hava'ra -- one of the 39 melachos with a lesser onesh, or not a melacha?

1)  וַיֹּ֣אמֶר מֹשֶׁ֔ה אֶל⁠־כׇּל⁠־עֲדַ֥ת בְּנֵֽי⁠־יִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל לֵאמֹ֑ר זֶ֣ה הַדָּבָ֔ר אֲשֶׁר⁠־צִוָּ֥ה ה׳ לֵאמֹֽר

Rashi comments:  זה הדבר אשר צוה – לי,⁠ לאמר – לכם.   Moshe was telling Bn"Y that Hashem had spoken to him and he was charged with the task of conveying the information to them.  Isn't that how every mitzvah in the Torah was given?  (See the meforshei Rashi)

I found a pshat in a sefer called Ramat Shmuel by one of the chachmei Morocco that fits the words very nicely.  Moshe was about to ask Bn"Y for donations for the mishkan.  When the Rabbi or the President of the shul makes an appeal for some cause and people give, sometimes they feel like they are giving because the Rabbi or President twisted their arm, or gave a great speech, or maybe they like the Rabbi or think it really is a great cause.  Moshe said to Bn"Y that he doesn't want to hear any of that. "Don't say I am giving because of Moshe."  Rather, Moshe said,  וַיֹּ֣אמֶר מֹשֶׁ֔ה אֶל⁠־כׇּל⁠־עֲדַ֥ת בְּנֵֽי⁠־יִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל, that  לֵאמֹ֑ר, to say when you give:  זֶ֣ה הַדָּבָ֔ר אֲשֶׁר⁠־צִוָּ֥ה ה׳ לֵאמֹֽר "This is what Hashem told Moshe to say."  It's not my arm twisting, the cause is not my idea, don't give because you like me -- I'm just the middleman.  It all comes from Hashem; it's His message.

R' Shimon Sofer says a similar pshat.  Chazal extol the virtues of someone who motivates others to give even more than someone who just gives himself.  Moshe did not just want people to give, but   לֵאמֹ֑ר, tell others about it, tell others  זֶ֣ה הַדָּבָ֔ר אֲשֶׁר⁠־צִוָּ֥ה ה׳ לֵאמֹֽר, so that word gets out and they will be motivated as well.  

 

2) The parsha singles out for mention the issur of lighting a fire on Shabbos.  לֹא⁠־תְבַעֲר֣וּ אֵ֔שׁ בְּכֹ֖ל מֹשְׁבֹֽתֵיכֶ֑ם בְּי֖וֹם הַשַּׁבָּֽת.  The meforshim offer various reasons in pshat why this issur in particular was singled out, and why davka here when the mitzvah of Shabbos had been given earlier (see R' Chaim Kanievski in Taama d'Kra).  Rashi quotes the halachic derush of Chazal: יש מרבותינו אומרים (בבלי שבת ע׳.): הבערה ללאו יצאת, ויש מהן אומרים: לחלק יצאת.  One view is that this is the source for the rule that you are chayav a chatas on each individual melacha done on shabbos and you don't have to violate all 39 at once to be chayav for chilul shabbos.  The other view is that lighting a fire is an exception and is only an issur lav, not kareis/chatas. 

 

Yesh lachkor: according to the view that hava'ra is a lav, does that mean it is not one of the 39 melachos, or it is a melacha, just it has a lesser punishment?

 

Nafka minos:

 

1) Would the hasra'ah for violating hava'ra be "lo taaseh kol melacha" (putting aside the Minchas Chinuch's discussion of whether one needs to include the specific melacha being violated in the hasra'ah), or would it be "lo tiva'aru eish?"

 

2) Is there an issur of hava'ra on Yom Tov?  The 39 melachos carry over to Y"T, but if hava'ra is a seperate issur, maybe not (similar question is asked about the issur of shevisas b'heima.)

 

The gemara in Pesachim (5a-b) quotes R' Akiva as proving that "ba'yom ha'rishon tashbisu chametz" must mean erev Pesach and not the first day of chag because burning one's chametz on Y"T itself is assur.

 

רבי עקיבא אומר אינו צריך הרי הוא אומר אך ביום הראשון תשביתו שאור מבתיכם וכתיב כל מלאכה לא (תעשו) ומצינו להבערה שהיא אב מלאכה

 

The gemara deduces from this proof that R' Akiva holds that hava'ra is singled out l'chaleik, not because it is a lav.  How do we see that from the proof?  Rashi explains that since R' Akiva refers to hava'ra as an אב מלאכה, it must be the same as any of the other 39 melachos.   Tos quotes a Riv"a that the proof is from the fact that hava'ra is prohibited on Y"T.  Had it been a lav, it would be a specific din in hil shabbps (point 2 above).

 

Why didn't Rashi accept the interpretation of Riv"a?  It could be that according to Rashi the din הבערה ללאו יצאת just means the punishment is diminished, but hava'ra still has a shem melacha and therefore would be assur on Y"T too.

