a chasm that cannot be bridged?

David Bernstein asks in his blog on The Times of Israel, "Is non-Orthodox American Judaism doomed?"  Bernstein writes, "...What animates many non-Orthodox Jewish families is not Judaism, but “social justice.”  ...For that matter, there are quite a few people who conflate Judaism with progressive social justice ideology, which is itself a problem."

I don't think this argument is a chiddush.  In the past it was humanism, liberalism, other -isms that served as the substitute for G-d, now it's social justice.  Nothing new.  

Non-Orthodox religion is like decaf coffee -- no matter how much you drink in the morning, it's just not going to give you what you need.  Everyone would be better off just taking off the coffee label and enjoying it for what it is without trying to pretend it's the real thing.  Have you ever heard a non-Orthodox person say "I can't do X" not because it's not right, not ethical, not just (all of which are important), but simply because my religion does not allow it?  The concept does not exist.

Anyway, I was not reading TIE when I came across Bernstein's article, but rather got the link from a secular site.  The comments there interested me more than the article.  One of the more amusing ones (I assume this had to come from a fellow member of the tribe) just said two words and linked to a video:

The two words: "The future:"

The video:

Obviously there are many degrees between non-Orthodoxy and R' Melech Biderman's tisch, but I think there is more than a little truth to the point being made.  The Orthodox Judaism of the future does look like it will be a more parochial, isolated, insular Judaism.  It also looks like a more uplifting, spiritual, emotion driven Judaism.  As the non-Orthodox move to jettison more and more of those values traditionally associated with religion because they do not square with progressivism, Orthodoxy will head further and further in the opposite direction and be forced to reject progressivism for exactly the same reason.  Caught in the middle is modern Orthodoxy, which for all intents and purposes has already ceased to exist as an intellectual movement (people like R' Aharon Lichtenstein were exceptions and exceptional and I doubt YU will produce any similar personalities any time soon to fill the void ) and is basically RW Judaism lite.  Those on the left end of the MO world will keep trying to square the circle and explain away their support for BLM and the like as consistent with Jewish values, but at some point even they will succumb to the incompatibility of the two systems.  

The exception seems to be in Eretz Yisrael, where the dati leuni/chardal world has managed to retain some vibrancy and dynamism, but I am hesitant to say any more on that without better information.  

I would be very happy if everything I just wrote proves to be wrong, but it's hard to find much cause for optimism.  

heroic

I wish I had even a percentage of this women's bitachon and gevurah:

leich alei -- staying where you are will not work

 After Moshe begs Hashem to forgive the cheit ha'eigel, Hashem responds (33:1-3):

 לֵ֣ךְ עֲלֵ֣ה מִזֶּ֔ה אַתָּ֣ה וְהָעָ֔ם אֲשֶׁ֥ר הֶֽעֱלִ֖יתָ מֵאֶ֣רֶץ מִצְרָ֑יִם אֶל־הָאָ֗רֶץ אֲשֶׁ֣ר נִ֠שְׁבַּ֠עְתִּי לְאַבְרָהָ֨ם לְיִצְחָ֤ק וּֽלְיַעֲקֹב֙ לֵאמֹ֔ר לְזַרְעֲךָ֖ אֶתְּנֶֽנָּה

וְשָׁלַחְתִּ֥י לְפָנֶ֖יךָ מַלְאָ֑ךְ וְגֵֽרַשְׁתִּ֗י אֶת־הַֽכְּנַעֲנִי֙ הָֽאֱמֹרִ֔י וְהַֽחִתִּי֙ וְהַפְּרִזִּ֔י הַחִוִּ֖י וְהַיְבוּסִֽי׃

אֶל־אֶ֛רֶץ זָבַ֥ת חָלָ֖ב וּדְבָ֑שׁ כִּי֩ לֹ֨א אֶֽעֱלֶ֜ה בְּקִרְבְּךָ֗ כִּ֤י עַם־קְשֵׁה־עֹ֙רֶף֙ אַ֔תָּה פֶּן־אֲכֶלְךָ֖ בַּדָּֽרֶךְ

Why do we have a repetition here of the promise of Eretz Yisrael and the command to drive out the inhabitants of Canaan?  Ramban explains that Hashem was telling Klal Yisrael that although cheit ha'eigel was not completely forgiven, 1) zechus avos is still intact, hence the reference to Avraham Yitzchak, and Yaakov; 2) the promise to bring Klal Yisrael into Eretz Yisrael is still intact; 3) kedushas ha'aretz is still intact intact, and therefore the nations must be driven out שלא תשחת הארץ ולא תחנף תחת יושביה מפני חטאתם, 

The Ramban emphasizes the positive, but one could read the pasuk in the opposite way (see Tzror HaMor), as saying that because of the cheit Klal Yisrael was not really deserving of Eretz Yisrael if not for zechus avos, and (Tzror haMor does not say this part, but I think it is a logical extension) that because they were so easily led astray they need to be extra careful to drive out the idolatrous nations that were already there.

Either way, the pasuk is like a damage assessment after the cheit.  In R' Shlomo Amar's sichot on the parsha he points out that Targum Yonasan suggests something deeper:

ומליל ייי עם משה איזל איסתלק מיכא דילמא יתקף רתח רוגזי בעמא ואישיצינון בגין כן טייל אנת ועמא דאסיקתא מארעא דמצרים לארעא דקיימית לאברהם ליצחק וליעקב למימר לבנך איתנינה.

According to T.Y., the pasuk is a tikun for Hashem's anger caused by the cheit. 

Hashem was telling Moshe that were Klal Yisrael to remain where they are, Hashem was liable to grow angry at them again and there would be consequences.  

The solution is to make aliya, begin the journey to Eretz Yisrael.  That's the game changer that causes Hashem to set aside his anger.

Micheini na mi'sifricha asher kasavta

Chazal tell us (Avodah Zarah 4b) that Klal Yisrael sinned in order to teach the possibility of teshuvah for the community; David sinned in order to teach that teshuvah was possible for the individual:

א"ר יהושע בן לוי לא עשו ישראל את העגל אלא ליתן פתחון פה לבעלי תשובה שנאמר מי יתן והיה לבבם זה להם ליראה אותי כל הימים וגו' והיינו דא"ר יוחנן משום ר"ש בן יוחאי לא דוד ראוי לאותו מעשה ולא ישראל ראוין לאותו מעשה לא דוד ראוי לאותו מעשה דכתיב ולבי חלל בקרבי ולא ישראל ראוין לאותו מעשה דכתיב מי יתן והיה לבבם זה להם ליראה אותי כל הימים אלא למה עשו  לומר לך שאם חטא יחיד אומרים לו כלך אצל יחיד ואם חטאו צבור אומרים (לו כלך) אצל צבור

Rashi explains:

 לא עשו ישראל את העגל. כלומר גבורים ושליטים ביצרם היו ולא הי' ראוי להתגבר יצרם עליהן אלא גזירת מלך היתה לשלוט בם כדי ליתן פתחון פה לבעלי תשובה שאם יאמר החוטא לא אשוב שלא יקבלני אומרים לו צא ולמד ממעשה העגל שכפרו ונתקבלו בתשובה: 

Maharal has problems with the idea of  גזירת מלך היתה לשלוט בם.  Did G-d decree that they would sin?  Was there no bechira!?  Maharal (in Tiferes Yisrael) explains that what the gemara means is that Klal Yisrael and David haMelech were on such high levels that they should have been afforded extra protection from the yetzer hara.  Torah protects a person from sin and doing mitzvos protect a person from sin.  However, when it came to cheit ha'eigel and the episode with Bas Sheva, Hashem did not intervene and afford that extra protection.  Klal Yisrael and David where left to battle the yetzer hara without any defenses to help them.

Even though there are countless pesukim in navi exhorting Klal Yisrael to do teshuvah, we still need these exemplars of teshuva because a person has the ability to explain away any and all proofs to justify avoiding changing their behavior.  Whatever pasuk you might quote, whatever the navi might say over in the name of Hashem, the sinner will reinterpret and (mis)interpret to mean something else.  The yetzer hara that fights against teshuvah corrupts not just a person's actions, but it corrupts a person's thinking and a person's ruchniyus, to the point that like Acheir, he might even hear a bas kol telling him that teshuvah is not possible.  Meaning, the very religiosity that should inspire a person to teshuvah can be used by the yetzer hara to undermine teshuvah, telling a person that his sins have doomed him and any proofs to the contrary are just false hope, a mirage.  Comes David haMelech, comes the episode of the eigel, and they show us concrete proof, maaseh rav, to the contrary.  (see Michtav m'Eliyahu vol 5 p 248)  

This is the background and context to Moshe's argument to Hashem that if he does not forgive Klal Yisrael, וְאִם־אַ֕יִן מְחֵ֣נִי נָ֔א מִֽסִּפְרְךָ֖ אֲשֶׁ֥ר כָּתָֽבְתָּ(32:32)

The gemara writes that before R"H there are three books that are opened.  G-d inscribes the perfect tzadikim into the Book of Life and signs it.  G-d inscribes the wicked into the opposite book and signs their decree.  Those in the middle are written into the Book of Beinonim and their judgment is suspended until Y"K -- no sign off on anything yet.

Why does there have to be a book for the folks in the middle?  Since they will eventually share either the same lot as the tzadikim or as the reshaim, let them not be written anywhere until their fate is determined?

"B'makom she'baalei teshuvah omdim afilu  tzadikim gemurim einam yecholim la'amod."  The answer is that the Book of Beinonim is not the same as the book in which the tzadikim are inscribed -- it is greater.  To be written in that book and then take advantage of the opportunity to do teshuvah is the highest level possible.

Maor vaShemesh explains that Moshe Rabeinu threw his lot in with the Jewish people and said to G-d that the whole point of this episode of the eigel, the whole point of a distinct book for Beinonim "asher kasavta," that you write but don't seal and sign off on, is to teach the greatness and power of teshuvah.  If you won't forgive, if you don't want to prove that repentance is not only possible, but can raise a person to the greatest heights, then erase me from that book, because it has no value and is unnecessary. 

a miraculous turn of events

 הוא אחשורוש – ר׳ יהודה ור׳ נחמיה, חד אמר, אחשורוש – שהרג את אשתו מפני אוהבו, הוא אחשורש – שהרג את אוהבו מפני אשתו,

The statement that Achashveirosh killed his wife [Vashti] because of his friend [Haman] and killed his fried [Haman] because of his wife [Esther] may be a pithy way to capture the irony of the situation, but what does it tell us outside the facts of the story which we already know?  What new insight are Chazal trying to convey?

The entire first two chapters of the megillah seem extraneous to the story.  The main idea is that the bad guy Haman was brought down by Mordechai and Queen Esther, the palace insider closest to the king, who revealed herself to be Jewish.  Who cares what happened to Vashti beforehand, or how/why Esther became queen?  

