why Nadav and Avihu had to be punished; how the opening of the parsha of kashrus is a response to their sin

1) Earlier this year  on parshas zachor I revisited the yesod the Meshech Chochma quotes from the Rambam many places: a nevuah l'tovah that is related to others can never be rescinded and must come true.   This is why Shaul could not do teshuvah for sparing Agag.  The punishment of  קָרַע ה׳ אֶת⁠ מַמְלְכוּת יִשְׂרָאֵל מֵעָלֶיךָ הַיּוֹם was linked to a promise l'tovah to David, וּנְתָנָהּ לְרֵעֲךָ הַטּוֹב מִמֶּךָּ, and a nevuah l'tovah cannot be undone.  R' Yosef Shaul Nathanson in Divrei Shaul uses this same yesod to explain why Nadav and Avihu had to receive punishment.  Their misa was linked to the positive outcome of creating a kiddush Hashem for the masses, as Moshe told Aharon  הוּא֩ אֲשֶׁר⁠־דִּבֶּ֨ר ה׳  לֵאמֹר֙ בִּקְרֹבַ֣י אֶקָּדֵ֔שׁ וְעַל⁠־פְּנֵ֥י כׇל⁠־הָעָ֖ם אֶכָּבֵ֑ד.  When there is a positive outcome involved, the nevuah must come to fruition. 

2) Rashi comments on  וַיֹּ֨אמֶר מֹשֶׁ֜ה אֶֽל⁠־אַהֲרֹ֗ן קְרַ֤ב אֶל⁠־הַמִּזְבֵּ֙חַ֙  that שהיה אהרן בוש וירא לגשת, אמר לו משה: מה אתה בוש? לכך נבחרת.  I heard the following pshat a few weeks ago but can't recall who says it: When Moshe was first chosen to be a navi by Hashem at the burning bush, he had a whole back and forth argument with G-d.  Moshe insisted that he was not the right one for the job.  Finally, Hashem had enough.  We read  וַיִּֽחַר⁠־אַ֨ף ה׳ בְּמֹשֶׁ֗ה וַיֹּ֙אמֶר֙ הֲלֹ֨א אַהֲרֹ֤ן אָחִ֙יךָ֙ הַלֵּוִ֔י יָדַ֕עְתִּי כִּֽי⁠־דַבֵּ֥ר יְדַבֵּ֖ר ה֑וּא וְגַ֤ם הִנֵּה⁠־הוּא֙ יֹצֵ֣א לִקְרָאתֶ֔ךָ וְרָאֲךָ֖ וְשָׂמַ֥ח בְּלִבּֽוֹ (Shmos 4:14).  Rashi there writes

ויחר אף – ר׳ יהושע בן קרחה אומר: כל חרון אף שבתורה עושה רושם, וזו לא נאמר בו רושם, לא מצינו שבא עונש עלא אותו חרון. א״ל ר׳ יוסי: אף זה נאמר בו רושם:⁠ב הלא אהרן אחיך הלוי – שהיה עתיד להיות לוי ולא כהן, והכהונה הייתי אומר לצאת ממך, מעתה לא יהא כן, אלא הוא כהן ואתה לוי, שנאמר: ומשה איש האלהים בניו יקראו על שבט הלוי

Moshe here in pour parsha is alluding to this episode from his past.  You know why you were chosen Aharon?  Because I made the mistake of protesting too much, of being too bashful and reluctant to take the job.  So why are you now doing the same, repeating my mistake?  מה אתה בוש?  The whole reason you were chosen, לכך נבחרת, is because you weren't guilty of my error.  Don't make it now.

 

3) The Rishonim address why the laws of kashrus appear in our parsha after the hakamas ha'mishkan, e.g. Abarbanel writes:

 

. אחר שהוקם המשכן והושמו בו כהני ה׳ וצוה להם שלא ישתכרו מפני שעיני ישראל עליהם להודיעם את דבר ה׳ להבדיל בין הקדש ובין החול ובין הטמא ובין הטהור. ולהורות חקי השם הוצרך ית׳ לדבר אל משה ואל אהרן יחד ולהודיעם מה הם הב״ח הטהורי׳ לאכילה

 

Others explain that once the mikdash and kohanim have been sanctified, the parsha can turn its attention to the sanctification of the rest of the nation, which begins with tumah and tahara of food. 

 

I think, in light of a Sefas Emes (5631), that at least the opening of this parsha is also a response to the sin of Nadav and Avihu.  

 

וַיְדַבֵּר ה׳ אֶל⁠ מֹשֶׁה וְאֶל⁠ אַהֲרֹן לֵאמֹר אֲלֵהֶם

דַּבְּרוּ אֶל⁠ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לֵאמֹר זֹאת הַחַיָּה אֲשֶׁר תֹּאכְלוּ מִכׇּל⁠ הַבְּהֵמָה אֲשֶׁר עַל⁠ הָאָרֶץ.

 

Who is the לֵאמֹר אֲלֵהֶם in the first pasuk speaking about?  Rashi opines that it refers to Elazar and Itamar:

 

לאמר אלהם – אמור שיאמרו להם לאלעזר ולאיתמר, או אינו אלא לאמר לישראל? כשהוא אומר: דברו אל בני ישראל (ויקרא י״א:ב׳), הרי דבור האמור לישראל, הא מה אני מקיים: לאמר אלהםא – לבנים, לאלעזר ולאיתמר.

 

Rashbam disagrees and sees the phrase as reflexive, speaking about Moshe and Aharon לאמר אליהם – למשה ולאהרן.  He makes a general observation: ומזה יש להוכיח על כל לאמר הכתוב בוידבר ה׳ אל משה, כי פירושו לאמר למשה.

 

Sefas Emes takes the position that לֵאמֹר אֲלֵהֶם is speaking about Bnei Yisrael.  What then are we to make of the next pasuk   דַּבְּרוּ אֶל⁠ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לֵאמֹר ?  One of the two phrases must be redundant?

 

To answer this question Sefas Emes sets down a yesod based on the Chazal at the end of Makkos  ר' חנניא בן עקשיא אומר רצה הקב"ה לזכות את ישראל לפיכך הרבה להם תורה ומצות שנאמר (ישעיהו מב, כא) ה' חפץ למען צדקו יגדיל תורה ויאדיר.  Rashi/Rivan explain כדי שיהו מקבלין שכר במה שמונעין עצמן מן העבירות לפיכך הרבה להן שלא היה צריך לצוות כמה מצות וכמה אזהרות על שקצים ונבלות שאין לך אדם שאינו קץ בהן אלא כדי שיקבלו שכר על שפורשין מהן.  What Rashi/Rivan is telling us is that R' Chananya ben Akashya didn't mean to say that Hashem dreamt up meaningless, arbitrary laws for us to obey just for the sake of giving us reward.  What he meant is that there are laws in the Torah that would seem to go without saying.  Do you really need a pasuk to tell you not to eat bugs?  Who in their right mind would have an appetite or want to do so anyway?  Nonetheless, Hashem gave us a mitzvah so that we get credit for doing what we might otherwise do anyway.  Ad kan Rashi/Rivan.  The Sefas Emes adds another layer.  If I wouldn't eat pig or bugs anyway, what is Hashem rewarding me for?  The answer is that I am being rewarded not for that what, but for the why. אל יאמר האדם אי אפשי בבשר חזיר רק אפשי ומה אעשה אבי שבשמים גזר עלי. Chazal tell us, "Don't say I don't like pig."  Don't do what you are doing because of your personal taste, your common sense, your intuition, your upbringing, social norms, etc.  Rather do it because Hashem decreed that this is what we have to do.  Do it for the sake of the mitzvah.  Attitude and intent make all the difference 

 

In our parsha, says Sefas Emes, the second pasuk of דַּבְּרוּ אֶל⁠ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לֵאמֹר זֹאת הַחַיָּה אֲשֶׁר תֹּאכְלוּ address the what.  The first pasuk is needed to address the why.  לֵאמֹר אֲלֵהֶם means don't just tell them what to do, but tell them that I, G-d, and the one telling them to do it.   

 

Nadav and Avihu wanted ruchniyus, so they offered "eish zarah" to achieve that goal.  They were guided by their own subjective intuition rather than the letter of the law.  Therefore, when it came to giving the laws of kashrus, the Torah stressed that even if you wouldn't eat it anyway, what should guide your behavior is not personal, subjective taste, but rather the fact that it is a mitzvah. 

the privilege of teaching Torah; tamei birds - why not rely on rov; Bruriah's attitude towards wrongdoers vs the bracha of la'malshinim

Like I said last week, the Ayeles haShachar provides a lot of food for thought, and I could go on and on, but just a few more highlights:

1)  וַיְדַבֵּר ה׳ אֶל מֹשֶׁה וְאֶל אַהֲרֹן לֵאמֹר אֲלֵהֶם

 דַּבְּרוּ אֶל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לֵאמֹר זֹאת הַחַיָּה אֲשֶׁר תֹּאכְלוּ מִכׇּל הַבְּהֵמָה אֲשֶׁר עַל הָאָרֶץ. (11:1-2) 

Rashi comments that the  אֲלֵהֶם in the first pasuk refers to Elazar and Itamar.

