Euthyphro dilemma and Chavah's mistake

Something like 13 years ago I quoted a chakirah from the Shiurei Da’as (vol 2 "Bein Yisrael l'Amim): are the laws of the Torah that tell us good vs bad a giluy milsa to the way teva works, and punishment and reward are just natural outcomes, or is it the mitzvos themselves that make things good (=keeping the law) or bad (=violating it) and reward and punishment are decrees, not consequences. 















This is a very old issue that goes back to the ancient Greeks and is known as the Euthyphro dilemma: Is something holy (moral) because it is loved by the gods, or is it loved by the gods because it is holy (or moral)? 
We once used this to explain the sin of Chavah.  When Chavah said the eitz ha'da'as was "tov lma'achal" when she was in effect saying was that really, the tree by its nature is something good to eat, but G-d imposed a decree upon us preventing us from eating it.  

I started thinking about the same issue again this year.  Chavah mistakenly thought she was not allowed to touch the eitz hada'as.  Rashi writes (3:4) that the nachash pushed Chavah into the tree to show her that nothing would happen if she touched it, and therefore, he argued that nothing would happen if she ate from it either.

The Sifsei Chachamim asks: this reasoning makes no sense.  Chavah was pushed into the tree against her will -- it was a case of ones.  Of course she would not be liable for that.  How can that be compared to willingly eating from the tree?

It must be that Chavah assumed that the prohibitions having to do with the tree were built into its nature.  G-d was simply revealing how teva works.  If come in contact with acid, even if someone pushed you into it, the claim of ones doesn't help -- the acid will burn you anyway.  Similarly, Chavah thought that by its nature the eitz hada'as was toxic.  When the nachash proved to her otherwise, her mental castle fell apart. 

rav chessed v'emes -- hoshana rabbah

A few weeks ago when the Y"T season started we started saying slichos with the 13 midos ha'rachamim, "Hashem Hashem K-l rachum v'chanun... v'rav chessed v'emes."  I think most of us would say that we hope the court upstairs does not judge us based on the "whole truth and nothing but the truth," because then we would be in big trouble.  We want Hashem's thumb on the scale tilting it in our favor -- that's what chessed, rachum, chanun, is all about.  So how is it that "emes" is one of the 13 midos ha'rachamim?  How can truth possibly work in our favor?

The Maharal often distinguishes between properties of a thing that are b'etzem and those that are b'mikreh.  All the books on child rearing say never criticize the child -- only criticize the behavior.  Johnny is b'etzem a good boy, just right now b'mikreh because he hasn't had his nap and instead had 6 pounds of sugar candy he is acting like a monster. 

The Kohzhiglover says that's the pshat in our 13 midos.  Yes, we did aveiros.  But that's not the truth of who we are.  We're in galus, we're surrounded by all kinds of bad influences, we have all kinds of distractions -- b'mikreh, we end of sinning.  But b'etzem, if you look at who we really are, and it's only Hashem that can really see who we really are underneath all the bad behavior on the surface, then the "emes" is that we are innocent.

Hoshana Rabbah is 26 days after the creation of mankind.  25 Elul was the day man was created; we are now 26, gematriya shem Havaya, days later.  The shem Havaya means this day represents the real essence, the etzem, of who a person really us.  We know the 4 minim represent the 4 types of Jews, some with ta'am and reiach, taste and smell, Torah and mitzvos, and then you have the aravah that has nothing -- no taste, no smell, no Torah, no mitzvos.  Yet it's the aravah that we take in our hand and put in parade this day.  Even if you've got nothing, it doesn't matter -- that's b'mikreh. Today we focus on the etzem, and the etzem of a Jew is always good.

Ramban writes that positive things need to be translated into concrete action.  When a navi got a message, he often would do something concrete -- when the message is translated into something concrete, it becomes more real.  Sukkos has a multitude of concrete mitzvos for us to do -- lulav, esrog, sukkah.  Shmini Atzeres comes along and we have nothing.  At least on Shavuos we have cheesecake, but Shmini Atzeres doesn't even have that. 

Maharal writes that the number 8 represents going beyond teva.  7 days is the natural cycle of the world as it was created; 8 is outside the boundaries, outside the lines.  During Sukkos we want to bring the ruchniyus into our world so we need concrete mitzvos, kelim, to contain the ohr.  Shmini Atzeres is 8 -- we are outside the boundaries.  It's not about bringing ohr into the concrete world, but rather about bringing ourselves to a place outside the normal confines of teva, outside the concrete and finite that is the day to day of our lives.  Shmini Atzeres if the extra mile, the extra 10% of the 110% we need to give. 

fleishig bread

Most of the time we keep the bread on the table parve and the leftover challah makes for perfect French toast after Shabbos/yom tov.  It doesn't always work out, and so over Y"T we ended up with half a challah that was fleishig.  My wife put it away and later used it for a bread kugel. 

There is a din (Y.D. 97) that we don't bake milchig or fleishig bread to eat with a milchig or fleishig meal.  The reason is because one may get things mixed up and assume the bread is parve and end up eating either milchig bread with fleishigs or vice versa.  I found that the Badei HaShulchan not in that siman, but earlier in siman 91 (s.k. 17), asks why the same din does not apply to leftover bread -- why not say that once your bread became milchig or fleishig by coming in contact with things on the table that it has the same din as bread baked milchig or fleishig and cannot be eaten?  He notes that the minhag ha'olam is to do what we did and not throw out the bread, but he leaves it as a tzarich iyun as to how this works.

I hadn't thought about it before I saw his comment.

sukkah and Eretz Yisrael

The Mishnayos and gemara frequently use the term "going up" into the sukkah, e.g. the Mishna (2:5) says that Rabban Gamliel and R' Yochanan ben Zakai were brought food and they said "he'alum la'sukkah," bring it up to the sukkah. The simple explanation for the term is that the sukkot in the times of Chazal were built on roofs or balconies. However, al pi derush perhaps Chazal are hinting to us that going into the sukkah is a spiritual aliya (R' Avraham Shapira; see Bnei Yisaschar for a kabbalistic interpretation.)

I would like to suggest that there is an additional connotation to the term that Chazal might have had in mind. The Sefas Emes (5650, see R' Avrohom Schor in Lekach v'Libuv 5760/61) writes that the sukkah has connection to the kedusha of Ererz Yisrael. Similarly, the Radomsker in Tiferes Shlomo asks what happened to Hashem's promise at yetzi'as Mitzrayim to bring Klal Yisrael into Eretz Yisrael? Justice delayed is justice denied -- it took 40 years in the desert passed before we got to Eretz Yisrael!  The Radomsker answers that during those 40 years we had sukkos -- we were in fact living in the avir of Eretz Yisrael. Way back in 2007 I posted that as far as I can figure out (others in the comments disagreed) there are only2 mitzvos you can do while sleeping: 1) yeshivas sukkah; 2) yishuv Eretz Yisrael.  Like they say, half the job is just showing up; all you have to do is show up and be in the sukkah, be in Eretz Yisrael, and you've accomplished something.  Maybe that's why Chazal use the term aliya with respect to sukkah.  When we hear the term "aliya" we think of the mitzvah of going to Eretz Yisrael.  Maybe that's exactly what Chazal intended to remind us of when we enter the sukkah. 
    
The Tur writes that the holiday of Pesach corresponds to Avraham, Shavuos to Yitzchak, Sukkos to Yaa'kov. Pesach marks our formation as a nation. Shavuos marks our getting the Torah.  Yaakov made his sukkot when settled the outstanding feud with Eisav and returned home to Eretz Yisrael.  The three chagim stand for the three essential pillars that define us -- nationhood, Torah, and Eretz Yisrael.         

leishev ba'sukkah on sleeping

The Rosh (Sukkah 4:3) asks why it is that we don't say a "leishev ba'sukkah" on sleeping in the sukkah.  Two answers: 1) If it should happen that you don't fall asleep the "leishav ba'sukkah" would be a bracha l'vatala, so we don't say it; 2) Rabeinu Tam argues that ke'va is defined as having a meal (everything we Jews do revolves around food); sleeping, learning, schmoozing and everything else you do in the sukkah are all tafeil to the seudah and are covered by the bracha of "leishev" done at the meal. 

