a taxonomy of rov: acharei rabim, bitul b'rov, rubo k'kulo

Judging from comments to the previous post, the audience is getting restless because of lomdus deprivation. More on Nisan-Iyar maybe later, but first a R’ Chaim to satisfy the lomdus craving. Those learning daf yomi recently came across the source for the din of rubo k’kulo (Nazir 42a). The Torah tells us that a nazir must cut all of his hair, not just a majority of his hair. The implication is that if not for the special gezeiras hakasuv in this case, cutting rov would suffice as if all the hair was cut. The Maharat”z Chiyus notes that although the principle of rov is well established elsewhere as a din d’oraysa (Chulin 11), there is an added element of chiddush to the din of rubo k’kulo. Had we only had the principle of rov, we would know that a majority counts as more than a minority, but the minority would still be theoretically present. Rubo k’kulo goes a step further and teaches that we treat the minority remnant as non-existent. For example: on Pesach night where according to some Rishonim one must drink the entire kos of wine, drinking the majority of the kos is considered equivalent to drinking the entire cup.

A full taxonomy of the concept of rov should include two other halachos, both learned from the pasuk of “acharei rabim l’hatos”: 1) the principle of following a majority; 2) the principle of bitul b’rov. Again, these are two very different chiddushim. The basic principle of following rov is useful to solve a safeik, e.g. if there are 9 frogs and 1 sheretz near a loaf of terumah and one of the above came in contact with the terumah, rov allows us to say with a degree of certainty that it was a frog and not a sheretz. Bitul b’rov is a different concept entirely. If a drop of milk fell into a pot of meat, bitul b’rov tells us that if the pot contains enough meat, it can be eaten. In the former case, rov tells us that a sheretz did not come in contact with the terumah. In the latter case, the halacha of bitul tells us that even though the milk fell into the pot, the meat can still be eaten.

R’ Chaim Brisker asked how these two very different halachos can be derived from the same pasuk. In a nutshell, R’ Chaim’s answer is as follows: “acharei rabim l’hatos” tells us that the psak of beis din always follows the majority. Tosfos (Bava Kamma 27) asks how we can decide dinei mamonos based on rov dayanim when we know that the principle of rov is not applicable to dinei mamonos. R’ Chaim explains that once beis din arrives at a psak, their conclusion is not just considered the conclusion of a majority of the judges, but is considered the conclusion of the court as a whole. The conclusion may be arrived at by polling the majority, but once decided, the minority of dayanim are bateil b’rov. Both halachos, rov and bitul b’rov, are operative in the psak of beis din.

Here is a question that has me stumped, and I am sure I must be missing something. Couldn’t the operation of beis din in cases of dinei mamonos be explained based on the principle of rubo k’kulo and not based on bitul b’rov? In other words, if 2/3 of the court reaches consensus, rubo k’kulo would mean that it is as if the entire court has reached a consensus. The justification for psak in dinei mamonos would therefore stem from the gezeiras hakasuv in hilchos nezirus, not from "acharei rabim l’hatos". If the operation of beis din could be explained in this way, then R' Chaim's question is left hanging: what is the source for the halacha of bitul b’rov in scenarios like a drop of milk falling into the pot of meat?

Nisan - re'iya; Iyar - shemiya

May seforim teach that the 12 months of the year correspond to the 12 shevatim [meaning: G-d reveals himself in certain paradigmatic ways in the context of time/space/people. There is a correspondence between the revelation of G-dliness brought about by the personalities of the 12 shevatim and the revelation of G-dliness which occurs through the yearly cycle of 12 months]. The Shem m’Shmuel teaches based on the Zohar that this relationship follows the birth order of the shevatim -- Nisan corresponds with Reuvain and Iyar corresponds with Shimon. The character of Reuvain is “re’iya”, sight, vision; in naming her son Leah referred to G-d seeing her plight. The month of Nisan is the month of the exodus from Egypt where we saw G-d’s presence revealed as never before in history. “Ra’asa shifcha al haYam…”, the maidservant saw G-d’s presence at the splitting of the Sea more clearly that the prophet Yechezkel. Seeing is believing; we attribute great certainty and confidence to what our eyes tell us. The process of seeing involves no effort other than to open ones eyes; similarly, the process of leaving Mitzrayim involved no effort from Bnei Yisrael other than to open their eyes to the deliverance being granted.

The month of Iyar corresponds to Shimon, the sheivet which characterizes the power of hearing. In naming Shimon Leah referred to G-d hearing of her plight, “ki shama Hashem…” We place far less confidence is hearsay than in what we witness with our own eyes. As David HaMelech tells us, “Shim’i bas ure’i v’hati ozneich…” (Tehillim 45:11) – hearing must be followed up with “hati ozeich”, a deliberate decision to attend to what was heard, to digest and assimilate what the ears absorbed. After the miracles of Egypt concluded, Bnei Yisrael were left with the task of assimilating what had occurred into their lives and consciousness. This is the avodah of sefirah and the month of Iyar. The Shem m’Shmuel forcefully writes that Hashem does not perform miracles to that we should be habituated to living in a world of supernatural, where every challenge is met by a burst of Divine deliverance and we stand by as idle witnesses, participating only through re’iya. Rather, Hashem does miracles so that we glean the inspiration to use our own efforts achieve the transcendent heights which the miraculous proved possible, participating as active agents, “hati ozneiach”. More to come bl”n.

"ki kadosh ani" - do we need a reason to be holy?

“Kedoshim tehiyu… ki kadosh ani”. Chazal in a different context note the multiple possible meanings of the word “ki”, but the ambiguity of the term certainly stands out in the context of our pasuk. I think Seforno comes closest to what we would call the pshuto shel mikra (in the sense of plain meaning) in his interpretation: man must be holy because the telos of human achievement is living b’tzlem Elokim, in G-d’s image, and G-d is holy. Ramban in a similar vein reads “ki kadosh ani” as an assurance that one who lives a life of holiness will be connected to G-d because (“ki”) G-d is holy.

If “ki kadosh ani” is a reason, a justification, for the goal of holiness, I think we need to take a step back and consider the question that just that begs asking – why does being holy need a reason or justification? Why does there have to be a “ki kadosh ani” to inspire us to holiness? We certainly find in Chazal the principle of imitation dei, emulating G-d as a reason for doing virtuous acts, in the formulation of “mah hu… af atah” etc., but I cannot think offhand of a clear textual basis in Torah for such a formulation outside of our pasuk. Puk chazei mai wikipedia dabar in its entry on imitation dei – our pasuk of kedoshim and no other is quoted as a Torah source.

Perhaps the answer is that we don’t really subscribe to the principle of imitation dei as the be-all and end-all of virtue after all. The Torah commands “V’asisa hayashar v’hatov” not because G-d is yashar or tov (as these justifications are not stressed), but simply because being “yashar v’tov” are worthy ends in themselves. Virtue should be pursued not just as a means of imitating G-d or of connecting to G-d, but virtue is its own reward.

The same cannot be said of holiness. Without G-d as its focus, holiness has no meaning or virtue. Ramban writes that the opening mitzvos of the parsha parallel the 10 commandments, with “kedoshim” paralleling “Anochi Hashem Elokecha”, the mitzvah of belief. “Ki kadosh ani” is not just a tangential reason, but is an inherent and necessary ingredient of the mitzvah of kedusha. Whether you retreat to live as an ascetic hermit on some Tibetan mountain or take more subtle steps at trying to create artificial kedusha by injecting contrived spirituality into mitzvah performance, neither will succeed because by definition a holy life is a G-d centered life. Creating your own spirituality may warm your heart, but does nothing for the soul.

Yom haShoah - "Breaking the Tablets" by David haLivni

I have read the argument that the Shoah is sui generis, incomparable to other tragedies in Jewish history, but have never quite been fully convinced. I say that fully aware that living at least a generation or two removed from the immediate historical context of the Shoah perhaps dulls one’s sensitivity to the events that occurred, but by the same token, those who experienced the Shoah live many generations removed from events like the Churban, the Spanish Inquisition, the Crusades, etc. Must we rank tragedies in order to fully appreciate the horror and significance of what occurred? Is there any historical or theological value to such rankings?

My reservations aside, I recently read and would recommend R’ David HaLivni’s Breaking the Tablets: Jewish Theology After the Shoah for a scholarly yet heartfelt articulation of the sui generis argument. Aside from making a historical argument, HaLivni also argues based on sources in Tanach and elsewhere that destruction on the scale of the Shoah cannot be attributed to our sins alone (an approach discussed here once before). The theological approach to the Shoah which he develops as well as some of the other issues he brings up deserve a full discussion best left for another time. I don't pretend to agree with everything he writes, but do find his essays well thought out and intriguing (life would be pretty boring if you only read books which you agree with). Just as an aside as it relates to the book, the content would I think have been better served as a long essay published in non-book format (as I believe it originally was) without the added introductory pieces written by Professor Ochs which in my opinion added little to the work.

why a katan / ketana is excluded from shlichus

While on the topic of shlichus – why is it that a katan cannot be a shaliach? I count two or possibly three reasons, depending on how finely you want to split hairs. Rashi in Bava Metziya (71b) points to the derivation of shlichus from the parsha of hafrashas terumah. Since a katan cannot be mafrish terumah or make nidrei hekdesh, he is excluded from shlichus. Rashi in Kiddushin (42a) points to the derivation of shlichus from the parsha of gittin where the Torah uses the term “ish” (“ki yikach ish”), which excludes a katan. Now we get to the hairsplitting part. The way I read Rashi is that the exclusion is based on the gezeiras hakasuv that specifies “ish”. The last Ketzos in Hil. Shlichus, however, explains that a katan is excluded because a katan cannot marry or divorce. What difference does it make if you read it as an explicit gezeiras hakasuv or an implicit sevara? If it is a gezeiras hakasuv I’m not sure you need to be bothered by the Ketzos’ problem of how to exclude a ktana who is capable of getting married provided her father accepts kiddushin on her behalf.

The Ketzos explains that the two reasons offered by Rashi may depend on the issue of whether the halacha of “mufla hasamuch l’ish” is a din d’oraysa or not (as discussed in a recent daf yomi). If “mufla hasamuch l’ish” is a din d’oraysa, it means a child of 12, who is technically a katan, is still capable of being mafrish terumah or making nidrei hekdesh. Therefore, we cannot derive the exclusion of a katan from shlichus from the parsha of terumah. Instead, we have a source from the parsha of gittin.

This same issue may explain a difficult Rambam. Whatever the reason a katan/ktana cannot be a shliach, the same logic would also disqualify him/her from being a meshaleyach as well. The Rambam (Gittin 6:9) writes that a ketana cannot appoint a shliach kabbalah to receive her get because witnesses must testify that the shliach was properly appointed, and witnesses cannot testify as to the competence of a ketana who lacks da’as to make such an appointment. The Ra’avad offers a far simpler reason – the parsha of terumah teaches us that a katan/ketana is excluded from shlichus. Why does the Rambam need to re-invent the halachic wheel and suggest a new sevara?

