of the mizbeyach. Ibn Ezra says that the leftover shards might be tossed in the garbage or used improperly or even worshiped. Rambam sees the whole prohibition as a safeguard against even maskis type avodah zarah. Ramban expands on the Midrashic idea that iron, which is used in weaponry, serves to shorten man's life, and therefore stands in contradiction to the whole purpose of service in the Mishkan, which is to extend and enrich life. Even the sockets of the Mishkan boards, which had to be made of metal, were not made of iron. How then were iron knives permissible to be used for slaughtering animals? Ramban cleverly answers that this proves the point the gemara in Zevachim makes a number of times: shechita is not considered avodah.

The Meshech Chochma and others (see footnotes to the Chavel ed.) point out that there seems to be an exception to the rule that the Ramban does not account for. When the Chashmonaim rededicated the Temple they did not have enough gold for a new menorah and therefore had to make a temporary one out of iron. Even if the lighting of the menorah can be done by a zar and is perhaps not technically avodah), the hatavas haneiros must be done by a kohein. The Chavel edition quotes an answer from R' Meir Arik: the menorah oil was first placed in a kli shareis before use; the menorah itself was not mekadeish anything. I'm not sure I understand this answer -- if the Ramban extends his principle to cover even the sockets used to hold the boards of the Mishkan in place, why would it not apply to the menorah, even if it does not serve as a mekadesh?

a greater miracle than the makos

I remember last time we discussed the famous Ohr haChaim about why Reuvain said to throw Yosef in a pit there were some qualms about it. The O.C. suggests that a human being who is a ba’al bechira and has free choice might be able to harm Yosef even if he didn’t deserve it. Therefore, Reuvain said to throw Yosef into a pit, because even if that pit was filled with snakes and scorpions, these creatures have no bechira and were wholly subject to Hashem’s control.

I don’t know if you will buy it any more because the Chasam Sofer says it, but here it is on this week’s parsha.

It wasn’t the miracles of the makos that convinced Yisro that Hashem was in charge -- pshita that Hashem could control nature. What convinced Yisro was the pursuit of the Egyptians into Yam Suf and the war waged by Amalek. To think even after seeing all the makos that Bnei Yisrael could be defeated is irrational; it is madness. The behavior of the Egyptians and Amalek could only be explained by the yad Hashem, in the case of the former to destroy them, in the case of the later to punish Bnei Yisrael for relaxing in their dedication to Torah. This power to override the free will of ba’alei bechira and cause them to behave in ways that contradict their own self interest is an even greater miracle than all the makos.

definition of melaches Shabbos at Marah

The Kli Chendah on last week’s parsha raises the question (discussed already by the Pnei Yehoshua) of what the definition of melacha on Shabbos consisted of after the command to observe Shabbos was given at Marah. The definition of av melacha in our halachic world means a significant labor that was performed in the construction of the Mishkan (B.K. 2a, Tosfos). But how could that possibly have been the definition in Marah, pre-building of the Mishkan?

My off-the-cuff idea is that the observance of Shabbos as given in Marah was not a kiyum mitzvah of shemiras Shabbos per se (i.e. with all the associated gedarim of hilchos shabbos like avos/tolados), but rather was a kiyum mitzvah of listening to the words of a navi (i.e. Moshe Rabeinu). There was simply no concept of a cheftza shel mitzvah as we know it until mattan Torah.

Rashi writes that mitzvos were given at Marah “l’hisasek bahem.” The Brisker Rav is medayek that this implies an obligation of limud but not of practical observance, in contradiction to a number of gemaras (e.g. Sanhedrin 56) which imply that practical observance did begin in Marah. It’s a little bit of a stretch, but I am wondering if Rashi perhaps is alluding to this idea that what was given in Marah was something to be "involved in" (in the sense of practical observance as well as limud), but not what we could truly call a mitzvah.

I’ll save you the trouble of asking and raise the question myself: what of the commandments like taking the korban pesach in Mitzrayim – were those mitzvos or not? I’m not sure that’s a knockout punch to my theory. Maybe pre-mattan Torah these were not mitzvos in the same sense or the same form they took on post-mattan Torah. How can you prove otherwise?

can we build a mizbeyach without a navi?

The gemara (Zevachim 62) tells us that nevi'im came to Eretz Yisrael with Ezra and testified as to the correct location of the mizbeyach. Why did it take the word of a navi to figure out where the mizbeyach should be built? Do we need a navi before we can build a mizbeyach? The Maharat"z Chiyus explains that the first Beis haMikdash was razed to the point that not even the foundations of what originally stood remained. There was no evidence left that would indicate where walls were, where the mizbeyach had been, etc. Therefore, it required the help of a navi to figure out where to place things. Today, since we have archeological evidence and we have remnants of the Mikdash still left standing, we can simply take out a tape measure and figure out based on the dimensions given in Mes. Midos exactly where things go. We can theoretically rebuild the mizbeyach even without a navi.

