Rabeinu Yonah: the one thing teshuvah cannot cure

The Tiferet Shlomo on our parsha comments that the pasuk כי תצא מחנה על אויביך ונשמרת מכל דבר רע derech remez alludes to Rosh haShana, a time when the machanot of angels of the sitra achara gather and try to ruin our upcoming year. How can a person assure that they are zocheh to a good year? He writes:

ועיקר ההכנה על יום הנורא הזה להיות אחוה וריעות בין בני ישראל כמ"ש בחצוצרות וקול שופר הריעו לפני המלך ד' לשון אחוה וריעות

Rosh haShana is a "yom teru'ah," meaning, a dat of re'us, i.e. v'ahavta l'rei'acha. If you get along with others, then you have nothing to worry about. Hashem will make sure that He gets along with you.

How do you do that? By training yourself to to not speak ill of other people. ונשמרת מכל דבר רע means דיבּור רע.

וזה הרמז בפ' שהתחלנו כי תצא מחנה על אויביך ונשמרת מכל דבר רע. לבל ידבר ח"ו רע על חבירו ולא יראה כלל בחסרונו רק במעלות חבירו וז"ש מי האיש החפץ חיים לבקש בר"ה כתבנו בספר החיים. נצור לשונך מרע לבל ידבר על חבירו סור מרע ועשה טוב. וזהו הכנה ליום הדין להוציא משפטינו לאורה. כי אם האדם מחזיק את חבירו בחזקת צדיק אזי גם אותו יכתוב בספרי הצדיקים:

We can use our words to build people up, to spread positivity. You can make the lowest person feel great. If you do that, Hashem then no matter where you are in life, Hashem will inscribe you for a good din and make you feel great too.

Rabeinu Yonah writes something in his Sefer haYirah (and the GR"A references it in his Iggeret) that should make you shake:

לכּל ישׁ רפואה חוץ מלשׁון הרע

(This line needs explanation, as R"Y himself in Shaarei Teshuvah 3:210 based on Archin 15b writes וְאָמְרוּ רַבּוֹתֵינוּ מַרְפֵּא לָשׁוֹן הָרַע לְהִנָּצֵל מִמֶּנּוּ, שֶׁיַּעֲסֹק אָדָם בַּתּוֹרָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (משלי ט"ו:ד') מַרְפֵּא לָשׁוֹן עֵץ חַיִּים. וְזֶהוּ שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (תהילים ל"ט:ב') אֶשְׁמְרָה לְפִי מַחְסוֹם וְגוֹ' פֵּרְשׁוּ רַבּוֹתֵינוּ זִכְרוֹנָם לִבְרָכָה כִּי הַמַּחְסוֹם הוּא הָעֵסֶק בַּתּוֹרָה.

He is quoting the sugya in Archin 15b

מר רבי חמא בר' חנינא מה תקנתו של מספרי לשון הרע אם תלמיד חכם הוא יעסוק בתורה שנא' מרפא לשון עץ חיים ואין לשון אלא לשון הרע שנאמר חץ שחוט לשונם ואין עץ יא] אלא תורה שנאמר עץ חיים היא למחזיקים בה ואם עם הארץ הוא ישפיל דעתו שנאמר וסלף בה שבר רוח רבי אחא ברבי חנינא אומר סיפר אין לו תקנה שכבר כרתו דוד ברוח הקדש שנאמר יכרת ה' כל שפתי חלקות לשון מדברת גדולות אלא מה תקנתו שלא יבא לידי לשון הרע אם תלמיד חכם הוא יעסוק בתורה ואם ע"ה הוא ישפיל דעתו שנאמר וסלף בה שבר רוח

It could be that R"Y paskens like the second opinion, and לְהִנָּצֵל מִמֶּנּוּ means to avoid speaking lashon ha'ra.)

It is a frightening thought that as powerful as teshuvah is, there is some things it won't work for. The Shem m'Shmuel (beginning of Metzora) tries to soften it and say that regular teshuvah is not enough, but teshuvah on some higher level does work, but whatever the hesber, it shows the seriousness of the sin of lashon ha'ra.


We don't need really need to reach for remazim to this idea in our parsha, as the Rishonim spell it out in pshat in the pesukim 24:8-9):

הִשָּׁ֧מֶר בְּנֶֽגַע־הַצָּרַ֛עַת לִשְׁמֹ֥ר מְאֹ֖ד וְלַעֲשׂ֑וֹת כְּכֹל֩ אֲשֶׁר־יוֹר֨וּ אֶתְכֶ֜ם הַכֹּהֲנִ֧ים הַלְוִיִּ֛ם כַּאֲשֶׁ֥ר צִוִּיתִ֖ם תִּשְׁמְר֥וּ לַעֲשֽׂוֹת

זָכ֕וֹר אֵ֧ת אֲשֶׁר־עָשָׂ֛ה יְקוָ֥ק אֱלֹקיךָ לְמִרְיָ֑ם בַּדֶּ֖רֶךְ בְּצֵאתְכֶ֥ם מִמִּצְרָֽיִם

Rashi explains that Miriam was afflicted with tzaraas because she spoke lashon ha'ra; therefore, if you want to be careful to avoid tzaraas, don't speak ill of people.

I've written about these pesukim a few times in the past, but for some reason Rashbam never caught my eye until this year. He offers a different takeaway than Rashi. Where I work, there are policies and procedures, but there are always people who assume those are for everyone else, not them, or they assume that their need is special, their circumstance is special, and so the rules don't apply. Rashbam address himself to the first half of that argument. Our pasuk warns that if someone is afflicted with tzaraas, no matter who it is, no matter how chashuv a person, they are not immune from punishment. We don't play favorites. The policy applies to everyone equally. אפילו הוא מלך כעוזיה לא יכבדוהו, אלא יסגירוהו וישלחוהו ובדד ישב. Look no further than Miriam, who despite being a nevi'ah, despite being Moshe's sister, was forced to sit outside the camp until her tzaraas was cured. (The Netziv here is a peleh, as he explains Rashbam here as follows: ורשב״ם פירש שלא יהיה עליך שמירת דיני צרעת למשא, שהרי גם מרים נהגה כך. I don't understand how he read it that way.)

This fits well with a midrash I quoted over a dozen years ago:

רבנן אמרי:

למה הדבר דומה? למלך שעלה מן המלחמה קילסה אותו מטרונה.

אמר המלך: תיקרי אומן של סנקליטור. לאחר ימים התחילה לערב אוננא של מלך.

אמר המלך: כך עשית?!

תיטרד למטלון!

כך, בשעה שעשה הקב"ה מלחמת הים אמרה מרים שירה ונקראת נביאה, שנאמר: (שמות טו) ותקח מרים הנביאה. כיון, שאמרה לשון הרע על אחיה, אמר הקב"ה תיטרד למטלון! שנאמר: (במדבר יב) ותסגר מרים:

R' Shlomo Kluger in Imrei Shefer explains that Midrash comes to explain why our pasuk needs to mention בַּדֶּ֖רֶךְ בְּצֵאתְכֶ֥ם מִמִּצְרָֽיִם. He reads the Midrash in a way that is similar to Rashbam. An important person usually has "protektzia."  The Midrash compares Miriam to an official appointed by the king as a reward for great service. Remember the shirah she sang when Bn"Y left Egypt, בַּדֶּ֖רֶךְ בְּצֵאתְכֶ֥ם מִמִּצְרָֽיִם? How great was that! Only a major blunder would cause a person on that level to come under scrutiny or be punished for an infraction. Well, lashon ha'ra is a major blunder on that level.

Ralbag / Abarbanel address the second argument, that due to extenuating circumstances, policy and procedure goes out the window and we can make exceptions. Bn"Y were en route to Eretz Yisrael and anxious to get there. Under those circumstances, you might have said to forget about Miriam's tzaraas so as to keep moving. That's not what happened. Even if everyone had to wait, Miriam's tzaraas had to be addressed and tended to. There is no "emergency" that trumps tzaraas because there is no need that is greater than demonstrating the severity of lashon ha'ra.

I still prefer the interpretation of the Midrash that I posted way back when. The greater the gifts and ability a person has, the greater hi/her responsibility to develop and use those talents wisely and properly. It is davka because Miriam sang shirah and understood the power of words that she is faulted for tripping up and using that power of speech improperly to criticize Moshe.

Bn"Y are lauded for being able to use words correctly. "HaKol kol Yaakov" -- our voice is meant to be used for tefillah and for Torah. That is what brings chiyus to a person. That is why מה תקנתו של מספרי לשון הרע אם תלמיד חכם הוא יעסוק בתורה. Precisely because we have that gift, we are held to account for lashon ha'ra, we are held to account when we improperly using our voice. As the Tif Shlomo says, ונשמרת מכל דבר רע, meaning דיבּור רע, is the key to a kesiva v'chasima tovah.

mah inyan shemita eitzel shiluach ha'kan (and sefira)?

One of my daughters sent me a picture of a table she left out on her mirpeset upon which a bird had built a nest and laid an egg.  

She wanted to know whether there was a mitzvah of shiluach ha'kan.  Earlier in the week I was thinking that this week's parsha would be a good opportunity to discuss a shemita sugya, but I ended up getting swept into shiluach ha'kan, which I discovered actually has a link to shemita and sefiras ha'omer, as you shall see.

First, some basics:

 

1) The mitzvah only applies to the female bird of a kosher species.  Does that apply here?  My daughter later sent a picture of the bird roosting.  

My guess was that it was a mourning dove, but she said ChatGPT told her it was a laughing dove.  My original thought was that the difference between my guess and ChatGPT was a matter of personality.  I'm not an upbeat guy, so I guessed mourning dove; ChatGPT  is more positive, so it said laughing dove.  The truth is that in North America, the doves we see are mourning doves.  The doves native to Eretz Yisrael are laughing doves.  Score 1 for ChatGPT. 