  אמור שיאמרו להם לאלעזר ולאיתמר, או אינו אלא לאמר לישראל? כשהוא אומר: דברו אל בני ישראל (ויקרא י״א:ב׳), הרי דבור האמור לישראל, הא מה אני מקיים: לאמר אלהם – לבנים, לאלעזר ולאיתמר 

The word דַּבְּרוּ in the next pasuk refers to Moshe, Aharon, and his children together.  Rashi comments:

 את כולם השוה להיות שלוחים לדבור זה, לפי שהושוו בדמימה וקבלו עליהם גזירת המקום מאהבה.

The reward given to Aharon and his children was their being given the opportunity to teach this parsha.  We see a beautiful chiddush : The capacity to teach Torah is a gift from Hashem, it's a reward.  Don't take it for granted! 

2) Yesterday I touched on the mitzvah of bedikas simanin to check whether an animal is kosher.  R' Itzelege Ponovicher has a chiddush based on a Rivash that R' Shteinman ties to another din in our parsha.  The gemara (Chulin 63b) writes that the Torah only lists the tamei birds because most birds in the world are kosher.  Tos asks: if we are unaware of the identity of a bird, why can't we rely on rov and assume it is kosher?  Tos answers that there might be multiple subspecies of each tamei bird, so they outnumber the kosher ones and there is no rov.  (Alternatively, one could say that even if the # of kosher species is greater than th # of tamei species, there are more individual tamei birds.)  R' Shteinman offers a more "lomdish" answer and suggests that  whether a bird is kosher or not is a safeik in din, and a safeik in din cannot be resolved with a rov in metziyus.  According to these answers either there is no rov, or rov is not good enough to resolve the issue.  R' Itzele Ponovicher (Zecher Yitzchak #80) writes that in fact the rov is a good rov and takes off the lav of eating a tamei animal -- the metziyus as determined by the rov is that the bird is a kosher bird.  However, the mitzvah of bedikas simanim tells us that knowing that a bird is kosher based on rov is not enough.  Eating such an animal violates the aseh of bedikas simanim.  

R' Shteinman understood the Rivash a little differently.  He understood that the din of bedikas simanim precludes relying on the rov.  The mitzvah tells us thsat in this case so long as you cannot identity the animal with simanin, you must be choshesh for the miyut and there would therefore be a lav.  

3) Rashi comments regarding the deaths of Nadav and Avihu (10:3) ועל פני כל העם אכבד – כשהקב״ה עושה דין בצדיקים מתיירא ומתעלה ומתקלס: אם כן באילו, כל שכן ברשעים.  This piece that R' Shteinman quotes from R' Chaim has little to do with the parsha, but it's R' Chaim, so how could I leave it out?   We say in kedusha of musaf that the angels turn to each other and ask, "Where is the place of kavod Shamayim?"  משׁרתיו שׁואלים זה לזה אי׳ מקום כּבודו.  R' Chaim explained that the angels' safeik is whether there is greater kvod Shamayim in Hashem bestowing goodness on the tzadikim for all to see, or is there greater kvod Shamayim in Hashem punishing tzadikim for transgressions so all can see the demonstration of justice.  The angels bleibt by a safeik.  We therefore continue and say given all things being equal, ממקומו הוא יפן בּרחמים לעמו..., let the kvod Shamayim come through rachamim, by giving us good things, not through onesh.  (Note from me: קטונתי מכל החסדים ומכל האמת...  Sefas Emes explains that there are two ways that Hashem can make a person feel small: 1) by punishing them and knocking them down to size; 2) by giving them so much goodness that they feel unworthy of the gift.  Yaakov Avinu asked that קטונתי come from the latter, מכל החסדים ומכל האמת, rather than the former).    

Rashi tells us that a greater kavod Shamayim than either the carrot or stick for tzadikim is the punishment of reshaim.  This is why we daven, says R' Shteinman, "V'lamalshinim al t'hi tikvah..."  The problem is this seems to fly in the face of a well known gemara (Brachos 10a):

הנהו בריוני דהוו בשבבותיה דר"מ והוו קא מצערו ליה טובא הוה קא בעי ר' מאיר רחמי עלויהו כי היכי דלימותו אמרה לי' ברוריא דביתהו מאי דעתך משום דכתיב יתמו חטאים מי כתיב חוטאים חטאים כתיב ועוד שפיל לסיפיה דקרא ורשעים עוד אינם כיון דיתמו חטאים ורשעים עוד אינם אלא בעי רחמי עלויהו דלהדרו בתשובה ורשעים עוד אינם בעא רחמי עלויהו והדרו בתשובה

Bruriah told R' Meir that he should daven for troublemakers to repent, not for their elimination.  So how do we explain the bracha in our shmoneh esrei?  

R' Shteinman makes no attempt here to offer an answer, but many others already address this question.  Maharal in Be'er haGolah reinterprets the bracha of lamalshinim as a request to eliminate wickedness, not the evildoers themselves, in concert with Bruriah's approach. Maybe one can distinguish between different types of evildoers.  Or maybe the truth is far simpler: who says we pasken like Bruriah and not R' Meir?  Sure, Bruriah's sentiments sound nice, but that doesn't mean she was correct.  

4) Lastly, a question that only a Litvishe Rosh Yeshiva could ask.  וַיֹּאמֶר מֹשֶׁה אֶל⁠ אַהֲרֹן קְרַב אֶל⁠ הַמִּזְבֵּחַ (10:7)  Rashi comments שהיה אהרן בוש וירא לגשת, אמר לו משה: מה אתה בוש? לכך נבחרת  Aharon was hesitating, so Moshe had to encourage him to step up to the plate.  R' Shteinman asks: so what if Aharon felt a sense of unworthiness or shame?  Hashem gave the command for him to do the avodah, so what difference should his emotional reaction make?  A command is a command!

I think I've written this about the Ayeles haShachar before.  Certain questions are ra'uy specifically for the person asking them.  Only someone who is capable of overcoming the challenge of putting aside their own emotions to do whatever Hashem asks can ask such a question on this Rashi.

parshas hachodesh; simanei kashrus - sibah or siman; achila less than k'zayis - ptur onshin or not a maaseh achila; and more

1) The gemara (Pesachim 6) has a din שואלין ודורשין בהלכות הפסח קודם הפסח שלשים יום which is derived from the fact that Moshe taught the halachos of Pesach Sheni one month in advance, on Pesach Rishon שהרי משה עומד בפסח ראשון ומזהיר על הפסח שני שנאמר ויעשו בני ישראל את הפסח במועדו וכתיב ויהי אנשים אשר היו טמאים לנפש אדם.  R' Chaim Kanievsky held that this is a real derasha, not just an asmachta, and is therefore a din d'orasya.  Rokeach writes that reading parshas Parah and HaChodesh is a kiyum of this din of being shoel v'doresh hil ha'chag, as the whole point of these parshiyos is to teach us the halachos of becoming tahor and offering korban pesach.  Acc to R' Chaim, the reading would therefore be a kiyum d'orasya.  Rama (282:4, see R' Akiva Eiger there) quotes a yesh omrim that a katan should not be called by for any of the 4 parshiyos.

I enjoyed posting the Ayeles haShachar pieces last week, so I am going to do more of the same this week, with a mix of halacha and aggadah.

2)  זֹאת הַחַיָּה אֲשֶׁר תֹּאכְלוּ -  מלמד שהיה משה אוחז בחיה ומראה אותה לישראל.  Why did Moshe have to hold up the animals for display?  What was the necessity of having a show and tell session instead of just teaching the halachos?

The Rogatchover has a chakira whether the simanei kashrus are a siman or a sibah for a creature's kashrus (see post here, also here ).  Tos (Nida 50b) writes with respect to some kind of wild chicken that lives by a pond:

 תרנגולתאדאגמא. הזכר אסור לפי שאין לו סימני טהרה ולא שרי מטעם כל היוצא מן הטהור טהור שהרי האם לא ילדה האפרוח אלא ביצים הטילה והאפרוח מעפרא קא גדיל ונאסר ממילא ע"י סימני טומאה ונקבה נמי אין לאוסרה למאן דאסר זה וזה גורם דהא אפרוח לא יצא אלא מן הביצה ומעפרא קגדיל כדפרישית.

Even though we know that this chicken is born from the egg of a kosher mother bird, it is considered a min tamei because it lacks simanim.  It seems from Tos that simanim are a sibah -- even though we know the family the bird is related to, it still needs simanim to be kosher.  Ralbag on our parsha seems to disagree and hold that simanin just serve to identify the species of the animal, and it's by virtue of being a member of that species that it is kosher.  

R' Shteinman suggests that our Rashi speaks to this issue.  Let's say a person could genetically engineer a tamei animal and cause it to be born with simanei kashrus, or genetically engineer a kosher animal so it was not born with simanim.  What would be its status -- tamei or tahor?  Are the simanim the sibah for the animal's status, and without them it is tamei, or are the simanim just a siman that help us identify the species?  R' Shteinman writes that Moshe held up each animal so that we can recognize it and know what species it is because that is what determines whether it is tamei or tahor, not the presence/absence of simanin.