The Brisker Rav (on Bechoros 17) disagrees. The Rambam writes (Beis HaBechira ch 3) that the place of the mizbeyach is "mechuvan b'yoseir" -- it has to be precisely placed in exactly the correct spot. Being even a little off disqualifies the whole effort. This type of exacting measurement is impossible even given the best surveying tools and the evidence of what once was. The place of the mizbeyach is not subject to calculation -- it can only be revealed to us by a navi.

didn't Moshe know the Egyptians would give chase?

The Rishonim (Ibn Ezra, Ramban) ask why Moshe started to daven and scream to Hashem when he saw the Egyptian army in hot pursuit of Bnei Yisrael – Moshe knew what was going to happen, as he had been told advance by Hashem (14:4) that the Egyptians were going to give chase?!

A short few weeks ago we discussed the fate of Pharoah’s three advisors: Bilam, Iyov, and Yisro. Bilam wanted Bnei Yisrael eliminated, so in turn he was eliminated. Yisro sacrificed everything and fled Egypt, so in turn he ended up regaining prestige as Moshe’s father-in-law. Iyov was silent, and so he was punished with suffering. What exactly did Iyov do wrong? Perhaps he was simply waiting for the right moment, calculating the best time to intervene in a way that would have the greatest effect? The Brisker Rav answers that when in pain, you scream, you don’t calculate. Iyov saw the tragedy of Bnei Yisrael’s enslavement unfolding before him and he felt no pain.

The Sefas Emes says the same idea here. Moshe knew the Egyptians would be after Bnei Yisrael and he knew that he had Hashem’s promise that Bnei Yisrael would somehow be saved. But when faced with danger, you don’t calculate what was promised, what you knew would happen, what you know will happen – when it hurts you scream; the visceral reaction kicks in, which in the case of Moshe Rabeinu meant the scream of tefilah. Adds the Sefas Emes, Hashem knows in advance that this is the behavior of tzadikim. His promises take into account that the Moshe Rabeinu’s of the world don’t listen to havtachos and then sit back and relax, but rather they still cry out and increase their avodah as if everything depended on it.

journeying day and night

Another week with barely time to think, much less time to think about the parsha, but I feel bad not saying something before Shabbos.

The Torah tells us that Bnei Yisrael travelled “yomam va’layla,” day and night, as soon as they left Egypt -- they had miraculous clouds to guide them by day and a pillar of fire to guide them at night so they could keep moving. It sounds like they needed every moment of travel to get where they needed to go. Yet, the truth is that no matter how fast they ran, they could never have covered the distance they did barring the miracle of being helped by “kanfei nesharim,” "eagle's wings." The Torah tells us that Bnei Yisrael accomplished an eleven day journey in only three days! So what was the point of pushing ahead day and night? It’s like the old joke of someone running through the train thinking he’s going to get where he’s going faster – just sit down and enjoy the ride, because your legs aren’t going to make a difference. When Hashem is doing to driving or flying, moving your feet faster or slower is not going to make much difference.

The Shem m’Shmuel answers that the need for day and night travel wasn’t for the sake of getting to Kadesh Barne’a faster, but rather was for the sake of creating a sense of retzifus, of continuity. Accomplishment in Torah requires a 24x7 effort – there is no vacation and no downtime. We know this from sefiras ha’omer – missing even a day forfeits the entire count, the entire buildup and preparation from Pesach to mattan Torah. From day #1 out of Egypt Bnei Yisrael had to understand that their journey was a continuous one that allowed for no rest stops and no pause.

There is a second lesson here as well. It is easy to keep pushing ahead in one’s journey when it is day – when the destination and road are clear, when the going is easy, when one is energized. It’s much harder at night. The Torah demands of us that we push ahead in our journey even when things are not clear to us, when things are difficult, when the going is not so easy.

I think the simplest answer to the original question is that as a general principle the Torah tries to minimize the miraculous. The Ramban writes in Parshas Noach that no matter how big a boat Noach built, it still required a miracle to fit all the animals inside. Nonetheless, Noach still had to do his part and build that boat. Here too, Bnei Yisrael covered far more ground than humanly possible, yet they still had to do all they could to minimize the miracle and cover as much ground as they could through their own effort.