The Ketzos explains that the Ra’avad must hold that that a mufla samuch l'ish cannot be mafrish terumah and therefore the parsha of terumah serves as a perfect source for the exclusion of a katan (like Rashi in Bava Metziya). Rambam disagrees and holds that a katan (who is mufla samuch l’ish) can be mafrish terumah and therefore suggests a sevara as a source.

I would be happy if I could find or work out another approach to the Rambam which still accepts the the parsha of terumah as the source for the exclusion of a katan but requires the additional sevara to explain some unique aspect of shlichus kabbalah. Don’t have this worked out yet, so consider it food for thought.

yahrzeit of the divrei chaim

The Divrei Chaim, i.e. R' Chaim m'Sanz, was not in my mind as an eponym of this blog, but names sometimes have a life of their own. It does seem remiss not to mention on a blog called Divrei Chaim that today is the Divrei Chaim's yahrzeit, so consider it noted.

shliach na'asah eid

Before Purim I did a post touching on one of the fundamental questions about how shlichus operates: If Reuvain appoints Shimon to be his shliach, do we view Shimon as if he legally has become Reuvain, or is Shimon still Shimon, but his actions count as if done by Reuvain? This chakira is used by the Ketzos to explain the dispute between the Rambam and the Tur regarding a husband who appoints a shliach to deliver a get and then goes insane. If the shliach’s appointment causes him to legally become identified as the husband, then the mental status of the “real” husband is no longer relevant. If the shliach’s retains his own legal identity and his actions are just ascribed to the “real” husband, then the real husband’s state of insanity would invalidate the get. (Just for the record: everyone agrees in such a case that the get is invalid; the issue is whether the psul is d’oraysa or derabbanan).

My son started learning the second perek of Kiddushin by himself and wanted to use this chakira to explain the debate (43a) over whether a shliach can serve as a witness (“shliach na’aseh eid”). If Shimon the shliach assumes the identity of Reuvain, the one who appointed him, then Shimon becomes a party to events and cannot testify about them. If, however, Shimon legally remains Shimon and his actions are just ascribed to Reuvain, because he retains his independent identity he is not precluded from testifying. (The same analysis can be found in R’ Yosef Engel’s sefer Lekach Tov).

eliminating negatives: qualitative vs. quantitative approaches

The Toras Kohanim presents a dispute between R’ Yehudah and R’ Shimon on how to understand the blessing of ‘v’hishbati chaya ra’ah min ha’aretz” which appears at the end of Sefer vaYikra. R’ Yehudah interprets the bracha to mean that there will no longer be wild animals, but R’ Shimon disagrees and interprets the pasuk to mean that wild animals will still exist, but will behave tamely, in the classic fashion of the lion lying down with the lamb.

It takes the creativity and genius of the Rogatchover to see the connection between this dispute and the issue we raised yesterday with respect to whether bitul chameitz means a qualitative or quantitative destruction. “Hishbati chaya…” shares the same root as “tashbisu chameitz”. R’ Yehudah who interprets that bitul chameitz must be done by burning, eliminating the quantity of chameitz from existence, also holds that “v’hisbati chaya” means that wild animals will cease entirely to exist. The opposing view holds that “hishbati” need not mean elimination of a quantity, but can also mean a qualitative change. Wild animals which no longer act wild also counts as a fulfillment of the bracha. In that same vein, if one took a bot of chameitz and mixed it with matzah so it became bateil before Pesach, although the same quantity of chameitz still exists, the fact that the mixture halachically is not considered to have the quality of chameitz fulfills the mitzvah of tashbisu.

Moving out of the world of lomdus, perhaps there is an issue of mussar here as well. What is the best approach to vanquish the “chaya ra’ah” within? Should one aim for complete elimination of negative tendencies, or perhaps those tendencies can be sublimated toward a higher good and in that way eliminate the negative consequences?

nechama leibowitz's gilyonot now online

Fans of Nechama Leibowitz's gilyonot on the parsha (and if you are not a fan, you will be once you take a look) will be happy to know they are now online:

http://www.nechama.org.il/

(Hat Tip to parshablog)

redesigned webpage

Over at kallahmagazine.com Feel free to offer your feedback.

is the mitzvah to eliminate a quantity of chameitz or the quality of chameitz: kamus vs. eichus

Boy, is it hard to get back into things after Yom Tov! I’m not sure I’m ready to jump back into blogging – for some reason my brain has a block on putting down anything on paper right now. My son has become a big fan of R’ Yosef Engel’s seforim and spent much of Yom Tov with the sefer Lekach Tov perched in front of him. One of the topics he was delving into was the issue of kamus/eichus, quality vs. quantity and how each plays out in various halachic scenarios. The Rogatchover toys with the same idea in the context of bitul chameitz. What if instead of burning or destroying chameitzdik flour before Yom Tov a person mixed that chameitzdik flour together with pesachdik flour so it was bateil? Leaving aside the issue of using that mixture on Yom Tov, has one fulfilled the mitzvah of tashbisu, of eliminating chameitz, by being mevateil it? On a quantitative basis (kamus), there is still the same amount of flour in the world as there was before bitul took place. But on a qualitative basis (eichus), the chamietz that exists no longer has the halachic status of chameitz. This sounds like a bad pun - can one fulfill bitul chameitz by doing bitul? More later bli neder... I need to ease back into things slowly.

preparing to enter the kodesh kodashim; preparing to experience the pnimiyus of Pesach

P’ Acharei opens with a warning to Aharon that he may not enter the kodesh kodashim whenever he chooses. The danger is reinforced with a reminder that Aharon's two sons, Nadav and Avihu, entered without permission and were killed.

The Shem m’Shmuel asks: Nadav and Avihu were killed, as the Torah tells us earlier, “b’hakrivam aish zarah”, because they brought an improper offering of k'tores. Chazal in Midrash ascribe many other sins to Nadav and Avihu which may have led to or contributed to their downfall. Whatever their exact sin was, clearly it was more than simply entering into kodesh kodashim. How does their death serve as a warning that simply entering kodesh kodashim poses a danger?

To answer the question we need to have some perspective on how schar v’onesh works. In G-d’s court of judgment, guilt and merit are not calculated based only on the deeds done, but are calculated relative to who we are and what we are capable of. A Jew who grew up with no background but makes an effort to keep some mitzvos may receive tremendous reward, while a Jew who grew up immersed in a Torah society but chooses to only minimally practice his Judaism may receive little reward for those very same deeds. Same act, different people, different contexts, different reward and punishment.

Because justice is relative, the closer a person grows to G-d, the greater the potential for punishment, as more is expected of him/her. There is an arousal of the attribute of justice that accompanies every step upward that a person takes, as actions that a person on a lower level would not be held accountable for are now judged to be sins and require tshuvah and reflection.

Aharon’s sons were indeed guilty of offering an “aish zarah”, whatever exactly that sin was. But these blemishes of sin were slight and would have been undetectable to us. Recall that Moshe told Aharon that Nadav and Avihu were even greater in stature than they were! Why then did Hashem punish Nadav and Avihu so harshly? Why did the anger of Hashem toward Nadav and Avihu which had been held in abeyance since Mattan Torah (according to one Midrashic view) suddenly spill over into Divine punishment? The answer is “b’korvasam lifnei Hashem” – because they drew closer to G-d. To enter the kodesh kodashim, the holiest spot on earth, demanded a level of purity that did not tolerate the slight blemishes of soul. It’s not the sin of “aish zarah” alone which killed Nadav v’Avihu, but it was the context in which the sin took place. In the context of kodesh kodashin, the ever so slight defects of soul that these giants might have had within them were suddenly judged as glaring errors of judgment. Because the context of kodesh kodashim is so special, it must be reserved for use only on the the most special moment of the year, as Aharon was told.

Now we can understand, says the Shem m’Shmuel, why the Jewish people needed a korban Pesach to merit escaping the danger of the final makkas bechoros. I would add that now we understand why it takes so much work and preparation before we can have a Yom Tov of Pesach. It’s not just about cleaning the cupboard, but it’s about cleaning the soul. What may have been fine and good for our souls before Peach simply does not cut it in the context of the tremendous aliya ruchanit of the chag. If you want to feel the spiritual energy inherent in matzah and enter the kodesh kodashim of the pnimiyus of the chag, you can’t just waltz into Yom Tov with the baggage of a whole year! There is a din v’sheshbon that comes along with aliya, a struggle a person needs to undergo to integrate the ohr of the chag into their total personality in a way that transforms the past and provides direction for the future. Without that preparation, we risk entering the kodesh kodashim and being found wanting.

Hope everyone has a chag kasher v’sameyach and we all merit experiencing the cheirus and aliya of Yom Tov!

yerusha of chameitz from someone who dies on erev pesach (r"l)

I did not want to include this in the previous post so as to not confuse things, but one further point from the Noda b'Yehudah is worth mentioning. Based on his chiddush (see previous post) that the chiyuv of bi’ur chameitz is a chovas hagavra incumbent only upon the owner of chameitz, the Noda b’Yehudah writes that if someone failed to do bi’ur chameitz and dies on Erev Pesach, his/her children can wait and acquire and benefit from that chameitz after Pesach. The owner of the chameitz, not his/her children, is responsible to fulfill tashbisu. Since chameitz cannot be acquired during Pesach, the laws of inheritance do not cause the chameitz to pass to the children on Yom Tov and they violate no issur. The chameitz is not prohibited because of chameitz she’avar alav haPesach because chameiz she’avar alav haPesach is a knas on the owner of chameitz for violating the din d’oraysa of bal yera’eh. The issur of bal yera’eh takes effect only at nightfall of 14 Nisan, at which point the owner of the chameitz was already dead.

The only catch is that chameitz is in effect considered hefker until after Pesach when the yorshim can acquire it. In theory, anyone else can be zocheh in the chameitz as well.

bi'ur chameitz on erev pesach which falls on shabbos (III)

The gemara (Pesachim 5) quotes Rabbi Akiva’s proof that “yom harishon” which is designated for bi’ur chameitz must mean Erev Pesach because chameitz may not be burned on Yom Tov. The gemara draws a number of conclusions from R’ Akiva’s proof, among them that R’ Akiva holds that chameitz must be eliminated by burning. The Pnei Yehoshua asks: according to the chiddush of Rashi (Beitzah 27b) which we discussed yesterday, namely, that the prohibition of burning of kodshim which are tamei on Yom Tov or Shabbos includes any form of elimination, what proof does the gemara have that R’ Akiva holds chameitz must literally be burned? Just as with respect to getting rid of tamei kodhsim any form of elimination is subsumed under the header of “burning” because of the sevara of “achshivei” (see yesterday’s post), so too, perhaps R’ Akiva holds that any means of eliminating chameitz is halachically designated as bi’ur because of the sevara of “achshivei”.

The Noda b’Yehudah (O.C. 15) answers this question by distinguishing between the mitzvah of burning tamei kodshim and the mitzvah of tashbisu. The mitzvah of burning kodshim is incumbent upon anyone who finds kodshim temei’im; the focus of the mitzvah is eliminating objects which are tamei. There is no comparable mitzvah to go around and eliminate all chameitz from the world; if you don’t own the chameitz, you don’t have to burn it. (It is tempting to link this distinction to the safeik of the Minchas Chinuch discussed last week.) The mitzvah is a chovas hagavra upon the owner of chameitz, not a function of the object.