 

Rabeinu Chananel has a different pshat entirely in the sugya.  He writes that R' Akiva must hold havra'ra is like any other melacha because if הבערה ללאו יצאת the mitzvas aseh of biur chametz would be doche the lav and it would be allowed on Y"T.  This just begs the question -- even if hava'ra is a melacha like any other, why isn't the aseh of biur chametz doche the lav of doing melacha?  And if you  tell me it's because on Y"T there is not only a lav but an aseh of shabbason as well that goes with it, why can't you say the same thing if הבערה ללאו יצאת and there would be no dechiya?

 

The R'Ch apparently holds (this is the shitas haRashba in Yevamos 6) that the aseh of shabbason only goes hand in hand with items that fall in the basket of the issur melacha of Y"T.  It does not come into play when dealing with other issurim, whether it is mechamer achar be'hemto, or the lav of hava'ra.

GR"A on Mordechai -- "chibas Eretz Yisrael alav"

1) The Rama miPana notes that the name of Haman is mentioned 54 times in the megillah, which corresponds to הגוי אשׂר יעבודו ד״ן אנכי.  Yaakov prayed הציליני נא מי״ד אחי מי״ד עשׂו which also is 54.  The Tiferes Banim says the same regarding שׁומר נפשׁות חסידיו מי״ד רשׁעים יצילם.  I wonder why he doesn't quote the pasuk from לַמְנַצֵּחַ עַל אַיֶּלֶת הַשַּׁחַר, Teh 22, which was said by Esther: הַצִּילָה מֵחֶרֶב נַפְשִׁי מִ"יַּד כֶּלֶב יְחִידָתִי.

2) אִ֣ישׁ יְהוּדִ֔י הָיָ֖ה בְּשׁוּשַׁ֣ן הַבִּירָ֑ה וּשְׁמ֣וֹ מׇרְדֳּכַ֗יא בֶּ֣ן יָאִ֧יר בֶּן⁠־שִׁמְעִ֛י בֶּן⁠־קִ֖ישׁ אִ֥ישׁ יְמִינִֽי׃

אֲשֶׁ֤ר הׇגְלָה֙ מִיר֣וּשָׁלַ֔יִם עִם⁠־הַגֹּלָה֙ אֲשֶׁ֣ר הׇגְלְתָ֔ה עִ֖ם יְכׇנְיָ֣ה מֶֽלֶךְ⁠־יְהוּדָ֑ה אֲשֶׁ֣ר הֶגְלָ֔ה נְבוּכַדְנֶצַּ֖רא מֶ֥לֶךְ בָּבֶֽל

 

The repetition and redundancy of the shoresh גלה so many times in the pasuk is glaring.  GR"A writes as follows:

 

אמר כאן הגלה ג׳ פעמים: ״אשר הגלה מירושלים״, ״אשר הגלתה״, ״אשר הגלה״ להודיע חיבת ארץ ישראל עליו, שבכל פעם חזר לירושלים והיה נגלה ג׳ פעמים וזהו שאמרו (בגמרא יג, א) שגלה מעצמו כלו׳ מדעתו שחזר לארץ ישראל משום כך נגלה פעם שנית, וכן פעם שלישית ואמר כאן ד׳ פעמים לשון של גלות להורות שכל הד׳ גליות יזכרו את גאולתו, כמו שנאמר (ט, כח) וזכרם לא יסוף.

 

You kicked Mordechai out of Eretz Yisrael again, and again, and yet again, but each time he kept trying to get back.  

Mashal l'mah h'dava domeh -- imagine going on a safari and bringing home some exotic bird to keep as a pet.  You're not happy with just a goldfish, guinea pig, or dog -- you want something more exciting.  Inevitably, the day will come when you leave the cage door open by accident and there goes your pet, flying off into the wild.  Even though you cared for it, fed it, put little toys in its birdcage, all that doesn't matter.  You can't change the teva of the creature.

 

The teva of a Jew is to be in Eretz Yisrael.  It's like a magnet that draws us back.  You can put us in the 5 Towns with more than a dozen kosher restaurants, shuls, yeshivos, etc., but at the end of the day, you've just decorated the cage nicely and provided better birdfood.  A Jew who is true to his teva should want to run off as soon as he can.

 

Maharal in Ohr Chadash adds as follows:

 

כתב זה שלא תאמר שיצא חוץ לארץ ישראל מדעתו, ודבר זה אינו ראוי לצדיק. ועל זה אמר ״אשר הגלה״, ולא יצא חוץ לארץ מדעתו. ושלא יקשה כיון שהיה מרדכי מוכן לגאולה באחרונה, אם כן היה ראוי שלא ילך בגולה הוא בעצמו.

 

You can’t say, "I love it here in galus, but don't worry – when the time comes, I'll be ready to leave."  That’s not מוכן לגאולה.  That's being comfortable where you are until you are forced to leave.  And by forced, I don't necessarily mean in a negative sense.  When mashiach comes we will all be "forced" to change in a positive sense.  מוכן לגאולה means the opposite.  You are ready to leave now.  For whatever reasons, circumstance forces you to stay, not by choice --  ולא יצא חוץ לארץ מדעתו, 

 

Later in the megillah we read  ויהי [כאמרם] (באמרם) אליו יום ויום ולא שמע אליהם ויגידו להמן לראות היעמדו דברי מרדכי כי⁠ הגיד להם אשר⁠ הוא יהודי.

