R' Elchanan points out that there seems to be different views in Tos. with respect to the relationship between tosefes shabbos and the actual kedushas hayom. Tosfos (Kesubos 47) writes that the halacha of "ain me'arvin simcha b'simcha" does not apply during tosefes shabbos or yom tov and one can hold a wedding then. This seems to indicate that the kedushas hayom of shabbos/yom tov is not yet in effect during the time of tosefes. However, Tosfos elsewhere (Pesachim 99) quotes R"Y M'Korbil that if not for being barred by a special gezeiras ha'kasuv, one could theoretically fulfill the mitzvah of korban pesach, matzah, and maror during the time of tosefes. This seems to indicate that the full kedushas hayom of the upcoming day is in effect during the time of tosefes.
Rav Wahrman resolves this inconsistency by positing that there is a difference between halachos which define the kedushas hayom and halachos which are merely an outcome of there being a kedushas hayom. He offers the following example:
The gemara (Shabbos 69) says that it is possible to be chayav 39 different chata'os if one is aware that it is shabbos and violated each of the 39 different melachos b'shogeg. How is such a case possible -- if one doesn't know any of the 39 melachos are prohibited, in what sense can one be aware that it is Shabbos? The gemara answers (according to Reish Lakish) that one is aware that there is an issur of techumin.
Tosfos asks why the gemara did not answer that the case is where the individual is aware of the mitzvos aseh of shabbos. The Achronim go further: Why did the gemara not simply answer that the case is where the person made kiddush or knew there was a mitzvah of kiddush?
The answer, writes Rav Wahrman, is that melachos or techumin, are part of the definition of the kedushas hayom of shabbos. The mitzvah of kiddush is a result, an outcome of there being a kedushas hayom -- i.e. since it is shabbos, one must say kiddush, but the saying of kiddush does not define the day as shabbos.
"Ain m'arvin simcha b'simcha" is a result, an extension, of their being a kedushas hayom of shabbos or yom tov. The mitzvah of korban pesach, of matzah, or maror, are part of what define the kedushas hayom of pesach. (Seems to me that this is a very subtle distinction!)
(Rav Wahrman mentions that R' Hershel Shachter has a different approach to explaining why the gemara in Shabbos defines awareness of shabbos only by reference to the melachos but not the mitzvos aseh of shabbos. RHS suggests that the concept of kedusha is created specifically through added issurim. Kedushas kehunah (kedusha of people) is reflected in the fact that a kohen cannot marry a gerusha and other issurim. Mitzvos that are teluyos in kedushas ha'aretz (kedusha of place) like terumah create issurim -- tevel. Kedushas shabbos (kedusha of time) is reflected specifically in the awareness that shabbos carries with it varios prohibitions. This may explain why according to one view in Tosfos (Baba Basra 81) the mitzvah of bikurum is not a mitzvah ha'teluya ba'aretz -- since there is no issur of tevel created if bikurim are not separated, the mitzvah cannot be considered connected with kedushas ha'aretz.)
Showing posts with label Oros Shabbos. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Oros Shabbos. Show all posts
Wednesday, January 18, 2012
Thursday, January 12, 2012
differences between hotza'ah and ma'avir
Continuing the series I started on Rav Wahrman's Oros Shabbos, this week I want to share something a little more technical from later in the sefer (siman 31). Aside from novel sevaras, Rav Wahrman also does an impressive job of collecting bekiyus. Watch what he does in putting together a Kapos Temarim with a teshuvah of the MahR"Y Asad:
We know that the source for melachos of Shabbos is the Mishkan (either building, or the work done therein -- different views in Rishonim). With respect to moving objects on Shabbos, there are two potential melacha elements: hotza'ah, carrying from one domain to another, and ma'avir, carrying an object 4 amos in a public domain. The gemara (Shabbos 96b) explains exactly where the melacha of hotza'ah occurred in the Mishkan. However, the gemara findd no source in the Mishkan for ma'avir and concludes it is a halacha l'Moshe m'Sinai.