Alshich and others write that if you read the story in the way I just summarized it, you miss the point.  This is not some story of political intrigue and infighting, where Haman thought he had the King's ear but was upstaged by Esther.  This is not a story of behind the scenes work by "askanim" who brought their political power and pressure to bear to push out an enemy of the Jews.  Yes, of course we can dress that up and say it was not politics alone but yad Hashem behind the actions of all the players, but even so, that's still not the real story here.  Were that indeed the story, then it would have a tragic ending, because there is no way that Mordechai and Esther would not have had the upper hand.  How do I know ?  Because we read in the first two chapters of the megillah that Achashveirosh was so close to his advisor Haman that he was even willing to kill his wife Vashti at Haman's behest!  You can just imagine Haman, after being accused of treachery, falling to his feet and crying to Achashveirosh's, "No, my good lord, banish Peto, banish Bardolph, banish Poins, but for sweet Jack Falstaff, kind Jack Falstaff, true Jack Falstaff, valiant Jack Falstaff, and therefore more valiant being, as he is old Jack Falstaff, banish not him thy Harry’s company, banish not him thy Harry’s company. Banish plump Jack, and banish all the world."  Henry IV Act 2 scene 4 -- just substitute Haman for Jack and Achashveirosh for Harry and the lines are perfect.  Do you think Achashveirosh would take the side of Esther and not only send Haman away, but kill him and thereby "banish all the world?"  Do you think he would do this after already having the sunk cost of having promoted Haman to the highest rank, having killed Vashti because of his advice, having turned over his ring to Haman and given him carte blance to do as he wished?  

The fact that Achashveirosh "killed his wife because of his friend" proves that if Achashveirosh is then willing to turn around and kill that same friend, this time because of his wife, it is a miracle -- not a yad-Hashem-acting-through-the-natural-course-of-events "miracle" in quotation makes,  but a miracle  MIRACLE of the type where something completely unexpected and inexplicable happens.  The first chapters lay the groundwork for just the opposite of what actually happened to happen, if not for Hashem's direct intervention.  This is what Chazal are teaching us by drawing our attention to the first half of the story in contrast to the second half.

What difference does it make in the end?  Who cares if Hashem saved us through the derech ha'teva means of palace politics pushing out Haman or Hashem saved us by causing some supernatural unexpected turn of events? 

The difference is that history does not repeat itself.  The moment in time that saw a king called Achashveirosh on the throne with a queen called Esther and an advisor called Haman will never repeat itself.  There may be similar situations, but what is similar in some respects is different in others.  If Purim was an event that happened through derech ha'teva, then it's meaning is confined to a particular time and place, the parameters that derech ha'teva plays out in.  But if Purim is a supernatural intervention, the who and the when and there where don't really matter.  That same spiritual power that exists l'maalah min ha'teva can be unleashed and does unleash itself time and again.  Teshuasam ha'yisa la'netzah v'tikvasam b'chol dor va'dor.

safeik brachos l'hakeil where there is a rov

Achronim discuss whether the rule of safeik brachos l'hakeil applies even where there is a rov to be machria the safeik.  (Is rov mevarer te safeik or is rov just a hanhaga, but the safeik remains?)   

The Rambam paskens (Meg 1:11):

עיר שהיא ספק ואין ידוע אם היתה מוקפת חומה בימות יהושע בן נון או אחר כן הוקפה קוראין בשני הימים שהן י"ד וט"ו ובליליהם. ומברכין על קריאתה בי"ד בלבד הואיל והיא זמן קריאתה לרוב העולם:

If a city has a safeik whether it is a mukaf or not, the megillah is read on both 14 and 15.  You would have thought that no bracha is recited since each reading is a safeik, but the Rambam paskens that a bracha is said on the reading of the 14th because  הואיל והיא זמן קריאתה לרוב העולם, there is a rov -- most cities are not mukaf and read on the 14th.  

QED that where there is a rov, the rule of safeik brachos l'hakeil does not apply.

Similarly, the gemara (Yevamos 121b) relates:

ההוא דהוה קאמר ואזיל מאן איכא בי חסא טבע חסא אמר רב נחמן האלקים אכלו כוורי לחסא

An aku"m went around asking if anyone knew the family of someone named Chasa, as he had drowned.  When he heard this, R' Nachman swore and said the fish have eaten Chasa.  

R' Akiva Eiger in the gilyon ha'shas quotes from the teshuvos of Hagahos Maimonis who questions how R' Nachman could take an oath using shem Hashem in this case.  Where someone falls into mayim she'ein lahem sof, a body of water that we cannot see the banks of, e.g. someone fell off a boat into the Atlantic Ocean, we assume his wife cannot remarry because there is always a chance that he emerged somewhere without our knowing -- i.e. there is a safeik.  So isn't R' Nachman's oath a safeik use of Hashem's name l'vatala?

The Hg"M explains that in most cases in fact the person will have drowned.  We have a rov that says R' Nachman's oath was not l'vatala.  It is just a chumra in dinei ishus that prevents the wife from remarrying despite the rov.  

QED again that using the shem Hashem, whether as an oath, or whether in making a bracha, where one has a rov to decide the safeik, is not a problem.

The common denominator between these cases is that the rov is a metziyus, it is based on facts on the ground.  A case were there is a machlokes ha'poskim and the majority of opinions favor one side, i.e. a rov of theories, may be a different animal entirely.  

a taste of the future

 1) Shem m'Shmeul 5671:

' מה שחר סוף כל הלילה אף אסתר סוף כל הנסים, הנה שחגי מתחיל להאיר בעוד לילה מחמת אור החוזר מהחמה, כך הי' נס פורים אור החוזר מבית השני, והאיר להם אף בעודם בגלות וזה דוגמא על כל ימי גלותנו הנ"ל אשר תאיר לנו הארה מגאולה העתידה אף בעודנו בחשכת הגלות: 

The miracle of Purim was an extension of the kedushas Bayis Sheni that was on the horizon, soon to be built.  לַֽמְנַצֵּחַ עַל־אַיֶּ֥לֶת הַ֜שַּׁ֗חַר, Tehillim 22, the chapter that Esther said when she was about to go before Achashveirosh, speaks about dawn breaking, the first glimmer of the sun that is about to rise while everything is still shrouded in darkness.

So too with respect to Bayis Shlishi, which we hope will speedily be built.  The glimmer of geulah will be felt in advance, even while we are still shrouded in the darkness of galus.  That is where we are at now. 

2) וַתֹּ֣אמֶר לוֹ֩ זֶ֨רֶשׁ אִשְׁתּ֜וֹ וְכָל־אֹֽהֲבָ֗יו יַֽעֲשׂוּ־עֵץ֘ גָּבֹ֣הַּ חֲמִשִּׁ֣ים אַמָּה֒ וּבַבֹּ֣קֶר | אֱמֹ֣ר לַמֶּ֗לֶךְ וְיִתְל֤וּ אֶֽת־מָרְדֳּכַי֙ עָלָ֔יו וּבֹ֧א־עִם־הַמֶּ֛לֶךְ אֶל־הַמִּשְׁתֶּ֖ה שָׂמֵ֑חַ וַיִּיטַ֧ב הַדָּבָ֛ר לִפְנֵ֥י הָמָ֖ן וַיַּ֥עַשׂ הָעֵֽץ: (5:14)

Zeresh tells Haman to TELL the King to make a tree and hang Mordechai on it.  Not to ASK, not to SUGGEST, but just tell him what to do. 

Next chapter (6:4), same thing: וַיֹּ֥אמֶר הַמֶּ֖לֶךְ מִ֣י בֶֽחָצֵ֑ר וְהָמָ֣ן בָּ֗א לַֽחֲצַ֤ר בֵּֽית־הַמֶּ֨לֶךְ֙ הַחִ֣יצוֹנָ֔ה לֵאמֹ֣ר לַמֶּ֔לֶךְ לִתְלוֹת֙ אֶֽת־מָרְדֳּכַ֔י עַל־הָעֵ֖ץ אֲשֶׁר־הֵכִ֥ין לֽוֹ:

Haman enters the king's courtyard to  TELL him to hang Mordechai.

Chutzpa!

But apparently that's the authority that Haman was given.  When you are riding high, you are riding high.

But v'nahapoch hu, and that's the lesson for us.  

Shem m'Shmuel 5677:

ומכאן כל איש משכיל ישים אל לבו, היות בית המן ניתן לאסתר ונהפוך הוא אשר ישלטו היהודים המה בשונאיהם, ובכל פורים מתעורר רשימו מזה, ואז בכח כל איש ישראל לאמור למלך מה"מ הקב"ה [דרך אמירה וציווי כענין הצדיקים גוזרים על הקב"ה והוא עושה] לתלות את המן ולמחות את שמו מתוך לבו של עצמו עכ"פ, אך האמירה צריכה להיות לא מהשפה ולחוץ אלא בכל אות נפשו, ובאותו חשק ורצון נמרץ שהי' אז להמן לתלות את מרדכי, ואז בודאי אמירתו יעשה פירות, וזהו שאמרו חסידי קדמאי שבפורים יכול כל איש להושע ולהתברר:

the enemy within

אֲשֶׁ֨ר קָֽרְךָ֜ בַּדֶּ֗רֶךְ וַיְזַנֵּ֤ב בְּךָ֙ כׇּל־הַנֶּחֱשָׁלִ֣ים אַֽחֲרֶ֔יךָ

Rashi explains that the necheshalim are חסירי כח מחמת חטאם, שהיה הענן פולטם.  Amalek attacked the weakest, meaning those who were sinners and therefore found themselves outside the protection of the ananei ha'kavod.  I don't think we pay enough attention to this detail.  This war of Amalek, an attack that we are never supposed to forget, was an attack on people who get stones thrown at them on shabbos, people who espouse hashkafos we reject, people do not follow mitzvos like we do, people do not keep torah the way we do.  But nonetheless, if an enemy comes to pick on them, they are one of us.

