can a kohen be mochel on his kavod? chiddush of the Chasam Sofer

Can a kohen be mochel on the kavod owed to him? Rambam in Sefer haMitzos #32 writes

היא שצונו לכבד זרע אהרן לפארם ולנשאם ושנשים מדרגתם מדרגה קודמת וראשונה ואפילו ימאנו לא נשמע מהם

Even if the kohen says not to bother, you shouldn't listen.

However, Maharam m'Rutenburg (quoted in the Mordechai) holds that the kohen can be mochel, just like a talmid chacham can be mochel on the kavod due him.

The analogy to a talmid chacham is revealing. The gemara says that a talmid chacham can be mochel because תּוֹרָה דִּילֵיהּ הִיא, it's his honor to do with what he wants, as the pasuk says וּבְתוֹרָתוֹ יֶהְגֶּה יוֹמָם וָלָיְלָה. While Maharam opines that the same is true with respect to a kohen, Rambam writes זה כלו הגדלה לאל יתעלה אחר שהוא לקחם ובחרם לעבודתו ולהקריב קרבנותיו. With respect to a kohen, it's not his honor to forgo.

The Rambam's argument makes logical sense, but there seems to be a gemara against it. The gemara (Git 59b) writes that Chazal made a takana that the kohen always should always take the first aliya. He cannot be mochel, because if he is mochel and doesn't take that aliya a fight is liable to break out in shul as to who should get the honor (nice to see that shuls have not changed much in 1500 years). According to the Rambam, why was a takana necessary? Built into the din d'oraysa is the fact that a kohen cannot be mochel!

This issue of mechila comes up in an incident quoted in the Mordechai in Gittin involving Rabeinu Tam and discussed by many of the poskim: there was a kohen who volunteered to draw water for Rabeinu Tam. R"T was asked how he could accept the favor, as it would be in breach of the mitzvah of honoring the kohen. R"T answered by quoting the din בִּזְמַן שֶׁבִּגְדֵיהֶם עֲלֵיהֶם, כְּהוּנָּתָם עֲלֵיהֶם; אֵין בִּגְדֵיהֶם עֲלֵיהֶם, אֵין כְּהוּנָּתָם עֲלֵיהֶם (Zevachim 17b). When a kohen is not wearing bigdei kehuna, he is like a zar and cannot do avodah. Given that no kohen today wears bigdei kehuna, their status is therefore forfeit. Rabeinu Tam was challenged: if so, can a kohen in our times marry a gerusha?! Can a kohen become tamei?! אֵין בִּגְדֵיהֶם עֲלֵיהֶם, אֵין כְּהוּנָּתָם עֲלֵיהֶם is a din in avodah, not a din in the kohen's status viz kedushas kehuna.  R"T was silent and offered no response. Mordechai goes on to quote R' Peter (interesting name for a Rishon) as defending Rabeinu Tam. The reason R"T had no problem with accepting the kohen's service is because the kohen was mochel on his kavod.

What are we to make of Rabeinu Tam's argument? Rashi on our parsha writes that the din of v'kidashto applies even to a kohen ba'al mum who cannot do avodah. Is a kohen who is not wearing bigdei kehuna worse than a ba'al mum?!

In defense of R"T the Ksav Sofer quotes his father as saying what sounds like a Brisker sevara. There are 2 dinim in kedushas kehuna: 1) an obligation to honor the kohen because of what he does; i.e. because he performs avodah in the mikdash, avodas Hashem on the highest level; 2) an obligation to honor the kohen because of who he is, i.e. the descendants of Aharon deserve kavod. It's like the joke of the guy who comes and begs the Rabbi  to make him a kohen. The Rabbi  refuses, but the man doesn't give up and is insistant.  The Rabbi can't take it and finally asks him, "Why do you want to be a kohen so badly?" To which the man replies, "My father was a kohen, my grandfather was a kohen, so I want to be a kohen." That's the second aspect to v'kidashto. Simply by virtue of being zera Aharon, you have certain privileges.

Nafka mina between these 2 dinin: it's with respect to the first din that the Rambam writes זה כלו הגדלה לאל יתעלה אחר שהוא לקחם ובחרם לעבודתו ולהקריב קרבנותיו. It's by virtue of avodah to Hashem, לעבודתו ולהקריב קרבנותיו, that the kohen deserves honor, and since the honor in the honor of Hashem, it is not subject to mechila. However, with respect to the second din, honor due to the kohen because of who he is, that is within his right to be mochel.

The was the point R' Tam was trying to make. R' Tam's answer goes hand in hand with what R' Peter said -- it's one answer in two parts. You have to first get past the first din of kavod that stems from the kohen's avodah, the honor that is non-negotiable, before you can begin to talk about mechila. That din, said R"T, is not in play because a kohen without bigdei kehuna cannot do avodah. Once that is out of the way, you can talk about the honor due to the kohn personally because of his lineage.  Even a kohen who is a baal mum, a kohen who cannot do avodah, still gets kavod, but that honor is subject to mechila, which was R' Peter's follow up.

This approach is meduyak in the language of the pasuk in our parsha וְקִ֨דַּשְׁתּ֔וֹ כִּֽי־אֶת־לֶ֥חֶם אֱלֹקיךָ ה֣וּא מַקְרִ֑יב קָדֹשׁ֙ יִֽהְיֶה־לָּ֔ךְ כִּ֣י קָד֔וֹשׁ אֲנִ֥י ה׳ מְקַדִּשְׁכֶֽם. There are two halves to the din. קִ֨דַּשְׁתּ֔וֹ כִּֽי־אֶת־לֶ֥חֶם אֱלֹקיךָ ה֣וּא מַקְרִ֑יב, kedusha that stems from the kohen's obligation to do avodah, but then there is an additional element: קָדֹשׁ֙ יִֽהְיֶה־לָּ֔ךְ, irrespective of avodah.

Coming back to the Rambam, perhaps when the Rambam writes that a kohen cannot be mochel he was speaking only about a kohen who can do avodah, in which case both dinim are in play. However, post churban, when we no longer have kohanim b'avodasam, even Rambam would agree that a kohen can forgo his honor. The gemara in Gitin is a post-churban takana, and therefore does not pose a problem for the shitas haRambam.

some notes from the Ayeles haShachar

Some he'oros from the Ayeles haShachar this week because I am preoccupied.  In some cases I left out his answers and some of the shakla v'terya:

 1) Rashi comments (21:1) לא יטמא בעמיו – בעוד שהמת בתוך עמיו, יצא מת מצוה that a kohen can be mitamei to bury a meis mitzvah.  The Chofetz Chaim writes that so long as there is another jew who can do the burial, it's not a meis mitzvah.  The implication is that if there are only aku"m available, a kohen can be metamei himself.  R' Shteinman asks: the din is that it is preferable to bury a meis by an aku"m on Y"T rishon rather than delay the burial until Y"T sheni.  If the fact that the burial is being done by an aku"m is not enough reason to allow for halanas ha'meis, why is it enough reason to allow for tumas kohanim?

 

2)  וְלַאֲחֹתוֹ הַבְּתוּלָה הַקְּרוֹבָה אֵלָיו - presumably the only way to know that she is a besula is because she has a chazakah as such.  Why does the gemara (Ch 10) never suggest this as the makor for the principle of chazakah?  (True, the gemara talks about examinations that can be performed to ascertain whether someone is a besulah, but it would be a dochak to say that the pasuk is speaking about the specific case that such an exam was done just before aveilus set in.)

 

3) The gedarim of "v'kidashto" are a bit unclear.  The PM"G (OC 53:14) writes that ideally a kohen gets first dibs to be the sha"tz for davening.  There is a a Keren Orah (Horiyos 12) that says if a kohen and a Yisrael have a bris milah on the same day, the mohel should do the bris of the kohen first.  Ah"S raises the question of two burials on the same day.  Does the mitzvah of v'kidashto apply even to a meis (like the din of kibud av v'eim, which continues after death) or not? 

 

4) A kohen asked the Steipler whether he should train his left handed son to be a righty because m'heira yibaneh ha'mikdash and a lefty can't do avodah (Bech 45).  The Steipler quoted a midrash that says all mumim will be healed when mashiach comes, so he has nothing to worry about.  The Ah"S asks: the Rambam brings down the halachos of what constitutes a mum, implying that these halachos are and will be noge'a l'maaseh.