 

2) My daughter has no desire for the eggs.  Is there still a mitzvah to send away the mother?  This is a big machlokes between Chavos Yair and Chasam Sofer.  Chasam Sofer says the mitzvah only applies if you want to get the eggs.  If not, why bother the bird?  CY says you can do the mitzvah anyway.  R' Yaakov Ariel makes two interesting points regarding this machlokes.  He suggests that there may be a parallel between these views and the different opinions in Rishonim with regard to the reason for the mitzvah.  If the reason is to avoid causing the mother bird pain by taking its young in its presence, as the Rambam suggests in Moreh (3:48), then the view of the Chasam Sofer that there is no reason to disturb the bird if you don't want eggs makes more sense.  Why cause the bird any discomfort if you don't have to?  However, Ramban rejects the idea that the mitzvah is motivated by rachmanus on animals.  The kabbalists and midrashim see great segulos as inherent in the mitzvah.  There is a suggested parallel between the cry of the mother bird for mercy on her children and crying by the Shechina on our behalf, our being Hashem's children.  CY may be in line with this approach and therefore sees inherent value in the act irrespective of the need for the eggs.

 

(This view of the Rambam has to be squared away with the din that one is not allowed in davening to cry out to Hashem "whose mercy extends even to kan tzipor."  R' Soloveitchik suggested that this is a din specific to tefilah.  That is not the appropriate context to give voice to our attempted justification and understanding of Hashem's mitzvos.)

 

Secondly, he suggests a conceptual difference between the two views.  According to CS, what concerns us is the end results, the toza'ah of the mitzvah -- retrieving the eggs without bothering the bird.  According to CY who holds the mitzvah applies even if you don't want the eggs, it is the act itself, the maaseh mitzvah, which is important.

 

When all that concerns us is the totza'ah, then kavanah for the action being done is not a factor.  For example, it doesn't matter if you have kavanah l'shem mitzvah when you give tzedakah.  You get credit anyway, no matter your intention, because what we are after is helping people.  When you put on tefillin, however, you have to have kavanah.  The act of donning the tefillin is what is crucial.

 

Rav Ariel suggests a proof to the CS's position: The gemara (Kid 39b) tells the story of a man who was sent by his father to gather eggs and fell off a ladder in the process of sending away the mother bird and retreiving them.  A witness to the event could not understand how could this happen.  This individual was engaged in doing two mitzvos -- kibud av and shiluach ha'kan -- where the Torah explicitly promises a blessing of long life!  The witness ended up going off the derech.  The gemara itself is bothered why the mitzvah did not protect the person from harm, and suggests that the person might have been harboring thoughts of idolatry. 

 

Why did the gemara need to come up with this extreme case as a solution to its question?  According to CY, so long as the one doing the mitzvah did not have kavanah for the mitzvah of shiluach ha'kan -- and he probably didn't, because his concern was getting the eggs for his father -- that should be enough to negate the credit for the mitzvah.  From the fact that the gemara did not offer this simple solution, it points in favor of CS's position.

 

3) Last point, which is one a lot of people overlook: the mitzvah of shiluach ha'kan only applies to a bird in the wild, not a domesticated bird or a bird that you own.  This makes finding a scenario where this mitzvah applies is exceedingly rare.  A person's chatzeir is koneh on behalf of the owner anything that falls within it.  Meaning, anything in my daughter's mirpeset is hers.  Anything on your windowsill is yours.  Anything in your backyard, in your garage rafters, etc. all belongs to you.  B'pashtus, this would include a bird living there as well.  A bird found in your yard is your bird and is no longer considered a bird in the wild.  Based on this, Achronim have a whole debate about whether the mitzvah can be done on a nest found on your property.  Even though she probably never thought about it before discovering this nest, my daughter has absolutely no desire to own that bird.  Does kinyan chatzeir work against her presumptive will (R' Moshe holds not)?  Would being mafkir the nest after it was found help?  These and other factors need to be investigated.

 

So much for the basics.  What does any of this have to do with shemita (our parsha) or sefirah?

 

Rishonim write that the mitzvah of shiluach applies in all places and at all times. However, there is a Rashash (the kabbalist, not the one in the back of the gemara) who writes that it should not be done during sefirah, and it should not be done in shemita years post-churban ha'bayis.

 

Even if you reject this Rashash is light of the statement in Rishonim to the contrary, the question that still begs asking is what he was thinking.  Is there any explanation for his view that we can make sense of?

 

Rav Yehoshua Van Dyke (RY of Itamar) brings us back to taamei ha'mitzvah, in particular the notion of this mitzvah eliciting rachmei Shamayim.  He compares it to saying tachanun.  We don't say tachanun on days like Shabbos and Y"T.  Ramban in Emor writes that the entirety of sefirah is like a chol ha'moed between Pesach and Shavous.  Shemita is like Shabbos on a national level, following a yearly instead of a weekly cycle.  Because of the significance and holiness of these days, it is not a time to cry out for rachamim and tachanunim via the instrument of shiluach ha'kan.

 

While some poskim reject the Rashash outright, R' Van Dyke suggests that perhaps it can be used as an additional snif l'hakeil where there is a doubt as to whether one is obligated to do the mitzvah or not, e.g. if one does not want the eggs.

 

I was surprised this bird had no fear of making a nest where it did.  My daughter said she is more afraid of the bird than it is of her, so she did not want to approach it.  According to the CS, she certainly is exempt from shiluach, as she does not want the eggs.  Aside from that, there is the question of whether there is any obligation of shiluach here given that by virtue of kinyan chatzeir the bird is no longer considered a wild bird.  Lastly, there is the additional snif l'hakeil of the Rashash, for whatever it's worth, since we are in the middle of sefirah,  All that adds up to the conclusion: find a practicing Rav to ask what to do : )

 

For the record, my daugher now reports two eggs in the nest.  The bird is making a habit of this and my daughter is not happy about it.

one small step in the right direction

לֹֽא־תִרְאֶה֩ אֶת־שׁ֨וֹר אָחִ֜יךָ א֤וֹ אֶת־שֵׂיוֹ֙ נִדָּחִ֔ים וְהִתְעַלַּמְתָּ֖ מֵהֶ֑ם הָשֵׁ֥ב תְּשִׁיבֵ֖ם לְאָחִֽיךָ

וְאִם־לֹ֨א קָר֥וֹב אָחִ֛יךָ אֵלֶ֖יךָ וְלֹ֣א יְדַעְתּ֑וֹ וַאֲסַפְתּוֹ֙ אֶל־תּ֣וֹךְ בֵּיתֶ֔ךָ וְהָיָ֣ה עִמְּךָ֗ עַ֣ד דְּרֹ֤שׁ אָחִ֙יךָ֙ אֹת֔וֹ וַהֲשֵׁבֹת֖וֹ לֽוֹ׃

וְכֵ֧ן תַּעֲשֶׂ֣ה לַחֲמֹר֗וֹ וְכֵ֣ן תַּעֲשֶׂה֮ לְשִׂמְלָתוֹ֒ וְכֵ֣ן תַּעֲשֶׂ֗ה לְכׇל־אֲבֵדַ֥ת אָחִ֛יךָ אֲשֶׁר־תֹּאבַ֥ד מִמֶּ֖נּוּ וּמְצָאתָ֑הּ לֹ֥א תוּכַ֖ל לְהִתְעַלֵּֽם׃

I can't remember who says it, but it's interesting that the pesukim in our parsha in this section (22:1-3) as well as throughout the perek refer to אָחִ֜יךָ, while in parshas Mishpatim, כִּ֣י תִפְגַּ֞ע שׁ֧וֹר אֹֽיִבְךָ֛ א֥וֹ חֲמֹר֖וֹ תֹּעֶ֑ה הָשֵׁ֥ב תְּשִׁיבֶ֖נּוּ לֽוֹ (23:4), the Torah speaks about אֹֽיִבְךָ֛. Before cheit ha'eigel you could speak of sinners and saints, those who are אֹֽיִבְךָ֛ and those who are אָחִ֜יךָ. After cheit ha'eigel, we are all tainted and are in the same boat together.  Everyone is אָחִ֜יךָ

The meforshei pshat clarify that וְהִתְעַלַּמְתָּ֖ מֵהֶ֑ם is not what you are supposed to do. That phrase is connected with the the לֹֽא־תִרְאֶה֩, and is what to avoid. Ibn Ezra writes: והתעלמת – דבק עם לא תראה. Chazal derech derush do read it as a stand alone command, as there are times and circumstances where a person is allowed וְהִתְעַלַּמְתָּ֖ מֵהֶ֑ם to ignore the lost item and avoid fulfilling the mitzvah of hashavas aveida. But following the pshat reading, the question that begs asking is why the pasuk seems to be phrased so awkwardly.  If the meaning is that one is not supposed to turn aside, then why not just phrase it in the negtive, like the last pasuk does, לֹ֥א תוּכַ֖ל לְהִתְעַלֵּֽם?  Why phrase it in the positive so you need a peirush Rashi or an Ibn Ezra to make sense of things?  In fact, why say anything at all in this pasuk when you have that לֹ֥א תוּכַ֖ל לְהִתְעַלֵּֽם at the conclusion?

A second problem in the pshat of the parsha is that the third pasuk seems like it could be eliminated entirely. Instead of speaking only about שׁ֨וֹר אָחִ֜יךָ א֤וֹ אֶת־שֵׂיוֹ֙ in the first pasuk and then adding an entire pasuk about חֲמֹר֗וֹ and שִׂמְלָתוֹ֒ and כׇל־אֲבֵדַ֥ת אָחִ֛יךָ, why not stick all of those items in the first pasuk? Why not say לֹֽא־תִרְאֶה֩ אֶת־שׁ֨וֹר אָחִ֜יךָ א֤וֹ אֶת־שֵׂיוֹ֙ או את חמורו או את שׂמלתו etc.? (Granted you also need to explain why each of these items has to be mentioned, but the gemara takes care of that question.)