Now for the other side of the coin.   אֲשֶׁ֨ר קָֽרְךָ֜ בַּדֶּ֗רֶךְ -- we know the famous mashal of cooling off the bath water.  Rav Shteinman in Ayeles haShachar points out that the Torah seems to focus even more on this detail of asher korcha more than the war itself.  We are told to remember Amalek and the first thing the Torah mentions is not that they attacked us, but this detail of cooling things off!  The Netziv explains that Amalek comes to cool off the intensity and hislahavus of a Jew, to the point that he/she c"v becomes a min and  partners with Amalek to bring down his own people.  וַיְזַנֵּ֤ב בְּךָ֙ -- it's not the enemy without that we have the most to fear from, who can do the most damage, but rather it's the enemy  בְּךָ֙ within.  Netziv writes:

 מה שלא היה אפשר לעמלק לעשות בעצמו, אבל ״בך״ — היינו ע״י רשעי ישראל שפקרו היו לעזר לעמלק ״לזנב וגו׳ כל הנחשלים״, היינו, ההולכים ביהדות במצות אנשים מלומדה ולא בחקירה ובשכל, כדכתיב (להלן לג,ג) ״והם תוכו לרגליך 

Asher korcha, says R' Shteinman, means chotei u'machti, which fits perfectly with the Netziv.  The danger and tragedy of Amalek is not only in what they do to us, but in that they turn so many of the best and brightest of our own people against ourselves. 

safeik sakana b'makom mitzvah

Eiruvin 21b:

 מעשה בר"ע שהיה חבוש בבית האסורין והיה ר' יהושע הגרסי משרתו בכל יום ויום היו מכניסין לו מים במדה יום אחד מצאו שומר בית האסורין אמר לו היום מימך מרובין שמא לחתור בית האסורין אתה צריך שפך חציין ונתן לו חציין כשבא אצל ר"ע אמר לו יהושע אין אתה יודע שזקן אני וחיי תלויין בחייך סח לו כל אותו המאורע אמר לו תן לי מים שאטול ידי אמר לו לשתות אין מגיעין ליטול ידיך מגיעין אמר לו מה אעשה שחייבים עליהן מיתה מוטב אמות מיתת עצמי ולא אעבור על דעת חבירי אמרו לא טעם כלום עד שהביא לו מים ונטל ידיו כששמעו חכמים בדבר אמרו מה בזקנותו כך בילדותו על אחת כמה וכמה ומה בבית האסורין כך שלא בבית האסורין על אחת כמה וכמה

The gemara relates that when R' Akiva was in prison, one day the guard took away half of his ration of water.  R' Akiva refused to eat without washing netilas yadayim, even though doing so placed him at risk of death.  "Better that I should die my own death [by hunger], rather than violate the takanas Chachamim and be chayav misa because of that."   

How could R' Akiva do this?  Except in the case of the three cardinal aveiros of murder, arayos, and avodah zarah, according to the Rambam not only are you not required to give up your life to avoid an issur, you are not allowed to give up your life.  How then could R' Akiva put his life in danger just to avoid eating without netilas yadayim?

When we speak of danger, there is a difference between someone putting a gun to your head and saying, "Eat without washing your hands or I shoot," and being forced to skip food and drink due to a lack of water (see Maharatz Chiyus).  Even though in the story R' Akiva put himself in danger, there was not an absolute certainty that he would die.  Conditions can change -- as we see from the story, they did, as R' Akiva did not die that day in prison -- and there are avenues of possible escape.   

What we see from R' Akiva's example is that where there is merely a safeik sakana and the odds are in your favor, even according to the shitas haRambam one is permitted to put oneself in the path of danger l'tzorech mitzvah.

choosing freedom over security

1) My wife writes on her blog that the eved ivri in choosing to stay enslaved was opting for the security of his master's home, where he, his wife, and children were guaranteed a roof over their heads and support, over the risk of going out and making his way in the world.  I would add that an eved ivri is someone who has either opted to sell himself into slavery because he is in desperate straits or someone who is a thief and has no assets to pay back what he has stolen -- in other words, someone who has not seen much success in making his way in the world in the past.  Nonetheless, the parsha teaches us that freedom trumps security.  The slave is wrong to remain in his master's house even if it appears to be the safer option.

2) There are seforim that talk about the lessons that we can learn in our avodas Hashem from the dinim in the parsha, but if you are like me, your knee jerk reaction is to read these as derush, as mystical concepts, as domains totally divorced from halacha.   So let's learn a Ketzos.  In Choshen Mishpat siman 4 the S.A. talks about the concept of "avid inish dina l'nafshei," cases where a plaintiff can take the law into his own hands rather than go through the laborious process of having a din torah and waiting for the court to act.  The S.A. has the following case: Reuvain gave Shimon a pikadon to watch.  Reuvain also happens to owe Shimon some money and has not been forthcoming in paying his debt.  Can Shimon take the law into his own hands and seize Reuvain's pikadon in order to reclaim his debt?

The Ketzos says nothing doing.  His proof comes from a Zohar.  Every night we entrust our soul to Hashem and every morning (hopefully) he returns it.  Modeh ani... she'hechezarta bi nishmasi, Hashem returns our pikadon.  Who among us does not have a pile of debts that they owe Hashem?  Who among us does not have aveiros of all kinds that we need to make restitution for?  Yet Hashem does not hold our neshoma upstairs in order to collect.  He treats the debts as a separate cheshbon, and returns the pikadon, our neshoma, to us.  

This is not some chassidishe sefer -- this is the Ketzos!  Yes, at the end he tacks on a Ritva as well, but that was not his first go-to point.  

Rosh Devarcha Emes = Adar

Chazal tell us that Moshe had difficulty understanding וְנָ֨תְנ֜וּ אִ֣ישׁ כֹּ֧פֶר נַפְשׁ֛וֹ by giving a half shekel.  That's all it takes to redeem a person's nefesh -- a half shekel?!  Hashem answered by showing him a half shekel of fire that he took from under the kisei ha'kavod (whatever that answer means).  

Chasam Sofer (Derashos, Shekalim 5669) asks: the pasuk in our parsha of Mishpatim by the din of a shor muad that kills someone tells us (21:30) אִם־כֹּ֖פֶר יוּשַׁ֣ת עָלָ֑יו וְנָתַן֙ פִּדְיֹ֣ן נַפְשׁ֔וֹ כְּכֹ֥ל אֲשֶׁר־יוּשַׁ֖ת עָלָֽיו׃  Here you have the same idea -- a payment of kofer that is "pidyon nafsho," to redeem the value of a nefesh -- but here Moshe did not have any problem understanding the pasuk.  What's the difference between the two cases?

The idea of machtzis ha'shekel is that you don't know it all and don't have it all; you are incomplete without the input of others, without someone else providing the other half of the coin.  

B'shlama in our parsha, Moshe had no problem understanding how one person could pay a debt of  וְנָתַן֙ פִּדְיֹ֣ן נַפְשׁ֔וֹ . But Moshe Rabeinu was no fool and he understood Klal Yisrael.  וְנָ֨תְנ֜וּ אִ֣ישׁ כֹּ֧פֶר נַפְשׁ֛וֹ not by each person paying for himself, but only b'shutfus, only by coming together, only by each individual realizing that he has just half of the equation.  That Moshe had trouble understanding how to pull off.  How do you get Jews to be united?  How do you get people who are "mefurad," as Haman said, to work together?

The Chasam Sofer explains the symbolism of Hashem showing Moshe the machtzis ha'shekel of fire was an answer to that question, but I don't think we really have an answer yet or understand the answer yet, as we see from what goes on in our communities.  

אדר = ראשׁ דברך אמת.  Adar is the month of truth.  Maharal explains in Nesiv ha'Emes that "chosamo shel HKB"H emes" (Shabbos 55) because Hashem is one and truth is one.  If I put something in a box and ask you to guess what it is, there are an infinite number of wrong guesses you can make, but there is only one possible true answer.  

 מִדְּבַר־שֶׁ֖קֶר תִּרְחָ֑ק (23:7) we have in our parsha.   R' Zusha of Anipoli explained that if you have in you even a smidgin of falsehood, tirchak, it will push you away from Hashem.  "Chosamo shel HKB"H emes," so only someone who is true to themselves, true to Hashem, true to their fellow man, can be close to Hashem.

To acquire the midah of emes you need to start with the midah of anivus.  In order to acquire truth, you have to first have the humility to admit that you don't already have it.  Titein emes l'Yaakov -- the pasuk uses the name Yaakov, not Yisrael, because it signifies the heel, the lowest point.  Emes mei'eretz titzmach because when you plant a seed and it disintegrates into nothing before it can grow.    אדר = ראש דברך אמת is the birthday of Moshe Rabeinu, the anav m'kol ha'adam, and therefore Moshe emes v'toraso emes because Moshe had nothing of his own, he was just a kli kibul for Hashem's truth. 

This why we start Adar by being "mashmi'im al ha'shekalim," announcing the collection of machtzis ha'shekel.  You can't absorb the "chosamo shel HKB"H" of emes which is oneness if you are a splintered people divided into factions.  Machtzis ha'hekel = we need each other (and we need the humility to know that we need each other) in order to complete the picture, to provide the other half of the coin, so that we can function as one people.

the doorpost

 וְהִגִּישׁ֤וֹ אֲדֹנָיו֙ אֶל־הָ֣אֱלֹהִ֔ים וְהִגִּישׁוֹ֙ אֶל־הַדֶּ֔לֶת א֖וֹ אֶל־הַמְּזוּזָ֑ה וְרָצַ֨ע אֲדֹנָ֤יו אֶת־אׇזְנוֹ֙ בַּמַּרְצֵ֔עַ וַעֲבָד֖וֹ לְעֹלָֽם

The Neos Desheh (Ishbitz) explains that the slave who chooses to remain with his master, who cannot separate himself from a live of avdus to olam ha'zeh, from thinking about his work and his wife and his kids and everything else that he is caught up in, should not think that he has no hope for ruchniyus.  His ear is punctured by the doorpost, by the mezuzah, the very place where in Mitzrayim we sprinkled the blood of the korban pesach.  Just like Hashem redeemed us then despite our lack of merits, so too, this Jewish slave who may have no merits, can be pulled out of situation by Hashem.

planting the seeds of geulah

 Mes Kesubos, which I finished today l'iluy nishmas my father on his yahrzeit, ends:

 אמר רב עתידין כל אילני סרק שבארץ ישראל שיטענו פירות שנאמר כי עץ נשא פריו תאנה וגפן נתנו חילם

One day even the barren trees that produce no fruit will bear fruit in Eretz Yisrael.

Chodesh Adar and Purim will soon be upon us, so I wanted to connect this gemara with inyana d'yoma.  The gemara (Meg 5) tells us:

אמר רבי חנינא רבי נטע נטיעה בפורים ורחץ בקרונה של צפורי בשבעה עשר בתמוז ובקש לעקור תשעה באב ולא הודו לו 

Rebbi planted a tree on Purim, he went to the bathhouse on 17 Tamuz, and he wanted to do away with the fast of 9 Av.

1) Didn't Rebbi have better things to do on Purim other than garden work?  Did he get the holiday confused with Tu b'Shevat?

2) Why does the gemara put together the statement about Rebbi planting trees with his attempt to abolish or push off the fast days that commemorate the churban?  What does one thing have to do with the other?