The fact that these two elements have two different sources leads to a number of interesting differences between them:
1. The Kapos Temarim (Sukkah 43) writes that the ptur of melacha she'aina tzericha l'gufa (i.e. there is usually no issur d'oraysa if a melacha is done for some other purpose other than it was used for in the Mishkan) does not apply to the issur of ma'avir. The ptur of melacha she'aina tzericha l'gufa is derived from the fact that the Torah says only meleches machsheves, melachos done with intention, as they were done in the Mishkan, are chayav on Shabbos. Since the issur of ma'avir is not patterened after the Mishkan, but is rather a separate halacha l'Moshe m'Sinai, it does not need to conform to any Mishkan-use purpose to be chayav. (This is a tremendous chiddush, which R' Wahrman notes can be disputed from other sources in Rishonim.)
2. The definition of reshus ha'rabim, a public domain, for the purposes of hotz'ah is also based on the melacha's source. The Mishkan, where the paradigmatic melacha of hotz'ah took place, was the central point of Bnei Yisrael's camp of 600,000 people; therefore, a reshus ha'rabim is defined as an area where there are 600,000 people (there are lots of technical details to this point that are relevant for hil eiruvin, but lets keep it simple for now). What about ma'avir? When we speak about the issur of carrying an object 4 amos in a public domain, what do we mean by "public domain"? MahR"Y Asad writes that since ma'avir is a halacha l'Moshe m'Sinai and not derived from the Mishkan, the standard of 600,000 goes out the window and does not apply.
Using this foundation, we can now solve a difficulty raised by Tosfos. Chazal made a gezeirah not to perform the mitzvos of lulav, shofar, and megillah on Shabbos lest a person who does not know how to do the mitzvah carry the lulav, the shofar, or the megillah to an expert to teach him what to do. "Amar Rabbah: Gezeirah shema ya'avirenu 4 amos b'reshus ha'rabim" -- Rabbah taught that the gezeirah is in place lest a person carry 4 amos in a public domain.
Why, asks Tosfos, does Rabbah focus only on the potential issur of carrying 4 amos in a public domain? Wouldn't the person who carries in the street also violate the issur of hotza'ah, of taking an object from the public domain of the street into the private domain of the expert who is going to teach him how to do the mitzvah? Why does Rabbah not use this as the basis for the gezeirah?
Putting together what we learned from the Kapos Temarim and the MahaR"Y Asad, we can resolve Tos.' question. The issur of hotza'ah is learned from the Mishkan and applies only where the public domain encompasses 600,000 people; the issur of ma'avir is a seperate halacha l'Moshe m'Sinai with its own parameters that applies to any public space. Chazal may not have been motivated to create a gezeirah for the relatively rare cases of domains populated by 600,000 people. They were, however, still concerned about carrying in public areas using the broader definition of the term.
We know that the source for melachos of Shabbos is the Mishkan (either building, or the work done therein -- different views in Rishonim). With respect to moving objects on Shabbos, there are two potential melacha elements: hotza'ah, carrying from one domain to another, and ma'avir, carrying an object 4 amos in a public domain. The gemara (Shabbos 96b) explains exactly where the melacha of hotza'ah occurred in the Mishkan. However, the gemara findd no source in the Mishkan for ma'avir and concludes it is a halacha l'Moshe m'Sinai.
The fact that these two elements have two different sources leads to a number of interesting differences between them:
1. The Kapos Temarim (Sukkah 43) writes that the ptur of melacha she'aina tzericha l'gufa (i.e. there is usually no issur d'oraysa if a melacha is done for some other purpose other than it was used for in the Mishkan) does not apply to the issur of ma'avir. The ptur of melacha she'aina tzericha l'gufa is derived from the fact that the Torah says only meleches machsheves, melachos done with intention, as they were done in the Mishkan, are chayav on Shabbos. Since the issur of ma'avir is not patterened after the Mishkan, but is rather a separate halacha l'Moshe m'Sinai, it does not need to conform to any Mishkan-use purpose to be chayav. (This is a tremendous chiddush, which R' Wahrman notes can be disputed from other sources in Rishonim.)
