kedushas makom mikdash b'zman ha'zeh

The Minchas Chinuch on the first mitzvah of last week's parsha (184:5)  tries to make a l'shitaso in the Rambam/Raavad. The Rambam distinguishes between kedushas ha'aretz and kedushas Yerushalayim, and holds that while with respect to the former there is a machlokes whether קידשׁה לשׁעתא or קידשׁה לעתיד לבא, the latter was sanctified for all eternity (Hil Beis haBechira 6:14):

כל מקום שלא נעשה בכל אלו וכסדר הזה אין קדוש גמור וזה שעשה עזרא שתי תודות זכרון הוא שעשה לא במעשיו נתקדש המקום שלא היה שם לא מלך ולא אורים ותומים. ובמה נתקדשה בקדושה ראשונה שקדשה שלמה שהוא קידש העזרה וירושלים לשעתן וקידשן לעתיד לבא:

The Raavad's view is 180 degrees the opposite based on gemaras as well as based on סוד הּ ליראיו as revealed to him:

א"א סברת עצמו היא זו ולא ידעתי מאין לו ובכמה מקומות במשנה אם אין מקדש ירקב ובגמּ אמרו דנפול מחיצות אלמא למ"ד קדושה ראשונה לא קדשה לעתיד לבא לא חלק בין מקדש לירושלים לשאר א"י ולא עוד אלא שאני אומר שאפילו לרבי יוסי דאמר קדושה שנייה קדשה לעתיד לבא לא אמר אלא לשאר א"י אבל לירושלים ולמקדש לא אמר לפי שהיה יודע עזרא שהמקדש וירושלים עתידים להשתנות ולהתקדש קידוש אחר עולמי בכבוד ה׳ לעולם כך נגלה לי מסוד הּ ליראיו לפיכך הנכנס עתה שם אין בו כרת:

According to Raavad, even according to the view that קידשׁה לעתיד לבא with respect to the kedusha of Eretz Yisrael, the kedusha of Yerushalayim and the makom mikdash is not eternal.

Nafka minah: according to the Rambam, a person who is tamei is prohibited from entering the makom mikdash.  According to Raavad, we would expect there to be no issur.  Raavad rather cryptically writes  אין בו כרת, which leaves open the possibility of there being no onesh, but still assur for some other reason.

Minchas Chinuch suggests that there should be other nafka minot as well.  In last week's parsha we had a din of באת יבא אהרון אל הקודשׁ, that kohanim can enter the mikdash only to do avodah, but not without any purpose.  Does this issur apply b'zman ha'zeh?  M.C. suggests that it depends on this machlokes Rambam and Raavad whether there is kedushas mikdash or not post churban or not.

He repeats the same idea this week at the end of the mitzvah of mora mikdash  (mitzvah 254). Here too, whether or not the issur applies b'zman ha'zeh would seem to depend on this machlokes Rambam and Raavad whether or not there is kedushas mikdash after the churban or not.  Rambam who holds there is kedusha l'shitaso in Beis haBechira 7:7 holds that there is an issur d'oraysa of morah mikdash even b'zman ha'zeh:

אע"פ שהמקדש היום חרב בעונותינו חייב אדם במוראו כמו שהיה נוהג בו בבניינו. לא יכנס אלא למקום שמותר להכנס לשם ולא ישב בעזרה ולא יקל ראשו כנגד שער המזרח שנאמר את שבתותי תשמורו ומקדשי תיראו. מה שמירת שבת לעולם אף מורא מקדש לעולם שאע"פ שחרב בקדושתו עומד:

Presumably the Raavad would disagree.

One "little" problem: if the M.C. is correct, where is the hasagah of the Raavad there stating his disagreement?  Where is the Raavad to tell us that the issur of mora mikdash no longer applies?

R' Soloveitchik explained (see footnote to Reshimos Shiurim Yevamos p 134) that even according to Raavad there can be an issur of mora mikdash even though there is no kedushas mikdash.  The halacha is that there is an issur of offering korbanos on a bamah in your backyard b'zmah ha'zeh.  This shows that irrespective of whether there is kedushas mikdash or not, the makom mikdash remains for all eternity the place chosen by Hashem to the exclusion of any other area.  The din of mora similarly is not dependent upon the place having kedusha, but rather of the place of the mikdash being chosen by Hashem to be special and unique.  

R' Betzalel Zolti  in Mishnas Yaavetz O.C. 47:5 (see this post as well) draws a similar distinction between kedushas mikdash and what he calls kedushas machneh, and in this way explains why even though Raavad holds there is no kareis for entering the makom mikdash, there is still an issur.  With respect to kareis, the Torah refers to defiling the "mikdash Hashem," (Bamidbar 19:20)  וְנִכְרְתָה הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַהִוא מִתּוֹךְ הַקָּהָל כִּי אֶת⁠ מִקְדַּשׁ ה׳ טִמֵּא, meaning the onesh depends on keduash mikdash.  However, with respect to entering whole tamei, the Torah speaks only about the "machaneh" which is holy,  (Bamidbar 5:3)  וְלֹא יְטַמְּאוּ אֶת⁠ מַחֲנֵיהֶם אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי שֹׁכֵן בְּתוֹכָם.  The makom mikdash may, according to Raavad, lack kedushas mikdash, but it still remains the machaneh Shechina.  

what haftarah did you read this week?

Rama paskens in the end of siman 428:

כשקורין שתי פרשיות מפטירין באחרונה (מרדכי פרק בני העיר) ובלבד באחרי מות וקדושים דמפטירין הלא כבני כושיים שהיא הפטרת א"מ

Mishne Berura comments:

פני שההפטרה של פרשה שניה מזכרת מתועבת ירושלים משא"כ כשהן נפרדות שכבר קראו הלוא כבני כושיים בפרשת אחרי בהכרח להפטיר בפרשת קדושים התשפוט. והנה הלבוש חולק על רמ"א ודעתו דגם כשהיא כפולה קוראין הפטרה אחרונה דהיינו של פרשת קדושים אבל הב"ח וש"א כתבו שנתפשט המנהג בכל הקהלות כהרמ"א

I happened to daven in a different minyan than my usual one on shabbos morning and was surprised when the person reading the haftarah read the perek from Yechezkel and not the haftarah of כבני כושיים.  Not only does the Rama say otherwise, but even the posek acharon of shuls in our time, i.e. the Artscroll, says that minhag Ashkenaz is like the Rama.  No one else said anything, and I figured I was not a regular there, so what do I know (the Rabbi of this shul davens at the later minyan, so he was not present). As the baal koreh was finishing, finally someone knowledgeable did walk up to the bimah and asked the gabai what's going on.  Someone else then yelled out that the reader was correct, as that is what the luach says.  Curious, I went over and asked to see the luach.  It's published by Heichal Shlomo and it's available online, so you can see for yourself here on p 64  that this person is indeed correct.  

So do the Rama and Mishne Berura and even the Artscroll have it all wrong?

Here is my conjecture.  R' Y.M. Tukachinsky, author of Gesher haChaim and other works, also wrote a luach of minhagei Eretz Yisrael.  This issue came up, and he was mechadesh that the minhag in Eretz Yisrael is not like the Rama.  This elicited a backlash from the Chazon Ish and others, who disagreed.  The occurrence of Acharei Mos and Kedoshim as separate parshiyos where the potential for this question to arise is fairly infrequent, so it's not you can just ask someone what was done last year.  As luck would have it, you can read about the controversy in this month's edition of HaMaayan, and so you don't need me to spell out the details of the back and forth.  In terms of our story, my hunch is that the luach printed by Heichal Shlomo is built around Rav Tukachinsky's luach of minhagei Eretz Yisrael, and therefore, assumes not like the Rama. (I wish I could find contact info to confirm this.) That's fine and dandy if you live in Eretz Yisrael and think R' Tukachinsky got it right, but it seems to me to be a very questionable stretch to assume this is the minhag Ashkenaz in the US and elsewhere.  

