teshuvah and arvus

The haftarah of Shabbos Shuvah comes from Hoshe'a.  Chazal famously comment:

 אמר לו הקב״ה לראובן מעולם לא חטא אדם לפני ועשה תשובה ואתה פתחת בתשובה תחלה חייך שבן בנך הושע פותח בתשובה שנאמר שובה ישראל.

Yet we know that there were in fact others who did teshuvah before Reuvain.  Kayin did teshuvah.  Adam did teshuvah.  Why do Chazal single out the teshuvah of Reuvain as being the first?

What in fact Reuvain's?  Braishis 35:22 tells us:

וַיְהִ֗י בִּשְׁכֹּ֤ן יִשְׂרָאֵל֙ בָּאָ֣רֶץ הַהִ֔וא וַיֵּ֣לֶךְ רְאוּבֵ֗֔ן וַיִּשְׁכַּ֕ב֙ אֶת־בִּלְהָ֖ה֙ פִּילֶ֣גֶשׁ אָבִ֑֔יו וַיִּשְׁמַ֖ע יִשְׂרָאֵֽ֑ל  

yet that very same pasuk ends

וַיִּֽהְי֥וּ בְנֵֽי־יַעֲקֹ֖ב שְׁנֵ֥ים עָשָֽׂר

upon which Rashi comments 

ורבותינו דרשו (בבלי שבת נ״ה:): ללמדנו בא, שכולם שוים וכולן צדיקים, שלא חטא ראובן.

The Yismach Yisrael of Aleksander writes that this is why Reuvain is held up as the paragon of teshuvah.  He did something wrong, but immediately regretted and repented on his actions, such that there is not even a pause between the sin and the tikun of וַיִּֽהְי֥וּ בְנֵֽי־יַעֲקֹ֖ב שְׁנֵ֥ים עָשָֽׂר.  The same cannot be said of Adam and Kayin.

That being said, just a few parshiyos later, when we read about the sale of Yosef, the Torah relates how Reuvain tried to save his brother, but then vanishes from the story while the brothers go and sell Yosef into slavery.  Reuvain comes back to retrieve Yosef and discovers him missing (37:29):

 וַיָּ֤שׇׁב רְאוּבֵן֙ אֶל־הַבּ֔וֹר וְהִנֵּ֥ה אֵין־יוֹסֵ֖ף בַּבּ֑וֹר

Where was Reuvain while the sale was going on?  

Rashi tells us: דבר אחר: עסוק היה בשקו ותעניתו על בילבול יצועי אביו.

You can't have it both ways!  If Reuvain did nothing wrong, or at least immediately repented for whatever slight mistake he made, then why here is he doing teshuvah again?  Why is this moment the time the rehash old wounds?

I think our parsha contains the answer.  In pesukim 10-13 of our parsha we have the mitzvah of hakhel, which, as we've discussed in the past, really would seem to fit better in parshas Shoftim, where we have the laws that pertain to a king, or maybe in the parshiyos of the moadim, since hakhel takes place on Sukkos.  Following that mitzvah we have pesukim which portend sin and galus:

 וְחָרָ֣ה אַפִּ֣י ב֣וֹ בַיּוֹם־הַ֠ה֠וּא וַעֲזַבְתִּ֞ים וְהִסְתַּרְתִּ֨י פָנַ֤י מֵהֶם֙ וְהָיָ֣ה לֶאֱכֹ֔ל וּמְצָאֻ֛הוּ רָע֥וֹת רַבּ֖וֹת וְצָר֑וֹת׃

It sounds like Bnei Yisrael repent: 

 וְאָמַר֙ בַּיּ֣וֹם הַה֔וּא הֲלֹ֗א עַ֣ל כִּי־אֵ֤ין אֱלֹקי֙ בְּקִרְבִּ֔י מְצָא֖וּנִי הָרָע֥וֹת הָאֵֽלֶּה׃

But instead of acceptance and forgiveness, the next pasuk (18) follows with a promise of greater hester panim:  

 וְאָנֹכִ֗י הַסְתֵּ֨ר אַסְתִּ֤יר פָּנַי֙ בַּיּ֣וֹם הַה֔וּא עַ֥ל כׇּל־הָרָעָ֖ה אֲשֶׁ֣ר עָשָׂ֑ה כִּ֣י פָנָ֔ה אֶל־אֱלֹהִ֖ים אֲחֵרִֽים

Ramban and everyone asks why it is that Hashem responds to this overture of repentance by hiding?