 

The Midrash writes:

 

ולא עוד אלא, שאנו איסגנסירין של הקב״ה, שכל השבטים נולדו בחוצה לארץ, וזקני נולד בארץ ישראל. אמרין* ליה ונימר ליה, מיד ״ויגידו להמן וגו׳⁠ ⁠⁠״. אמר להון המן, אמרינן ליה זקנו הלא הוא השתחוה לזקני, הדה הוא דכתיב (בראשית לג, ו-ז) ״ותגשן השפחות וגו׳ ואחר נגש יוסף ורחל וישתחוו״. היתיב, ועדיין לא נולד בנימין. אמרין ליה הדה הוא דכתיב ״ויגידו להמן

 

Binyanim was the only one of the shevatim born in Eretz Yisrael.  Maharal comments עוד, כי הוא נולד בארץ ישראל, שמזה תראה כי הוא שכן אל השם יתברך, וקשה להוציא אותו משם.   

 

Maharal is alluding to Moshe's bracha to Binyamin of וּבֵ֥ין כְּתֵפָ֖יו שָׁכֵֽן (Devarim 33:12).  Rashi there comments that Beis haMikdash was built in Binyamin's portion.  Maharal is adding that it's the fact that Binyamin was born in Eretz Yisrael that gives him this segulah. 

 

The megillah needs to be read against the backdrop of events in Sefer Ezra.  The 10 sons of Haman according to Chazal were those who claimed the Jews were rebelling and wanted to put a stop to the reconstruction of the Beis haMikdash.  Achashveirosh offered Esther "ad chatzi ha'malchus" but no more, which Chazal take to mean he excluded binyan haMikdash.  The Shem m'Shmuel writes that just as at daybreak, "ayales ha'shachar," the sun has not risen yet but its rays are peeking over the horizon, so too, the nes of Purim really stems from the power of Bayis Sheni that was just over the time horizon in the future.  The great challenge to those who lived then was to not get distracted by the lavish party of Achashveirosh, to remain מוכן לגאולה, as Maharal puts it, and not to forget who they were and where they came from.  The end was just over the horizon, if only they could hold on.

lomdus of the chiyuv/kiyum of ben mukaf chomah reading megillah on 14 Adar erev Shabbos

Since 15 Adar falls on Shabbos this year cities that are mukaf chomah will celebrate Purim on Fri, 14 Adar, along with everyone else.  Yesh lachkor: is the chiyuv of megillah for mukaf chomah moved to 14 Adar, or is their chiyuv really on 15 Adar, but since the megillah cannot be read then because of gezeirah d'Rabbah, they get a makeup day on the 14th?  If the former is true, a ben mukaf chomah can read for a ben ir because they share the same chiyuv.  If the latter is true, perhaps not.

A similar issue is debated by the Rishonim.  Rashi writes that when the bnei kfarim read on earlier dates like 11,12, 13, it is the bnei ha'ir who read for them.  Tos (Yevamos 14) disagrees based on a Yerushalmi that says a ben ir whose chiyuv is on the 14th cannot read for a ben mukaf chomah whose chiyuv is on the 15th.  How then can a ben ir who has to read on the 14th be motzi a ben kfar who reads earlier?  (I thought I posted on this issue before, but can't find it - lots of Purim material on the blog).  The hesber for shitas Rashi (Steipler, Brisker Rav) is that while Chazal allowed the possibility for the kiyum mitzvah on earlier days, the chiyuv for kfarim is the same as that of the ben ir.  It's the same chiyiv of "arei perazos."  However, for someone living in a walled city, however, it's not just the kiyum mitzvah which is on the 15^th – it's the chiyuv which is different.

 

Based on this lomdus, it would seem that while a ben ir and a ben mukaf chomah might this year share a kiyum mitzvah on the 14^th, they are fulfilling different chiyuvim and therefore cannot be motzi each other.    

 

A few other potential nafka minot (many of these were discussed in the Pninei Halacha sheets put out by Yeshivas Mir):

 

1) Some suggest that the reason for the BH"G's shita that women cannot be motzi men in megillah is because men are chayav m'divrei kabbalah but women are only chayavos mi'derabbanan because af hein ha'yahu b'oso ha'nes.  Those chiyuvim are not parallel.  This year, when the bnei mukaf chomah read on the 14th, can a women be motzi a man?  If the chiyuv mi'divrei kabbalah of reading on the 15th is effectively cancelled because of gzeirah d'Rabbah, men are left with a chiyuv derabbanan makeup day of the 14th.  That is parallel to the chiyuv derabbanan which women have.   However, if the chiyuv on the 15th remains in place and just the kiyum is moved to the 14th, the disparity between the chiyuv of men and women remains in place.  