Lastly, it's worth noting the formulation of לֹ֥א תוּכַ֖ל לְהִתְעַלֵּֽם instead of אל תתעלם (or something similar). לֹ֥א תוּכַ֖ל in other contexts means, "It can't be done," as opposed to here, where it means, "It may not be done."  It's not impossible, it's just not allowed. We've discussed this formulation in other contexts, but it's still worth noting.

So what are we to make of this all?

The Alshich solves all three problems in one shot. This section, as well as other sections in our parsha, demands that we rise above the direction our natural inclination pulls us. You see an animal wandering in a road or a field, you know it is lost and needs to be taken care of and led home, but do you really want to go out of your way to do so? After all, we are all busy, we all have our own things to take care of -- who has time to get involved? Let the owner go find his animal and deal with it. וְהִתְעַלַּמְתָּ֖ מֵהֶ֑ם is what we are all thinking, what we all want to do, what human nature drives us to do. B y phrasing the pasuk this way the Torah is telling is that it knows exactly what is going on inside our head. But don't do it, says the pasuk. Overcome that inclination.

How is a person supposed to do that? The answer is הָשֵׁ֥ב תְּשִׁיבֵ֖ם לְאָחִֽיךָ. Chazal take note of the double phase here and teach us הָשֵׁב תְּשִׁיבֵם. הָשֵּׁב. אֲפִלּוּ מֵאָה פְּעָמִים מַשְׁמָע. The Alshich draws on the principle of mitzvah goreres mitzvah. If you work hard and manage to do the right thing once, הָשֵׁ֥ב, then it get's easier, and תְּשִׁיבֵ֖ם, you will end up doing it a second time as well. Once you take the first step in the right direction, the next step down that road comes more naturally and is even easier.

That first pasuk singles out ־שׁ֨וֹר אָחִ֜יךָ א֤וֹ אֶת־שֵׂיו because in those cases there is the animal to think of. You may not want to get involved, but on the other hand, it's hard not to take pity on an animal, especially a b'heima tehora. But once you take that first step, things snowball from there:

אך עתה אחר שהחלות לעשות מצוה זו בטהורים מובטחני בך שוכן תעש' לחמורו עם שהיא בהמה טמאה. ועדיין אפשר שיהי' רצון טוב במצוה למה שהוא בעל חי משום צער בעלי חיים אך מזה ימשך לך שוכן תעשה לשמלתו ואחרי ששלשת במצוה מאז דע לך שכ"כ תהי' מושרש ומלומד במצוה שמעצמך לא תוכל להתעלם

Once you do the right thing when it comes to a lost b'heima tehora, you will end up doing the right thing when it comes to a chamor, and then when it comes to a lost shirt, and then whenever the opportunity to do the mitzvah arises.  After time, you become habituated to do the right thing. לֹ֥א תוּכַ֖ל לְהִתְעַלֵּֽם Not just that you are not allowed to, but at this point, you can't turn away. It's now built into your nature to do good.

It's hard to know whether there is a rhyme or reason to the smichus ha'parshiyos in Ki Teitzei. Some meforshim try to link each section to the next, others avoid dealing with the problem.  The Alshich offers an explanation here, but I would like to suggest something a little different than what he writes. The parsha opens with the din of yefat to'ar, which is followed by ben sorer u'moreh because one bad turn leads to another -- gving into the temptation to take the yefat to'ar leads to the problems of the ben sorer. The ben sorer u'moreh himself is neherag al shem sofo, because given the direction he is headed, future crimes seem inevitable. A step in the wrong direction is followed by other steps down the same road. Our parshas of hashavas aveida is the same principle in action, but in a positive way. Instead of one bad turn leading to another, in this case it's one good turn leading to another, one positive step snowballing in the right direction until it is goodness which becomes inevitable.

Many meforshim talk about the message these parshiyos, which are always read this time of year, have for us in Elul. The lesson here is simple. If you are aiming to do an about face and break all your bad habits on erev Rosh haShana, it ain't gonna work. True change comes about gradually and takes time. That's why we have a full month to prepare for Yamim Noraim. You can't change everything at once, but what's important is to take that first step in the right direction. Change one small thing, and then mitzvah goreres mitzvah; that will lead to the next step in the right direction.  Over time the transformation will happen.  The wrong thing will eventually be a לֹ֥א תוּכַ֖ל, just not possible anymore, as an inclination toward goodness will become the norm.

it all depends on context - the ptur of chaburah shel mitzvah for ben sorer u'moreh

  כִּי⁠ יִהְיֶה לְאִישׁ בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה אֵינֶנּוּ שֹׁמֵעַ בְּקוֹל אָבִיו וּבְקוֹל אִמּוֹ וְיִסְּרוּ אֹתוֹ וְלֹא יִשְׁמַע אֲלֵיהֶם (22:18)

1) The Tiferes Banim (son of the Bnei Yisaschar) writes that it's what a parent does which matters more than what a parent says.  The ben sorer u'moreh ignores his parents, וְיִסְּרוּ אֹתוֹ וְלֹא יִשְׁמַע אֲלֵיהֶם, when they tell him to daven or tell him to learn.  Why?  Because his parents talk the talk but don't walk the walk. אֵינֶנּוּ שֹׁמֵעַ בְּקוֹל אָבִיו וּבְקוֹל אִמּוֹ, he doesn't hear the kol of his parents learning or the kol of their davening.  Their lecture is not reflected in their own behavior.

2) The Mishna in Sanhedrin (70) writes that a ben sorer u'moreh who eats in a chaburas mitzvah is ineligible to become chayav because this type of eating does not draw a person to become zolel v'sovei and rebel.  The gemara (70b) writes that even eating a meal of tanchumei aveilim, which is only a chiyuv derabbanan, is included in this ptur.  Rashi explains the chiddush as follows:

דאע"ג דתקנתא דרבנן בעלמא הוא דאי מרישא הוה אמינא חבורת מצוה היינו כהנים שאוכלין קדשים או פסחים

The Rogatchover asks how Rashi can possibly suggest that there is a hava amina that eating korban pesach is the pradigmatic case of chaburah shel mitzvah.  The gemara on the previous amud has a din that a person can become a ben soreh u'moreh only if he eats underdone, only partially cooked meat, like you would grab off the grill if you were in a hurry and had no time to wait:  

אמר רבינא יין חי מזיג ולא מזיג בשר חי בשיל ולא בשיל כבשר כיבא דאכלי גנבי

By the korban pesach there is an issur d'oraysa of אל תאכלו ממנו נא.  One is not allowed the eat the korban unless it is fully roasted.  Forget the ptur of chaburas mitzvah -- eating the meat of korban pesach cannot make one a ben sorer u'moreh because it is too well done!

Probably the simplest answer to the Rogatchover's question is that if meat is cooked kmaachal Ben Derusa'i, either 1/3 or 1/2 cooked, it is cooked enough to avoid the issur of  נא but rare enough to still make one eligible to become a ben sorer u'moreh (Divrei Yechezkel end of #15).  

R' Shmuel Rozovsky suggested a different yesod: the ptur of chaburas mitzvah does not depend on what is being eaten, but rather depends on the context in which the eating occurs.  If you read the Mishna in Sanhedrin carefully

אכל בחבורת מצוה אכל בעיבור החדש אכל מעשר שני בירושלים אכל נבילות וטריפות שקצים ורמשים... אכל דבר שהוא מצוה ודבר שהוא עבירה

There are two separate exclusions mentioned: אכל בחבורת מצוה and אכל דבר שהוא מצוה.  The latter case is speaking about where consuming the food is the mitzvah.  The former case, חבורת מצוה, is where the ben sorer u'moreh is eating whatever he is eating, nearly raw meat and underaged wine, not a cheftza shel mitzvah, but the chevra he is eating with are engaged in a meal that is a mitzvah, like eating korban pesach. In this case the food he is eating makes him eligible to become a ben sorer u'moreh, but the context he is eating in in precludes that possibility.

This yesod helps resolve another difficulty with Rashi. Aside from the case of eating korban pesach, Rashi gave another example of chaburah shel mitzvah: היינו כהנים שאוכלין קדשים.  Why does Rashi say *kohanim* eating kodshim?  Kodshim like a korban shelamim can be eaten by the person who brings the korban, even a yisrael; it doesn't have to be eaten only by a kohen?!  

Pshat in Rashi is that we are not speaking here about a ben sorer eating kodshim, which is an achila shel mitzvah.  The case Rashi is speaking about is where the ben sorer u'moreh goes out and steals his underdone steak of chulin but joins in with a chevra of kohanim who are eating their own kodshim steaks.  Even though the cheftza of food the ben sorer u'moreh is eating makes him eligible to be chayav, Rashi tells us that if you are eating that meal alongside those who serve in the Mikdash, kohanim who are eating kodshim l'shem mitzvah, you can't be a ben sorer u'moreh.  The context, the environment, keeps you on the straight and narrow.

The flipside of this yesod is the Ramban we discussed 10 years ago which explains that the reason why the ben sorer u'moreh is chayav is כי לא הומת בגודל חטאו, אלא לייסר בו את הרבים ושלא יהיה תקלה לאחרים.  As R' Leib Chasman explains, the din of the prat, the individual, is influenced by the tzibur, by the klal.  Even though the ben sorer's actions taken on their own are not necessarily so bad, since they can have a negative influence on the community and lead others astray, they therefore must be nipped in the bud.  Where the ben sorer finds himself in a chaburah shel mitzvah, the tables are turned and it is he who falls under the influence of the community, his environment, and therefore the danger is averted.

shome'a k'oneh by mikra bikurim

A few weeks ago I asked why it is that we go out of our way to wear a 4 cornered garment to be able to fulfill the mitzvah of tzitzis but no one makes a point of washing every meal in order to have the opportunity to fulfill the aseh of bentching.

