Bilvavi Mishkan Evneh shiurim

Dixie Yid has a link to download all the shiruim given by R’ Itamar Shwartz (author of Bilvavi Mishkan Evneh) during his recent trip to the US.

thinking skills - mah kashe l'Rashi (II)

Instead of my cherry picking an example of the value of asking "mah kashe l'Rashi" (see previous post), you can find even better examples randomly from the first Mishna of many masechtot:

1) Rashi on the first Mishna in Kiddushin: “isha nikneis – l’ba’alah”. If not to her husband, to whom would we think this woman is mekudeshet? Mah kashe l’Rashi that required this explanation?

2) First Rashi in Kesubos: “besulah niseis – takanas chachamim hi shetinasei b’revi’i b’shabbos…” Question: Mah kashe l’Rashi? Is the word “revi’i” ambiguous because it can refer to a date as well as a day (though its meaning is clear from the Mishna’s continuation and the dibur hamaschil is not the word revi’i), or is there some reason we would not have understood the Mishna to be a takanah (what else could it be)?

3) First Rashi in Gittin: “ha’mavi – kol chutz la’aretz kari medinas hayam bar m’Bavel”. Question: Mah kashe l’Rashi that prompted his defining medinas hayam as “everywhere” outside Eretz Yisrael – the continuation of the Mishna itself implies that not all places in chutz la’aretz are treated equally. Furthermore, what prompted the mention of Bavel here? Are these two questions related?

Every one of these issues is discussed by rishonim or achronim, but the question that prompted them is simple enough for anyone to ask. Many of the answers are beyond what a boy in mesivta could think of or even understand, but she’eilat chacham chatzi tshuvah! – before getting to answers you have to know how to ask the right questions. Instead of randomly "hocking" away, here is a methodology.

In the comments to the previous post on covering ground vs. learning some wrote that you can’t have iyun without bekiyus. I agree to a certain extent, but I argued that bekiyus can be done independently from a rebbe. The point I am trying to make here is that even without learning anything other than gemara and Rashi a person can ask (and at some point develop answers for) intelligent questions that allow for a deeper appreciation of any sugya.

But these type questions are not asked by R’ Chaim? But it’s not going to lead to asking a stirah in Rambam and coming up with a tzvei dinim sevara? You’re right. But tzvei dinim can’t replace reading Rashi. And when students say over tzvei dinim sevaras because they can parrot their rebbe and know every 2 rambams thrown at them must lead to some Brisker-type conceptual chiluk then iyun has become bekiyus for the sake of saying a shtickel torah, not real havanah.

I am wondering if there are other simple questions that can be re-used over and over and which pay dividends like this – something to watch out for. In writing this up I found that I like the “mah kashe l’Rashi” so much I’m thinking of posting other examples on a more regular basis – we’ll see…

teaching gemara thinking skills - mah kashe l'rashi?

Matt raised the question in the comments to a previous post on how to teach thinking. I don’t think (no pun intended) there is an easy answer to that question and no single answer that works in all cases, e.g. Edward de Bono’s six thinking hats is a nice approach to encourage considering different sides of an issue, but is not going to work for a difficult rashi. There is definitely a need for someone to work out a systematic approach to teaching textual skills in the context of gemara learning, but until someone does that I don’t understand why schools ignore one fantastic resource already out there.

The master of a didactic method that emphasized thinking has to have been Nechama Leibowitz. This article summarizes some of her approach, and the gilyanot give a good flavor of her methodology. If it worked for chumash, why has no one applied the same principles to gemara? As an example, I want to focus on one method she popularized - asking “mah kashe l’Rashi”. Instead of emphasizing just being able to repeat what Rashi says (which is itself valuable, as there is no more canonical peirush than Rashi’s), the question of "mah kashe l'Rashi" shifts the focus to understanding and grappling with difficulties in the text. Instead of knowing what Rashi says, the emphasis is on knowing how Rashi thought. Why every time a student sees a Rashi on a piece of gemara are they not automatically trained to ask (even if they cannot always answer) the magic question of “mah kashe l’Rashi”?