2) According to Rama we say a bracha of she'hechiyanu on the megillah reading of the day (Rambam holds that there is only one she'hechiyanu said at night -- reading during the day is an encore performance of the same mitzvah).  The Aderet explained that  the reason for 2 birchot she'hechiyanu is because the night reading is derabannan; the day reading is divrei kabbalah. See this post where we discussed this chidduush.  Based on this logic, it should come out that this year even the bnei mukaf chomah who read during the day do NOT recite she'hechiyanu.  They chiyuv mi'divrei kabbalah is on the 15th.  When they read on the day of 14th, it is only a kiyum derabbanan, same as at night.

 

3) The gemara gives a number of reasons why we do not say hallel on Purim, among them that reading the megillah counts as hallel.  Meiri holds that if one does not have a megillah, one must says hallel.  If a ben mukaf chomah does not have a megillah this year, presumably he would say hallel on shabbos, they day he would be theoretically mechuyav  to read megillah, even though had he had a megillah he would lmaaseh read it on Friday.

 

4) R' Shlomo Zalman Auerbach is quoted as saying that if a baal koreh who is a ben mukaf chomah reads megillah on Friday and then r"l dies before Shabbos, the tzibur was not yotzei.  Since the baal korei never reached the point at which the chiyuv mitzvah kicks in, he only was alive at the time of the kiyum mitzvah, he cannot be motzi anyone. 

 

5) There is a fascinating chiddush of the Maharil Diskin regarding a katan who becomes bar mitzvah on this Shabbos.  The Rishonim discuss why certain cases are exceptions to the rule of gezeirah d'Rabbah, e.g. bris milah.  One answer is that the gezeirah only applies to mitzvos like lulav, shofar, megillah, where the mitzvah is incumbant upon everyone to do.  Since everyone is busy trying doing there own mitzvah, someone who makes a mistake and carries is liable to escape notice and end up violating Shabbos.  Where only one person is involved in doing the mitzvah, e.g. bris milah, all the other people not involved might notice an error and prevent the chilul shabbos.  In our case, the katan who hears megillah on Friday cannot be yotzei since he is not yet a bar chiyuva.  Everyone else was already yotzei by reading on Friday.  Therefore, says Maharil Diskin, the katan should read megillah on Shabbos.  For him it is like the mitzvah of milah -- a mitzvah only a yachid and not everyone is involved in, in which case gezeirah d'Rabbah does not apply.  (See Shu"T Sheivet haLevi 5:83) 

(I wrote this a bit b'kitzur, but hopefull the gist is clear.)

a 4 kugel problem; Chazon Ish on women's obligation to hear zachor; bracha on zachor; why Shaul's fate was sealed; the zechus of yishuv ha'aretz

1) Sherlock Holmes had his three pipe problems.  Apparently zachor is a four kugel problem:

קיים מנהג לאכול בשבת זכור ארבעה סוגים של קוגל, בהתאם לראשי התיבות- "עמלק": 

עפל (ביידיש: תפוחי עץ) מעהל (ביידיש: קמח)  לוקשן (ביידיש: אטריות) קרטופל (ביידיש: תפוחי אדמה).

 ובכך לקיים את מצוות זכירת מעשי עמלק, או מחיית זכר עמלק על ידי אכילת הקוגלים.

My son and I were both wondering where this "minhag" came from.  If you have any info  other than what is on the otzar hachochma forum, pls pass it on.

2) The Chazon Ish brought proof that women are exempt from hearing parshas zachor from the Rosh (Brachos 7:2) that learns the gemara there to mean that R' Eliezer freed his eved to make a minyan for zachor.  An eved has the same chiyuv as women.  If women are obligated in zachor, the eved should have been chayav even without being freed.  R' Chaim Kanievsky countered that even if the eved is chayav, he might not count to make up the minyan.  For example, Rama holds that the bracha of "ha'rav es riveinu" can only be said with a minyan.  Women have a chiyuv to hear megillah, but MB in 690:63 the M"B has a safeik whether they can count for the minyan for purposes of the bracha. 

3) There is no bracha on the mitzvah of tzedaka because the recipient may not accept the gift, in which case the mitzvah is not fulfilled (Shu"T haRashba).  That same concern does not come into play with respect to mishloah manos according to Rama's view that even if the recipient is mochel and does not accept the gift, one is yotzei.  So why no bracha?  Seridei Eish offers a number of sevaros, among them that mishloach manos is really a mitzvah tmidis.  The point of giving gifts is to engender friendship and comradery.  That is not something you should strive for just once a year -- it's something you should aim for every day.  Chazal just formalized a once a year practice to cause us to remember and reflect on what we should be doing every day.  According to Ohr Zarua there is never a bracha on a mitzvah tmidis, and so there is no bracha on m"m.