Where the focus is eliminating tumah, the sevara of achshivei tells us that all forms of elimination are subsumed under the melacha of burning because they fulfill the more general goal of disposal. However, the same cannot be said with respect to eliminating chameitz. We never find something which is categorized as a melacha for one person but not another. It cannot be that the owner of chameitz who tosses his bread into a public trashbin has violated Shabbos but the identical act performed by a neighbor who is not the owner of the chameitz is permissible. The definition of melacha is absolute, not relative to the person performing the act.

Getting back to the point raised in previous posts, R’ Soloveitchik’s explanation of the Rambam that disposing of chameitz of Shabbos is prohibited because of the sevara of achshivei contradicts this Noda b’Yehudah and leaves unresolved how to explain Rashi in Pesachim 5. Tzarich iyun on how RYBS would deal with these points – something to work on.

mussar from the daf (nazir 28)

There is a tremendous mussar in the daf yomi that is worth mentioning. The Mishna (Nazir 28) discusses the cutoff point after which a husband can no longer be meifer his wife’s nezirus. According to R’ Eliezer who holds nezirus is not finished until the nazir cuts his/her hair upon completion, so long as a person’s wife has not cut her hair, her husband may still be meifer. Why? Tosfos explains that the husband is empowered to be meifer nedarim which cause pain, inuy. Since a person’s wife suffers the inuy of not being able to drink wine until the final haircut takes place, the neder is subject to hafarah until that point.

Think about this for a moment. We have a women who has gone a least a full month observing her vow of nezirus successfully. She has brought her korbanos to the Beis HaMikdash and offered them already. All that remains is a short delay until she can take a haircut. How much trouble could waiting for that haircut cause? Yet, that little delay, the little demand that a person have patience, is still called inuy, suffering!

bi'ur chameitz on erev pesach which falls on shabbos (II)

Getting back to yesterday’s post, the Ba’al haMaor suggested that the machlokes between Rabbi Meir and Chachamim whether bi’ur chamietz (except the minimum necessary for seudas Shabbos) on Erev Pesach which falls on Shabbos must be done before Shabbos or can be done on Shabbos depends on the machlokes R’ Yehudah and Chachamim as to how bi’ur must be done. If bi’ur must be done by burning (R’ Yehudah’s opinion), then it must be done before Shabbos; if bi’ur can be done through any means of disposal, then it can be done even on Shabbos (as the Chachamim hold). The Rambam clearly disagrees with this analysis. Rambam paskens that bi’ur can be done by any means of disposal, but holds that bi’ur must be done before Shabbos. Why according to the Rambam can bi’ur not be done on Shabbos itself?

R’ Soloveitchik explained the Rambam based on a chiddush of Rashi in Beitzah (27b). Kodshim which are tamei, including challah or terumah which became tamei, are disposed of by burning. The Mishna in Shabbos (23) tells us that these items may not be burned on Shabbos or Yom Tov. Rashi writes that one should not interpret this gezeira narrowly as applying only to burning, but it includes any means of disposal, e.g. one would not be allowed to feed challah tamei'ah to one’s dog. Even though it seems no melacha is being done by feeding a dog challah temei’ah on Shabbos, Rashi writes that “rachmana achshivei l’havarasan” – the Torah declared disposal of kodshim to be a significant act and labeled it a melacha.

Using Rashi’s chiddush, R’ Soloveitchik argued that the same idea of “achshivei” applies to bi’ur chameitz as well as bi’ur kodshim. Any means of disposal of chameitz is prohibited on Shabbos. A footnote in the sefer Mo’addei haRav notes that R’ Soloveitchik would not dispose of his leftover chameitz crumbs by flushing them down the toilet on Shabbos in consideration on this view of the Rambam. (No other poskim to my knowledge share this view.) Instead, R' Soloveitchik relied on bittul alone.

R’ Soloveitchik’s equation of bi’ur chameitz and bi’ur kodshim is a major chiddush which flies in the face of a tshuvah of the Noda b’Yehudah (O.C. 15). Hopefully more on that to come…. As we get closer to Pesach there is less and less time to think and write, so posting is a bit difficult.

pesach with extended family who are not religious

Having read and recommended Azriela Jaffe’s book in this post, I would just like to follow up with a recommendation to read her blog post here at beyondbt.com about Pesach with extended family who are not observant or less observant. In my reaction to her book I distinguished between attempts to deal with superficial symptoms like not being able to eat in a relative’s home and more fundamental differences of philosophy and values that may be a wedge between families. I think in her post Jaffe recognizes that she has hit up against one of these fundamental issues when it comes to Pesach. Take a look.

bi'ur chameitz on erev pesach which falls on shabbos

The Mishna (Pesachim 49) has a machlokes when to dispose of chameitz when Erev Pesach falls on Shabbos. The Chachamim hold that all chameitz need not be disposed of until Shabbos, but Rabbi Meir disagrees and holds that bi’ur chameitz with the exception of lechem mishne should be done on Friday. What is the crux of the issue? Had you asked me I would have said we are dealing with a simple harchaka derabbanan. Rabbi Meir is concened lest too much chameitz be left on Shabbos without a means of disposal; the Chachamim don’t feel disposing of leftover chameitz poses a concern. One clue that this might be the case is R’ Eliezer bar Tzadok’s view that chulin may be left until Shabbos but terumah must be disposed of on Friday. The reason behind the split seems to be that terumah is harder to dispose of than chulin because it cannot be eaten by non-kohanim. Rabbi Meir perhaps extends the concern for disposal from terumah to all foods, while the Chachamim do not see any danger in either case.

Why is Rabbi Meir more concerned with insuring proper disposal of chameitz on Shabbos than on a regular weekday? My guess would be that since Shabbos has issurim like carrying chameitz to a reshus harabim, burning chameitz, etc. which do not apply on a weekday, proper disposal is more of an issue.

The Ba’al haMaor offers a deeper insight into the dispute. According to Ba’al haMaor, Rabbi Meir holds like Rabbi Yehudah that chameitz must be disposed of by burning, and therefore bi’ur chameitz must take place on Friday. The Chachamim are consistent with their view that chameitz may be disposed of by any means and can therefore be accomplished even on Shabbos.
The Rambam clearly disagrees with this view of the Ba’al haMaor. The Rambam (Chu”M 3:3) paskens like Rabbi Meir that all chameitz should be disposed of on Friday, yet the Rambam also paskens like the Chachamim (Chu”M 3:11) that chameitz may be disposed of using any means.

According to the Rambam, if chameitz can be disposed of using any means, why not simply wait until Shabbos to accomplish that disposal? My approach would answer the question, but resorts to formulating a dispute about a rather vague harchaka derabbanan. R’ Soloveitchik had a different solution… stay tuned (if I have time to write).

tziruf of different grains for a k'zayis of matzah

I imagine yesterday was cleaning day for almost everyone spending Pesach at home.... I am aching from scrubbing, but I enjoy spending Pesach at home so much that it is well worth it.

The Minchas Chinuch debates whether one can combine eating part of a k’zayis made from one type of grain with part of a k’zayis made from a different type of grain to fulfill the mitzvah of matzah. Since the mitzvah can be fulfilled with any of five different types of grain, why would one think that one cannot combine different pieces together to get to the total of a k’zayis? In fact, the halacha is clear with respect to challah that breads made of different grains may be combined together to add up to the total shiur to be chayav in challah.

Perhaps the issue depends on how one understands the halacha of tziruf, combining items together. Does tziruf mean that items which may appear to be different are in fact part of the same family and therefore can be combined, or does tziruf mean that items can be combined in certain contexts despite the fact that they are inherently different? In other words, is tziruf a siman that items are the same, or a sibah, a new halacha that allows for combining different elements? If tziruf is a siman, a giluy milsa that items belong to the same family, what is true for challah should also be true for matzah. But if tziruf is a new din, then perhaps it is true only in some contexts and not others. Since there is no explicit source that tells us such a din exists by matzah (see the Minchas Chinuch’s attempts to find one), there is room to argue that no such option exists.

siyum on ta'anis bechorim (II)

Shu”t Arugas haBosem (#139) writes that a siyum on ta’anis bechorim is not a way to avoid the fast or be doche the fast because of a seudas mitzvah, but the siyum is a kiyum of the fast! Since the whole point of ta’anis bechorim is to mark the nes of the Jewish bechorim being saved while the Egyptian bechorim perished, the very fact that one schedules a siyum for that specific date marks it as significant and celebrates the nes.

To answer the question posed yesterday – if a milah occurs on Ta’anis Esther which is mukdam, the Rama paskens to fast on Friday because the milah is doche the chiyuv ta’anis but does not cancel it. If a siyum is made on ta’anis bechorim there is no need to fast on Friday because the siyum fulfills the inyan of the ta’anis and there is no need for a makeup.

siyum on ta'anis bechorim

The Rama (O.C. 686) paskens that if a milah occurs on Ta’anis Esther which is mukdam on Thursday instead of Shabbos, the seudah for the milah is held on Thurs. and the fast is postponed (for those involved) until Friday. Shouldn’t it follow that if a siyum held on ta’anis bechorim which is mukdam on Thurs., the fast should be postponed until Friday. Yet, we know nobody does that and we assume the siyum cancels the ta’anis. Why the difference?
There is a nice lomdus here, but I’ll let the question simmer so the answer is absorbed b’teyavon, like Rashi’s shita in the hidur of achilas matzah : )

matzah ashira on Erev Pesach

Pesachim 99 tells us that a meal may not be eaten from close to mincha time until nightfall on Erev Pesach. Tosfos is bothered by the Mishna codifying what should be practically obvious. One cannot eat a meal because there is nothing to eat! Chameitz is prohibited from mid-day, and the Yerushalmi tells us that matzah may also not be eaten on Erev Pesach – what could this prohibited meal possibly consist of? Rabeinu Tam answers that this diyuk proves his contention that it is permissible to eat matzah ashira (what for us commonly is egg matzah) on Erev Pesach.

The reason for the restriction on eating Erev Pesach seems to be a dispute among the Rishonim. In yesterday’s post I cited the Rambam’s explanation (Chu”M ch 6) that matzah may not be eaten on Erev Pesach so that the mitzvah of eating matzah at night is distinctive (heker). Rashi and Rashbam explain that the reason is hiddur mitzvah, so that the matzah consumed at night is eaten with a full appetite (teyavon).

I don’t understand R’ Moshe Shternbruch’s suggestion in Moadim u’Zmanin (notes at the end of last volume) that whether or not Rabeinu Tam’s heter to eat matzah ashira is correct depends on this dispute. He writes that according to the Rambam that matzas mitzvah requires a heker, matzah ashira, which looks for the most part exactly like regular matzah, should be prohibited on Erev Pesach. However, according to Rashi, since matzah ashira tastes significantly different from regular matzah, eating matzah ashira would not diminish one’s appetite for regular matzah and therefore not be a problem.