I can cherry pick an example from what I was learning with my son a few nights ago: In Bava Kama 5a the gemara mentions the act of “mefagel” as a form of nezek. I asked my son what pigul meats and he remembered that it is the result of offering a korban with intent to eat it after the proper time. Rashi in B”K explains “mefagel” to mean offering a korban chatas with the intent for it to be a korban shelamim. Question: mah kashe l’Rashi that prompted redefining pigul?

(Note: for the sake of clarity I decided to break this long post in two - more examples to come).

yashrus

My wife sometimes runs across people who have a true sense of yashrus in their business dealings, but sadly, she more often runs across people who seem to forget there is a cheilek of shulchan aruch called "choshen mishpat". Yesterday she got an e-mail and phone call from someone who wanted to ask mechila before Rosh haShana for not attributing to her magazine a dvar torah (one I had written) which the person got off her website. I was more than a little gratified (as was she) and impressed by that person’s thoughtfulness. The same cannot be said of the person who yesterday agreed to purchase advertising and asked that they be faxed a contract but today did not return any phone calls and instead had a secretary say that she guesses he changed his mind. I guess the reneger is a notch better than the people who are months late is paying for advertising they already received and the person who out-and-out stiffed my wife for payment. Does knowing that the former episode involved a reconstructionist rabbi and the latter episodes involved "frum" people make me cynical? You bet it does! : )

mitzvos lav l'henos nitnu (II)

R’ Shterbruch in Moadim u’Zmanin answers the Avnei Miluim’s question on mitzvos lav l’henos nitnu (see post here). The Ritva describes the heter to remarry as incidental to chalitzah and the status of tahara as incidental to tevila and not direct hana’ah. However, the case of eiruv is different. The issur of techum is not an extrinsic issur which eiruv happens to lift, but is intrinsically related to the eiruv. The issur techum depends by definition on one’s makom shevisa; eiruv does not lift that issur, but simply moves the makom shevisa so the techum has different boundaries. One might very well say that eiruv is not a matir at all, but is what defines the issur of techum. Therefore, since the hana’ah of moving the techum is a direct attribute of the eiruv, one cannot apply the principle of mitzvos lav l’henos nitnu.

The Rashba and Ran debate whether mitzvos lav l’henos nitnu means simply that the reward for mitzvos is not considered a hana’ah (which is what the Ritva’s question suggested) or whether it means that the physical pleasure that may accompany a mitzvah is also not considered hana’ah. The Ran asks: according to the Rashba’s opinion that mitzvos lav l’henos nitnu applies even when there is actual physical hana’ah, how does one understand the gemara prohibiting tevilah in a cool spring on a hot day (RH 28)? Why in that case is the physical hana'ah a block to performing the mitzvah?

learning vs. covering ground

My son finished part 2 of his summer projects last night when he made a siyum on masechet Rosh haShana. Since I have limited time to learn with him on a daily basis, he has been using my mp3 player with English daf-yomi shiurim to cover more ground on his own. Obviously this is not a substitute for being able to “make a leining”, but it helps build bekiyus and it is probably no worse than the daf yomi many people do with the help of a shiur. Thanks to all the people who suggested getting him to use Kehati in Hebrew; he started using it for mishnayos moed where he already has learned some of the masechtos and hopefully that will bear fruit.

My wife was recently talking to another parent of an 8th-grader-to-be who thought Mesivta Ploni was a decent option because they covered ground. My inclination (we haven’t really started looking into H.S.’s yet) is to avoid Mesivta Ploni for that very reason – they cover ground, but make no attempt to develop a derech halimud. If all I want is my son to know a lot of halachic “facts”, an mp3 player suffices (until he learns to read a sugya himself), but that is the bare minimum of what learning entails. Ultimately, the gauge of a lamdan is being able to independently “think in learning”, i.e. to be develop a methodology to analyzing problems in a sugya and discovering solutions. My impression is that some mesivta shiurim manage to turn iyun into bekiyus – the rebbe says over more rishonim/achronim on the daf, but it just amounts to more “facts” to accumulate rather than a process of thinking. Hopefully we will find a H.S. that will put him on the right track (suggestions welcome!). In the meantime, he has started on the second perek of sukkah while I try to finish R”H myself before Y”T hits us!