A possible nafka mina: what if someone ate at a neighbor's house and came home to sleep in his own sukkah (or what if one had nothing to eat)?  According to the first answer, there would still be no requirement to say "leishev" before going to sleep.  However, one could argue that according to Rabeinu Tam the "leishev" on the keviyus in a different sukkah has no connection to your sukkah and a bracha would be required.  Aruch haShulachan even suggests that even though Rama paskens like Rabeinu Tam and we usually only recite a "leishev ba'sukkah" when we have a meal in the sukkah (GR"A disagrees), that is only the case when you are sitting in your own sukkah and all the other activities of the day are tafeil to the meal you ate there.  If you go to visit a friend and sit there for awhile, even if you have no meal, you would need to say a bracha there.

Be that as it may, a question to ponder: what's the difference between the bracha of "leishev" on sleeping, which we avoid lest one fail to doze off and it be a bracha l'vatala, and the bracha of "ha'mapil" that we recite every night before going to sleep?  Why are we not concerned lest a person fail to doze off and that bracha be a bracha l'vatala?

(If you are going to tell me ha'mapil is a birchas ha'shevach, pls be prepared to defend that assertion.  And please don't bother to tell me about Brisker shitos on not reciting ha'mapil -- I'm obviously asking according to Shulchan Aruch psak.)

Shirah -- how to look at the world

Al regel achas: the concept of the "shirah" of haazinu comes from the same root as "ashurenu v'lo karov" (in parshas balak) -- it refers to seeing.  Shirah is about how we see the world.  Do things just happen, or is it "haTzur tamim pa'alo?"

The Rambam writes that the mitzvah of "kisvu lachem es hashirah ha'zos" refers to writing shiras haazinu.  However, since there is din that you can't write a sefer of an individual parsha, so m'meila you have to write an entire sefer Torah.

To be able to see the world properly, to absorb the shirah-vision, one needs the context of kol hatorah.  The individual parshiyos of life, of history, may not make sense on their own unless they are put in broader context.

Becha chosmin -- Yom Kippur is the chag of chessed

Neila is the time of the chasimas ha'din.  "Chasmeinu l'chaim...". Rashi in parshas Lech Lecha comments that the brachos given to Avraham, "v'e'escha l'goy gadol va'avarechicha..." etc refer to the fact that we mention the Avos in our shmoneh esrei -- Elokei Avraham, Elokei Yitzchak, v'Elokei Yaakov.  Rashi continues, "yachol yehiyu **chosmin** b'kulan?  Talmud lomar 'v'heyei bracha' -- becha chosmin."  We end the bracha "magen Avraham" -- the chasima is only with Avraham's name.  The Tiferes Shlomo quotes the Tikunei Zohar that Rosh haShana, "vaHashem pakad es Sarah...," is the holiday of Yitchak; the Tur (417) writes that Sukkos is the holiday of Yaakov, "ulmikneihu asah sukkos." Yom Kippur, says the Tif Shlomo, is the holiday of Avraham Avinu, and particularly neila, the chasima, is in his merit -- becha chosmin.  Avraham personified the midah of chessed, and it is only through chasdei Hashem that we are given a chasima ltovah.

How do we earn chasdei Hashem?  By emulating Avraham and doing chessed ourselves.

On erev Y"K there is a halacha of ritzuy.  True, the shulchan aruch says this means that we should ask each other for forgiveness, but, as the Sefas Emes explains, that's not exactly all that ritzuy means.  Tikabeil brachamim ub'**ratzon** tifilaseinu.  Y'yehu na amareinu **l'ratzon**. We want Hashem to want to listen to us and want to accept our tefilos.  How do we earn that?  By doing ritzuy ourselves, which means that we should not just forgive, not  just to tolerate, but that we should have "ratzon" for our friends -- we should want good for them.

Wishing you all a gmar chasima tovah, that our tefilos should be accepted bratzon, that we be zocheh to chasdei Hashem, and that we be zocheh to see the good in others and accept each other b'ratzon as well.  

Oseh ha'shalom

Although there seems to be an old established minhag to change the ending of the last bracha of shmoneh esrei from ha'mevarech es amo yisrael ba'shalom to oseh ha'shalom during the aseres ymei teshuvah, many (I would say most) shuls these days opt to keep the standard ending rather than tamper with the nusach of the chasimas habracha.  I've noticed most of these same shuls have no problem on Yom Tov changing the chasimas habracha of retzey from ha'machazir Shechinaso l'Tzion to she'odcha levadcha b'yirah naavod.

Tartei d'sasrei, or can you come up with a difference?

mitzvah of hakhel

Ramban writes that the children who the Torah says should be brought to hakhel, "u'bneihem asher lo yad'u yishm'u v'lamdu," must be children of the age of chinuch, otherwise how could they learn anything by coming -- what kind of "lamdu" could there be for children too young to understand anything.  However, continues Ramban, it does not appear from the gemara that this is the case, as the gemara quotes R' Elazer ben Azarya as saying that the children are brought "litein schar l'mivi'eihem," only to give their parents more reward for shlepping them. The Minchas Chinuch goes so far as to suggest that even newborns should be brought, as there is no shiur given for the definition of "taf."

The question of what age child should be brought may hinge on what the purpose of the mitzvah of hakhel is. "L'ma'an yishm'u u'lma'an yilmidu v'yar'u es Hashem Elokeichem" (31:12): Is the mitzvah of hakhel one of limud, and yiras shamayin is a byproduct, or is the mitzvah to inculcate yiras shamayim, and the limud is just a means to set the stage and create the experience that engenders yirah?

Ramban clearly views the mitzvah as one of limud. Therefore, only children who are old enough to learn and understand need to be brought. Contrast that with the language of the Rambam (Chagigah 3:6):

 אפילו חכמים גדולים שיודעים כל התורה כולה, חייבין לשמוע בכוונה גדולה יתרה.  ומי שאינו יכול לשמוע--מכוון ליבו לקריאה זו, שלא קבעה הכתוב אלא לחזק דת האמת; ויראה עצמו כאילו עתה נצטווה בה, ומפי הגבורה שומעה--שהמלך שליח הוא, להשמיע דברי ה-ל

According to the Rambam, even chachamim who are already versed in the pesukim must participate in hakhel, and even those who cannot hear must try to be attentive to the kriah. In other words, even when there is no limud involved, the mitzvah still applies.  The purpose of the kri'ah is not learning, but rather the  because the purpose is "l'chazek das ha'emes" -- the inculcate yiras shamayim.
   
The tension between the two elements of the mitzvah can be seen in the pesukim themselves. The parsha first tells us "mikeitz sheva shanim... tikra es haTorah ha'zos" -- read from the Torah. But then the parsha continues "hakhel es ha'am..." -- the miztvah is for the nation to gather together. Sadya Gaon in fact counts these as two seperate mitzvos: one to read the Torah, one to gather together. The majority of monei ha'mitzvos, however, count them as one mitzvah.  The question is which element is the engine and which is the caboose -- is the ultimate goal limud haTorah, and that's what the nation gathers for, or is the experience of coming together, children included, and end in itself, and the Torah reading is just a means to get us together. 

(A bit of derush: Shouldn't the order of the pesukim be reversed?  First the people have to gather -- "hakhel es ha'am" -- and only then is the Torah read -- "tikra es haTorah ha'zos."  Why does the parsha put it the other way around?  Maor vaShemesh explains that the "Torah ha'zos" that is read to the people, the Torah that they are supposed to learn and take with them, is "hakhel is ha'am" -- we have to come together as a people, men, women, and children included.)
   
See Shu"T Binyan Av vol 2 re: the parallel between the idea of bringing even little children to hear megilas esther and the mitzvah of hakhel.

Yesh tikvah l'achriseich

I think there are two elements that contribute to 'ha'ben yakir li  Ephraim' bring chosen as the haftarah for the second day of Rosh haShana:

1) As a parallel to the kriah on the first day which speaks about our matriarch Sarah and Hashem's fulfillment of her desire to have a child we read about our matriarch Rachel and her desire for the return of all her children.

2) Lest a person think that the job of repentance is too great and too overwhelming we read the words "yesh tikvah l'achriseich," Hashem's encouragement not to give up hope.