 

5) The gemara equates the fact that a lulav with a split ti'yomes is pasul on Y"T with the fact that it is a shinuy which is koneh in dinei mamonos.  However, R' Elchanan in Koveitz Shiurim (B"K 112) points out that not every mum constitutes a shinuy, e.g. a nick in the ear of a korban is a mum that disqualifies but is not a shinuy that would be koneh.  How do you distinguish between these cases?

 

Yesh lachkor whether the presence of a mum is the sibah which pasels a korban, or whether the mum is a siman that the object is changed from its original state and therefore no longer acceptable?

 

The nicked ear falls into the former category.  The animal is essentially the same animal, but the presence of the nick disqualifies it.  The split ti'yomes falls into the latter category.  It's not the fact that it is pasul which proves that it is a shinuy, but aderaba, it's the fact that it is a shinuy which creates a psul because the object is a different object. 

 

Which category does the mumim of kohanim fall into?  Rashi writes (21:21) that a mum is posel only while it is present מום בו – בעוד מומו בו פסול, הא אם עבר מומו, כשר.  R' Shteinman argues that this proves that it is the presence of the mum which is the psul, not the fact that it indicates a shinuy, otherwise even if the mum is removed, the psul should still remain.  (Why this is true is a but unclear to me, but I think he means is that when something is acquired through a shinuy, if the shinuy is removed, the object does not revert back to the original owner.  So too, if mum is a psul because it indicates that there is a shinuy, it is the fact that the shinuy happened which is the psul, it is the change which occurred, irrespective of whether it can be undone or not.)

 

6)  וּמִיַּד בֶּן נֵכָר לֹא תַקְרִיבוּ אֶת לֶחֶם אֱלֹקיכֶם מִכׇּל אֵלֶּה כִּי מׇשְׁחָתָם בָּהֶם מוּם בָּם לֹא יֵרָצוּ לָכֶם. (22:25) Is there a din of "ritzuy" by the korban of an aku'm?  The gemara (Zev 45b) writes that עובדי כוכבים לאו בני הרצאה נינהו:  Similarly the Hagahos Ashr"I in Baba Basra explains the reason that we cannot accept tzedakah from an aku"m but can accept korbanos nedava from them is because there is no kaparah associated with korbanos nedava [tzedakah is a mechapeir!]  Some therefore explain that the end of our pasuk is not talking about the particular case of korbanos aku"m, but in a more general sense.

 

7) The gemara writes that the issur of oso v'es bno only applies when shechita is done, but not if you just stab the animal.  The gemara doesn't mean davka shechita, but rather means whatever the halachically proper way to kill the animal is, as we see from the fact that oso v'es bno applies to the sa'ir la'Azazel pushed off the cliff on Y"K.  Yesh lachkor according to R' Akiva who holds (Chulin 17a) that during the 40 years in the midbar shechita was not required on non-korban meat, was there an issur of oso v'es bno?  Does the gemara mean there was no din of shechita then, or for those 40 years was stabbing the animal the equivalent of shechita? 

 

8) בַּחֹדֶשׁ הָרִאשׁוֹן בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר לַחֹדֶשׁ בֵּין הָעַרְבָּיִם פֶּסַח לַה׳.  (23:5)  14 Nisan is not a moed.  Why is it listed here? 

 

9) Yesh lachkor whether וּשְׂמַחְתֶּם לִפְנֵי ה׳ אֱלֹקיכֶם שִׁבְעַת יָמִים is a tnai in the mitzvah of lekichas lulav, and therefore if someone is noteil lulav but is not b'simcha while doing so his mitzvah of netilas lulav is lacking, or whether  וּשְׂמַחְתֶּם לִפְנֵי ה׳ אֱלֹקיכֶם שִׁבְעַת יָמִים is its own mitzvah which netilas lulav is one element of fulfilling.  (According to the Bikurei Yaakov's understanding of the Rambam the mitzvah of netilas lulav for 7 days applies in Yerushalayim even today.)

 

10) Does someone who is sitting in the sukkah have to leave to go inside and shower for Shabbos?  Would we not apply the rule of oseik b'mitzvah patur min ha'mitzvah here?

 

11) The gemara writes that there was (at one point in time) a special bracha associated with lechem ha'panim so that even if a person ate only a small portion (less than a k'zayis) he would feel satiated.  Yesh lachkor in that case whether a person would have to say birkas ha'mazon.  On the one hand it is "v'savata" from the eating, but on the other hand less than a k'zayis is not considered a maaseh achila.

 

12)  וַיַּנִּיחֻהוּ בַּמִּשְׁמָר (24:123)  Was that just so he would not run away, or is there a din that required putting such a person in prison?

 

13) Rashi comments on  וְרָגְמוּ אֹתוֹ כׇּל הָעֵדָה that from here we learn כל העדה – במעמד כל העדה, מכאן ששלוחו של אדם כמותו.  R' Akiva Eiger (Kid 41) points out that the gemara never suggests this as a source for the din of שלוחו של אדם כמותו.  Interestingly the Sifra which is the source for the first half of Rashi's statement --  בְּמַעֲמַד כָּל הָעֵדָה --  omits the second half.  As Ah"S points out, if everyone (כל העדה) was in fact present, then you don't need a din of shlichus here.  The first half of Rashi/Sifra seems to contradict the second half. 

limud vs shemira

Rashi comments on וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם מִצְוֺתַי וַעֲשִׂיתֶם אֹתָם (23:31) that    

ושמרתם – זו המשנה.

ועשיתם – זה המעשה.

Rashi's source is the Toras Kohanim (see also Kiddusin 37a).

R' Shteinman asks in Ayeles haShachar: peshita that without studying the laws, one will be unable to do mitzvos.  What's the chiddush of this pasuk?

My wife's grandfather, R' Dov Yehudah Shochet, posed another difficulty with this Rashi.  We read in VaEschanan (5:1) וּלְמַדְתֶּם אֹתָם וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם לַעֲשֹׂתָם.  If shemira mean mishna, learning the halachos, then what is וּלְמַדְתֶּם אֹתָם? 

He answered based on a Seforno later in Bechukosai (26:3):

ואת מצותי תשמרו – הנה השמירה במצות היא ההשגחה באופן עשייתם ובמכוון מהם, וזה בעיון נאות, כאמרם ז״ל: ״שמר״ זו משנה

Limud is the basic level of knowledge necessary to do mitzvos.  Shemirah is, as Seforno explains, is a deeper level of learning --  בעיון נאות -- which brings a person to a richer, more spiritual life. 

I would add that the Netziv in many places writes that לַעֲשֹׂתָם actually means being mechadesh in halacha, expanding on what one already knows (e.g. see in Acharei Mos 18:5: וע״ז הכונה תנן במס׳ אבות פ״ד הלומד ע״מ ללמד מספיקין בידו ללמוד וללמד הלומד ע״מ לעשות מספיקין בידו ללמוד וללמד לשמור ולעשות. ואם הכונה ולעשות פעולת המצוה. פלא וכי ברישא מיירי ללמד ולא ע״מ לעשות ח״ו והרי זה רשע גמור. וכבר נדחקו בזה הר״ב ובתוי״ט. אבל הפי׳ הברור ע״מ לעשות לחדש בעיונו ולהוסיף לקח בלימודו).  Chiddush is only possible after one attains a deeper understanding of Torah.  Merely knowing what is required for the practical task of doing mitzvos would not be enough.

Seems to me that this distinction resolves R' Shteinman's question.  Of course certain basic knowledge is needed to do mitzvos, but what the pasuk demands of us is far more than that.  What it asks of us is a level of learning, "shemira," that calls on us to focus on ההשגחה באופן עשייתם ובמכוון מהם in doing mitzvos, as Seforno writes, or as Netziv suggests, expands our learning in new directions.

yiras Hashem tehora

 The Midrash comments on the opening of our parsha:

 אֱמֹר אֶל הַכֹּהֲנִים – הֲדָא הוּא דִכְתִיב (תהלים י״ט:י׳): יִרְאַת ה׳ טְהוֹרָה עוֹמֶדֶת לָעַד, אָמַר רַבִּי לֵוִי מִיִּרְאָה שֶׁנִּתְיָרֵא אַהֲרֹן מִלִּפְנֵי הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא, זָכָה וְנִתְּנָה לוֹ הַפָּרָשָׁה הַזּוֹ שֶׁאֵינָהּ זָזָה מִמֶּנּוּ וְלֹא מִבָּנָיו וְלֹא מִבְּנֵי בָנָיו עַד סוֹף כָּל הַדּוֹרוֹת, וְאֵיזוֹ זוֹ פָּרָשַׁת הַמֵּת, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: וַיֹּאמֶר ה׳ אֶל משֶׁה אֱמֹר אֶל הַכֹּהֲנִים בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן.

