a relationship that can endure stress

1) R' Moshe Wolfson suggests that the reason we read parshas parah before ha'chodesh is because parshas hachodesh represents the hischadshus of the new month of Nissan which heralds the geulah. Every time there is a his'orerus for geulah, it arouses a corresponding push back of kitrug. Why are we worthy of geulah?  Who says we deserve it?  We want to get ahead of the curve in responding to the kitrug. Maybe it's true -- maybe it makes no rational sense to say that we are worthy of geulah. But so what? We observe mitzvos like parah adumah that make no sense. Whether something makes sense or not is not the be-all and end-all of everything. 

2) In response to the cheit ha'eigel Hashem told Moshe that in place of His presence, going forward there would now be a malach (33:2-3).

וְשָׁלַחְתִּ֥י לְפָנֶ֖יךָ מַלְאָ֑ךְ ... כִּ֤י עַם־קְשֵׁה־עֹ֙רֶף֙ אַ֔תָּה פֶּן־אֲכֶלְךָ֖ בַּדָּֽרֶךְ

Moshe refused to accept that state of affairs. וַיֹּ֖אמֶר אֵלָ֑יו אִם־אֵ֤ין פָּנֶ֙יךָ֙ הֹלְכִ֔ים אַֽל־תַּעֲלֵ֖נוּ מִזֶּֽה (33:14). Rashi explains: וַיֹּ֖אמֶר אֵלָ֑יו אִם־אֵ֤ין פָּנֶ֙יךָ֙ הֹלְכִ֔ים אַֽל־תַּעֲלֵ֖נוּ מִזֶּֽה

Hashem agreed: וַיֹּ֤אמֶר ה׳ אֶל־מֹשֶׁ֔ה גַּ֣ם אֶת־הַדָּבָ֥ר הַזֶּ֛ה אֲשֶׁ֥ר דִּבַּ֖רְתָּ אֶֽעֱשֶׂ֑ה

Yet in the next perek, Moshe repeats the same request all over again: וַיֹּ֡אמֶר אִם־נָא֩ מָצָ֨אתִי חֵ֤ן בְּעֵינֶ֙יךָ֙ אֲדֹנָ֔י יֵֽלֶךְ־נָ֥א אֲדֹ־נָ֖י בְּקִרְבֵּ֑נוּ כִּ֤י עַם־קְשֵׁה־עֹ֙רֶף֙ ה֔וּא וְסָלַחְתָּ֛ לַעֲוֺנֵ֥נוּ וּלְחַטָּאתֵ֖נוּ וּנְחַלְתָּֽנוּ (34:9)

Hashem had already agreed to Moshe's request. Why is Moshe rehashing the same thing all over again?

Everyone knows the vort that Yom K-Purim is like Purim. In fact, it would seem that Purim is the greater holiday, as katan nitleh b'gadol. But, as my BIL R' Yochanan explained on Purim, there is a difference between them. Y"K is like you are in the dark, and suddenly a light is turned on and you can see everything clearly. That's what we feel like by neilah. At that moment all the petty things in life feel like exactly that -- petty, insignificant things. We rise above it all and the only thing that really matters is out connection to Hashem. The problem is that the light doesn't stay on forever. Eventually -- whether already by motzei Y"K, or maybe if you absorb something more it happens after Sukkos, or maybe it lasts until Chanukah -- the light grows dim and we are back in the same dark world as before, immersed in gashniyus and inyanei ha'guf. Purim is a different kind of experience. On Purim we eat and drink and party and our guf is having a great time too. Purim is not about coming close to Hashem just when the light goes on and we see His presence clearly. Purim is about knowing Hashem is there even when it's dark, even when there is hester panim, even when we are immersed in the gashniyus of olam ha'zeh. Y"K is the day the satan has no power of kitrug; we rise above his realm and escape. Purim we take the battle to the yetzer on his own court. You, yetzer ha'ra, can have your say, can have your olam ha'zeh that you drag us into -- because we can find Hashem even there.