R' Simcha Bunim Sofer gives a magnificent answer.  He writes that the bris we read about in Nitzavim created the idea of arvus, the idea that no one in Klal Yisrael is an island.  One person's wrongdoing bears not just on the individual, but weighs down the nation as a whole.  

The statement עַ֣ל כִּי־אֵ֤ין אֱלֹקי֙ בְּקִרְבִּ֔י is all about personal wrongdoing, personal repentance.  "B'kirbi" -- it's all about me.  This type of repentance misses the mark because there is no acknowledgment of belonging to something greater, of having caused harm to something greater.

Perhaps that is why the Torah deliberately uses the mitzvah of hakhel as an introduction to this parsha.  Hakhel, the gathering together of men, women, even little children, as one, is the antithesis of the selfish teshuvah where the individual is concerned only with his/her own spiritual plight to the exclusion of others.

Returning to Reuvain,  וַיִּֽהְי֥וּ בְנֵֽי־יַעֲקֹ֖ב שְׁנֵ֥ים עָשָֽׂר certainly proves that Reuvain was in good standing, no different than his brothers, but at the same time, this same pasuk underscores the fact that these were 12 separate individual sons, not one united family.  Reuvain may have regretted moving his father's bed, but his actions opened a Pandora's box and exposed the underlying feeling that not all Yaakov's wives, and by extension not all the brothers, were in fact equal, and hence not united as one.  The result that would play out over time would be the sale of Yosef.  

This leads to the second teshuvah of Reuvain, the teshuvah he comes to when he sees the plot against Yosef playing itself out.  This is not his repentance as an individual for the sin of moving his father's bed, but repentance for the effect of his sin on the community, on the family structure.  This is the repentance of arvus, of feeling for the plight of his brother.

Adam repented, Kayin also repented.  Reuvain had already done his own private repentance as well.  But what we celebrate on Shabbos Shuvah is not just repentance for private wrongdoing, but the repentance for the harms done to the nation, to the community, by our own shortcomings.

sima b'PIHEM vs sim b'OZNEI Yehoshua

In our parsha we have the very last mitzvah in the Torah, "v'Atah kisvu lachem es ha'shirah ha'zos... sima b'PIHEM," to write a sefer Torah and, literally translated, to "place it in their [the people's] mouths," an allusion to Torah shebaal peh. 

This pasuk reminded me of an earlier pasuk.  After the war with Amalek Moshe is told "ksov zos zikaron ba'sefer," to write what happened in a book, "v'sim b'OZNEI Yehoshua," and, literally translated, "place it in Yehoshua's ear," also an allusion to orally transmitting Torah shebaal peh. 

Both pesukim refer to writing a book, both refer to teaching the lessons of Torah orally, so why then does the pasuk we read this week refer to placing Torah in the people's MOUTHs while Moshe is told to place Torah in Yehoshua's EAR?  

Seems to me that leaders are often good at using their mouths to give orders, but sometimes need reminding to use their ears as well, to listen and take advice and guidance from others.  The flipside is that people sometimes get good at just following orders, blind obedience, and need to be reminded that they can, and should, use their mouths to speak up and contribute their own ideas and insights, not just act as automatons or yes men.  

GR"A on why we don't blow shofar Erev Rosh haShana and the piyus of Nitzavim

1) To explain why we don't blow shofar on Erev Rosh haShana, the Vilna Gaon in his commentary to Yonah (3:3) quotes the gemara (Gittin) that relates how Hashem sent a little bug or bird to fly up Titus' nose into his head and bang away there for years.  One day Titus happened to walk past a blacksmith, and when the blacksmith's hammer was banging, the pecking in his brain stopped.  Now finally having a way to get some relief, Titus arranged to have blacksmiths working in his palace, banging away day in and day out.  After 30 days, however, the pecking resumed as usual.  The bird had acclimated itself to the banging, and resumed its pecking at Titus brain.

You see from this gemara that when something happens for 30 straight days, a creature, whether it is a bird or a person, becomes acclimated to it and it makes no impression.

If we blew shofar inclusive of Erev Rosh haShana, then we would have 30 days of blowing before the chag and tekiyas shofar would make no impression on is. Tekiyos have to make a roshem!  Therefore, says the GR"A, we take a break on Erev R"H.

(But we never have 30 straight days -- there are shabbosos in between that break things us?  R' Chaim Kanievski points to the din that when you switch to saying tein tal u'mater, 30 days makes a chazakah and after 30 days you can assume in case of safeik that you said the correct insertion.  Even though you don't say teil tal u'matar on shabbosos so the 30 days are really 26 days, the fact that the change at every possible opportunity to do so during those 30 days makes a chazakah.  Same with teikyas shofar.)