What's the midah k'neged midah here?  What does yiras shamayim have to do with the parsha of tumas kohanim?

Shem m' Shmuel (5672) has a hesber in which he tackles this question by way of resolving a stira between the AR"I and the Zohar, but I don't understand such things, so I will do him the injustice of boiling what he says down to its essence: A person who has yiras shamayim keeps away from the tumah'dik things in this world that he is supposed to keep away from.  Midah k'neged midah, Hashem keeps the kohanim, who have yiras shamayim, away from the tumah and defilement of death.  The same, writes the Shem m'Shmuel, is true of tzadikim, who are zocheh to die b'neshika.

I would like to suggest a different hesber based on a well known gemara in Brachos (5a):

א"ר לוי בר חמא אמר ר"ש בן לקיש לעולם ירגיז אדם יצר טוב על יצר הרע שנא' רגזו ואל תחטאו. אם נצחו מוטב ואם לאו יעסוק בתורה שנאמר אמרו בלבבכם אם נצחו מוטב ואם לאו יקרא קריאת שמע שנאמר על משכבכם אם נצחו מוטב ואם לאו יזכור לו יום המיתה שנאמר ודומו סלה.

The gemara suggests various antidotes to combat the yetzer ha'ra -- learning Torah, reading shema -- and then says that if all else fails, think about the day of death and that will get rid of the yetzer.

The question is asked: if thinking about the day of death is the ultimate trump card against the yetzer, then why got through the process of first learning Torah, then if that doesn't work reading shema, etc.?   Just cut to the chase and think about yom ha'misa!  

Chazal apparently understood that taking the strongest medicine sometimes has unintended consequences that may not be desirable.  Sure, the patient will be cured, but at what cost?  In this case, Chazal understood that living life obsessed with the thought if impending death is not psychologically very healthy.  Sure, it works to ward off the yetzer ha'ra, but the costs of the cure are great.  Better to try safer methods first and hold this one back unless all else fails.

Last Sunday it was my FIL's yahrzeit, so we visited the cemetery in the morning, followed later that same day by a shiva visit to other relatives because my wife's aunt passed away.  In the back of our minds as well was the thought that just two weeks from now is the first yahrzeit of a cousin who unfortunately died in his 50's after a bout with cancer.  When you are in your 20's, it seems like 50+ is old, but once you get to your 50th birthday, your perspective changes completely.  The day last week was filled with the gloom of yom ha'misa.  Sometimes, for whatever reason, Hashem gives us one of those days to wake us up and remind us of what our priorities should be, but if every day were like that day, it would be very hard to get on with life.

What the Midrash is telling us, I think, is that Aharon and sons did not need days like that.  When you are overflowing with yiras shamayim, that is enough to keep the yetzer ha'ra at bay.  You don't need יזכור לו יום המיתה.  You don't need the medicine of tumas meis to give you the right perspective on life. 

a lesson in sensitivity

Rashi tells us that the mevareich shem Hashem discussed at the end of the parsha took place at the same time as the episode of the mekoshesh, yet they were each locked up in separate jail cells:

ויניחוהו – לבדו, ולא הניחו המקושש עמו, ששניהם היו בפרק אחד, ויודעין היו שהמקושש במיתה, שנאמר: מחלליה מות יומת (שמות ל״א:י״ד). אבל לא פורש להם באיזו מיתה, לכך נאמר בו: לא פורש מה יעשה לו (במדבר ט״ו:ל״ד). אבל במקלל הוא אומר לפרוש להם, שלא היו יודעין אם חייב מיתהא אם לאו.

What was the point of keeping them apart?  Oznayim laTorah has an amazing answer. 

Rashi makes a point of telling us that the fate of the mekoshesh was known.  He was going to get some form of misa, the only question was what form.  

The fate of the mevareich, on the other hand, was in doubt; it was not clear yet that he would in fact get misa.  

Imagine what would happen if these two convicts shared the same death row cell.  Comrades in arms!  Yet what if the mevareich were to walk out of that jail cell scot free while the mekoshesh remained, doomed to await his inevitable death sentence?  Could there be anything more galling than seeing that comrade in arms, someone in the same boat, in the same cell, walk away free knowing that you on the other hand face certain death?  It would be like rubbing salt in the wound.

Therefore, the Torah mandated that they be kept apart.

We all know that we have to be respectful of other people's feelings, but who are we talking about here?  We are talking about someone sitting on death row, someone who was mechalel shabbos the very first shabbos in the desert.  Who cares whether he suffers a little more or not?  Yet af al pi kein, we have to care...

(The gemara in a few places learns some of the halachos of how misas beis din is carried out from the din of v'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha, which requires giving a respectful death even to those who are guilty of capital offenses. Even if someone is guilty of the most heinous crime, we don't rob them completely of dignity.)

can a kohen come in contact with safeik tumah b'reshus ha'rabim?

Last week's parsha introduced the issur of a kohen becoming tamei meis, except to bury certain close relatives.  The Marcheshes (long footnote at the end of siman #2) raises the following chakirah: can a kohen enter a reshus ha'rabim where there is a safeik tumas meis?  Does the din of safeik tumah b'reshus harabim tahor mean that there is no tumah, and therefore the kohein can l'chatchila enter the area, or does safeik tumah b'reshus ha'rabim mean that even though there may be potential tumah, ex post facto, we treat someone who entered such a place as tahor -- only b'dieved?

The Marcheshes was not a Brisker (see his hakdamah!), but the chakirah echoes a gavra/cheftza type split.  Is safeik tumah b'reshus harabim a din in the tumah, the cheftza, not really being tumah, or is it just a din in the gavra remaining tahor even though he might have in fact encountered something tamei?

The Rambam writes in Hil Aveil 3:6

כהן גדול אינו מטמא לקרובים שנאמר לאביו ולאמו לא יטמא. וכן אינו נכנס עם המת באהל אפילו קרוביו. שנאמר ועל כל נפשות מת לא יבא. הא למדת שהוא חייב בלא יבא וחייב בלא יטמא

There are two different issurim involved here: 1) לא יטמא and 2) ועל כל נפשות מת לא יבא

The Marcheshes suggests that viz a viz the issue of לא יטמא, all that we look at is the end result -- is the kohen causing himself, the gavra, to become halachically tamei or not.  Since safeik tumah b'reshus ha'rabim does not cause a state of tumah, there is no issur.

However, when it comes to the issur of ועל כל נפשות מת לא יבא, here we are not speaking about the end result, but rather about physical contact and proximity to a meis.  Since there is a cheftza of safeik tumah present, the kohen must l'chatchila avoid the area.

The flipside applies to a kohen who entered a reshus ha'yachid where there is safeik tumah.  Since the halacha says the gavra is tamei, לא יטמא has been violated.  However, since the cheftza is safeik tumah, there would be no malkos for the lav of  ועל כל נפשות מת לא יבא.

The Marcheshes then adds some icing onto the cake.  He writes that he heard b'shem R' Chaim that even though safeik tumah b'reshus ha'yachid is treated as a vaday, that is not the same as a vaday of tumas **meis**.  There is a difference between actual tumas meis and a din tumah.  If a kohen comes in contact with an actual body, then the lavim of לא יטמא and ועל כל נפשות מת לא יבא kick in.  However, if the kohen comes to a safeik tumah b'reshus ha'rabim, **legally** it is as if the kohen became tamei, but that legal reality is not the same as actually coming into contact with a body.  Therefore there would be malkos for neither lav.

lechem ha'pnim

It's been a busy week.  My wife finished shiva, and then my son had a baby girl, so it's been a roller coaster ride.  Still, I did not want to leave another week without at least something on the parsha:

1) Right after the Torah talks about the offering of the korban ha'omer on Pesach and then the shtei ha'lechem on Shavuos in the context of speaking about all of the moadim, the Torah sticks in the mitzvos of pe'ah and leket:

 וּֽבְקֻצְרְכֶ֞ם אֶת־קְצִ֣יר אַרְצְכֶ֗ם לֹֽא־תְכַלֶּ֞ה פְּאַ֤ת שָֽׂדְךָ֙ בְּקֻצְרֶ֔ךָ וְלֶ֥קֶט קְצִירְךָ֖ לֹ֣א תְלַקֵּ֑ט לֶֽעָנִ֤י וְלַגֵּר֙ תַּעֲזֹ֣ב אֹתָ֔ם

The Ohr haChaim puts the question succinctly:  מה ענין זה לכאן.  