R' Naftali of Ropshitz in Zera Kodesh writes that we always read Ki Tisa the week after Purim and so there must be some connection between the parsha and Purim. Perhaps (this is not his answer, so ayen sham what he has to say) the explanation of why Moshe repeated his request is that connection. Moshe's original request was for Hashem not to be angry with Bn"Y. It's Yom Kippur, so wipe the slate clean, because if that slate is not wiped clean, if You continue to be angry, then we are in deep trouble. We are stuck with a malach, and that's not good enough. So Moshe pleaded for Hashem to change His mood, kavyachol, and put aside the gzar din.

Not only did Hashem respond positively to that request, but He went a step further and taught Moshe the 13 middos. Armed with this new tool in his arsenal, Moshe now revisited his earlier request.  Tzror haMor writes:

ועוד אני אומר כי זה דבר חדש. כי משה קודם שידע שלשה עשר מדות בקש שילכו פנים של זעם ויתנהג עמהם במדת רחמים. ואחר שלמד י״ג מדות שהם כולם רחמים ומעבירין כל מיני מדות הדין ויש בהם כפרת עונות. חזר לומר דבר אחר הפך מהראשון. והוא ילך נא אדני שהוא מדת הדין בקרבנו. כי איני ירא ממנו אעפ״י שהוא דין וזה העם עם קשה עורף. אחר שהוא בטוח בחסד ה׳ ובי״ג מדותיו של רחמים שהם יבטלו כל הגזרות וכל מיני מדות הדין. וזהו כי עם קשה עורף. אע״פ שהוא עם קשה עורף מהטעם כי אתה תסלח לעונם. ולכן תמצא שכתוב בכאן ילך נא אדני באל״ף דלי״ת שהוא לשון אדנות ומדת הדין.

Moshe is not repeating what he said earlier.  He is changing the terms of his earlier request. Not only do we want Hashem's presence with us when the slate is clean, when the light is on, when we are like malachim, like on Y"K, and we won't cause problems, but now Moshe asks for Hashem to be with us even if the slate is dirty, even if כִּ֤י עַם־קְשֵׁה־עֹ֙רֶף֙ ה֔וּא, because we know at the end of the day there are 13 midos ha'rachamim and He will stick with us anyway.   Even though we see hester panim, even though we see midas ha'din, at the end of the day we know He will bail us out anyway. That's what Purim is all about.

There are some relationships where the two parties somehow never have a disagreement, or they tiptoe around things to avoid one, because they know that if they do, it is liable to break the bond between them. Then there are relationships where the two parties sometimes do clash. That doesn't mean the bond between then is weaker.  Aderaba, it shows the relationship is strong enough to survive the disagreement.  Moshe originally asked Hashem to put aside his anger -- we can't have a disagreement, because if we do, then You are going to leave us in the hands of a malach.  Moshe then changed his request, and said to Hashem that even if we have our fights, it doesn't matter -- we will remain bonded together anyway.

when was the parsha of tumas ohel given?

The Torah tells us that Nadav and Avihu died "lifnei Hashem" (10:2).  Toras Kohanim quotes a machlokes where exactly that was.  One opinion is that they were standing in the mishkan offering ketores, but a malach pushed the out.  R' Akiva, however, argues and holds that they died inside the tent. 

פלוגתא איכא בתורת כהני׳ רא״א שמתו בחוץ במקום שהלוים מותרים ליכנס שנא׳ ויקרבו וישאום בכתנות׳ וא״כ מאי לפני ה׳ שנגפן המלאך והוציאן לחוץ רע״א לא מתו אלא בפנים שנא׳ לפני ה׳ ומאי ויקרבו וישאום בכתנות׳ מלמד שנתנו חכה של ברזל לתוך פיהם וגררום והוציאום לחוץ.

If so, asks the Daas Zekeinim, according to R' Akiva, shouldn't the entire mishkan and all the kelim inside it have become tamei tumas ohel?  Yet we don't find that the avodah stopped to allow time to be metaheir everything.

R' Chaim Kanievksi in Taama d'Kra suggests that perhaps the dinim of tumas ohel had not yet been given, and therefore, even though BN"Y may have known there was such a halacha, it was not in effect yet.