I don't know how you can read the final words of that pasuk, "v'shavu banim li'gevulam," without being moved by the fact that for hundreds and hundreds of years Jews have read this promise of return and it was always a distant dream, but we have been zocheh to see it happening in our lifetime.  

it's not about the past

If the avodah of Rosh haShana is to review the past and do teshuvah on what we messed up during the previous year, then it would make the most sense to celebrate Rosh haShana on the last day of the year.  On the last day we could take stock of all that transpired over the previous year and make an accounting of where we did well and where we fell short.  But that's not what we do.  We celebrate not on the last day of the year, but rather on the first day of the year, before anything has even transpired in that new year yet.  How does that make sense?

Secondly, if you notice, our Rosh haShana davening actually does not have in it viduy, we don't klap al cheit, we don't say slichos on Rosh haShana.  All that is part of the avodah of Yom Kippur, but is not part of Rosh haShana.

So what is the avodah of the day?

Meforshim explain (see for example, the Sifsei Chaim, or the Sichos of R' Noson Tzvi Finkel) that Rosh haShana is not about the past, but rather it's about the future.  What do you want the new year to be?  What are your she'ifos for the future?   That's what you need to consider on day #1.

That is what the din of the day is all about: firstly, because a person is defined by his/her aspirations.  You may not get there, but you at least have to know where you are going.  And you have to ask Hashem help you get there. Secondly, and this is where teshuvah fits into the picture, our aspirations are inevitably shaped by where we are coming from and where we are currently holding.  The triple AAA baseball player hopes next year to move up to the majors, but the player on some low level minor league team is nowhere land can't realistically have that same dream.  If you come to the table with last year's baggage, it is hard to aspire to something radically different this year.  It's hard to ask Hashem, "Let me become a baki in sha"s this year," when you are coming to the table with a history of barely keeping up with daf yomi.  Hashem is not going to give a person a mission that will inevitably end in failure or be an exercise in futility.  It's a struggle to overcome the past, but that's what teshuvah is all about.

Around two weeks ago I did a post on the word "avah," and the question of how to understand the pasuk in our parsha speaking about the person who rebels against Hashem, "lo yoveh Hashem slo'ach lo."  How is it possible that G-d should not want to forgive even such a person?

The problem is I put the comma in the wrong place.  What actually makes the person rebellious is that, "Lo yoveh," he, this rebellious individual, does not want, comma, 'Hashem slo'ach lo," for G-d to forgive him (Mishne Sachir quoting Kreizer Rav of Sanz).

G-d is willing to forgive anyone.  All we have to do is want that forgiveness.

So that's what the next two days of Rosh haShana is all about -- finding amidst the nigunim, the chazzanus, the piyutim, the speeches, the tekiyos, one real moment of introspection, one moment where we really desire to be forgiven, one moment when we actually have a desire for true growth in the coming year and ask Hashem for help.

Hopefully we will all be successful in finding at least one moment like that and making the most of it.

viduy ma'aser

On erev Pesach every third year of the terumos/maasros cycle there is a mitzvah of biyur maasros, to distribute whatever terumah/maaser is left in one's possession. One then makes a declaration known as viduy maser, saying that one has given away the required tithes to support the kohen, the levi, the poor.  
         
This time of year we are all focused on the mitzvah of teshuvah and we are all familiar with the concept of viduy as a confession of sin. Why should the declaration that one gave teru"m properly be called viduy?

The Seforno answers that Hashem's original plan was for the bechorim to do the avodah in the Mikdash and be the recipients of our teru"m. Because of the cheit ha'eigel Hashem took that honor away from the bechorim and gave it to the leviim and kohanim. The declaration is called viduy because even though one fulfills the mitzvah of teru"m by giving to the kohen, the levi, etc., one must still acknowledge that it is a departure from the ideal.

With this idea the Seforno is able to answer a question raised by Rashi. We say to Hashem as part of the viduy, "Hashkifa m'm'on kodshecha...," look down from Heaven and give us blessings. Usually the word "hashkifa" has a negative connotation. Here, it is used in a positive way to make a request for bracha after the fulfillment of the mitzvah. Rashi explains that the Torah is teaching that giving to the poor changes the midas ha'din into rachamim. Seforno, however, gives a much simpler explanation of the negative connotation here: true, the parsha is speaking about the fulfillment of the mitzvah of giving teru"m, but the mitzvah itself is tainted by the change in process caused by the cheit ha'eigel.  Hashem therefore cannot look completely favorably on the way we carry it out.
        
We see a number of chiddushim in this Seforno:

1) Teshuvah is not just for aveiros -- it's for mitzvos as well. The person in this case didn't do any aveira -- he is doing the mitzvah of giving teru"m. Nonetheless, since the mitzvah is not being done in the ideal way the farmer must say viduy.

2) Teshuvah applies even when a person is a victim of long past circumstance. Imagine a farmer at the time of Shlomo haMelech fulfilling biyur maasros. The cheit ha'eigel that caused the transition from avodah by bechorim to avodah by kohanim would have occurred around 400 years in the past. Nonetheless, the farmer has to say viduy for his inability to do the mitzvah in its ideal sense because of that long past circumstance.

3) My wife added another observation: the mitzvah teaches us that there is value to the less-than-ideal. We operate with a full set of mitzvos built around the less than ideal circumstance of avodah done by kohanim instead of bechorim. Hashem did not discard the entire system because of the failure of cheit ha'eigel. The alternative to not being able to do 100% is not doing nothing -- sometimes even the less than ideal has value.

13 midos -- davar she'b'kedusha

1. The gemara tells us that Ezra made a takanah to read the tochacha of Bechukosai before Shavuos and the tochacha of our parsha before Rosh haShana.  Rav Ruderman (see Sichos haLevi on our parsha and on Bechukosai) quotes Ramban's comment that the first tochacha corresponds to churban bayis rishon and the second tochacha corresponds to churban bayis sheni.  The gemara tells us that the nevi'im wondered "al mah avdah ha'aretz," what caused the destruction of the first Mikdash.  Hashem revealed that it was due to a lack of learning Torah lishma.  Therefore, explains Rav Ruderman, it is appropriate to read the tochacha of Bechukosai before Shavuos as the moment when we come to celebrate kabbalas haTorah presents us with the perfect opportunity to make a tikun for the cheit of bitul Torah lishma.  The gemara tells us that churban bayis sheni was caused by sinas chinam, sins bein adam l'chaveiro.  Our teshuvah efforts should be focused on precisely these areas during the month of Elul as we lead up to Yamim Noraim.  Therefore, explains Rav Ruderman, we read the tochacha of our parsha now, as the time is ripe to correct the sins that led to churban.
    
2. This week we will IY"H start saying slichos.  The S.A. paskens that if you are not davening with a minyan then you cannot recite the 13 midos ha'rachamim.  The Rishonim already question why this should be so.  The Mishna in Megillah (23b) lists those things which require a minyan, and conspicuously absent from the list is the recitation of the 13 midos.  The midos are, after all, just a tefilah, a bakashas rachamim -- why should they be categorized as a davar she'b'kedusha that requires a minyan?  What is the source for such a din?
      
Some point to the gemara in Rosh haShana (17b) that says that Hashem wrapped himself in a talis like a shliach tzibur and taught Moshe the 13 midos as the source.  Since the gemara refers to Hashem acting as shliach tzibur, it implies that a tzibur is needed.  As to why this din is left off the list in the Mishna in Megillah, it could be that the Mishna there is listing chiyuvim.  There is no chiyuv to recite the 13 midos -- if you choose to take advantage of their power and add them to your tefilah, then you need a minyan to do so.
    
The Maor vaShemesh (end of Parshas vaYechi) suggests another hesber.  The gemara writes that Hashem told Moshe that whenever Klal Yisrael sins "ya'asu lifanei ka'seder ha'zeh," of the 13 midos, "V'ani mochel lahem."  The Rishonim point out that the gemara does not say "kol ha'omer" -- whoever recites the 13 midos.  It says "kol ha'oseh" -- whoever does the 13 midos.  A person must put those behaviors of rachum, chanun, erech apayim, etc. into practice and live them to benefit from them and be granted mechilah.  (I can't help but think that in the back of the Maor va'Shemesh's mind was the RaMaK's sefer Tomer Devorah, which is devoted to explaining how to put Hashem's midos ha'rachamim as described in the pasuk "Mi K-l kamocha nosei avon..." into practice.  "Mah hu -- af atah" -- we have a concept of imitation Dei.  If G-d reveals to us that he acts with certain attributes of mercy, it obligates us to behave in a similar fashion.)
    