mitzvos lav l'henos nitnu

If someone took a neder not to benefit from a shofar they would still be permitted to use a shofr for the mitzvah of tekiya because mitzvos lav l’henos nitnu, mitzvos are not considered a form of hana’ah. The Ritva (Sukkah 31) questions why this is so – don’t we receive the hana’ah of reward in this world or the next for every mitzvah performed? The Ritva answers that hana’ah is defined as a direct benefit received from an object; the reward for mitzvah performance is indirectly caused (gorem) by fulfillment of the mitzvah, but is not a quality of the object being used. For this same reason one is permitted to perform chalitzah with a shoe that had been used for avodah zarah, or use a mikveh that one took a neder not to have benefit from – the change in status effected by the process of chalitzah or tevilah so the women can now remarry and the person is tahor does not stem directly from the shoe or water, but is an indirect consequence of the mitzvah being fulfilled.

The gemara (Eiruvin 31) writes that whether an eiruv may be placed in a cemetery (which poses a problem of hana’ah from the dead) depends on whether an eiruv should be made only for the purpose of mitzvah-related travel, in which case we assume mitzvos lav l’henos nitnu, or even for personal enjoyment. The Avnei Miluim (28:60) asks: based on the Rtiva’s explanation, just like the personal benefit of becoming tahor or a woman being allowed to remarry is not counted as a hana’ah because these are consequences of mitzvah performance, so too, even of one gains the personal benefit of a larger area for personal travel on shabbos, since this is just a consequence of fulfilling the mitzvah of eiruv, why not apply mitzvos lav l’henos nitnu and allow the eiruv to be placed in a cemetary in all cases?

quality vs. quantity: shiur tefach by ma'akah, shofar

The gemara (Eiruvin 3b) identifies two ways of measuring tefachim: tefachin sochakos, a wider measure (spread fingers), and tefachim atzvos, a narrower measure (fingers held together). When it comes to Torah law we usually adopt the stricter measure to avoid any doubt. The Minchas Chinuch asks why the poskim to do not make clear that the 10 tefach shiur required for a ma’akah built on a roof must be measured using larger tefachim l’chumra? The Emek Bracha answers that issue of sochakos/atzvos is relevant only when a specific quantity must be measured. The mitzvah of ma’akah is not to build a railing which has a specific quantity of height; the mitzvah is to build a ma’alah which has the quality of preventing someone from falling off the roof, a quality which Chazal tell us 10 tefachim is sufficient to accomplish. We don’t apply the rule of quantifying l’chumra when dealing in qualities of a mitzvah object.

The Emek Bracha uses a similar sevara to explain the shiur of shofar. The gemara tells us that a shofar must be big enough to be held in one hand with the ends seen sticking out slightly, which poskim explain is equivalent to a tefach. It seems that it suffices to measure using the smaller tefach shiur in this case, even though the mitzvah of shofar is d’oraysa. Why do we not require the stricter measure? The Emek Bracha again explains that the shiur of shofar is not a quantitative measure, but is a quality of the object, i.e. a horn slightly larger than the hand, and therefore quantitative stringencies do not apply.

chinuch and chumra

In an earlier post I raised the question of whether one should teach a child chumros, or wait until the kid gets older and either picks up the practices independently or can at least appreciate them better. I found in Shu”t Ad Nidbiru (vol 14 #33) that R’ Binyamin Zilber was asked this question in the context of a tefillin shayla. The Satmar Rebbe’s opinion apparently is that a lefty should put tefillin (after fulfilling the mitzvah by putting them on his right hand) on his left hand (like righty’s do) based on an AR”I – a chumra not brought in other poskim. A father asked whether he should teach this chumra to his lefty son who was near bar mitzvah, or wait until the child was more mature. Unfortunately for my purpose R’ Zilber spends the majority of the tshuvah disagreeing with the whole chumra, but in the last paragraph he writes that if a chumra is valid a child should keep it from bar mitzvah.