Rashi works well l'shitaso, as he writes at the end of the parsha (11:47) writes that the mitzvah of knowing the simanei kashrus is לא בלבד השונה, אלא שתהא יודע ומכיר ובקי בהן.  Theoretical knowledge is not enough; you have to be able to recognize the physical signs of what makes an animal kosher.  

3) וְאֶת הַשָּׁפָן...וְאֶת הָאַרְנֶבֶת  For those interested in this sort of thing (which, for the record, I am not), R Shteinman quotes R' Hirsch who writes  והנה, רגילים לפרש ששפן וארנבת הם בעלי החיים הקרויים כן בימינו. אך פירוש זה לא ייתכן, אלא אם כן שני בעלי חיים אלה יהיו מעלי גרה, ודוחק לומר כן and then adds that today we know that the ארנבת actually does chew its cud, but it is almost undetectable.  (I'm not sure why this piece is in brackets.)  

4) Yesh lachkor whether אין אכילה פּחותה מכּזית means it is not a maaseh achila, or whether it is a maaseh achila but there is a ptur onshin? 

Rashi comments on the pasuk  וְהָאֹכֵל מִנִּבְלָתָהּ יְכַבֵּס בְּגָדָיו וְטָמֵא עַד הָעָרֶב וְהַנֹּשֵׂא אֶת נִבְלָתָהּ יְכַבֵּס בְּגָדָיו וְטָמֵא עַד הָעָרֶב that the reason the pasuk mentions eating is to tell us that the shiur of noge'a or nosei is the same amount as that which constitutes achila, namely, a k'zayis:

  האוכל – ליתן שיעור לנושא ולנוגע כדי אכילה, והוא כזית.

It sounds from here like the definition of achila is a k'zayis.  

However, R' Shteinman points out that the implication of there being a chiyuv for eating a chatzi shiur (according to R' Yochanan Yoma 74) is that the shiur k'zayis is a maaseh achila, just there is a ptur onshin.  If achila less than a shiur is not a maaseh aveira, then the sevara of "chazi l'itztarufei" makes no sense -- 0+0 is still 0.   

even Moshe is human

Chazal tell us that opening day of the Mishkan was a tremendous day of simcha, as great as the moment of creation.  Why then, asks Ohr haChaim, does the parsha begin with the word "vayehi," which usually connotes suffering?  He answers:

ולצד שהפציר בשליחות פרעה חרה אפו בו ביום ההוא ועזבו מהיות כהן לעולם, וכשהגיע יום הפקידה נצטער על אשר פרח ממנו עוז תפארת כהונת עולם, והגם כי עצם מאוד בצדקות ובענוה, הלא כל לב חי מרגיש ובפרט בדבר מצוה יקרת הערך ומופלאה כזאת

Even though Moshe reacted with joy when Hashem told him that his brother Aharon was going to be kohen gadol, even Moshe Rabeinu is still flesh and blood and cannot escape a feeling of pain and remorse.  That's the tzaar reflected in the word "vayehi."  

The baalei mussar would eat this vort up.  No one should think they are immune from tempation, from the danger of sin.  

The Baal haTurim writes that because Moshe argued with Hashem for 7 days when Hashem appeared to him by the sneh and he did not want to accept the role of being the go'el of Klal Yisrael, therefore he served only 7 days in the Mishkan and then had to turn the job over to Aharon.  

Of course it's not the seven days of service which are the punishment; it's the taking away of the job.  The 7 days Moshe got to serve only whet his appetite to continue in the position of kohen gadol, serving Hashem in that way.  Worse than not getting the job is thinking for seven days that you have the job in hand only to have it snatched away.

Why should Moshe be punished for his refusal?  The reason why he demurred is because וכל זה שלא היה רוצה ליטול גדולה על אהרן אחיו, שהיה גדול הימנו ונביא היה (Rashi Shmos 4:10), he did not want to steal the spotlight from his brother Aharon.  You would think that Moshe would get a reward for his refusal, not a punihsment!  And where is the midah k'neged middah?  (See R' Chaim Elazari's Nesivei Chaim)

I think the Ohr haChaim provides us with a solution.  Ain hachi nami, had Moshe truly been concerned only for the sake of his brother for those seven days at the sneh, he would be deserving of the greatest reward.  But even a Moshe Rabeinu is flesh and blood.  Even Moshe Rabeinu cannot say with certainty that his refusal was 100% rooted in that l'shem shamayim with no other concern.  

How do we know?  Hashem's answer is "Vayehi ba'yom ha'shemini," with the word "vayehi" connoting tzaar, showing that even the selfless Moshe cannot 100% completely escape the same thoughts and feelings anyone who is human will experience.  

That same infinitesimal amount of self interest that showed itself here was the same infinitesimal amount of self interest that also played a role in Moshe's refusal at the sneh, and the two therefore go hand in hand.  

when was the parsha of tumas ohel given?

The Torah tells us that Nadav and Avihu died "lifnei Hashem" (10:2).  Toras Kohanim quotes a machlokes where exactly that was.  One opinion is that they were standing in the mishkan offering ketores, but a malach pushed the out.  R' Akiva, however, argues and holds that they died inside the tent. 

פלוגתא איכא בתורת כהני׳ רא״א שמתו בחוץ במקום שהלוים מותרים ליכנס שנא׳ ויקרבו וישאום בכתנות׳ וא״כ מאי לפני ה׳ שנגפן המלאך והוציאן לחוץ רע״א לא מתו אלא בפנים שנא׳ לפני ה׳ ומאי ויקרבו וישאום בכתנות׳ מלמד שנתנו חכה של ברזל לתוך פיהם וגררום והוציאום לחוץ.

If so, asks the Daas Zekeinim, according to R' Akiva, shouldn't the entire mishkan and all the kelim inside it have become tamei tumas ohel?  Yet we don't find that the avodah stopped to allow time to be metaheir everything.

R' Chaim Kanievksi in Taama d'Kra suggests that perhaps the dinim of tumas ohel had not yet been given, and therefore, even though BN"Y may have known there was such a halacha, it was not in effect yet.

I must be missing something, because I cannot figure out what he means.  Rashi quotes from Chazal that the dinim of parah adumah were given in Mara, right after kri'as Yam Suf (Shmos 15:25).  If you don't understand that there is a concept of tumas meis, then you can't really understand what parah adumah is all about.  Did they know some of the halachos of tumas meis but not the din of tumas ohel?  M'heicha teisi to make such a distinction?

Even without the derash quoted by Rashi, we know the Leviim had to be metaheir before serving in the mishkan --  וְכֹֽה־תַעֲשֶׂ֤ה לָהֶם֙ לְטַֽהֲרָ֔ם הַזֵּ֥ה עֲלֵיהֶ֖ם מֵ֣י חַטָּ֑את (Bamidbar 8:7), and Rashi there explains הזה עליהם מי חטאת – של אפר פרה, מפני טמאי מתים שבהן.  Proof again that the halachos of tumas meis were known (see Netziv at the opening of Chukas).

Furthermore, the gemara darshens (M"K 28) למה נסמכה פרשת פרה למיתת מרים, לומר לך מה פרה אדומה מכפרת אף מיתתן של צדיקים מכפרת.  The implication of a "lamah nismicha" question/derash is that had the Torah followed chronological order, the text would appear elsewhere; its location is shifted  to make a point (see Mizrachi and Gur Aryeh to Bamidbar 13:2).  It sounds like these parshiyos of parah and tumah/tahara chronologically were given earlier, but the text is shifted to this location to create the juxtaposition with Miriam's death. 