2. The definition of reshus ha'rabim, a public domain, for the purposes of hotz'ah is also based on the melacha's source. The Mishkan, where the paradigmatic melacha of hotz'ah took place, was the central point of Bnei Yisrael's camp of 600,000 people; therefore, a reshus ha'rabim is defined as an area where there are 600,000 people (there are lots of technical details to this point that are relevant for hil eiruvin, but lets keep it simple for now). What about ma'avir? When we speak about the issur of carrying an object 4 amos in a public domain, what do we mean by "public domain"? MahR"Y Asad writes that since ma'avir is a halacha l'Moshe m'Sinai and not derived from the Mishkan, the standard of 600,000 goes out the window and does not apply.
Using this foundation, we can now solve a difficulty raised by Tosfos. Chazal made a gezeirah not to perform the mitzvos of lulav, shofar, and megillah on Shabbos lest a person who does not know how to do the mitzvah carry the lulav, the shofar, or the megillah to an expert to teach him what to do. "Amar Rabbah: Gezeirah shema ya'avirenu 4 amos b'reshus ha'rabim" -- Rabbah taught that the gezeirah is in place lest a person carry 4 amos in a public domain.
Why, asks Tosfos, does Rabbah focus only on the potential issur of carrying 4 amos in a public domain? Wouldn't the person who carries in the street also violate the issur of hotza'ah, of taking an object from the public domain of the street into the private domain of the expert who is going to teach him how to do the mitzvah? Why does Rabbah not use this as the basis for the gezeirah?
Putting together what we learned from the Kapos Temarim and the MahaR"Y Asad, we can resolve Tos.' question. The issur of hotza'ah is learned from the Mishkan and applies only where the public domain encompasses 600,000 people; the issur of ma'avir is a seperate halacha l'Moshe m'Sinai with its own parameters that applies to any public space. Chazal may not have been motivated to create a gezeirah for the relatively rare cases of domains populated by 600,000 people. They were, however, still concerned about carrying in public areas using the broader definition of the term.
Thursday, January 05, 2012
smichas geulah l'tefilah and why we say baruch shem kvod malchuso quietly
Last week we started what I hope will be a series based on R' Wahrman's Oros Shabbos. I want to continue this week with a piece (siman 5 in the sefer) that relates to parshas hashavu'a as well as hilchos shabbos.
The halacha is that one may not interrupt between the bracha of ga'al yisrael and shmoneh esrei in shacharis -- one is required to have smichas geulah l'tefilah. The same holds true for ma'ariv, except that there is the additional bracha of hashkiveinu (and baruch Hashem l'olam) after ga'al yisrael. The gemara explains that this is a "geula arichta", a long geulah, meaning the bracha of hashkiveinu continues the theme of geulah and is therefore not considered an interruption. What about on Shabbos and Yom Tov, where we add V'shamru Bnei Yisrael es haShabbos and VaYidaber Moshe es Moadei Hashem... between hashkiveinu and our amidah -- why are these insertions not considered interruptions? How on these days do we satisfy the requirement of smichas geulah l'tefilah?
The Rishonim offer various answers to this question. The Tur writes that V'Shamru... is also a form of geulah, as Hashem has promised to redeem Bnei Yisrael if only we observe two Shabbosos. The Prisha sees these pesukim not as connected to geulah, but as part and parcel of our teflah, as they describe the kedushas hayom of Shabbos / Yom Tov. Rav Wahrman focusses his attention on the interesting answer of the Rokeach, who writes that these pesukim are not considered an interruption because they are recited quietly. Putting aside the fact that our minhag is not like the Rokeach, how can we explain this view? What difference does it make whether the pesukim are recited aloud or in a whisper?
There is a well known machlokes between Rashi and Tosfos (Brachos 21) regarding what to do if one is in the middle of shmoneh esrei and the tzibur is saying kedusha. Rashi writes that one should remain silent and simply attend to the recitation of the tzibur -- based on the principle of shome'a k'oneh, hearing can substitute for actually saying the words. Tosfos disagrees. If hearing is equivalent to saying the words, argues Tosfos, then listening to the words of kedusha would be no less a hefsek, an interruption, than actually reciting the words themselves. According to Rashi, obviously this is not the case -- there is a distinction between a recitation done aloud and recitation done quietly or by listening.