The same sevara explains why there is no bracha on parshas zachor (a topic we've discussed before).  "Zachor" is a mitzvah tmidis -- every day we should remember what Amalek did.  Tos (Brachos 4) quotes one view that when we say "y'hei shemei rabbah" there is a period after the word "rabbah."  The Torah tells us that Hashem's name is incomplete so long as Amalek exists.  What we are saying is that "yhei shemei," the name of Hashem, "rabbah," should be great=complete again.  We should remember and eliminate Amalek.  Chazal created a formal once yearly reminder of what we should be doing every day.

4) וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלָיו שְׁמוּאֵל קָרַע ה׳ אֶת⁠ מַמְלְכוּת יִשְׂרָאֵל מֵעָלֶיךָ הַיּוֹם וּנְתָנָהּ לְרֵעֲךָ הַטּוֹב מִמֶּךָּ

וְגַם נֵצַח יִשְׂרָאֵל לֹא יְשַׁקֵּר וְלֹא יִנָּחֵם כִּי לֹא אָדָם הוּא לְהִנָּחֵם

Malbi"M explains:

אומר אל תדמה כי היעוד האלהי דומה כיעוד בני אדם, שלפעמים הוא שקר תיכף שמגזם בפיו להרע ובלבבו לא כן ידמה, ופעמים הגם שחושב כן לעשות יתנחם אחר כך ולא יעשה

What could the possible hava amina be to say otherwise?

Radak explains that the pasuk וְגַם נֵצַח יִשְׂרָאֵל לֹא יְשַׁקֵּר וְלֹא יִנָּחֵם is not speaking about Shaul, but rather about David.  B'shlama Shaul, there was never any guarantee from G-d that he would reign forever.  The malchus was contingent on his serving Hashem properly.  However, the promise of malcus to David is eternal.  Even though it was taken from Shaul, it would be David's forever.

Rashi and others, however, read the pasuk as speaking about Shaul, and so hadra kushya l'duchta.  The Meshech Chochma quotes a Turei Even to answer this question.  The gemara (R"H 17) writes that once a gzar din is issued, it cannot be retracted.  The only exception is with respect to a tzibur.  Turei Even asks: but the gemara in R"H writes that even after Yeshayahu haNavi told Chizkiyahu (Yesh 38) that there is a gzar din that he is going to die, Chizkiyahu didn't give up hope and was able to change the gzar din through tefilah?  From here we see, says the Turei Even, that a melech is not treated like a yachid.  A melech represents the nation, and therefore has the din of a tzibur.  Shaul therefore might have thought that in his case too, he is the king, he is like a tzibur, and so gzar din or no gzar din, he can beg Hashem for forgiveness.

Why did it work for Chizkiyahu and not for Shaul?

The Meshech Chochma every few parshiyos brings up a yesod from the Rambam in Peirush HaMishnayos to explain some difficulty.  I've quoted two places where he says it here.  The Rambam says that when a navi is shown a vision of something positive that is supposed to happen, there is no guarantee that it will take place.  It is a possible outcome, but not a guaranteed outcome.  That vision may be contingent on people's behavior, on circumstances, on other factors.  However, if the navi is told to prophesize and tell people what is going to take place, you can take it to the bank.  No matter if the circumstances change, the outcome is guaranteed.  The Torah says you can test a navi.  If a navi makes a promise that doesn't come true, you know he is a navi sheker.  If there was no guarantee of fulfillment, the test wouldn't work.  The Meshech Chochma (this is one of his 2 answers) uses that same yesod here.   קָרַע ה׳ אֶת⁠ מַמְלְכוּת יִשְׂרָאֵל מֵעָלֶיךָ הַיּוֹם וּנְתָנָהּ לְרֵעֲךָ הַטּוֹב מִמֶּךָּ.  Hashem didn't just take the malchus away from Shaul -- Hashem promised it to David.  A prophecy for good cannot be retracted.  

5) The Shu"t Oneg Y"T in his intro explains that when Shaul said to Shmuel בָּרוּךְ אַתָּה לַה׳ הֲקִימֹתִי אֶת⁠ דְּבַר ה׳ he was not crazy.  There was a technical halachic justification for what he did (I discussed it in this post).  The lesson of the haftara is that G-d does not want technical obedience.  What he wants is for us to fulfill his ratzon. The Mahari"L Diskin offers his own variation on that same theme.  Shaul did not just start coming up with rationalizations to spare Amalek out of the blue.  The gemara in Makkos (7a) has a din 

 דתניא רבי יהודה בן דוסתאי אומר משום רבי שמעון בן שטח ברח מארץ לחוצה לארץ אין סותרין את דינו מחוצה לארץ לארץ סותרין את דינו מפני זכותה של ארץ ישראל.  

Rashi explains: מפני זכותה של ארץ ישראל. אולי תועיל למצוא לו פתח של זכות.  Shaul held that it is kibush ha'aretz by the king and nation that establishes kedushas ha'aretz.  Therefore, the din on Amalek that was true before he waged war on them.  Once he conquered their land, all bets were off.  Even for an aku"m, even for Amalek, the zechus of Eretz Yisrael can perhaps help, and therefore he wanted to review whether killing was justified. The punchline remains the same: technically, Shaul's argument might have merit, but it nonetheless circumvented the ratzon Hashem.