Particularly in this case, that independent effort perhaps served a psychological need. Bnei Yisrael essentially got a free pass from Hashem – they got out of Egypt without having to endure 400 full years of servitude, they got out with a bare minimum of zechiyos, they got out without having to really do anything. Nahama d’kisufa – a person is embarrassed by taking undeserved handouts; people want to earn their keep. Bnei Yisrael wanted to be active participants in their own exodus. A little kid who has Mommy or Daddy running alongside his bike with while s/he tries to balance between the huge training wheels still feels like s/he is riding the bike because s/he is the one pushing the peddles. Having Mommy or Daddy push the bike while s/he just sits there is just not the same thing. The push to travel day and night may not have made any difference in terms of the ground Bnei Yisrael covered, but it made a world of difference in terms of the way they felt about the journey. And this too is chasdei Hashem – not just to get us where we need to go, but to make us feel like we are the ones who did all the work and earned being there.

Chasam Sofer on Torah u'Mada

Link to the original (Toras Moshe, Parshas Beshalach). Well worth seeing the whole thing inside.

where was the mizbeyach located -- halacha vs. reality

At a daf shiur where I am a sometimes once a week substitute I was asked the following question: how can the gemara (Zevachim 58-59) have a machlokes Tanaim whether the mizbeyach stood in the north/south/center of the Mikdash? These Tanaim did not live so long after the churban and they might have personally seen or known people who had personally seen the Mikdash while it was standing. Didn't anyone remember?

Granting the premise that the memory of where the mizbeyach stood would remain fresh in at least some people's minds (which I'm not 100% certain about, but it seems reasonable), I proposed two responses:

1) Where the mizbeyach stood last time around is irrelevant. If in theory the Tanaim agreed to darshen pesukim differently and locate the mizbeyach in a different spot, that is what we would do going forward.

2) As we once discussed, the metziyus is not necessarily proof in the world of halacha. R' Dessler points out (Michtav m'Eliyahu vol 4 p. 56-57) that we have disputes in many areas where it is inconceivable that there was not some historical precedent or even some common practice that would support one side over the other. Yet, that proof does not make for torah sheb'al peh. Halacha can only be derived from derashos, from a mesorah, from sevara. Without those theoretical underpinnings, what was done in practice might be called a minhag, but it lacks the formal stamp of law. (I think R' Dessler's chiddush sheds light on a Ran at the end of R"H. The Ran asks how the gemara could have a dispute as to what the sound of a teru'ah should be -- didn't people blow shofar every Rosh HaShana? The Ran answers that all the various opinions -- shevarim, teru'ah, shevarim-teru'ah -- were done in practice, i.e. they were minhagim, but the gemara wanted to codify a standard, i.e. codify one view as a matter of law.)

On a similar note (not exactly the same): Chazal teach (Ta'anis 5) that Ya'akov Avinu did not die. The gemara asks: but we know that Ya'akov was embalmed? To which the answer is given that our teaching is based on a derasha. Everybody wonders what kind of answer that is -- so what if it's a derasha, it still contradicts reality!? R' Chaim explained that if "Ya'akov Avinu lo meis" is a metziyus, if it is based on an observation of reality, then it can be challenged and disproven by a contrary observation. However, if it is a dersha, the facts on the ground can't stand in the way. OK, so we have a question from what we see as reality, but that proof is not strong enough to force us to dismiss the equally strong reality of the truth of the derasha. (Something to keep in mind when dealing with other areas like this...)

So much for my 2 cents. Anyone have any other ideas on how to answer this question?

galus -- it's all relative

Parshas Bo is particularly rich in mitzvos and hashkafa to talk about, but that doesn’t mean I have time to write a lot : (

The gemara (Brachos 9) tells us that Hashem wanted Bnei Yisrael to help themselves to the Egyptian wealth “lest Avraham Avinu protest that the prophecy of enslavement was fulfilled through them, but the prophecy that they would escape with great wealth was not fulfilled through them.” Everybody wonders what this gemara means – surely even if not for Avraham’s protests Hashem would have kept his word?

The Yismach Moshe explains that the key word in the gemara is “through them.” Bnei Yisrael cleared Mitzrayim out of all its wealth – it was the accumulated wages owed for generations of servitude which they were collecting (as Chazal later explained to the wise men of Alexandria), not just the wages for the work done that year or the past few years before the exodus. What right did the generation who left Egypt have to collect the wages of their ancestors? The answer is that it was theirs by virtue of yerusha, inheritance. The booty collected from Mitzrayim was proof that there existed a direct line from Avraham down to the generation that left Egypt, that intermarriage and intermingling with Egyptians did not dilute the zera Avraham during their stay in galus. It was this connection that Hashem wanted to demonstrate, not simply the fact that Egypt could be emptied of its gold.

The Lubliner Rav also has an amazing pshat here based on the same diyuk. Hashem promised Avraham that his children will go into galus; Hashem promised that his children will be freed with great wealth. What galus and slavery meant, what great reward meant, was never defined. For a tzadik like Avraham, just having to live in a country like Mitzrayim, to do mundane tasks there, was galus, was avdus. Not so for his descendents, who became less sensitive to degradation of their kedusha. For them, galus and avdus had to entail real oppression to mean anything. The same was true of the promise of great reward. For a tzadik like Avraham, there could be no greater reward than kabbalas haTorah. Yet, his descendents could only be satisfied with a tangible, material reward, the wealth of Mitzrayim.