אמרו לפני בראש השנה מלכיות זכרונות ושופרות מלכיות כדי שתמליכוני עליכם זכרונות כדי שיעלה זכרוניכם לפני לטובה ובמה בשופר 

The kashe of  ובמה is not asking "How do we properly fulfill the mitzvah of reciting malchiyos, etc." and telling us that you need to blow in the shmoneh esrei.  The kashe the gemara is asking (see Ritva) is "How to we fulfill the mitzvah of coronating G-d as King?"  And the answer is that you do that with a shofar.

That requires mental activity.

That requires the shofar making a roshem.

2) The Divrei Chaim of Sanz on our parsha quotes the pasuk in Yeshayahu 3:13 נִצָּ֥ב לָרִ֖יב הֹ׳ וְעֹמֵ֖ד לָדִ֥ין עַמִּֽים׃.  The word נִצָּ֥ב there refers to Hashem standing in judgment, as Radak there explains, אמר אל תחשבו כי לא יענישכם האל על הרעות שתעשו כי בכל זמן הוא נצב ועומד לדין כל העמים כל שכן עמו ישראל    We read in Tehillin 82:1  אֱֽלֹקים נִצָּ֥ב בַּעֲדַת־קל.  The word "nitzvav" implies you are coming to pick a fight.  אַתֶּ֨ם נִצָּבִ֤ים הַיּוֹם֙ כֻּלְּכֶ֔ם, we are נִצָּ֥ב לָרִ֖יב, to borrow the phrase from Yishayahu, we are troublesome, quarrelsome, rebellious. That's why we read the tochacha last week.  Nonetheless, says the Divrei Chaim, we are לִפְנֵ֖י הֹ׳ אֱלֹקיכֶ֑ם, there is the shem Havaya, the midas haRachamim, that is extended to us b'pnimiyus of the din.  This is what Rashi means:

 התחיל משה מפייסן אתם ניצבים היום (דברים כ״ט:ט׳) – הרבה הכעסתם למקום ולא עשה אתכם כלייה, והרי אתם קיימים לפניו.  

Despite הרבה הכעסתם למקום , despite אתם ניצבים היום, despite our rebellious quarrels, G-d does not punish us vindictively, and does not reject us.  We are still הרי אתם קיימים לפניו and will always be so.

bikurim, nachala, and kinyan peiros

 וְהָיָה֙ כִּֽי־תָב֣וֹא אֶל־הָאָ֔רֶץ אֲשֶׁר֙ הֹ׳ אֱלֹקיךָ נֹתֵ֥ן לְךָ֖ נַחֲלָ֑ה  Chazal tell us that  וְהָיָה֙ at the start of a parsha connotes simcha.  The simcha here is not the fact that the first crops are ready, but, as the Ohr haChaim writes, להעיר שאין לשמוח אלא בישיבת הארץ, the simcha is from the fact that we have Eretz Yisrael.  

The Sifri writes that by fulfilling the words of our parsha, the parsha of bikurim, you will be zocheh to yeshivas ha'aretz (see here). The mitzvah of bikurim can only be done only after you are already in Eretz Yisrael and are harvesting crops there.  How then can Chazal say that it's because of this mitzvah that we will enter the land?

A couple of years ago I quoted from R' Teichtel's Eim haBanim Smeicha: 

Ki tavo'u el Eretz Canann asher ani nosein lachem l'nachala v'nasati nega tzara'as b'veis eretz achuzaschem (14:35).  A strange promise!  Once we finally merit seeing Hashem's promise to give us the land fulfilled, the Torah tells us that our homes will be plagued with leprosy.  Why?  What did we do to deserve that?  (see Rashi)

Rav Teichtel in his classic Eim haBanim Smeicha interprets the pasuk derech derush as saying that if after G-d is "nosein lachem nachala" and gives us a homeland, we still think of the 5 Towns, Boro Park, Englewood, Teaneck, or even Lakewood, NJ as "home," then "v'nasati nega tzara'as," I will bring tzara'as and tzaros to "beis achuzaschem," that place in galus you still mistakenly think of as home.  Sometimes unfortunately we need a wakeup call, a little suffering and discomfort, to appreciate and recognize where home is.

Eretz Yisrael is our nachala, our homeland.  Everyplace else in the world is just a hotel.  