Afterwards, the person who read the haftarah came over to the person who tried to correct him and admitted that in retrospect he thinks he made a mistake, as he found a parsha sheet that said the haftarah should be כבני כושיים. (I learned from this that a random parsha sheet trumps even the heilege Artscroll.)  Assuming like the lishna basra that this was an error, I wonder what this minyan should do next week.  Should they read the haftarah of התשפוט like everyone else reads for Kedoshim?  Or since they already read that haftarah of התשפוט for Achrei Mos, albeit in error, should they read  כבני כושיים for Kedoshim? I hope someone there asks their Rav what to do before next shabbos rolls around.  I also hope I get myself out of bed up on time to get to my normal place of worship so I avoid situations like this : ) 

It's worth mentioning that there is yet a third minhag, minhag Yerushalayim, to read the same haftarah of כבני כושיים for both Acharei Mos and Kedoshim (see here).  The essential background to all this is the last line of the last Mishna in Megillah, which says  רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר, אֵין מַפְטִירִין בְּהוֹדַע אֶת יְרוּשָׁלַיִם.  Bartenua comments: משום יקרא דירושלים.  We don't want to read a haftarah that speaks badly of Yerushalayim.  He adds that we don't pasken like R' Eliezer.  Tos Y"T asks: the stam Mishna earlier writes that we do read the maaseh ha'eigel even though the sin is an embarrassment because there is a silver lining to that embarrassment -- suffering the embarrassment enables us to get kaparah.  Why does R' Eliezer agree with the sevara there, but not with respect to reading about the sins of Yerushalayim?  Why not read about the wrongdoing of Yerushalayim to suffer embarrassment and get kaparah?  Furthermore, adds the Tos Y"T, if R' Eliezer is correct, he should have a problem with the haftarah of Kedoshim as well:   וכן הפטרה דקדושים התשפוט התשפוט את עיר הדמים (יחזקאל כ"ב) וכו' He goes on to try to answer this question, but is his answer, which you can look up, really satisfying?  This story speaks for itself:

קרה מקרה בבית הכנסת אשר בבתי ברודא כאשר התחיל הקורא לקרוא בפרשת קדושים את הפטרת הלא כבני כושיים, קרא לעומתו רב גדול אחד מהעולים החדשים אז, – קוראים התשפוט! ירד בעל הקריאה מעל הבימה ואמר: אני אינני מוכן לעמוד בהקפדתו של ר' אליעזר, אם כת"ר רוצה דוקא בהפטרת התשפוט, יעלה כת"ר ויקרא! ולבסוף הכריעו המתפללים והקורא קרא את הפטרת הלא כבני כושיים".

Besmirching  יקרא דירושלים is not something to take lightly.

Final point: a takeaway from the above story to keep in mind not just for this week, but for every week, is that the words of the navi are to be taken seriously and taken to heart.  The haftarah is not just a time to shmooz with a neighbor or go out of shul for a stroll or for some liquid fortification while the person called for maftir struggles to read words that are incomprehensible to him and most of the listeners.  The haftarah is the navi speaking to us from the page, across history.  When you read about to'eivos, you should look at what goes on around you and your eyes should fill with tears.  And when you read about the redemption of Yerushalayim, you should also look around you and fill your heart with joy.

the greater the potential gain, the greater the obstacles to get there

A)  דַּבֵּר אֶל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאָמַרְתָּ אֲלֵהֶם אֲנִי ה׳ אֱלֹקיכֶם

 כְּמַעֲשֵׂה אֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם אֲשֶׁר יְשַׁבְתֶּם בָּהּ לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ וּכְמַעֲשֵׂה אֶרֶץ כְּנַעַן אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי מֵבִיא אֶתְכֶם שָׁמָּה לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ וּבְחֻקֹּתֵיהֶם לֹא תֵלֵכוּ

 Rashi comments:

 ר׳ אומר: גלוי וידוע לפניו שסופן לנתק בעריות בימי עזרא, לפיכך בא עליהם בגזירה: אני ה׳ אֱלֹקיכֶם – דעו מי גוזר עליכם, דיין ליפרע ונאמן לשלם שכר.

It sounds like Rashi means that this is a prelude to the parsha of arayos which follows, and Hashem is warning in advance that Bnei Yisrael would succumb to these issurim.  The only problem is that the sin committed in the days of Ezra to which Rashi is referring is the sin of taking a non-Jewish wife.  Look through the parsha of arayos and you will not see this sin mentioned anywhere there!  R' Shteinman raises the question but offers no answer.

Chasam Sofer explains derech derush (d"h dabeir) that Rashi's comment is not a prelude to the parsha of arayos, but rather a prelude to the sin of כְּמַעֲשֵׂה אֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם אֲשֶׁר יְשַׁבְתֶּם בָּהּ לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ וּכְמַעֲשֵׂה אֶרֶץ כְּנַעַן אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי מֵבִיא אֶתְכֶם שָׁמָּה לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ, which is not just about who you can or can't marry.  We find in Nac"h the term for relationship between man and woman, בּעילה, is used as a metaphor for our relations to other nations and to Hashem. Yeshayahu (26:13) describes our becoming subservient to the nations as בְּעָל֥וּנוּ אֲדֹנִ֖ים זֽוּלָתֶ֑ךָ.  Similarly, the geulah is described (63:5) as a bride coming to her groom כִּי יִבְעַל בָּחוּר בְּתוּלָה יִבְעָלוּךְ בָּנָיִךְ וּמְשׂוֹשׂ חָתָן עַל כַּלָּה יָשִׂישׂ עָלַיִךְ אֱלֹקיִךְ.  When the Torah tells us כְּמַעֲשֵׂה אֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם ***אֲשֶׁר יְשַׁבְתֶּם בָּהּ*** לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ what it means that we should not become subjegated to Mitzrayim and fall into the orbit of Mitzrayim.  The same warning applies when entering Canaan.  Our job there is to setup our own independent society, not become subjects of others or subservient to their whims.  A wife cannot have two husbands; this is arayos.  Klal Yisrael cannot be both subjects of Hashem and subjects of other nations; this is metaphorically arayos.  This was the sin of Erza's days. The marrying of non-Jewish wives was a siman that the people thought of themselves as part of the non-Jewish society at large. 

B) The Toras Cohanim writes on these pesukim: 

מְנַיִן שֶׁלֹּא הָיְתָה אֻמָּה בָּאֻמּוֹת שֶׁהִתְעִיבוּ מַעֲשֵׂיהֶן יָתֵר מִן הַכְּנַעֲנִים?

תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר ״וּכְמַעֲשֵׂה אֶרֶץ כְּנַעַן... לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ״.

מְנַיִן לַדּוֹר הָאַחֲרוֹן שֶׁהִתְעִיבוּ מַעֲשֵׂיהֶן יָתֵר מִכֻּלָּם? תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר ״וּכְמַעֲשֵׂה אֶרֶץ כְּנַעַן... לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ״.

מְנַיִן לַמָּקוֹם שֶׁבָּאוּ בוֹ יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכִבֵּשׁוּ, שֶׁהִתְעִיבוּ מַעֲשֵׂיהֶן יָתֵר מִכֻּלָּם?

תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר ״אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי מֵבִיא אֶתְכֶם שָׁמָּה לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ״.

מְנַיִן שֶׁבִּיאָתָן שֶׁלְּיִשְׂרָאֵל גָּרְמָה לְכָל הַמַּעֲשִׂים הַלָּלוּ?

תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר ״אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי מֵבִיא אֶתְכֶם שָׁמָּה לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ״.

What does that last line -- בִּיאָתָן שֶׁלְּיִשְׂרָאֵל גָּרְמָה לְכָל הַמַּעֲשִׂים הַלָּלוּ -- mean?  How could Bn"Y coming into Eretz Canaan be the cause of the base behavior of the inhabitants?  

Malbim says you have to flip the phrase around and read it as the behavior of the inhabitants of Canaan rubbing off on Bn"Y and the acting as the cause of their going astray:

שמצד שישבו שם יהיה גרמה לישראל שיעשו התועבות האלה כי למדום מן המצריים, וכן מצד שיבואו לכנען יהיה זה גרם לישראל לעשות כן כמ״ש ״כי אתם ידעתם את אשר ישבנו בארץ מצרים ואת אשר עברנו בקרב הגוים...ותראו את שקוציהם...פן יש בכם איש או אשה וכולי״. וז״ש ומנין למקום... ומנין שישיבתם של ישראל גרמה להם (פירוש: שהוא יהיה גרם לישראל בעתיד 

Sefas Emes (5648) reads the phrase to mean just what it says.  In order to understand his approach, two points of introduction are needed:

1) The Midrash (Braishis 34) writes:

ר' שמעון בן לקיש היה יושב ויגע בתורה באלסיס זו של טבריה. יצאו שתי נשים משם. אמרה אחת לחברתה: ברוך שהוציאנו מן האוויר הרע הזה. צווח ואמר להן: מהיכן אתן? אמרו לו: ממזגא; אמר: אני מכיר את מזגא ואין בה אלא שתי דירות. אמר: ברוך שנתן חן מקום על יושביו. תלמיד אחד משל ר' יוסי היה יושב לפניו, היה (ר' יוסי) מסביר לו ולא סבר. אמר לו: למה אין אתה סובר? אמר לו: מפני שאני גולה ממקומי. אמר לו: מהיכן אתה? אמר לו: מגובת שמאי. אמר לו: ומה הן האוירות של שם? אמר לו: כשתינוק נולד, אנו גובלים לו אדמדמנים7 וטשים את מוחו, שלא יאכלוהו היתושים. אמר: ברוך שנתן חן מקום בעיני יושביו.