The gemara elsewhere (San 98) records another statement about trees:

אמר רבי אבא אין לך קץ מגולה מזה שנאמר ואתם הרי ישראל ענפכם תתנו ופריכם תשאו לעמי ישראל וגו'

Rashi comments:  כשתתן ארץ ישראל פריה בעין יפה אז יקרב הקץ ואין לך קץ מגולה יותר

The truest sign of impending redemption is when the trees of Eretz Yisrael begin to produce beautiful fruit.

Various gedolim in the past century have said that we are living in aschalta d'geulah.  How do we know that this this is true?  Rav Kook in a letter quotes this gemara.  He writes that the restoration of Jewish agriculture in Eretz Yisrael is the truest sign that we are closing in on redemption.  How do we know that we are close to Mashiach coming?  Look in the supermarket for Jaffa oranges!  Look at all the produce and products of Eretz Yisrael now available. 

The gemata (Meg 17) writes that the reason why the bracha of "t'ka b'shofar gadol," which speaks about kibutz galiyos, comes in shmoneh esrei right after the bracha of "bareich aleinu," is because enjoying the bounty of Eretz Yisrael (as we discussed once before, according to the GR"A, the nusach habracha of bareich aleinu is "nisba m'tuva," that we should enjoy the bounty of Eretz Yisrael, which radiates out from there to the rest of the world) is a precursor to kibutz galiyus. 

Purim is a holiday of geulah.  The gemara (Meg 6) writes that when there are two Adars, we celebrate Purim in the second one, in the Adar closest to Nisan, because  מסמך גאולה לגאולה עדיף, we want the geulah of Purim to adjoin the geulah of Pesach.  Achashveirosh thought the 70 years of galus were up and redemption had not arrived, so it was all over for us, but he miscalculated, and we did end up returning to Eretz Yisrael with Ezra and Nechmia and building Bayis Sheni.

Therefore, davka on Purim, Rebbi went out to plant.  Rebbi was thinking of geulah, and geulah means trees and agriculture.  

It is Rebbi l'shitaso who wanted to do away with Tisha b'Av, because Rebbi wanted to overcome the mourning of churban.

Ki ha'adam eitz ha'sadeh.  Geulah means each one of us will produce peiros of Torah umaasim tovim to the best of our ability, and hopefully soon, not only will the fruit trees flourish, but even barren trees, those who have nothing going for them, will produce amazing fruits.

not being makpid

 לֹֽא־תַעֲלֶ֥ה בְמַעֲלֹ֖ת עַֽל־מִזְבְּחִ֑י אֲשֶׁ֛ר לֹֽא־תִגָּלֶ֥ה עֶרְוָתְךָ֖ עָלָֽיו (20:22)

Rashi:  והרי דברים קל וחומר: ומה אבנים הללו שאין בהן דעת להקפיד על בזיונו, אמרה תורה: הואיל ויש בהן צורך לא תנהג בהן מנהג בזיון, חבירך שהוא בדמות יוצרך ומקפיד על בזיונו, על אחת כמה וכמה.

Question: The seifa of Rashi does not match the reisha.  It should have said מה אבנים הללו שאין בהן דעת להקפיד...חבירך שיש בּו דעת ומקפּיד.  Why does Rashi switch and write חבירך שהוא בדמות יוצרך ומקפיד ?  

Rav Druk answered that there is no such thing as חבירך שיש בּו דעת ומקפּיד.  

A person who has daas is not a person who is makpid on slights. 

live and in person

I am going to lump two very different ideas into one post, an  important "pshat" Ibn Ezra and a mussar/derush idea:

1) Ibn Ezra back in parshas Bo notes the discrepancy between Moshe's prediction of the way makas bechoros would happen (11:5)  מִבְּכ֤וֹר פַּרְעֹה֙ הַיֹּשֵׁ֣ב עַל־כִּסְא֔וֹ עַ֚ד בְּכ֣וֹר הַשִּׁפְחָ֔ה אֲשֶׁ֖ר אַחַ֣ר הָרֵחָ֑יִםand the way the Torah describes the actual event  מִבְּכֹ֤ר פַּרְעֹה֙ הַיֹּשֵׁ֣ב עַל־כִּסְא֔וֹ עַ֚ד בְּכ֣וֹר הַשְּׁבִ֔י אֲשֶׁ֖ר בְּבֵ֣ית הַבּ֑וֹר and he sets out an important yesod:

וכבר אמרתי לך כי הנביאים אינם שומרים המלות רק הטעמים, כי מלת הגמאיני (בראשית כ״ד:י״ז) – השקיני (בראשית כ״ד:מ״ה), וזכור (שמות כ׳:ז׳) – ושמור (דברים ה׳:י״א), ושוא (שמות כ׳:י״ב) – ושקר (דברים ה׳:ט״ז), לא תחמוד (שמות כ׳:י״ג) – ולא תתאוה (דברים ה׳:י״ז) שוים בטעם. ועוד אדבר על זה בתפלת משה (ראב״ע שמות פירוש שני ל״ב:ט׳). והנה בכור השפחה הוא כמו: בכור השבי (שמות י״ב:כ״ט), כי השבויה שפחה היא, ואשר בבית הבור – בלילה כמנהג האסורים, כאשר הזכיר יוסף, כי שמו אותי בבור (בראשית מ׳:ט״ו), ובמקומו אפרשנו (ראב״ע שמות פירוש שני י״ב:כ״ט).

Nevi'im -- even Moshe Rabeinu -- don't quote, they paraphrase.  They privilege content over form, they can change a word here and there so long as the message remains the same.

All the differences between the dibros in our parsha and the dibros as Moshe repeated them in VaEschanan can be explained away with this one simple rule.  Don't quibble over zachor vs shamor, shav vs sheker, etc because it doesn't matter in the end, the dibros are the same dibros.  

Ibn Ezra repeats the same idea in our parsha and expands upon it (20:1):

והכלל,יז כל דבר שנוי, כמו: חלום פרעה (בראשית מ״א), ונבוכדנצר (דניאל ב׳), ואחרים רבים, תמצא מלות שונות, רק הטעם שוה.

וכאשר אמרתי לך שפעם אחזו דרך קצרה, ופעם ארוכה, כך יעשו פעמים להוסיף אות משרת, או לגרוע אותו, והדבר שוה. אמר השם: ותכלת וארגמן (שמות כ״ה:ד׳), ומשה אמר: תכלת וארגמן (שמות כ״ח:ו׳). אמר השם: אבני שהם (שמות כ״ה:ז׳), ומשה אמר: ואבני שהם (שמות ל״ה:ט׳). וכאלה רבים, ושניהם נכונים, כי הכתוב בלא ו״ויח אחז דרך קצרה, ולא יזיק, גם הכותב בוי״ו לא יזיק, בעבור שהוסיף לבאר. והנה הו״ו שהוא נראה במבטא הפה,יט אין אדם מבקש לו טעם למה נגרע, ולמה נכתב, או למה נוסף, ולמה נכתב, כי זה וזה נכון. והנה על הנראה שיבוטא בו לא יבקש לו טעם, אם כן למה נבקש טעם בנח הנעלם שלא יבוטא בו, כמו מלת: לעולם, למה נכתב מלא או למה נכתב חסר. והנה בני הדור יבקשו טעם גם למלא גם לחסר. ואילו היו מבקשים טעם לאחד מהם, שהמנהג היה לכתב הכל על דרך אחד, הייתי מחריש. הנה אתן לך משל: אמר לי אדם: כתוב לי כתב לרעי, וזה כתב: אני פלני אהבך לעלם.כ והנה כתבתי: פלני בלא ו״ו, ואהבך, גם כן לעלם. ובא ראובן ושאלני: למה כתבת חסר. ואני אין לי צורך לכתוב רק מה שאמר לי, ואין לי חפץ להיותם מלאים או חסרים. אולי יבא לוי ויודיעני איך אכתוב. ולא ארצה להאריך, רק המשכיל יבין

He gives a mashal: If Ploni asks you to write a letter expressing his enduring love for someone, the important thing is the content, not form, not whether you spell Ploni with or without a vav, malei or chaseir.  

I have a problem with this explanation of malei and chaseir.  Except for sefer Devarim, which has its own particularities, the rest of the Torah was dictated word for word by G-d to Moshe.  We are not reading Moshe's words, his paraphrase of G-d's message; we are reading G-d's words, right down to each letter.  Why should G-d be inconsistent, spelling the same word one way here and another way there?  Is spelling (malei/chaseir) just a matter of random choice with no rules?

2) VaYishma Yisro....  מה שמועה שמע ובא the gemara asks.  What did Yisro hear that caused him to come to join Klal Yisrael.  Rashi lumps together two of the gemara's answers: קריעת ים סוף ומלחמת עמלק.  

Why is the gemara/Rashi not satisfied with what the pasuk itself tells us that Yisro heard, namely, "Es kol asher asa Elokim l'Moshe ul'Yisrael amo ki hotzi Hashem es Yisrael miMitzrayim?"  And why does Rashi put together two different answers of the gemara, kri'as Yam Suf and milchemes Amalek, as if only both, not one or the other, motivated Yisro to come?

What was bothering Rashi was why Yisro needed to make the journey from Midyan to the camp of the Jewish people.  Couldn't he just have tuned into yeshivaworld, or if he was really low tech, maybe just open the Midyan Jewish Times to catch up on the latest?  Couldn't he have caught Moshe Rabeinu's shiur over Zoom, or listened to it on Torahanytime?  מה  שמועה שמע ובא -- why did he need to come, to be there in person?

We read in the shira last week, "Shamu amim yirgazun..."  The nations of the world heard about kri'as Yam Suf and they were afraid.  Amalek heard about kri'as Yam Suf too.  But the effect did not last; it did not take long until Amalek went on the attack.

Yisro put two and two together and realized that hearing about it is not enough; reading about it in the newspaper or on a website is not enough.  "Shamu amim yirgazun" has a very short lifespan, as we see from Amalek's behavior.  You have to be part of a community, a beis medrash, a shul, and personally experience Judaism as it is lived and breathed.  You have to speak with a Rav or a Rebbe in person, face to face, not just read his torah in a sefer or on a website or listen to a Zoom shiur with 100 other people.  (based on the Shinova's reading of Rashi)

The tragedy of Covid is not just that we were deprived of so many of these interactions over the past year.  Ones Rachmana patrei, sometimes you have to make due with the less than ideal.  The bigger tragedy is that what should be a bdieved has become the new normal. Rabbi Schoenfeld wrote in an article a few months ago that even when people were allowed to return to shul, they didn't, because they have internalized that shul is no longer necessary.  Can't I talk to G-d in my living room?  The bigger tragedy is that what started as concessions to the situation have now become institutionalized.  People are now writing articles and discussing how we can now reimagine davening forever after, how we can permanently shorten our tefilos on Yamim Noraim to make davening more tolerable, how Zoom has expanded the capacity to deliver shiurim like never before.   