The point I want to make from this MahariL Diskin is that kal v'chomer hu! if Shaul thought the zechus of Eretz Yisrael might even help Amalek, surely the zechus of Eretz Yisrael should stand in our favor.  May we be zocheh to finally blot out Amalek and bring the shem HavayaH to completion.

Adar and Binyamin; why the mishkan had to be built lishma

1) As we've discussed many times before, the Tur tells us that the 3 regalim correspond to the Avos and the 12 months of the year correspond to the 12 shevatim.  There are many shitos and variations as to which month matches which sheivet (maybe someone should compile them all into a sefer) but if you simply go by birth order the last month of the year Adar should correspond to Binyamin.

 וַיְהִי בְּצֵאת נַפְשָׁהּ כִּי מֵתָה וַתִּקְרָא שְׁמוֹ בֶּן⁠ אוֹנִי וְאָבִיו קָרָא⁠ לוֹ בִנְיָמִין (35:18)

Ramban explains:

והנכון בעיני: כי אמו קראתו בן אוני ורצתה לומר בן אבלי, .. ולכן קרא אותו: בנימין – בן הכח כי החוזק הוא בימין ולכן קראו בן הכח או בן החוזק. כי הימין בו הגבורה וההצלחה כענין: לב חכם לימינו (קהלת י׳:ב׳), ..רצה להיות קורא אותו בשם שקראתו אמו, כי כן כל בניו בשם שקראו אותם אמותם יקראו, והנה תרגם אותו לטובה ולגבורה.

This is the essence of chodesh Adar, the chodesh of v'nahapoch hu.  Yaakov Avinu changed his son's name from that which connotes sorrow to that which represents strength.  

2) Rashi comments at the opening of our parsha ויקחו לי – לשמי, that the collecting of funds for the mishkan had to be done lishma.  Even though by tzedaka there is a din that הָאוֹמֵר סֶלַע זוֹ לִצְדָקָה בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁיִּחְיֶה בְּנִי אוֹ שֶׁאֶהְיֶה בֶּן הָעוֹלָם הַבָּא הֲרֵי זֶה צַדִּיק גָּמוּר and she'lo lishma is praiseworthy, apparently the mishkan was an exception to the rule.  My wife's grandfather, R' Dov Yehuda Shochet, explained that when it comes to avodah zarah, Hashem takes account of machshava as well as deed (Chulin 142).  The mishkan was a kaparah for cheit ha'eigel, an issur avoda zarah.  Therefore, since the cheit was one which involved the sin of tainted machshava, the tikun demands a purity of machshava.  

אָמַר הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא לְיִשְׂרָאֵל, מָכַרְתִּי לָכֶם תּוֹרָתִי, כִּבְיָכוֹל נִמְכַּרְתִּי עִמָּהּ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: וְיִקְחוּ לִי תְּרוּמָה, מָשָׁל לְמֶלֶךְ שֶׁהָיָה לוֹ בַּת יְחִידָה, בָּא אֶחָד מִן הַמְּלָכִים וּנְטָלָהּ, בִּקֵּשׁ לֵילֵךְ לוֹ לְאַרְצוֹ וְלִטֹּל לְאִשְׁתּוֹ. אָמַר לוֹ: בִּתִּי שֶׁנָּתַתִּי לְךָ יְחִידִית הִיא, לִפְרשׁ מִמֶּנָּה אֵינִי יָכוֹל, לוֹמַר לְךָ אַל תִּטְלָהּ אֵינִי יָכוֹל לְפִי שֶׁהִיא אִשְׁתֶּךָ, אֶלָּא, זוֹ טוֹבָה עֲשֵׂה לִי, שֶׁכָּל מָקוֹם שֶׁאַתָּה הוֹלֵךְ קִיטוֹן אֶחָד עֲשֵׂה לִי, שֶׁאָדוּר אֶצְלְכֶם, שֶׁאֵינִי יָכוֹל לְהַנִּיחַ אֶת בִּתִּי. כָּךְ אָמַר הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא לְיִשְׂרָאֵל, נָתַתִּי לָכֶם אֶת הַתּוֹרָה, לִפְרשׁ הֵימֶנָּה אֵינִי יָכוֹל, לוֹמַר לָכֶם אַל תִּטְלוּהָ אֵינִי יָכוֹל, אֶלָּא בְּכָל מָקוֹם שֶׁאַתֶּם הוֹלְכִים בַּיִת אֶחָד עֲשׂוּ לִי שֶׁאָדוּר בְּתוֹכוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: וְעָשׂוּ לִי מִקְדָּשׁ

Rav Yissachar Meir, R"Y of Yeshivat haNegev, explains that the message of בַּיִת אֶחָד עֲשׂוּ לִי שֶׁאָדוּר בְּתוֹכוֹ is that we have to have a place inside of ourselves that we can retreat into to reconnect with G-d.  L'havdil, the the secular world, when things are going bad people talk about retreating into their "happy place."  I don't know if Judaism places such a priority on having a happy place inside, but it does place a priority on having a G-dly place inside.  