It's impossible for any one individual, says the Maor va'Shemesh, to truly embody all of the 13 midos.  Each one of us has personality quirks that tilt us in the direction of one midah or another.  It's only when we join together as a tzibur and blend all our individual talents together that we can cover all 13 bases. 

Coming back to Rav Ruderman's idea, the tikun of bein adam l'chaveiro is perhaps even more necessary at this time of year because it is what enables us to truly come together as a community so that we can fulfill the 13 midos and merit receiving the bracha of "kol ha'oseh... ani mochel lahem."

3. Lastly, just to put you in the right mood:

     

the simcha of coming into the land

"V'haya ki tavo el ha'aretz..."  Ohr haChaim comments that "ain 'v'haya' elah lashon simcha."  The biggest simcha is coming into Eretz Yisrael.  It doesn't matter who won the election or how many seats any party has -- sometimes we forget the bigger picture, namely, we have a country where we can hold elections and govern ourselves for the first time in 2000 years.  For 2000 years we have been waiting for simcha like this.
 What is it about the experience of learning in yeshiva/seminary in Eretz Yisrael that transforms students who  may have been disinterested in high school into students who are excited and inspired?
    
Rather than offer my own theories, I thought a better idea would be to bounce the question off my daughter who is now learning in Eretz Yisrael and get her reaction.  So what makes seminary different?  Here was her short, off the cuff answer after about 2 weeks into her program:

"They [the teachers] are a lot more involved and people can ask any question they want and they wont be like "oh we cant talk about that now.  They actually start discussions and try to answer your questions.

They also have a lot more personality and try harder to relate to us..."

I could write a whole peirush Rashi on just those comments, but I'll let them speak for themselves and just add one thing.  If you ask your typical high school morah what she is trying to teach, the answer I think would be something along the lines of X number of perakim, or the Rambans on this or that perek, or some sefer in Nach, etc.  The curriculum boils down to a list of facts to be absorbed and spit back.

I would argue that even in the best case scenario, a student can learn a bunch of those facts really well and sadly, still know very little about Judaism.  Facts and information don't really inspire and are often not really relevant to the challenges of every day life in an obvious way.  They have to be woven into a framework that is meaningful, that provokes, that inspires, that gives direction and that encourages a student to go stretch their thinking.  That is what the gap year does for a lot of kids, and that's why it makes such a powerful impact.

a want that can't be explained

We once discussed different answers to the question of why G-d thwarted Bilam's attempt to curse Klal Yisrael and changed his words to bracha. Why not just let him say whatever he wants and ignore him?

Chasam Sofer in our parsha offers another answer. "V'lo avah Hashem Elokecha lishmoa el Bilam...ki a'heivcha Hashem Elokecha." (23:6) When you love someone, you don't want to listen to bad things being said about them, even if the words are meaningless. Hashem loves Klal Yisrael; therefore, He did not want to even give Bilam the chance to speak.

The Ohr haChaim has an interesting comment on the language used in this pasuk. The word "AVAH," writes the Ohr haChaim, means having a desire for no reason. Earlier in sefer Devarim (2:26-30) Moshe relates how he sent messengers to Sichon asking permission for Klal Yisrael to pass through his territory, and even offering to buy food and drink from the Emori despite the fact that Klal Yisrael had mon and the be'er and didn't really need anything.  "V'lo AVAH Sichon.. ha'avireinu bo..." -- Sichon did not **want** to let Klal Yisrael pass through.  This was was a want that made no sense -- hence the use of "lo AVAH."  Sichon could have avoided war, he could have made money for his people, but he still did not give in. Here too, Bilam pointed to the misdeeds of Klal Yisrael, to their rebellions, to the cheit ha'eigel, and still, Hashem did not want to allow him to harm Klal Yisrael. Why? How do you justify that?   "V'lo AVAH" -- we can't explain it.  Can you explain love? 
 
Now that we know this Ohr haChaim, we have a deeper insight into the parsha of yibum at the end of our sidra (25:7-8). The Torah tells us, "V'im lo yachpotz ha'ish lakachas es yivimto," if the man does not want to do yibum, "V'also yivimto ha'sha'ara," the woman comes to beis din and declares, "... lo AVAH yabmi." Beis din then responds: "V'kar'u lo ziknei iro v'dibru eilav," they give the guy a talking to. If he responds and says, "Lo chafatzti likachta," I don't want to marry her, then they perform chalitza.  We have a whole shakla v'terya here -- he says, she says, beis din says, and then he responds again.  What's going on?

The key to the parsha is the one word AVAH.  Malbim explains: the man whose brother died says, "Lo **chafatzti** likachta" -- I have nothing to gain from marrying this woman -- chafeitz = desire for something that is beneficial in some way -- and don't want to be involved. But what the woman hears and what she presents to beis din is "lo AVAH yabmi" -- he has no good reason for his refusal.  It's just a whim.  So beis din comes to investigate. The man then reiterates to them "lo chafatzti..." -- it's not just some nonsensical behavior, but rather it's that I dont see this match as being beneficial to either of us. It's "lo chafatzti" -- not "lo AVAH" like she said.  That's a different story, and beis din now gets involved in arranging a chalitza.

Back in sefer Braishis, when Avaraham sends Eliezer to find a wife for Yitzchak, Eliezer ask Avraham what to do if, "Lo tOVEH ha'isha laleches..." Eliezer was a good negotiator and whatever reason the girl might give for not wanting to go -- money, questions of yichus, kavod, etc. -- he had an answer for. But what if "lo toveh" -- what if she refuses on a whim and has no good reason? You can't argue with a whim, so what am I to do? 
 
So we have a few good examples of this Ohr haChaim in action where it gives us new, deeper insight into pesukim. Now for an example that has me baffled. In parshas Nitzavim the Torah speaks about the evil person who rejects the bris of Hashem and says "bi'shrirus libi eilech," I'll go my own way and be fine. The Torah tells us, "Lo YOVEH Hashem sloch lo," Hashem will not let him off the hook (29:18-19)  "Lo YOVEH?"  Hashem on a whim, for no reason, turns away a person???  Surely Hashem never turns someone away for no reason, and here, the reason this person is punished is clear from the pesukim.  I'm stuck -- how do you explain this pasuk?

psychology or ontology

Our parsha tells us that a king is not permitted to take too many wives (machlokes Tanaim exactly how many is too many) "v'lo yasir livavo," lest he be led astray. The Midrash in Parshas Va'Eira (see also Sanhedrin 21) writes that Shlomo haMelech said to himself that he is sure he will not be led astray, and so he took many wives. The letter yud from "lo yarbeh" came to complain to Hashem. "If Shlomo gets away with it," said the yud, "Then it will be as if "lo yabreh" is erased from the Torah."  End of the story is that Shlomo was in fact led astray by his wives despite the confidence he had in his own ability.

The simple lesson of the Midrash is that you're not as smart as you think you are, even if you are Shlomo haMelech, the smartest person alive. If you think you are immune from temptation, if you think the law only applies to lesser people than yourself, you are only fooling yourself and in the end will pay the price.

On the other hand, this is Shlomo haMelech we are talking about. Did he really not appreciate such a simple idea?  Did he really fool himself into not appreciating the danger of his actions?

R' Ahron Kotler (quotes in m'Shulchan R' Eliyahu Baruch) explained that in truth, Shlomo HaMelech did properly asses his own character -- psychologically, he should have been immune from the effects of "lo yasir levavo."  The Torah, however, is more than psychology.  There is an "inyan seguli" to Torah, and therefore, even if al pi teva Shlomo might have been immune, since the Torah says having many wives will lead to temptation, it inevitably will.  (Compare with Shem m'Shmuel VaEira 5672 -- I think the idea is the same.)

I would like to suggest along similar lines that perhaps the Midrash can be understood in light of a talk Rav Soloveitchik once gave in response to a certain Rabbi who suggested that the chazakos and umdenot of Chazal were historically/socially conditioned.  For example,  this Rabbi argued that the idea of "tav l'meisav" that says a woman would rather be married than not, may no longer apply in our time because psychologically and socially things have changed from what once was in the days of Chazal. Rav Soloveitchik thought this was completely incorrect.  The Rav held that the umdenot of Chazal are ontological -- that's how Hashem built the teva of human beings. They are not something determined by psychological tests or assessments of the situation at a certain time and place.  Therefore, since that is how Hashem built us, these are immutable principles.