מה שמועה שמע ובא  Showing up is more than half the battle.  You can't just host Judaism on a website; you can't communicate torah exclusively with a podcast.   We need to experience Torah live and in person.

va'yachalosh Yehoshua es Amalek -- Daat Zekeinim, Raavad, and Aristotle's sea battle problem

The Daat Zekeinim has an interesting answer as to why Yehoshua did not decimate Amalek completely, he only weakened them -- "va'yachalosh Yehoshua es Amalek (17:13) -- when he battled them (see also Ibn Ezra on the word vayachalosh!)

לכך כתיב ויחלש ולא כתב ויכה לפי שעמלק חוזה בכוכבים היה ובחר לו אנשים שאינן עתידין למות באותה מלחמה. וכן יהושע עשה כן דכתיב בחר לנו אנשים דמשמע קיימים ובריאים לכך לא היה יהושע יכול להרגם אלא חתך ידיהם ורגליהם וזהו ויחלש

Amalek had stargazers who knew the future and they sent into battle people who were not fated to die.  Yehoshua countered by choosing for his own army people who were also not fated to die.  So they fought to a standoff and Amalek was weakened in battle, but not wiped out.

Does this idea make sense?  Let's say, for example, that a soldier had his fortune told and it was revealed that he would not die in an upcoming battle.  If that solider chose to run directly into the enemy lines, right into their gunfire, fearing nothing, would the bullets just bounce off him?  Would he really remain unharmed?

Is this the same as Aristotle's "tomorrow's sea battle" problem?  If the statement "tomorrow there will be no sea battle" is true, then no matter what I do, there will be no battle.  So forget diplomacy, forget the need to stand down the navy -- just sit back and watch, because the outcome is already determined.  What then of free choice?  

Raavad in Hil Teshuvah 5:5 is not bothered by the contradiction.  His response to the Rambam's question of how Divine foreknowledge still allows for free will is that Divine knowledge is אבל היא כידיעת האצטגנינים שיודעים מכח אחר מה יהיו דרכיו של זה.  Just because the star gazer knows what you will eat for breakfast tomorrow morning does not mean that when you look in the cabinet tomorrow at the different boxes there you are not freely choosing the one you would like to have that day.  

Again, does it makes sense?  If the star gazer said today that you would eat Cheerios tomorrow, are you really free to choose whatever cereal you like?  

These topics are good for when you have a lot of free time on your hands.

don't wait to start singing

 תשורי מראש אמנה

עתידין ישראל לומר שירה לעתיד לבוא, שנאמר: (תהלים צח, א)שירו לה' שיר חדש כי נפלאות עשה.

ובאיזה זכות אומרים ישראל שירה?

בזכות אברהם שהאמין בהקדוש ברוך הוא, שנאמר: (בראשית טו, ו) והאמין בה', היא האמונה שישראל נוחלין בה, ועליו הכתוב אומר: (חבקוק ב, ד) וצדיק באמונתו יחיה.

הוי, תשורי מראש אמנה.

Last week I posted R' Chaim's chiddush that even if a person is sure Hashem is going to do a miracle and save him, he can only sing shirah after the fact.  "V'ani b'chasdicha batachti yageil libi b'yeshuasecha," but nonetheless, "Ashira la'Hashem ki gamal alay," not beforehand. 

The SHL"H has a different POV based on the Midrash above.  עתידין ישראל לומר שירה לעתיד לבוא -- why the double language?  If shirah is something that Bnei Yisrael are עתידין in the future going to sing, then obviously it will take place עתיד לבוא?  

The SHL"H explains that tzadikim don't wait for the miracle to happen -- their trust in Hashem is so great that they start singing shirah in anticipation of what's going to come.  

In the future, when we have that level of emunah, עתידין we will sing shirah לעתיד לבוא, on what will happen, without waiting for it to actually occur.  תשורי מראש אמנה - the shirah will be מראש, before the event occurs, because of our  אמנה, our faith in Hashem.

Bnei Yisrael at Yam Suf were not at that level, which is why (al pi peshuto shel mikra, not like the Mechilta we learned last week) they sang shira only after the fact.  "Ya'yaaminu ba'Hashem ub'Moshe avdo" afterwards, but their emunah was not complete enough beforehand.

The complaint (Meg 10b) of מעשה ידי טובעין בים ואתם אומרים שירה is not because G-d was per se opposed to the malachim singing shira.  G-d was asking why the delay until now; why the wait until the Egyptians were drowning to start singing instead of starting beforehand.

Based on this approach, the SHL"H says a fantastic pshat in this gemara regarding Chizkiyahu:

 ביקש הקב"ה לעשות חזקיהו משיח וסנחריב גוג ומגוג אמרה מדת הדין לפני הקב"ה רבש"ע ומה דוד מלך ישראל שאמר כמה שירות ותשבחות לפניך לא עשיתו משיח חזקיה שעשית לו כל הנסים הללו ולא אמר שירה לפניך תעשהו משיח לכך נסתתם (Sanhedrin 94) 

The reason Hashem did not appoint Chizkiyahu to be Mashiach is because Chizkiyahu לא אמר שירה לפניך -- he didn't sing shirah לפניך, before the fact, but waited only until afterwards.  In the times of Mashiach we will be singing in anticipation of the miracles, not only after they happen.  

This also explains, writes the SHL"H, why when discussing the shirah Bnei Yisrael sang the pasuk uses the feminine voice, "ha'shira ha'zos," but when talking about the song of Miriam and the women, it uses the masculine voice, "va'taan lahem Miriam."  Bnei Yisrael's faith was incomplete, "tashash kocham k'neikeivah" in their midah of emunah, but the women went of of Mitzrayim carrying their "tupim u'mecholos," musical instruments, ready to sing even before the Yam split.  They had the gevurah the men were lacking, the emunah of "zechus nashim tzidkaniyos" which was the catalyst for the geulah.

kol ha'machala... lo asim alecha

I saw that learning the shtickel torah below from the Noam Elimelech is a segulah for refuah.  Now, I don't know if that's true or not, or whether it helps any more than reciting parshas ha'mon this past Tues helps with parnasa, but I figure at least you have a nice dvar Torah for shabbos and that's not a bad thing in itself.  If it also helps those in need of refuah, mah tov u'mah na'im, but that's just icing on the cake.

Kol ha'machala asher samti b'Mitzrayim lo asim alecha ki ani Hashem rofecha.  Rashi already is bothered by the question: if Hashem promises not to afflict us with any machalos, then what do we need the refuah for?

Next week we will read the aseres ha'dibros, and as we all know, the first commandment is Anochi Hashem Elokecha asher hotzeisicha mei'Eretz Mitzrayim.  Everybody asks: why is it that G-d "introduces" himself, if you will, as the one who redeemed us from Egypt instead of telling us that he is the creator of the universe?  

The N.E. explains that G-d's greatest "desire" is to give over his goodness.  G-d is the most perfect tov, and tov is not truly complete and perfect unless there is an element of being meitiv, of sharing that goodness with others.  Ramchal writes that G-d created the world for that purpose alone, so that He can be meitiv.  So viz a viz G-d, creation is not such a big chiddush.  Had it said, "Anochi Hashem Elokecha the creator of heaven and earth," you would say pshita, mai kah mashma lan, of course G-d created everything because he is the greatest tov and therefore wants to be meitiv.  (Compare with Moreh Nevuchim 2:33 and Derashos haRan derush 9, covered in this post). 

Yetzias Mitzrayim is a different story altogether.  As we read over the past two weeks, the Egyptians suffered one makkah after the next, culminating in makas bechoros and then finally Yam Suf.  "Asher hotzeisicha..." is a chiddush, as what happened seems to contradict the quality of G-d being meitiv.  Where is G-d's goodness in smacking around the Mitzryim?   Kol ha'machala asher samti... lo asim -- Hashem does not bring machalos, mi'pi elyon lo yeitzei ra'ah.  But we know Hashem did smite the Egyptians?  

The answer is that olam ha'zeh, for the most part, is a zero sum world.  It's either Egypt gets the good luck of an economy driven by slave labor, or Bnei Yisrael get their freedom -- either/or.  What is meitiv to one party comes at the expense of the other.  Hashem decided that being meitiv to Bn"Y is the best tov; punishing the Egyptians and forcing them to free Bn"Y is not a ra'ah, but is just a means to the end of the greater good.  

Coming back the the pasuk we started with: Kol ha'machala asher samti... lo asim, Hashem will not bring bad into the world.  If you see bad happening, then remember, "Ani Hashem rofecha," I, Hashem, am just there to make you better, to be meitiv to Klal Yisrael.  Sometimes there has to be suffering for the sake of the greater good, and the greater good is always that which benefits Klal Yisrael in the end.

כל המחלה אשר שמתי במצרים לא אשים עליך כי אני ה' רופאך. רש"י ז"ל הקשה בודאי כאשר לא ישים למה לרפואה? ונראה לפרש דהנה כתיב "אני ה' אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים", ומקשים למה לא אמר אשר בראתי שמים וארץ, שלפי הנראה זה חידוש יותר. אך נראה דבאמת זה חידוש יותר שהוציאנו מארץ מצרים, דהנה בריאת עולם היה מחמת שהשי"ת ב"ה רצה להטיב לברואים, ואין הבריאה חידוש נגד השי"ת כי טבעו להטיב, אבל יציאת מצרים שהכה השי"ת את מצרים במכות מופלאות, וזה נגד טבעית הבורא ב"ה כי "מפי עליון לא תצא הרעה", אך מחמת שזה היה הטבה לישראל מה שהכה את מצרים, ועיקר הטובה היה לישראל, עשה השי"ת נגד הטבעית להכות אותם, וזה חידוש יותר גדול. וזהו "כל המחלה לא אשים", אך איך הכה אותם הלא מפי עליון לא תצא הרע? לזה אמר "כי אני ה' רופאך", ונמצא היתה ההכאה הזאת הטבה לישראל, אבל להשים חלילה שום מחלה על ישראל זה בלתי אפשר, כי מה הטבה יבוא מזה. וק"ל.

a cure worse than the disease

Scott Atlas writes (emphasis added by me):

Here’s the reality -- almost all states and major cities, with a handful of exceptions, have implemented severe restrictions for many months, including closures of businesses and in-person school, mobility restrictions and curfews, quarantines, limits on group gatherings, and mask mandates dating back to at least the summer. These measures did not significantly change the typical pattern or damage from the SARS2 virus.

He goes on to cite statistics to convey the extent of the damage caused by the restrictions and policies put in place, e.g. increases in domestic abuse, child abuse, thousands of cancer cases that went undetected and untreated, estimates of decreased life expectancy caused by the stress of unemployment, etc.  He concludes:

We know we have not yet seen the full extent of the damage from lockdowns, because it will last for decades. Perhaps that is why lockdowns were not recommended in previous pandemic analyses, even for infections with far higher death rates.