People can live in the most ugly places, but to them it is home, and they can't function outside their "natural habitat."  חן מקום על יושביו.  You can put a polar bear in Hawaii, and no matter how delightful it is sitting under a tree on the beach, it won't be happy because it's home is the Arctic.  There were many stories written about Gus, the famous polar bear of the Central Park Zoo, suffering depression.  I don't blame him; anyone stuck living in NY would and should be depressed.  Yet there are NYers who would not trade their home in the Big Apple for anything in the world.  

Sefas Emes explains that it's not just a matter of becoming acclimated to a place.  A polar bear born in Hawaii would still feel out of place.  What makes a person feel at home in the innate connection his/her soul has with that place.  

We all belong somewhere.  Where all have a place that we feel is home.  What that place is is determined by our neshoma.  

What is true of individuals is true of nations. The soul of Frenchmen causes them to feel at home in France.  The soul of Italians makes them long for Italy.  The soul of a Jew tells him that only Eretz Yisrael is home.

2) Sukkah 52a:

כִּדְדָרֵשׁ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: לֶעָתִיד לָבֹא, מְבִיאוֹ הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא לְיֵצֶר הָרָע, וְשׁוֹחֲטוֹ בִּפְנֵי הַצַּדִּיקִים וּבִפְנֵי הָרְשָׁעִים. צַדִּיקִים נִדְמֶה לָהֶם כְּהַר גָּבוֹהַּ, וּרְשָׁעִים נִדְמֶה לָהֶם כְּחוּט הַשַּׂעֲרָה. הַלָּלוּ בּוֹכִין וְהַלָּלוּ בּוֹכִין. צַדִּיקִים בּוֹכִין וְאוֹמְרִים: הֵיאַךְ יָכוֹלְנוּ לִכְבּוֹשׁ הַר גָּבוֹהַּ כָּזֶה! וּרְשָׁעִים בּוֹכִין וְאוֹמְרִים: הֵיאַךְ לֹא יָכוֹלְנוּ לִכְבּוֹשׁ אֶת חוּט הַשַּׂעֲרָה הַזֶּה! וְאַף הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא תָּמֵהַּ עִמָּהֶם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כֹּה אָמַר ה׳ צְבָאוֹת כִּי יִפָּלֵא בְּעֵינֵי שְׁאֵרִית הָעָם הַזֶּה בַּיָּמִים הָהֵם גַּם בְּעֵינַי יִפָּלֵא״.

The yetzer ha'ra doesn't waste effort.  If a person has his sights set only on little things, then there is no point in the yetzer putting up much of a fight.  However, when there are big things at stake, he pulls out all the stops.  

Sefas Emes puts the two ideas together.  

It's because Eretz Yisrael is destined specifically for Am Yisrael -- it is a place of greatness destined for great people -- that the yetzer ha'ra pulls out all the stops there and unleashes defilement, temptation, confusion, and all sorts of difficulties there.  Yes, בִּיאָתָן שֶׁלְּיִשְׂרָאֵל גָּרְמָה לְכָל הַמַּעֲשִׂים הַלָּלוּ.  

The war in Eretz Yisrael, the challenges that exist there, the secular and even anti-religious environment in certain places, this is the yetzer ha'ra pulling out all the stops.  This greater the ohr, the greater the hester trying to get us to turn away. 

תְּבִאֵמוֹ וְתִטָּעֵמוֹ בְּ**הַר** נַחֲלָתְךָ -- this is צַדִּיקִים נִדְמֶה לָהֶם כְּהַר גָּבוֹהַּ 

כֹּה אָמַר ה׳ צְבָאוֹת כִּי יִפָּלֵא בְּעֵינֵי שְׁאֵרִית הָעָם הַזֶּה בַּיָּמִים הָהֵם גַּם בְּעֵינַי יִפָּלֵא 

doing mitzvos because they make sense

1) Rashi addresses why the command אִ֣ישׁ אִמּ֤וֹ וְאָבִיו֙ תִּירָ֔אוּ וְאֶת־שַׁבְּתֹתַ֖י תִּשְׁמֹ֑רוּ ends off אֲנִ֖י ה׳ אֱלֹקיכֶֽם.  You can say about every mitzvah אֲנִ֖י ה׳ אֱלֹקיכֶֽם who is giving the tzivuy, so why mention it here?  Rashi says the pasuk is mechadesh that if your parent tells you to do an aveira, you don't have to listen because אֲנִ֖י ה׳ אֱלֹקיכֶֽם overrides the command to listen to them.  There is a hierarchy of who you need to listen to.  Abarbanel suggests that the Torah is teaching us a fundamental yesod here. The mitzvah of kibud av is a basic, moral imperative that any ethical person can appreciate.  Chazal tell us that Eisav excelled in the mitzvah of kibud av.  The gemara (Kid 31) tells a story about a non-Jew, Dama ben Nesina, who refused to wake his father even if it meant giving up a lucrative sale.  The same is true about having a day of shabbos, a day off from work.  It's common sense that workers need a break.  True, no other nation has rules saying things like you can't turn on a light on the weekend, but they appreciate the general concept of a day of rest.  The same in fact can be said about many of the being adam l'chaveiro laws in parshas Kedoshim -- these are norms of basic morality that all people subscribe to -- but it all starts with shabbos and kibud av.  Therefore, the Torah jumps in and tells us אֲנִ֖י ה׳ אֱלֹקיכֶֽם.  The reason you have to obey these principles is not because they make sense, not because it's what all people do, not because there is some ethical principle behind them, but rather simply because Hashem commanded them, because אֲנִ֖י ה׳ אֱלֹקיכֶֽם.  

In the aseres hadibros the mitzvah of kibud av v'eim (Shmos 20:11) has a promise of reward  כַּבֵּ֥ד אֶת־אָבִ֖יךָ וְאֶת־אִמֶּ֑ךָ לְמַ֙עַן֙ יַאֲרִכ֣וּן יָמֶ֔יךָ עַ֚ל הָאֲדָמָ֔ה אֲשֶׁר־ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ נֹתֵ֥ן לָֽךְ׃, that we should have a long life in Eretz Yisrael.  Why does the Torah specifically mention the reward?  Netziv quotes a principle that Ramban elaborates on in our parsha of Acharei Mos.  Ramban holds that fundamentally, mitzvos are meant to be done in Eretz Yisrael.  Not just mitzvos ha'teluyos ba'aretz, but all mitzvos.  However, if we had nothing to do in galus, it would not be so easy to retain our identity or even to know what to do and how to do it when we return to the land.  The Torah therefore commands us to do mitzvos that are not teluyos ba'aretyz even in chu"l so that we remain in practice and have the necesssry training so we can do them properly when G-d willing we come back to Eretz Yisrael.  

I would have thought, says the Netziv, that this Ramban is talking only about mitzvos bein adam lamakom like putting on tefillin, wearing tzitzis, etc.  However, when it comes to mitzvos bein adam l'chaveiro, like kibud av, like v'ahavta l'reiacha, etc., what difference does it make whether I am in Eretz Yisrael or in chu"l -- those mitzvos should apply equally at all times and places, with no distinction.  That's why, says Netziv, the pasuk tacks on that the reward for kibuv av is  לְמַ֙עַן֙ יַאֲרִכ֣וּן יָמֶ֔יךָ עַ֚ל הָאֲדָמָ֔ה.  The Torah is showing us that even a mitzvah sichlis like kibid av that you think would apply equally everywhere is still is fundamentally connected to Eretz Yisrael and its reward can be gleaned more easily and in greater abundance only in Eretz Yisrael.  Logically, it makes no sense, and that gufa is the point -- the mitzvos, even those that make sense to us, transcend logic.  Netziv writes: משום הכי כתיב במצוה זו של כיבוד אב ואם גם כן ״על האדמה״ ללמדנו דאחר שהיא מצות עשה הכתובה בתורה הרי היא ככל חוקי התורה שאין בהם טעם ושכל אנושי

That's the same point the Abarbanel is making.  Yes, kibud av is something that makes sense to do; yes, having a weekend break makes sense.  But that's not why you should keep the mitzvos. אֲנִ֖י ה׳ אֱלֹקיכֶֽם, irrespective of what makes sense or doesn't make sense.