If this is true of the umdenot of Chazal, kal v'chomer it's true of what is stated in a pasuk.

If "lo yasur levavo" were a psychological umdena, Shlomo would be justified in saying, "That's for most people -- but not me." But if we are talking about the human condition, Shlomo cannot say, "I am not a human being." 

With this I think we can understand the end of the Midrash we well. Why does the letter yud complain that if Shlomo disobeys, it is as if the pasuk is erased from the Torah? If someone is mechalel Shabbos, does it mean that pasuk is erased? If someone eats treif, have they erased a pasuk? (See here where we discussed this).

Based on either hesber of the Midrash above, the difference is clear: Shlomo's error revealed something fundamental about the nature of Torah.  It was not simply a mistake based on ta'avah or based on a too grand assessment of his own abilities.  It was a philosophical error.  The letter yud was complaining because Shlomo's error reduced the din to a psychological maxim instead of an inyan seguli, instead of an ontological truth.  

haftarah of shabbos rosh chodesh - 7 nechemta

The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 425) paskens that when rosh chodesh Elul falls on Shabbos we still lein the haftarah "aniya so'ara" of the 7 d'nechemta cycle and not the haftarah of rosh chodesh.  The Rama disagrees and writes that minhag ashkenaz is to read the haftarah of rosh chodesh.

I was wondering what the din should be if you are in a shul that follows minhag ashkenaz but they get mixed up and read aniya so'arah. 

When discussing this halacha over our Shabbos meal I pointed out the reason given by the Mishna Berura for the psak of the Rama: since the haftara of rosh chodesh contains pesukim that refer to the nechama of Yerushalayim, by reading it we in effect cover all our bases -- we cover the theme of nechama, as well as the theme of rosh chodesh.

My wife pointed out that there is another possible reason to lein the haftarah of rosh chodesh: it is more tadir than that of "aniya so'arah."  (We then had a debate whether this is indeed true.)  Indeed, there are poskim who cite this justification as well.

Perhaps my question hinges on which of these two reasons in correct.  According to the M.B.'s reason, the Rama agrees in principle that the chiyuv is to read a haftarah of nechama -- he just holds that if you can cover the extra base of rosh chodesh, why not do so.  B'dieved, I would say that if you read "aniya so'arah" and only covered the theme of nechama, since that is the ikar chiyuv, you are yotzei.  However, if the reason to read the haftarah of rosh chodesh is because of tadir, then that is the real chiyuv -- the chiyuv of reading a haftarah of nechama is pushed off.  You would accomplish nothing even b'dieved by reading "aniya so'arah."

Check the notes in the Dirshu M.B. and they tell you to treat the b'dieved case like any case where you read the wrong haftarah -- you have to correct it and read the right one.  I guess my reasoning is wrong.

makom asher yivchar Hashem -- a player to be named later?

"Lo ta'asun kein l'Hashem Elokeichem" (12:4)  What is the "kein" that we are not supposed to do in our avodas Hashem?  The previous pesukim told us to destroy the altars, the asheirot, the matzeivot from all the many places where idolaters worshipped.   Tzror haMor explains that it is the multiplicity of places and types of worship that the Torah is warning against.  For us, there is one place.  We are one nation, united in one type of avodah directed to one Beis haMikdash.

Speaking of the Beis haMikdash, interestingly it is never mentioned in the parsha.  Instead, the parsha refers to "...ki im el ha'makom asher yivchar Hashem Elokeichem m'kol shivteichem," the place that Hashem chose from among the shevatim.  (12:5)  Again, a few pesukim later, "V'haya ha'makom asher yivchar Hashem..." (12:11)  And again, "Ki im ba'makom asher yivchar Hashem b'achad shevatecha..." (12:14)  There was a mesorah from the days of the Avos as to where the Beis haMikdash would be; Moshe Rabeinu surely knew where it would stand.  Why then not name the place?  Why couch it in terms of a place to be chosen (like saying a player to be named later), as if there was some mystery, some doubt as to where exactly that would be?

I saw in R' Reisman's discussion on the parsha he raises this question and offers an answer and refers to the Kli Yakar who asks it as well. I don't know if R' Reisman has a taste for chassidishe seforim, but the same question is asked by the Tiferes Shlomo as well, and it's his answer that I will leave you with.  Rashi already points out that in 12:5 the Torah refers to the Mikdash coming "m'kol shevatecha," from all the shevatim, but in 12:14 the Torah tells us "b'achad shevatecha," that the Mikdrash was built on the land of only one sheivet.   The Tiferes Shlomo answers that geographically, the land of the Mikdash may have belonged to one sheivet; however, it was the desire for a Mikdash on the part of the all the shevatim that brought it into being -- the "mem" in "m'kol shevatecha" is being used in the sense of "because of."  "Kol zman she'lo hayu ha'retzonos v'hatefilos b'shleimus al binyan Beis haMikdash," writes the Tiferes Shlomo, "Lo haya klal ba'olam ha'makom shel Beis haMikdash."  The Har HaBayis is just a mountain, just a point on a map.  What makes it the makom Mikdash is our desire to have a Mikdash there.  When Moshe Rabeinu was addressing the Jewish people, that desire had not yet come to fruition -- it was still just a place that Hashem will choose, but not yet in existence.  It took all the years of Yehoshua, of the Shoftim, of Shaul, until David haMelech finally brought that desire for a Mikdash to its culmination and the place became a reality. 

In our time yet again, Hashem awaits our tefilos for a Mikdash.  When we arouse that desire though our derishat Tzion, then instead of a point on the map, instead of a mountain with a golden dome travesty on it, we will once again have a makom Mikdash.

tefilah = dependency

The gemara (Kesubos 62) relates that after his marriage, Rebbi's son went off to learn for 12 straight years. As a result of his being gone for so long his wife ended up becoming infertile and was unable to have children. Rebbi debated with himself what he could do. To have his son divorce her was not fair, as his poor wife had waited for him faithfully for 12 years while he was learning. To have his son take another wife to be able to have children also was not a tenable solution wither, as people would assume the wife with children is the "real" wife. Having no way out, Rebbi davened for his son's wife and miraculously she was healed and was able to have children.

Rav Yisrael Meir Druk (in a parsha sheet on P' VaEschanan) asks why Rebbi needed to go through this whole give and take with himself, exploring different possibilities of what he could do, before davening for his son's wife. If his tefilos could heal her, then why did Rebbi not just daven right away?

Rav Druk explains that the gemara is revealing to us a key insight into the concept of tefilah. So long as a person thinks that he/she can fix a problem, then there will be something lacking in his tefillah. They are not really turning the reigns over to Hashem and 100% asking for His help because they still think they can fix the problem themselves. Rebbi therefore first made a cheshbon to himself and contemplated what he could do to solve the problem at hand. Only once he took to heart that there was nothing in his power that would work could he daven effectively.

Tefilah is called avodah, work. Chazal derive the obligation to pray from the pasuk in our parsha, "U'l'ovdo b'chol levavchem." Saying words is not laborious. Where is the hard work involved? The answer is that there is nothing harder for a person and nothing that requires more work than accepting being dependent. We hate when things are out of our hands to fix and out of our power to change. Tefillah ultimately means accepting that EVERYTHING is out of our hands. Without Hashem's help, we are nothing.

The Sefas Emes uses this idea to interpret these pesukim:

"Ki tomar bilvavcha, 'Rabim ha'goyim ha'eileh, eicha uchal l'horisham?'
Lo tira meihem: zachor tizkor es asher asa Hashem Elokecha l'Pharoah..." (7:17-18)

The parsha does not simply tell us that Hashem will help us conquer Eretz Yisrael. Instead, it tells us that we will wonder to ourselves, "How are we ever going to get the job done?" and in response, Hashem offers his help. Why does the parsha not just cut to the chase and tell us that Hashem will take care of things for us?  Answers the Sefas Emes: Hashem does not offer his help until we first realize that without that help, we can't do it ourselves.

land of milk and honey

Ramban (11:6) points out a very strange omission in our parsha.  After relating the great miracle of the destruction of the Egyptian army at Yam Suf, the parsha then speaks about the midbar and focusses specifically on, "v'asher asa l'Dasan v'Aviram…" who were swallowed up by the earth.  Why does the parsha zero in on Dasan and Aviram and completely ignore the instigator of that whole rebellion, Korach?  Why focus on the supporting players and leave out any mention of the star of the show?