So what does RCK mean when he writes that the parsha of tumas ohalim had not yet been given?

re-creation is a greater miracle than creation

 The Midrash opens our parsha by speaking about the creation of the world:

וַיְהִי בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁמִינִי – רַב אַהֲבָה בַּר כַּהֲנָא פָּתַח (משלי ט׳:א׳-ד׳): חָכְמוֹת בָּנְתָה בֵיתָהּ, טָבְחָה טִבְחָהּ וגו׳ שָׁלְחָה נַעֲרֹתֶיהָ וגו׳ מִי פֶתִי וגו׳, רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה בַּר אִלְעָאי פָּתַר קְרָא בִּבְרִיָּתוֹ שֶׁל עוֹלָם, חָכְמוֹת בָּנְתָה בֵיתָהּ, זֶה הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא דִּכְתִיב בֵּיהּ (משלי ג׳:י״ט): ה׳ בְּחָכְמָה יָסַד אָרֶץ. (משלי ט׳:א׳): חָצְבָה עַמּוּדֶיהָ שִׁבְעָה, אֵלּוּ שִׁבְעָה יְמֵי בְרֵאשִׁית, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות כ׳:י׳): כִּי שֵׁשֶׁת יָמִים וגו׳ (בראשית ב׳:ג׳): וַיְבָרֶךְ אֱלֹהִים אֶת יוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי. טָבְחָה טִבְחָה, (בראשית א׳:כ״ד): וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים תּוֹצֵא הָאָרֶץ. מָסְכָה יֵינָהּ, (בראשית ב׳:ט׳): וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים יִקָּווּ הַמַּיִם. אַף עָרְכָה שֻׁלְחָנָהּ, (בראשית ב׳:י״א): וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים תַּדְּשֵׁא הָאָרֶץ דֶּשֶׁא עֵשֶׂב מַזְרִיעַ זֶרַע. שָׁלְחָה נַעֲרֹתֶיהָ תִקְרָא, זֶה אָדָם וְחַוָּה. (משלי ט׳:ג׳): עַל גַּפֵּי מְרֹמֵי קָרֶת, שֶׁהֱסִיטָן הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא וְקָרָא אוֹתָן אֱלָהוּת, הֲדָא הוּא דִכְתִיב (בראשית ג׳:ה׳): וִהְיִיתֶם כֵּאלֹהִים, אַחַר כָּל הַשֶּׁבַח הַזֶּה מִי פֶּתִי יָסֻר הֵנָּה, הֵן הִנִּיחוּ דַּעְתּוֹ שֶׁל הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא וְהָלְכוּ אַחַר דַּעְתּוֹ שֶׁל נָחָשׁ, בִּשְׁבִיל כָּךְ (משלי ט׳:ד׳): חֲסַר לֵב אָמְרָה לוֹ (בראשית ג׳:י״ט): כִּי עָפָר אַתָּה וְאֶל עָפָר תָּשׁוּב.

The implicit message is that there is a parallel between the seven days of creation and the seven days of miluim that culminated in "va'yehi bayom ha'shmini."  The first seven days of creation ended in the sin of Adam; our seven days are the tikun of the cheit ha'eigel, the undoing of sin.  Parshas Braishis is the story of creation that ends in tragedy, in failure; our parsha teaches that creation can be remade anew despite the failings of the past.

Chazal tell us that the yom ha'shmini was as joyous a day as the moment of creation.  Yet, at the same time, the word "va'yehi" that opens the parsha usually portends sorrow.  Ohr haChaim comments:

צריך לדעת מה טעם אמר ויהי ובמסכת מגילה (דף י) אמר רבי לוי דבר זה מסורת בידינו מאנשי כנסת הגדולה כל מקום שנאמר ויהי אינו אלא לשון צער, ומקשה והכתיב ויהי ביום השמיני ותניא אותו היום היתה שמחה לפני הקב״ה כיום בריאת שמים וארץ כתיב הכא ויהי וגו׳ וכתיב התם (בראשית א ה) ויהי ערב ויהי בקר

Even before the deaths of Nadav and Avihu occurred, the day was tinged with sadness for Moshe Rabeinu:

אָמַר רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר נַחְמָן, כָּל שִׁבְעַת יְמֵי הַסְּנֶה הָיָה הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא מְפַתֶּה אֶת משֶׁה שֶׁיֵּלֵךְ בִּשְׁלִיחוּתוֹ לְמִצְרַיִם, הֲדָא הוּא דִכְתִיב (שמות ד׳:י׳): גַּם מִתְּמוֹל גַּם מִשִּׁלְשֹׁם גַּם מֵאָז דַּבֶּרְךָ אֶל עַבְדֶּךָ, הֲרֵי שִׁשָּׁה, וּבַשְּׁבִיעִי אָמַר לוֹ (שמות ד׳:י״ג): שְׁלַח נָא בְּיַד תִּשְׁלָח, אָמַר לוֹ הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא, משֶׁה, אַתְּ אוֹמֵר שְׁלַח נָא בְּיַד תִּשְׁלָח, חַיֶּיךָ שֶׁאֲנִי צוֹרְרָה לְךָ בִּכְנָפֶיךָ, אֵימָתַי פָּרַע לוֹ, .... רַבִּי חֶלְבּוֹ אָמַר כָּל שִׁבְעַת יְמֵי הַמִּלּוּאִים הָיָה מְשַׁמֵּשׁ בִּכְהֻנָּה גְדוֹלָה וְכַסָּבוּר שֶׁלּוֹ הִיא, בַּשְּׁבִיעִי אָמַר לוֹ, לֹא שֶׁלְךָ הִיא אֶלָּא שֶׁל אַהֲרֹן אָחִיךָ הִיא, הֲדָא הוּא דִכְתִיב: וַיְהִי בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁמִינִי.

Sefas Emes explains that this was not some kind of vindictive punishment, but rather was a natural outcome of Moshe's refusal.  Had Moshe taken the mantle of leadership and run with it, the geulah would have occurred with a level of perfection that would have made sin impossible.  His reluctance led to the possibility of a cheit ha'eigel.  

Yet in that failing there was a silver lining: we learned that perfection is not a necessasry condition to coming close to Hashem.  One can suffer setbacks and overcome them.  B'makom she'baalei teshivah omdin afilu tzadikim gemurim ainam yecholim laamod -- that is even greater than remaining on the plateau of perfection.  

Re-creation is an even greater miracle than creation itself.

Moshe tells Aharon, "Krav el ha'mizbeiach." (9:8)  Rashi comments קרב אל המזבח – שהיה אהרן בוש וירא לגשת, אמר לו משה: מה אתה בוש? לכך נבחרת.  Aharon was chosen precisely because he had sinned in the cheit ha'eigel and overcome that failing.  לכך נבחרת -- that quality is what the mishkan is all about.

where sfeikos span a spectrum - kashrus, bein ha'shemashos

The Netziv reads  לְהַבְדִּ֕יל בֵּ֥ין הַטָּמֵ֖א וּבֵ֣ין הַטָּהֹ֑ר וּבֵ֤ין הַֽחַיָּה֙ הַֽנֶּאֱכֶ֔לֶת וּבֵין֙ הַֽחַיָּ֔ה אֲשֶׁ֖ר לֹ֥א תֵאָכֵֽל (11:47) as a mitzvah to examine any case of safeik to determine whether the animal is kosher or not.  Even though sfeika d'oraysa according to the Rambam is l'kula on a d'oraysa level, that is only when it is impossible to resolve the safeik.  Here it is not only possible, but it is a mitzvah to resolve the safeik.  Meaning, the Torah does not want a person to simply label any safeik as tfeif with the goal of erring on the side of caution.  The Torah wants and commands a person to find out the truth.  Netziv writes:   וכשם שאסור להקל בספק הקרוב להחמיר. או שלא לברר איזה ספק ולנהוג בו היתר כך אסור להחמיר במקום שאפשר לברר היתרו    

The Netziv then makes an interesting comment on the language of the pasuk.  He notes that sometimes the Torah distinguishes 2 things by saying "bein X and Y" and sometimes it distinguishes, like in our pasuk, by saying something like "bein X u'bein Y," repeating the word "bein" twice.  When the word is repeated, it indicates that we are speaking about two things or two groups being compared that have points where they are unlike at all, but also have points where they are very similar and come close to overlapping, where the difference is very subtle.  Had the Torah said "bein ha'tamei la'tahor," it would mean that if you examine a case of safeik, you will be able to tell clearly whether it is tamei or tahor.  By saying "bein ha'tamei u'bein ha'tahor" the Torah is speaking about two different cases of safeik: the case of safeik which is similar to tahor animals, but there is still some doubt, and the case of safeik which seems similar to tamei animals, but there is still some doubt.  The Torah is telling us that there is a spectrum of safeik: one end is close to tahor, the other end is closer to tamei, and the middle is a blur.  The nafka mina is for onshim.  There is a more severe punishment for erring in a case of safeik close to the tamei end of the spectrum and less severe punishment for erring in a case on the end of the spectrum closer to tahor -- take a look at the Netziv for examples.

We have another example of the "bein...bein" distinction right in the first chapter of chumash: "Vayavdeil Elokim bein ha'or u'bein ha'choshech."  Bein ha'shemashos, twilight, is a safeik period between day and night.  The beginning of b"hs is closer to day, the end is closer to night, and the middle is blurry state where the two come come close to converging. 

The Netziv applies this chiddush to reading the Mishna we say every Friday night at the end of perek 2 of Shabbos: safeik chasheicha safeik aina chasheicha... where the Mishna tells us the laws of bein hashemashos.  Why does the Mishna need to say "safeik...safeik?"  Why not just say "safeik chasheicha or aina chasheicha?"  And why does the Mishna put "safeik chasheicha" first when the day chronologically moves from aina chasheicha towards chasheicha and not the other way around?  Netziv answers that the Mishna phrases itself this way because bein hashemashos as a spectrum of safeik, one end very close to day where there is only a slight "safeik chasheicha," the other end closer to night where there is only a slight "safeik aina chasheicha."