Couldn’t one make exactly the opposite argument? Perhaps the difference in taste between matzah ashira and regular matzah is sufficient heker between the two and matzah ashira is permitted even according to the Rambam. And perhaps according to Rashi since matzah ashira is satisfying and fills a person up when eaten it should be avoided on Erev Pesach to perserve one's appetite for matzas mitzvah. Tzarich iyun for me on this one.

how old was Haran when he gave birth to Sarah (and a lesson for husbands)

My wife's old Wordpress blog has vanished so I can't link to her old post, but a few months ago she posted and had asked me about Haran's age when he gave birth to Sarah. If Avraham is 10 years older than Sarah, and Haran, who is Sarah's father, was younger than Avraham, it must mean that Haran fathered Sarah when he was under 10. I did not really think much about it at the time - working out things like this is just not my cup of tea and I tend to me dismissive of these type practical questions. Well, I guess I should have paid attention because lo and behold, I just came across a Yerushalmi (Yevamos 59b in Vilna ed) which makes exactly the same calculation to prove that one can father a child pre-puberty. I shared the Yerushalmi with my wife because I deserve an "I told you so!" on this one and promised a blog post to be modeh al ha'emes. Moral of the story: always pay attention to your wife!

erev pesach she'chal b'shabbos - what to eat

There is a wild tshuvah in the Mishneh Halachos (vol 8) regarding someone who woke up very late on Erev Pesach she’chal b’Shabbos and was faced with the choice of washing over chameitz to fulfill the mitzvah of eating a seudah on pas before the time to eat chameitz expired or davening. On the one hand, there is an issur of eating before tefilah, but on the other hand, there is a mitzvah to wash for seudas Shabbos, and that mitzvah is potentially a mitzvah overes because there is not much else you can wash on the rest of the day. R’ Menashe Klein sets out a whole list of things wrong with the assumptions behind the question which you can mull over.

While on the topic of what to eat on Erev Pesach which falls on Shabbos, I discovered a few sources which discuss an idea which may get points for creativity but did not make too many poskim happy. Rabeinu Tam writes that since egg matzah cannot be used for the mitzvah of matzah, it is not off-limits on Erev Pesach. Using similar logic, a contemporary Rabbi proposed that matzah baked specifically “shelo lishma” which is not usable for mitzvas matzah would be permissible to eat on Erev Pesach as well. Aside from the fact that no previous poskim ever entertained this idea, the Rambam writes (Hil Ch”M ch. 6) that the prohibition of eating matzah on Erev Pesach is designed to make eating matzah on the seder night something distinctive (heker). Egg matzah is easily distinguishable from matzah shemurah. The same cannot be said for matzah that looks identical to matzah shemurah but was baked shelo lishma.

"kitusei michtas shiurei" used as a kula

I owe a debt of hakaras hatov to a local talmid chacham (I don’t know how he feels about public acknowledgement, so I’ll omit his name) who I asked about applying kitusei michtas shiurei l’kula (see previous post) and was nice enough to get back to me late last night after doing a Bar Ilan search and digging up a mareh makom. It is actually apropos to the parshiyos of these shabbasos. Yevamos 103b has a case of a cloth which is tamei muchlat with tumas tzara’as which is brought into a house, rendering the whole house tamei. The gemara is troubled by this din – since the cloth needs to be burned because of its tumah, why don’t we apply the principle of kitusei michtas shiurei and declare that it lacks the necessary shiur to be metamei the house? The gemara resolves the question by invoking a gezeiras hakasuv, but the hava amina of the question assumes kitusei michtas shiurei works l'kula.

Interestingly, the Minchas Chincuh does not reference this mareh makom in mitzvah #9 when he discusses tashbisu on wheat which is kilayim, but he does mention it in mitzvah #16 (os 19). The footnotes of the new M.C. don’t give you the reference, which just goes to show you that as good as the footnotes are, there is still what to think about.

haysa Yehuda l'kodsho

For an insight into Hallel in honor of Rosh Chodesh (or an early start on preparing Pesach vortlach) see my wife’s take on “haysa Yehuda l’kadsho” – why is Yehudah singled out, and why the feminine “haysa” instead of “haya”?

in defense of birthdays

I have heard at various times that celebrating a birthday is not a Jewish thing, a sevara I don’t pretend to understand, but people repeat things until even silly sevaras becomes “canonized” in popular folklore. It came to mind when I saw the discussion of Adar 7 in yesterday’s daf, Nazir 14. The gemara discusses whether making a kabbalah “like Moshe on 7 Adar” constitutes accepting nezirus or not. Tosfos explains the gemara's safeik: on the one hand, 7 Adar is the day Moshe died and many people took vows of nezirus in response to the tragedy; on the other hand, 7 Adar is the day Moshe was born, a day of simcha not in the spirit of nezirus. Which aspect of the day did the person have in mind when he/she made their kabbalah?

If Moshe Rabeinu could be happy on his birthday, and if klal yisrael could be happy on his birthday, what could be wrong with birthdays?

While on the topic, what is the idea of tzadikim being born/dying on the same day? R’ Tzadok haKohen explains in Kuntres Divrei Chalomos that a birthday marks the pinnacle of a person’s mazal’s influence. This power boost to the neshoma can help a person overcome all kinds of obstacles in life on that day. For a tzadik who is already on a high madreiga, this boost elevates the neshoma that it can no longer be held in a physical body in this world. The fact that a neshoma departs the world on a birthday proves that the departure of the neshoma is a result only of a great aliya.

chameitz which is kilayim - "kitusei michtases shiurah" applied l'kula?

The Minchas Chinuch makes a brief observation that one cannot be in violation of an issur chameitz (on a d’oarysa level) by owning wheat which is kilayim. Since kilayim must be burned, “kitusei michtases shiurah”, i.e. anything halachically must be burned is assumed to be non-existent and less than a shiur, so one does not really posses a shiur of chameitz.

I was wondering about this. All the cases I recall of “kitusei michtas shiurah” apply the principle l’chumra, e.g. if you have a lulav which is made from an asheira tree, it is disqualified because of kitusei michtas shiurah. Here, the principle works l’kula. Is it such a davar pashut that the principle can work l’kula as well? Are there any similar cases you can think of?

scheduling a siyum to avoid ta'anis bechorim and the use of textual emendation in psak

I think it is fair to say that most bechorim avoid actually fasting on ta’anis bechorim by finding a convenient siyum to attend, but this practice has not found unanimous approval in halacha. It is hard to label a meal a seudas mitzvah done l’shem simcha shel mitzvah when the real goal is just to get a heter to eat. And what about speeding up / slowing down one’s learning just to schedule a siyum - doesn’t that prove the real goal is just to eat on the desired day and not really to celebrate the mitzvah through that siyum?

Shu”T Minchas Yitzchak (II:93) tries to justify the minhag ha’olam of scheduling a siyum for ta’anis bechorim and marshals a host of halachic sources you can peruse. I want to just highlight one of the more obscure sources he presents as a sni’f l’hakeil. In the sefer Pe’er Yitzchak, a biography of R’ Yitzchak Isaac of Zidichov, R’ Y”I quotes the Rebbe R’ Tzvi Hirsch of Zidichov as suggesting that our girsa in the Mes. Sofrim which reads “bechorim mis’anim b’Erev Pesach” is incorrect. Instead, the girsa should read “bechorim mis’angim”! And lest you be underwhelmed by this suggestion of girsa change flat out against the shulchan aruch, the sefer asks us to bear in mind that R’ Y”I held that R’ Tzvi Hirsch m’Zidichov was on the same level as the Tanaim, and R’ Y”I himself had all the madreigos of the Maggid m’Mezrich. (I bet all you Litvishe misnagdim are convinced now : )

True, the M.Y. is not convinced enough to pasken on this basis alone against a din in Shulchan Aruch, but he does not hesitate to this idea (and from a biographical work, not a halachic work) into the discussion as a snif l'hakeil. I hate to get all cynical, but can anyone imagine a university-trained scholar suggestion a similar textual emendation and having his idea mentioned as a snif l’hakeil by an acharon writing a tshuvah? Of course, there are very few university scholars I am aware of that people claim are on the madreiga of Tanaim, or even of the Magid m'Mezrich...

Maharal: two apsects of Yetziyas Mitzrayim

The Maharal (Gevuros Hashem ch 3) cites the Midrash Shochar Tov which offers two analogies to explain the process of Yetziyas Mitzrayim: 1) The Midrash compares Yetziyas Mitzrayim to removing the purified gold from a burning hot smelter; 2) The Midrash compares Yetziyas Mitzrayim to removing a baby animal from its mother’s womb. These two analogies highlight two different aspects of Yetziyas Mitzrayim.

The first analogy calls our attention to the power and might of Egypt. Like a roaring fire that can consume a person’s hand if he is foolish enough to reach into a furnace and try to pluck out something being smelted, Egypt was a dominant force that had the power to destroy any outside force that might try to liberate the Jewish people. Only though miraculous intervention could that power be diminished.

But Yetizyas Mitzrayim was not just about diminishing the strength of Egypt. The baby animal within the mother’s womb struggling to be born is not enslaved because of the mother’s dominating force, but rather the baby is simply incapable of mustering its own strength to extricate itself. Like the shepherd or farmer who intervenes to help the baby out into the world, Hashem’s intervention was necessary because the Jewish people lacked the internal strength to pull themselves out of bondage.

Life is filled with Mitzrayim’s that we want to escape. Too often we focus our hopes and tefilos on asking Hashem to eliminate those problems that seem insurmountable. We also need to work at and daven for help at tranforming ourselves so we can find the inner strength to deal with whatever burdens come out way without becoming enslaved by frustration and failure.

lav she'kadamo aseh and the mitzvah of tashbisu

My son happens to be learning Makos in school and we recently discussed the sugya (daf 15) of “lav she’kadamo aseh”. The gemara suggests that the category of lav hanitak l’aseh for which there is no malkos applies only in cases where the aseh can be fulfilled only after the lav has been violated. Lav hanitak l’aseh means the aseh serves to correct the lav; if the aseh applies even before the lav has been committed, it is not directly associated with correcting the violation. For example: the lav of entering the mikdash tamei is not considered lav hanitak l’aseh to the mitzvah of t’mei’im not entering the mikdash (vi’shalchu min hamachane…). The mitzvas aseh of keeping out of the mikdash while tamei can be fulfilled irrespective of whether one has violated a lav and entered the mikdash while tamei or whether one stands outside the mikdash and refrains from entering without violating any lav.