My bad for not remembering that my wife's grandfather, R' Dov Yehudah Shochet, dealt with a similar issue.  He suggested that even though technically one is not required to wear a 4 cornered garment, the way the Torah phrases the mitzvah alludes to the fact that one should do so.  Tzitzis is phrases as a command, gdilim taaseh lecha.  The mitzvah of maakah, by way of contrast, is conditional, ki tivneh bayis.  Same with shiluach ha'kan, ki yikarei...  

I did not pose an answer back then, but was thinking that birchas ha'mazon is different because the mitzvah is to give thanks.  You can't force someone to give thanks or order then to give thanks.  It's an emotional response that a person has to feel.  Therefore, we cannot require someone to fulfill the mitzvah of bentching in the same way we require wearing tzitzis.

Minchas Chinuch and others discuss whether one can fulfill the mitzvah of mikra bikurim through shome'a k'oneh.  One aspect of the debate relates to the disagreement between Beis haLevi and Chazon Ish whether birchas kohanim can be fulfilled through shome'a k'oneh.  Beis haLevi held that since birchas kohanim must be said b'kol ram, it must be heard, therefore shome'a k'oneh does not suffice.  We do not ascribe to the listener the properties of the "voice" of the speaker.  C.I. disagreed.  Here too with respect to mikra bikurim, Rashi comments on v'anisa v'amarta that one has to say the declaration out loud.  However, I think there is an additional issue here.  Avudraham writes that we say modim derabbanan during chazaras hashat"z and do not simply listen to the recitation of modim by the shliach tzibur because modim is an expression of thanks, and thanks has to come from your heart.  It's not about saying the words; it's about feeling the emotion behind them.  Similarly, mikra bikurim is thanks to Hashem for the harvest.  Here too, someone cannot stand in your place to experience that emotion.  The words are just an expression of what one has to feel in one's  heart.

starting off on the right foot

Last week I wrote about the smichus ha'parshiyos of yefat to'ar and ben sorer u'moreh.  There is, however, a parsha that separates the two, namely, the parsha of giving the bechor double.  Shem m'Shmuel explains that the reason this parsha is stuck in the middle is to teach us the importance of firsts.  A bechor has extra rights because he is the first child born; how the parents raise him sets the tone for the way other future children will be raised.  A person might be tempted to downplay or excuse the aveiros of a ben sorer u'moreh, as they are done right after he becomes a gadol.  We don't do that. Davka because these aveiros are done right after the child becomes a gadol they carry extra weight, as these first months of entering adulthood set the tone for the life to come.  Amalek is singled out because they were the first to attack us after we left Egypt. reishis goyim Amalek.  This upcoming week's parsha speaks about bikkurim, the first fruit that we have to bring to the mikdash so that our harvest gets off on the right foot.  

The Midrash Tanchuma on our parsha comments:

אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ בְּשֵׁם רַבִּי יוֹסִי בַּר חֲנִינָא, בּוֹא וּרְאֵה כַּמָּה מִתְחַטְּאִין, וְכַמָּה יֵשׁ לָהֶן פִּתְחוֹן פֶּה לְעוֹשֵׁי מִצְוֹת. אָדָם יֵשׁ לוֹ עֵסֶק אֵצֶל מַלְכוּת, פְּעָמִים שֶׁהוּא נוֹתֵן כַּמָּה מָמוֹן עַד שֶׁמַּגִּיעִין אוֹתוֹ אֵצֶל הַמֶּלֶךְ. כֵּיוָן שֶׁהִגִּיעַ אֵצֶל הַמֶּלֶךְ, סָפֵק עוֹשֶׂה שְׁאֵלָתוֹ, סָפֵק לֹא עוֹשֶׂה. אֲבָל הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא אֵינוֹ כֵּן, אֶלָּא יוֹרֵד אָדָם לְתוֹךְ שָׂדֵהוּ, רָאָה אֶשְׁכּוֹל שֶׁבִּכֵּר, תְּאֵנָה שֶׁבִּכְּרָה, רִמּוֹן שֶׁבִּכֵּר, מַנִּיחוֹ בַּסַּל וְהוֹלֵךְ לִירוּשָׁלַיִם וּבָא וְעוֹמֵד בְּאֶמְצַע הָעֲזָרָה וּמְבַקֵּשׁ רַחֲמִים עַל עַצְמוֹ וְעַל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְעַל אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: הַשְׁקִיפָה מִמְּעוֹן קָדְשֶׁךָ וְגוֹ'. וְלֹא עוֹד, אֶלָּא שֶׁהָיָה אוֹמֵר, אֵינִי זָז מִכָּאן עַד שֶׁתַּעֲשֶׂה צָרְכִּי הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה, שֶׁכָּתוּב אַחֲרָיו, הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ מְצַוְּךָ לַעֲשׂוֹת

The Midrash connects the tefilah of הַשְׁקִיפָה מִמְּעוֹן קָדְשֶׁךָ with the bringing of bikkurim.  However, that pasuk is not part of mikra bikkurim.  That pasuk appears later in the parsha in the context of viduy maasros, the declaration made at the end of three years saying that terumos and maasros were properly tithed and distributed.  

The Tanchuma did not misread the parsha.  What the Tanchuma is teaching us is that the viduy maasros that happens years later is the culmination of the reishis, the first steps taken in the right direction, that started with the bringing of bikurim.  

The Ishbitzer writes in Mei haShiloach:

בזה שהאדם מחזיר להקב"ה ראשית פרי האדמה, בזה מברר א"ע כי יוכל לעבוד את ה' בכל מאודו.

Halacha tells us that כל העושה על דעת ראשונה הוא עושה (Shabbos 91).  If a person starts by giving his first fruits, we can be assured he will continue down that path in avodas Hashem of giving of his $ and himself (see here.)

The mussar haskel with respect to Rosh haShana goes without saying.

headed down the wrong track

What does the ben sorer u'moreh do that is so wrong?  Because he steals a little food and drink he is chayav skilah?  Ramban explains:

והנה יש עליו שני עונשין, האחד שהוא מקלה אביו ואמו וממרה בהם, והשני שהוא זולל וסובא, עובר על מה שנצטוינו: קדושים תהיו (ויקרא י״ט:ב׳), ונאמר עוד: ואותו תעבודו ובו תדבקון (דברים י״ג:ה׳), כאשר פרשתי (רמב״ן דברים ו׳:י״ג), ושנצטוינו לדעת השם בכל דרכינו, וזולל וסובא לא ידעו דרך י״י.

It's not the stealing of the food and the gluttony per se which does the ben sorer u'moreh in.  It's what that behavior is indicative of.  Someone who lives the ben sorer u'more lifestyle is guilty of violating "kedoshim ti'hiyu," of violating "bo tidbakun," of failing to try "la'daat es Hashem." 

R' Chaim Friedlander in the Sifsei Chaim is bothered by this statement of Ramban.  How many of us in our day to day lives behave in ways that are completely consistent with the ideals of kedusha, dveikus, emulating Hashem's midos?  And I deliberately use the term ideals, because to some extent that's what these are.  We try our best, but for those of us who are not tzadikim, putting these mitzvos into day to day practice is a challenge.  So why are we knocking a 13 year old for not living up to them?  

The Sifsei Chaim answers that it's not the failure to live up to the ideals which is what we take the ben sorer u'moreh to task for.  It's for failing to *aspire* to live up to them, for lacking the desire to live up to them.  He quotes from the mashgiach R' Chatzkel Levenstein that sometimes you miss the train, so you have to take a different train, or a train on a different track, or a train at a different time.  Sometimes you have to transfer once or even multiple times.  Those who take the LIRR from the 5 Towns to NYC know that some trains goes to Penn, some to Grand Central, and so sometimes you have to switch lines at Jamaica or elsewhere to get to your destination.  And if there is a problem that day, sometimes you need to hop on a subway, or make some other change.  No matter what steps you take, there is one ironclad rule -- you will never get to NYC if the train you get on is headed towards Far Rockaway or Long Island.  A train headed eastbound will never get you to a westbound destination.  We all face challenges in living up to the ideals of kedusha, dveikus, etc.  Some of us are on an express and get there quickly, some of us are on a local, some of us need to re-route ourselves a few times along the way.  But we are at least headed in the right direction.  We at least want to get there.  The ben sorer u'moreh is headed the opposite way, and he doesn't want to turn around.  The longer he sits on the train, the further he will get from where he should be.  Mutav she'yamus zakai and not wait until the end of the line.

With this yesod we can better understand the smichus ha'parshiyos between the eishes yefat to'ar and the ben sorer u'moreh.  Rashi at the beginning of the parsha tells us:

אבל אם נשאה, סופו להיות שונאה, שנאמר אחריו: כי תהיינהא לאיש וגומ׳, וסופו להוליד ממנה בן סורר ומורה. לכך נסמכו פרשיות הללו.

This is not magic, but is an inevitable consequence of a less than ideal home structure.  Ibn Ezra points to the fact that elsewhere, e.g. the parsha of the mekalel at the end of Emor, the Torah makes a point of mentioning the mother of someone who does wrong, because a poor motherly upbringing can have a tremendous negative impact.  ונסמכה זאת בעבור אשת יפת תאר (דברים כ״א:י״א). והעד: ושם אמו  The Torah mentions that Aharon married Elisheva bas Aminadav because in that case having a great mother led to Aharon having great children.  