recommendation for book to learn hebrew

When my son learns mishnayos he uses the English Kehati series, which he has gotten comfortable with, but I am not very happy with that. One of the big differences between my girls’ school’s curriculum and my son’s school is that the girls learn Hebrew fairly well, i.e. they can take any pasuk in chumash and identify the shorashim of words, otiyot shimuch, etc., translate the words, and manage to speak and write a fairly understandable Hebrew. The girls’ school tries to teach ivrit b’ivrit but in chumash will do English translation for harder words; they also learn some grammar and are occasionally assigned “chiburim” to write. My son’s school half-heartedly uses the Lashon haTorah workbook series which my son admits to not pay attention to. They translate only into English, none of the Rebbeim speak Hebrew, and certainly none of the boys could engage in any conversational Hebrew. The result is that my son is chained to English crutches for his learning. Can anyone out there recommend a Hebrew workbook, audio program, or something that can jumpstart his learning and understanding Hebrew?

For the record, I am biased from my own experience and believe ivrit b'ivrit instruction is the way to go, but no boys school that I know of really carries it out. In the long run it makes a huge difference. Reading in Hebrew/Aramaic and then mentally translating sentence by sentence back to English is not the same as being able to read and undertstand a book/sefer in the language it was written in.

more pilpul on kan tzipor

Since the Midrash lumps together kan tzipor, milah, and the issur of offering as a korban an animal less than 8 days old all as expressions of G-d’s mercy, why does the Mishna single out the mention kan tzipor as objectionable – why not give all three examples?

Sidduro Shel Shabbos answers: according to the opinion that G-d’s commandments are gezeiros and not based on mercy, there clearly is a problem with mentioning milah/korban as merciful because it might lead to the incorrect conclusion that milah before day 8 is valid (see yesterday’s post!). The Mishna highlights the even bigger chiddush, that even mentioning mercy in reference to kan tzipor, where there is no danger of drawing an incorrect halachic conclusion, is problematic.

According to the opinion that the problem with kan tzipor is that it singles out birds as beneficiaries of G-d’s mercy to the exclusion of other creations, the reason the Mishna does not mention all three cases the Midrash gives - birds, animals, man – is because incorporating all three in one prayer would be permitted, as no single creation is singled out.

One other note: the S.S.S. questions whether can one infer from the fact that the Midrash/Mishna draws on a case of kan tzipor to illustrate G-d’s mercy on birds and does not use the din of not bringing a korban before day 8 that a bird (torim, bnei yonah) would be acceptable as a korban from birth without waiting 8 days.

r' tzadok hakohen

Rabbi Sedley’s blog notes that yesterday was the yahrtzeit of R’ Tzadok haKohen. Check out the link he provides to order a copy of Tzidkas haTzadik and Machsheves Charutz for only $7.50 + shipping (I know nothing about and gain nothing from the institution selling the seforim – I’m just passing on the link because $7.50 sounds like a steal to add these to your bookshelf if you don’t own copies yet).

author of Bilvavi Mishkan Evneh speaking in US

Dixie Yid has info here on the US speaking schedule of the author of Bilvavi Mishkan Evneh. For 5 Towners, note that he will be in Aish Kodesh on Sun night at 8:30.

UPDATE: Please check Dixie Yid's blog for change in time - the shiur has been postponed from Sun night.

milah before 8th day and reasons for mitzvos

The gemara (Brachos 32) presents two reasons why one is not permitted to say “ad kan tzipor tagiyu rachamecha” in davening – 1) because saying G-d is merciful on birds implies he is less merciful on other creatures, which breeds enmity in creation; 2) because G-d’s commandments are decrees; G-d is not motivated by extrinsic reasons like mercy (see previous posts on this issue. The Midrash sides with the view that mitzvos are given to be merciful, and tosses into this same discussion the commandment not to sacrifice an animal less than a week old and to perform milah only on the eighth day so the animal and baby have a chance to reach full strength.