My son connected this discussion to our discussion of the mitzvah of tashbisu. The mitzvah of tashbisu applies both to cases where one has violated bal yera’ah and now has chameitz to dispose of on Pesach as well as to cases where one has not violated any lav and simply fulfills tashbisu by disposing of all chameitz before Pesach starts. If the Rambam holds that lav she’kadamo aseh is not classified as a lav hanitak l’aseh and is still subject to malkos, the Rambam's psak that there is a punishment of malkos for buying chameitz on Pesach makes perfect sense (I have also seen this sevara quoted in the name of the Sha’agas Arye but have not had time yet to read the piece inside).

malkos for buying chameitz

The Rambam writes (Chameitz u’Matzah 1:3) that if one purchases chameitz on Pesach, one would receive malkos. The meforshim address themselves to two difficulties in the Rambam: 1) Bal yera’eh u’bal yimatzeih can be violated simply by owning chameitz, a completely passive state; why are these lavim not categorized as lavim she’ain bahem ma’aseh for which there is no malkos? 2) The mitzvas aseh of destroying chameitz *tashbisu) corrects the lav of owning chamietz. Why are these lavim not categorized as nitak l’aseh for which there is no malkos?

The first problem can be dismissed if we assume the Rambam held (as do other Rishonim) that whether a lav is classified as ain bo ma’aseh is not determined on a categorical basis by the way a lav is normally violated, but is determined on a case by case basis based on whether the person took action or not.

The second problem brings us back to the chakira of the Minchas Chinuch (discussed last week). A lav hanitak l’aseh is a lav which the Torah provides corrective action for. The Minchas Chinuch and R’ Chaim Brisker explain that the Rambam held like Rashi, that the mitzvah of tashbisu is defined not the act of destroying chameitz, but the state of not owning chameitz. Since the mitzvas aseh is fulfilled passively by not possessing chameitz and does not not involve a specific corrective action, the lav is not categorized as a lav hanitak l’aseh.

p' shmini - a thought from the noam elimelech on his yahrzeit

One last idea for the week l’kavod Shabbos. Today is 21 Adar, the yahrzeit (unless you marked it in Adar I) of R’ Elimeleh m’Lizensk, author of the Noam Elimelech. I remember reading in R’ David haLivni’s autobiography “The Book and the Sword” (well worth reading irrespective of his theories about Tanach!) that in his hometown of Sighet in Romania people would go to mikveh before learning the torah of the Noam Elimelech, and the rumor was that the stars found in many editions at the end of certain segments hint to greater sodos that could not be put into text. With rumors like that it’s enough to even get a misnaged (even one that reads R’ David haLivni) curious enough to take a peek. Anyway, the opening torah on this week’s parsha seems appropriate:

“VaYisa Aharon es yadav el ha’Am vayivarchem, vayeired mey'asos hachatas v’ha’olah v’hashelamim” (9:22). There seems at first glance to be no reason for the Torah to tell us that Aharon descended from the mizbeyach after blessing the people, and grammatically, the phrase itself is strange – one descends from a place, from the mizbeyach, not from an action. The Noam Elimelech uses the pasuk as a springboard to discuss the tension in balancing love of G-d with love of mankind. The “ivory tower” tzadik” can devote himself to the pure pursuit of perfection and closeness with G-d, but that pursuit comes at the sacrifice of closeness with others who can never reach such lofty heights. One cannot influence and elevate people without coming in contact with their problems and their shortcomings; one cannot bless people unless one is truly sensitive to their shortcomings.

Aharon is the paradigm of the tzadik who suffers a “descent” not in the physical sense of going to a lower location, but in the sense of sacrificing the world of personal perfection for the sake of bringing blessing to the lives of ordinary people. “Descent” is a consequence of blessing. Dealing with people, even for the lofty goal of elevating their lives, entails personal sacrifice of the world of “chatas, olah, and shelamim”, korbanos, from the root krv=closeness to G-d, but that sacrifice itself is the mark of true tzidkus.

When I first thought about this idea I was somewhat depressed by it, maybe because I’m not a chassid. Is it fair to say that one must choose between mankind and G-d, between dedication to self-perfection and tolerance for others? I have a hunch that is not what R’ Elimelech meant to convey. I think the lesson here is that the dichotomy that I painted is ultimately a false one. One cannot truly be dedicated to G-d without concern for one’s fellow man, and one cannot truly achieve perfection without being willing to sacrifice that goal for the concern of another. The “descent” of Aharon is temporary and superficial, as it ultimately leads to the elevation of the people as a whole to greater and more lofty heights.

Of course, R’ Elimelech’s life and the lives of so many tzadikim are characterized by a love of G-d comparable only to their love of mankind. Their teachings are the bracha left for us to learn from, a bracha which entailed a ”descent” in terms of sacrificing time and effort to impart, but paradoxically I think it is that descent to influence future generations which ultiamtely is the source of the greatest aliya, esp. on the yom hayahrzeit.

tzedaka: the Bais haLevi's two models and reward for effort

Yesterday we discussed two possible models for how bitul chameitz works: 1) Rashi – bitul fulfills the mitzvah of tashbisu; 2) Tosfos – bitul creates the circumstance (not owning chameitz) under which the mitzvah of tashbisu does not apply. Earlier in the week we had a discussion about charging for communal services which elicited a comment from Barzilai mentioning the Bais haLevi’s derush on tzedaka. By coincidence, that derasha (derush #1 in vol 2 of the Shu”T) proposes a similar lomdus regarding the mitzvah of tzedaka. The Bh”L distinguishes between two levels of giving: 1) Charity given lishma, which fulfills the mitzvah of tzedaka; 2) Charity given for ulterior motives, which removes the ani from poverty, creating a circumstance under which the mitzvah of tzedaka does not apply, but which itself is not a true fulfillment of the mitzvah. Make of it what you will: concidence, hashgacha, or Barzilai having ruach hakodesh and anticipating that these topics relate : )

Getting back to the topic of tzedaka for a moment, I wrote in the comments there that a poor person who gives $18 to tzedaka at great personal sacrifice gets far more reward than a millionaire who donates a lot of money which requires little sacrifice – l’fum tza’ara agra. The concept of “ain tzedaka mishtalemes elah l’fi chessed she’bah” (Sukkah 49b) is a proof to this very idea, as Rashi explains the chessed is the effort exerted in carrying out the tzedaka, e.g. if someone cooks food an gives it to a poor person, the cost of the food is the tzedaka, but the reward really stems from the chessed of expending effort in the shopping and cooking of the meal. In other words, putting a poor person’s restaurant tab on your credit card or cooking him a meal may accomplish the same end result, but the latter generates more reward than the former.

Here is the monkeywrench: Rashi (VaYikra 5:17) quotes a Toras Kohanim which says that if change falls from your pocket and a poor person picks it up, you get the reward for having fulfilled the mitzvah of tzedaka. Where is the l’fum tza’ara here – you didn’t even realize what happened!?

I think the simplest answer is that l’fum tza’ara agra means that reward is proportional to the effort expended, but there is certainly some level of reward even for an effortless kiyum mitzvah. Another possibility is that reward is accrued after the loss of money is discovered and the person does not try to recover it, but this seems to be a forced reading of Rashi (see R” Yosef Engel in Esvan D’Oraysa #23 for more on this topic). Any other ideas?

the mitzvah of tashbisu (II)

The gemara (Pesachim 4b) writes that on a d’oraysa level there is no need to do bedikas chameitz provided bitul is done. What exactly does bitul accomplish? After all, the chameitz is still there! Rashi explains that since the Torah used the term “tashbisu” and not “teva’aru”, to burn, it teaches that the mitzvah of eliminating chameitz need not involve destroying it. Bitul alone suffices to fulfill the mitzvah of tashbisu. Tosfos, however, disagrees. The mitzvah of tashbisu begins at the 6th hour of Erev Pesach, writes Tosfos, and we know that bitul is no longer effective from the 6th hour once chameitz becomes prohibited. Tosfos explains that the reason bitul works is not because it fulfills the mitzvah of tashbisu, but rather because there is no mitzvah of tashbisu on chameitz which one does not own.

The point of disagreement between Rashi and Tosfos fits very nicely into the Minchas Chinuch’s safeik (see previous post). According to Tosfos, the mitzvah of tashbisu is a chovas hagavra to destroy chameitz. That process can only be fulfilled at a certain point in time (after the 6th hour of the day) and is incumbent only upon people who own chameitz. If one does not own chameitz (e.g. one did bitul), there is no mitzvah of tashbisu. According to Rashi, tashbisu is fulfilled by achieving the state of not owning chameitz; the mitzvah is the result, not the process. Since bitul helps achieve the state of not owning chameitz, it is part of the kiyum of tashbisu. No matter how or when one destroys chameitz, if the end result of not owning chameitz on Pesach is accomplished, that fulfills tashbisu.

the mitzvah of "tashbisu"

Time to start getting geared up for Pesach! One of the many notable issues the Minchas Chinuch delves into in his discussion of Pesach is defining the nature of the mitzvah of “tashbisu” (#9 in the Chinuch’s count). Is it a positive mitzvah to actually go out and burn chameitz, just like the mitzvah to eat matzah or pick up a lulav, or is the mitzvah to simply passively be in a state of not possessing chameitz, like the mitzvas aseh of “shabason” which we keep by not doing work on Shabbos? Briskers would phrase the same issue somewhat differently – is the mitzvah a “chovas hagavra”, i.e. the person is obligated to eliminate chameitz, or a “chovas hacheftza”, a din that chameitz itself, if possessed, must be eliminated?

The simplest nafka minah in this chakira is whether a person who owns no chameitz on Erev Pesach fulfills the mitzvah of tashbisu. If there is a chovas hagavra to go out and eliminate chameitz, one needs to get chameitz and destroy it, even if that means buying a loaf of bread just to burn it. But if the mitzvah is simply to be in a state of not possessing chameitz, one need not take any action if one does not have any chameitz to destroy. The Minchas Chinuch suggests a few more creative nafka minos: 1) With respect to the din of “chotef mitzvah”, i.e. someone is not permitted to seize a mitzvah you are about to do. If someone burns the chameitz you were planning to eliminate, have they stolen your mitzvah? The answer is “yes” only if you assume the mitzvah is the act of eliminating chameitz; if the mitzvah is simply being in a state of not owning chameitz, the process of burning or destroying the chameitz is just a means to an end but not the mitzvah itself. 2) With respect to “mitzvah haba’ah b’aveirah”. If you find chameitz on Pesach and eat it (which is certainly a valid way to get rid of chamietz), has one fulfilled the mitzvah of “tashbisu”? True, one has also violated an issur in the process, but “mitzvah haba’ah b’aveira” may only be a derabbanan consideration (Tosfos Sukkah 9a); strange as it may sound, perhaps one gets some credit for fulfilling an aseh in this case. The kiyum mitzvah only counts, however, if the act of eliminating the chameitz is a mitzvah. If the process is just a means to an end, one gets no credit at all – only an issur of having ingested chameitz.

This issue may boil down to a debate among Rishonim – more to come, bl”n.

the halacha of "tziruf" by issurei nezirus

The gemara (Nazir 4) darshens from the pasuk “kol asher yeitzei m’gefen ha’yayin” that there is a halacha of tziruf with respect to issurei nezirus. Meaning: the Torah prohibits eating chartzanim or zagim (different parts of the grape). If a nazir ate half a zayis of chartzanim and half a zayis of zagim, even though each is individually less than a shiur of issur, the two are viewed as combined (tziruf), and since a k’zayis in total was eaten, the nezirus has been violated.