This is what the gemara means. Hashem could have fulfilled his end of the bargain with the reward of kabbalas haTorah. Yet, were he to do so Avraham would have a ta’anah. Since the punishment of slavery was fulfilled not based on Avraham’s definition of avdus and galus, but rather, “through them,” according to his descendents perception of what galus and avdus meant, according to their needs, the reward also must be “through them,” i.e. in accordance with their definition of what a reward is, not simply a spiritual reward that only the likes of Avraham could appreciate.

It seems that the galus we have to experience is relative to where we are at spiritually. Just riding the NYC subway, even if you are learning along the way, even if you get a seat -- it’s still galus. Sometimes we forget that it’s galus, we become accepting of an environment of tumah that surrounds us 24x7. Worse still, sometimes we embrace galus as an ideal, thinking that not only shouldcertain internet sites or whatever not be banned, but that it’s a mitzvah to look at them, v’kol hamarbeh in page refreshes harei zeh meshubach. When that happens we unfortunately create a need for Hashem to bring about a less subtle galus, and I don’t know if all the gold and silver in the world is worth it.

birchas haTorah after an afternoon nap

The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 47) quotes two views as to whether one must recite a new birchas haTorah after taking an afternoon nap. It is easy to understand why you should: if you, for example, leave a sukkah to go do something else and then come back, you say a new bracha. Same here: if you stop concentrating on learning to sleep, you should be required to say a new bracha when you resume learning. (No bracha is needed if you simply interrupt learning to do some other activity because the thought of learning is still latent somewhere in your consciousness. The same cannot be said when you are asleep.) Yet, the minhag generally is to not say a new bracha. Why not? There are two possible ways to formulate the issue here:

1) Everyone agrees in theory that a new birchas haTorah is necessary if there is a hefsek, just like the case of sukkah, just like case of all birchos hamitzvah. The issue here is whether an afternoon nap is really considered a hefsek.

I have a hard time swallowing this. Some people sleep more on Shabbos afternoon than others do on some nights – why is that Shabbos nap not a hefsek but going to sleep at night is? The Aruch haShulchan comes to the rescue and adds some lomdus to distinguish between my sukkah example and birchas haTorah. True, every time you sit in sukkah there is a kiyum mitzvah, but there is no ongoing chiyuv that forces you to remain sitting there. Learning Torah is an ongoing obligation. You can sleep through your obligation, but it’s still there waiting for you to wake up and fulfill it. So why don’t we just recite birchas haTorah once in our life since the same obligation to learn continues every second thereafter for the rest of our lives? When we say the bracha we really only have in mind that day’s learning. A nap doesn’t end the day; going to sleep at night does. (So why not just say this sevara and skip the lomdus – a nap is temporary; sleep for the night closes out the day? Apparently the AhS did not want to say this because were it true, the same distinction should apply by every mitzvah – taking a nap outside the sukkah and then going back in would not necessitate a new bracha. Therefore he adds that the chiddush only applies to birchas haTorah where the chiyuv is ongoing.)

2) The two views disagree fundamentally over whether the din of hefsek applies to birchas haTorah. The bracha over sitting in sukkah, the bracha over any mitzvah, is in effect only so long as there is no hefsek. Were birchas haTorah a birchas hamitzvah, the same rule would apply. The reason it doesn’t points to the fact that birchas haTorah is not a true birchas hamitzvah. What then is it? You can say it’s a birchas hashevach. Maybe you can say (like the Brisker Rav does) that the bracha is on the cheftza of Torah, not the chovas hagavra of learning, and therefore a hefsek on the part of the gavra plays no role. Either way, I find this approach much simpler to swallow.

One final note: if you are interested in reading more about alos/hanetz after last week's post about netilas hayadim / shema very early, this article has much more.

v'lakachti eschem li l'am

When the Torah uses the term “am” as opposed to “Bnei Yisrael” it usually refers to the uneducated masses, (Rashi Bamidbar 11 writes that it refers to resha’im), the hoi polloi. So why would Hashem promise, “V’lakachti eschem li l’am?” Perhaps it means even as an “am” we are still accepted, but the pasuk seems to be more of an aspiration than a promise. Is being an “am” all we aim for?

The Shem m'Shmuel explains that as much as we value talmud Torah, thinking about the dvar Hashem, these are not the ultimate sources our commitment. A Jew who knows the simple fact that Hashem commanded X and therefore he/she does it is on some level far greater than the Jew who can tell you a whole lomdus and ta’amei hamitzvos and philosophy lesson to explain what he she is doing while the idea of mitzvah=commandment, obedience to outside authority, gets lost somewhere along the way. In some sense, yes, “V’lakachti eschem li l’am,” without any chochmos, is an ideal.