What is it that a good wife brings to a family that a yefat to'ar or a bad wife does not?  Tanna d'Bei Eliyahu (ch 9) tells us אין לך כשרה בנשים אלא אשה שעושה רצון בעלה.  Sometimes a husband comes home from work exhausted from a long, hard day and wants nothing more than to eat some dinner and collapse on the couch.  The last thing on his mind is going to the beis medrash to learn.  He has no רצון!  What he aspires to is relaxation, not a blatt gemara.  The L. Rebbe (Likutei Sichos vol 4 p 1069, end of Balak) explains that this is what Chazal are telling us. אשה שעושה רצון בעלה.  A good wife awakens in her husband the ratzon that he is lacking.  A good wife will kick her husband off the couch and out of the house to go learn.  She will point him in the right direction and give him the push that he needs.

Like the Sifsei Chaim teaches, the ben sorer u'moreh is a person who lacks ratzon, who lacks the desire to do better and grow.  He heads away from, not toward, kedusha and dveikus.  That comes from growing up in a home where there is a lack of אשה שעושה רצון בעלה, a wife, a mother, who can create that desire, that ratzon, in her husband and in her children.   A yefat to'ar, a woman that is taken when a person is overcome with a desire of taavah, the wrong kind of desire, is not such a wife and mother.

We say multiple times a day in ashrei רצון יראיו יעשׂה.  When a person has yiras shamayim, Hashem steps in to help out and give him/her the ratzon to grow and do more.  The Shem m'Shmuel (Pinchas) writes: בגמ' שבת (קי"ח:) כל המענג את השבת נותנין לו משאלות לבו הפי' אצלי שנותנין דעת ללב לידע מה ישאל:  To know what to ask for, what to aspire to, to at least be on the right track headed in the right direction, is one of the greatest gifts Hashem can give us.  We say again and again this time of year אחת שׁאלתי...אותה אבקשׁ.  Even if we are not at this moment holding on the level of שׁבתי בּבּית ה׳, if that is our bakasha and shei'la from Hashem, if that is our ratzon and aspiration, then we are at least headed in the right direction.

shiluach ha'kan

In the past few years I have seen advertisements offering people the opportunity to fulfill shiluach ha'kan.  I suspect the motivation here is the great weight the kabbalah assigns to this mitzvah.  Whenever you start talking segulos and kabbalah, people pay attention.  

The problem is that it's not a very easy mitzvah to fulfill.  First off, many if not most poskim hold there is no reason to do the mitzvah unless you want to collect the eggs or chicks.  The Chavos Ya'ir disagrees, and presumably if you want to do the mitzvah to be choshesh for that view, or because of the segulah, that purpose overrides the potential tzaar baalei chaim involved.  Still, it seems cruel to take the eggs or chicks for no purpose.  To avoid this problem R' Melamed in his Pninei Halacha suggests in this circumstance one can rely on the view of Chacham Tzvi who holds that there is a kiyum  in chasing away the mother even if one does not take the chicks or eggs.    

The mitzvah only applies to kosher birds, and only applies when the chicks are still too young to fly, and only applies when the mother bird, not the father, is on the nest.  There are birds where the mother and father alternate sitting on the nest at different times.  Good luck to you in being able to tell the difference.

Finally, and most critically, the nest has to be in the wild, ownerless.  A lot of times people discover a nest somewhere on their property, either tucked under a section of roof on a porch, or under an air conditioning unit, or something like that.  A soon as the mother bird flies off that nest for a moment, there is a potential kinyan chatzeir that should kick in and make the nest one's own, no longer in the wild.  Some hold that if you catch the birds in the process of building the nest before it is complete, you can make a tnai in advance that prevents the kinyan chatzeir from being chal.  Others go further and argue that since one does not really want to own a bird's nest, even without a tnai the kinyan is not chal.  Perhaps you can be mafkir the nest after the fact.  R' Shlomo Zalman Auerbach is not too happy with these solutions.  

root causes

Parshas Ki Teitzei (24:8-9) juxtaposes  הִשָּׁ֧מֶר בְּנֶֽגַע־הַצָּרַ֛עַת לִשְׁמֹ֥ר מְאֹ֖ד וְלַעֲשׂ֑וֹת with the warning/mitzvah of זָכ֕וֹר אֵ֧ת אֲשֶׁר־עָשָׂ֛ה ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ לְמִרְיָ֑ם.  B'shlama if the warning of הִשָּׁ֧מֶר בְּנֶֽגַע־הַצָּרַ֛עַת comes to tell us to avoid the root cause of tzaraas, which is speaking lashon ha'ra, the connection to what happened to Miriam is obvious.  However, as the Netziv already notes, ואינו לפי פשט ענין הכתוב.  Furthermore, the gemara darshens that הִשָּׁ֧מֶר בְּנֶֽגַע־הַצָּרַ֛עַת comes to prohibit cutting off a baheres.  What does that have to do with what happened to Miriam?  

Meshech Chochma explains that had there been no issur, instead of holding back everyone from travelling because Miriam became a metzora, they could have simply cut off the baheres.  The juxtaposition of the pesukim shows us the severity of the lav, that even at the cost of everyone waiting, Miriam's tzaraas had to be dealt with properly.

Ohr haChaim (R' Yaakov Shapira's develops this idea in a sicha on the parsha) explains that the issur of cutting off a baheres also teaches us something about lashon ha'ra, and that is the link to the episode with Miriam.  

השמר בנגע וגו׳ זכור וגו׳ – לדבריהם ז״ל (שבת קל״ב:) שאמרו שבא להזהיר לבל יקוץ בהרתו, נתכוין בהסמכת זכור את אשר עשה ה׳ למרים להודיע שורש שממנו יהיה הנגע ואותו יצו ה׳ לקוץ ורפא

Cutting off a baheres is wrong because it just removes the surface symptom without addressing the root cause of the disease.  

Not speaking lashon ha'ra is not just about controlling your mouth (thought that is certainly part of it).  A person who speaks lashon ha'ra is a person who views the world with negativity, a person who has trouble seeing the best in others.  Were such a person to tape their mouth shut, it would be a temporary band-aid that fixes the surface symptom, but not the root cause.   

the harm in doing wrong

Rashi (21:11) explains the smichus ha'parshiyos of topics at the beginning of our parsha: if you take a yefat to'ar in battle, even if permitted, you will eventually come to hate her, and your offspring will end up being a ben sorer u'moreh.  Why should a person suffer all these horrible outcomes if what he did is permitted?  R' Bloch in Shiurei Daas explains (see post here) that the Torah's commandments function on two levels.  When a doctor tells you smoking is the wrong thing to do, that's a different "wrong" from an IRS agent telling you that it's wrong not to pay taxes.  One is a legal restriction; the other is a metziyus.  When Hashem tells you something is wrong, it's meant in both senses of the word.  To combat the yetzer ha'ra, the Torah lifted the IRS agent element of the yefat to'ar prohibition.  It's not going to cause you to be brought before beis din shel maalah and penalized.  However, the metziyus remains the metziyus.  The element of it being harmful remains in place, and you assume the consequences.

In last week's parsha we had the issur of lo tasur.  Rambam holds that issurim derabbanan fall under the lo tasur umbrella that orders us to listen to Chazal.  Ramban disagrees, and asks if this is true, why is it that sfeika d'oraysa l'chumra but sfeika derabbanan l'kula?  Every derabbanan is implicitly a safeik doraysa of lo tasur?

R' Baruch Sorotzkin uses this same yesod of the Shiurei Daas to answer that question.  The reason sfeika d'oraysa l'chumra is because even though legally you may not be doing anything wrong by taking a gamble, you still risk running into negative consequences b'metziyus.  L'mashal, even if legally you are allowed to smoke outside as opposed to inside your office building, that does not mean you are immune from cancer so long as you remain outside.  That sevara only applies when speaking about issurei d'oraysa, where what the Torah spells out as wrong is both legally wrong as well as b'metziyus wrong.  When Chazal instituted a new issur derabbanan, they did not change the metziyus; they only added legal strictures.  (Compare with R' Yosef Engel in Esvan D'Oraysa who writes that issurei d'oraysa are issurei cheftza, as opposed to issurei derabbanan that are only issurei gavra.  But Shaarei Yosher's hesber of the Rambam in I:3 and in ch 7 top of the page here.)

The Netziv uses this same sevara to explain a difficult Raavad.  If a person's life is in mortal danger, the gemara writes that where there is a choice of different issurim to violate, the rule of thumb is to choose the lesser evil.  Raavad  holds that it is better to violate Shabbos to shecht and animal and eat kosher food rather than eat treif, even though the latter is only an issur lav of malkos.  Netziv (Harchev Davar to Devarim 6:10, see the many proofs he brings) explains that food prepared on Shabbos is a legal violation; treif food is bad for you b'metziyus, like poison.  To save a person's life we can suspend legal restrictions, but b'metziyus, poison is still poison and will cause harm.  

According to this Netziv, it is meduyak why the gemara writes that beis din does not have to intervene to stop a katan from eating neveilah -- katan ocheil neveilos ain beis din metzuvim l'hafrisho.  The same is true of any issur.  Why single out neveilah for special mention?   Netziv answers that one might have thought that with respect to maachalos assuros beis din should intervene because even though a katan is legally not bound to stop eating, there is a harm b'metziyus that the katan suffers by eating treif, kah mashma lan beis din can still remain on the sidelines.