To explain this idea found in Rashi and the Rokeach, as he does in many places, R' Wahrman cites a novel explanation from his rebbe, R' Leizer Silver. The gemara Pesachim (56) explains the reason we say the words, "Baruch shem kvod malchuso..." after Shema in a whisper as follows: Ya'akov Avinu became worried when he wanted to reveal the day of geulah to his children and his ruach hakodesh departed. The Shevatim consoled Ya'akov by declaring, "Shema Yisrael (meaning their father), Hashem Elokeinu, Hashem echad," and Ya'akov responded to their declaration of faith by saying, "Baruch shem kvod malchuso..." However, says the gemara, when Moshe Rabeinu wrote and said the parsha of Shema, he did not add "Baruch shem..." Ya'akov said it; Moshe didn't say it; we compromise and recite it in a whisper.
The Tzlach asks what the whole tumult in the gemara is about. There are many praises and expressions that we have in our davening that were not said by Moshe. Just because Moshe didn't say, "Baruch shem...," doesn't seem to be enough of a reason to leave it out.
Tzlach answers that the difference here is context. To insert in davening additional praises not recited by Moshe, like chapters of tehillim, of course needs no justification. But here, in the case of "Baruch shem...," the additional phrase is being stuck right in the very middle of Moshe's words. What gives us the right to create a hefsek, an interruption, right in the middle of the parsha of Shema as told to us in the Torah by Moshe Rabeinu?
The gemara's answer is that there is no problem of creating an interruption because we say, "Baruch shem..." quietly. In other words, a quiet recitation, a recitation that is different in tone than the normal tefilah voice, does not consititue a hefsek.
The is exactly the point Rashi and the Rokeach were making. Through shome'a k'oneh listening counts the same as a recitation of kedusha, but since that recitation takes place silently, it does not count as an interruption. Since "V'shamreu Bnei Yisrael es haShabbos" is recited quietly, it also therefore does not count as an interruption that would break smichas geulah l'tefilah.
R' Wahrman notes that his rebbe said this derech derush and he goes on to provide a more detailed halachic analysis, but it's nonetheless a clever and enjoyable vort.
The halacha is that one may not interrupt between the bracha of ga'al yisrael and shmoneh esrei in shacharis -- one is required to have smichas geulah l'tefilah. The same holds true for ma'ariv, except that there is the additional bracha of hashkiveinu (and baruch Hashem l'olam) after ga'al yisrael. The gemara explains that this is a "geula arichta", a long geulah, meaning the bracha of hashkiveinu continues the theme of geulah and is therefore not considered an interruption. What about on Shabbos and Yom Tov, where we add V'shamru Bnei Yisrael es haShabbos and VaYidaber Moshe es Moadei Hashem... between hashkiveinu and our amidah -- why are these insertions not considered interruptions? How on these days do we satisfy the requirement of smichas geulah l'tefilah?
The Rishonim offer various answers to this question. The Tur writes that V'Shamru... is also a form of geulah, as Hashem has promised to redeem Bnei Yisrael if only we observe two Shabbosos. The Prisha sees these pesukim not as connected to geulah, but as part and parcel of our teflah, as they describe the kedushas hayom of Shabbos / Yom Tov. Rav Wahrman focusses his attention on the interesting answer of the Rokeach, who writes that these pesukim are not considered an interruption because they are recited quietly. Putting aside the fact that our minhag is not like the Rokeach, how can we explain this view? What difference does it make whether the pesukim are recited aloud or in a whisper?
There is a well known machlokes between Rashi and Tosfos (Brachos 21) regarding what to do if one is in the middle of shmoneh esrei and the tzibur is saying kedusha. Rashi writes that one should remain silent and simply attend to the recitation of the tzibur -- based on the principle of shome'a k'oneh, hearing can substitute for actually saying the words. Tosfos disagrees. If hearing is equivalent to saying the words, argues Tosfos, then listening to the words of kedusha would be no less a hefsek, an interruption, than actually reciting the words themselves. According to Rashi, obviously this is not the case -- there is a distinction between a recitation done aloud and recitation done quietly or by listening.