Abarbanel has a beautiful answer: The korban ha'omer uses grain; the shtei ha'lechem uses grain.  Part of your crop gets to be used to serve G-d, and therefore, you might think you were "yotzei" your religious obligation, and now the rest is yours to do with it as you like.  Comes the Torah and says that serving G-d is not enough.  You have to also remember to serve your fellow man as well.  Don't think because you offered a korban ha'omer or a shtei ha'lechem you can forget about the poor and the needy. 

2) One of my kids kept making the mistake of referring to the Misrad ha'Pnim in Israel as the Misrad haPanim (yes, I am embarassed).  It finally sunk in that Pnim = inside, what in the US would be called Ministry of the Interior, or something like that.  The end of our parsha speaks about the lechem ha'panim.  Sefas Emes writes that it's really the lechem ha'pnim, because that special bread that is inside the heichel reveals to us the pnimiyus of the bread we consume every day.   כִּ֠י לֹ֣א עַל־הַלֶּ֤חֶם לְבַדּוֹ֙ יִחְיֶ֣ה הָֽאָדָ֔ם כִּ֛י עַל־כׇּל־מוֹצָ֥א פִֽי ה׳  יִחְיֶ֥ה הָאָדָֽם  R' Chaim Vital famously explained that it's the motzah pi Hashem **found within that bread** that keeps us going.  The lechem ha'panim=pnim reveals that מוֹצָ֥א פִֽי ה׳ found inside, that we ordinarily don't see.  

The Midrash comments at the beginning of the parsha speaking about korban ha'omer:

אָמַר רַבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר נַחְמָנִי בִּקְּשׁוּ לִגְנֹז סֵפֶר קֹהֶלֶת שֶׁמָּצְאוּ בוֹ דְּבָרִים שֶׁהֵם נוֹטִים לְצַד מִינוּת, אָמְרוּ כָּךְ הָיָה שְׁלֹמֹה צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר: מַה יִּתְרוֹן לָאָדָם, יָכוֹל אַף בַּעֲמָלָהּ שֶׁל תּוֹרָה בַּמַּשְׁמָע, חָזְרוּ וְאָמְרוּ אִלּוּ אָמַר בְּכָל עָמָל וְשָׁתַק הָיִינוּ אוֹמְרִים אַף בַּעֲמָלָהּ שֶׁל תּוֹרָה בַּמַּשְׁמָע הוּא, הָא אֵינוֹ אוֹמֵר אֶלָּא בְּכָל עֲמָלוֹ, בַּעֲמָלוֹ הוּא שֶׁאֵינוֹ מוֹעִיל אֲבָל בַּעֲמָלוֹ שֶׁל תּוֹרָה מוֹעִיל.

What kind of hava amina is is that even the ameilus of Torah has no value?  The whole book of Koheles is about olam ha'zeh being hevel havolim and the tachlis of man being to engage in Torah and yiras shamayim?

Sefas Emes (5656) answers that to find Hashem in a blatt of Bava Kama does not requires ameilus.  To find Hashem when you are standing in shul davening does not require ameilus.  What requires ameilus is to find Hashem when you are out in the world, engaged in your daily life, in your mundane pursuits.  That's עֲמָלָהּ שֶׁל תּוֹרָה.  It takes work to see the entire world through the lens of Torah, to find Hashem in everything.

So who says we need to do that?  Maybe just stick to Bava Kama?

יָכוֹל אַף בַּעֲמָלָהּ שֶׁל תּוֹרָה בַּמַּשְׁמָע, maybe there is no value to seeking out G-d in the world at large?  הָא אֵינוֹ אוֹמֵר אֶלָּא בְּכָל עֲמָלוֹ, בַּעֲמָלוֹ הוּא שֶׁאֵינוֹ מוֹעִיל אֲבָל בַּעֲמָלוֹ שֶׁל תּוֹרָה מוֹעִיל. 

That's the same message as the lechem ha'panim.  Don't starve yourself -- enjoy your sandwich.  But remember that there is a pnim to the lechem, that there is a מוֹצָ֥א פִֽי ה׳ that we have to dig for and uncover.

pri'ah vs kri'ah

If anyone would like to help learn some mishnayos for the shloshim of my FIL, much appreciated.  Here is a sign up link.

I was learning sotah and came across the mishna in the first perek that says:

וְכֹהֵן אוֹחֵז בִּבְגָדֶיהָ, אִם נִקְרְעוּ נִקְרָעוּ, אִם נִפְרְמוּ נִפְרָמוּ

The fact that the mishna uses both terms shows that there must be a difference between the term פרע and the term קרע.  

Rashi comments:  פרימה גדולה מקריעה שנקרעה לקרעים הרבה

Bartenura has another interpretation that kr'iah is a vertical tear.

Given the distinction between the terms, I was wondering why our parsha says with respect to the kohen gadol  אֶת־רֹאשׁוֹ֙ לֹ֣א יִפְרָ֔ע וּבְגָדָ֖יו לֹ֥א יִפְרֹֽם׃ (21:10)?  Since the idea is that the k"g is not supposed to display simanei aveilus, shouldn't the pasuk use the term קריעה and not  פּריעה?

See Malbim.

the issur of korcha al meis

On the pasuk of לֹֽא־יִקְרְח֤וּ קׇרְחָה֙ בְּרֹאשָׁ֔ם the gemara, quoted by Rashi, comments:

קרחה בראשם – מה ת״ל בראשם, לפי שנאמר (פ׳ ראה) ולא תשימו קרחה בין עיניכם, יכול לא יהא חייב אלא על בין העינים בלבד, ת״ל בראשם – לרבות כל הראש

The Taz in his commentary on Rashi is bothered by the gemara's diyuk.  What do you mean מה ת״ל בראשם -- you need בראשם to tell you that you are chayav for a korcha on the head as opposed to anywhere else on the body?  

Taz writes a chidush l'halacha that even though all the poskim refer only korcha on the head, it must be that a person would in fact be chayav for a korcha anywhere on the body, and that is why the word is extraneous.  In the notes in the Mosad haRav Kook edition the editor writes that the Taz seems to be a daas yachid, as he looked all over and could not find anyone else who refers to the issur as applying to anywhere else other than the head.

Torah Temima raises the same question as the Taz and answers:  וצ״ל כיון דהאי קריחה איירי בקורח מפני הצער על מת, כפי שנתבאר לעיל, ודרך הקריחה של צער הוא לגוז שער הראש, וא״כ מיותר המלה בראשם דממילא משתמע  The pasuk is speaking about the behavior of someone in mourning, where the custom was to make a korcha on the head; therefore, the word בראשם should go without saying.

kedushas ha'yachid and kedushas ha'tzibur

Boaz tells Rus “…U’t’hi maskurteich shleima” –- your reward will be complete.  Of course it will be complete -– Hashem doesn’t short change people.  What did Boaz mean?

 

The TIferes Shlomo explains that when it comes to other holidays, there are specific individual mitzvos that we have to do.  On Pesach you fulfill the mitzvah of matzah and you get schar for eating matzah.  On Sukkos you shake a lulav or eat in sukkah and get schar for those specific mitzvos.  It is like taking individual vitamins -– one holiday is your B12, another is your vitamin D, etc.  Shavuos is different.  Shavuos is the multivitamin holiday.  There is no one specific mitzvah associated with it, but rather Shavuos is about accepting the Torah = accepting all mitzvos.  It is just like geirus; the gemara in fact learns hil geirus from what Klal Yisrael did in preparation for kabbalas haTorah.   The reward of Shavuos, of geirus, is therefore a complete reward, as it encompasses the totality of all mitzvos together.

 

Even though we learn halachos of geirus from mattan Torah, there does seem to be a slight difference between the way the Rambam formulates the geirus of maamad Har Sinai and the way he formulates what happens in an individual geirus.  In Hil Issurei Bi’ah 13:1 the Rambam writes:

 

בשלשה דברים נכנסו ישראל לברית במילה וטבילה וקרבן:

 

A few halachos later the Rambam continues with respect to an individual ger:

 

וכן לדורות כשירצה העכו"ם להכנס לברית ולהסתופף תחת כנפי השכינה ויקבל עליו עול תורה צריך מילה וטבילה והרצאת קרבן.