Netziv offers a similar explanation in our parsha for why there is a special command to be careful to protect the sanctity of the camp when going out to war,  כִּֽי־תֵצֵ֥א מַחֲנֶ֖ה עַל־אֹיְבֶ֑יךָ וְנִ֨שְׁמַרְתָּ֔ מִכֹּ֖ל דָּבָ֥ר רָֽע (23:10).  According to Ramban (see post here) it was permissible to eat maachalos assuros during the battles of conquest of Eretz Yisrael. Even the legal restriction against maachalos assuros was lifted, the danger of consuming what b'metziyus poses a danger remains in place.  Netziv writes:

 עוד יש טעם מה שכתב הרמב״ן כאן, באשר במחנה עלול לכל שקץ ותועבה. והוספנו לעיל שם (ו,י) הסיבה לזה, משום שהותרו מאכלות אסורות, והמה גורמים לטמטם נפש הישראלי. וכבר הזהיר הרבה לעיל (ו,יג) על זה ״השמר לך פן תשכח את ה׳ וגו׳⁠ ⁠״ וכל הענין, וכאן כפל הענין משום הוספה שהובאה כאן

With this perspective on issurim, undoing wrong and doing teshuvah is more than just a matter of spiritual rehabilitation, but encompasses restoring the damage done b'metziyus as well.

mei Noach

 You have in this week's haftarah

 כִּֽי־מֵ֥י נֹ֙חַ֙ זֹ֣את לִ֔י אֲשֶׁ֣ר נִשְׁבַּ֗עְתִּי מֵעֲבֹ֥ר מֵי־נֹ֛חַ ע֖וֹד עַל־הָאָ֑רֶץ כֵּ֥ן נִשְׁבַּ֛עְתִּי מִקְּצֹ֥ף עָלַ֖יִךְ וּמִגְּעׇר־בָּֽךְ׃

Hashem tells us that the churban ha'bayis was like the Noach's flood.  Hashem promises that He will never again bring upon Bnei Yisrael such an act of destruction.

1) What's the comparison?  The flood destroyed the entire world.  The churban and ensuing galus is our problem, not the whole world's problem?  

When you lose someone dear to you and close to you, it's like your whole world is gone.  Hashem is telling us that when he has to give such a big punishment to us, for whom He created the whole world, it's like that whole world is gone.

2) Everybody knows the derasha that it's called מֵ֥י נֹ֙חַ֙ because Noach is held responsible for the flood.  He could have davened and done something to avert the disaster, and is assigned blame for not having done so.  

If Chazal want to teach us who is to blame for the flood, why here?  Why stick this in a pasuk in the middle of Yeshayahu and not somewhere in parshas Noach or elsewhere?

R' Tzadok haKohen (Pri Tzadik 12) quotes the gemara (Yoma 86) תניא היה ר"מ אומר גדולה תשובה שבשביל יחיד שעשה תשובה מוחלין לכל העולם כולו שנא' ארפא משובתם אוהבם נדבה כי שב אפי ממנו מהם לא נאמר אלא ממנו .  All it takes is one person doing teshuvah and the whole world can be uplifted and be granted mechila and kapara. 

Chazal are telling us about the flood because it's a lesson for us.  We had a churban ha'bayis and we are sitting in galus for 2000 years already and Hashem comes and tells us that it's like מֵ֥י נֹ֙חַ֙ because all it takes is one person to do teshuvah, all it takes is one Noach willing to beg Hashem to forgive Klal Yisrael, and the whole world changes, everything can be different.

3) There is a machlokes whether מֵ֥י נֹ֙חַ֙  is one word or two (see Radak).  If you read it as two words, it means "the waters of Noach," like I explained above.  If it is one word, then it means "like the days of Noach," k=like+ y'mei=days.  

Abarbanel explains:

שכמו מה שקרה לישראל בחטאתיהם וגאולתם ותשועתם כן קרה לדור המבול שנתרבו על פני כל הארץ והשחית כל בשר את דרכו ונתן השם להם זמן לשוב בתשובה ולא שבו ונתחייבו כליה ונשארו מהם מעט מהרבה נח ובניו והם נעשו לגוי גדול ומאלה נפצה כל הארץ ונשבע ה׳ בזרוע קדשו שלא להביא עוד מבול לשחת כל בשר כן ישראל פרו ורבו ותמלא הארץ אותם ומלאה הארץ חמס מפניהם ונתן השם להם מקום לשוב בתשובה ולא שבו עדין, ומפני זה שבלת מים שטפתם זרם מים רבים שהוא הגלות האמנם ישארו מהם אחד מעיר ושנים ממשפחה כאותם שניצולו בתיבה והם יהיו לראש פנה וירבו ויעצמו בארץ וישבע השם שלא להביא עוד עליהם גלות 

Just like in the days of the flood there was a long window of opportunity of teshuvah that no one took advantage of, and then Hashem finally brought the flood to wipe out the world and only Noach and his small family was spared, so too, before the churban Hashem sent warnings, there was a window of opportunity for teshuvah, but once that passed Hashem brought us into galus, which, like the flood, wiped out everyone except for small pockets here and there.  

If you live in the 5T like I do, or some other frum neighborhood, you live in a little bubble and you think the Jewish world is booming.  The latest census data shows that the fastest growing neighborhoods in NY/NJ are those areas where Orthodox Jews live -- we have lots of kids and so the population grows.  In my area we have kosher restaurants aplenty, we have multiple yeshivos to choose from, plenty of minyanim to choose where you want to daven and where you won't step foot.  But all this is an illusion.  Your little island may have gotten a little bigger in the last census count, it may have better restaurants and more schools than the next little island, but sach ha'kol, it's still just a little island surrounded by the vast ocean of the flood, and those waters and closing in more rapidly than you think.  The vast majority of American Jews are underwater already or barely holding their head above water Jewishly, as intermarriage, assimilation, ignorance, and apathy take their toll.  These is מים רבים שהוא הגלות that the Abarbanel is referring to.  We can only hope that we are among the אמנם ישארו מהם אחד מעיר ושנים ממשפחה כאותם שניצולו בתיבה those who can make it to the finish line and witness Hashem's promise that days like those of Noach, whether the flood of rain or the flood of galus, never repeat themselves again.

teshuvah that is transformative

עַל־דְּבַ֞ר אֲשֶׁ֨ר לֹא־קִדְּמ֤וּ אֶתְכֶם֙ בַּלֶּ֣חֶם וּבַמַּ֔יִם בַּדֶּ֖רֶךְ בְּצֵאתְכֶ֣ם מִמִּצְרָ֑יִם וַאֲשֶׁר֩ שָׂכַ֨ר עָלֶ֜יךָ אֶת־בִּלְעָ֣ם בֶּן־בְּע֗וֹר מִפְּת֛וֹר אֲרַ֥ם נַהֲרַ֖יִם לְקַֽלְלֶֽךָּ׃

וְלֹֽא־אָבָ֞ה ה׳ אלקיך לִשְׁמֹ֣עַ אֶל־בִּלְעָ֔ם... כִּ֥י אֲהֵֽבְךָ֖ ה׳ אלקיך

How can the pasuk juxtapose and equate something so trivial like not serving food with the sin of hiring Bilam to destroy Klal Yisrael? Not only does it put the two together, but it puts the not bringing out the food first!   R' Baruch Mordechai Ezrachi suggests a thought experiment: if you wanted to get a Bilam to do teshuvah, what would you have him do?  Keep shabbos?  Eat kosher?  Daven?  R' Ezrachi says that even if he did all that, all you would have is a Bilam who davens, eats kosher, and keeps Shabbos -- the same rotten person, just one who does a few mitzvos.  The way to change the core of the person and make Bilam not Bilam anymore is to have him do chessed like serving food to a stranger, something that will change his midos.  The אֲשֶׁ֨ר לֹא־קִדְּמ֤וּ אֶתְכֶם֙ בַּלֶּ֣חֶם וּבַמַּ֔יִם is the siman that at core, Amon and Moav were rotten people.  What starts with a trivial slight ends up with  אֲשֶׁר֩ שָׂכַ֨ר עָלֶ֜יךָ אֶת־בִּלְעָ֣ם בֶּן־בְּע֗וֹר .  It's just a matter of degree, not a qualitatively different sin.

We're supposed to be doing teshuvah during Elul.  The Chayei Adam (143) writes at length about how during this time of year a person is supposed to add time to his learning, add to the $ he gives to tzedaka, adds to his zehirus in shemiras ha'mitzvos.  I think what you learn from R' BM"E is that Reb Ploni can do all that -- he can learn an extra hour, he can wake up at dawn for slichos, he can write checks to a dozen different charities -- and yet he can still be the same Reb Ploni, just with a few extra mitzvos under his belt.  The goal of teshuvah has to be to not be the same Reb Ploni.  

Taz explains that the two different reasons given for our rejecting Amoni and Moavi, 1) עַל־דְּבַ֞ר אֲשֶׁ֨ר לֹא־קִדְּמ֤וּ אֶתְכֶם֙ בַּלֶּ֣חֶם וּבַמַּ֔יִם  and 2) אֲשֶׁר֩ שָׂכַ֨ר עָלֶ֜יךָ אֶת־בִּלְעָ֣ם בֶּן־בְּע֗וֹר are hah b'hah talya.  Why should Amon and Moav be held accountable for not offering food and drink more than any other nation?  (see Ramban!)  Taz quotes the pasuk in Mishlei 25:21 אִם־רָעֵ֣ב שׂ֖נַאֲךָ הַאֲכִלֵ֣הוּ לָ֑חֶם וְאִם־צָ֜מֵ֗א הַשְׁקֵ֥הוּ מָֽיִם, that there is a mitzvah to extend hospitality davka to your enemy, the person who you like least, because that's how to overcome your yetzer ha'ra.  Similarly, the gemara (BM 32) writes that even though unloading a burden from an animal is a bigger mitzvah than loading, if the person who needs help loading is your enemy, then that mitzvah comes first.  And we learned from the Netziv earlier this year, the way to solve a dispute is to do something good davka for the person who has harmed you.  If it would have been anyone else, any other nation, the fact that we were not greeted with a welcome parade and a tray of cake and cookies would not have been that big a deal.  But since שָׂכַ֨ר עָלֶ֜יךָ אֶת־בִּלְעָ֣ם בֶּן־בְּע֗וֹר, proving their hate, Amon and Moav had an even greater obligation to try to do good.  (Amazing that this obligation to break one's yetzer extends even to a ben Noach. )  Doing what we like least, or doing something good for someone we like least, is transformative in a way that just doing more of what we are already good at is not.