The lockdown fanatics keep screaming about pikuach nefesh.  I agree 100%  that it's pikuach nefesh -- lockdowns literally kill people.  

singing shira before a miracle occurs

What if a person is 100% sure that Hashem will do a miracle and save him from danger -- can/he say thanks to Hashem even before the miracle has occurred?  

The Emek Bracha quotes from R' Chaim that the answer is found directly in the pesukim, "V'ani b'chasdicha batachti yageil libi b'yeshuasecha," I have complete faith that Hashem will bring me salvation, "Ashira la'Hashem ki gamal alay," and I will sing praise to Hashem when he rescues me.  Even though I have complete faith that the miracle will occur, it is only after the fact, "ki gamal alay," that I sing shira, not beforehand.

The Mechilta on our parsha reads the pasuk, "Hashem yilachem lachem v'atem tacharishun?" as a question, not a statement.  You expect Hashem to do a miracle for you while you sit on the sidelines and do nothing?  Bnei Yisrael asked Moshe what they should do, and he answered that they should sing praises to Hashem.  

I can't find a Mechilta online, but here it is in Yalkut Shimoni:

 רַבִּי אוֹמֵר, ה׳ יִלָּחֵם לָכֶם הַמָּקוֹם יַעֲשֶׂה לָכֶם נִסִּים וּגְבוּרוֹת וְאַתֶּם תִּהְיוּ עוֹמְדִין וְשׁוֹתְקִין. אָמְרוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל לְמֹשֶׁה, מֹשֶׁה רַבֵּנוּ, מָה עָלֵינוּ לַעֲשׂוֹת. אָמַר לָהֶם, אַתֶּם תִּהְיוּ מְפָאֲרִין מְרוֹמְמִין וּמְשַׁבְּחִין וְכוּ׳. בְּאוֹתָהּ שָׁעָה פָּתְחוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל פִּיהֶם וְאָמְרוּ שִׁירָה, (להלן ט״ו:א׳) ״אָשִׁירָה לַה׳ כִּי גָאֹה גָּאָה״.

The Mechilta's reading that shira occurred before the miracle runs counter to simple pshat in the pesukim, but putting that aside, the Mechilta seems to undermine R' Chaim's argument.  According to the Mechilta, Klal Yisrael sang shira an anticipation of the splitting of Yam Suf; they didn't wait until after the fact, until the "ki gamal alay."

The Brisker Rav tries to defend R' Chaim by distinguishing between having emunah that a miracle will occur and being told by a navi like Moshe Rabeinu that a miracle will occur.  I think you need to explain why that distinction makes a difference, and secondly, where does it say that Moshe told Klal Yisrael that there would be a miracle like the splitting of the sea? 

the stamford marshmallow experiment and בוצינא טב מקרא

The famous Stamford marshmallow studies "found that children who, as 4-year-olds, could resist a tempting marshmallow placed in front of them, and instead hold out for a larger reward in the future (two marshmallows), became adults who were more likely to finish college and earn higher incomes, and were less likely to become overweight."  

In other words, the ability to delay gratification, to hold out for a larger reward, is the key to success.

Kesubos 83b:

אמר אביי בוצינא טב מקרא

Rashi: וצינא טב מקרא. בוצינא דלעת קטנה קרא דלעת גדולה והאומר לחבירו קח לך דלעת קטנה בגינתי או המתן עד שיגדילו וקח גדולה טוב לו ליקח הקטנה מיד כי לא ידע מה יולד יום

Is Abayei saying that it is better to take the one marshmallow up front? 

Or is Abayei just telling us what more people do, not necessarily the best thing to do?

Or maybe Abayei has nothing to do with the marshmallow experiment?  Maybe you  can be mechaleik and say that there is a lot more risk involved in growing a plant than in waiting for someone to come back in a few minutes with that extra marshmallow.  I don't know whether a four year old would perceive it that way.  Why should he/she trust an unknown person making a promise?  

The marshmallow experiment has been generalized to other, more risky situations, as well.  For example, if you own a stock and the share price has gone up, do you sell, or do you hold out for better returns?  It seems to me that Abayei would council to sell and lock in your earnings now rather than delay and risk losing what you have.  However, do a search on stock price and marshmallow test and you will find lots of folks who invoke the marshmallow experiment to council holding out for the greater gains e.g. here, here, here.

is kiruv always a good thing?

No Rabbi alive today could say what the Maor vaShemesh says below:

והנראה לומר בכתובים הללו נרמז תוכחת מגולה לאנשים המקרבין את כל הבא לידם שמראין עצמן להם שהם חפיצים להיות מעובדי השם הגם שאין תוכם כברם מקרבין אותם ואומרין שבזה מתרבים כבוד שמים ובאמת טועין הם בזה שלא די שאינם עוזרים כלל בעבדות השם אלא שגם מבלבלים את העובדי השם אם הם עמם בצוותא חדא וכמה דברים מקולקלים מתנוצצים על ידם ומי לנו גדול ממשה רבינו ע"ה אב החכמים ואב לנביאים שודאי כוונתו הי' להרבות כבוד שמים במה שקירב את הערב רב ואעפ"כ היו כספחת לישראל וגרמו להם כמה רעות כמובא בספרי קודש ועד עתה הם הגורמים אריכות הגלות וקושי השיעבוד והי' גלוי לפניו ית' שיגרמו לישראל כמה דברים מקולקלים ויבלבלו אותם מעבדות השם ולא רצה לומר בפי' למרע"ה שירחק אותם מפני שהבחירה נתונה ביד האדם ולאשר יחפוץ יטנה ואולי ישובו מדרכם אבל רצון השם לא הי' שיקרב אותם משה רבינו והנה אם בני ישראל לבדם היו יוצאים ממצרים ולא הי' נדבק בהם הע"ר היה הש"ית מוליכם מיד לארץ ישראל דרך ארץ פלשתים כי קרוב הוא ושם תכלית העבודה ולא היו צריכים לניסי הים והמן ומתן תורה במדבר כי בית הבחירה הוא מעולה מכל המעלות כמו שחושב בעל האגדה האחרון אחרון חביב שהוא בנין בית הבחירה. אך שצפה הקב"ה שבאם יבואו תיכף לארץ ישראל והערב רב בתוכם יצמח לישראל כמה מכשולות רעות ח"ו לכן הקיפם דרך המדבר י"ס אולי בראותם שסגר עליהם המדבר ופרעה וחילו רודף אחריהם ברכבו ופרשיו וגם יראו מלחמת עמלק עי"ז יתנו לב לשוב ויתפרדו כל פועלי און

He sees the miracles of Yam Suf, the mon, even mattan Torah as all b'dieved concessions to the spiritual needs of the eirav rav, but ideally unnecessary.  We should ideally have left Egypt and immediately entered Eretz Yisrael and built Beis HaBechira (I assume he means that Torah would have been given there somehow), but the eirav rav made that impossible.  Think about that for a minute -- he is not pointing to the rebellions that took place in the midbar as signs that things were less than perfect, but rather he is pointing to the miracles, the things that we would have thought prove that things were great!  

mi va'mi ha'holchim -- sustaining growth

R' Simcha Bunim Sofer quotes a Midrash (which I haven't found, so pls enlighten me if you can locate it) on Pharoah's question (10:8) to Moshe  מִ֥י וָמִ֖י הַהֹלְכִֽים -- why the double מִ֥י וָמִ֖י (see Kli Yakar as well)?  The Midrash comments that Pharoah challenged Moshe's request as unreasonable given that in the future Bnei Yisrael will one day say מי יעלה לנו בהר ה׳ ומי יקום במקום קדשׁו

What's the connection?

My chavrusa once prepared a whole shiur on this idea of "Mi yaaleh... u'mi yakum."  Ascending the mountain is a great achievement, but even harder than making it to the top is sustaining yourself there.  I remember as a teenager in camp that there was someone who went min ha'katzeh el ha'katzeh, what today people call flipping out.  This guy gave up all his hobbies, all his outside interests, switched his wardrobe to dress pants and white shirts, and went from a background of next to no exposure to learning to doing nothing but learning.  It lasted about a year or two, and then he fell back to his old self just as fast as his meteoric rise.  There are a lot of people like that, people who get the mi yaaleh part, but then fail in the mi yakum.  It's like people who go on these crash diets for a few weeks and lose a ton of weight, but then turn into a balloon again as soon as the diet is over.  There is no mi yakum because they focused on the goal of shedding pounds quickly, but not on developing good eating habits that can make the weight loss sustainable.  A person needs to go step by step, to grow gradually and adjust and accommodate to each level before trying to climb higher or it will not last.

This was Pharoah's argument.  "Lchu na ha'gevarim," let those who are giborim=koveish es yitzro, those who have shown themselves already to be religiously committed, those who have been on top of the mountain for awhile, leave Egypt to serve G-d.  But how can you demand that everyone, even those who, until Moshe started making demands, are no different than their Egyptian counterparts -- halalu ovdei avodah zarah v'halalu ovdei avodah zarah -- pick up suddenly and leave?  רְא֕וּ כִּ֥י רָעָ֖ה נֶ֥גֶד פְּנֵיכֶֽם -- they people are still attracted to רָעָ֖ה, their same old ways, their same old lifestyle.  Even if they go out and have a chag l'Hashem, it's a one time deal and they will quickly revert back to who they are now.  Moshe, you are asking for a מי יעלה without considering מי יקום, and it can't work.

Pharoah indeed had a point, as we see time and again from the rebelliousness of Bnei Yisrael in the midbar.  Yetzi'as Mitzrayim was a tremendous opportunity, as Hashem brought us up the ladder in one shot, על כנפי נשׁרים, but at the same time it was a tremendous challenge, as מי יעלה demands מי יקום or it is for naught.

issur melacha as a din in "mikra kodesh"

 An interesting chiddush din which Maharal derives from Rashi:

וּבַיּ֤וֹם הָרִאשׁוֹן֙ מִקְרָא־קֹ֔דֶשׁ וּבַיּוֹם֙ הַשְּׁבִיעִ֔י מִקְרָא־קֹ֖דֶשׁ יִהְיֶ֣ה לָכֶ֑ם כׇּל־מְלָאכָה֙ לֹא־יֵעָשֶׂ֣ה בָהֶ֔ם אַ֚ךְ אֲשֶׁ֣ר יֵאָכֵ֣ל לְכׇל־נֶ֔פֶשׁ ה֥וּא לְבַדּ֖וֹ יֵעָשֶׂ֥ה לָכֶֽם׃ (12:16)

Rashi comments: לא יעשה בהם – אפילו על ידי אחרים  

Ramban asks: who is the "acheirim" that Rashi is referring to?  If it is a Jew, then there already is an issur for that person to do melacha; if it is a nochri, then there is no issur d'oraysa of a nochri doing work for a Jew on Y"T or Shabbos, so that can't be what the pasuk is talking about.