I must be missing something, because I cannot figure out what he means.  Rashi quotes from Chazal that the dinim of parah adumah were given in Mara, right after kri'as Yam Suf (Shmos 15:25).  If you don't understand that there is a concept of tumas meis, then you can't really understand what parah adumah is all about.  Did they know some of the halachos of tumas meis but not the din of tumas ohel?  M'heicha teisi to make such a distinction?

Even without the derash quoted by Rashi, we know the Leviim had to be metaheir before serving in the mishkan --  וְכֹֽה־תַעֲשֶׂ֤ה לָהֶם֙ לְטַֽהֲרָ֔ם הַזֵּ֥ה עֲלֵיהֶ֖ם מֵ֣י חַטָּ֑את (Bamidbar 8:7), and Rashi there explains הזה עליהם מי חטאת – של אפר פרה, מפני טמאי מתים שבהן.  Proof again that the halachos of tumas meis were known (see Netziv at the opening of Chukas).

Furthermore, the gemara darshens (M"K 28) למה נסמכה פרשת פרה למיתת מרים, לומר לך מה פרה אדומה מכפרת אף מיתתן של צדיקים מכפרת.  The implication of a "lamah nismicha" question/derash is that had the Torah followed chronological order, the text would appear elsewhere; its location is shifted  to make a point (see Mizrachi and Gur Aryeh to Bamidbar 13:2).  It sounds like these parshiyos of parah and tumah/tahara chronologically were given earlier, but the text is shifted to this location to create the juxtaposition with Miriam's death. 

So what does RCK mean when he writes that the parsha of tumas ohalim had not yet been given?

korban pesach and parah adumah

The Midrash plays up parallels between parah adumah and korban pesach.  Shmos Rabbah 19 calls attention to both being called a chukah: 

 דָּבָר אַחֵר, יְהִי לִבִּי תָמִים בְּחֻקֶּיךָ, זֶה חֻקַּת הַפֶּסַח וְחֻקַּת פָּרָה אֲדֻמָּה, לָמָּה, שֶׁשְּׁנֵיהֶן דּוֹמִין זֶה לָזֶה, בָּזֶה נֶאֱמַר: זֹאת חֻקַּת הַפָּסַח, וּבָזֶה נֶאֱמַר (במדבר יט, ב): זֹאת חֻקַּת הַתּוֹרָה, וְאִי אַתָּה יוֹדֵעַ אֵיזוֹ חֻקָּה גְּדוֹלָה מִזּוֹ. מָשָׁל לִשְׁתֵּי מַטְרוֹנוֹת דּוֹמוֹת שֶׁהָיוּ מְהַלְּכוֹת שְׁתֵּיהֶן כְּאַחַת נִרְאוֹת שָׁווֹת, מִי גְדוֹלָה מִזּוֹ אוֹתָהּ שֶׁחֲבֶרְתָּהּ מְלַוָּה אוֹתָהּ עַד בֵּיתָהּ וְהוֹלֶכֶת אַחֲרֶיהָ. כָּךְ בַּפֶּסַח נֶאֱמַר בּוֹ: חֻקָּה, וּבְפָרָה נֶאֱמַר בָּהּ: חֻקָּה, וּמִי גְדוֹלָה, הַפָּרָה, שֶׁאוֹכְלֵי פֶּסַח צְרִיכִין לָהּ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (במדבר יט, יז): וְלָקְחוּ לַטָּמֵא מֵעֲפַר שְׂרֵפַת הַחַטָּאת, הֱוֵי: כָּל בֶּן נֵכָר לֹא יֹאכַל בּוֹ.

Shmos Rabbah 17 notes the similarity between the sprinkling done with the azov bundle for korban pesach and the same done for parah adumah:

 בְּפָרָה אֲדֻמָּה צִוָּה לְהַשְׁלִיךְ בִּשְׂרֵפָתָהּ עֵץ אֶרֶז וְאֵזוֹב, וְהַזָּאַת מֵי נִדָּה צִוָּה לַעֲשׂוֹת בָּאֵזוֹב, וְטַהֲרַת הַמְצֹרָע צִוָּה לַעֲשׂוֹת בְּעֵץ אֶרֶז וְאֵזוֹב. וְכֵן בְּמִצְרַיִם צִוָּה לְהַגִּיעַ הַדָּם אֶל הַמַּשְׁקוֹף וְאֶל שְׁתֵּי הַמְּזוּזוֹת בָּאֵזוֹב, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: וּלְקַחְתֶּם אֲגֻדַּת אֵזוֹב

There seems to be a common thread running between these two mitzvos, an idea that Rav Bakshi Doron develops at length in an essay in his teshuvos.  