The Oznayim laTorah offers a brilliant analysis that takes us back to the story of the meraglim.  When the spies return and report, they tell Moshe and the people, "V'gam zavas chalav u'devash hi," (13:27) that Eretz Yisrael is ***also*** a land of milk and honey.  To the Jewish people at the time, the land of Egypt was the most beautiful, sophisticated society that they could ever imagine. If not for their being enslaved, it would have been the greatest place to live.  So when the spies report, the best thing that they could say about Eretz Yisrael is that it's also good -- Egypt is of course great, and is the standard by which we measure everything else, but (and this was their one bit of truth) Eretz Yisrael is nothing to look down on either.  From there on, the report was all downhill and led to the people rebelling against going.

Yehoshua and Kaleiv responded that G-d will bring them into (14:8) "...Eretz asher HI zavas chalav u'devash," ***IT***, Eretz Yisrael is the land of milk and honey.  "HI" in the pasuk is a miyut -- only Eretz Yisrael, no other place, can be described as the land of zvas, chalav, u'devash.  Forget Egypt -- we are promised a much better place.

This was the shakla v'treya that led to the punishment meted out to the meraglim.  Is Eretz Yisrael THE land of milk and honey, or is it A land of milk and honey -- one of many possibilities.

This set the stage for Dasan and Aviram, who went even further than that and challenged Moshe, "Ki he'elisanu mei'eretz zvas chalav u'devash la'hamiseinu ba'midbar," (16:13) "You took us out of the land of milk and honey" -- i.e. Egypt! -- "in order to kill us in the desert."  They don't equate Eretz Yisrael with Egypt, but instead reverse things completely and identify Egypt as THE true land of milk and honey. 

This is a completely different argument than that advanced by Korach, one that cuts to the heart of where Klal Yisrael should make their future homeland.

This is the argument that Moshe once again is addressing himself to in our parsha, on the doorstep to finally entering the Land.  Having just spoken about the destruction of the Egyptian armies, Moshe turns to address the question that nagged at the people's heels during these past episodes.  If Egypt was such a wonderful place if not for the fact that they chose to enslave the Jews, why not simply return there once the Egyptian army was destroyed and the Jews freed?  Why travel through the desert to some uncharted new territory when the height of culture and civilization was now open?   Why search for a new "eretz zvas chalav u'devash" when there is one already available?

That's exactly the sin of Dasan and Aviram, Moshe reminds the people.  There is only one land that is THE land of zvas chalav u'devash.

Based on this reading of the Oznayin laTorah, the conclusion of the parsha fits perfectly.  "U'shmarten es kol hamitzvah... lama'an ta'arichu yamim al... eretz zvas chalav u'devash." (11:8-9)  But why  not Egypt?  "Ki ha'aretz asher ata ba shama l'rihsta lo k'Eretz Mitzrayim hi..."  Because Eretz Yisrael is not like Egypt.  It's irrigated by rain, it's got mountains and valleys and beautiful land, it's got hi-tech (OK, I threw that one in), and most importantly, it's "eretz asher Hashem Elokecha doreish osa tamid."  (11:11-12) 

There is no other land like that. 

ha'zan vs nodeh lecha -- the perspective of Moshe vs that of Yehoshua

Chazal tell us that Moshe composed the first bracha of birchas ha'mazon; Yehoshua composed the second.  The Ishbitzer (Mei haShiloach vol 2 on P' VaEschanan) points out that in the first bracha we refer to Hashem in third-person -- ha'zan es ha'olam, etc.; the second bracha, however, switches to second person -- nodeh lecha, etc. Moshe Rabeinu was forced to remain outside Eretz Yisrael and ha'dar b'chutz la'aretz k'mi she'ain lo Eloka -- in chu"l G-d appears distant; it is hard to see his presence in day-to-day life.  We can only speak of Him in the abstract.  Yehoshua took us into Eretz Yisrael.  In our own land G-d in there with us as we work the fields, as we build bridges and trains, as we build a country.  We switch to second person to show G-d's direct involvement in every detail of what happens.

Va'Eschanan -- the parsha of nechama

Rambam (Tefilah 13:2):

עזרא תיקן להם לישראל שיהו קורין קללות שבספר ויקרא קודם עצרת ושבמשנה תורה קודם ראש השנה. והמנהג הפשוט שיהו קוראין במדבר סיני קודם עצרת. ואתחנן אחר תשעה באב. אתם נצבים קודם ראש השנה. צו את אהרן קודם הפסח בשנה פשוטה. לפיכך יש שבתות שקורין שחרית שני סדרין כגון אשה כי תזריע וזאת תהיה תורת המצורע. אם בחקותי עם בהר סיני וכיוצא בהן כדי שישלימו בשנה ויקראו אותן הסדרים בעונתן:

We all think that you have to lein Devarim before Tishba B'Av and get in the pasuk of "Eicah esa livadi..."and m'meila, it just happens to work out that Va'Eschanan then falls out the week afterwards.  Rav Soloveitchik showed from this Rambam that just the opposite is true.  The reason we end up leining Devarim before Tisha b'Av is because Va'Eschanan always has to come after Tisha b'Av.  Va'Eschanan is the nechama for destruction as it tells us that even though there may be galus and churban, ultimately we will enter Eretz Yisrael. 

carry the vision with you

1. "Va'Eschanan el Hashem ba'eis ha'hi..."  Why did Moshe choose to daven davka then, ba'eis ha'hi, at that moment?  Rashi explains that since Moshe had entered the land of Sichon v'Og, he was already part of the way there into Eretz Yisrael, and therefore he thought he could ask Hashem to let him go the rest of the way.  It was an opportune moment to see if he could get what he wanted.  Netziv offers a different explanation.  Moshe foresaw that the splitting off of the tribes of Reuvain and Gad after the defeat of Sichon and Og and their settling in Eiver haYarden would lead to eventual galus.  The only thing that preserves Klal Yisrael in galus in Torah.  Therefore, Moshe wanted to enter Eretz Yisrael so that he could help reveal the torah of Eretz Yisrael, which is, as we learned last week, qualitatively different, deeper, more profound, than Torah learned elsewhere. 

2. Moshe Rabeinu is nitzchiyus.  Moshe Rabeinu brought down the Torah for us from Har Sinai and Torah is ours forever in its same immutable form.  Moshe Rabeinu at the beginning of our parsha davened to be able to enter Eretz Yisrael because had he done so then Eretz Yisrael would have been ours forever -- no galus, no Tisha b'Av, game over, complete geulah (see Ohr haChaim 3:25).  Why should Klal Yisrael have to wait for geulah?  "E'ebrah na v'ereh es ha'aretz…"  Rashi says "na" here is "lashon bakasha," like saying please, but, as the Sifsei Chachamim points out, that's not what the word "na" usually means.  What it usually means is "now," which is how the Targum translates the pasuk.  Moshe said, "We want geulah now!" -- not in a few thousand years.  And had Moshe entered the land, then it would have been the geulah right then.

Hashem responded to Moshe's prayers by letting him see Eretz Yisrael.  He couldn't physically go there, but he would have a vision of the land, something to carry in his mind and heart.  Sefas Emes explains that because Moshe is nitzchiyus, this too became ours forever.  Wherever we may be in galus, no matter how long we may be in galus, we will always  have in our minds a vision of Eretz Yisrael.  

3. The Torah ends its record of Moshe's tefilah and Hashem's response with the pasuk, "Va'neishev ba'gai mul Beis Pe'or." (3:29)  The Kotznitzer Magid writes that the Torah is not switching gears here and going from the report of the dialogue between Hashem and Moshe back to a note on geography, where Bnei Yisrael were camped.  Rather, this too is part of the dialogue, part of what Hashem said to Moshe.  "Va'neishev" -- we sat, in the plural.  Hashem is telling Moshe, "Don't think you being left all alone.  I am here with you -- va'neishev -- we will together sit here.  Just like you, Moshe, are waiting here in galus until the day that you can lead the Jewish people back into the land for a geulah of nitzchiyus, I'm here with you, waiting for that day as well."  