To explain this idea found in Rashi and the Rokeach, as he does in many places, R' Wahrman cites a novel explanation from his rebbe, R' Leizer Silver. The gemara Pesachim (56) explains the reason we say the words, "Baruch shem kvod malchuso..." after Shema in a whisper as follows: Ya'akov Avinu became worried when he wanted to reveal the day of geulah to his children and his ruach hakodesh departed. The Shevatim consoled Ya'akov by declaring, "Shema Yisrael (meaning their father), Hashem Elokeinu, Hashem echad," and Ya'akov responded to their declaration of faith by saying, "Baruch shem kvod malchuso..." However, says the gemara, when Moshe Rabeinu wrote and said the parsha of Shema, he did not add "Baruch shem..." Ya'akov said it; Moshe didn't say it; we compromise and recite it in a whisper.
The Tzlach asks what the whole tumult in the gemara is about. There are many praises and expressions that we have in our davening that were not said by Moshe. Just because Moshe didn't say, "Baruch shem...," doesn't seem to be enough of a reason to leave it out.
Tzlach answers that the difference here is context. To insert in davening additional praises not recited by Moshe, like chapters of tehillim, of course needs no justification. But here, in the case of "Baruch shem...," the additional phrase is being stuck right in the very middle of Moshe's words. What gives us the right to create a hefsek, an interruption, right in the middle of the parsha of Shema as told to us in the Torah by Moshe Rabeinu?
The gemara's answer is that there is no problem of creating an interruption because we say, "Baruch shem..." quietly. In other words, a quiet recitation, a recitation that is different in tone than the normal tefilah voice, does not consititue a hefsek.
The is exactly the point Rashi and the Rokeach were making. Through shome'a k'oneh listening counts the same as a recitation of kedusha, but since that recitation takes place silently, it does not count as an interruption. Since "V'shamreu Bnei Yisrael es haShabbos" is recited quietly, it also therefore does not count as an interruption that would break smichas geulah l'tefilah.
R' Wahrman notes that his rebbe said this derech derush and he goes on to provide a more detailed halachic analysis, but it's nonetheless a clever and enjoyable vort.
Thursday, December 29, 2011
the mitzvah of preparing for Shabbos
On hebrewbooks.org I found a sefer call Oros Shabbos by R' Shlomo Wahrman that I am enjoying immensely. I remember years ago R' Wahrman's seforim (he has a number of volumes titled She'eris Yosef) were very popular among the YU / Morasha Kollel chevra, no doubt in part because in addition to being a gaon atzum, he is a Rosh Yeshiva at HANC (Hebrew Academy of Nassau County) -- there was a certain feeling that he is one of us, or at least knows where we are coming from. Anyway, I thought it would be nice to do a series on some of the torah in his sefer so that I remember it better (the self-serving motive here) and so that you can share in the enjoyment. (I'm open to comments if you think this is not a good idea or a waste of time, and it goes without saying that summaries are only a taste and not a replacement for the sefer and any mistakes in the posts are mine alone.)
The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 250) writes that there is a mitzvah on Friday to prepare for Shabbos. R' Wahrman discusses three different possible sources for this din:
1. The meforshim on the S.A. (see GR"A) point to the gemara in the beginning of the second perek of Kiddushin (41), where, in the context of discussing "mitzvah bo yoseir m'bshlucho"(Rashi: because one gets greater schar for personally attending to the mitzvah), the gemara mentions how various Amoraim would personally attend to Shabbos preparations in their home. Given this context, it seems that the mitzvah of preparing for Shabbos is no different than any other mitzvah which should preferably be done personally rather than through an agent.
2. Rav Wahrman points out that there may be an additional element to the mitzvah of preparing for Shabbos that is unique to hilchos Shabbos. Rashi elsewhere explains (Shabbos 119a) that the reason for the elaborate preparations for Shabbos is because it shows the importance of the day, similar to the preparation one would make for one's rebbe or an important guest. Preparing for Shabbos is not just a means to an end, a way to make sure one can fulfill the mitzvah of oneg Shabbos properly with cholent and kugel, but rather it is an end in its own right -- the very act of preparation demonstrates the importance of Shabbos. Personal involvement is necessary not just as a function of mitzvah bo yoseir mbshlucho, a means of getting extra schar, but rather personal involvement is an essential component of the etzem hamitzvah because it is this personal attention which demonstrates kavod for Shabbos.