(Abarbanel frequently addresses himself to the Rambam's rationalizations of mitzvot.  It would be interesting to do a fuller study of his attitude toward taamei hamitzvot and rationalism in general, but that's beyond a blog post.)

2) While on the topic of Abarbanel: the pasuk writes with respect to a person who gives his children over to Molech that  עַ֥ם הָאָ֖רֶץ יִרְגְּמֻ֥הוּ בָאָֽבֶן (20:2).  Abarbanel suggests that this phrase may mean אולי שכיון הכתוב בזה שמבלי התראה ולא חקירת ב״ד ירגמוהו.  I am not aware of a makor that no hasra'as is required here or no chakiras eidim is required, but if anyone knows of one, let me know, otherwise I imagine you have to say Abarbanel simply means this is something you might deduce based on peshuto shel mikra.  

Iyar - the month of vav hachibur

1) Why could Aharon enter the kodesh kodashing only on Y"K?  B'makom she'baalei teshuvah omdim afilu tzadikim ainam yecholim laamod.  On Y"K, we are baalei teshuvah and can enter places that are off limits even to the greatest tzadikim the rest of the year. (Sefas Emes)

2) I had previously asked why in Dayeinu we say "banah lan es beis ha'bechira" when it is we who did the building -- it did not come down from Hashem.  (Thank you to everyone who responded with suggestions.)

Shir haShirim Rabbah right at the beginning:

יִצְחָק בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה בַּר יְחֶזְקֵאל אָמַר, כְּתִיב (מלכים א ח׳:י״ג): בָּנֹה בָנִיתִי בֵּית זְבֻל לָךְ, בִּנְיַן בָּנֹה בָּנִיתִי. רַבִּי בֶּרֶכְיָה אָמַר, הַבַּיִת אֲשֶׁר הָיוּ בּוֹנִים, אֵין כְּתִיב כָּאן, אֶלָּא (מלכים א ו׳:ז׳): וְהַבַּיִת בְּהִבָּנֹתוֹ, מֵאֵלָיו הָיָה נִבְנֶה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (מלכים א ו׳:ז׳): אֶבֶן שְׁלֵמָה מַסָּע נִבְנָה. בָּנוּי אֵין כְּתִיב כָּאן, אֶלָּא נִבְנָה, מְלַמֵּד שֶׁהָיְתָה הָאֶבֶן נוֹשֵׂאת אֶת עַצְמָהּ וְנִתְּנָה עַל גַּבֵּי הַדִּימוֹס.

Unlike Al Gore and the internet, we did not build it.  The Mikdash built itself miraculously.  We just went through the motions.

3) Sefer Yetzira says the month of Iyar corresponds to the letter vav.  Ain li eisek b'nistaros, but R' Tzadok gives us insight to understand it on some level.  Vav is the vav ha'chibur, the vav which connects.  Nisan is the month where we left Egypt with the goal of taavdun es ha'Elokim al ha'har ha'zeh.  Sivan is when we fulfilled that goal with kabbalas haTorah.  We need some way to connect the start of the process with its fulfillment.  That's Iyar, the vav ha'chibur between the two.

I would suggest as well that we know that this is the month when R' Akiva's students died because they did not treat each other respectfully.  There needs to be a vav ha'chibur between people, better connection between us to create more harmonious relationships. 

safeik tumah, Ibn Ezra on chiyuv mitzvos of a ger toshav, Sefas Emes on the parsha, and a Shaul Lieberman anecdote

1) One more point of catch up from Pesach... The gemara learns the din that safeik tumah b'reshus ha'yachid is tamei from the parsha of sotah.  The flip side of that coin should be that in all other cases, i.e. s"t b'reshus ha'rabim, the din is tahor.  That's your baseline; the case of rh"y is the exception.  The Rambam, however, quotes a makor for the din of s"t b'reshus ha'rabim from hilchos pesach (Hil Avos haTumah 16:1):

מפני מה טהרו חכמים ספק טומאה בר"ה. שהרי הציבור עושין פסח בטומאה בזמן שהטמאים מרובין אם טומאה ודאית נדחית מפניהן קל וחומר לספק טומאה שאיסור כל הספקות מדבריהן כמו שביארנו בהלכות ביאות אסורות. ומפני מה החמירו בספק רה"י. שהרי סוטה שנסתרה אף ע"פ שהדבר ספק הרי היא טמאה לבעלה עד שתשתה:

The source for the Rambam in a Tosefta in Taharos, which gives another reason as well, quoted by Raavad:

א"א ובתוספתא מפרש עוד טעם אחר מפני שאפשר להשאל על היחיד וא"א להשאל על הרבים:

Aside from the question of whether there is a a machlokes here or just two possible reasons, the more fundamental question is why we need a makor at all.  The baseline does not need a makor, only the exception needs a makor.

Just wanted to mention the question.  Od chazon la'moed...

2) There is a well known Ramban in our parsha that says that outside Eretz Yisrael mitzvos are just done for practice, but the real fulfillment can only take place in E"Y.  Less well known (I think) is a chiddush of the Ibn Ezra which also shows the centrality and importance of Eretz Yisrael (good week to discuss the topic given the upcoming chag).  Commenting on וְכׇל־נֶ֗פֶשׁ אֲשֶׁ֨ר תֹּאכַ֤ל נְבֵלָה֙ וּטְרֵפָ֔ה בָּאֶזְרָ֖ח וּבַגֵּ֑ר (17:15), Ibn Ezra writes:

ואם טען טוען והלא הכתוב אמר: לגר אשר בשעריך תתננה ואכלה (דברים י״ד:כ״א). התשובה: כי זה הגר גר תושב, וכן כתוב: והגרא הגר בתוככםב (ויקרא י״ז:י״ב) לא נעזבנו שיאכל נבלה, רק הנכרי שיבוא בשערינו נתן אותה לו ויאכל אותה לחוץ.

The usual assumption is that a ger toshav has to keep just 7 mitzvos.  Ibn Ezra writes that you see from our pasuk (he interprets וּבַגֵּ֑ר as ger toshav) that a ger toshav cannot eat neveila either.  

But, you will ask, the Torah itself writes in P' Mishpatim that neveilah and treifa can be disposed of by giving them to a ger?  Answers Ibn Ezra, there is a difference between a ger who lives in E"Y and a ger from outside.  E"Y demands a higher standard of behavior even from everyone, even the ger.

In case you are not convinced, he says it again in P' Kedoshim.  Notice there how the Torah itself there connects the issur of maachalos assurus with the command of yishuv haaretz (20:24-25):

וָאֹמַ֣ר לָכֶ֗ם אַתֶּם֮ תִּֽירְשׁ֣וּ אֶת־אַדְמָתָם֒ וַאֲנִ֞י אֶתְּנֶ֤נָּה לָכֶם֙ לָרֶ֣שֶׁת אֹתָ֔הּ אֶ֛רֶץ זָבַ֥ת חָלָ֖ב וּדְבָ֑שׁ אֲנִי֙ ה׳ אלקיכם  אֲשֶׁר־הִבְדַּ֥לְתִּי אֶתְכֶ֖ם מִן־הָֽעַמִּֽים

 וְהִבְדַּלְתֶּ֞ם בֵּֽין־הַבְּהֵמָ֤ה הַטְּהֹרָה֙ לַטְּמֵאָ֔ה וּבֵין־הָע֥וֹף הַטָּמֵ֖א לַטָּהֹ֑ר וְלֹֽא־תְשַׁקְּצ֨וּ אֶת־נַפְשֹֽׁתֵיכֶ֜ם בַּבְּהֵמָ֣ה וּבָע֗וֹף וּבְכֹל֙ אֲשֶׁ֣ר תִּרְמֹ֣שׂ הָֽאֲדָמָ֔ה אֲשֶׁר־הִבְדַּ֥לְתִּי לָכֶ֖ם לְטַמֵּֽא

Ibn Ezra comments:  על כן גר תושב לא יאכל טמא בארץ טהורה, כי על זה התנאי ידור בתוכנו.