Nachamu Nachamu ami...  The process of return has started, the revelation of toras Eretz Yisrael grows every day.  We need to appreciate the special gift that we have!

batzar lecha... v'shavta

I am not aware of any day of the year when the people of Greece gather around the Parthenon and sit and mourn the ruins of their empire.   And I don't think the people in Rome ever walk by the ruins of the Forum and say to themselves, "Od yeishvu zekeinim u'zkeinos…" and there will be children playing and this place rebuilt.  It's ruins of the past -- great for tourism, a place to visit, a place to learn ancient history, but completely irrelevant to the life of anyone in any real way.  

Someone not yet religious went on a trip to Israel.  

"So how was the trip?"

"OK, nothing so great."

To that person unfortunately it's like going to Greece to see the Parthenon or going to Rome to see the ruins there or anywhere else.  It's just a question of where the hotel is nicer and the food better.

For us, it's not like that.  We have a Tisha b'Av because for us it's not just ancient history and it's not just ruins.  It's something that matters very much to us ad ha'yom ha'zeh.

We just read this morning, "Batzar lecha u'metz'ucha kol hadevarim ha'eileh v'shavta ad Hashem Elokecha."  The Chasam Sofer in his Derahos explains that "batzar lecha," if it bothers you -- not just the antisemitism of galus, but it bothers you that there is no Mikdash, it bothers you that we are not in Eretz Yisrael, and if you are in Eretz Yisrael it bothers you that we don't yet have a full hasra'as haShechina -- then that very fact that you are bothered is a sign of teshuva, "v'shavta."  People are not bothered by ancient history and don't sit on the floor and say kinos for it.  If we are bothered enough to do that, then we are on the right path.

"Kol ha'misabel al Yerushalayim zocheh v'ro'eh b'binyanah."  The SIfsei Chaim points out that it doesn't say "yizkeh v'yireh" in the future tense -- it says "zocheh v'ro'eh," present tense, here and now.  The very act of crying over Yerushalayim, appreciating Yerushalayim, is part and parcel of rebuilding Yerushalayim.

the torah of Eretz Yisrael

1. On 9 Av: My wife had an interesting thought on the connection between Yitzchak Avinu and 9 Av here.

2. B'eiver ha'Yarden b'eretz Moav ho'il (Rashi: hischil) Moshe be'eir es haTorah ha'zos...

What does the pasuk mean when it says that at that point Moshe started to explain the Torah?  Hadn't he been teaching Torah for the past 40 years?  (See post here).

Moshe was now standing in Eiver haYarden, which, if it is not Eretz Yisrael proper (see Meshech Chochma at the beginning of next week's parsha), is the front door to Eretz Yisrael.  Explains Sefas Emes, the Torah of Eretz Yisrael is a completely different Torah than the Torah of chu"l.  Our understanding of the dvar Hashem contained within Torah, the spirituality that is revealed when one learns Torah, is completely different when one learns in Eretz Yisrael.  Therefore, although Moshe had been teaching Torah for 40 years, this was a new start and a fresh beginning.

When the gemara (Taanis 5) tells us that galus is the biggest bitul Torah, it's not just because it's hard to learn when you suffer pogroms and persecution.  You can be living in luxury in the 5 Towns or Englewood or some other American suburb and it's still a galus of bitul Torah because whatever you learn, it in no way compares to the Torah of Eretz Yisrael -- the cheftza shel Torah is a qualitatively different cheftza shel Torah.  The spiritual plumbing in galus is blocked up and the shefa cannot flow down in the same way.  Just ask any high school kid who when he graduated could barely read a pasuk and now after shanah beit or gimel or however many years in yeshiva in Eretz Yisrael he now is a transformed person and can immerse himself in a sugya.   

Everybody asks why is it that in the haggadah shel Pesach we don't answer the ben rasha -- "af atah hakhei es shinav" the haggadah tells us -- but if you look at the pesukim in the Torah, the chumash does offer an answer: "V'haya ki yomru aleichem bneichem mah ha'avodah ha'zos lachem, v'amartem zevach pesach hu la'Hashem..."  Rav Moshe Avigdor Amiel in his Derashos el Ami (derush 25 p 255) explains that the answer lies in the beginning of that pasuk: "V'haya ki tavo el ha'aretz... u'shemartem es ha'avodah ha'zos..."  When we are living in Eretz Yisrael, when we have a Mikdash and are offering a korban pesach, then we have the kelim to answer and respond to a ben rasha.  We have the torah of Eretz Yisrael to offer him.  But when we are living in galus, as the ba'al ha'hagadah was, as we see from the story of R' Eliezer and R' Akiva and the other zekeinim who were learning in hiding in Bnei Brak, then all we have is "hakhei es shinav." 

On 9 Av we still have a lot of mourning to do.  We still await a Mikdash, we still await the full hashra'as haShechina in Eretz Yisrael.  But when we get up in the afternoon and start thinking about nechama, let's also remember that we live in a generating privileged to once again taste the flavor of the torah of Eretz Yisrael, as the process of our return and redemption has begun. 

eicha as a kinah

A few years ago I suggested that the reading if Eicha is a kiyum of kinos, not a chiyuv of kri'as hamegilah like other megilos. This is why the mes sofrim brings down that the reading must be accompanied by targum so that everyone can understand the message, and why women are obligated as well as men, and why it is read at night when our mourning is most intense, unlike other megilos that are read during the day. The mes sofrim writes that the megilah is read "b'bechi u'b'yilalah" -- perhaps there is no formal trop, but rather a chiyuv to read in a crying manner because it is a lamentation.

I saw in Rav Shternbruch's teshuvos another chidush din along these same lines. He suggests that there may not be a din of shomea k'oneh by eicha because kina is a personal expression of grief -- someone else can't express feeling or grieve on your behalf.  I like the idea, but the mes sofrim sounds like there was a chazan who read on behalf of everyone. Perhaps the idea in the mes sofrim is that aside from our grief as individuals, there is a concept of communal mourning. The reading of Eicha is not meant to fulfill our individual chovas hayachid of kina, in which case you would need to debate whether shomea k'oneh applies, but rather is a kiyum of a chovas hatzibur of communal mourning.

failure to learn from mistakes

Rashi explains that the list of places in the first pasuk in our parsha all are allusions to sins done in the midbar which Moshe was giving tochacha for. "Chatzeiros" alludes to the episode of Miriam's lashon ha'ra which the meraglim should have learned from but didn't. 

Mizrachi asks: Rashi comments that "Paran," mentioned earlier in the pasuk, alludes to the cheit hameraglim. Why do we need two allusions -- Chatzeiros and Paran -- as tochacha for this same sin of the meraglim?

Maharal in Gur Aryeh answers (see Mizrachi for a different answer) that there are two different aspects to the meraglim episode, each of which independently is deserving of tochacha.  The first sin was the act of sending the spies, which demonstrated a lack of emunah -- Paran.  The second sin was the failure to take heed and learn from the example of Miriam -- Chatzeiros.  It's one thing to do wrong, but it's a far worse thing to do wrong when one should have known better.  The failure to learn a lesson is itself a crime.

The Sefas Emes writes that the tragedy of churban bayis sheni is more serious than churban bayis rishon (compare the 2000 years we have been in galus with the mere 70 years of galus between bayis rishon and bayis sheni) because before churban bayis rishon the people could perhaps have rationalized dismissing all the warning and nevuos -- they really believed the Mikdash would never be destroyed.  Yirmiyahu (7:4) quotes the false prophets who told the people, "Heichal Hashem, Heichal Hashem, Heichal Hashem!"  This is G-d's house -- nothing can happen to it.  Later, as Radak explains, Yirmiyahu (22:29)echoes back to them, "Eretz Eretz Eretz shim'i dvar Hashem..." that destruction will indeed come.  (BTW, there is one more pasuk in Tanach where you have a refrain repeated three times -- I'll leave it to you to figure out where it is.)  In the days of bayis sheni, those rationalizations could not hold water any more.  Once you see that the Mikdash can be destroyed, then you have no excuse not to think that it can happen again.  More than that -- failure to learn from what happened only compounds the sin the second time around.

al tifrosh min ha'tzibur

The Chayei Adam points out what seems to be a stirah in MG"A.  In hil Tisha b'Av the MG"A writes that if you are in the middle of eating a fleishig shalosh seudos and shavua she'chal bo starts that night (assuming you only stop eating fleishig during shavua she'chal bo or rosh chodesh falls on Sunday), you have to stop eating once the tzibur starts maariv.  You can't march to your own drum and extend your meal and your shabbos until whenever you want.  However, in hil tefillin (siman 30) the MG"A writes that if you have not yet put on tefillin that day, even if the tzibur davens maariv, you can still do your own thing -- so long as it is still not really night, you can put on tefillin.  Why, asks Chayei Adam, is night defined based on when the tzibur davens maariv with respect to the start of the 9 days, but not with respect to the last zman to put on tefillin?  