The Brisker Rav points out that there are two possible ways to understand this din. One approach is that “kol asher yeitzei m’gefen ha’yayin” teaches that the issur of chartzan is violated even if only ½ a k’zayis has been eaten provided there is a tziruf with other issurei nazir, and vice versa, the issur of zag is violated even if only ½ a k’zayis is eaten provided there is a tziruf with other issurei nazir. But there is another possibility. Perhaps the issur of zag and chartzan are only violated if a full k’zayis is eaten of each individually. However, “Kol asher yeitzei...” is a new independent issur that includes under its umbrella eating any of the different items such as chartzan, zag, etc. as long as in total a k'zayis is eaten.

The chakira of the Brisker Rav may underly the positions of Rambam and Ra'avad in the following dispute: The Rambam (Nazir 5:8) writes that a nazir who eats a k’zayis of grapes, chartzan, zag, raisins, and drinks a revi’is of wine is chayav 5 separate malkos (plus bal yachel). The Ra’vad asks why the Rambam left out a 6th set of malkos for “kol asher yeitzei m’gefen ha’yayin”. According to Ra’avad, “kol asher yeitzei..." is a new issur subject to malkos. According to the Rambam, "kol asher yeitzei…” simply teaches that tziruf applies to the individual issurim of grapes, raisins, chartzan, and zag, but is not an independent issur in its own right.

(Note: this is a bit difficult to fit into the sugya on daf 38, but those learning daf yomi can worry about that in a few weeks : )

demanding $ to daven for a choleh

I hate to “steal” someone else’s post, but I feel so strongly about this issue that I want to add my two cents. Orthonomics posts a comment from one of her readers:

I have a Purim-related question. I just found out that the learning for boys that has become en vogue in many Shuls on Purim morning is often sponsored by people financially so that they can get the merits of the learning or some other Zechus for their family…I found this out because we asked the Shuls in our area if they could give the boys the name of a sick relative of ours to keep in mind and say Tehillim for while they are there and we were told we would have to cough up some money. Every Shul, but one had the same response. Any thoughts on this?

Orthonomics focuses her attention on the “she’lo lishma” attitude created by these prizes, many of which are not items we would necessarily want our kids to have. But I am more troubled by the attitude of shuls that demand $ for praying for the zechus of a choleh. I am sorry, but this attitude just makes me sick, and this is not the first instance of these type tactics that I have witnessed. Of course the shul can suggest that the person contribute to sponsoring the event. Of course the shul needs to raise tzedaka. But when it comes to the point that praying for a choleh comes with a price tag attached, a quid pro quo, a bill that demands payment or you just are not part of the program, that is where I part ways with whatever organizations run these events. Just my 2 cents.

seudas Purim on Shabbos - different reading of the Yerushalmi

Before leaving Purim behind and looking toward Pesach, I have to add one last point to an issue I raised in a previous post. In discussing whether we pasken like the Yerushalmi’s chiddush that seudas Purim cannot take place on Shabbos, my assumption was that “al hanissim” aside, there is not much of a big deal in eating a seudah both on Shabbos and on Sunday to be yotzei all opinions. I take that back! R’ Friedman (Rosh Mesivta of Mesivta Rambam in Lawrence) quoted a chiddush of R’ Soloveitchik that the Yerushalmi does not just mean that there is a chisaron in the kiyum of seudas Purim if done on Shabbos, but the Yerushalmi means there is an issur from the perspective of hilchos Shabbos in holding a Purim seudah on Shabbos day. Very interesting lomdus. I am just wondering though, assuming the Yerushalmi means there is an issur, how exactly is the issur violated? In what way would the seudah be defined as a seudas Purim as opposed to a normal Shabbos meal (seems strange to say kavanah alone is the issue here)?

oznei haman

My wife commented to the earlier post regarding the command “sim b’aznei Yehoshua” following the battle with Amalek:

Your mention of sim b'aznei made me think of the fact that Hamantashen in Hebrew are ozney Haman. Perhaps the name implies a hint as to what one hears. We hear the megillah; we said at kabbalas haTorah na'ase venishma. As a part of the body, the ear could also stand in for the slave status that Haman had based on the Midrash that he sold himself to Mordechai for bread.

I can't resist getting the last word in, so I would just add the following: Amalek failed to respond to what their ears heard in the same way as other nations did – “sham’u amim yirgazun”. The parsha of Amalek is followed by the immediate contrast of “vayishma Yisro”, and it was the Keini descendents of Yisro who Shaul warned away before battling Amalek of his time.

But focussing more directly on “ozen”: Maharal (Be’er haGolah ch. 3, see also Ch Aggados to Kesubos 5) has an interesting comment about the ear. Every sense organ has a covering – eye lids, mouth can be closed, a nose can be pinched closed. The ear is always open – it is the ultimate kli kibul. A kli kibul has no identity of its own but is made by what is placed inside, and to a certain degree, it is this quality of being a kli kibul which makes us human. We absorb and assimilate into our thinking and personality that which we take in from the outside world. A cherish is patur from mitzvos because without the kli bibul of hearing, he/she is lacking in identity.

We are what we hear, and whether we fill our ears with the dvar Hashem or with havalei olam hazeh determines whether we are in the reshus of Amalek or following Hashem.

Chochmas Adam ta’ir panav. All the other sense organs – eyes, nose, mouth – are located in the front of the face with the exception of the ears. The defeat of Amalek is not through chochma, through the direct experience of “panim”, but through hisbatlus, ad d’lo yada.

Divrei Chachamim b’Nachas Nishma’im. The gematriya of ozen is 58, the same as the gematriya of chein. R’ Nachman m’Breslev (Lik Moharan #1) explains that chein must make an impression, which is indicated by the letter “taf” added to “nach” (to spell “nachas”), as used in the pasuk “v’hisvisa tav” (Yechezkel 9), making a mark. The “chein” or “ozen” is the kli kibul for divrei chachamim, but words are only effective to the degree that they impact the listener.

And of course, the gematriya of 58 matches noach, prominently featured in the pesukim about "nachu mei'oyveihem".

“Sim b’aznei Yeshoshua” is the charge to create an impact upon Yehoshua, to ensure that he is a kli kibul which will carry the message of mechiyas Amalek l’dor dor.

more on mishloach manos and shlichus

Why doesn’t connecting the machlokes Rambam and Tur mentioned in the previous post to mishloach manos make much sense? If you were reading this blog a year ago you might remember a question of the Dvar Avraham. People seem to get hung up on the chumra of sending mishloach manos via shliach, so all over the neighborhood you see little kids running around delivering on behalf of their parents. But, asks the Dvar Avraham, the halacha is that a katan cannot serve as a shliach!

The D.A. says a beautiful chiddush that helps resolve many issues in shlichus. There are two ideas in shlichus that get confused: 1) shlucho shel adam k’moso; 2) plain vanilla shlichus. Sometimes halacha simply looks at whether a desired result is accomplished, in which case plain vanilla shlichus suffices; sometimes halacha is concerned with whether I performed a specific action, in which case the rule of shlucho shel adam k’moso needs to be invoked. For example, if I appoint a shliach to shecht a korban for me, the only requirement to be met is that the animal be properly slaughtered - who does the slaughtering is irrelevant. However, if I designate a shliach to be mekadesh a woman to be my wife, not only must the end-result of the woman receiving a ring be accomplished, but I must be the one giving it. A shliach who delivers the ring must be shlucho k’moso, acting in my place.

When it comes to mishloach manos all that is important is that the recipient receive the manos; how does the delivery and how it gets there is irrelevant. A katan cannot serve as a shliach when we need to invoke shlucho k’moso, but when our only concern is producing a result, plain vanilla shlichus, there is no exclusion on a katan.

The whole dispute between the Rambam and the Tur is in a case of divorce where it is important to establish shlucho k’moso because only the husband and no other person may divorce his wife. However, with respect to mishloach manos, where all that is necessary is to produce the end result of the recipient getting manos, even the Rambam would agree that the shliach is not an actual surrogate stand-in for the sender.

response to a youth in crisis - must read

Rabbi Lazer Brody (website) has a simple agenda of increasing emunah in Hashem. Whether you agree with everything he writes or not, you have to admire (at least I do) his dedication to the apolitical agenda of simply getting people to have faith. This letter he wrote in response to a plea for help from an all too typical teen in the yeshiva system about to go off the derech haTorah is a must read.

eating seudas purim before giving mishloach manos and issues of shlichus

I lost track now of the comment someone posted recently referencing the machlokes between the Rambam and Tur regarding shlichus. Whether the intent was to get me to find a way to do a post on it, I don’t know, but as coincidence would have it, the topic resurfaced. The machlokes in a nutshell: a husband appoints a shliach to deliver a get to his wife and goes insane before the get is actually delivered. Is the get valid? The Rambam (Geirushin ch 2) holds that min haTorah it is valid. Once the shliach is appointed and given charge of the get, he stands in the husband’s place and the “real” husband is no longer in the picture (the get is, however, pasul mderabbanan). The Tur disagrees and holds that such a get is invalid min haTorah. The shliach is not a surrogate husband or a replacement husband; the shliach’s actions are merely attributed to the original husband as if he had performed them. Since the original husband cannot divorce his wife while insane, the actions of the shliach done on his behalf are of no consequence. (See Ketzos 188:2 for more on this topic.)

What does this have to do with Purim? Apparently there is a shortage of chumros in the world, so someone reasoned as follows: since it is prohibited to start a meal when a mitzvah performance is pending, perhaps one is not permitted to start one's seudas Purim until the mitzvah of mishloach manos and matanot la'evyonim have been fulfilled. The fact that such an idea is not mentioned in earlier poskim is not a problem - it was simply so obvious (so the argument goes) that mentioning it would be redundant. (The obvious catch is that seudas Purim is itself a pending mitzvah – why should mishloach manos come first? Let’s leave that aside for now.)

But how long must one wait before eating? Is it OK to hand off one’s mishloach manos to a shliach and then sit down to eat, or must one wait until the recipient actually takes delivery?

Had you asked me that question (and I was willing to take the chumra seriously) I would have said it depends on whether one holds like the Terumas haDeshen or the Manos haLevi that we discussed yesterday. If the purpose of mishloach manos is to foster friendship (like the Manos haLevi suggests), then the act of giving alone seems to suffice even if it never reaches the recipient (the Rama even writes that one fulfills the mitzvah of mishloach manos if the recipient is mochel). However, if the purpose of mishloach manos is to enhance a neighbor’s seudas Purim (like the TH”D suggests), then until the recipient gets the food the goal has not yet been accomplished.