The argument against Amon and Moav is m'mah nafshach: if you hate Bnei Yisrael, all the more reason you owe them the favor of a proper greeting with food and drink.  And if you don't really hate them because you know that G-d loves them, כִּ֥י אֲהֵֽבְךָ֖ ה׳ אלקיך, and it would be wrong to hate that which G-d loves, then why did you go  out and hire Bilam to curse them?  

erecting a spiritual maakeh

The gemara (Kesubos 77b) writes that when R' Chanina bar Papa died, there was a pillar of fire that separated his holy body from everyone:

כי נח נפשיה אפסיק ליה עמודא דנורא בין דידיה לעלמא וגמירי דלא מפסיק עמודא דנורא אלא לחד בדרא או לתרין בדרא
קרב לגביה רבי אלכסנדרי אמר עשה בשביל כבוד חכמים לא אשגח עשה בשביל כבוד אביך לא אשגח עשה בשביל כבוד עצמך איסתלק אמר אביי לאפוקי ממאן דלא קיים (אפילו אות אחת) אמר ליה רב אדא בר מתנא לאפוקי ממר דלא אית ליה מעקה לאיגריה ולא היא מיהוה הוה וההיא שעתא הוא דשדייה זיקא

Abayei said the purpose of that pillar is to keep away those who have not fulfilled the Torah in its entirety.  Rav Ada bar Masna then criticized Abayei, saying that he, Abayei, failed his own test, as his roof was missing a maakeh.  (The gemara then concludes that Abayei had built a maakeh but it had blown down at that moment.)

The point of R' Ada is that nobody's perfect, and Abayei's lack of maakeh (whether intentional or not) served as an example to bring home the point. 

Of all the mitzvos Abayei might be found wanting in that would make R Ada's point, why was it maakeh in particular where he got tripped up?

The Tiferes Yosef, the Radziner, quotes from that Ishbitzer that maakeh is not just about erecting a physical barrier to prevent people from falling off your roof.  It's also about preventing people from falling in ruchniyus.  "Ki yipol ha'nofel" -- there are unfortunately a lot of people who are "noflim."  Let it not happen because of you, because your standards are not those that anyone can meet or relate to.

Rav Ada was telling Abayei that if the standard is perfection, then in your world everyone is a "nofel" and no one will every measure up.  Your standard fails the litmus test of the mitzvah of maakeh.

Of course one has to be careful not to err in the other direction either.  Having too loose standards, ignoring the need "l'migdar milsa" or avoid "mar'is ayin," can lead to equally destructive results.

shiluach ha'kan

The gemara in Makos has a debate how a lav ha’nitak l’aseh works: does the fulfillment of the aseh take off the punishment of malkos (kiymu v’lo kiymo) or is it the violation of the aseh which will result in incurring malkos for the lav (bitlo v’lo bitlo).   Rashi in the sugya of shiluach ha’kan (Chulin 141a d”h kiymo) writes a chiddush: if you hold kiymo v’lo kiymo the aseh must be fulfilled within toch k’dei dibur of the lav.   The Rambam makes no such stipulation when he quotes that halacha.  Just passing on an interesting mareh makom.

The Mishna in Brachos writes that one cannot ask in tefilah that Hashem should have mercy on us like the mercy exhibited by the mitzvah of shiluch ha'kan in sending away the mother bird.  The gemara explains that we must treat mitzvos as gezeiros, not something that we do for a particular reason.  Yet we find in Midrash (and the Rambam writes in Moreh) that the mitzvah is in fact about being merciful and avoiding causing pain to the mother bird. 

R' Soloveitchik and Rav Kook explain that there is no contradiction here.  When one is learning Torah and approaching mitzvos in an intellectual way, then one can delve into taamei ha'mitzvos.  However, when one is davening, one must take the approach that our job is simply to fulfill the ratzon Hashem, with no reasons, without even trying to understand.  Avodas ha'lev has different parameters than avodah with the brain.

Sefas Emes (5647) offers a different answer.  The mother bird can't watch its offspring taken only because Hashem planted rachmanus in mother birds when he created the world.  Hashem implanted all aspects of rachmanus that exist in the world -- if he did not create nature that way, it would not exist that way.  What the Mishna means to tell us is that we should not think the bird inherently feels pain when its offspring are taken and halacha and the mitzvos haTorah are a reaction to that.  To the contrary, it is the mitzvos haTorah, the gezeiras Hashem, which is what defines nature. 

a want that can't be explained

We once discussed different answers to the question of why G-d thwarted Bilam's attempt to curse Klal Yisrael and changed his words to bracha. Why not just let him say whatever he wants and ignore him?

Chasam Sofer in our parsha offers another answer. "V'lo avah Hashem Elokecha lishmoa el Bilam...ki a'heivcha Hashem Elokecha." (23:6) When you love someone, you don't want to listen to bad things being said about them, even if the words are meaningless. Hashem loves Klal Yisrael; therefore, He did not want to even give Bilam the chance to speak.

The Ohr haChaim has an interesting comment on the language used in this pasuk. The word "AVAH," writes the Ohr haChaim, means having a desire for no reason. Earlier in sefer Devarim (2:26-30) Moshe relates how he sent messengers to Sichon asking permission for Klal Yisrael to pass through his territory, and even offering to buy food and drink from the Emori despite the fact that Klal Yisrael had mon and the be'er and didn't really need anything.  "V'lo AVAH Sichon.. ha'avireinu bo..." -- Sichon did not **want** to let Klal Yisrael pass through.  This was was a want that made no sense -- hence the use of "lo AVAH."  Sichon could have avoided war, he could have made money for his people, but he still did not give in. Here too, Bilam pointed to the misdeeds of Klal Yisrael, to their rebellions, to the cheit ha'eigel, and still, Hashem did not want to allow him to harm Klal Yisrael. Why? How do you justify that?   "V'lo AVAH" -- we can't explain it.  Can you explain love? 
 
Now that we know this Ohr haChaim, we have a deeper insight into the parsha of yibum at the end of our sidra (25:7-8). The Torah tells us, "V'im lo yachpotz ha'ish lakachas es yivimto," if the man does not want to do yibum, "V'also yivimto ha'sha'ara," the woman comes to beis din and declares, "... lo AVAH yabmi." Beis din then responds: "V'kar'u lo ziknei iro v'dibru eilav," they give the guy a talking to. If he responds and says, "Lo chafatzti likachta," I don't want to marry her, then they perform chalitza.  We have a whole shakla v'terya here -- he says, she says, beis din says, and then he responds again.  What's going on?

The key to the parsha is the one word AVAH.  Malbim explains: the man whose brother died says, "Lo **chafatzti** likachta" -- I have nothing to gain from marrying this woman -- chafeitz = desire for something that is beneficial in some way -- and don't want to be involved. But what the woman hears and what she presents to beis din is "lo AVAH yabmi" -- he has no good reason for his refusal.  It's just a whim.  So beis din comes to investigate. The man then reiterates to them "lo chafatzti..." -- it's not just some nonsensical behavior, but rather it's that I dont see this match as being beneficial to either of us. It's "lo chafatzti" -- not "lo AVAH" like she said.  That's a different story, and beis din now gets involved in arranging a chalitza.

Back in sefer Braishis, when Avaraham sends Eliezer to find a wife for Yitzchak, Eliezer ask Avraham what to do if, "Lo tOVEH ha'isha laleches..." Eliezer was a good negotiator and whatever reason the girl might give for not wanting to go -- money, questions of yichus, kavod, etc. -- he had an answer for. But what if "lo toveh" -- what if she refuses on a whim and has no good reason? You can't argue with a whim, so what am I to do? 
 
So we have a few good examples of this Ohr haChaim in action where it gives us new, deeper insight into pesukim. Now for an example that has me baffled. In parshas Nitzavim the Torah speaks about the evil person who rejects the bris of Hashem and says "bi'shrirus libi eilech," I'll go my own way and be fine. The Torah tells us, "Lo YOVEH Hashem sloch lo," Hashem will not let him off the hook (29:18-19)  "Lo YOVEH?"  Hashem on a whim, for no reason, turns away a person???  Surely Hashem never turns someone away for no reason, and here, the reason this person is punished is clear from the pesukim.  I'm stuck -- how do you explain this pasuk?

millstones and marriage

It's  not clear to me which is the lesser of the two evils: to abandon any hope of trying to explain the smichus ha'parshiyos between all the mitzvos listed in our parsha and just accept that it is a jumble of different ideas, or to risk trying to make connections at the cost of the explanation being forced and unconvincing.  Ibn Ezra 24:6 for one attempts to link together an extended series of mitzvos and parshiyos in the sidra.  Even if the attempt to link everything together with a common theme fails, that does not mean there is no value in thinking about connections between isolated links in the chain.  Not much time to write this week (and I skipped last week too, so my son told me I have to write something), so I want to just look at one example:

כִּֽי־יִקַּ֥ח אִישׁ֙ אִשָּׁ֣ה חֲדָשָׁ֔ה לֹ֤א יֵצֵא֙ בַּצָּבָ֔א וְלֹא־יַעֲבֹ֥ר עָלָ֖יו לְכׇל־דָּבָ֑ר נָקִ֞י יִהְיֶ֤ה לְבֵיתוֹ֙ שָׁנָ֣ה אֶחָ֔ת וְשִׂמַּ֖ח אֶת־אִשְׁתּ֥וֹ אֲשֶׁר־לָקָֽח׃

לֹא־יַחֲבֹ֥ל רֵחַ֖יִם וָרָ֑כֶב כִּי־נֶ֖פֶשׁ ה֥וּא חֹבֵֽל׃

What's the connection between the newly married husband being freed from army service and the prohibition of taking a millstone as collateral for a loan?