It's not just caution against being sucked into the secular world that the Midrash is speaking about, but it's also speaking about how we perform mitzvos and learn Torah.  Too often we are just going through the motions.  Are we learning Torah only with our head, or with our heart as well?  The Midrash gives a mashal to a king that cannot leave his daughter, and in that same was כָּךְ אָמַר הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא לְיִשְׂרָאֵל, נָתַתִּי לָכֶם אֶת הַתּוֹרָה, לִפְרשׁ הֵימֶנָּה אֵינִי יָכוֹל.  A human king, neicha, there are limits to what he can or can't do, but how is that applicable to Hashem?  What does  אֵינִי יָכוֹל here mean?  R' Dovid Povarski explains that the "can't" here is not a din in Hashem's ability c"v, but rather it's a din in Torah. נָתַתִּי לָכֶם אֶת הַתּוֹרָה, לִפְרשׁ הֵימֶנָּה אֵינִי יָכוֹל because Torah without Hashem's presence is not Torah -- it's just a book.  Without the mishkan, without a life of avodah to accompany the intellectual depths and pursuit of Torah, all you have is a book, not a life, not a lifestyle.  Rav Yissachar Meir spesks in that same way about the mishkan as a space inside ourselves to reconnect our thoughts to our values, to reconnect to ויקחו לי – לשמי the right machshava, so that mitzvos themselves do not lose their meaning.  

Noda b'Yehuda on what to do if one leined shekalim before the kriah of rosh chodesh

There is a machlokes Rama/Taz in siman 684 regarding what to do if on rosh chodesh teves/chanukah the tzibur mistakenly started leining the chanukah kriah first instead of the kriah of rosh chodesh, which should come first.  Rama says to stop immediately and switch to reading rosh chodesh.  Taz disagrees and says that even though rosh chodesh is tadir and therefore should come first, tadir is only a lichatchila and is not m’akeiv. 

 This week we have shabbos shekalim and rosh chodesh together.  Noda b’Yehuda (mh”t 11) was asked what to do in this case if the tzibur mistakenly started leining parshas shekalim before the kriah of rosh chodesh.  Lichora this sounds like it should hinge on exactly like the same machlokes Rama and Taz.  However, Noda b’Yehuda says here l’kulei alma you should continue and not stop.  What’s the chiluk between the cases?

In siman 684 there is another din that if you took out only one sefer and read the leining of rosh chodesh and left out chanukah, you are yotzei.  GR”A points you to meg 29b that “ain mashgichim b’chanukah” (which if you look up the gemara you will see means something else in context).  That’s why Rama holds that when you took out both sefarim but started reading the chanukah leining first, you stop right away.  It’s not just that rosh chodesh is tadir – it’s that chanukah really carries no weight compared with r”c.  

The same is not true of shekalim.  If you didn't take out a sefer to lein shekalim and just leined the kriah of rosh chodesh, you haven't fulfilled your chiyuv properly and have to take out a sefer to read shekalim.  Since we see that shelakim does carry at least as much weight as the reading of rosh chodesh, you cannot stop and cut it off in the middle.

(See further in the teshuvah where the Nb"Y discusses which haftarah to read.)

I understand the proof, but I don’t understand the lomdus/sevara.  Why is the leining of chanukah “ain mashgichim bo” viz a viz the kriah of rosh chodesh but not shekalim?   

I am not sure, but my thinking so far is that when it comes to chanukah and rosh chodesh, it is the kedushas ha’yom that gives rise to the chiyuv of kriah.  For whatever reason, the kedushas hayom of rosh chodesh eclipses that of chanukah, and defines that kriah as the primary one of the day.  

Yesh lachkor: do you read parshas shekalim because it’s Shabbos shekalim, or is it Shabbos shekalim because you lein parshas shekalim?   Obviously, it's the latter.  It's not the kedushas ha'yom which is mechsyeiv the kriah, but aderaba, it is the kriah which gives this shabbos its unique name and character.  Therefore, the kriah of r"c which stems from the kedushas ha'yom cannot substitute for or eclipse the kriah of shekalim, which is an independent chovas ha'gavra.

(Yes, I am aware of the Rav's piece in Shiurim l'Zecher Aba Mari about the function of krias haTorah in establishing the kedushas hayom of chagim.)

why say "eye for an eye" if the intent is to pay damages? -- parshanut and Brisker lomdus that go hand in hand

While Chazal and parshanim spill much ink justifying the reading of עין תחת עין to mean $, the question that begs asking is why the Torah would use this expression instead of simply saying to pay if that is what the pasuk means.  Seforno explains that there is a moral lesson the Torah is trying to convey:

כך היה ראוי כפי הדין הגמור, שהיא מדה כנגד מדה, ובאה הקבלה שישלם ממון, מפני חסרון השערתנו, פן נסכל ונוסיף על המדה לאשמה בה

One shouldn't think that just like when one's ox gores, the solution is to take out the checkbook and pay for the damages, the same is true when dealing with harm to people -- it's just a matter of the amount of $ involved.   The Torah uses the expression עַ֚יִן תַּ֣חַת עַ֔יִן to make the moral point that there is a qualitative difference between the two.  When you harm another person, the penalty deserved goes beyond $.  Theoretically one should have one's eye knocked out. 