We have a din that ain kateigor naasah saneigor, e.g. the kohen gadol does not wear bigdei zahav when he does avodah lifnim on Y"K because gold is associated with cheit ha'eigel and we don't want that negative association hanging around our neck.  So why is it, asks the ShLa"H, that a sheep, the very animal that the Egyptians worshipped, is used for korban pesach?  Why use an animal that has a negative association with idolatry, which we ourselves were guilty of in Mitzrayim?  

Why in our parsha us Aharon told to offer an eigel when that is the very animal of the sin of cheit ha'eigel?  

The ShLaH answers that with respect to avodah on Y"K, the gold garments are incidental to the avodah taking place.  In that case, we don't want to introduce anything that has a cheit association into the mix.  However, with respect to korban pesach, the whole point of offering the korban is to undermine the avodah zarah.  The same with the eigel korban in our parsha, the whole point of the korban is to show that we no longer have a connection with cheit ha'eigel.  We davka want to bring up the association in order to negate it.

Rav Bakshi Doron suggests that this yesod of the ShLaH is behind the link between k"p and parah.  Parah adumah paradoxically is mtamei tehorim but mitaheir tmei'im.  So too, when we offer k"p, paradoxically the same animal that had been worshipped as avodah zarah becomes the vehicle by which we negate idolatry and come to avodas Hashem.  

The gemara likens sprinkling the blood of k"p on the doorposts to zerikas ha'dam of other korbanos, but based on the link to parah adumah, Rav Bakshi Doron suggests that just as parah is a m'taheir, so too the k"p served as a m'taheir for the homes where avodah zarah had previously been worshipped.

how many pesukim do you have to read for parshas parah?

I meant to note this when we read parshas Parah, but better late than never.  If you look in the halachos of 4 parshiyos it does not tell you exactly how much of Chukas needs to be read to be yotzei parshas Parah.  However, if you look back in siman 137 the S.A. quotes a KolBo that says if you just read until "v'la'ger ha'gar b'tocham l'chukas olam" (19:10) you are not yotzei -- you have to read the entire chapter.

Maaseh she'haya that where I was davening this year on parshas Parah the baal koreh read until sheni of parshas Chukas (19:17), until "mayim chaim el keli," and stopped there.  This is further than "v'lager ha'gar..", but is still 5 pesukim short of the end of the perek, until "titma ad ha'arev."  Are you yotzei?

I found that the Aruch haShulachan explicitly address this exact case:

כתב הכלבו: מעשה בחזן אחד שקרא בפרשת "פרה" ופסק "להגר הגר בתוכם", וגלל ספר תורה וישב במקומו. והקפיד רבי על הדבר ואמר: לא קריתם הפרשה. ודומה כאילו לא קרינו, שלא אמרנו אלא ברמז בעלמא. וחזרו ופתחו והתחילו בראש הפרשה, והקורא בירך לפניה ולאחריה מטעם רבי, וגמרו כל הפרשה עד "תטמא עד הערב". עד כאן לשונו, והובא בקצרה בשולחן ערוך סעיף ה. ונראה לי דדווקא משום שפסק ב"הגר הגר בתוכם", דעדיין עיקרי דיני טהרת הפרה לא נתבארו עדיין, דלהלן כתיב: "הנוגע במת הוא יתחטא…". אבל אם סיים "מים חיים אל כלי", אף שלא גמר כל הפרשה – אינו צריך לחזור ולקרות. דכן מבואר מלשונו, שכתב "שלא אמרנו אלא ברמז בעלמא", כלומר: שעיקרי דיני טהרת מי חטאת עדיין לא נתבארו (ועיין מגן אברהם סעיף קטן י"א).

the paradox of parah

Parshas parah is the antidote to tumas meis.  When you have no chiyus of your own, when you have no energy and no life left in you, you need parshas parah.  The Sefas Emes explains that the ashes are the ultimate nothingness. Water is also a symbol of humility -- Chazal tell us that Torah is like water in that it flows down to the lowest point, to the person who is truly humble.  The taharah of parah involved mixing ashes and water together -- a double-done of nothingness and humility.  If you are mevateil yourself to Hashem, says the Sefas Emes, then you don't need to worry about your own chiyus -- Hashem will give you the chiyus you need.  "V'es ruchi e'tein b'kirbichem," as we read in the haftarah.  Hashem says, "I will give you my ruach" so you don't need to worry anymore about your own lacking.