Looking to find something more lomdish to say, a talmid chacham wrote to R’ Binyan Zilber (Shu”T Az Nidberu 6:65) that this issue depends on the machlokes Rambam and the Tur. According to the Rambam, the shliach becomes a surrogate for the giver, removing the giver from the picture. The shliach therefore cannot eat Purim seudah until he completes delivery, but the sender definitely can. However, according to the Tur, the shliach is merely acting on behalf of the sender, but is not the sender’s substitute. Until the manos are actually given, the sender is not allowed to eat. R’ Binyam Zilber was not convinced… maybe more on this later after some thinking time.

mishloach manos using issurei hana'ah

The Mishna in Kiddushin tells us that a person cannot be mekadesh a women using issurei hana’ah, as these items have no value. The Mishne l’Melech (Ishus perek 5) raises an interesting question: if a person is mekadesh a women who is deathly ill with issurei hana’ah that she needs for her illness, is the kiddushin valid? On the one hand, for this particular woman the issur hana’ah does have value; on the other hand, for the mekadesh and for the rest of the world, the prohibition of using such an item renders it valueless.

Achronim raise a similar question with regards to mishloach manos. If one were to give an item which is assur b’hana’ah to someone who is deathly ill, has one fulfilled the mitzvah of mishloach manos? Does mishloach manos need to be something of value to begin with (and if so, how much value)? Can it have to be something which the recipient alone values, or something of value to the sender as well?

Shu”t L’Horos Nasan (vol 2 # 54) suggests that this question may hinge on a famous dispute between the Terumas haDeshen and the Manos haLevi regarding the purpose of mishloach manos. The TH”D holds that the purpose of mishloach manos is to add to and enhance seudas Purim. Therefore, if a person is deathly ill and is permitted to eat a seudah of issurei hana’ah, these foods can serve as mishloach manos. The Manos haLevi, however, holds that the purpose of mishloach manos is to create a sense of friendship and camaraderie. Support for such an idea can be found in the Ritv”a’s chiddush (Meg 7) that if one gives a mishloach manos of insignificant value to a wealthy important person, one has not fulfilled the mitzvah. Since the gift makes no impression on the recipient and does not foster any feeling of friendship, it cannot count as mishloach manos. Perhaps one can apply the same chiddush in reverse to our case. Since giving away issurei hana’ah costs nothing and is something the giver would want to get rid of anyway, it does not convey that feeling of friendship that mishloach manos is supposed to foster and would therefore not fulfill the mitzvah.

more lessons from Parshas Amalek

Further thoughts on Parshas Amalek:

1) Unlike, for example, the war against Yericho, where Chazal interpret the pasuk “vayalan b’toch ha’eimek” to mean that Yehoshua “lan b’omko shel halacha” and devoted his time before battle to learning, here the Torah focuses on Moshe's tefilah as an integral aspect to the battle. I think this reinforces the Shem m’Shmuel’s point with respect to understanding “rifyon yadayim” for Torah as a lack of proper anticipation for kabbalas haTorah. The tikun for lack of learning is more learning. The tikun for lacking anticipation for learning and eagerness for learning is not through more learning (a disinterested student will not be more responsive to two hours of shiur than he will be to one), but requires tefilah.

The Rishonim ask why Ta’anis Esther is commemorated the day before Purim when nomally fasting is prohibited the day before and the day after any holiday mentioned in Megilas Ta’anis. The Ohr Gedalyahu explains based on the Ra’avad (Ta’anis 7 in RI”F) that Ta’anis Esther is different because tefilah and fasting is an integral part of the celebration of destroying Amalek.

2) The parsha ends with Moshe being told to write down what occurred and “sim b’aznei Yehoshua”, relate it to Yehoshua. This is the first place in the Torah that Moshe is told to transmit Torah to his talmid – to create a mesorah of Torah passed from Rebbe to student. Why here? The content of learning can often be transmitted through books or other means, just like any other body of knowledge. What it means to be mekabeil Torah, to have that enthusiasm and desire that Amalek tried to extinguish, can only be transmitted through personal interaction.

3) I would have expected this charge of writing the parsha and teaching it to Yehoshua to be followed by a pasuk telling us “vayichtov Moshe…” or “vaYomer Moshe l’Yehoshua…”. Instead, the next pasuk tells us that Moshe built a mizbeiach and offered another tefilah. Shouldn't that pasuk follow immediately after the story of the battle? What is it doing here after Moshe was told to teach Yehoshua? The Seforno in a few words has an amazing insight: וְשִׂים אֵיזֶה זִכָּרון בְּאָזְנֵי יְהושֻׁעַ. וְזֶה עָשָׂה משֶׁה בְּבִנְיַן הַמִּזְבֵּחַ (פסוק טו) וּבִתְפִלָּתו Moshe did impress the lesson of Amalek upon Yehoshua – he did it through his tefilah.

Parents all the time try to “sim b’aznei” their children various messages, most of which are usually ignored. There are obviously more important messages, and less important messages. If you ask someone what they learned from their parents and they say “To pick my dirty socks up off the floor”, they are missing something. True, their mother may have repeated that message 5000 times, but that is a less important message. How can we tell what are the more important messages and what are the less important one's? By listening to what our parents, our Rebbeim, our leaders daven for. No mother davens that her kid pick his dirty socks up, no matter how many times she may repeat it. “Sim b’aznei Yehoshua” by showing him what you are davening for.

Amalek and kabbalas haTorah - banishing "sipuk"

The gemara (Shabbos 87) tells us that Hashem coerced the Jewish people to accept the Torah at Sinai and only after the events of Purim was the Torah willingly embraced and accepted. Why was this acceptance achieved davka after the events of Purim and not at any earlier historical point? As discussed previously, the Shem m’Shmuel identifies the “rifyon yadayim” that led to the battle with Amalek not as a lack of Torah study, but a lack of intensity and preparedness for kabbalas haTorah. By definition, the defeat of Amalek during Purim is one and same as achieving kabbalas haTorah with full vigor.

The gemara (Meg 7) brings various proofs that Esther was written b’ruach hakodesh. Rava adds that all the proofs can be refuted except for the derasha of “kiymu v’kiblu – kiymu l’ma’alah mah she’kiblu l’matah”. Only b’ruach hakodesh could Esther and Mordechai have known that Hashem accepted their enactment of Purim. Yet, asks Tosfos, this proof also can be refuted, as Rava elsewhere (Shabbos 87) uses the same pasuk to darshen that that the Jewish people had a “kiyum” duing Purim of the kabbalas haTorah which had occurred at Sinai – “kiymu mah shekiblu kvar”. The Shem m’Shmuel in his last piece on Purim writes that these are not contradictory derashos, but complementary points (see the Kedushas Levi on this same gemara for a beautiful explanation). Because there was a deeply felt “kiyum” of kabbalas haTorah on the part of Bnei Yisrael, there was a complementary acceptance of all that was enacted as being a part and parcel of Torah, inspired by ruach hakodesh. In other words, the kabbalah is not simply a passive act of acceptance, but actualizes the Torah and creates the cheftza of Torah in the process.

What is the biggest obstacle to feeling this anticipation for Torah and having a kabbalah filled with hislahavus and intensity? Lots of people say derashos about Amalek being equal in gematriya to safeik=doubt. I would like to suggest that the gematriya is right, but they are misreading the word. It’s not safeik=doubt, but sipuk, satiation, feeling fulfilled (see the Koznitzer Maggid on the Mishna in Avos “histaleik min hasfeik” who suggests the same reading there). If a person feels fulfilled and satisfied where he or she is holding, then there is no expectation for change and certainly no desire for change. Banishing Amalek requires removing that feeling of sipuk and rekindling the desire to accept and grow.

responses to tragedy at merkaz harav

The Belzer Rebbe's tremendous personal caring and concern for those involved in the tragedy at Merkaz haRav has been publicized in many places already, but this article I think is one of the most moving.

At the opposite extreme, and I hate to even mention it in the same post, this report is simply mind boggling.

how often to hear parshas zachor

The Chasam Sofer (Even haEzer #119) writes that the amount of time that elapses before forgetfulness sets in is one year. Assuming the reading of parshas zachor from a Torah text is a din d’orasya, it therefore must be repeated once a year to fulfill the obligation of “zachor – lo tishkach”, not forgetting Amalek. How then do we fulfill the mitzvah in a leap year when more than 12 months have passed since the last reading of zachor? The Ch”S answers that the shiur is one year, not 12 months. During a leap year, the shiur extends by a month.

My impression is that this Ch”S is relatively well known, but less well known is the Sefer haChinuch who addresses this same issue. Pointing to the fact that the minhag in Eretz Yisrael was to lein the entire Torah over three years instead of one, the Sefer haChinuch writes that there is no obligation to hear zachor on an annual basis. How often must one hear the parsha? The Minchas Chinuch suggests that perhaps even hearing it once a lifetime would fulfill the obligation.

the battle with Amalek in Refidim

When one studies history it may be important to know who did what when and where, but the Torah is not history. There must be some reason relevant to our moral education for the Torah to tell us that the battle with Amalek took place in Refidim. Chazal do offer such a reason: the name of the place hints at the cause of Amalek’s attack, namely “rafu y’deihem min haTorah”, there was a weakness and lack of intensity in Torah.

The Shem m’Shmuel asks: the battle with Amalek took place en route to Sinai, before the Torah was given. There were only a few halachos that had been taught at Marah, and even with respect to these laws there was no mitzvah of talmud torah, to study torah as an end in itself. How then can the Jewish people at this point be criticized for “rifyon yadayim” in Torah?

The answer the Shem m’Shmuel suggests opens a door into understanding the whole parsha of Amalek and Purim. True, there was not yet Torah to study, but the Jewish people knew that kabbalas haTorah was the end goal of the entire process of the exodus from Egypt. They had been counting days of sefirah in eager anticipation of that end goal. They should have been filled with anticipation and longing for that end goal. Yet, they hit a Refidim. “Rafu y’deihem”, the zeal and eagerness hit a road bump, the preparation and anticipation lost some steam, and a little voice told them that maybe they should maybe slow down, maybe think a little more about this kabbalas haTorah idea and consider if they are really ready for it. That’s Amalek in a nutshell.

Road bumps or setbacks in a life of learning are inevitable, but if that initial commitment is not strong and suffers from “rifyon yadayim” the danger is far more serious.

what attracts people to shul?

I was recently thinking about this question and am curious as to others' opinions. What attracts you to a shul and why? The building? The cholent served at the kiddush? The derasha of the Rav? The social crowd? The chazzan? For those of you out there who are practicing Rabbanim, do you throw everything you can out there and hope you hit the magic trigger that will turn people on to your shul, or is there one particular quality that you work on to distinguish your message?