Ibn Ezra approaches the same question as follows:

והנה יהיה פירוש עין תחת עין – ראוי להיותו עינו תחת עינו, אם לא יתן כפרו.

When he writes אם לא יתן כפרו what he is referring to is the pasuk later in Banidbar 35:31 ולא תקחו כפר לנפש רצח אשר הוא רשע למות כי מות יומת.  A **murderer** cannot pay a fine and be released from punishment.  The implication is that in cases other than murder, i.e. bodily harm, it is enough to pay a fine.  We see that even without getting to torah shebaal peh, the Torah itself does its own parshanut on עין תחת עין and defines it as $.  

Both Ibn Ezra and Seforno see עַ֚יִן תַּ֣חַת עַ֔יִן as the theoretically just punishment.  Seforno says on a practical level we cannot carry it out so we read the pasuk otherwise; Ibn Ezra sees the Torah itself as offering the culprit the opportunity of payment as a way out of his crime.  

What is interesting is that we see the echo of these parshanim in the the Rambam (Chovel u'Mazik 1:3):

זה שנאמר בתורה כאשר יתן מום באדם כן ינתן בו אינו לחבול בזה כמו שחבל בחבירו אלא שהוא ראוי לחסרו אבר או לחבול בו כאשר עשה ולפיכך משלם נזקו. והרי הוא אומר ולא תקחו כופר לנפש רוצח לרוצח בלבד הוא שאין בו כופר אבל לחסרון איברים או לחבלות יש בו כופר:

If bottom line the halacha defines עין תחת עין as $, why does the Rambam in his sefer halacha, need to give us parshanut?  Just tell us the din!

R' Yehuda Cooperman connected the dots here.  The Rambam saw in the use of  עין תחת עין in place of $ a fundamental yesod: the הגדרה of the payment for חבלות is different than all other monetary payments.  When your ox gores and causes damage, the purpose of the payment is to make the damaged party whole, to compensate them for loss.  When you harm another person, the theoretical עַ֚יִן תַּ֣חַת עַ֔יִן that should take place would not make the other party whole or provide compensation.  It's all about punishment of the aggressor.  So too, the $ that are in place of עַ֚יִן תַּ֣חַת עַ֔יִן are about punishment, not restitution.  

R' Soloveitchik brought many raayos to this idea, but the basis for it is already found in R' Chaim al HaRambam.  The Rambam writes in To'en v'Nit'an 5:2

 וכן החופר בשדה חבירו בורות שיחין ומערות והפסידוה והרי הוא חייב לשלם בין שטענו שחפר והוא אומר לא חפרתי או שטענו שחפר שתי מערות והוא אומר לא חפרתי אלא אחת או שהיה שם עד אחד שחפר והוא אומר לא חפרתי כלום. הרי זה נשבע היסת על הכל:

There is no שׁבועה of modeh b'miktzas when the claim is for fields because there is a din that אין נשׁבעין על הקרקעות.  

Raavad argues and says that the claim for digging up a field is a monetary claim, not a claim for the property itself.  Why is this case any different than כשאר תביעת ממון וכמי שאמר לו חבלת בי שתים והוא אומר לא חבלתי אלא אחת עכ"ל:?  The Rambam agrees that even though הוקשׁ אדם לקרקעות you can have a  שׁבועה of modeh b'miktzas when dealing with an argument about chovel because the claim is about the $ owed, so why is this case of קרקע any different?

R' Chaim answered that there is a fundamental difference between the claim of relief for damaged land and the claim of relief for chovel.  When it comes to damaged land, the $ is restitution for the land, and therefore the halacha links the payment directly to the קרקע.  When it comes to chovel, the payment is not restitution for the damage caused.  It is punishment for the act of aggression.  Therefore, there is no direct link between the $ and the victim.

Those learning daf yomi are familiar with the limitations on beis din in chutz la'aretz.  Rambam writes (Sanhedrin 5:10)

כל הנישום כעבד אין גובין אותו דייני חוצה לארץ. לפיכך אדם שחבל בחבירו אין גובין הנזק והצער והבשת שהוא חייב בהן דייני חוצה לארץ. אבל שבת ורפוי גובין מפני שיש בהן חסרון כיס. וכן הורו הגאונים ואמרו שמעשים בכל יום לגבות שבת ורפוי בבבל

Is נזק not about חסרון כיס?!  R' Soloveitchik explains that indeed it is not, because the payment is a punishment to the aggressor, not about making the victim whole.

There are many other proofs, but the take away point is that while the expression עין תחת עין at first glance seems to obscure the intent of the halacha, in truth it reveals halacha in a sharper and clearer light.