Maharal (Tif Yisrael ch 42) explains that Eisav was meticulous in his observance of kibud av because there is no more rational mitzvah that kibud av. We owe our very existence to our parents and it therefore makes sense to give them their do. When it came to things that made sense to him, Eisav’s enthusiasm was unparalleled. However, when things didn’t make sense, he felt no obligation whatsoever.

Moshe demanded from Pharaoh, “Shelach ami” – let even the “am” go free to worship. Not only the philosophers and wise men, but everyman. But, “Me’ein Pharaoh l’shalach ha’am” – Pharaoh refused to set the am free. Pharoah was willing to listen to reason, but having six year olds running around the desert is not reasonable. What possible value could it serve; what possible reason could there be for such avodah? “V’lakachti eschem li l’am” – the freedom to do what doesn’t make sense is exactly what Am Yisrael aspired to.

free choice and the plague of frogs

The gemara (Pesachim 53) teaches that Chanayna, Misha’el, and Azarya deduced that they had an obligation to sacrifice their lives and be tossed into a burning oven at Nevuchadnezer’s hands from the fact that during the plague of frogs the frogs jumped even into the Egyptian ovens, forfeiting their lives.

There seems to be a clear difference between these two cases. G-d specifically commanded that the frogs enter even the ovens of Egypt. G-d never specifically commanded Chananya, Misha'el, and Azarya to be tossed into an oven. How could they draw an analogy from the frogs to their situation?

The Sha’agas Arye is quoted as answering that G-d commanded that the frogs enter the ovens, the bedrooms, the kitchens – every area of Egypt. The frogs as a group had to be everywhere. However, no one said that any individual frog had to enter an oven as opposed to a bedroom, or vica versa. The fact that a frog would choose to jump into an oven demonstrates the chiyuv of self-sacrifice which Chananya Misha’el and Azarya imitated. (See Rashi/Tosfos why they needed the frogs as a model when there is a chiyuv of kiddush Hashem is learned from pesukim.)

Maharil Diskin is troubled by this answer. If every frog had a choice whether it wanted to be the one to jump into an oven, it is entirely possible that all the frogs could choose to not jump into ovens. How then would the command that frogs be everywhere – including in the ovens – be fulfilled? The will of all frogs cannot be greater than the sum of their individual decisions. Maharil Diskin therefore gives a different answer to this question, as to many other meforshim.

The debate between the Sha’agas Arye and Maharil Diskin parallels a debate between the Rambam and Ra’avad. The Rishonim ask why the Egyptians deserved punishment for enslaving Bnei Yisrael when Hashem had already told Avraham in the bris bein ha’besarim that his descendents would be slaves. Rambam (Hil Tshuvah 6:5) answers that while the Egyptian nation as a whole was destined to enslaved Bnei Yisrael, each individual Egyptian had a choice whether he/she would be part of that victimization. Ra’avad disagrees and argues that if each individual Egyptian could potentially choose to not participate in the enslavement, how could it be guaranteed that the Egyptian nation as a whole would enslave Bnei Yisrael? The whole cannot be greater than the sum of those individual choices. Ra’avad therefore offers a different answer: the Egyptians went above and beyond in their persecution of Bnei Yisrael and were therefore culpable. (There is another answer as well – ayen sham.)

In a nutshell, it seems like the issue here boils down to whether we allow for some form of soft determinism in our conception of bechira. (What bothers me is how the Ra'avad's rejection of the Rambam here fits with what sounds like his own form of soft determinism at the end of ch 5 of Hil Teshuvah.)

too much lishma?

“V’ lo sham’u el Moshe m’kotzer ruach u’mei’avodah kashah.” The plain meaning of the pasuk is that the people were too burdened with work to hear Moshe’s message. (Interesting that you can be so overwhelmed with work that you don’t even absorb the message that you don’t need to work any more.) Moshe then continued, “If Bnei Yisrael won’t listen, how then will Pharoah listen?”

Everybody asks the same question – this seems to be a non-sequitor. Bnei Yisrael had the burden of work that prevented them from getting the message, Pharoah didn’t. Why wouldn’t he listen?

The Noam Elimelech is always melameid zechus on Klal Yisrael and he says an amazing pshat here. This piece really echoes themes we touched on when we did the Noam Elimech on Parshas Toldos (he even repeats here the same vort on “retzon y’reyav ya’aseh”) so you may want to take a peek back there. As we discussed then, the purpose of tefilah, the purpose really of all our attempts to connect to Hashem, is not to present G-d with a laundry list of our wants. Tefilah is not about selfish wish fulfillment. The ideal prayer is selfless – we are not concerned with our own needs, but rather with G-d’s, kavyachol. Pain, suffering, want, need, all obscure and hide G-d’s presence, and so we pray to ask that these obstacles be removed. Avodah is not about us; it’s about G-d.