Chasam Sofer uses this same idea to explain the Sifri. Thinking of  Eretz Yisrael as our nachala, as our homeland, doesn't start just when we get there.  Thinking of Eretz Yisrael as our nachala is the precursor to our getting there.  We can't bring bikruim in galus, but we can recognize that Eretz Yisrael, not wherever in the world we find ourselves, is the one place  אֲשֶׁר֙ הֹ׳ אֱלֹקיךָ נֹתֵ֥ן לְךָ֖ נַחֲלָ֑ה.  If we adopt that attitude, then we will be zocheh to physically be able to fulfill the mitzvah.

Notice the repetition throughout our parsha:

וְהָיָה֙ כִּֽי־תָב֣וֹא אֶל־הָאָ֔רֶץ אֲשֶׁר֙ הֹ׳ אֱלֹקיךָ נֹתֵ֥ן לְךָ֖ נַחֲלָ֑ה

וְלָקַחְתָּ֞ מֵרֵאשִׁ֣ית׀ כׇּל־פְּרִ֣י הָאֲדָמָ֗ה אֲשֶׁ֨ר תָּבִ֧יא מֵֽאַרְצְךָ֛ אֲשֶׁ֨ר הֹ׳ אֱלֹקיךָ נֹתֵ֥ן לָ֖ךְ

 וּבָאתָ֙ אֶל־הַכֹּהֵ֔ן אֲשֶׁ֥ר יִהְיֶ֖ה בַּיָּמִ֣ים הָהֵ֑ם וְאָמַרְתָּ֣ אֵלָ֗יו הִגַּ֤דְתִּי הַיּוֹם֙ לַ הֹ׳ אֱלֹקיךָ כִּי־בָ֙אתִי֙ אֶל־הָאָ֔רֶץ אֲשֶׁ֨ר נִשְׁבַּ֧ע ה׳ לַאֲבֹתֵ֖ינוּ לָ֥תֶת לָֽנוּ

Again and again the parsha reminds us that Eretz Yisrael is the homeland that Hashem promised to us. 

Why do we mention the story of Lavan harassing Yaakov when we bring bikurim?  Malbim reminds us of the Midrash: ועז״א ארמי אובד אבי דכתב המדרש מה שהיה ללבן כח להתאבק כ״כ עם יעקב הוא משום שהוא בח״ל והיה בידו חטא מה שאינו דר בא״י  How could a rasha like Lavan have any power over the bechir ha'Avos?  The Midrash tells us that it's because Yaakov was outside Eretz Yisrael, where he belonged, where his homeland was.   

The Midrash Tanchuma writes that Moshe foresaw that we will be in galus and would not be able to fulfill the mitzvah of bikruim so he instituted tefilah 3x a day.  What's the connection between bikruim and tefilah? (see here, here, and here) When a person davens, he/she must turn to face Eretz Yisrael, to face the Beit HaMikdash.  If it's not possible to physically face that direction, he/she has to turn their heart to Eretz Yisrael.  If we cannot physically bring bikurim to give thanks for the nachala of Eretz Yisrael, we can year to do so, we can remind ourselves 3x a day about the importance and centrality of Eretz Yisrael.

Tos in Gittin (48) puts two halachos together an asks a great kashe: In order to read the parsha of bikurim you have to own the land the produce grew on.  The gemara has a machlokes R"Y and Reish Lakish whether kinyan peiros is k'kinyan ha'guf or not, and we pasken like Reish Lakish, that it is not.  Someone who only has a kinyan peiros cannot read the parsha of bikurim.  We also pasken that brothers who divide up a yerusha are considered lekuchos --- the inherited land is theirs only as a kinyan peiros until the yovel, at which point it reverts to the estate and has to be re-divided.   הקשה רבינו תם ואנו איך מצאנו ידינו ורגלינו!  How can anyone then ever read the parsha of bikurim?  Unless a property was passed from father to his only son generation after generation from the time of Yehoshua, every piece of land was either bought or inherited by a group of brothers and everyone's kinyan in the land of Eretz Yisrael is only a kinyan peiros? 

The Rishonim answer (see Tos 48a, Rashba, see Malbim on our parsha as well) that yerushas Eretz Yisrael is different.  Eretz Yisrael is ours because it is the land promised to the Avos, it is the land those who left Mitzrayim were supposed to conquer.  The farmer who brings bikurim states כִּי־בָ֙אתִי֙ אֶל־הָאָ֔רֶץ אֲשֶׁ֨ר נִשְׁבַּ֧ע ה׳ לַאֲבֹתֵ֖ינוּ לָ֥תֶת לָֽנוּ.  The land being an inheritance does not diminish our ownership claim and turn it into a kinyan peiros.  Aderaba, viz a viz bikurim, it defines and strengthens our claim and connection to the land.

pruzbul and shemitas kesafim

Some Achronim write that if someone makes a pruzbul, he should make a small loan to a friend and allow shemita to cancel it in order to fulfill the mitzvah of shemitas kesafim.  Another possible solution to accomplish the same thing is to exclude one debt from the pruzbul and allow it to be cancelled.  A third option, which is questionable, is to declare the pruzbul void with respect to one outstanding loan (the use of verbal declaration to cancel a written pruzbul is what makes this questionable).