Avoiding maachalos assuros is a tnai in living in E"Y, regardless of whether you are a Jew or not.

In the back of the new Oz v'Hadar Mikraos Gedolos they have additional notes, and I found that they put together a whole list of other places the Ibn Ezra says this same chiddush with respect to other issurim.  Being in E"Y is a privilege that demands a greater level of observance.

3) The Toras Kohanim has an interesting comment on the pasuk כְּמַעֲשֵׂ֧ה אֶֽרֶץ־מִצְרַ֛יִם אֲשֶׁ֥ר יְשַׁבְתֶּם־בָּ֖הּ לֹ֣א תַעֲשׂ֑וּ וּכְמַעֲשֵׂ֣ה אֶֽרֶץ־כְּנַ֡עַן אֲשֶׁ֣ר אֲנִי֩ מֵבִ֨יא אֶתְכֶ֥ם שָׁ֙מָּה֙ לֹ֣א תַעֲשׂ֔וּ וּבְחֻקֹּתֵיהֶ֖ם לֹ֥א תֵלֵֽכוּ׃  It writes:

מְנַיִן לַמָּקוֹם שֶׁבָּאוּ בוֹ יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכִבֵּשׁוּ, שֶׁהִתְעִיבוּ מַעֲשֵׂיהֶן יָתֵר מִכֻּלָּם?

תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר ״אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי מֵבִיא אֶתְכֶם שָׁמָּה לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ״.

מְנַיִן שֶׁבִּיאָתָן שֶׁלְּיִשְׂרָאֵל גָּרְמָה לְכָל הַמַּעֲשִׂים הַלָּלוּ?

תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר ״אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי מֵבִיא אֶתְכֶם שָׁמָּה לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ״

Not only are the aku"m in E"Y the most depraved, but, say Chazal, it is our coming into the land which causes it.   How and why are we the cause of the aku"m doing wrong?

Ksav Sofer (see Netziv as well) explains that since the aku"m know that ultimately the land will be ours, they have no incentive to behave or take care of the land.  When you know there is no future, then you live for the moment, and indulge, enjoy, and abuse.

Sefas Emes has a different approach.  Just like we have a principle that "kol ha'gadol mei'chaveiro yitzro gadol mimenu," that the greater a person, the greater their yetzer ha'ra pushing back against whatever they try to achieve, so too with respect to a place -- the greater the kedushas ha'makom, the greater will be the obstacles and challenges, the greater the klipos, standing in the way of realizing that place's potential.  

Because E"Y is promised to us, because it is invested with such great spiritual potential for us to realize, davka there the aku"m are the most immoral.  Davka there we find the greatest obstacles to ruchniyus.  On Har haBayit you now have the aku"m having riots, throwing stones, etc.  Even on a regular day, they have picnics there and use it as a playground.  The holiest place in the world should have such tumah there?!  The answer is yes, because it's the holiest place in the world that's what happens there.  You need a lot of pushback, a lot of hester, a lot to hide the irrepressible force of kedusha that is bursting to escape. 

4) Lastly, in Hillel Halkin's new book A Complicated Jew: Selected Essays, I found the following wonderful anecdote about his uncle, R' Shaul Lieberman: 

A Lithuanian Jew with a no-nonsense attitude toward religion, he once, when I was a college student, startled me by saying that he considered prayer a waste of time, since it interrupted his study of Talmud and he had nothing to say to G-d.  I did not contradict him by remarking that, standing diagonally behind him as a boy on Yom Kippur, the only day of the year on which he covered him head with his prayer shawl, I had glimpsed beneath it the tears running down his cheeks."  (p 34-35)

Notes from the Underground -- erev Shabbos edition

1) It's a good sign when Bloomberg is willing to run a piece entitled "Lockdown Critics May Have Some Valid Points."  I applaud the writer for at least being willing to consider arguments that the mainstream media have shut out and that most of our community leadership chooses to ignore. 

 

2) When the kohen gadol does avodah on Y"K, he goes to mikveh before and after changing from the bigdei zahav to bigdei lavan and then again before and after changing back from bigdei lavan to bigdei zahav.  Chasam Sofer asks: the k"g needs to go to mikveh before putting on bigdei lavan because it is a step up in kedusha -- these are the garments worn to enter kodesh kodashim -- but why does he need to go to mikveh when he changes back to the bigdei zahav which are just used for ordinary avodah?

 

Chasam Sofer answers that after doing avodah in the bigdei lavan, after having an experience of intense kedusha, even ordinary tasks take on a new light and must be done with greater intensity and kedusha.  Switching back to bigdei zahav is not a step down, but needs to be a step up as well.

 

Like I've said from Day #1, when we eventually do leave the bunker, we need to return to our daily routine, to our bigdei zahav, with greater energy, focus, and kedusha, not return to things as they were before.  We need to grow from the experience and take a step up.

 

3) U'mi'zaracha lo titein l'ha'avir laMolech v'chilalta es shem Hashem Elokecha...  Seforno and Ramban explain that since korbanos to Hashem consist only of animals, if a person offers to Molech something even more precious, namely his children, it is a chilul Hashem, as it shows that he places more importance in Molech than in HKB"H. 

 

This is a lesson in life -- where you put your kochos and energy, what you are willing to sacrifice for, shows what you value most.  If a person spends 30 minutes davening lifelessly through a blatt from an English gemara but then spends 3 hours arguing passionately on facebook or twitter  about all kinds of shtuyos, what does that say about which he values more?  He's putting Molech first, and that's the chilul Hashem.  And it's not just a matter of the time invested.  It's also a matter of attitude.  One person might spend 12 hours a day at work and have only a small window to learn because his dream and ambition is to make it to the top of the corporate ladder, while another person might spend the same 12 hours at work and have a small window to learn because he needs to pay tuition bills, a mortgage etc., but that small window of learning time is his whole chiyus, it's his "ki heim chayeinu."  The first person can't stop talking about what new project will lead to his next promotion; the second person can't stop talking about R' Akiva Eiger's kashe on a Tosfos.  What's keva and what's aray?  What's the ikar and what's the tafeil?  What are you passionate about and what is just something you do because you have to?   Daveing, learning, chessed are not just items on a checklist that we have to do each day, but they have to be the #1 priority, they have to be things we are invested in more than anything else that takes up our time and energy. 

don't just be civil and ethical

1) The Torah warns against our imitating the laws and customs of Mitzrayim and Canaan.  Rashi explains that these were the most barbaric societies to be found at the time.  Ksav Sofer, however, takes the opposite view -- these were cultured societies, (supposedly)governed by laws and morals. 

Sefer HaIkkarim writes that there is what is called "das tiv'it" and "das Elokit."  You can have a society that has laws, that has a moral code, that is civil, but has no religion -- those laws are "dat tiv'it."  On top of that, you can build a relationship with G-d through religious law and practice, which is "dat Elokit."  (See also Derashos haRan in his derasha on parshas shoftim).  Years ago when the j-blogsphere was more active you had a lot of people talking about "rationalist" forms of Judaism, which basically meant they wanted to turn everything into dat tiv'it.  Religion in their view was a means to a more just society, a more ethical lifestyle.  Hence, orthopraxy -- following the rules in deed because they made sense, but absent belief. 

According to Ksav Sofer, this is what the Torah is warning against.  Don't turn Judaism into ethics, into law, into a means for a civil society like you had in Mitzrayim, like you had in Canaan.  Judaism is far more than that.  "U'shamrten is chokosai v'es mishpatai... ani Hashem" -- observe the mitzvos in order to have a relationship with "ani Hashem," not just for the positive morals and ethics that are to be gained as well.

2) I have to mention a question of the Chasam Sofer that I don't understand, but which he feels is so strong that he leaves it with no answer and just says "mitzvah l'yasheiv."  From the words "v'chai bahem" the end off the parsha we were just discussing ("U'shamrtem is chokosai v'es mishpatai asher ya'aseh osam ha'adam v'chai bahem" (18:5) the gemara learns that a person should violate an issur rather than die.  For example, if a person is going to starve to death unless he eats McDonalds, then he should eat at McDonalds.  The three exceptions to the rule are arayos, murder, and idolatry. 