The Netziv's proof from that Mishna is noteworthy because of the pshat the Netziv does not learn.  The MG"A (342) raises the following question: does the principle in the Mishna that there was no gezeira on shvusin derabbanan apply only to bein hashemashos Friday night, or does it also apply to bein hashemashos of Shabbos, Sat night, as well?  Perhaps on Friday the assumption is that the day is chol until proven otherwise, and therefore the Mishna has certain leniencies for bein hashemashos, but maybe once Shabbos starts the day has a chazakah of kedusha until proven otherwise, and therefore one must be strict during bein hashemashos of Sat night until certain nightfall?  Many Achronim kick this safeik around.  Is it possible for there to be a chazakah on a unit of time when time is always changing?  See Ohr Sameiach here.  R' Akiva Eiger on that Mishna in Shabbos quotes a "davar nechmad" from the Tos Chadashim.  The reason the Mishna uses the word "safeik" twice (the Netziv's question) and the reason it puts the safeik chasheicha first is because it is speaking about two different bein ha'shemashos periods -- 1) the bein hashemashos of Friday night, which has a chezkas chol and our safeik is whether it is chasheicha and therefore Shabbos, and 2) the bein ha'shemashos of Sat night, which has a chezkas kodesh, and our safeik is whether aina chasheicha, whether that status has changed and we may be lenient because it is chol.  The upshot of the Mishna is that the same leniencies apply to both of these cases, both the bein hashemashos of Fri night and the bein has"s of Sat night.

Take your pick of the Netziv or RAK"E, either way, next time you read this Mishna, it will be that much more meaningful.

Notes from the Underground - va'yidom Aharon

Although Chazal and meforshim attribute a whole panalopy of aveiros to Nadav and Avihu, we need to take things in context. A flaw that Hashem holds a great person accountable for might be ignored in a lesser person. Why is it that Nadav and Avihu's death is mentioned at the beginning of parshas Acharei Mos, which talks about the avodah of Yom Kippur? To teach us, answers the Yalkut, that the death of tzadikim brings as great as kaparah as Y"K. "Tzadikim" the Midrash calls them -- despite their cheit.

In last week's parsha we find that even before we finish with the laws of aninus and the story of which korbanos Aharon ate and which were left over, there is a break and Hashem speaks to Aharon directly and tells him the law of not entering the mikdash or paskening halachos in a state of drunkenness. Rashi comments that the parsha being told directly to Aharon was a reward for "va'yidom Aharom," Aharon accepting the din on his children in silence.

And if the parsha would have been given later, or if we would not have a special parsha from which Rashi can derive that Aharon got a reward for his silence, would we have thought that Hashem would not give him the schar he deserved???

The sefer She'eiris Menachem answers that sometimes a person accepts tragedy in silence, but inside he is eating his kishkes out in torment. The parsha here comes to tell us that this was not the case with Aharon -- he was tocho k'boro. How do we know? Because "ain ha'Shechina shorah ela mitoch simcha." By telling us that Hashem spoke directly to Aharon and revelaed Torah to him, the it means Aharon was in a state of inner simcha -- he was capable of receiving the dvar Hashem despite what he had just gone through. When you can accept tragedy in that way, then you deserve special schar.

In current events, today is Earth Day.  It is amazing how many predictions the climate fanatics and earth lovers (we all love the earth, don't get me wrong) have made that have never come true, but they are never held accountable or taken to task.  The same is true for the virus models.  No matter how often they update the models, they are wrong, and wrong by a lot.  I don't know about you, but in my job, if I consistently got things wrong, I would soon find myself unemployed.  Not these folks.  No matter how wrong they were in the past, they get to take another crack at it and another crack it, and no matter how often they are wrong their "expert" opinions will be cited and their recommendations are followed by the herd.

I want to go on record with a prediction that I hope comes to be proven false: at the rate NY/NJ is going, they will not allow minyanim to happen on R"H and Y"K.  If there is some enterprising person out there, rent a hotel in a state that is outside the northeast and maybe some of us will be able to get there to daven for Yamim Noraim.

Again, I hope this proves to be wrong.

Notes from the Underground - Monday edition: mandelorian comes to NY and a chakira of the Rogatchover

1) A little inspiration to start the week off right:

 

2) Yesterday I was out of the bunker with Wife and Daughter #3.  Here's a picture of where we were:

I'm afraid I cannot reveal the location and had to avoid capturing any of the hundreds of other people there in my photo because Mayor De Blasio is now encouraging all NYers to rat out their neighbors and friends who might be breaking social distancing rules.  I did not want to put anyone in jeopardy or risk having the stormtroopers police come to shut the place down.

This is a great opportunity the mandelorian bounty hunters out there.  I assume there is some kind of reward for bringing your fellow citizen to "justice."  Or maybe it works like the good ol' days of the Inquisition when you got to keep the property of the neighbor that you turn in to the authorities.  Good luck all NYers, and thank you for voting this guy in.

3) The Mishna in Bechoros has a din "ha'yotzei min ha'tamei tamei" -- if, for example, you have a chamor that gives birth to an animal that has split hooves and chews its cud just like a cow, the animal is still considered not  kosher.  The Pischei Teshuvah (Y.D. 79:2) has a lomdishe chakirah whether this din means that the animal is considered a chamor, or whether the animal is a cow, just the Torah does not allow you to eat this type of cow.  There are many nafka minos.  For example, can you use the klaf of such an animal to write sta"m on?  If you shecht such an animal, is does it have tumas neveila (shechita is not a matir on a tamei animal) or not? 

 

Ralbag on last week's parsha writes that simanei kashrus serve to identify the species of the animal.  We know an animal born from a donkey is a donkey -- it can't be a different species than the parents it came from -- and therefore even if this particular donkey looks strange and has split hooves and chews its cud, it still is not permitted to be eaten.  This explanation seems to resolve the chakira of the P.T.  Ha'yotzei min ha'tamei is the same animal as its parent.

 

The underlying issue behind the P.T.'s chakira and this Ralbag is the question posed by the Rogatchover: are simanei kashrus a siman or a sibah?  Are simanim just a means of identifying what family the animal belongs to (as Ralbag indicates), or do the presence of the siman actually make the animal into a kosher animal?  (The L. Rebbe has a discussion of this Rogatchover in Likutei Sichos, see vol 3 of the English edition.)

Notes from the Underground - erev shabbos edition

1) Our chametz toaster oven broke just before pesach and a new one came in the middle of the chag.  Do you know what it's like to sit through pesach staring at a box with a picture of toast and bagels on the cover? 

 

R' Shlomo Zalman (footnote 79* in ch 31 of the S"ShK) had a safeik what the din should be if a ben chu"l is in Eretz Yisrael on Y"T sheni and decides mid-day that he wants to stay in Eretz Yisrael, e.g. what if a ben chu"l was in Eretz Yisrael observing Thurs as Y"T and mid-day decided he could not take it anymore and just needed a bagel -- would he have to say havdalah and put on tefillin right away?  Can you even make a change like that mid-day? 

 

R' Shlomo Zalman does not clarify what the tzedadim of the chakira are, but I assume at least part of the issue may revolve around the Rogatchover's chakira of what the mechayeiv of shabbos or Y"T is: whether bein ha'shemashos is mechayeiv observance of the entire day, or whether each minute of shabbos or Y"T is a new mechayeiv.

 

2) When this lockdown started I wrote that this is a large scale trolley problem -- we are saving lives at the cost of other lives, because make no mistake, robbing people of their jobs will lead to divorce, foreclosure, suicide, alcoholism, etc. Families will be destroyed, businesses destroyed, children's lives impacted, not to mention the loss of our freedoms and civil rights that have all but gone out the window (a topic that deserves its own discussion).  Cuomo's extension of the lockdown for another full month will be the final straw for many small businesses and even large firms will be forced to make further reductions simply to be able to meet operating expenses.  Amazing that such actions can be dictated by a small unnamed group of "experts" whose models have been consistently proven wrong just as quickly as they are updated. 

 

"...You don’t know what you need to do to contain the virus if you don’t actually have the details or facts,” said Marty Martinez, Boston’s chief of Health and Human Services.

 

I couldn't have said it better myself.  But lack of details or facts appear to not stand in the way of our leaders.

 

3) A quick idea on the parsha:

 

"Va'yar kol ha'am va'yaronu..."  After the korbanos Aharon offered on the 8th day of the miluim were consumed by the fire that came down from shamayim, the people were awestruck and said shira.  The Sefas Emes (5639) suggests (based on a zohar) that the shirah recited was shiras ha'yam.  As we discussed last post, the shiras ha'yam begins "vayomru leimor;" the word "leimor" seems redundant as there was no one being spoken to.  Sefas Emes says that "leimor" is l'doros -- Klal Yisrael sang shirah with such fervor that the shirah became part of our Jewish DNA.  Unfortunately, cheit  ha'eigel put a damper on things and we lost the melody.  The korbanos of the yom ha'shmini were a kapara for cheit ha'eigel, and so we resumed singing our long lost song.