 

R’ Bakshi-Doron z”l (sichos on Moadim) points out that the Rambam add those extra words ולהסתופף תחת כנפי השכינה ויקבל עליו עול תורה when speaking about the individual, but not when speaking about  the geirus of ma’amad Har Sinai.  There, the Rambam merely mentions entering a bris.  It is this bris which necessitates milah, tevila, etc.  If the bris the Rambam is speaking of is not kabbalas hamitzvos, not kabbalas ol, then what is it?  And why is it the first ingredient on the list, taking precedence even over kabbalas miztvos and kabbalas ol, which would seem to be the essence of what defines a Jew?

 

I want to frame what is going on in the Rambam (and this is essentially R’ Bakshi-Doron’s answer in different words) using a hesber of R’ Aharon Soloveitchik to a famous machlokes Ramban and Chachmei Tzorfas.  Chazal tell us that the mikalel mentioned at the end of parshas emor had a Jewish mother but a Mitzri father and was megayeir.  Ramban and Chachmei Tzorfas disagree as to why geirus was needed.  Chachmei Tzorfas held that pre-mattan Torah membership in “Klal Yisrael” (or whatever you want to call the entity that existed) was based on patrilineal descent, just like all  halachos of yichus for bnei Noach.  It is only post-mattan Torah that we follow matrilineal descent.  Therefore, the ben Mitzri mikalel needed geirus to become a Jew.  Ramban disagrees and writes that from the time of Avraham Avinu membership in Klal Yisrael was based on matrilineal descent and the mikalel was a J  from birth.  The geirus Chazal were speaking of is the geirus of mattan Torah that all of Klal Yisrael underwent, not some special requirement unique to him.

 

What is the neukdas ha’machlokes?  Parashas Derachim (as we’ve discussed before) explains the issue here revolves around the question of whether the Avos had the status of bnei Noach, or whether they were already considered Yisraelim.  According to Ramban, the Avos were Yisraelim; therefore, lineage follows matrilineal descent.  According to the Chachmei Tzorfas, the Avos were bnei Noach; therefore, the standards of yichus followed dinei ben Noach, which looks at paternal descent

 

R’ Aharon offered a different hesber.  He explained that there are two overlapping elements to kedushas Yisrael –- there is the kedusha of the individual and there is the kedusha of the tzibur.  Avraham Avinu established kedushas yisrael as an individual; kabbalas haTorah at Har Sinai established the kedushas yisrael of the tzibur.  The machlokes Ramban and Chachmei Tzorfas is whether matrilineal descent is a din in passing on the kedushas yisrael of the tzibur, and therefore applies only post matan Torah, or whether it applies to passing on even the kedushas yisrael, and applied from the time of Avraham Avinu.

 

Longtime R’ Aharon talmid R’ Josh Hoffman z”l suggested that this is the meaning behind the oxymoronic term “b’mispar sheimos” used in the count in parshas bamidbar.  Mispar= you’re just a number, a small unit in a larger whole; sheimos = unique identity  of the individual.  This is the overlap of the kedushas ha’klal and the kedushas ha’prat.

 

This distinction gives us a new perspective on the Rambam in Peirush haMishnayos in Chulin who writes that we don’t keep the mitzah of milah or gid ha’nasheh because it was given to one of the Avos; we keep these mitzvos because they were given to Klal Yisrael at mattan Torah.  What the Rambam is saying is that mitzvos are not a function of the kedusha of the individual, but rather are a function of the kedushas ha’tzibur that we took on at mattan Torah.

 

We also now better understand what in fact we are celebrating on Shavuos.  Didn’t the Avos already do mitzvos and learn Torah?  Didn’t they pass that on to their children?  The answer is that their observance was the observance that stemmed from the kedusha of the individual.  Mattan Torah marks the creation of a kedushas ha’tzibur, and ties observance to being a member of the community.

 

Coming back to the Rambam, the Jewish people at Har Sinai already had a tradition of mitzvah observance and had accepted the yoke of the Shechina when they left Egypt.   The ingredients of ולהסתופף תחת כנפי השכינה ויקבל עליו עול תורה were not lacking.  What was lacking was becoming a tzibur = entering a bris as a collective unit, attaining kedushas a a klal, not just kedusha individuals.   That is what happened at Sinai.  The first step for any ger has to be choosing to throw his lot in with the collective unit of Klal Yisrael -– deciding to enter that bris.  

 

And to come back to the Tiferes Shlomo: how can we ever have “maskurteich shleima,” complete reward for all mitzvos, when we can’t ever do all mitzvos?  The Shem m’Shmuel asks this question in a few places.  His solution is that we as individuals can’t do all mitzvos, but we as Klal Yisrael can.  “U’t’hi maskurteich sheleima” because througg geirus you will no longer be just a righteous individual, getting reward for his/her individual deeds, but you will be part of the community of Klal Yisrael.  You will have the kedushas yisrael of the tzibur, not just kedushas yisrael of a yachid.  That’s why the Rambam mentions ולהסתופף תחת כנפי השכינה ויקבל עליו עול תורה only after he mentions entering the bris.  What is required of the ger is not just kabbalas mitzvos and kabbalas ol as an individual, but kabbalas mitzvos and kabbalas ol as a member of the collective unit of Klal Yisrael -- a qualitatively different thing entirely.  This is what our kabbalas haTorah, our kabbalas hamitzvos of Shavuos is all about -– not our individual commitment to Torah, but our commitment as a nation.

 

Notes from the Underground: Lag baOmer, destiny vs free will

1) The lack of bonfires got me thinking back to when I was a kid and had TV.  I remember WPIX, channel 11, home of the Yankees, would go off air on Xmas and just show a loop of logs burning in a fireplace so that those folks living in their NY apartments or homes without fireplaces could still imagine themselves sitting all cozy around a yuletide fire.  Is there a virtual bonfire l'havdil out there that we can put on our screens in honor of Rashbi?

On second thought, it just wouldn't be the same as this:

No one plays a crowd like R ' Melech.

For some reason Lag baOmer has grown in popularity over the years.  It is hard to see the background in this picture of my wife's uncle, R' Immanuel Shochet a"h, as a very young man (center) speaking at Meiron in 1958, but it does not look like hundreds of thousands were there in those days:

2) Lab BaOmer is hod she'b'hod.  Hod=the midah of Aharon haKohen, oheiv shalom, rodef shalom, oheiv es ha'briyos u'mikarvan la'Torah.  This is why the day is also about R' AKiva, who taught v'ahavta l'reiach kamocha = oheiv shalom is the klal gadol ba'Torah; u'mikarvan laTorah= R' Akiva is the shoresh of Torah she'baal peh.  Those two are ha b'ha talya. 

The day is not really about the bonfire : )

3) Do you drive a car?  I used to have to drive as part of my commute. Link to your article of the day where they crunched the numbers and found: The COVID-19 death risk in people less than 65 years old during the period of fatalities from the epidemic was equivalent to the death risk from driving between 13 and 101 miles per day for 11 countries and 6 states, and was higher (equivalent to the death risk from driving 143-668 miles per day) for 6 other states and the UK... CONCLUSIONS: People less than 65 years old have very small risks of COVID-19 death even in pandemic epicenters and deaths for people less than 65 years without underlying predisposing conditions are remarkably uncommon."  The price we pay by doing a lockdown to protect against that risk is reported in in another study: "The same number of people could die from ‘deaths of despair’ as have already died in the U.S. from coronavirus, new study finds"  Mai chazis d'damei didach who want the lockdown sumak tfei from those dying because of it?

4) The Midrash at the beginning of Emor, commenting on the pasuk "amaros Hashem t'horos," gives a mashal: A politician comes to town and the people love him.  The more they sing his praises, the more promises he makes to them -- when he's elected he will fix the Van Wyck, he will have the subways cleaned up and running on time, there will be a chicken in every pot.  Lo and behold, once he is elected none of what was promised materializes.  Hashem is not like that.  His word is true for eternity.