Chasam Sofer asks: the very next pesukim after "v'chaim bahem" talk all about the issurei arayos.  How can arayos be an exception to the rule when it is the very context in which "v'chai bahem" appears?

I don't get it.  "V'chaim bahem" is the conclusion to the parsha discussing the issur of chukos ha'aku"m and the command to keep our own chukim and mitzvos.  Arayos is the topic of the next parsha.  Who says one thing is connected with the other? 

In fact, see Ba'al haTurim who writes that the juxtaposition of "lo tikrivu l'galus ervah" to "v'chai bahem" is to make the very point that even though there is a "v'chai bahem," nonetheless, "lo tikrivu" to arayos.   
3) VaYidaber Hashem el Moshe achrei mos shenei bnei Aharon... VaYomer Hashem el Moshe...

Hashem spoke... and Hashem spoke.  Why the repetition with nothing in the middle?

Rashi explains that there was something in the middle.  "Achrei mos shnei bnei Aharon" is a message to be careful.  Rashi gives a mashal: a doctor who tells a patient not to do X will likely be ignored; the doctor who says not to do X or you will die just like so-and-so has the patient's attention.  Hashem wanted to make sure Aharon was on guard, so he warned that a mistake in doing avodah might lead to death, just as had occurred to Aharon's own two sons.

Is this not a great example of yiras ha'onesh?  Don't be bad or Hashem will give you a big potch!   Is this what it took to keep the great Aharon haKohen in line?  Not only a threat, but even that's not enough -- a threat accompanied by an example he could relate to in order to make it real. 

Wouldn't Aharon have listened to Hashem just because it was the dvar Hashem?

Two approaches:

The mussar approach (e.g. see Ohr Yahel, Chiddushei haLev) is that we see from here that no matter how great the person, a human being is still flesh and blood, and while the neshoma may soar to lofty places, flesh and blood will always struggle with tayva, with failings, with challenges.  No one is above the need for sometimes getting harsh mussar, the threat of a potch, because that is what our physical selves can relate to.

The approach of R' Tzadok and the Sefas Emes is quite different.  Hashem's warning needs to be taken in context.  As we discussed here, Nadav and Avihu were great people who aspired to a hisgalus of Hashem even greater than what Moshe merited.  They could not contain their enthusiasm, their fervor, and so they entered the Mikdash and offered ketores even though they had no permission to do so and even though it would cost them their lives -- what value is human life relative to the prize of greater closeness to Hashem?  (see Meshech Chochma in parshas Braishis on "V'h'yisem k'Elokim") For someone with that type of yetzer ha'ra, the threat of death is no deterrent -- the ends more than justify the cost.  And yiras ha'romemus, appreciation of Hashem's majesty, awe of Hashem, is no deterrent either, as the greater one's appreciation, the more one would desire to come close to Hashem.  In order to prevent Aharon from falling into the same trap as his children, Hashem had no choice other than to directly command Aharon and say that this is not the type mesirus nefesh that He sanctions, and it must be avoided.

For the ba'alei musar, the Torah is speaking to Aharon's frailties as flesh and blood like any one of us.  For the gedolei chassidus, the Torah is speaking to Aharon's greatness, because who but a great person would be swayed by the temptation to even sacrifice his life to come closer to the majesty of Hashem. 

Ramban the philosopher/mystic vs Ramban the halachist

R' Aharon Lichtenstein zt"l was asked who he would rush to meet first when he got to the olam ha'emes.  Who among the pantheon of Rishonim does he admire most?   You would think someone steeped in Brisker lomdus like R' Aharon would of course answer "the Rambam," but guess again -- it was Ramban who most fascinated R' Aharon (see the article I linked to).  Parshanut, philosophy, mysticism, halacha -- Ramban touches on it all.  I want to look at one issue related to our parsha that brings that multi-faceted outlook into sharper focus.

A Jew must sacrifice his life rather than violate any one of the three cardinal sins of avodah zarah, arayos, or murder.  However, when it comes to other prohibitions, the Torah tells us "v'chay bahem."  It's not clear whether that is simply a matir, a license to avoid the sacrifice of mesirus nefesh, or whether it is a commandment, an order to preserve one's life even at the cost of violating other prohibitions.  Tos (Avodah Zara 27b) would presumably take the former position, as they hold that a person can choose, if they so desire, to give up their life for any commandment.  The Rambam, on the other hand, holds that one is not allowed to give up one's life unless obligated by halacha to do so, and so presumably he would take the latter position.

The Avnei Nezer (Choshen Mishpat 193) has a fascinating teshuvah in which he discusses whether a person  suffering a life threatening illness who is told by doctors that he/she must eat on Yom Kippur is permitted to forgo medical advice and fast anyway.  Rather than approach the issue from the perspective of the different viewpoints of Rambam/Tos above, he instead cites at length the Ramban on Parshas Bechukosai who argues that consulting doctors is only for those who are not on the ideal level of bitachon, for those who do not understand that everything is in G-d's hands alone and that illness can be cured by teshuvah.  "Mah cheilek b'rofim b'beis osim ratzon Hashem!"  Who needs doctors when you have G-d?  Most of us are not on that level, so the Torah allows us to live b'derech ha'teva and get medical help for our problems.  However, for a person who truly places his trust in Hashem, whatever the doctor says is irrelevant.

R' Ovadya Yosef (Yechaveh Da'at 1:61) discusses this same issue and interestingly, he also cites a Ramban: Ramban in the Milchamos in Sanhedrin (74) writes that not only is it not a midas chassidus for a seriously ill person to fast on Yom Kippur contrary to medical advice, but to the contrary -- a person who does not eat when there is danger in not doing so is liable for taking his own life!  (Just for the record, at the end of the section on Moadim in the Shem m'Shmuel there is a letter from the author, the Avnei Nezer's son, to someone in the hospital over Y"K in which he warns the person that they must eat if instructed to do so by doctors.  Did he backtrack from his father's position?) 

What would Ramban the halakhist writing the Milchamos say to Ramban the philosopher/mystic's argument in his peirush al haTorah?   Why is it not a midas chasidus to fast if a person trusts fully in G-d?  Will the "real" Ramban please step forward and make his views clear?

Obviously both Rambans are the "real" Ramban.  Somehow Ramban the philosopher/mystic saw no contradiction between what he wrote in his peirush al haTorah and what he wrote in the Milchamos.  If we only had one or the other, it would be easy for us.  But the greatness of Ramban is that he gives us both -- an abundance of riches!  -- and leaves it to us to puzzle out how to fit the pieces together.  I'll leave it to you to do that : )

more on molech and contextual interpretation

Although the Targum Yonasan in last week’s parsha interprets the issur of molech as a prohibition against marrying an aku"m, seemingly against the Mishna in Megillah, the T.Y. in this week’s parsha (20:2) interprets the pasuk prohibiting molech as an issur avodah zarah. Why the difference? My wife’s grandfather, R' Dov Yehidah Shochet, explained that it depends on context. In last week’s parsha, the issur of molech appears in the context of issurei arayos. Therefore, the Targum explains the pasuk in a way that best fits that context, as an issur arayos (baruch she’kivanti - see last week's post). In this week’s parsha, the pasuk appears at the beginning of a perek and the context is not yet set. Therefore, Targum renders the pasuk literally and explains it as an issur avodah zarah.

The Ibn Ezra says exactly the opposite. Back in last week’s parsha, where the context is arayos, Ibn Ezra interprets the molech pasuk as an issur avodah zarah. In this week’s parsha, where the context is not set, he writes, “yitein m’zar’o lamolech – v’ha’ta’am: lishkov im ovedes kochavim” -- here he interprets it as an arayos-related issur.  Very hard to understand.

The question that begs asking is why there is this switch in context switches between the parshiyos – why in last week’s parsha does the issur of molech appear towards the end of the list of arayos but in this week’s parsha it is in the lead off position before any arayos are discussed? Furthermore, why does the order in which the arayos are presented changed between the two parshiyos?

what is molech doing in the middle of the parsha of arayos?

A positive note to start with: the Kohen gadol could enter the kodesh kodashim only one day a year, only on Yom Kippur. This proves the rule, says the Sefas Emes, that b'makom she'ba'alei teshuvah omdim, even tzadikim gamurim ain omdim.  On Yom Kippur we are all ba’alei teshuvah.  We can enter places and reach heights that are closed off the entire rest of the year.