 

I think the S.E.'s parallel between va'yaronu and shiras ha'yam is already implicit in the Yalkut Shimoni: 

 

״וַיַּרְא כָּל הָעָם וַיָּרֹנּוּ״, וְכֵן הוּא אוֹמֵר (דבהי״ב ז, ג) ״וְכָל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל רֹאִים בְּרֶדֶת הָאֵשׁ״ וְגוֹ׳ לְכָךְ נֶאֱמַר ״רַנְנוּ צַדִּיקִים בַּה׳⁠ ⁠״ רַנְּנוּ צַדִּיקִים לַה׳ אֵין כְּתִיב כָּאן, אֶלָּא ״בַּה׳⁠ ⁠״ בִּזְמַן שֶׁהֵם רוֹאִין אוֹתוֹ. וְכֵן אַתָּה מוֹצֵא (שמות יד, לא) ״וַיַּרְא יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶת הַיָּד הַגְּדֹלָה״ הִתְחִילוּ מְרַנְּנִים (שם טו, א) ״אָז יָשִׁיר מֹשֶׁה״ וְגוֹ׳, וְהָרְשָׁעִים אֵינָם מְרַנְּנִים עַד שֶׁהוּא מֵבִיא עֲלֵיהֶם מַכּוֹת שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שם ט, ז) ״ה׳ הַצַּדִּיק וַאֲנִי וְעַמִּי הָרְשָׁעִים״.

 

Both "vayaronu" and the shiras ha'yam according to the Yalkut are responses to directly experiencing G-d's presence.  Both have a common shared thread. 

 

The Targun interprtes "v'anveihu" in the shirah as a desire to build a home for G-d, i.e. the Mikdash.  Shiras ha'yam is the response to the temporary experience of seeing G-d's presence in the miraculous.  "Va'yaronu" is the same shirah, but this time in response to seeing G-d's presence in a permanent dwelling of the Mishkan, i.e. in our daily lives. 

Simcha and Torah she'ba'al peh

Rashi comments on the last pasuk in our parsha, "Va'ya'as Aharon u'banav eis kol hadevarim asher tzivah Hashem byad Moshe," that the Torah tells us that Aharon and his children followed instructions to emphasize that they did not deviate one iota from what they were told.

Maharal in Gur Aryeh here disagrees with Rashi instead of defending him as he usually does.  He quotes Toras Kohanim which explains that the point of the pasuk is not that Aharon obeyed, but that he did what he had to b'simcha, as if he had been commanded to do so directly by Hashem.  It is much harder, says Maharal, to take orders from someone else - a middleman - than to follow orders when they are given to you directly.

According to this pshat the language of the pasuk is meduyak.  It's the "asher tzivah Hashem b'yad Moshe" which is the challenge -- the fact that the instructions were given through an intermediary.

Much of Torah is transmitted to us via intermediary.  Torah sheba'al peh, mesorah, is all about following the instructions of Hashem as relayed to us by Chazal.  

Klal Yisrael willingly accepted Torah she'b'ksav.  The threat of kafah aleihem har kgigis was because Torah she'bal peh was a harder sell.

The gemara writes that true complete acceptance of Torah came at the time of Purim.

Just as the Toras Kohanim learns that Aharon's simcha reflected a complete kabbala of the ba'al peh mesorah given via Moshe,  so too simcha Purim reflects our complete kabbala of the same.

a sense of purpose

After the death of Nadav and Avihu, Hashem commands Aharon and his remaining sons not to show any signs of mourning.  If they do, they will suffer the penalty of death and Hashem will be angry at Bnei Yisrael (10:6).

Why should Hashem be angry at Bnei Yisrael if Aharon or his sons disobey and mourn?  Why is the community held liable for their wrongdoing?

Among the many answers to this question (see Ibn Ezra, Da'as Zekeinim, Ohr haChaim, HaKsav V'haKabbalah) I want to focus on that of the Alshich.  Loss and tragedy often give rise to doubts and questions of faith.  It takes a remarkable person like the Sanz Klausenberger Rebbe to not only rebuild, but inspire others to not lose faith and to rebuild after losing everything.  It takes a remarkable person like Mrs Racheli Frankel to go around speaking about emunah when her son was murdered by terrorists.  

At times of loss and tragedy, we need Rebbes like the Sanz Klausenberger; we need mothers like Racheli Frankel.  We need people who can lead Klal Yisrael out of despair and teach them to mourn, to reflect, to grow, and not to lose faith.  Hashem was telling Aharon to be careful lest he or his sons trip up and incur punishment because they are the ones who can do that.  G-d would certainly not hold Klal Yisrael accountable for Aharon or his son's missteps.  But if Aharon or his sons were to be punished for their missteps and lost, their absence would create an unfillable void that would inevitably lead to the nation sinking into doubt and despair and incurring Hashem's anger.

Perhaps the reason Hashem expressed concern for the effect the loss of Aharon or his remaining sons might have on Klal Yisrael was not just for the sake of the tzibur, but rather it was for Aharon's sake as well.  Aharon was charged with doing avodah and bringing kaparah to the nation.  Imagine his thoughts at that moment -- here his avodah could not serve to protect his own children; how could he serve as a meilitz for the nation as a whole?!   The pasuk therefore comes and reminds Aharon that despite the death of Nadav and Avihu, his presence, his influence, his avodah, was both necessary and critical for the nation, even to the point that he was not excused for doing avodah even to mourn.  

Viktor Frankl, himseld a Holocaust survivor, built his whole theory of psychology around the idea that a person who has a purpose to live for will lead a successful and happy life.  Hashem here was giving Aharon a renewed sense of purpose by reminding him that his presence and influence was essential to Klal Yisrael.

welcome to the big leagues

Isn't it amazing how people descend on supermarkets like a swarm of locusts and buy out every crumb of chameitz as soon as Pesach is over?  It defies rational explanation.  I expect to eventually see someone setup a tent on Central Ave in the 5 Towns on chol ha'moed so they can camp out in front of the pizza store to be first on line to get that first pie after Yom Tov.  Anyway, welcome back everybody!

"Yom ha'shmini," the day the opening of our parsha focusses on, was one of the greatest days in history.  Chazal (Shabbos 87) tell us that the day had 10 crowns, i.e. there were 10 reasons why the day was special, from it being the day on which creation happened to it being the day in which the mishkan was inaugurated and Aharon began serving as kohen gadol.  It was opening day x10.  Yet Rashi writes in Yisro (Shmos 24:9) that Nadav and Avihu were really chayav misa back then for improperly gazing at Hashem's presence (whatever that means) but Hashem let the cheit go until our parsha so as to not disrupt the joy of kabbalas haTorah.  "Yom ha'shmini," as joyous and great as it was, could be marred by Nadav and Avihu's death, but the simcha of Torah cannot be disturbed.  There is no simcha as great as the simcha of Torah.

During the 7 days of milu'im Moshe brought korbanos on behalf of Aharon and his children.  Among them was a par offered as a chatas, which was meant, explains Rashi (Shmos 19:1), as a kapparah for cheit ha'eigel.  In our parsha we read that on yom ha'shmini Aharon himself offered the korbanos, and among them was an eigel offered as a chatas meant, as Rashi (9:2) explains, as a kapparah for cheit ha'eigel.  Didn't we do that already?  Why did Aharon need to bring another chatas for kapprah for cheit ha'eigel when korbanos had been offered for that purpose during the milu'im?   

Maharal in Gur Aryeh answers (not exactly in these words) that it's like a minor league player who is the talk of the triple A league, but then makes it to the majors and finds his ability questioned on the back pages every time he has a bad game.  Those very same back pages of the newspaper had only the highest praise when he was in the minors, so what changed?  The answer is simple: welcome to the big leagues.  Stepping up to the next level invites greater scrutiny and demands greater accountability.

The Midrash darshens "u'Pharoah hikriv" by Yam Suf (why hitpa'el?) that we just read at the end of Peach as telling us that Pharoah's pursuit of Klal Yisrael inspired them to teshuvah more than any words of mudsar or chastisement could have done.  But what was Klal Yisrael doing teshuvah for?  They had just come from offering korban pesach, doing milah, experiencing yetzi'as Mitzrayim, not from any wrongdoing (see Imrei Emes)?  Perhaps the point is the same: davka because they were now free from Egypt, free from the environment that dragged them down to sin, Klal Yisrael had a greater responsibility to introspect and improve further.  Climbing to the next level does not absolve one from obligation -- it creates greater obligations.

"Yom ha'shmini" was a different league from the 7 days of milu'im.  Kapparah that may have sufficed in the past now needs to be re-examined and taken to another level.

I have the old edition of the Maharal at home and that's how I understood the point when I read it, but then I saw in Rav Hartman's footnotes in the new edition that he understands it a bit differently.  Maharal holds that there are certain pivotal moments in Jewish history.  Just as we hopefully want to seize those moments for good, the yetzer ha'ra works even harder than usual to thwart us and turn those moments sour.  That's why we find that during what should have been a time of spiritual greatness, matan Torah, there was a cheit ha'eigel.  Precisely because there was such positive energy, there was a counterbalancing of explosive negative energy that the yetzer marshaled to thwart us.  So too, at the time of "yom ha'shmini," because this day was a pivotal moment, an extra kapparah was needed so as to not have a recurrence of an eigel situation.