Yesh lachkor how pruzbul works: does pruzbul allow for the collection of the loan that existed before shemita, or does pruzbul mean the previous loan was cancelled, but thanks to the pruzbul a new loan now exists that can be collected?

All the above solutions assume the former is correct and the previous loan is still outstanding and not cancelled.  See R' Berel Povarski's shiurim on Gittin 36  where he takes the latter approach.  If that is correct, then none of these solutions are needed, as the loans are cancelled by shemitas kesafim and what pruzbul allows for is the collection of a new "refinanced" loan.

the harm in doing wrong

Rashi (21:11) explains the smichus ha'parshiyos of topics at the beginning of our parsha: if you take a yefat to'ar in battle, even if permitted, you will eventually come to hate her, and your offspring will end up being a ben sorer u'moreh.  Why should a person suffer all these horrible outcomes if what he did is permitted?  R' Bloch in Shiurei Daas explains (see post here) that the Torah's commandments function on two levels.  When a doctor tells you smoking is the wrong thing to do, that's a different "wrong" from an IRS agent telling you that it's wrong not to pay taxes.  One is a legal restriction; the other is a metziyus.  When Hashem tells you something is wrong, it's meant in both senses of the word.  To combat the yetzer ha'ra, the Torah lifted the IRS agent element of the yefat to'ar prohibition.  It's not going to cause you to be brought before beis din shel maalah and penalized.  However, the metziyus remains the metziyus.  The element of it being harmful remains in place, and you assume the consequences.

In last week's parsha we had the issur of lo tasur.  Rambam holds that issurim derabbanan fall under the lo tasur umbrella that orders us to listen to Chazal.  Ramban disagrees, and asks if this is true, why is it that sfeika d'oraysa l'chumra but sfeika derabbanan l'kula?  Every derabbanan is implicitly a safeik doraysa of lo tasur?

R' Baruch Sorotzkin uses this same yesod of the Shiurei Daas to answer that question.  The reason sfeika d'oraysa l'chumra is because even though legally you may not be doing anything wrong by taking a gamble, you still risk running into negative consequences b'metziyus.  L'mashal, even if legally you are allowed to smoke outside as opposed to inside your office building, that does not mean you are immune from cancer so long as you remain outside.  That sevara only applies when speaking about issurei d'oraysa, where what the Torah spells out as wrong is both legally wrong as well as b'metziyus wrong.  When Chazal instituted a new issur derabbanan, they did not change the metziyus; they only added legal strictures.  (Compare with R' Yosef Engel in Esvan D'Oraysa who writes that issurei d'oraysa are issurei cheftza, as opposed to issurei derabbanan that are only issurei gavra.  But Shaarei Yosher's hesber of the Rambam in I:3 and in ch 7 top of the page here.)

The Netziv uses this same sevara to explain a difficult Raavad.  If a person's life is in mortal danger, the gemara writes that where there is a choice of different issurim to violate, the rule of thumb is to choose the lesser evil.  Raavad  holds that it is better to violate Shabbos to shecht and animal and eat kosher food rather than eat treif, even though the latter is only an issur lav of malkos.  Netziv (Harchev Davar to Devarim 6:10, see the many proofs he brings) explains that food prepared on Shabbos is a legal violation; treif food is bad for you b'metziyus, like poison.  To save a person's life we can suspend legal restrictions, but b'metziyus, poison is still poison and will cause harm.  

According to this Netziv, it is meduyak why the gemara writes that beis din does not have to intervene to stop a katan from eating neveilah -- katan ocheil neveilos ain beis din metzuvim l'hafrisho.  The same is true of any issur.  Why single out neveilah for special mention?   Netziv answers that one might have thought that with respect to maachalos assuros beis din should intervene because even though a katan is legally not bound to stop eating, there is a harm b'metziyus that the katan suffers by eating treif, kah mashma lan beis din can still remain on the sidelines.