I could not figure this Midrash out.  What are Chazal trying to teach me?  That Democrats campaign on lies?  I know that.  That Hashem is not a politician and keeps his promises?  I know that too.  Sefas Emes (5640) says an amazing vort.  I've posted many times about the Ohr haChaim in P' VaYeishev (its in other sources too) that speaks about the power of bechira to even thwart hashgacha -- meaning, Hashem built into the teva the power for us to make decisions that change the course of our lives, and barring exceptional zechuyos that warrant a l'maalah-min-ha'teva intervention, we suffer the consequences.  Why am I so disturbed by the lockdown when Hashem sent the virus?  Why don't I just accept His gezira, like I quoted from the Ishbitzer yesterday?  The answer is that, as Alex Berenson puts it, the virus didn't put 30 million people out of work -- our reaction did.  Hashem gives us bechira to do as we please.  If you believe humans will usually choose well, then this is a very uplifting message -- we have a hand in tikun olam and making the world a better place.  I unfortunately am not one of those people that think people generally choose well : )  I am one of the people who believe if you bet on human stupidity, the odds are very much in your favor.  What Chazal are telling us here is that even if that is the case, don't lose faith.  Hashem promises that in the end we will overcome it all, that there will be a geulah, that we will return to Him, and though we may wittingly or unwittingly find ourselves sometimes working against those very outcomes, "amaros Hashem t'horos" and Hashem keeps his promise to make it all happen in spite of us.  The best thing we can do sometimes is to just do out best to get out of the way : )  

Notes from the Underground - Mothers Day, Lag baOmer, etc

1) Baba Basra 80 - "ima a'barta mitzavta."  Mothers take comfort in their children being there.  It doesn't matter if it's birds (the context in the sugya) or people.  So happy mothers day to all the mothers who are always there for their children and whose greatest nachas comes from their children.  (Though to be honest, unlike the birds in the sugya, it would be nice if some of my kids managed to get out of the house already, but that's another story.)

2) I guess if there are no bonfires allowed for Lag BaOmer we will have to celebrate by just learning Torah or something.  I have a hunch Rashi would approve, at least b'dieved : )

3) Remember why Rashbi ended up in the cave?  Why he was stuck in a bunker for 13 years?  My wife quotes the whole gemara in her Lag BaOmer post.  Rashbi was forced into hiding because he was brave enough to speak out against the Roman government.  Rashbi would not sit back in silence if the state were to shut schools to schoolchildren who are largely immune from the worst dangers of a virus but force nursing homes filled with  vulnerable elderly to accept patients that are still infectious.  He would cry out in protest.  Or maybe that's just my imagination.  

4) My wife asked why he is called Bar Yochai and not Ben Yochai.  The Lev Simcha explained that bar is like the word milbar vs milgav -- outside, as opposed to inside.  When a kid becomes bar mitzvah it means he comes out of his domain of pratiyus and becomes part of the klal, part of the community.  So too, Rashbi stepped outside himself and gave himself up completely to the klal.  

Parshas Emor tells us that a regular kohen can become tamei to his attend the funeral of his closest relatives, but not so the kohen gadol.  Why the difference?  The Kotzker explains that the kohen gadol gives himself over to the klal.  We are all his relatives.  He has to love every Jew like a brother, like a mother or father.  That's the spirit of R' Shimon bar Yochai -- giving everything over to the klal.  

5)  A very powerful Ishbitzer (end of P' Emor) to keep in mind when you are in the bunker:

  כי איש ישראל אחר שלבו דבוק בהש"י וכוונתו לש"ש, אף אם הש"י ידחה אותו מאיזה טובה, בזה עצמו יקרא עובד ה' במה שמרחיק עצמו על פי רצון הש"י ויזכה לטובה גדולה, כגון בעל מום מזרע אהרן, בזה עצמו היה זוכה לטובה גדולה במה שהרחיק עצמו מהעבודה, אך מי שאין שורשו וגזעו מישראל באם ירוחק מטובה אז לא יוכל עצור רוחו ויבעט

The proof that the mekalel's desire to have a place in machaneh yisrael was not truly lshem shamayim was the fact that when his dream could not be realized he rebelled.  True avodas Hashem means being willing to give up what you desire and accepting the task Hashem desires of you instead. 

 

Why does the Torah tell us the whole story of the mekalel?  Why not just give us the din of "nokeiv shel Hashem mos yumas" without the story?

The Torah wants to show us the exception that proves the rule (see Seforno).  It's only this individual who came from a Mitzri, who mother was not-so- good either, who could be nokeiv shem Hashem.  The same story could never happen to a person m'zera Yisrael, raised in a home in Klal Yisrael.  It's in our DNA not to behave this way.  The parsha is not just telling us a din, it's telling us something about the character of a Jew.  Klal Yisrael's greatness is that we accept the gzar din of shamayim without a rebellion.

Notes from the Underground -- erev Shabbos Emor, amazing chiddush of the Meshech Chochma

1) Lots to say on the parsha (don't miss the Meshech Chochma in point 5 at the bottom if you are going to skip), but let me get the article of the day out of the way.  Chairman of emergency services at St Barnabus writes in the NY Post: "Everyone seems to be avoiding the health system — an important and unfortunate consequence of the stay-at-home strategy...The growing numbers ­dying at home during this crisis must include fatal myocardial infarctions, asthma exacerbations, bacterial infections and strokes."
For those who support the lockdown, let me grant for now whatever figure you want to use, whatever imaginary number of lives you think have been saved -- 1 million, 10 million, 100 million -- I don't care.  Just tell me the halachic justification for being allowed to cause the deaths of others in the process to achieve that end.   

2) Baal haTurim on the din of shivas yamim tachas imo quotes a Midrash that says if the animal was offered on day #1 it would be like a korban to shamayim v'aretz that were created on day #1, on day #2 it would be like a korban offered to the heavens, etc. until 7 days pass and a person knows Hashem created everything and the korban can be offered lishma.  We are talking about someone who wants to offer a korban, not an ovied avodah zarah.  What's going on here?

 

R' Shteinman in Ayeles haShachar explains the Midrash based on shitas haRambam (Yesodei Torah 2:2) that ahavas Hashem comes from contemplating creation.  If a person contemplated Hashem's handiwork on day #1 of creation, when there was only shamayim va'artez, his appreciation of Hashem would be lacking because he did not experience the other days of the briya.  On day #2, his appreciation would still be lacking because he still only sees part of the picture.  It's only after a person sees the totality of the briya, after 7 days, that his lishma can be complete.  Ahavas Hashem takes time to grow and develop; therefore, the Torah says wait awhile before you bring your korban.  Go through a week thinking about the borei olam and then come to the Mikdash. 

 

3) Targum Yonasan writes on the pasuk "oso v'es bno lo tishchatu b'yom echad" that just like Hashem has mercy on us, so too we should have mercy and not shecht the mother and calf together. 

 

The Mishna in Megillah (25) says that a person is not supposed to ask Hashem in davening to have rachmanus on us just like he has mercy and gave the mitzvah of shiloach ha'kan.  The gemara explains that Hashem's mitzvos are gezeiros, decrees -- not acts of mercy.  So why is oso v'es bno any different?  See Maharasha there.

 

4) The gemara (Chulin 79) has a machlokes Tanaim whether the mitzvah of oso v'es bno applies only to the mother cow or also to the father.  When translating the pasuk, Onkelus switches the words from masculine (oso, bno) to feminine form.  Ramban (see also Rosh in Chulin) writes that Onkelus deliberately changed the gender used by the pasuk because he held the mitzvah only applies to the mother cow, not the father. 

 

One might argue that the mitzvah applies at least mi'safeik to both mother and father; however, since it is much harder to know which animal in the herd is the calf's father than which is its mother Onkelus changed the gender to reflect the metziyus where the mitzvah is most likely to apply.  See Ma'adanei Y"T on the Rosh who rejects this idea.  In any event, according to Onkelus it is hard to understand why the Torah would phrase the mitzvah in lashon zachar when it only applies to the mother cow  (see Ramban).

5) Finally, an amazing chiddush of the Meshech Chochma based on no more than his understanding of peshuto shel mikra.  Here is the case: you have a cow located at the north pole and its calf is located at the equator  When you shecht the cow at the north pole, it is already night=the next day at the equator.  Can you shecht the calf immediately because it is not "yom echad" relative to the mother's time zone, or do you look at things relative to the calf's time zone and say that since the mother was shechted when it was night at the equator, you can't shecht the calf until the next night?

 

Meshech Chochma says that everything is relative to the time zone of the initial shechita.  Since in the time zone of the shechita of the mother cow it was day, the calf that is located someplace where it is night can be shechted right away.

 

Then he goes a step futher: not only can you shecht the calf at the equator, but since the pasuk is written in plural -- "lo tishchatu" -- it alludes to the fact that if there was another calf at the north pole, it too can be shechted!  Even though this calf is in the same time zone where it is still the same day as when the  mother was shechted, since the issur does not apply to the calf at the equator, it also does not apply to the one at the north pole -- it's all or nothing.