Netziv explains that people are often faced with competing obligations.  A man has a duty to server his country, but he also has a duty to his wife.  The Torah here tells us that during shanah rishona, the duty to society, as important as it is, is set aside because it would infringe too greatly on the home.  So too, while the Torah allows a lender to take security for a loan and guarantee his shibud on a debtor, if that infringes on the debtor to the point of robbing him of his living things have gone too far.

This Netziv speaks to modern life.  You are sitting and trying to learn, or trying to talk to your wife --suddenly you hear that annoying "ping ping" of your phone telling you another message has arrived.  Remember the good ol days when all we had to worry about was talking in shul an not a cacophony of electronic noise?  Society -- our jobs, etc. -- has a right to make demands on our life, but there has to be a balance.  Sometimes the intrusion is too much and has gone too far. 

Meshech Chochma offers another explanation for the smichus haparshiyos based on shitas haRambam that just like there is an issur of the lender taking the millstone even if the debtor voluntarily surrenders it, so too the husband may not go out to war even if his wife voluntarily allows him to do so. Why not?  If she doesn't care, why can't he go?  I think the answer is that the tachlis of the mitzvah is not to be home because your wife needs you around, but rather to home because you need to be around your wife.  Even if she allows it, the new husband should feel that he can't go and can't leave his bride.

2) On a completely different note, I wanted to share a tremendous vort on this pasuk from the Mishnas Sachir.  The pasuk starts "ki yikach isha..."  Why does it need to echo the same idea in the closing, "...ishto asher lakach?"

Every Friday night we sing eishes chayil.  It's nice to think of your wife when you sing it, but Chazal tell us that the chapter is really speaking about Torah.  "Yom chasunaso," the Mishna is Ta'anis tells us, is mattan Torah.  Each of us had a bride before we every got married -- we are married to Torah. 

When a couple gets married there are all kinds of details that need to be taken care of.  They need an apartment, they need furniture, they need pots and pans, and everything else to set up a house.  It's hard.  But there is something even harder than putting all that together -- what's even harder is filling your new home with ruchniyus. 

The Torah tells us, therefore, that when a person takes a new wife -- in addition to his "old" wife of Torah that he has been married to at Har Sinai -- he needs to set aside a whole year.   The truth is that the job takes a lifetime, but at least for one year a person needs to concentrate and dedicate himself to building his new home with ruchniyus.  "...V'simach es ishto" -- because if he does that with his new wife, than "ishto," his wife of Torah, his wife from Har Sinai, will share in his rejoicing as well.  And that's the most important simcha of all.

Al dvar asher lo tza'akah -- sometimes you have to scream

The one factor, at least based on a superficial reading of the parsha, that distinguishes a case of ones from a case of znus is whether the woman screamed out or not.  "Al dvar asher lo tza'akah ba'ir" (22:24) -- the assumption is that if whatever happened took place in the city, the woman must be guilty as well or someone would have heard her screaming.

Ramban is bothered: why are we so hung up on the screaming?  Maybe this woman lives in NY and knows no one is going to respond to her screams anyway, like the Kitty Genovese story, so she doesn't scream -- she obviously is not still guilty.  The key question should be whether she was coerced or not, whether she engaged in an illicit act willfully, not whether she specifically screamed.    

Ramban answers that you have to say that screaming is lav davka and the Torah is just describing a typical case.

Sefas Emes, however, says screaming makes all the difference in the world.  Screaming is not just a siman, a way to raise an alarm, but screaming is the means to effect yeshu'a.  "Al dvar asher lo tza'akah ba'ir" -- because had she screamed, she surely would have been heard and saved.  Not seizing that opportunity is itself a crime.

(Without the Sefas Emes I think you have a bit of a pshat difficulty.  The Torah tells us exactly what the man did wrong -- "al asher inah..."  When it comes to the woman, if you read the pasuk like Ramban, it does not tell us anything.  It just gives us a siman, "asher lo tza'akah," and leaves us to infer that she therefore consented and committed an immoral act.  According to Sefas Emes, the failure to scream, the failure to avail oneself of the opportunity of rescue, is itself the crime.  It's not just an inference but the Torah is telling us exactly what was done wrong by the man and by the woman.) 

The Sefas Emes is not just a comment on this specific parsha, but is a comment on life.  There is a lot of stuff that does not befit us that we come in contact with due to our having to work in and live in a secular society.  What can you do -- ones!  We can't so easily change when and where we live.  The Sefas Emes is telling us that if it's really ones, then you should be screaming.  If you passively sit back and do nothing, or worse, accommodate yourself to the situation or enjoy he situation, then all bets are off.  If you want to be saved, you have to scream.  And if you do scream, you will be saved.   

(I had a very hard time trying to formulate this Sefas Emes.  For some reason earlier in the week I became fixated on writing this point up and then I couldn't let it go.  It became a mental block to my writing anything else.  After mulling it over for 2 days I don't like the results.  See S.E. in the Likutim, in 5634, and 5640 and see what you make of it.)

remembering what Miriam had done

The Midrash writes that Moshe told Hashem that either he should heal Miriam or Moshe himself will do the job. Very strange – Moshe could do something without Hashem?

Ksav Sofer explains that Moshe was not sure what Miriam was guilty of – was it an issur bein adam laMakom or bein adam l’chaveiro? The Mishna tells us that Hashem does not give kapparah on a bein adam l’chaveiro unless and until the injured party is mochel. Moshe said to Hashem as follows: if Miriam is guilty of a bein adam laMakom, then Hashem, you give her mechilah and kapprah; if Miriam is guilty of a bein adam l’chaveiro and it’s all up to me, then I will do the job and pardon her.

It seems a little strange to me to categorize Miriam's wrongdoing did as a bein adam l’chaveiro. One of the ikkarim is that “lo kam navi k’Moshe.” Miriam is not considered guilty of violating ikkarei emunah, as it was only through Hashem’s response to this episode that this ikkar was revealed, but still, once Hashem did reveal that Moshe is in a class by himself, isn’t it also clear that Miriam’s wrongdoing should be considered a bein adam laMakom?

Rambam/Ramban disagree as to whether “rapo yirapeh” is a reshus for those who are not on the level of relying completely on Hashem to cure all ailments, or whether it is part of the necessary hishtadlus a person must make in order to live. Perhaps this was Moshe’s safeik – was he required to do something to cure Miriam, or was he supposed to leave it completely in Hashem’s hands? (Granted that since Miriam was suffering from tzara’as, it is hard to see what Moshe could have done.)

Chasam Sofer writes that part of what we are supposed to remember about this episode with Miriam is the fact that Bnei Yisrael waited for her for seven days before travelling. Chazal tell us that this was a reward / hakaras ha’tov for Miriam having waited a few minutes on the banks of the Nile to see what would happen to baby Moshe after the basket he was in was put in the river. Why is Miriam rewarded davka here for what she did so many years earlier?

Chasam Sofer explains that there are two ways to look at Miriam's actions.  You could say that she waited for baby Moshe simply because she was her sister.  The fact that normally a parent is more concerned for a son/daughter than a sibling, and we know that Yocheved and Amram did not stand and watch what happened, underscores the amount concern and love Miriam had for her little brother.  For that, she deserves some reward.  But there is another way to look at it.  Why did Miriam alone spend the extra few minutes watching what would happen to baby Moshe? Because Miriam more than anyone else believed and had prophesized that this was not just her brother and not just any baby, but this was the moshian shel yisrael – a one of a kind.  The reward for that type of emunah, says the Chasam Sofer, is not something that can be given in tangible goods of olam ha’zeh.  A reward that great can only come in olam ha'ba.

Had it not been for this espisode of Miriam speaking against Moshe, then Hashem would have judged her l'kaf zechus and credited her not just with being a concerned sister, but for having emunah that her brother was the one who would redeem all of Klal Yisrael from galus and for helping to bring that dream to fruition.  However, since Miriam failed to judge her brother l'kaf zechus -- since she spoke against Moshe without giving him the benefit of the doubt -- Hashem did not give her the benefit of the doubt.  Waiting for Miriam for seven days in exchange for her waiting on the banks of the Nile and watching after Moshe is not a reward – it’s a punishment!  Instead of her getting a super reward in olam ha’ba, she was now paid out in the paltry currency of olam ha’zeh for the lesser good of the two.

This, says the Chasam Sofer, is the mussar the Torah is telling us about lashon ha'ra.  The way you look at others and judge them is exactly the way Hashem will look at you and judge you.

That sounds a little scary, so let me end on a more positive note.  In one of R’ Ya’akov Shapira’s (R”Y of Merkaz haRav) sichot he deals with the same question but puts a positive spin on the answer. Hakaras ha’tov can only be fulfilled if a person is fully cognizant of the value of the gift he/she receives. For example, if someone were to give a child a toy made of solid gold, even if the child says thank you, to him/her it’s just a thank you for a shiny new toy. Later in life, when the child understands the true value of that “toy,” he/she hopefully will say thank you again with a different sense of appreciation. Miriam had undoubtedly been thanked for having been the one to look after baby Moshe. However, that thank you was like the thank you of the child who does not understand the full value of his/her gift. It is only after Hashem revealed at this moment that Moshe was in a class by himself, far above any other navi, that the true value of Miriam’s act could be appreciated as well. It was not just her brother that she saved and looked after, not just a future navi, not just the moshi’an shel yisrael, but someone the likes of whom would never exist again. In that light, the thank you and hakaras ha’tov of the past was not sufficient.  Bnei Yisrael had to delay on her account and an expression of hakaras ha’tov that showed renewed appreciation for what she had done.