(I keep feeling like I am missing something in the question.  I would say that when you stand to lose a mitzvah d'oraysa like tefilin, then we are lenient and the individual is not schlepped along with the tzibur.  However, if all you stand to lose is an extra bite of fleishig, then we say stop eating.  On the other hand, I guess one could also argue that if one is not forced to be part of the tzibur when it comes to the issur derabbanan of putting tefillin on at night, then kal v'chomer one should be able to do what one wants when dealing with only a minhag like not eating meat during the 9 days.  The Chayei Adam offers neither sevara, just the question.)

In the Sha'ar haTziyun the M"B buries a teirutz to this question that is probably more important as a matter of hashkafa than a matter of halacha (the view of MG"A is not accepted).  He answers that ain hachi nami, just like with respect to tefillin, if you don't want to daven maariv yet then it's not night, so too with respect to fleishig, for you it's not night yet.  However, even if it's not night -- even if shavua she'chal bo has not officially started for you -- since for the tzibur it has started, since they are in more intense aveilus, you have a chiyuv to be mishtatef in their pain.  A person cannot be poreish from the tzibur when they are suffering!

Maybe this why the Rama paskens that the minhag is for pregnant or nursing mothers to fast on a regular fast day unless or until they feel unwell or incapable of doing so.  My brother asked me the following question: if Chazal never included pregnant women or nusing mothers in the takanah to fast, then what do they gain by doing so?  I would say that that argument holds water viz a viz the chiyuv ta'anis, but there is an additional chiyuv here of not being poresh min ha'tzibur.  Even if you are exempt -- for you it's not the 9 days yet, it's not shavua she'chal bo, you are not included in the chiyuv ta'anis -- since the tzibur has a chiyuv, you have to do something to show that you empathize with their pain and share in their suffering.

Even they believe in the koach of tefilah

News reports say that Jordan forced a group of tourists to remove their kipot and tzitzis  and expelled them for  the crime of praying at the kever of Aharon in Petra.  We know that Jews are barred from praying on Har HaBayis.  It goes without saying that were the shoe on the other foot and we barred others from worship, we would never hear the end of it.  

Did you ever wonder what they are so afraid of?  

They seem to take our tefilos pretty  seriously and think that whatever we are doing has some meaning. Maybe something for us to take to heart.

Ptur ones in kiyum Hamitzvos (II)

Coming back to the question from earlier in the week: according to the Mordechai's opinion that you can wear a 4 cornered garment on shabbos without tzitzis because the issur of tying gives you a ptur ones from the mitzvah of tzitzis, why can't you use a kli that you have not toiveled on shabbos since you are ones and cannot bbe toivel the kli?

Rav Gestetner surprisingly does not point out that a similar question was already asked by R Shlomo Eiger (YD 28:20).  The SA paskens that you can't shecht unless you have dirt prepared for kisuy ha'dam.  Why not shecht and then if it turns out that you have no dirt, eg it is Yom Tov and you did not prepare any dirt in advance to not be muktzah, so what -- you are in a situation of ones and are therefore exempt from the mitzvah.  What's the difference between putting on a talis knowing it has no tzitzis and you cannot tie any on and shechting knowing you have no dirt?

The Steipler (printed in Baba Basra in the new editions) says there is a big difference, and this will answer R Gestetner's question was well.  Even if you put tzitzis on that talis tomorrow, it can't help you with the mitzvah of tzitzis that you have today.  Tomorrow is a new opportunity to do tomorrow's mitzvah, but in terms of today, you lost the mitzvah.  The same is not true of kisuy ha'dam or tevilas kelim.  The mitzvah in those cases is to be toivel the kli, to cover the dam -- the mitzvah is on the cheftza, which will be the same tomorrow as it is today.  If you delay the shechita or delay using the kli you haven't lost a mitzvah opportunity, you've simply postponed the same opportunity for a different time.

(Consider this a starting point on the issue.)

lo tisov nachala l'mateh acheir -- keeping the land ours

The leaders of Menashe complained to Moshe that giving land to Bnos Tzelafchad opened the door to the possibility of their tribe losing territory.  Were Bnos Tzelafchad to marry outside their sheivet, then their husbands from another sheivet might inherit their property.  In response, Hashem commanded, "V'lo tisov nachala l'Bnei Yisrael mi'mateh el mateh..." (36:7) that the Bnos Tzelafchad or any bas yoreshes should marry only within their own sheivet.  The parsha then continues, "V'lo tisov nachala mi'mateh el mateh acheir...," (36:9) almost word for word a repetition of the earlier pasuk.  Why reiterate the same point?

When Bnos Tzelafchad came before Moshe in Parshas Pinchas to request their father's portion of land, the Torah introduces them as "Bnos Tzelafchad ben Cheifer ben Gilad ben Machir ben Menashe l'mishpachas Menashe ben Yosef." (27:1)  Rashi explains that the Torah traces their lineage all the way back to Yosef because they were following in the footsteps of Yosef who  also exhibited great love for Eretz Yisrael. Yosef demanded that Bnei Yisrael promise to remove his bones from Mitzrayim and carry them with them to Eretz Yisrael when they would leave.

The complaint of the leaders of Menashe stemmed also from this great love of Eretz Yisrael that was built into the DNA of the offspring of Yosef.  Their story is a parallel to the story of Bnos Tzelafchad: the complaint that they would lose a portion of land, and Hashem's response with a law that had not yet been revealed to Moshe.

(Interesting that if you count Matos-Masei as one unit, this is the 9th parsha we will read in BaMidbar.  The Ishbitzer in Mei HaShiloach in P' Balak writes that the 9th pasuk of any parsha contains a deeper meaning al derech sod (see also Mei HaShiloach on next week's parsha of Devarim).  Nine is the midah of yesod which corresponds to Yosef ha'tzadik, who hid his tzidkus while outwardly acting like an Egyptian viceroy.  So perhaps the ninth parsha contains the sod of Yosef ha'tzadik as well in the form of Yosef's love of Eretz Yisrael while living in galus.)

The Radomsker in Tiferes Shlomo writes that just like the complaint of  "lamah nigara" gave rise to the laws of Pesach Sheni and the opportunity to bring a korban even after the fact, so  too, the complaints of Bnos Tzelafchad and the leaders of Menashe is what gave rise to Hashem giving these halachos that would ensure they receive their portion.  It's the desire for the land, it's the strength of the claim one advances, which itself gives rise to Hashem's response of giving the land and guaranteeing its possession.

 "V'lo tisov... mi'mateh el mateh," is talking about the inter-sheivet transfer of land.  But the parsha is also telling us something else, writes the Radomsker.  When our love for Eretz Yisrael is so great that we are not willing to give up any portion of what should be ours, then "lo tisov... mi'mateh el mateh acheir," then Hashem will ensure that the land remains ours and never is taken by an "acheir," an outsider.  You want to see a Jewish Yerushalayim, not a Jewish quarter, or a Jewish Chevron, or to again have a Jewish Gush Katif?  Then increase your love of Eretz Yisrael and demand it.

"Sha'alu shlom Yerushalayim yishlayu ohavayich" (Teh 122:6)  Radomsker explains that it's cause and effect: when will it be that we will live in shalvah, tranquility, in our land?  When we are "sha'alu shlom...," when we ask Hashem to give us our land back, when we complain loudly enough about it not being ours. 

It's no coincidence that these themes come up during the three weeks.  Sefas Emes in P' Pinchas writes that we read the parshiyos of korbanos at this time of year because it reminds us that we need to aspire to have a Mikdash back where we can do avodah.  Perhaps here too, the episode of Bnos Tzelafchad, of Menashe, reminds us that we need to cherish Eretz Yisrael and demand a return to our Land.