 

There are similar questions raised with respect to other dinim.  The Oneg Y"T (#35) already discusses whether there is an issur of owning chametz in another time zone where it is pesach if it is not yet Y"T in your own time zone.  These days it is possible to control appliances in your home with the touch of a button.  If you are in a time zone where it is not yet shabbos, can you remotely turn on the air conditioner in your home which is in a time zone where it is shabbos?  Yesh l'chaleik between each one of these cases... 

A preface to the mitzvos

Emor el hakohanim bnei Aharon v'amarta aleihem...  There are two redundancies here: 1) the double emor... v'amarta 2) Kohanim = bnei Aharon, so why say both?

The Kohanim are about to get mitzvos that place more restrictions on them than on an ordinary person.  The Torah therefore prefaces the commandments with an introduction: Emor el hakohanim bnei Aharon, tell the Kohanim that they are the decendents of the great Aharon hakohen, they are the heirs to his legacy.  You have more restrictions not to make your life difficult, but because you are holy and special. (Chasam Sofer)

Chazal learn from the double emor... v'amarta the idea "l'hazhir gedolim al ha'ketanim." I would say this goes hand in hand with the Chasam Sofer.  The way to teach a child is to first make him feel special, make him feel privileged to be given mitzvos. That is the preface needed before anything else can be taught.

(Lzecher nishmas Eliezer been Meir)

subjective vs objective truth

Keitzad merkadim lifnei ha'kallah?  Beis Hillel hold that one can say "kallah na'ah v'chasudah" no matter what the kallah looks like; Beis Shamai holds that one must tell the truth.  (Kesubos 17)

One could learn that the point of disagreement here is whether one can bend the truth for the sake of shalom.  You don't want the chassan to feel bad, so no matter what the kallah looks like, you pay a compliment. 

R' Yaakov Kaminetzki explained the sugya differently.  The issue is not whether one has a license to bend the truth, but rather the issue is more fundamental -- what is truth?  Beis Shamai hold there is an objective standard of truth, and therefore, if the kallah is ugly, we have to call it like it is.  Beis Hillel, however, holds that truth is relative.  To the chassan, the kallah is the most beautiful girl in the world.  Relative to his way of thinking, one is being entirely truthful in saying "kallah na'ah v'chasudah."

R' Yaakov uses this yesod to explain another gemara (Eiruvin 14) l'shitasam.  Beis Shamai were sharper than Hillel's school, but Beis Hillel were more numerous.  Does the halacha follow smarts or rov?  A bas kol from Heaven declared that although eilu v'eilu divrei Elokim Chaim, the halacha follows Hillel.  Tosfos asks: "lo bashamayim hi" -- why should the bas kol carry any weight?

Hillel l'shitasam was interested in subjective truth.  Since the majority of people saw things their way, that defined the "correct" answer.  Shamai was interested in objective standards.  Therefore, l'shitasam they had to follow the bas kol, the objective voice of truth that stood outside the fray.

What does this idea of relative truth being truth come from?

The Midrash writes that Hashem took a poll among the angels to see whether He should create man.  It was a tie score among the different groups, with shalom and emes being opposed to man's creation because we are quarrelsome and can't be truthful.  To break the tie G-d took the angel of emes and cast him down to earth.

Why did G-d cast down the angel of truth and not the angel of shalom, since both were opposed?  And how does throwing the angel down to earth, removing him from the scene, address his objection?  It doesn't seem like a fair way to address the problem.

R' Yaakov explains that Hashem was not disregarding concern for truth.  What the Midrash is saying is that truth can be defined in different ways.  There is Heavenly truth, the truth of the bas kol and angels, objective truth -- man cannot live up to that standard.  But G-d revealed that there is also a truth based on human perception, a subjective truth.  Hashem said that to be fair to man we have to look at truth the way it appears on earth, through man's eyes.  That is a truth man can be held to and which he can live up to.  And if we go with that definition of truth, there will be shalom as well.  When all we know is subjectivity, then eilu v'eilu prevails because right and wrong can never be established with objective certainty.

Now we can get back to the question from yesterday's post: given that chazakah is proof even for dinei nefashos, why is it a chidush to say that a kohen can become tamei for his father, who we identify based on rov/chazakah, any more than his mother, who we can identify with certainty? 

R' Yaakov suggests that the Torah's allowance for tumah is tied to the emotional need to mourn for the loss of one's closest relatives (My 2 cents: see Rambam Hil Aveil 2:6 "kamah chamurah mitzvas aveilus she'harei nidcheis lo ha'tumah... k'dei she'yisasek imahem v'yisabel aleihem."  Note that the Rambam does not say that tumah is allowed in order to *bury* the dead, but rather he says that it is tied to *aveilus.*)  Therefore, what matters is not the objective definition of paternity, but rather what matters is the subjective emotions of the mourner. In that regards, a mother b'toras vaday trumps a father whose identity is established only by rov and chazakah.  These may be objective proofs, but that is not sufficient when the question on one of subjectivity and emotion.

tumas kohanim

In listing the relatives which a kohen can/should (machlokes Rishonim whether it is a chiyuv or a reshus) become tamei to bury, the Torah firsts lists his mother and then father.  Yet when it comes to listing who the kohen gadol may not become tamei for and who the nazir may not become tamei for the Torah places the father before the mother.  Why here does the Torah place the mother first? 

The Ibn Ezra gives what I would call an actuarial answer: men outlive women.  Women, in this case the mother, are listed first because they die first.  I believe the modern metziyus is that women in fact live longer, but maybe that was not true in the past given the higher chance of death in childbirth.  

Meshech Chochma points to the Rambam's view (Aveil 2:7) that m'd'oraysa a husband may not become tamei to bury his wife, but the Chachamim allowed it.  How can they uproot a doraysa prohibition?  Rambam answers that the Chachamim treated the wife as a meis mitzvah. A meis mitzvah means there is no one responsible for burial.  When it comes to a wife, the Chachamim defined the husband as the only one with a close enough relationship to feel responsible to bury her.  

The Torah lists mother first in the pasuk because one might have thought that if a person's father is alive, the father is responsible for the mother's burial and the kohen son should not make himself tamei, kah mashma lan that he can, and according to the Rambam, must.

The Toras Kohanim seems to say that the pasuk lists the mother first and father second because while we know exactly who a person's mother is, absent a DNA or paternity test we only know who a father is based on rov/chazakah.  If two people are married, we assume that the father is the mother's husband, but an assumption cannot outweigh certainty.

Aside from the technical detail that this is not much of a chiddush (beis din can administer the death penalty based on rov and chazakah, so it surely is a good indicator or paternity), the Rishonim and Achronim ask an even more basic question on the Toras Kohanim: any doubt as to the paternity of the "kohen" is MORE of a reason to allow him license to become tamei, not less!  If the father in question is not the true father of this individual, then odds are that he is not an kohen and there is no issur in him becoming tamei in the first place.

In other words, m'mah nafshach: either this is the son of a kohen and he can become tamei for his father, or he is not the son of a kohen and there is no issur on him becoming tamei.  What hava amina can there be to say otherwise that would cause us to think there is some chiddush here?

So hopefully I will have more time to write and get to an amazing yesod of R' Yaakov Kaminetzky's.  Stay tuned, and see the Malbim as well. 

a good word -- amaros tehoros

I was not feeling in a writing mood this week, but then I got an uplifting email from someone telling me how much they appreciated the posts and it changed my mind.  That person gets the credit for being mezakeh everyone who might read this and learn something.  You never know the value of a kind word.

Why a bow and arrow on Lag ba'Omer?  When you use a bow and arrow, if you want to shoot an arrow into the air you have to pull back the drawsting toward the ground.  The further back down you pull the string, the higher up the arrow will go.  Life often pulls us down.  Lag Ba'Omer tells us that what we think is a big setback is really just a needed step to shoot even higher.  Can you imagine how far R' Akiva thought he had fallen when all 24,000 students of his died?  But then the arrow shot upwards again, and it was the whole torah sheba'al peh that was the result.

The Midrash opens our parsha by telling us that "amaros Hashem tehoros" unlike the promises of a human ruler.  A human king may make all kinds of campaign promises to build this or fix that, and then the king goes to sleep and maybe never wakes up and all the promises are for naught.  (The Midrash is pretty dramatic -- I guess the Midrash could not even conceive of modern politicians who make promises and don't keep them even though they remain alive and well.)  Hashem's word is emes for all eternity.