And now we can get to arayos and idolatry : )   There is one pasuk in the middle of the parsha of arayos that sticks out like a sore thumb: “U’mi’zaracha lo titein l’ha’avir la’molech…” (18:21) Why should the Torah place a warning against molech worship smack in the middle of the discussion of arayos?  The Mishna in Megillah (4:9) warns that someone who translates this pasuk as a prohibition against conceiving a child with an ovedes kochavim should be silenced. The rejected reading is obviously an attempt to find a simple solution to the problem of what the pasuk is doing in this context.  The Mishna’s admonition notwithstanding, some parshanim (e.g. Abarbanel, Targum Yonasan) accept this reading as pshat. (As to how they deal with the Mishna, see Maharasha, Mahartz Chiyus, Tos Y”T on the Mishna, and my cousin-in-law [is there such a word?] R' Avraham Wagner's sefer Na’ar Yonasan on the Targum. Maybe I don't get it, but I’m not really bothered by this question. Meforshei pshat oftentimes read pesukim counter to the way Chazal do. Just because the Mishna expresses its opposition to this reading so strongly doesn't change anything.  The Mishna is speaking l'halacha; the parshanim are talking about pshat -- two very different levels of meaning.  To ignore the distinction would lead to things like censoring Rashbam -- who would dare do that?    : ) 

I want to throw out what may be a crazy idea and suggest that there may be a hint to this rejected reading even in Rashi, or to be more accurate, a derash Rashi quotes. While Rashi on the pasuk interprets molech as a form of idolatry, earlier in the perek (18:2) he cites a derasha in the name of Rebbi: “Hashem knew that Bnei Yisrael would violate issurei arayos in the days of Ezra; therefore, the parsha issues a warning in advance, ‘Ani Hashem Elokeichem,’ a judge who will hold you accountable and one trustworthy to reward those who obey.” The Chasam Sofer asks a simple question: what issur of arayos did Bnei Yisrael violate in the days of Ezra? True, in Ezra’s time intermarraige was rampant, but marrying a nochris is not an issur of arayos as listed in our perek!   If you accept at least as plausible pshat the reading that the Mishna rejected l’halacha, namely, that the issur molech is a warning against having relations with a nochris and having child, then the Chasam Sofer’s question is moot and Rebbi’s derash makes perfect sense.

Assuming that one takes the Mishna at face value and the pasuk is referring to actual molech worship, how do you explain what it is doing here? R’ Bachyei writes that the covenant between Hashem and Klal Yisrael is like that of marriage. The Torah here is hinting that the sin of avodah zarah is in some sense equivalent to arayos/infidelity. Alternatively, maybe the Torah is reflecting the idea in Chazal that Klal Yisrael engaged in avodah zarah only to allow themselves the opportunity to engage in arayos, not because they were true believers.  We also see from the Ba’al Pe’or episode in sefer BaMidbar that the two sins of idolatry and arayos often go together.

The downside of these explanations is that they do not explain why it is molech in particular and not avodah zarah in general that the Torah focusses on. Perhaps there is a relationship between the manner of molech worship and the rationale behind the issurei arayos. Ramban writes that arayos relationships are the result of pursuit of ta'avah and a rejection of the mission of building a family. (This would explain why nidah is mentioned in the parsha even though technically it might not be one of the arayos [see Esvan d’Oraysa]. Ramban writes that relations with a nidah leads to tainted offspring). The worship of molech involved turning over one’s children to the priests of molech to pass them through fire.   Just as arayos is, according to Ramban, a forsaking of normal family life for ta’avah, molech also is a sacrifice, in the literal sense, of one’s family, one’s children, for the sake of avodah zarah.

the kodesh kodashim within

R' Shimshon Dovid Pincus makes a simple but beautiful point on P' Acharei. The avodah of Yom Kippur done by the kohein gadol was the highlight of the year. You would think that maybe it should be done at Citi Field, Met Life Stadium, or maybe [substitute your local sports arena here]. But no -- the most intense avodah of the day, the offering of ketores, is done inside the kodesh kodashim with no one, not even a malach, present to observe! There is certainly a value to b'rov am hadras melech, but often times we assign too much weight to public displays of piety and lose sight of the fact that it's what happens in private, in the 4 amos of yours that no one but you and G-d can see, that can make all the difference in the world.

The truth is this idea is already found in the first sicha in Ohr Tzafun of the Alter of Slabodka, who takes it a step further. The Alter notes that given two people, one who is shuckling away while learning or davening, visibly involved in what he is doing, and one who is quiet and introverted, the natural tendency (except for those of us who ourselves are introverts) is to think the first person is more "into it" than the second. The knee-jerk assumption is based entirely on what we see on the outside but ignores what is going on in the kodesh kodashim inside.

The gemara (Nedarim 81) tells us that the Chachamim and Nevi'im could not figure out why the churban habayis was warranted until Hashem himself revealed that it was because people were lax in reciting birchas haTorah. The Ran explains that the lack of birchas haTorah demonstrated a lack of "lishma," of proper intent and motivation in learning. The Chachamim and Nevi'im, explains the Alter, saw all the learning taking place, saw the shmiras hamitzvos people had -- on the outside everything looked kosher. They could not see in the kodesh kodashim of people's hearts. But Hashem can see there, and Hashem judges us precisely on what no one else is aware of and no one else can see but ourselves.

mikra kodesh

The Chayei Adam (132) quotes the minhag of the GR"A to eat chadah immediately after 16 Nissan in order to demonstrate that the reason he refrained from eating new wheat earlier was not because he preferred his Cheerios made from old grain, but rather because he did not want to violate the issur of chadash. The GR"A wanted to actively demonstrate that his behavior was motivated only by the desire to fulfill the lav. We see an interesting chiddush: Just like there is a din of mitzvos tzerichos kavanah when it comes to the positive performance of a mitzvah, there is also an idea of obeying a lav with the right kavanah as well.

Where did the GR"A get this idea? The gemara in Shavuos (13a) discusses whether someone who does not fast, does not refrain from melacha, does not call the day of Yom Kikkur a "mikra kodesh," gets a kapparah. Rashi interprets the vague idea of not calling the day "mikra kodesh" to mean that the person did not refer to the day as mikra kodesh in his tefilah. Tosfos rejects this interpretation. How can the gemara attempt to derive from a derasha whether someone who does not refer to the day as "mikra kodesh" in davening gets or does not get a kapprah when the whole text of tefilah is only derabbanan? Instead, Tosfos quotes Rabeinu Tam who explains that the gemara is referring to someone who refrains from melacha but does so simply out of sheer laziness. Even though such an individual has done nothing wrong -- he has fully kept the lav of not doing melacha -- nonetheless, since his kiyum is for the wrong reason, it does not count as a full kiyum mitzvah. 

(If not for the Chayei Adam quoting this proof, I would have though you could be mechaleik. The din of mikra kodesh is a mitzvas aseh that requires sanctifying the day in some way. I would have thought Rabeinu Tam meant that if one does not do melacha out of laziness, one indeed does get full credit for fulfilling the lav; however, one has failed to fulfill the mitzvas aseh of mikra kodesh.  The bad fulfillment of the lav is just a siman that the aseh is lacking, not a sibah in itself to discount any kiyum.  That's very different than the case of chadash where, according to the GR"A, the fulfillment of the lav itself is deficient.)

Rav Soloveitchik (link) is quoted as suggesting a brilliant understanding of a well known gemara based on this chiddush of Rabbeinu Tam.  The gemara connects the mitzvah of "zachor" on Shabos with the mitzvah of "shamor." Women are obligated in the mitzvah of kiddush even though it is zman gerama because whoever is chayav in the lav of shamor is also obligated in the aseh of zachor. This connection between zachor and shamot is not merely a technical derasha. What Chazal meant is that only though  "zachor," by sanctifying the day of Shabbos and declaring in kiddush why we are refraining from work, can we properly fulfill the mitzvah of "shamor." Merely abstaining from work without a sense of being motivated by the kedushas hayom is not sufficient.

What about Rashi's reading of the gemara? Apparently Rashi holds that even though the specific text of tefilah is derabbanan, there is a mitzvah d'oraysa of engaging in tefilah that mentions the kedushas hayom of Yom Kippur / Yom Tov as a means of sanctifying the day. In other words, davening on Yom Tov is not (just) a kiyum mitzvah of the mitzvah of tefilah -- it's a kiyum mitzvah of "mikra kodesh."  Failing to daven does not merely undermine the mitzvah of tefilah alone, but it undermines the sanctity of the day, as part and parcel of how we make our Yamim Tovim special is through engaging in tefilah that makes mention of their special distinction.