Netziv offers a similar explanation in our parsha for why there is a special command to be careful to protect the sanctity of the camp when going out to war,  כִּֽי־תֵצֵ֥א מַחֲנֶ֖ה עַל־אֹיְבֶ֑יךָ וְנִ֨שְׁמַרְתָּ֔ מִכֹּ֖ל דָּבָ֥ר רָֽע (23:10).  According to Ramban (see post here) it was permissible to eat maachalos assuros during the battles of conquest of Eretz Yisrael. Even the legal restriction against maachalos assuros was lifted, the danger of consuming what b'metziyus poses a danger remains in place.  Netziv writes:

 עוד יש טעם מה שכתב הרמב״ן כאן, באשר במחנה עלול לכל שקץ ותועבה. והוספנו לעיל שם (ו,י) הסיבה לזה, משום שהותרו מאכלות אסורות, והמה גורמים לטמטם נפש הישראלי. וכבר הזהיר הרבה לעיל (ו,יג) על זה ״השמר לך פן תשכח את ה׳ וגו׳⁠ ⁠״ וכל הענין, וכאן כפל הענין משום הוספה שהובאה כאן

With this perspective on issurim, undoing wrong and doing teshuvah is more than just a matter of spiritual rehabilitation, but encompasses restoring the damage done b'metziyus as well.

a question of survival?

I noticed an ad for a Labor Day program featuring some prominant Roshei Yeshiva and Rabbonim speaking on the topic of "Can We Survive in the Medina Shel Chessed?"  

You can say a derasha on almost every word of the title.

Firstly, I've never really liked the term "Medina Shel Chessed."  I mean, I guess if your point of comparison is the threat of government sponsored pogroms, then yes, living here is a great chessed.  But if you were on the St Louis in 1939 and had to turn around and go back to face near certain death in Germany because the US would not allow the ship to dock, then maybe you would not think of this as such a Medina Shel Chessed.  

Secondly, who is the "We" in "Can **We** Survive?" Jews in general?  Orthodox Jews?  Orthodox Jews who identify with a certain movement?  The answer may be very different for each of those groups.

Lastly, and most importantly, the fact that the question "Can We Survive?" even needs to be asked should set off alarm bells.  We are not talking about whether we can build another yeshiva or kollel somewhere, or whether we can get more people involved in yiddishkeit.  The bar is being set at bare bones survival.  Assuming the speakers are not all simply alarmists, the fact that the question needs to be asked should tell you already what dire straits we are in.

If only there were a country with a Jewish majority, a place where Jews could live freely, where they could defend themselves against external physical threats, where they could run their own affairs and not be subject to the whims of a secular, outside government.  Hmmm....   : )

egkah arufah -- what went wrong

The gemara interprets the final pasuk in the parsha of eglah arufah, וְאַתָּ֗ה תְּבַעֵ֛ר הַדָּ֥ם הַנָּקִ֖י מִקִּרְבֶּ֑ךָ כִּֽי־תַעֲשֶׂ֥ה הַיָּשָׁ֖ר בְּעֵינֵ֥י הֹ׳, to mean that if the murdered is found after the eglah arufah is done, he is still executed.  R' Chaim Kanievsky in Taama d'Kra  asks what about the end of the pasuk -- כִּֽי־תַעֲשֶׂ֥ה הַיָּשָׁ֖ר בְּעֵינֵ֥י הֹ׳.  What does that come to teach us?

R' Chaim cites a SHL"AH that quotes a Midrash that if Bn"Y are worthy, there will be worms that crawl out of the eglah arufah and make a beeline straight to the murderers home, exposing the killer.  The last letters of אַתָּ֗ה תְּבַעֵ֛ר הַדָּ֥ם הַנָּקִ֖י spell out the word רימה, alluding to this miracle.  

R' Chaim reads this into the last pasuk: we can be zocheh to אַתָּ֗ה תְּבַעֵ֛ר הַדָּ֥ם הַנָּקִ֖י מִקִּרְבֶּ֑ךָ, to identify the murderer through this special property of the eglah arufah, if כִּֽי־תַעֲשֶׂ֥ה הַיָּשָׁ֖ר בְּעֵינֵ֥י הֹ׳, we are worthy of such a miracle.

R' Chaim is trying to connect כִּֽי־תַעֲשֶׂ֥ה הַיָּשָׁ֖ר בְּעֵינֵ֥י הֹ׳ to the din of killing the actual murdered when found, but al pi peshuto shel mikra, I think the simpler reading follows Ibn Ezra.  As we discussed before, Ibn Erza interprets the confession of the elders where the body is found, יָדֵ֗ינוּ לֹ֤א שָֽׁפְכוּ֙  אֶת־הַדָּ֣ם הַזֶּ֔ה וְעֵינֵ֖ינוּ לֹ֥א רָאֽוּ, not in relation to the specific crime at hand, but rather in relation to other, similar crimes that occurred in their city.  ויתכן, שהשם צוה לעשות כן העיר הקרובה, כי לולי שעשו עבירה כדומה לה, לא נזדמן אדם שיהרג קרוב מהם. ומחשבות השם עמקו וגבהו לאין קץ אצלנו.  This type of outrage -- murder -- does not occur in a vacuum; it occurs in an environment that allows similar crimes to go unpunished and ignored. 