Bnei Yisrael didn’t listen to Moshe not because they didn’t hear his message of “no more work,” but rather because that’s all they heard. What kind of geulah is it when all you can think about is, “no more work?” When you are happy and dancing because tomorrow is a day off from the brick factory, as if whether you are or aren’t in that brick factory is the most important thing in the world? Who knows, maybe in this world it is, but certainly there are greater things out there! Klal Yisrael worried that the burdens of slavery had made them concerned only with themselves, their suffering, their plight – they worried that they would give no heed to the fact that G-d was with them in slavery, the Shechina too was suffering and waiting for a release. Therefore, they closed their ears to Moshe’s message. It was not a refusal to listen, but a refusal to listen to a message that may introduce a “shelo lishma” into their thoughts of geulah.

Can there be such a thing as too much lishma? Imagine someone who makes a wedding, a bris milah, etc. but refuses to be too happy lest that sense of personal happiness interfere with his/her lishma – is stoic indifference an ideal? This was Moshe’s worry. The klipah of Pharaoh can only be addressed through simcha – I don’t think he means the klipah of Pharoah, King of Egypt, but rather the klipah of Pharaoh inside each and every one of us. Our humanity is inescapable – if we don’t tend to its needs through our avodas Hashem, it will come back to haunt us. If Bnei Yisrael refuse to listen, if they tune out the message of simcha and hisla’havus because of an ideal of lishma that may or may not be attainable, the Pharoah inside will never be appeased. Better to relish the message, to dance at the joy of the brick factory closing, even if all it is is a brick factory. Accepting joy as the product as Hashem’s plan, using it to increase one’s commitment and dveikus, is far better than a stoical indifference, even if motivated by the highest ideals.

stages of geulah

The Netzi”v makes a simple point about the 4 leshonos of geulah, but sometimes it’s worth reiterating the basics. The four expressions represent four stages in the unfolding of geulah. Why do we need four stages? Because geulah is not an event – it’s a process. Transformation and change do not happen instantaneously, but rather occur step by step.

Chazal compare geulah to the rising of the sun to start a new day -- the shift from darkness to light is gradual. It’s not like throwing a light switch and illuminating a room instantly. The situation in Eretz Yisrael can be frustrating and disappointing, but overcoming obstacles as we move toward a better future slowly is exactly what geulah is all about.

early to bed, early to rise - netilas yadayim, kri'as shema

If you have to be at work early (I know the feeling), these days sunrise is so late that there is a real possibility that you may be waking up before amud hashachar, literally before the crack of dawn, to get to shul and put on talis and tefillin at the earliest possible moment. This may create an issue for netilas yadayim. The Rishonim offer various reasons why we wash netilas yadayim in the morning: 1) as a preparation for tefilah; 2) because we are created anew each morning; 3) because there is a ruach ra’ah that rests on the hands at night. The Shulchan Aruch (4:14) questions whether the cause of the ruach ra’ah is sleeping or it being night. Therefore, if one rises before daybreak, to avoid a safeik (i.e. in case night and not sleeping is the cause of the ruach ra'ah) the Shulchan Aruch says to wash again after daybreak. Rama adds that no bracha is recited (see M.B. #33).

While on the topic of rising early… there is a debate among the Rishonim as to the earliest time to recite morning kri’as shema. Rambam paskens that ideally shema should be recited just before henetz hachamah so that tefilah can be started immediately at henetz. This is the prevalent practice (I think) among vasikin minyanim. Rabeinu Tam disagrees (Tosfos Yoma 37b) and holds that the time for shema begins only after hanetz hachamah. This view of Rabeinu Tam is not quoted by the Shulchan Aruch, but it is not an isolated opinion. Some (see Shu”T Tshuvos v’Hanhagos vol 1 # 66) go so far as to suggest that one reason (among others) many gedolim were not particularly makpid to daven k’vasikin even if they were awake was to avoid this machlokes -- better to daven a little later and fulfill the mitzvah d'oraysa of shema without a safeik in Rishonim whether one is yotzei at all than to daven early for the sake of the extra zechus of tefilah at hanetz. One simple way to be yotzei kol hade'yos is to read shema again post-hanetz (one loses smichas geulah l'tefilah, but at least on a d'oraysa level you fulfill kri'as shema in its proper time according to R"T).

with only the shirt on one's back

Hashem promised Bnei Yisrael that they would leave Egypt with "klei kesef k'lei zahav u'semalos. " The Ba'al haTurim writes that "smalos" in the plural means exactly two garments -- one to carry dough in, the other the literal shirt on their backs. These clothes did not wear out and lasted miraculously for the 40 year journey through the desert ("simlascha lo balsa mei'alecha...") My wife pointed out that this suggests that they did not change clothes for Shabbos, something we consider very much part of our kiyum of kavod Shabbos.