The Sidduro shel Shabbos (shoresh 4) suggests that the machlokes (Rama/Shach Y.D. 261) of whether a baby who was given a milah before the eighth day needs hatafas dam bris depends on this issue. If the reason for waiting until the eighth day sis simply a gezeirah with no reason, then the preceding days count for nothing. But if the reason for waiting until the eighth day is to be merciful to the baby, if one went ahead and did the milah early there is no reason ex post facto to invalidate the bris. (Litvishe readers, please don’t jump on me too much for posting this : )

harry potter, etc.

A brief break from the regular topics for a word on Potter. At the beginning of the summer I told my daughter if she wants some reading to keep her busy do she might try the Harry Potter series, and I volunteered to read in parallel (for some reason none of my other kids were interested in Potter). She is still going, but I finished book seven yesterday (not quite a siyum because I skipped book one, having read it years ago, and I skipped book five because my daughter and wife were reading it as well and I could not pry it away). First of all, I hate to put it so crudely, but the thought by some that reading books about magic will lead children astray from frumkeit is simply silly, as is the idea that the series has Xstian overtones. If you want Xstian overtones read “The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe” (arguably better than any book in the Potter series). As for the meat and potatoes of the series: I read the first book years ago and thought it was second rate, and while the series as a whole has many bright patches, nothing has caused me to think of Harry Potter as great literature. The books do get better as the series goes on, but it seems to me that many of the characters are two-dimensional, the morals in the early books seem afterthoughts to the plot, at points the story drags for no reason, and there is a general superficiality to all the themes touched on. I do like the way Rowling manages to tie the plot together in the end, but Potter is too much about plot and not enough about thought and feeling. At one point in watching one of the DVD’s I noticed that there was a Dickensian quality to the Diagnosis Alley set, which left me wishing Rowlings had borrowed more from Dickens and less from Star Wars (was the revenge/control idea at the end of five lifted straight from Return of the Jedi?). Don’t get me wrong – the books are good, they are entertaining; they just fall short of being truly great. I have now seen all the movies as well, and they seem to improve as the series goes on (the critics are way off base on their disappointment with five). Even before hitting book seven (no spoilers for those who haven’t read it) my favorite character was Snape (I think my wife said it has something to do with my personality : ), but it’s not much of a contest – what exactly does Prof McGonagall do that would interest anyone? And aside from popping up at the end to deliver some contrived moral, and appearing all knowing, what makes Dumbledore worthy of our interest in the early books? Oh well – I’ll stop complaining now. Maybe I’ve just outgrown this type stuff (though I have enjoyed what I have read of "A Series of Unfortunate Events"). I haven’t read fantasy or sci fi in ages so I have little to compare Potter to… is Rowling maybe another E Nesbit? I imagine the series is better than much of what is out there, but I still feel that something that gets so much attention should be truly great and not just good or above average. For those who have done the usual (Dahl, Pullman, Sachar, L'Engele, the Potter series, etc.) any recommendations of undiscovered gems that we should read?

mamzer talmid chacham vs. kohen gadol am ha'aretz

The last Mishna in Horiyos lists the order in which people should be saved in a life-or-death crisis (e.g. who gets in the lifeboat first): kohen, levi, yisrael, mamzer, nasin, ger, freed slave. However, concludes the Mishna, this rule is true only where comparing people of equal scholarship - even a mamzer who is a talmid chacham takes precedence over a kohen gadol who is an am ha’aretz.

My son was medayek: if the Mishna wanted to contrast the extreme cases of a talmid chacham with tainted lineage vs. the kohen hagol am ha’aretz, why choose the case of a talmid chacham mamzer? The Mishna should have illustrated the point with the most extreme case of bad lineage, the case of a freed eved!

The Tiferes Yisrael makes the same observation and concludes that a talmid chacham who is a nasin, ger, or freed eved would not in fact take precedence over a kohen gadol. The status of talmid chacham only tips the scales in favor of someone who is a yisrael, levi, or mamzer.