Based on Ibn Ezra, one can answer R' Chaim's question. וְאַתָּ֗ה תְּבַעֵ֛ר הַדָּ֥ם הַנָּקִ֖י מִקִּרְבֶּ֑ךָ is a promise (see Netziv who reads it this way as well), not a din.  The pasuk is teaching that innocent blood will not be spilled in a city where כִּֽי־תַעֲשֶׂ֥ה הַיָּשָׁ֖ר בְּעֵינֵ֥י הֹ׳ in other areas, meaning where there is a general climate of justice.  

Ibn Ezra writes:

 והנכון בעיני, הוא אשר הזכרתי: כי לא ישפך דם נקי בארצך אם תעשה הישר , כסוד ושכר עבירה עבירה ושכר מצוה מצוה 

Where there is justice, שכר מצוה מצוה, but where criminals are free to act as they will in one area, שכר עבירה עבירה and other troubles follow.

 Or, as Ralbag puts it:

, או ירצה בזה שכאשר תעשה הישר בעיני י״י לא יקרה בקרבך כמו זה החטא כי הזקנים יוכיחו העם ויקבלו כלם מוסרם ללכת בדרכי התורה 

Along similar lines, Tzeror haMor makes a nice diyuk in the parsha and places blame on the kohanim for spiritual failure:

וְנִגְּשׁ֣וּ הַכֹּהֲנִים֮ בְּנֵ֣י לֵוִי֒ כִּ֣י בָ֗ם בָּחַ֞ר הֹ׳ אֱלֹהֶ֙יךָ֙ לְשָׁ֣רְת֔וֹ וּלְבָרֵ֖ךְ בְּשֵׁ֣ם הֹ׳ וְעַל־פִּיהֶ֥ם יִהְיֶ֖ה כׇּל־רִ֥יב וְכׇל־נָֽגַע׃

וְכֹ֗ל זִקְנֵי֙ הָעִ֣יר הַהִ֔וא הַקְּרֹבִ֖ים אֶל־הֶחָלָ֑ל יִרְחֲצוּ֙ אֶת־יְדֵיהֶ֔ם עַל־הָעֶגְלָ֖ה הָעֲרוּפָ֥ה בַנָּֽחַל׃

 וְעָנ֖וּ וְאָמְר֑וּ יָדֵ֗ינוּ לֹ֤אשָֽׁפְכוּ֙ אֶת־הַדָּ֣ם הַזֶּ֔ה וְעֵינֵ֖ינוּ לֹ֥א רָאֽוּ׃

Notice the switch between the first pasuk, which speaks about the kohanim gathering, and the second, which speaks about the zekeinim and then goes on to say that they wash their hands and declare that they are innocent of wrongdoing.  Tzeror haMor writes that it is davka the zekeinim and NOT the kohamim who make this declaration because it is only the zekeinim and NOT the kohanim who can truly say they are innocent:

 וכן נראה שהוצרכו בכאן הכהנים לקבל בושה וכלימה. על מה שלא נתכוונו בעבודתם ובתפלתם. כי ידוע שהכהנים נוטלים בשכרם מישראל מתנות כהונה. והכהנים היו עובדים עבודתם בבהמ״ק לכפר על ישראל ולהצילם מכל מכשול ועון. ואחר שנהרג זה בגבולם. לא כיונו בתפלתם ובעבודתם. ואחר שזה כן. ראוי שיבואו לכאן ויקבלו בושה וכלימה על מה שעשו.

The fact that a murder occurred is proof that the avodah of the kohanim was not up to par.  Therefore, they must stand silently, suffering embarrassment, as the elders declare their innocence, but they cannot say the same.

לכן על פיהם יהיה כל ריב וכל נגע. כי מות וחיים ביד לשון

The pasuk davka here describes the kohanim as  עַל־פִּיהֶ֥ם יִהְיֶ֖ה כׇּל־רִ֥יב וְכׇל־נָֽגַע because it is the avodah they do על פיהם with their mouth -- their tefilah -- which has in this case failed.