Perhaps one could explain (derech derush) that we change our clothes l'kavod Shabbos to demonstrate that on Shabbos we feel in the presence of Hashem more than during the week. In the desert, surrounded by the clouds of glory, the man, the well of Miriam, the Jewish people always felt in Hashem's presence -- they wore Shabbos clothes all the time.

a time to cry out

The Midrash tells us that Pharoah had three advisers, Bilam, Yisro, and Iyov, from whom he sought counsel regarding his “Jewish problem.” Bilam advised Pharoah to kill the Jews. Yisro wanted no part of the plan and so he ran away. Iyov was silent.

Bilam was later punished mida k’neged midah by being killed by Bnei Yisrael. Yisro, who lost his wealth, his fame, his power as advisor to Pharoah, gained everything back midah k’neged midah by becoming the father-in-law of Moshe. But what of Iyov? Iyov figured that objecting at this moment would be a futile gesture; better to hold his tongue and live to fight another day, to intercede when he voice would be heard so he could perhaps mitigate the evil decree. Why was he punished with such severe suffering?

The Brisker Rav answers that Iyov was punished with suffering because when a person feels pain, there is usually little accomplished by crying in anguish, but a person cries anyway. When it hurts, you scream – you don’t make cheshbonos. Iyov may have had wonderful plans about when and how he should or should not intervene to help Klal Yisrael, but the very fact that he could sit there and make such calculations while other people’s lives were on the line showed a major character flaw. Sometimes you need to react, to scream, and leave the planning for later.

My wife suggested that the punishment of Iyov was deserved because he did not truly feel the pain of Bnei Yisrael; he did not relate to their experience. Therefore, he was made to suffer personally to bring the lesson home.

self-justification

1) Vayakam melech chadash... asher lo yada es Yosef. Rashi explains that Pharoah pretended that he never heard of Yosef; the memory of the contributions of Yosef were blotted out of Egyptian history. This gave Pharoah license to begin his persecutions.

The Brisker Rav asks why Pharoah had to pretend -- why couldn't he simply initiate his plot against the Jewish people in spite of what Yosef had done? I think the answer is that the anti-semite has a psychological need for self-justification. To accept that Yosef had done good and at the same time want to destroy the Jewish people would create uncomfortable cognitive dissonace. The first step has to be to demonize, to define the victim as an outsider, as the "other" who is worthy of persecution.

2) On a different note, when Moshe returns from Midyan with the message to Pharoah to release Bnei Yisrael, he does not go straight to Pharaoh's palace, even though the fact that he could enter Pharoah's most private space umolested (according to the Midrash Pharoah had lions guarding his garden and Moshe was able to miraculously walk right past them) would have given instant credibility to his message. Instead, he first gathers the leaders of Bnei Yisrael and relays his message to them. R' Chatzkel Levenstein writes that geulah does not begin with miracles; it begins with belief. The buy-in to the message has to happen before the miracles can begin to unfold.

Aharon's humility

Another Lubliner Rav vort (the last one was pretty good, wasn’t it? I'm getting addicted):

Hashem told Moshe not to be concerned lest Aharon have bad feelings about his being appointed as leader. To the contrary, Aharon was on the way to happily greet Moshe, “V’ra’ach v’samach b’libo.” The Midrash comments that had Aharon realized that the Torah would write such words of praise about him, he would have gone out to greet Moshe with a whole parade!

Everybody asks: you mean Aharon was out for the glory? He would have behaved differently had he known his deeds would be recorded for posterity than he behaved in private?

R' Meir Shapiro answers: Aharon was not at all out for the glory. To the contrary, Aharon did everything in his power to conceal his greatness from people. It would have been easy for Aharon to walk around with a big smile, showing everyone how happy he was to greet Moshe, proving to the world that he bore no ill will, that he had no trace of envy in him. People would walk around saying, “Look at that Aharon – such a sterling model of perfect behavior.” But that was not Aharon’s way. “V’ra’acha v’samach b’libo” – Aharon will rejoice in his heart. Aharon davka kept that smile tucked away inside, between Hashem and himself, and didn’t show off his true feelings to others, so as to avoid the lavish praise that would come from people noticing his exemplary midos.

Yet Aharon’s efforts were for naught. Not only did he get credit for being happy for his brother Moshe, for not having any jealousy or envy, but the Torah records for posterity the “samach b’libo,” the fact that he didn’t even want the public to know about it. Had Aharon known that acting privately would have attracted that much more attention from the Torah to his midos tovos, he would have arranged a parade to minimize the credit he received!