Shlomo haMelech said that the more he tried to understand parah, the further away from it's truth he got.  That doesn't mean that there is no reason for parshas parah.  The Midrash writes that Hashem revealed the reason to Moshe Rabeinu.  Rashi even gives a reason from R' Moshe haDarshan.  So why couldn't Shlomo understand it?

The Ishbitzer explains, as we learned last week, that drinking on Purim "ad d'lo yada" means that we appreciate the difference between Haman and Mordechai, between Esther and Vashti, not because of empirical data or rational chakira, i.e. "da'as," but rather it's something that we know in our hearts.    

Shlomo haMelech was telling us that the more he tries to translate the sugya of parah adumah into chochma and da'as, into logical terms and sevaros, the more elusive the parsha becomes.  Not because there is no reason, but because chochma is not the right vehicle to get to that reason.

Much as parah itself is paradoxical -- it is metaheir those who are tamei but is m'tamei those who are tahor -- the reason for the mitzvah if paradoxical as well.  The more one uses reason to try to arrive at it's secret, the less success one has of getting there.  And the more one accepts the limits of one's own mind, the more comprehensible the parsha becomes. 

parah and shabbos

 Why read parshas parah davka on Shabbos?  Why not during the week just before rosh chodesh Nisan?  (The same question is asked with respect to all of the 4 parshiyos, as they could all just as well have been done during the week.)

Both in last week's parsha and in this week's parsha we learn the halacha that building the mishkan is not doche Shabbos.  Rashi in last week's parsha explains that the word "ach" in "ach es shabsosai tishmoru" is a miyut that excludes work on the mishkan from being done on Shabbos.  Chazal explain that the juxtaposition of Shabbos and mishkan in this week's parsha teaches the same idea.  (Why you need two limudim is not my topic -- that's a question for homework : )

Sefas Emes on last week's parsha explains: cheit ha'eigel tainted all of creation.  The world post-cheit ha'eigel was a different world; it was like the world of Adam after the cheit, after gan eden was no more.  However, the cheit could not taint Shabbos -- Shabbos stands apart from the other six days of creation and is the nekudah pnimit that can never be sullied.  Building the mishkan was a tikun for the cheit ha'eigel.  On Shabbos, you don't need that tikun -- you don't need to do meleches hamishkan to effect your tikun because on Shabbos you are in a state that needs no tikun, that is unaffected by sin.  Therefore, meleches hamisihkan is prohibited on Shabbos.

The Midrash tells us that the secret of parah adumah was understood only by Moshe.  We can't relate to it.  Sefas Emes explains that Moshe alone was absent from the camp during cheit ha'eigel and had nothing to do with it.  Moshe was untainted by sin; therefore, only he stood on the level necessary to learn parshas parah.

On Shabbos we too return to that untainted level.  The crowns we lost due to cheit ha'eigel are returned to us on Shabbos -- we are as if we are in the pre-cheit stage.  Therefore, it is davka on Shabbos that we read parah, as davka on Shabbos we have the ability to understand a little more deeply, a little like Moshe, what the parsha is all about. 

Keats' "negative capability" and parshas parah

There is an interesting point R’ Baruch Rosenberg, R”Y of Slabodka, makes in his sichos (Divrei Baruch) that I want to take in a completely different direction than he does.  He puts together two Midrashim that he puts together:

1) The Midrash tells us that the reason behind parah adumah was revealed only to Moshe. Shlomo tried to understand its secret, but even he was stymied.

2) There is another Midrash that lists four things that the yetzer ha’ra uses as ammunition to challenge us. One of the four is the law of parah adumah. How can it be, asks the yetzer, that the ashes of the parah are metaheir, but those who come in contact with the parah becomes tamei? How do you explain the self-contradiction?