Have you given your answer some thought? I am curious if anyone else included in their answer a factor that I rank as being of primacy importance. The magic word: stimulation. Maybe it’s just me, but unless my brain is working, I just get bored, lose interest, and start getting impatient. Stimulation can come in a lot of different forms, e.g. a new melody incorporated into tefilah, a different dish at the kiddush, etc. but for me those items sit on the periphery. For a different food I can go to a restaurant, for a different nigun I can go to a concert, for a social outing I can go to a Mets game. What being in a makom torah can give that those experiences can’t is one thing: Torah. By that I don’t mean a stale vort that has been passed around for 200 years and is delivered with the usual platitudes about the importance of chessed, torah, etc. I mean Torah in the sense of a meaningful insight that challenges me to think, to evaluate, to learn and grow. In other words, Torah that stimulates.

kallahmagazine blog address

If you have been looking for my wife's blog the past few days, the address has changed to http://kallahmagazine.blogspot.com Her old ISP had too many issues and outages so she pulled the plug and switched; in the process, she abandoned wordpress and is now on blogger. The web address www.kallahmagazine.com remains the same. And while on the topic, the latest issue of her magazine just came out - look for it in the 5T, Queens (being delivered today), Baltimore, Teaneck, and it should hit Brooklyn soon.

purim meshulash - seudah, parshas zachor

The Yerushalmi (mentioned in yesterday’s post) writes that the simcha of Purim established by Sanhedrin cannot be celebrated simultaneously with the simcha of Shabbos, which was established by G-d, and therefore if Purim falls on Shabbos, the seudah is pushed off until Sunday. The Bavli does not mention such an idea; whether that silence indicates disagreement or not is a subject of major debate. The Ran already is uncomfortable with the whole idea of celebrating seudas Purim on the 16th when the megillah explicitly tells us “lo ya’avor”, that the date of the celebration cannot extend beyond the 15th. Another problematic element of the Yerushalmi is the assumption that Shabbos is not just a day of oneg, but includes an obligation of simcha as well. Tosfos in M.K. (23b d”h “man”) writes that the reason a Yom Tov cancels aveilus and Shabbos does not (i.e. if a Yom Tov falls out in the middle of shloshim or shiva, one does not resume mouring after Y”T) is because Y”T is a time of simcha and Shabbos is not. Even if one grants the assumption that Shabbos is a day of simcha, whether we apply this idea of “ain m’arvin simcha b’simcha”, not celebrating two simchas simultaneously, to this type of simcha is debatable (see M”K 8). No one would suggest, for example, that a pidyon haben needs to be rescheduled until after chol hamoed so as to not mix the two elements of simcha.

Is there any explicit gemara in the Bavli that we can point to as being in disagreement with the Yerushalmi? The Bavli (Meg 30a) quotes an argument between Rav and Shmuel when to read parshas zachor in a year such as this one where Purim falls on a Friday. Rav says to read zachor the week before Purim, as we do, so that the reading precedes the Purim. Shmuel, however, argues, and says zachor should be read on the Shabbos of the 15th so that “zechira v’asyia b’hadei hadadei”, the reading of zachor and the celebration of Purim for those in walled cities will be simultaneous. The simple reading of the gemara clearly implies according to Shmuel that the celebration of Purim is not pushed off until Sunday, but occurs on Shabbos itself, the same day that zachor is read. The Pri Chadash and others attempt to refute this proof, but certainly at first glance it seems very convincing.

For those with a hearty appetite, it probably is not such a big deal to make a seudah on Shabbos and a seudah on Sunday to be yotzei all opinions. However, you still can’t completely escape the debate, because one must decide on which day(s) to say “Al haNissim”. For those with a hearty appetite for learning and want a fuller treatment of this topic, R’ Ovadya Yosef in the first volume of Yechaveh Da’at has a nice review of the issues involved in a "Purim meshulash".

seudas Rosh Chodesh on Shabbos and Purim meshulash

I meant to post this on Friday but did not have time... better late thane never. The Yerushalmi writes that if Purim falls on Shabbos, seudas Purim is pushed off and held after Shabbos rather than earlier. This creates the phenomenon known as "Purim meshulash". If you are in Yerushalyim this year for Purim, you will hear megillah and do matanos l'evyonim on Friday, then have Shabbos, and have your Purim seudah on Sunday, creating a three day celebration.

Why, asks the Yerushalmi, is the Purim seudah not held on Shabbos? The Yerushalmi answers by quoting the pasuk from the megillah, "la'asos oso y'mei mishteh v'simcha", that Purim involves turning an ordinary day into a special day of simcha, as opposed to Shabbos, which is already fixed since creation as a day of simcha. You can't mix celebrations of G-d-imosed simcha and man-made simcha on the same day. The fact that we never find such a derasha in the Bavli already should make us suspicious that perhaps this Yerushalmi is not unanimously accepted, and sure enough, from Rishonim to Achronim, there is debate as to whether this conclusion is accepted l'halacha. Maybe more on that later in the week.

Even though this Yerushalmi is much discussed in the context of Purim, it actually applies to a halacha that came up this Shabbos, which coincided with Rosh Chodesh. The Shulchan Aruch writes (O.C. 419) that there is an obligation to mark Rosh Chodesh with a special seudas Rosh Chodesh (this halacha is not too popular in practice; see the Aruch haShulchan). We don't find a clear statement in the Bavli that such an obligation exists, but the Taz points to the same Yerushalmi above as a source. The Yerushlami writes that not only seudas Purim, but also seudas Rosh Chodesh is delayed until after Shabbos. QED from the fact that the two seudos are discussed in the same context that just like there is an obligation for a seudah on Purim, there is a similar seudah obligation on Rosh Chodesh. The MG"A writes that on Shabbos one needs to find some way to add something to one's seudah to make it more special and indicate that it includes this added kiyum of seudas Rosh Chodesh. However, if one accepts the Yerushalmi at face value, then in reality the seudas Rosh Chodesh cannot be fulfilled on Shabbos and needs to be celebrated after Shabbos. The Mishna Berura (Sha'ar haTziyun #5) quotes R' Ya'akov Emden's psak, based on the Yerushalmi, that one can fulfill the seudas Rosh Chodesh by having a special melaveh malka, even though Motzei Shabbos is not longer Rosh Chodesh.

building a mizbeiach on Yom Tov (II)

The Minchas Yitzchak’s explanation of the hava amina to think binyan mikdash might be doche Shabbos or Y”T follows along the same lines suggested by Chaim M. in a comment yesterday. The M. Y. just adds an additional twist which to help explain why the Mechilta illustrates the issur of building the mikdash using a case of fixing the mizbeiach and not with a case of building the actual walls of the mishkan.

As we discussed once before, Tosfos holds that the aseh of Yom Tov is zman gerama and women are obligated only in the lav. This opens the theoretical possibility of saying that the aseh of binyan mishkan could be doche the lav of Yom Tov, as Chaim M. suggested. However, the gemara (Shavuos 15) writes that the mitzvah of binyan mikdash cannot be done at night. If so, it should be classified as a mitzvas aseh she’hazman gerama and not apply to women! (We actually discussed this one about a year ago as well, and my son spoke about it at his bar mitzvah, last year P’ VaYakhel-Pekudei.)

The Minchas Yitzchak brilliantly rescues the sevara for the hava amina by pointing to a suggestion in achronim that even though the building of the actual miskhan could not be done at night, the building of kelim could be done at night. If so, perhaps women could fulfill the mitzvah of binyan mikdash by building kelim at night, and one might have thought they could even do so on Yom Tov, kah mashma lan our pasuk that they may not. Based on this analysis it is also meduyak that the Mechilta offers an example of building the mizbeiach, a kli, and not building the walls of the mishkan itself.

I am still a bit puzzled. Unless I am mistaken, even Tosfos who holds women are not obligated in the aseh of Yom Tov still holds that one cannot be doche the lav of Y"T to fulfill a different aseh (yes, we discusssed this one as well in the past.) Doesn't that shoot down the hava amina here?

the mizbeiach built on Yom Tov

Rashi in P’ VaYakhel writes that the pasuk “sheishes yamim ta’aseh melacha” teaches that the Mishkan can only be built during the 6 weekdays but not on Shabbos. Rashi’s interpretation is based on the Mechilta, which learns from this pasuk that even fixing the broken corner of a mizbeiach is prohibited on Shabbos.

According to most opinions of Tanaim (see Shabbos 87) the Torah was given on Shabbos, the 51st day after Pesach. The MG”A famously asks why we refer to the holiday of Shavuos, which we celebrate on the 50th day of the sefira count, as “zman mattan Toraseinu”, when the Torah was actually not given until the day after the holiday of Shavuos. You have until Shavuos to work out a good answer to that one, but for now, I want to focus on a different point. After working through the calculations of the dates, the Minchas Chinuch (#309) notes that Moshe was commanded to build a mizbeiach on the day before mattan Torah. If mattan Torah was on day 51 of sefira, the mizbeiach would have been built on day 50, which was the Yom Tov of Shavuos. How could Moshe violate the issur of building a mizbeiach on Yom Tov? True, the Torah had not yet been given, but Moshe, like the Avos, would certainly have observed halacha even before the formal mattan Torah.

The Minchas Yitzchak (Kuntres Divrei Cheifetz, end of vol 3) offers two answers: 1) the mizbeiach was not a permanent structure and therefore did not violate the d’oraysa prohibition of binyan; 2) two people worked on building the mizbeiach and each was “aino yachol” and therefore not in violation of a d’oraysa.

These answers each have debatable points, but I’ll leave that for another time. One final question worth thinking about: why is a limud necessary to teach us that building a Mishkan cannot be done on Shabbos? We know that a mitzvas aseh cannot be doche a lav + aseh, so why would we think that the Mishkan could be built on Shabbos? The Minchas Yitzchak has a beautiful pilpul to answer this question. I may try to post it later, but if I don’t get to it, it is worth the effort to look up.

nedarim 72 - shlucho shel adam k'moso

As part of the discussion of whether a husband must actually hear the neder he is being meifer, the gemara Nedarim 72b presents a machlokes R’ Yonasan and R’ Oshiya whether an apotropus can be appointed by a husband to absolve his wife’s nedarim. R’ Yonasan takes the position that “shlucho shel adam k’moso”, but R’ Oshiya argues that the pasuk of “isha” excludes shlichus for hafaras nedarim. The gemara suggests that the possibility of the husband delegating the right of hafarah to someone else proves that the husband’s hearing the neder is not a prerequisite for hafarah.

The Rishonim ask an obvious question on this proof: if the delegate can serve as a shliach for hafarah, doesn’t the delegate hearing the neder also count as if the husband heard it by virtue of this same principle of “shlucho shel adam k’moso”?

The Ran and Rosh offer two solutions. Ran explains: a necessary condition for appointing a shliach is having the ability and right to personally perform the same act. If hearing a neder is a prerequisite to hafarah, the husband must fulfill that prerequisite before he can appoint a shliach to do hafarah on his behalf. The Rosh answers by asserting a chiddush in where shlichus applies. Shlichus, writes the Rosh, only empowers an agent to perform an action on someone’s behalf. Since hearing is passive and involves no action, is it not subject to delegation.

This Rosh is one of the proofs of the Ketzos (182:1) to his famous answer to the Tosfos RI”D’s question of why a person cannot appoint a shliach to put on tefillin for him or perfom other similar mitzvos on his behalf. If Reuvain acts as Shimon’s agent to don tefillin for him, true shlucho shel adam k'moso would mean it is as Shimon homself performed the act of putting on tefillin. However, the body those tefillin were placed on is Reuvain's, not Shimon's! Shimon's mitzvah of tefillin can only be fulfilled by putting tefillin on his own body, not someone else's. As the Rosh writes, shlichus only extends to actions - it does not mean that the agent who hears a neder functions as the ear of the husband, and it does not mean that Reuvain's body upon which tefillin are wrapped can be considered like Shimon's.