Mizrachi answers that the "acheirim" here is a nochri and Rashi is just quoting an asmachta as pshat in the pasuk.  (The issue here may be whether asmachta is just a mnenomic device, or whether there is some connection between the din and the words of the pasuk.)  Maharal in Gur Aryeh, however, learns that "acheirim" is referring to a Jew.  Aside from the issur melacha of doing work yourself on Y"T, there is a separate issur of having a Jew do work on your behalf.  

Why should there be such an issur on Y"T and not on Shabbos?   R' Chaim Elazari explains that aside from the aspect of each individual not doing melacha and observing Shabbos and Y"T as a personal day of rest, Y"T has an additional element of being a "mikra kodesh."  Ramban in P' Emor (23:2) explains this term as meaning that Y"T is a day in which the tzibur gathers for tefilah and hallel and simcha -- it is a public holiday.  (It could be according to Ramban that tefilah b'tzibur on Y"T is a kiyum d'oraysa).    

What Rashi is telling us is that by having someone else do work, although you have not violated the personal aspect of resting on Y"T since you are not doing anything, you have violated the "mikra kodesh" aspect of the day by taking away from it being an all inclusive public celebration.

I don't understand R' Elazari's chiddush.  In the very Ramban he refers to, the Ramban writes with respect to Shabbos: שגם הוא יום מועד, נקרא אותו מקרא קדש,  According to Ramban, Shabbos is also called a mikra kodesh.  So hadra kushya l'duchta, why do we only find this din mentioned with respect to Y"T and not Shabbos?

if time allowed

  וַיֹּאפ֨וּ אֶת־הַבָּצֵ֜ק אֲשֶׁ֨ר הוֹצִ֧יאוּ מִמִּצְרַ֛יִם עֻגֹ֥ת מַצּ֖וֹת כִּ֣י לֹ֣א חָמֵ֑ץ כִּֽי־גֹרְשׁ֣וּ מִמִּצְרַ֗יִם וְלֹ֤א יָֽכְלוּ֙ לְהִתְמַהְמֵ֔הַּ וְגַם־צֵדָ֖ה לֹא־עָשׂ֥וּ לָהֶֽם

We read in the haggadah "Matzah zu she'anu ochlim al shum mah?" and the haggadah goes on to answer, as seems to be pshat in our pasuk (12:39), that the Egyptians were in such a rush to kick us out that they did not even give us time to bake bread for the road.

The Ran in Pesachim (25b in pages of RIF) infers a big chiddush from this statement.  The implication of the haggadah and of the pasuk is that had we had time, we could have baked bread even though it was Pesach -- no problem of bal yera'ah!   

Ramban explains the pasuk differently to avoid this conclusion:  

וטעם ויאפו את הבצק – שאפו אותו מצות מפני המצוה שנצטוו: שאור לא ימצא בבתיכם כי כל אוכל מחמצת ונכרתה

ואמר כי גורשו ממצרים – לומר שאפו אותו בדרך בעבור כי גורשו ממצרים ולא יכלו להתמהמה לאפות אותו בעיר, ולשאת אותו אפוי מצות, ועל כן נשאו אותו בצק ומשארותם צרורות בשמלותם על שכמם (שמות י״ב:ל״ד), ומהרו ואפו אותו טרם יחמץ בדרך או בסכות, כשבאו שם לשעה קלה כדברי רבותינו.

The pasuk speaks about the dough אֲשֶׁ֨ר הוֹצִ֧יאוּ מִמִּצְרַ֛יִם, which they took out of Egypt and baked into matzah on the road.  According to Ramban, two things the require explanation: 1) why they were eating matzah and not bread; 2) why they had to bake it on the road and not at home.  The answer to the first question, the pasul tells is,  is that כִּ֣י לֹ֣א חָמֵ֑ץ, because Hashem had prohibited chametz and commanded Bnei Yisrael to eat matzah.  The answer to the second question is that the Egyptians rushed them out, כִּֽי־גֹרְשׁ֣וּ מִמִּצְרַ֗יִם וְלֹ֤א יָֽכְלוּ֙ לְהִתְמַהְמֵ֔הַּ.  

The difficulty with the Ran (as the Tzlach points out) is that the Mishna (Pesachim 95) lists the differences between Pesach Mitzrayim and Pesach as celebrated in future years and absent from that list is the Ran's assumption that there was no prohibition of bal yera'eh on that first Pesach in Egypt.

The difficulty with Ramban is that the pshat may work well for the pasuk, but it does not fit the haggadah so well. "Matzah zu...al shum mah" sounds like we are offering an explanation for why we eat matzah, not just for why it was baked it on the road.   

what it takes to be a leader

The Yalkut Shimoni (Shmos ch 3) writes:

 וּמֹשֶׁה הָיָה רֹעֶה, כְּתִיב (תהלים י״א:ה׳) ״ה׳ צַדִּיק יִבְחָן״, אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק, בַּמֶּה בּוֹחֵן אֶת הַצַּדִּיקִים, בְּמִרְעֶה. דָּוִד נִבְחָן בְּמִרְעֶה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״מֵאַחַר עָלוֹת הֵבִיאוֹ לִרְעוֹת בְּיַעֲקֹב עַמּוֹ״. [עָמוֹס] נִבְחָן בְּמִרְעֶה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (עמוס ז׳:ט״ו) ״וַיִּקָּחֵנִי ה׳ מֵאַחֲרֵי הַצֹּאן״. אַף מֹשֶׁה נִבְחָן בְּמִרְעֶה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר וּמשֶׁה הָיָה רֹעֶה.

Hashem tests tzadikim to see if they are worthy of leading Klal Yisrael before he turns over the reins to them.  How does he test them?  By seeing how they behave as shepherds.  If they can manage a flock of sheep, then Hashem turns over his flock of Klal Yisrael to them.

Let's look back at how Moshe got that job of being a shepherd.  Moshe was a prince in Egypt, but he threw away his position and intervened when he saw a Jewish slave being abused.  Pharoah wanted to kill him, so he was forced to flee.  When he got to Midyan, he saw the shepherds there treating the daughters of Yisro unfairly, and once again he intervened to set things right and stand up for the underdog when no one else would.  

None of that was sufficient to earn him the job of leader of Klal Yisrael.  Yet if a little sheep ran off on its own away from the flock and Moshe had to chase it down and carry it back, that proved that he was fit to be the leader of Klal Yisrael.  

It's not the one time act of heroism or bravery that proves someone has what it takes to lead.  It's the day in and day out show of caring in doing what seems like a mundane and thankless job that proves it.  (from R' Nissim Yagen)

don't wait for a crisis

 וְגַ֣ם׀ אֲנִ֣י שָׁמַ֗עְתִּי אֶֽת־נַאֲקַת֙ בְּנֵ֣י יִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל אֲשֶׁ֥ר מִצְרַ֖יִם מַעֲבִדִ֣ים אֹתָ֑ם 

So which is it -- was Hashem moved by the cries of Bnei Yisrael, in which case  אֲשֶׁ֥ר מִצְרַ֖יִם מַעֲבִדִ֣ים אֹתָ֑ם is extraneous, or was Hashem moved by the injustice of the Egyptian persecution, irrespective of whether anyone else cried out or objected to it, in which case אֶֽת־נַאֲקַת֙ בְּנֵ֣י יִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל is extraneous?

The Oheiv Yisrael (also R' Liebele Eiger) explains the pasuk as follows: many people go through life ho-hum without thinking too much about G-d, until one day when the going gets tough, and then suddenly its time to break open the Tehillim and rediscover what avodas Hashem means.  Klal Yisrael in Egypt was pushed until their backs were against the wall, and so they cried out to Hashem for help.  But what they cried about is more than the pain of slavery.  What they cried about is the fact that it took a crisis to bring them to that point.  They cried because  אֲשֶׁ֥ר מִצְרַ֖יִם מַעֲבִדִ֣ים אֹתָ֑ם -- the Egyptians were the ones that drove them to avodas Hashem.  It shouldn't take a crisis to bring the children of Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov to speak to their Father upstairs.

a hashkafa of "lo nachon" vs a hashkafa of "assur" -- should we have an innate sense of right and wrong?

When Pharoah finally gave in a little bit and told Moshe that he can offer korbanos provided he do so in Mitzrayim, Moshe turned him down.  "Lo nachon la'asos kein ki toavas Mitzrayim nizbach..." (8:22).  Chasam Sofer notes Moshe's choice of words -- "lo nachon," it's not the right thing to do.  The Egyptian people don't want to see us sacrificing their gods.  It's not menchlishkeit.  Pharoah, you think we are a bunch of barbarians, but that's not who we are.

This diyuk of Chasam Sofer I think speaks to the difference between my father's generation and my children's generation.  The vast majority of Jews of my father's generation were not yeshiva educated and did not think in terms of assur or mutar, what it says in a seif katan somewhere in the mishna berura.  But those old timers knew the words, or the concept, of "lo nachon."  Certain things were just not done because it was not right.  Today, baruch Hashem our kids all know how to dig up all kinds of obscure chumros brought down in all the latest seforim, but the concept of "lo nachon" seems to have vanished.  Too many people seem to have no inner moral compass, no innate sense of right and wrong, no thought as to what is proper before they even get to what it says in Shulchan Aruch.

The Yerushalmi in B"M (8a) relates (I'm quoting the Sefaria translation):

Shimon ben Shetah was dealing with flax [as his profession]. His students said to him: ‘Master, leave it behind and we will buy you a donkey and you won’t need to work so much,’ and they bought him a donkey from an Arab, and it had a jewel hanging from it[s neck]. They came to him and said him: ‘from now on you won’t have to work again.’ He said to them: ‘why?’ They said to him: ‘ We bought you a donkey from an Arab and it had a jewel hanging from it[s neck]!’ He said to them: ‘Did the owner know?’ They said to him: ‘no.’ He said to them: ‘go return it.’ [Later students objected to this story:] But didn’t Rav Huna Bibi bar Gozlon say in the name of Rav, said they responded before Rabbi, even according to the one who says an item stolen from a gentile is prohibited, all agree that an item lost by a gentile is permitted!?’ ‘What, do you think Shimon ben Shetah is a barbarian? Shimon wished to hear ‘blessed be the God of the Jews’ more than all the wages of this world.

The difference between Shimon ben Shetach and his students is the difference between a world view of assur/mutar and a world view of lo nachon.