It seems from the second Midrash that if not for the yetzer ha’ra, parshas parah would not present a challenge. Yet the first Midrash tells us that the law of parah adumah is incomprehensible -– it begs an inescapable and unanswerable question.

R’ Rosenberg concludes that although on the level of sod parshas parah will always remain incomprehensible, it is Torah to be learned and therefore must have some meaning for us.  The yetzer ha’ra tells us it is void of sense altogether, but that is not true.

Had R’ Rosenberg read Keats or been married to someone who read Keats : ) I think he perhaps might have offered a different answer.

Keats wrote in one of his letters, “Several things dovetailed in my mind, & at once it struck me, what quality went to form a Man of Achievement especially in Literature & which Shakespeare possessed so enormously — I mean Negative Capability, that is, when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason - Coleridge, for instance, would let go by a fine isolated verisimilitude caught from the Penetralium of mystery, from being incapable of remaining content with half-knowledge. This pursued through volumes would perhaps take us no further than this, that with a great poet the sense of Beauty overcomes every other consideration, or rather obliterates all consideration.”

It’s Coleridge and the Enlightenment thinkers who are, for Keats, the yetzer ha’ra the Midrash speaks of. The obsession with arriving at philosophical answers, scientific answers, arriving at THE truth that resolves all doubts and questions, is something that Keats, a Romantic poet, rejected. Kears preferred savoring the beauty of the mystery itself, the beauty of multiple contradictory perspectives that the poet can slip in and out of.

It’s not the fact that we can understand the parsha of parah on at least some level that protects us from the challenges yetzer.  It's our acceptance of unfathomable mysteries and paradoxes which is the ultimate shield.     

from the ashes of parah to hischadshus

Why do we read parshas parah before parshas hachodesh?  Chronologically, the new month/year would have started before Bnei Yisrael would have had to become tahor for Pesach using the parah?

The order of the parshiyos does not reflect the chronological order in which events occurred, but rather it reflects the spiritual steps we need to climb.  The Sefas Emes quotes from the Ch haRI”M that hischadshus can only be built on the ashes of parah adumah.  As we discussed yesterday, the taharah of parah comes from someplace higher than a person’s da’as.  “Ain kol chadash tachas ha’shemesh.”  As long as a person remains imprisoned by the limits of his own assumptions, ideas, and intelligence, he/she will discover nothing new.  Throw out the hubris of da’as, throw out the assumption that chok doesn’t exist, that there is an answer that can be discovered for everything, reach beyond “tachas hashemesh” and then you can have real hischadshus.

It sounds so neat and clean, but in reality, at least the way I read it, the Ch haRI”M is describing a messy, painful process.  Sometimes people’s whole world collapses.  They can be faced with terrible pain and tragedy and struggle understand, “Why is this happening to me?”  In truth, the only answer we can often offer is that it’s a chok that no amount of explaining can unravel.  The Ch haRI”M is reassuring us that the ashes of tragedy that rip apart what is are the first steps to creating what will be.

When I saw this Ch haRI”M I also could not help but think about modern Jewish history, about the journey from the ashes of the crematoriums to the hischadshus of shivas Tzion.  I don’t mean to suggest that one event precipitated the other or was necessary for the other to occur; I’m just observing the parallel between history and our parshiyos.

the mystery of parah adumah

Why is the parsha of parah adumah considered such a mysterious chok when the Rishonim give reasons for it: it is the mother cow that comes to clean up the mess of the cheit ha’eigel?  Chasam Sofer explains that parhas parah was one of the parshiyos given to Bnei Yisrael at Marah, right after yetziyas Mitzrayim, before the cheit ha’eigel occurred.  How can G-d give a means of kaparah for a sin yet to occur without predetermining that such a sin will occur?  This, writes the Chasam Sofer, was Aharon’s complaint to Moshe in response to the eigel: “Atah yadata es ha’am ki b’ra hu” – You knew this was going to happen, because there already was a parshas parah.  The mystery of parah adumah is the great mystery of how yediya and bechira coincide.