It's Elul!  Slichos, ymei ha'din, a time of tefilah.   כי מות וחיים ביד לשון.  

fear of battle

There are two opinions Rashi quotes to define יָּרֵא֙ וְרַ֣ךְ הַלֵּבָ֔ב in the pasuk

 וְיָסְפ֣וּ הַשֹּׁטְרִים֮ לְדַבֵּ֣ר אֶל־הָעָם֒ וְאָמְר֗וּ מִי־הָאִ֤ישׁ הַיָּרֵא֙ וְרַ֣ךְ הַלֵּבָ֔ב יֵלֵ֖ךְ וְיָשֹׁ֣ב לְבֵית֑וֹ וְלֹ֥א יִמַּ֛ס אֶת־לְבַ֥ב אֶחָ֖יו כִּלְבָבֽוֹ׃

Rashi comments:

הירא ורך הלבב – ר׳ עקיבא אומר: כשמועו, שאינו יכול לעמוד בקשרי המלחמה ולראות חרב שלופה.

ר׳ יוסי הגלילי אומר: הירא מעבירות שבידו. ולכך תלתה לו תורה לחזור על בית וכרם ואשה, לכסות על החוזרים בשביל עבירות שבידם, שלא יבינו שהם בעלי עבירות, והרואהו אומר: שמא בנה בית או נטע כרם או ארש אשה

The baalei musar point out that the Torah is so concerned with protecting anyone from embarrassment that it even allows extra people, those who אֲשֶׁר־אֵרַ֤שׂ אִשָּׁה֙ וְלֹ֣א לְקָחָ֔הּ, נָטַ֥ע כֶּ֙רֶם֙ וְלֹ֣א חִלְּל֔וֹ,  בָּנָ֤ה בַֽיִת־חָדָשׁ֙ וְלֹ֣א חֲנָכ֔וֹ , to leave the army just before battle, when they are needed most, to avoid shaming a sinner.  

What's the nekudas ha'machlokes between the two views quoted in Rashi?  Mizrachi writes that the issue is whether a person innocent of cheit can be killed (yesh misa b'lo cheit).  R' Yosi holds not, and therefore, only a sinner need worry about going out to war; R' Akiva disagrees. 

Maharal, however, points out that the gemara in Shabbos (55, see this post) rejects the view that ain misa b'lo cheit, so it is hard to build a machlokes around this point (see R Akiva Eiger in the gilyon hasha"s there).  

I still dont get how the Maharal understands the machlokes, but from what I can piece together, he links it to the pesukim earlier in the parsha

 וְהָיָ֕ה כְּקָֽרׇבְכֶ֖ם אֶל־הַמִּלְחָמָ֑ה וְנִגַּ֥שׁ הַכֹּהֵ֖ן וְדִבֶּ֥ר אֶל־הָעָֽם

וְאָמַ֤ר אֲלֵהֶם֙ שְׁמַ֣ע יִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל אַתֶּ֨ם קְרֵבִ֥ים הַיּ֛וֹם לַמִּלְחָמָ֖ה עַל־אֹיְבֵיכֶ֑ם אַל־יֵרַ֣ךְ לְבַבְכֶ֗ם אַל־תִּֽירְא֧וּ וְאַֽל־תַּחְפְּז֛וּ וְאַל־תַּֽעַרְצ֖וּ מִפְּנֵיהֶֽם׃

 כִּ֚י הֹ׳ אֱלֹֽקיכֶ֔ם הַהֹלֵ֖ךְ עִמָּכֶ֑ם לְהִלָּחֵ֥ם לָכֶ֛ם עִם־אֹיְבֵיכֶ֖ם לְהוֹשִׁ֥יעַ אֶתְכֶֽם

R' Yosi held that the whole point of the kohen telling the people to be brave and not fear the enemy is to remove that as a justification for not fighting.  Physical fear alone is not a justification to leave the front.  R' Akiva, on the other hand, holds that if despite the kohen's admonition someone is afraid of battle, they should return home.

Maharal writes:

טעמא דרבי יוסי, משום ד״הירא״ משמע יראה בלבד בלב, ואם כן למה יחזור, יאמר לו ״אל תירא כי ה׳ אלהיכם הוא ההולך עמכם״ (ר׳ פסוקים ג, ד), כמו שהיה מזרז אותם השוטרים והכהן (שם), ולמה יחזור בחנם. אבל רבי עקיבא בודאי סובר כיון דהוא ירא ומצטער - יחזור

I dont understand how this works because m'mah nafshach: if after hearing the kohen the person is still afraid, then why not send him home, like R' Akiva holds?  But if there is a chance that hearing the kohen's encouragement would help overcome fear, then why not have the kohen speak to him, like R' Yosi holds?  What exactly is the point of contention between them?