3. Aside from the divrei kabbalah elements of kavod and oneg Shabbos there is a d'oraysa kiyum in preparing for Shabbos based on the pasuk of "V'haya bayom hashishi v'heichinu es asher yavi'u" (see Biur Halacha).
One nafka minah between these sources might be when preparation should be done. The M.B. (250:5) writes that it is better (if possible) to make preparations on Friday for Shabbos rather than on the preceding day. If the mitzvah of preparing for Shabbos was just a means to the end of ensuring one has food, then it would seem to make little difference if cooking is done on Thursday, Friday, or any other day. However, if preparing for Shabbos is itself a fulfillment of kavod Shabbos, then it is understandable that preparations should be made davka on Friday when they stand out as being undertaken specifically for the honor of Shabbos.
This factor of kavod can also help resolve another difficulty. The Chavos Ya'ir writes that even though kavod habriyos overrides mitzvos derabbanan, the Amoraim put aside their kavod to personally be involved in making ready for Shabbos because of its great kedusha. If preparing for Shabbos was just a means to an end, then it would not seem to matter how it got done, whether personally or through an agent, and there would seem to be little reason to sacrifice one's kavod to do the mitzvah. However,if personally being involved is what defines preparations as being l'kavod Shabbos, if personal involvement is part of the definition of the etzem hamitzvah, obviously it is impossible to delegate the chore.
The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 250) writes that there is a mitzvah on Friday to prepare for Shabbos. R' Wahrman discusses three different possible sources for this din:
1. The meforshim on the S.A. (see GR"A) point to the gemara in the beginning of the second perek of Kiddushin (41), where, in the context of discussing "mitzvah bo yoseir m'bshlucho"(Rashi: because one gets greater schar for personally attending to the mitzvah), the gemara mentions how various Amoraim would personally attend to Shabbos preparations in their home. Given this context, it seems that the mitzvah of preparing for Shabbos is no different than any other mitzvah which should preferably be done personally rather than through an agent.
2. Rav Wahrman points out that there may be an additional element to the mitzvah of preparing for Shabbos that is unique to hilchos Shabbos. Rashi elsewhere explains (Shabbos 119a) that the reason for the elaborate preparations for Shabbos is because it shows the importance of the day, similar to the preparation one would make for one's rebbe or an important guest. Preparing for Shabbos is not just a means to an end, a way to make sure one can fulfill the mitzvah of oneg Shabbos properly with cholent and kugel, but rather it is an end in its own right -- the very act of preparation demonstrates the importance of Shabbos. Personal involvement is necessary not just as a function of mitzvah bo yoseir mbshlucho, a means of getting extra schar, but rather personal involvement is an essential component of the etzem hamitzvah because it is this personal attention which demonstrates kavod for Shabbos.
3. Aside from the divrei kabbalah elements of kavod and oneg Shabbos there is a d'oraysa kiyum in preparing for Shabbos based on the pasuk of "V'haya bayom hashishi v'heichinu es asher yavi'u" (see Biur Halacha).
One nafka minah between these sources might be when preparation should be done. The M.B. (250:5) writes that it is better (if possible) to make preparations on Friday for Shabbos rather than on the preceding day. If the mitzvah of preparing for Shabbos was just a means to the end of ensuring one has food, then it would seem to make little difference if cooking is done on Thursday, Friday, or any other day. However, if preparing for Shabbos is itself a fulfillment of kavod Shabbos, then it is understandable that preparations should be made davka on Friday when they stand out as being undertaken specifically for the honor of Shabbos.
This factor of kavod can also help resolve another difficulty. The Chavos Ya'ir writes that even though kavod habriyos overrides mitzvos derabbanan, the Amoraim put aside their kavod to personally be involved in making ready for Shabbos because of its great kedusha. If preparing for Shabbos was just a means to an end, then it would not seem to matter how it got done, whether personally or through an agent, and there would seem to be little reason to sacrifice one's kavod to do the mitzvah. However,if personally being involved is what defines preparations as being l'kavod Shabbos, if personal involvement is part of the definition of the etzem hamitzvah, obviously it is impossible to delegate the chore.
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