It was the sin of Adam of eating from the eitz hada'as which brought death into the world.  Therefore, explains the Sefas Emes, for the parah adumah to serve as a metaheir for that tumah of death it must remain an unfathomable mystery, something that our da'as cannot comprehend.  The correction for the pollution of the eitz hada'as must come from a higher source than da'as itself.

Oneg Y"T on how bitul b'rov works

Rambam (K.P. 3:9) writes (based on Pesachim 88) that if a group of korbanos pesachim got mixed up together and it was later discovered when looking at the hides that one of the animals was a ba’al mum, none of the korbanos may be eaten. 

Achronim ask (see the Steipler for a nice piece): Why we don’t say that the one korban that is pasul is bateil and all the animals can be eaten?

(Even if you hold that a whole animal is a chaticha ha'reuya l'hiskabeid, that's only a din derabbanan.  Here, you risk bringing chulin l'azarah on pesach sheni if bitul doesn't work and you discover the problem before zerikas ha'dam.)

The Oneg Y”T has a chiddush that tzitzis which were not spun lishma (or matzah not baked lishma) cannot become bateil if it is mixed in with other kosher threads (or good matzah).  Bitul can only nullify a property of an object, e.g. a piece of meat that is assur loses that status if it falls into a mixture.  Bitul cannot assign a new property to an object.  The tzitzis thread (or matzah) that was not made lishma cannot attain that quality of being lishma just because it fell into a mixture.

The Mishna in Parah (9:7) tells us that if some fireplace ashes got mixed in with the ashes of parah adumah, even though the fireplace ashes are bateil to the parah adumah ashes, the mixture cannot be used to be metaheir someone.  Why not?  Once the ashes are bateil, shouldn’t the whole mixture be treated as parah adumah ashes, just like we treat a pot of cholent that a piece of treif meat fell into the same as a pot filled with kosher meat?  The Oneg Y”T answers that this Mishna proves his yesod: meat can loses it’s status of issur through bitul, but fireplace ashes cannot attain the status of ashes of being parah adumah through bitul.

If you are the Oneg Y”T, the answer to the korban pesach question is simple: a pasul korban cannot be made into kosher hekdesh by virtue of bitul.

I wanted to share R’ Wahrman z”l's twist to this story.  He suggests (Oros haPesach siman 74) that even if you reject this Oneg Y”T, there is a still a difference between bitul by korban pesach and other cases.  Bitul changes halachic reality, but it cannot change physical reality.  A thread of tzitzis not spun lishma is physically the same as any other thread; a matzah not baked lishma is still the same physical matzah as any other matzah.  Perhaps bitul can rectify these defects, but cannot rectify a korban found to be a ba’al mum.  At the end of the day, the physical reality of the blemish is still present, and it is that physical reality which prevents the korban from being accepted.

parah - undoing the cheit of eitz hada'as

Ashes of the parah adumah are used to make someone who has come in contact with a dead body tahor.  Yet, these same ashes cause someone tahor who handles them to become tamei.  Even Shlomo haMelech could not understand the paradoxical nature of this mitzvah.  It is "chukas haTorah," a mystery.

Sefas Emes explains that death came into the world as a punishment for Adam's sin of eating of the eitz ha'adas, the tree of knowledge. The way to undo the taint of death that resulted from succumbing to the temptation for knowledge is to obey G-d even when his commands seem to defy reason and understanding.  The most unfathomable chok is therefore the greatest metaheir.

I would put the idea this way: When a person relies on the eitz ha'da'as alone, on reason to the exclusion of all else, something within that person dies.  Life can't be boiled down to equations alone, and to do so kills something of the human spirit.  If one is willing to surrender and accept that there is more out there than our little mind's can fathom, that taint vanishes -- a person can live larger than the confines of his/her physical self and is not chained to the decomposing piece of flesh we all eventually become.