Perhaps this sheds light on why Moshe reacted with anger when he saw what he thought was an error being made and korbanos being disposed of and not eaten after Aharon and his sons became aveilim.  R' Simcha Zisel of Kelm puts it in context: Aharon has just lost his sons; his other children have lost their brother.  Even if they were in error in disposing of the korbanos, wouldn't it be understandable given their grief?  Did they deserve to be questioned so harshly?  Yet the greater context is that this is a one time pivotal moment in Jewish history, a day that can never be duplicated.  Evil lurks waiting to once again spoilt the show.  As sensitive as he was to his brother's and nephew's plight, Moshe was also sensitive to history hanging in the balance.  

Speaking of auspicious days in Jewish history, this is a great article by Shmuel Sackett. 

the chassidah that does not know how to do chessed

One of the non-kosher birds mentioned in the parsha is the “chassidah.” (11:19)  Rashi explains that it is called chassidah because it does chessed with its friends and brings them food.  Why should such a nice bird be not-kosher?  The Chiddushei haRI”M famously explains that it does chessed only with its friends, but not those who are not friends.  Others explain that it gets the food it distributes by taking from other birds.  It’s great to do chessed by giving your own things away, but not so great when you seize others' property to give away (I will refrain from making a political comment here).  Daughter #3, who asked me to mention that she is only 14 and has red hair [I am not sure what the latter detail has to do with anything], thought of her own answer that I said I would quote in her name.  Chessed is wonderful, but a person also needs to care of him/herself.  The flaw of the chassidah is that it gives away all its food away to friends at the expense of its own nest.  That is not a proper exercise of charity. 

(This week I did a few shorter posts instead of lumping them together.  Not sure which way works better.)

standing lifnei Hashem

There are what looks like three sections to the opening of Shemini:

A) Moshe’s instructions to Aharon and Bnei Yisrael as to what korbanos they need (9:1-5).

B) Moshe’s declaration, “Zeh ha’davar asher tzivah Hashem ta’asu v’yeirah Aleichem kvod Hashem.” (9:6)

C) A new round of instructions, “Vayomer Moshe el Aharon…” as to how to bring the korbanos. (9:7-on)

The meforshim struggle with step B. What is the “zeh ha’davar” that Moshe is referring to? Is it getting the korbanos? That’s step A. Is it offering the korbanos? That’s step C. What does this pasuk add? Ramban, Ibn Ezra, Netziv all offer answers, but it’s the Ohr haChaim’s fantastic diyuk that I want to focus on. O.C. explains that the “zeh ha’davar” that Moshe is referring to connected to the phrase that ends the previous pasuk: “va’ya’amdu lifnei Hashem” -- not “lifnei Ohel Mo’ed” but “lifnei Hashem.” That’s what Moshe complimented the people on as being exactly what Hashem commanded.

Here’s what I think that means: sometimes you come into shul to daven and it’s very hard to orient yourself. Sometimes there are a lot of children running around and it seems that you are in a playground. Sometimes it may seem like you are in a social hall, a baseball game, a bazaar. Sometimes the shat”z may even make you feel like you are in an auction house. For one reason or another, it sometimes can be very hard to feel that the place you are gathering to worship in is actually a place where you are standing “lifnei Hashem.”

When the Mishkan was opened for business, “va’yikrivi kol ha’eidah va’ya’amdu lifnei Hashem.” The people got it -– it was not a playground, a bazaar, the trading floor of a bank or a newsroom. It was a place where they came to stand together “lifnei Hashem.” It’s such an obvious thing, yet it seems so hard to actually accomplish. 

why Aharon needed kapparah for the cheit ha'eigel

The eigel brought by Aharon on opening day of the Mishkan was a kaparah for cheit ha’eigel.  The gemara (Sanhedrin 7) writes that Chur tried to dissuade people from making the eigel and they killed   him.  Aharon figured that if he also gives tochacha, they will do the same to him.  We have a mesorah that if a kohen and navi are killed   together, then it’s all over for us.  Aharon feared that “lo havya le’hu takantah l’olam.”  Therefore, under the circumstances he figured it would be better to go along with the eigel.  Sounds like an excellent justification -- so why did he need a kaparah? 

R’ Shaul Yisraeli answers that it was not making the eigel that Aharon needed the kapparah for.  What he needed kaparah for was entertaining the thought of “lo havya le’hu takanah l’olam.”  No Jewish  leader should ever think that the people can reach rock bottom and strike out; no leader should ever think that Klal Yisrael’s situation can ever reach the point of hopelessness. 

getting the sevara right

או ירצה וישמע משה פירוש התורה מעידה שחילוק זה שמעו משה מפי הקב''ה, וייטב בעיניו הדבר אשר עשה אהרן.
ואם תאמר אם שמע כן מפי הקב''ה מה מקום להקפדתו? אולי לצד שלא אמרו עדיין לאהרן, חש שדן בו טעם אחר שאינו צודק ושרפו

 

The Ohr haChaim here has an amazing chiddush.  He writes that Moshe knew there was a chiluk between kodshei sha’ah and kodshei doros and that’s why one of the three korbanos was burnt and the others eaten (parenthetically, the Targum Yonasan writes that all three were burnt!)  Moshe had heard this chiluk directly from Hashem.  So why was Moshe upset at what Aharon had done?  O.C. answers that Moshe had yet to tell Aharon this chiddush din, and therefore, he had no idea why Aharon had distinguished between the korbanos.  Was it because Aharon had intuited the chiluk Moshe had learned, or was it because of some other sevara?

The sefer Nesivei Chaim points out that it seems from here that just fulfilling the mitzvah correctly was not sufficient -– Aharon had to get the “why,” the sevara, right as well.  

(It could be, as he suggests, that this was only true because Aharon had not been given these dinim as a mitzvah yet.  Once something is given as a mitzvah, just doing the correct actions even without the correct sevara is enough.)

 

2) The simple pshat in “vayitav b’einav” is that Moshe was satisfied with Aharon’s response and glad that no wrong had been committed, i.e. he breathed a sigh of relief.  The Seforno, however, says it means much more than that.  He explains that Moshe was happy to hear such great lomdus from his family; “vayitav b’einav” that his brother and nephews were such talmidei chachamim.  Divrei Torah are always m’samchei lev, but it’s especially m’samchei lev if it’s your brother, nephew, or especially son or daughter who is the one saying over that Torah. 

why Moshe could not serve as kohen gadol

Not a lot to say yet this week : (

1) The Ba’al haTurim at the opening of our parsha writes that because Moshe spent seven days by the burning bush arguing against accepting the mission of leading Klal Yisrael out of galus therefore he served as kohen gadol for only seven days.

The Midrash (also quoted in Rashi Shmos 4:10 and Ramban there explains similarly) writes that Moshe did not want to accept the job as go'el because he wanted his brother Aharon to have the kavod of being the leader. For this Moshe is punished?

The purpose of the Mishkan (at least according to some Rishonim) was to show that Hashem forgave the cheit ha’eigel. Aharon himself was directly involved in the cheit ha’eigel, and nonetheless, davka Aharon was chosen to be the kohen gadol and run the show. Moshe was denied the privilege perhaps not as a punishment, but simply because based on his reaction to Hashem’s charge at the burning bush, he disqualified himself. If Moshe couldn’t look beyond his perceived unworthiness and take the job then, how would he now be able to look beyond the past sin of cheit ha’eigel and accept the job of running the Mishkan?

The Ohr haChaim comments on “V’atah hakreiv eilecha es Aharon achicha” (why the extra “eilecha?”) that Moshe’s appointment of Aharon was itself a korban (“hakreiv”) of sorts to atone for his refusal to assume the mantle of leadership when Hashem offered it to him at the sneh.

2) Chazal ask why Klal Yisrael had to bring a sa’ir korban along with a par while Aharon did not.  The Toras Kohanim answers that Klal Yisrael was guilty of selling Yosef, for which they shechted a sa’ir and put the blood on the ksones pasim, and they were guilty of the cheit ha’eigel -- 2 sins, 2 korbanos.  Aharon, however, was guilty only of the cheit ha’eigel. Kli Yakar explains that even though Levi had also participated in the sale of Yosef, Aharon, the great oheiv shalom and rodef shalom, had already eradicated the animosity and jealously that was at the root of that sin.  Therefore, he was exempt from the need for kaparah for it.  

Why is the cheit of mechiras Yosef being brought up now?  Meshech Chochma explains that the brothers had a potential “out” for the sale of Yosef.  They could have argued that he should have given them tochacha directly rather than go to Ya’akov.  When Chur gave them tochacha directly to try to forestall the cheit ha’eigel and was killed as a result, it stripped the excuse for mechiras Yosef of whatever credibility it might have had.  

Why should the rejection of tochacha by Klal Yisrael at the cheit ha’eigel have any bearing on the culpability of their great… great grandparents for selling Yosef?  How does the rejection of tochacha by the eigel worshippers prove that the brothers would have also rejected direct tochacha from Yosef?   