On that note, my son gets a mazel tov for finishing the mishnayos in Seder Nezikin, which was certainly a productive use of his summer break, and I am happy to see he is learning to make diyukim and ask thoughtful questions.

kedushas eretz yisrael (II)

Two other sources for the distinction between kedushas ha’aretz and the “shem” Eretz Yisrael:

1) The Rambam writes (Rotzeiach 10:1) that eglah arufah can be performed only in Eretz Yisrael and Eiver haYarden. Even though Eiver haYarden has no kedushas ha’aretz (though see previous post here) it is still within the boundaries of land designated as belonging to Am Yisrael.

2) R’ Ahron Soloveitchik quoted the opinion of the Kaftor vaFerach that the issur of leaving Eretz Yisrael applies even to those places conquered by Yehoshua, whether or not they were re-conquered by Ezra. The Ramban similarly writes (beg of Gittin) that the concept of loving Eretz Yisrael extends even to those portions which have no kedushas ha’aretz but are part of the land promised to the Avos.

kedushas eretz yisrael

The Rambam (Sanhedrin 4:6) quotes the halacha that smicha can be given only in Eretz Yisrael, the boundaries of which are defined by those areas captured by Yehoshua.
וכל ארץ ישראל שהחזיקו בה עולי מצריים, ראויה לסמיכה.

The Minchas Chinuch asks: the Rambam elsewhere (Hil Terumos 1:5) writes that the kedusha of Eretz Yisrael established by Yehoshua’s conquest was negated by the first exile; Eretz Yisrael was resanctified by Ezra when the nation returned from Bavel, and only areas sanctified by this second enduring kedusha are included in the halachic boundaries of Eretz Yisrael. Why with respect to smicha does the Rambam refer to the original boundaries, which were negated?

Rav Soloveitchik quoted an idea from his father to answer this question. In Hilchos Terumos the Rambam is discussing the sanctity of the land viz. agricultural mitzvos. In that context, the Rambam addresses himself to defining what areas of the Land were endowed with kedusha by Ezra. However, the idea of Eretz Yisrael as the land chosen by G-d and promised to the Jewish people encompasses far more area than that which Ezra reclaimed. When it comes to smicha, the Rambam invokes this far broader concept. Smicha is not dependent on the sanctity of the land, more broadly on the idea of a promised homeland in which the transmission of mesorah can function as an ideal. There are many other proofs to this idea of R' Moshe Soloveitchik - maybe more on this in later posts.

psak on hashkafa and the issue of suffering

Shabbos 55a quotes Rav Ami that “ain misah b’lo cheit v’ain yisurim b’lo avon”, there is no death and suffering not caused by sin. After some back and forth, the gemara concludes with a “tiyuvta d’Rav Ami tiyuvta”, Rav Ami’s opinion was proven wrong because of a contradictory braysa.

I’m wondering how those who are convinced that there can be no psak in areas of hashkafa/belief read this gemara? If the gemara can label a belief wrong because of contrary evidence from a braysa, why can we not label a belief wrong because of contrary evidence from a majority of Rishonim? What’s the difference between saying Rav Ami held a view which the mesorah rejected and saying some Rishonim held views which the mesorah rejected?

While on the topic, Rashi’s writes (Brachos 5) that yisurim shel ahavah are brought on a tzadik to increase merit, not in response to any sin of the tzadik. Ramban in Toras haAdam rejects this idea that suffering can occur without sin (see previous post here). According to the gemara’s conclusion that Rav Ami is rejected, the Ramban’s argument seems much weaker.

batei din of the shevatim and lo tasur

The Ramban interprets the command to appoint a Bais Din “lishvatecha” to mean that each sheivet had a supreme court that was the final arbiter of issues that related to that sheivet and which was empowered to enact takanos:

כדרך שסנהדרי גדולה ממונה על כל בתי דינין של כל ישראל, כך יהא ב"ד אחד ממונה על כל שבט ושבט
ואם הוצרכו לתקן ולגזור דבר על שבט שלהם גוזרין ומתקנין והיא לשבט כגזרת סנהדרי גדולה על כל ישראל

Although the issur of “lo tasur” applies prima facie only to the Sanhedrin (see Rambam, Chinuch), since the Ramban compares the supreme court B”D of each sheivet to the Sanhedrin, I was wondering whether the issur of lo tasur would extend to their takanos as well.