(The Midrash makes a similar comment about Boaz and Reuvain, but I’m not sure you can get this pilpul to fit those cases… It's too nice an idea to nitpick about such things.)

Moshe's argument with Hashem

At work I have been moved to a different building, a different team, and am doing something different, which takes some getting used to, so I haven’t had time to write much here. Anyway… a quick idea from R’ Meir Shapiro of Lublin:

Moshe Rabeinu was very reluctant to accept the mission of serving as the redeemer of Bnei Yisrael and he tried to use his speech impediment as an excuse. Hashem responded that He, Hashem, is the one who grants the power of speech; surely if He wishes Moshe to speak to Pharaoh, Moshe will have the ability to do so. “Mi sam peh l’adam…. ?!” But Moshe didn’t give up so easily. Moshe again argued, “Shlach na b’yad tislach,” that Aharon should be sent instead. Hashem at this point got angry and answered that Moshe need not worry that Aharon will feel slighted, as “Aharon achicha halevi,” is headed out to happily greet Moshe.

Chazal (cited by Rashi) see in this response not only an answer, but a punishment to Moshe as well. Why does the Torah mention Aharon being a levi specifically in this context? Chazal explain that Moshe himself was going to be given the future honor of serving as kohen gadol, while Aharon would be a levi. However, because of his argument here, Moshe was denied that privilege. Aharon the levi would become kohen gadol, and Moshe would serve as levi instead.

It’s very hard to understand why Moshe continued to argue with Hashem after he heard Hashem’s answer of, “Mi sam peh…” Why was he not satisfied with that answer? And what are we to make of his demotion from potentially being kohen gadol to instead serving as levi? All of the punishments in the Torah are “midah k’neged midah” – the punishment is a precise inverse of the crime. How is Moshe being made a levi a fitting punishment for his continuing to argue?

The Lubliner Rav explained that it was precisely because Moshe understood full well Hashem’s message of, “Mi sam peh…,” that he continued to argue. Moshe said, “If you Hashem are the one opening my mouth and putting words in it, hayitachein, is it possible that I should use such a holy mouth to speak to a person like Pharoah?!” What a waste, an abuse, a degradation, of this awesome power of speech!

This is why Moshe became a levi and not a kohen. What was the job of the levi’im? To sing shirah in the Mikdash. Who is more fitting for such a role than the person who appreciates the gift of speech in its fullest sense? Moshe’s “punishment” was indeed, a perfect match for the “crime” of his argument.

issur for a ben noach to hit a yisrael

The Rambam writes that a nochri who strikes a yisrael is chayav misa, but is not killed -- i.e. it is a chiyuv misa b'ydei shamayim (Melachim 10:6). The Rambam himself (Chovel u'Mazik 5:3) cites the gemara's proof: in our parsha Moshe strikes down the Mitzri who was hitting a yisrael. This is a very strange proof for a chiyuv misa b'ydei shamayim considering that Moshe actually killed the Mitzri in question!

In the Igros haGR"ID there is a shtickel torah that R' Ahron Soloveitchik said on this when he was 10 years old (!) Rashi writes that Moshe Rabeinu killed the Mitzri using the shem hameforash. R' Ahron suggested that this method of misa is at best a gerama, not a true action, and therefore does not constitute a ma'aseh of misas beis din. His proof: the Ritva writes that asking someone to commit murder is a gerama, not a real act of murder. We see that speech is not the same as action; QED that in our case as well, killing through speech is not the same as an act of misas beis din.

R' Moshe Soloveitchik wrote this shtickel to the Rav in a letter along with a he'ora of his own, and the Rav responded with a number of additional observations. I feel sorry for R' Ahron, who probably worked pretty hard on saying his chiddush, something any 10 year old could be proud of, yet it gets swallowed up in the complex give and take between the Rav and his father. The Rav rejected the proof from the Ritva, arguing that there is a difference between asking someone else to take action (=gerama) and a case where one's own words produce an effect, which is itself equivalent to action. The Rav also noted in passing that the chiyuv misa b'ydei shamayim in the case of murder is unique. With respect to other chiyuvei misa b'ydei shamayim, e.g. a zar who eats terumah, there is no obligation except k'lapei shemaya; however, with respect to hitting, there is real chiyuv misas beis din that at least should theoretically be carried out, but for technical reasons is transformed into a lesser punishment b'ydei shamayim. Finally, the Rav noted that this is not the only case of misa b'ydei shamayim given to a nochri. Similar chiyuvim exist for a nochri learning Torah, keeping Shabbos, and other cases. Although any violation of the 7 mitzvos is punishable by misas beis din, apparently these other violations, including striking a yisrael, are categorically different. The question is why, but I'm short of time, so we'll leave that discussion for another time.