A beautiful idea, but what does it have to do with our parsha?  Why stick it here?  Just because the word "amaros" is like "emor" and "amarta" in the parsha -- so what?

Secondly, the Midrash gives examples of the promises a human king makes with no guarantee of being able to fulfill them, but it doesn't tell us what promise of Hashem it is talking about. 

If you had to choose one word to sum up the theme of our parsha, a good choice would be "tahara."  We learn in our parsha about the holiness of the kohen, who cannot become defiled with the dead and who cannot serve as a ba'al mum.  We learn about korbanos and the disqualification of mumim.  We learn about the mitzvah of sefira that we are engaged in, "u'sefartem lachem" = to make ourselves into sapir, precious sparkling gems, so to speak, ready for kabbalas haTorah.  It's all, at least in a symbolic sense, about perfection is serving G-d, about not being spiritually defiled, blemished, unsuitable.

The first Sefas Emes on the parsha asks a basic question: how is it possible for a human being of flesh and blood to become tahor, to purify himself properly to serve G-d?  How can any of us, with all the mistakes we make, with all our shortcomings, measure up?

The Besh"t taught "l'olam Hashem devarcha nitzav bashamayim" means that the words of Hashem used to create the world are constantly emanating from Him and constantly causing the world to be recreated.  Not only that, but as the Alter Rebbe explains in the second part of Tanya, those words are what are the true essence of what everything is made of.  In other words, Hashem's utterance do not cause the world to exist; rather, they are the very stuff of which the world is made, the underlying subatomic subphysical "stuff" of everything that exists. 

Says the Midrash in Parshas Kedoshim, "Nasata kedusha l'Yisrael, nasata lahem l'olam, she'ne'emar 'Kedoshim ti'hiyu.'"  G-d gave us eternal kedusha.  How do you know?  Because, answers the Midrash, the pasuk says, "Kedoshim ti'hiyu." 

How does that answer the question?  All the pasuk says is that we have a mitzvah to be holy?

Based on the Besh"t's teaching the Rebbe of Aleksander answers that the words "kedoshim ti'hiyu" are not just a command, but they are a reality.  Just as the words, "ye'hi or" reverberate for all eternity and every moment ensure the recreation of light in the universe, so too, G-d's words of "kedoshim ti'hiyu" reverberate for all eternity and make us holy.


I'm just flesh and blood, a human being with all the faults that go with that -- a spiritual ba'al mum, a person with spiritual tumah enveloping him.  How can I get ready for kabbalas haTorah?  The answer is "amaros Hashem tehoros" for all eternity.  What promise is the Midrash talking about?  The promise of "l'nefesh lo yitamah."  The promise of "kedoshim ti'hiyu."  Our parsha is not just a list of demands, commands.  It's a map of the reality of who we are and what we are.  Hashem's words give us the koach to be tahor, to be kadosh, for eternity -- no matter if we've fallen, if we've become a little blemished and defiled.  That's just the arrow being pulled back.  The koach to be better is within us willy nilly because Hashem's words, the words of our parsha, make it so.  All we have to do is not spoil that kedusha and tahara, not drive it away. 

every day can be a holiday

The Midrash (28:1) writes that the Chachamim wanted to put sefer Koheles in geniza because they thought it heretical ( modern books that have been banned by "gedolim" can consider themselves in good company!)  Shlomo haMelech tells us, "Mah yisron l'adam b'chol amalo..." what good is all the toil of man.  Can it be that  Shlomo was suggesting that toil in Torah has no value? 

The Chachamim reread the pasuk so that in fact it does give us a positive message.  It doesn't say "amal" - toil; it says "amalo" - his [man's] toil.  Toiling in the mundane affairs of man does not accomplish anything; toiling in G-ds Torah is worthwhile work.  Koheles is giving is the right message.

Asks the Sefas Emes (5656): what was the hava amina of the Midrash?  The thrust of sefer Koheles is that the secular world davka is "hevel havalom," but "sof davar ha'kol nishma..." yiras shamayim and Torah and mitzvos have real value.  How can the Midrash even entertain the thought that Shlomo meant to suggest that ameilus in Torah is worthless?

If not for the Sefas Emes I would suggest that perhaps you can explain the Midrash using a vort that we've all heard said over at siyumim.  In the hadran we say that "anu ameilim v'heim amelilim....," that we work and the non-Jews work, but while we get reward for our work, they don't.  What does that mean -- don't even non-Jews get a salary for their work?  The famous answer is that in the secular world, you get paid for the finished product.  The labor is just a means to the end.  In Torah, G-d rewards us even for the toil.  You can spend the whole day trying to understand a hava amina that has no bearing on the final halacha and you still get credit for learning.  Maybe the hava amina of the Midrash is that toil in Torah is no different than toil at any other occupation and it's only the final product -- what you come away with in the maskana -- that counts.  "Amal," the work to get there, has no value.  Kah mashma lan the Midrash that there is reward in Torah even for the ameilus, even for just the work, independent of the results.

But the Sefas Emes says a better pshat.

The parsha has a long section listing the chagim that opens with the introduction, "Eileh moadei Hashem... sheishes yamim tei'aseh melacha u'bayom ha'shevi'i Shabbos shabbason... (23:2-3)  Some meforshim are bothered by the fact that the list of holidays begins with Shabbos, which is not a mo'ed.  I don't know if that question will cause anyone to lose too much sleep because we sort of understand that there is a relationship between Shabbos and other holidays in that that all of them have kedushas zman.  The whole question, however, is misplaced, because the list of holidays does not really begin with Shabbos.  The list of holidays begins with "sheishes yamim tei'aseh melacha," work should be done on the six days that precede (or come after, depending on how you look at at) every Shabbos.  The six work days of the week certainly have no kedusha, are not holidays, and would seem to have no place on the list.  The real question is why begin the list of moadim with them?

On Yom Kippur we know that the kohen gadol has to dunk in the mikvah between every change of clothes, from gold to white and white to gold, etc.  The Chasam Sofer last week in Acharei Mos writes that we understand that when the kohen gadol switches from gold garments to white so he can enter the kodesh kodashim, he is going into a holier place than normal,  he will be doing avodah that is more special than normal, and so he has to go to mikveh to enter a higher state of purity.  But why dunk again on the way out, to switch back to gold?   That's a step down, not a step up? 

The Chasam Sofer says a yesod: after the kohen has experienced the higher level he was at in the kodesh kodashim and comes out, those gold garments he changes into are not the same gold garments as before.  Life is different now.  It may look the same, it may fit the same, but it's not the same.  The higher level the kohen was on sticks with him even as he returns to the gold garments that he wore before.

When a nazir completes his vow of nezirus, the Torah tells us, "achar yishteh ha'nazir ya'yin," afterwards the nazir can drink wine.  Shem m'Shmuel asks: why does the Torah says "the nazir" can drink wine -- he is not a nazir anymore once his vow is up?!  The answer is the same yesod the Chasam Sofer is telling us.  The whole point of that period of abstinence is so that once the vow is complete, the person is still a nazir, he still retains his kedusha.  He may be able to now drink wine, but he is not the same person as before.

Coming back to the parsha of the moadim, the Kozhiglover in Eretz Tzvi writes that the cycle of moadim is not about spending a week here and a week there in a state of holiness and the rest of the year in a different, secular world.  The point of the parsha is that the week here and a week there we bask in revealed kedusha give us something to take with us and make part of the rest of our lives so that the six work days we come back to are different days than before.  The same kedusha that we experienced in the mo'ed is still there afterwards, albeit in hidden form, albeit without generating an issur melacha, but it's part of our lives.  "Sheishes yamim tei'aseh melacha..." is a mo'ed too.

Now the table is set for the Sefas Emes.  Peshita that a guy sitting and learning is accomplishing, while someone working so he can buy himself a new car or gadget is wasting his time.  There was never a hava amina otherwise.  But what about the person who works as a doctor and treats the poor without charging -- is he he/she simply toiling for nothing?  Is the person who spends a few hours helping a friend in need wasting his time with worthless work?  That's what bothered Chazal. 

Of course you get credit for poring over a Rashba in the beis medrash.  But what the Midrash is telling us is that to take the Rashba out of the beis medrash, to bring G-d into everything you do, to find G-d in everything that you do, to make the "sheishes yamim..." holy too, that' takes real work.  You can toil as a doctor, a plumber, a lawyer, and it can be "mah yisron l'adam b'kol amalo," or you can toil as a doctor, a plumber, a lawyer, and it can be ameilius of Torah and the highest value.