Ramban writes similarly (VaYikra 23:2) writes that there is a mitzvah on Yom Tov to gather in shul "l'kadesh hayom b'farhesya b'tefilah v'hallel...," i.e. for public prayer and thanksgiving. I believe someone commented on a post here once that even though R' Chaim Brisker held that it is better to daven in private without a minyan in order to make zman kri'as shema, perhaps the same would not apply on Yom Tov where there is a kiyum d'oraysa of tefilah b'tzibur based on this Ramban. (I would think that so long as one davened even a single tefilah at some point during the day b'tzibur it would be sufficient to fulfill this din of mikra kodesh, so tzarich iyun, but it's an interesting idea.)

the command to be mechadesh -- for the right reasons

The Netziv understands the warning, "U'shmartem es chukosai v'es mishpatai asher ya'aseh osam ha'adam v'chai bahem" (18:5) not as a general exhortation to observe mitzvos, but as a specific command to be an "oseh", to create and innovate in Torah. We ask Hashem daily in Ahavah Rabbah to give us the ability to "lilmod u'lelameid, lishmor, v'la'asos, u'l'kayeim" -- "la'asos" is distinct from the shmiras hamitzvos of "kiyum" and is connected to the process of limud haTorah. Study, limud, must eventually lead to la'asos, creative insight and chiddush. The Mishna at the end of Kiddushin that tells us "Avraham asah es kol haTorah ad shelo nitna" may be interpreted to mean not that Avraham practically fulfilled every aspect of the Torah, but that he intuited and was mechadesh halacha even before it was given. Using this insight, the Netziv offers a brilliant answer to a famous question posed by the Rishonim. The gemara (Brachos 17) darshens the paskuk "seichel tov l'chol oseihem" to refer to those who are "osim lishma", because if one engages in Torah shelo lishma it would be better if he/she were never born. Rashi and Tosfos are bothered by this gemara's harsh critique of shelo lishma when Chazal tell us that l'olam ya'asok adam b'Torah u'mitzvos afilu she'lo lishma as that will eventually lead one to the higher level of lishma. Netviv answers that when Chazal tell us that she'lo lishma is acceptable, they are referring to the study of Torah, the accumulation of knowledge and wisdom. The gemara in Brachos, however, refers to those who are "oseihem" -- "osim lishma", meaning those who are engaged in new interpretation and insight, chiddush. Study can be pursued for any aim, but chiddush and change demand pure motive and intention. This novel interpretation of the Netziv is echoed by many poskim. R' Moshe Feinstein writes (Igros Moshe 4:49) regarding women innovating practices like wearing a talis, etc. in the name of equality that while there is nothing technically wrong with the action involved, it is a chiddush in the sense of departing from previous tradition, and therefore must be undertaken only with the purest intent and motive. Rabbi Arye Frimer quotes the policy of the Chief Rabbi of Britain in his paper on women's minyan: "The most important consideration, however is the motive underlying the request. If this is genuinely put forward by observant students seeking, as you write, "a religiously fulfilling experience," it is one thing... But if the true intention is to challenge the accepted by symbolic reforms, then clearly greater caution is called for. As a protest action, what begins with relatively minor modifications may well end with far more serious violations of accepted practices. . . . " Rav Hershel Shachter has similarly stated, "How much more so when one wants to be mechadeish to reverse an accepted position, we must be sure that the author of the original idea is not formulating his chidush shelo lishma - just to gain popularity or for some other ulterior motive. Although it is permissible, and even encouraged, for one to learn shelo lisham, for one to be mechadeish shelo lishma is not allowed (see pg. 26 in B'Ikvei Hatson)." Two final observations: firstly, because of this concern for motive I think in recent times we have seen a reactionary pull away from all chiddush, a la the Chasam Sofer's famous dictum "chadash assur min haTorah". Even where innovation is clearly called for and undertaken with the best intentions, there are those reject it in the name of preserving the status quo. This approach abrogates the ideal of "la'asos" entirely. Secondly, my wife has observed that the criteria of lishma does not seem universally applied. "Amein groups" and "amein parties" are widely accepted even by those who would frown at the thought of a women's "minyan", but there may be little or no difference in the motivation of the attendees. Nearly every week our inbox has an e-mail from someone advertising their efforts on a local e-mail list to try to get 43 women in total baking challah as a segulah for that week's needs for yeshua -- is this not a chiddush (I am not aware of any source for it in general, and in particular wonder why the modern orthodox community in which I live is so adopting of segulos and minhagim from outside sources) that should be communally adopted only with proper motivation? Yet, practices such as these pass unquestioned. A feminist or cynic would perhaps rightfully wonder if our concern for lishma only extends to areas where the male dominated heirarchy is at risk. In short, each situation demands careful evaluation. We must personally aspire to innovate and be mechadesh for the right reasons, but at the same time must be careful of crushing others creative insights by questioning their sincerity and motive. A very delicate balance indeed.

preparing to enter the kodesh kodashim; preparing to experience the pnimiyus of Pesach

P’ Acharei opens with a warning to Aharon that he may not enter the kodesh kodashim whenever he chooses. The danger is reinforced with a reminder that Aharon's two sons, Nadav and Avihu, entered without permission and were killed.

The Shem m’Shmuel asks: Nadav and Avihu were killed, as the Torah tells us earlier, “b’hakrivam aish zarah”, because they brought an improper offering of k'tores. Chazal in Midrash ascribe many other sins to Nadav and Avihu which may have led to or contributed to their downfall. Whatever their exact sin was, clearly it was more than simply entering into kodesh kodashim. How does their death serve as a warning that simply entering kodesh kodashim poses a danger?

To answer the question we need to have some perspective on how schar v’onesh works. In G-d’s court of judgment, guilt and merit are not calculated based only on the deeds done, but are calculated relative to who we are and what we are capable of. A Jew who grew up with no background but makes an effort to keep some mitzvos may receive tremendous reward, while a Jew who grew up immersed in a Torah society but chooses to only minimally practice his Judaism may receive little reward for those very same deeds. Same act, different people, different contexts, different reward and punishment.

Because justice is relative, the closer a person grows to G-d, the greater the potential for punishment, as more is expected of him/her. There is an arousal of the attribute of justice that accompanies every step upward that a person takes, as actions that a person on a lower level would not be held accountable for are now judged to be sins and require tshuvah and reflection.

Aharon’s sons were indeed guilty of offering an “aish zarah”, whatever exactly that sin was. But these blemishes of sin were slight and would have been undetectable to us. Recall that Moshe told Aharon that Nadav and Avihu were even greater in stature than they were! Why then did Hashem punish Nadav and Avihu so harshly? Why did the anger of Hashem toward Nadav and Avihu which had been held in abeyance since Mattan Torah (according to one Midrashic view) suddenly spill over into Divine punishment? The answer is “b’korvasam lifnei Hashem” – because they drew closer to G-d. To enter the kodesh kodashim, the holiest spot on earth, demanded a level of purity that did not tolerate the slight blemishes of soul. It’s not the sin of “aish zarah” alone which killed Nadav v’Avihu, but it was the context in which the sin took place. In the context of kodesh kodashin, the ever so slight defects of soul that these giants might have had within them were suddenly judged as glaring errors of judgment. Because the context of kodesh kodashim is so special, it must be reserved for use only on the the most special moment of the year, as Aharon was told.

Now we can understand, says the Shem m’Shmuel, why the Jewish people needed a korban Pesach to merit escaping the danger of the final makkas bechoros. I would add that now we understand why it takes so much work and preparation before we can have a Yom Tov of Pesach. It’s not just about cleaning the cupboard, but it’s about cleaning the soul. What may have been fine and good for our souls before Peach simply does not cut it in the context of the tremendous aliya ruchanit of the chag. If you want to feel the spiritual energy inherent in matzah and enter the kodesh kodashim of the pnimiyus of the chag, you can’t just waltz into Yom Tov with the baggage of a whole year! There is a din v’sheshbon that comes along with aliya, a struggle a person needs to undergo to integrate the ohr of the chag into their total personality in a way that transforms the past and provides direction for the future. Without that preparation, we risk entering the kodesh kodashim and being found wanting.

Hope everyone has a chag kasher v’sameyach and we all merit experiencing the cheirus and aliya of Yom Tov!