mitzvah bo yoseir mi'bshlucho

Last post I raised the possibility of a new chumra of having to lein zachor yourself because mitzvah bo yoseir mi'bshlucho. I want to throw a lomdish twist out there as a way to avoid this conclusion even granting my assumptions. Step 1: Seems that mitzvah bo yoseir mi'bshlucho applies only where a mitzvah is a chovas hagavra. If the mitzvah is simply for some effect to be produced (chovas hacheftza), what difference does it make who does the mitzvah? Step 2: Maybe the chiyuv of zachor is not a chovas hagavra to read the parsha, but a chovas hacheftza on the parsha to be read. (So why can't a katan lein? Because a katan's keri'ah is not a ma'aseh mitzvah.) If I'm not on thin enough ice already, let me take it to step 3: the reason the first Mishna in Megillah uses the term "megilah nikreis" instead of the more direct "korin es hamegilah" (as is asked by the Ritva, Turei Even, others) is because kri'as hamegilah is a kiyum in zechiras amalek and is therefore also a chovas hacheftza ro be read, not a chiyuv on the gavra of "korin..."

But enough already, because we are up to Parshas Parah. "Zos chukas haTorah asher tzivah Hashem leimor. Dabeir el Bnei Yisrael..." Why the double language of "leimor" followed again by "dabeir?" Chasam Sofer writes that this is a hint that the dibur itself, the very reading of the parsha, is what Hashem commanded Moshe to tell the people to do. From here we have an allusion to the fact that (according to some views) the kri'ah is a din d'oraysa.

more on parshas parah, Rabbi Eliezer, and Moshe Rabeinu

I discussed in a previous post the Midrash that Moshe desired a son named Eliezer when he heard R’ Eliezer, the tanna, cited in Mishnayos Parah, and Josh weighed in on the same at parshablog. I happened across a R’ Tzadok that touches on the issue, but he does not elaborate in detail. From what I am able to gather, R’ Tzadok draws a dichotomy between the development of torah she-ba’al peh through human reasoning, which demands that we draw our own conclusions, and the giving of torah she-b’ksav which comes with pre-packages “right” answers. In the famous story of tanur shel achna’i (B.M. 59), the Chachamim argue with Rabbi Eliezer based on their interpretation of torah sheba’al peh, and declare “lo bashamayim hi”, that the process of interpretation guided by human intelligence, is supreme. Rabbi Eliezer, however, called on miraculous signs from Heaven to try to prove that his position was correct – he looked toward pre-packaged “right” answers, duplicating the torah sheb’ksav process. This story exposes the affinity between the “soul” of Rabbi Eliezer, and that of Moshe, the primary giver of torah sheb’ksav. Parah Adumah is the paradigm of the “chok”, a law which is unfathomable, which seems to prove that as great as man’s intellect is, there is a limit beyond which torah sheb’al peh cannot take us and we must rely on Heavenly revelation alone. Moshe Rabeinu saw all of Torah through the lens of the torah sheb’ksav process. When Moshe Rabeinu heard the shiur of Rabbi Akiva he was discomforted until hearing that all is really based on “halacha l’Moshe m’Sinai”. When Moshe Rabeinu heard the laws of Parah Adumah, especially as expressed by Rabbi Eliezer, who also typified that same torah sheb’kav approach, he wanted to preserve this paradigm of limud for future generations, and therefore called his son Rabbi Eliezer as well.

parshas parah and Eliezer, son of Moshe Rabeinu

I have never succeeded in understanding this Midrash on Parshas Parah - maybe someone out there has an idea. The Midrash teaches that Moshe Rabeinu began learning the halachos of parah adumah with Hashem. Hashem kavyachol recited the Mishnayos b’shem omro, beginning with the first Mishna in Parah, “R’ Eliezer omeir…” that a parah refers to a cow that is 2 years old. When he heard that Mishna, Moshe was so impressed by R’ Eliezer’s statement that he said he hoped to have a son just like him. This, according to the Midrash, is why Moshe Rabeinu’s son is named Eliezer.

Maybe it bothers me because my son is also named Eliezer, but whatever the reason, I am baffled. There is a piece in the Piecezna’s sefer Aish Kodesh that explains how Moshe Rabeinu wanted to pass to his children davka the message of Parah Adumah, but this strikes me as missing the main point. The Midrash seems to be highlighting some aspect specifically of the words of Rabbi Eliezer which captivated Moshe Rabeinu. Why was Moshe captivated by Rabbi Eliezer and this halacha in particular more than any other Mishna or meimra in shas???