So which is better -- to know something is wrong and refrain from doing it out of instinct, or to always have to look up the din in Shulchan Aruch to know good from bad?

Sounds like this is exactly the question the Rambam addresses in Shmoneh Perakim (ch 6).  Rambam asks: the Torah is supposed to shape a person to be moral, to not want to steal or harm people, etc., yet Chazal tell us that a person should not say that he doesn't want to eat pig because it is not healthy or tastes bad, but rather because Hashem said not to eat it.  In other words, don't refrain because you think it is wrong, just obey because of what it says in Shulchan Aruch!

The Rambam distinguishes between mitzvos sichliyos and other mitzvos.  It makes rational sense to not steal, so a person should not want to do so.  It makes no sense not to eat pig, so we obey simply because G-d said so.

The distinction is not as clear cut as it seems.  R' Amital in this piece, based on R' Kook, greatly expands the category of rational mitzvos to include things like observing Shabbos.  The Shem m'Shmuel (Parshas Tzav) goes a step further (I recall seeing my wife's grandfather also took this same approach, but can't track down where at the moment):

האומנם כי לכאורה יקשה על הנחה זו מהא דאל יאמר אדם אי אפשי בבשר חזיר אלא אפשי ואבי שבשמים גזר עלי, וידוע דעת הרמב"ם שיצא לחלוק בין עבירות השכליות והשמיעיות, ולדידי הפי' עפ"י דברי הא"ע בלאו דלא תחמוד שרבים תמהו איך אפשר שאדם לא יחמוד לדבר יפה ונחמד לעיניו ונתן משל לזה שהוא כמו שלא יתאוה האיש להיות לו כנפים לעוף למעלה כי דבר הנמנע לא יתאוה לו הטבע, ככה צריך איש הישראלי לידע שכל דבר שלא ניתן לו מן השמים לא שייך אליו כלל כמו כנפים לאיש ולא יכול לקחתו בתחבולותיו והוא נמנע ממנו ע"כ לא יתאוה לו כלל ודפח"ח, ואף אנו נאמר שכ"ש דבר שאסרה תורה היא עוד יותר נמנע מפחמין לאכילה, ומה שאמרו ז"ל אבל אפשי ואבי שבשמים גזר עלי, היינו שבאם לא הי' גזר הי' באמת דבר טוב כי הביט בתורה וברא את העולם, ואם עפ"י התורה הי' זה מותר ומאכל לאיש הישראלי אז הי' לו צורה אחרת והי' באמת טוב, אבל עכשו שהתורה אסרה אין זה רק רע וכפחמין לאכילה ואי אפשר להתאוה לו כלל, וע"ד זה תקיש לכל העבירות שבאם לא אסרה תורה בהכרח שהי' לו צורה אחרת והי' טוב וראוי, אבל עתה שאסרה תורה שוב נמאס ואין ראוי להשתוקק אליו, וע"כ המשתוקק אליו הוא חוטא וצריך כפרה:

The only difference, says Sm"S, between a mitzvah sichlis and a mitzvah like not eating pig, is whether the mitzvah a priori makes sense.  However, once G-d commands us not to eat pig, we have to view eating pig as repugnant, as something we would never want to do.  

He draws an analogy to the Ibn Ezra's interpretation of lo tachmod.  Ibn Ezra asks how the Torah can command a person not to desire something -- can a person control his heart?  You see you neighbor has a nice car and nature takes over and you want it.  Ibn Ezra answers that a pauper would never dream of marrying a princess -- his mind places it so far outside the realm of possibility that it's unimaginable.  It would be like having a desire to flap your arms and fly.  So too, once G-d commands us not to eat pig, to us that act has to become like some unimaginable fantasy, a thought we would never entertain, much less struggle to overcome.

Ibn Ezra is speaking on a psychological level as to what drives a person's attractions and desires.  Sm"S is going a step further: It's not just that psychologically we must view eating pig as unimaginable (irrespective of whether there is really any harm in doing so), but that once G-d commanded it, it actually becomes morally so.

k'zayis matzah -- shiur in the chiyuv or shiur in the kiyum mitzvah?

The Rambam (Chametz u'Matzah 6:1) formulates the mitzvah of achilas matzah as follows:

מצות עשה מן התורה לאכול מצה בליל חמשה עשר שנאמר בערב תאכלו מצות. בכל מקום ובכל זמן. ולא תלה אכילה זו בקרבן הפסח אלא זו מצוה בפני עצמה ומצותה כל הלילה. אבל בשאר הרגל אכילת מצה רשות רצה אוכל מצה רצה אוכל אורז או דוחן או קליות או פירות. אבל בליל חמשה עשר בלבד חובה ומשאכל כזית יצא ידי חובתו:

The Rambam could just as easily have said מצות עשה מן התורה לאכול **כזית** מצה בליל חמשה עשר Why the circuitous מצות עשה מן התורה לאכול מצה...משאכל כזית יצא ?

B'pashtus one would have thought that once you eat your kzayis of matzah, the mitzvah is over and if you continue stuffing your face, that's for your own pleasure alone.  But it seems from the Rambam (and this is also the opinion of Maharal in Gevuros Hashem ch 48) that that's not how it works.   There is a mitzvah to eat, period -- the more, the better.  Every additional bite is a kiyum.  If you want to do the minimum, then the Rambam at the end of the halacha tells us that you are yotzei with a k'zayis. 

The gemara (Pesachim 107) relates that Rava used to drink a lot of wine on erev pesach so that he would have an appetite to eat a lot of matzah during the night.  Rav Wahrman (She'eiris Yosef I:1) brings proof from this gemara to the Rambam's point.  Had the mitzvah been to eat a k'zayis, there would be no point to eating more.  

(Tos in Kiddushin 38 writes that you can't say aseh doche lo ta'aseh when eating a second k'zayis, but that's because dechiya depends on their being a chiyuv, not just a kiyum.)

The gemara (Sukkah 41) similarly writes that there were people who held their lulav and esrog all day, even while davening.  The gemara asks how that can be when there is an issur of holding things in your hand during tefilah, and the gemara answers that taking the lulav is different because it's a mitzvah.  Even though m'ikar ha'din a person is yotzei netilas lulav just by picking it up, we see from the gemara that that's just a minimum, like eating just a k'zayis of matzah, but if you do more, it also counts as a mitzvah.

The gemara (R"H 16) writes that we blow shofar during shmoneh esrei on R"H even though we already did the mitzvah before starting musaf in order to confuse the satan.  Rashi comments that by blowing extra times we demonstrate our love of the mitzvah.  In his sefer on chumash (shmos p50) Rav Noson Gestetner suggests that you see the same chidush from this Rashi.  Had there been a defined shiur beyond which there is no kiyum, by blowing extra kolos we would just be entertaining ourselves.  Rashi is telling us that the additional kolos are a mitzvah, as there is no maximum limit to "yom teru'ah."

persecution is a symptom, not the problem

 וָאֵרֵ֞ד לְהַצִּיל֣וֹ׀ מִיַּ֣ד מִצְרַ֗יִם וּֽלְהַעֲלֹתוֹ֮ מִן־הָאָ֣רֶץ הַהִוא֒ אֶל־אֶ֤רֶץ טוֹבָה֙ וּרְחָבָ֔ה אֶל־אֶ֛רֶץ זָבַ֥ת חָלָ֖ב וּדְבָ֑שׁ אֶל־מְק֤וֹם הַֽכְּנַעֲנִי֙ וְהַ֣חִתִּ֔י וְהָֽאֱמֹרִי֙ וְהַפְּרִזִּ֔י וְהַחִוִּ֖י וְהַיְבוּסִֽי׃

A number of meforshim ask the following question (I took this quote from Maor vaShemesh) in one form or another:

 גם מה לבשר להם תיכף שביאתם תהי לארץ טובה זבת חלב הלא לעת כזאת רב להם אם ינצלו מהעבודה הקשה אשר עובד בם

Klal Yisrael was suffering bitterly under Egyptian slavery.  They were not looking to be brought to a land of milk and honey -- they were just looking for a day that they did not have to wake up and face an Egyptian taskmaster holding a whip over their heads.  Why did Hashem introduce the plan for them to enter Eretz Yisrael  now?  Why not leave that discussion until after the exodus?

One can interpret the question in two ways: 1) Psychologically -- if the goal is to give Klal Yisrael hope to sustain them, then it would be enough to tell them that their slavery would end.  There was no need to add the cherry on the cake of coming to Eretz Yisrael.   2) Existentially -- the response to the threat against Jewish well being should be to save them from danger.  Why introduce coming to the land into the mix?

The answer, I think, can be gleaned from modern Jewish history.  In 1903, when the sixth World Zionist Congress met, Herzl introduced a proposal that neatly caused a rift in the entire Zionist movement.  Russian Jews were in immanent danger; anti-semitism was rampant.  The dream of a homeland in Israel seemed exactly that -- a dream.  So Herzl proposed that they look elsewhere in the interim, to establish a colony in Uganda or some other territory that could be more easily attained, and in this way provide a means of escape for those Jews whose lives were on the line.

רָאֹ֥ה רָאִ֛יתִי אֶת־עֳנִ֥י עַמִּ֖י

וָאֵרֵ֞ד לְהַצִּיל֣וֹ׀ מִיַּ֣ד מִצְרַ֗יִם

Let's talk about saving Jews and put this Israel thing on the back burner.

Herzl's proposal was ultimately rejected.  There were pragmatic flaws that would render the whole plan moot, but what is more significant is the ideological opposition to it.  

Writing a few decades later, Ben Tzion Dinur, who would become one of Israel's education ministers, wrote, "Zionism is a revolution against Exile, a declaration of war on it  The first requirement for victory is to know the enemy, {which is} Jewish life in Exile" (quoted in We Stand Divided - The Rift Between American Jews and Israel, by Daniel Gordis, p61, as translated by Gordis). 

Yetzi'as Mitzrayim is the template for geulah.  Therefore, it is critical, as Dinur wrote, "to know the enemy," to define what geulah hopes to achieve and overcome.  The enemy is not slavery or persecution; redemption is not about getting a respite from work or a respite from being beaten up.  That is but a partial solution, a stop along the way.  Those afflictions are but symptoms of the underlying disease.  The only way to truly fix the cycle that repeats itself over and over during our history in exile, i.e. we find safe heaven in a country for a few decades, maybe even a few centuries, persecution starts, eventually we get kicked out and are forced to take up home elsewhere, and then the process repeats itself all over again, is for us to come back to our own homeland.  

Yes, Hashem could have told Moshe to tell the Jews in Egypt that their suffering would be alleviated and left it at that and the people would have been happy.  But the Torah wants to give us more than that -- it wants to give us the recipe to fix the underlying problem, not just a bandaid.  That can only be done by our return to Eretz Yisrael.