I don’t think this is a question. We enjoy zechus Avos because we assume the traits of chessed, of mesirus nefesh, etc. that the Avos exhibited became part of our spiritual DNA. It is part of who we are, even if we don't always live up to our abilities.  If the assumption works in one direction, it has to work in the other direction as well. The rejection of tochacha in such a blatant and flagrant way, by killing Chur, didn’t come form nowhere – it must have become ingrained at some point in the past.  The seeds were planted already when the brothers rejected Yosef.

a few thoughts

1. Anyone who feels any connection to the world of YU/modern orthodoxy/religious Zionism in America or Israel must feel a profound sense of loss at the passing of R’ Aharon Lichtenstein. I have no doubt that if you were to ask anyone like myself too young to have seen the Rav for the name of a single individual who best personifies the blend of gadlus in Torah and intellectual greatness that a YU / Torah u'Mada /modern orthodox education should bring one to aspire to, if not achieve, that one name would be R’ Aharon Lichtenstein. An unbelievable loss.

2. Last week I mentioned the Ohr haChaim’s question of how Moshe could have missed the obvious distinction between kodshei sha’ah, which Aharon ate despite being in aninus, and kodshei doros, the korban of Rosh Chodesh, which Aharon reminded Moshe that he could not eat. The Ruzhiner offered a brilliant answer. The gemara (quoted by Rashi on chumash) tells us that the korban musaf of Rosh Chodesh is unique in that it is not a kapparah for us, but is a kapprah that Hashem asks us to bring on his behalf kavyachol for his diminishing the moon during ma’aseh braishis (see Maharal in Gur Aryeh and the Ishbitzer in Mei haShiloach for some perspective on what that means). We know that this difference between the sun and moon (again, whatever symbolic meaning that has) is temporary in nature. At the time of geulah the moon will be restored to its original size and glory. Moshe therefore saw the musaf of Rosh Chodesh as kodshei sha’ah as well. It was because Moshe had greater, not lesser vision that he missed the distinction that Aharon drew.

3. Rashi comments on “banav hanosarim” (10:12) that Elazar and Isamar deserved punishment as much as Nadav and Avihu did, but were spared. The pashtus I assume is that the derasha is based on the extra word “nosarim,” but that just begs the question of why Rashi wasn’t also bothered by the extra word “banav.” HaKsav v’haKabbalah as usual has an interesting linguistic insight. We have two words in the Torah for something leftover/remaining: 1) nishar, 2) nosar. What’s the difference? Nishar means the more important thing was left behind. “Vayisha’aru shenei anashim bamachaneh…” – Eldad and Meided were greater than their peers, as they alone remained prophesizing. “Vayisha’er ach Noach” – Noach alone remained after the flood and everyone else was destroyed. The word nosar means the less important thing was left. That’s exactly why we call the leftover portion of a korban that was not eaten and now must be disposed of “nosar.” Even though Elazar and Isamar were spared punishment, they were not “nisharim,” not more distinguished or more worthy, but were merely “nosarim.” 

4. The simple pshat in “vayishma Moshe vayeitiv b’einav,” (10:20) is that Aharon’s sevara or Aharon himself (see Ohr haChaim) found favor in Moshe’s eyes – the subject of “vayitav” is Aharon, the predicate of “b’einav” is Moshe. The Targum Yonasan learns the pshat a little differently. He adds that Moshe made a public service announcement and spread the word that he was in error and Aharon was correct. The Peirush Yonasan explains that the T.Y. learned that Moshe, not Aharon was the subject of “vayitav” – Moshe did something to make himself “tov,” to make amends to Aharon and regain favor in his eyes after previously criticizing him. I think there is a third way to read the pasuk. The Targum Yerushalmi adds a few extra words and says that Moshe received schar for his willingness to publicly admit error and acknowledge that Aharon was correct. Why the need to mention that Moshe got rewarded here?  I think the Targum Yerushalmi read “vayitav b’einav” as meaning that Moshe found favor in G-d’s eyes.

vigilante halacha

The Torah records the reaction of Klal Yisrael to the presence of the Shechina coming into the Mishkan: “Va’yar kol ha’am va’yaronu va’yiplu al p’neihem” (9:24) – the people sang praises to Hashem. “What song did they sing?” asks the Sefas Emes. Why is there no record of it? He answers that we already know the words to the song -- they sang shiras ha’yam, the same song we read on the last days of Pesach. This was a return to former glory. The downfall and tragedy of cheit ha’eigel which the Mishkan was intended as a kapprah for was now past history. The joy and spiritual ecstasy that marked yetzi’at Mitzrayim and the splitting of Yam Suf were now regained.

I would take the connection the Sefas Emes makes between shiras ha’yam and the Mishkan a step further. The Mishkan was G-d’s “home” so to speak, his permanent address. Bnei Yisrael took the inspiration of shirah, the response to a one-time miracle, and they incorporated it into the Mishkan, the permanent and day to day. This was a fulfillment of “zeh K-li v’anveiyhu,” the word “anveyhu,” as Onkelus explains, coming from the same root as “naveh,” a house. Bnei Yisrael at the time of shirah wanted to take their enthusiasm of the moment and give it a permanent home. Our parsha proves that they succeeded.

This is our post-Pesach job: to take the enthusiasm of shirah, the enthusiasm of the chag, and incorporate it now into our day to day. 

On to Parshas Shmini, with apologies to any readers in Eretz Yisrael who are a week ahead, or maybe I should say that we are a week behind?  What to do if you travel back to Eretz Yisrael after spending Pesach in chutz la'arertz -- how do you make up the lost parsha?  Do you need to?  Something to work on...


There is a question raised by the Ohr haChaim that I think captures a tension inherent in Shmini. The Ohr haChaim (end of d”h “hein hayom”) raises the following issue: is there an issur for a student to pasken a shayla for himself in the presence of his teacher? The halacha is that if Reuvain comes and asks Shimon a shayla, Shimon must pass on answering and defer to his rebbe.  There is an issur of being moreh halacha bifnei rabbo.   But here it’s not Reuvain asking Shimon – it’s Shimon figuring out viz a viz his own behavior what to do. Does that make a difference? The Ohr haChaim suggests that our parsha provides the answer. Aharon decided on his own, without consulting with Moshe, his rebbe, that he and his children should not to eat the korban chatas of rosh chodesh.

Whether the Ohr haChaim’s conclusion is correct or what the lomdus behind the question is (perhaps the issue depends on what the reason for the issur of being moreh halacha bifnei rabbo is. If it is a din in kavod harav, then whether one is paskening for oneself or others should make little difference; however, if it is because the talmid may not be able to communicate properly, as the simple reading of the sugya in Eiruvin 62 suggests, than perhaps when one is dealing only with one’s own private behavior and not communicating with others there would be no issur. See Aruch haShulchan Y.D. 242:8-12 for a discussion of the different reasons) is not my topic for now. What I want to focus on is the sharp contrast between the positive reaction to Aharon acting independently, “vayishma Moshe vayitav b’einav,” and the response of Hashem to Nadav and Avihu’s actions. At least according to one view in Chazal, Nadav and Avihu were guilty of no more than being moreh halacha b’fnei rabbo, of deciding what to do without consulting Moshe. What’s the difference between their deciding for themselves that they should offer ketores and Aharon’s deciding for himself that the korban chatas of rosh chodesh should be eaten?

Whatever the answer is (and there are a number of approaches possible), I think this is the key question that the parsha begs us to ask, the focal point around which the whole episode of Nadav and Avihu’s death and the follow up centers. In light of the Ohr haChaim I would say that the reason for the retelling of what happened to the chatas is not to teach us a din in hilchos kodshim, but to force is to draw a distinction (or distinctions) between independent action that has no place in Torah and independent action that should be valued and praised. (Just as, if one assumes that Nadav and Avihu are guilty of an issur hora’ah, the focus of the parsha of shtuyei ya’ayin may be the issur of hora’ah while drunk, not the issur avodah.) Not every “vigilante” halachic decision should be met with disapproval. Sometimes acting independently is necessary and warranted. The key is to figure out the when, where, and how.

Moshe may have been the rebbe and Aharon the talmid, but interestingly it was Aharon, not Moshe, who grasped that the chatas of rosh chodesh should not be eaten. The Ohr haChaim (in a different piece) wonders in fact how Moshe could have missed such an obvious distinction between koshei sha’ah and kodshei doros.  An important lesson: no rebbe, not even Moshe Rabeinu, has a monopoly on truth and is right at all times and places.  

The ambiguity of Aharon’s role – subservient to Moshe or someone who can act on his own authority – comes across in the next parsha. On the one hand, the plain reading of the text “vayidaber Hashem el Moshe v’el Aharon leimor…” (11:1) suggests an equivalence between Moshe and Aharon, yet Rashi tells us that the pasuk means that Hashem spoke to Moshe who in turn relayed the information to Aharon, a denial of any such equivalence. Of course Aharon was not Moshe’s equal, yet I think the plain reading deliberately obscures the distinction here and necessitates a “peirush Rashi” because the parsha wishes to underscore that there are times when in face a talmid can measure up to the greater personality of the rebbe and attain – momentarily, in a given context – equality and independence.