tochacha is not just for others; Torah on one foot

1) R' Gershon Edelstein z"l points out that the mitzvah of tochacha doesn't just mean going around and telling other people what they are doing wrong.  Rabbeinu Yonah writes in the Shaarei Teshuvah 2:26

וְיִתְבּוֹדֵד בְּחַדְרֵי רוּחוֹ וְיָשׁוּב יַהֲפֹךְ יַד תּוֹכַחְתּוֹ עַל נַפְשׁוֹ. וְלֹא יִסְמֹךְ עַל תּוֹכַחַת הַמּוֹכִיחַ לְבַדּוֹ.

The mitzvah is also to give oneself tochacha!  Chazal darshen הוכח תוכיח אפילו מאה פעמים.  Certainly this applies to correcting one's own shortcomings.

2) The gemara tells the famous story of the convert who came to Hillel and asked to be taught the entire Torah on one foot.  Hillel responded with a reformulation of v'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha -- don't treat others in a way that you would not want to be treated yourself.  Treat other people with kindness and respect.

What a crazy request -- the whole Torah on one foot?!  Was he just trying to test Hillel's patience?  (discussed this before here)

R' Shlomo Fischer explained that we learn in Avos that על שׁלשׁה דברים העלם עומד.  The world stands on three things: Torah, avodah, and gemillus chassadim.  

The ger was asking Hillel: if you had to choose one of the three -- one foot to stand on instead of three -- which is the most important?

To which Hilel replied: chessed comes before everything else.  Master midos and chessed, and the rest will follow.  

lifnei iveir -- bein adam l'chaveiro or bein adam laMakon? issur klali or issur prati?

R' Yaakov Kaminetzky in Emes l'Yaakov on the parsha sets down a fundamental yesod in understanding lifnei iveir.  We think of lifnei iveir as a bein adam l'chaveiro din, like many of the other dinin in the parsha.  Don't cause someone to trip and come to physical harm, don't give bad advice, don't cause someone spiritual harm by causing them to violate an issur.  R' Yaakov is mechadesh (and others say this as well, e.g. see Koveitz Shiurim from R' Elchanan in Pesachim #95 very muck b'kitzur) that lifnei iveir contains a bein adam laMakom component as well.  When the Torah prohibits eiver min ha'chai, for example, the issur is not just for you to not eat eiver min ha'chai. The issur is for you to cause eiver min ha'chai to be eaten by yourself *or* by others.  To put in another way, not only is there a din klali of lifnei iveir that says not to cause harm, but lifnei iveir is also a prat in every individual lav which extends it to actions done by others.   

(Seems to me that lifnei iveir is like the opposite side of the coin as arvus.  Arvus means (according to some Rishonim) that if someone else needs help to do a mitzvah, even if you've done the mitzvah already yourself, it’s like your chiyuv is incomplete.  Here too, even if you haven’t eaten the eiver min ha'chai, if you enable someone else to do so, your observance of the lav of maachalos assuros is faulty.)

 The difference between these two components comes into play when we speak of lifnei iveir by an aku"m.  The gemara tells us that lifnei iveir applies even to an aku"m, e.g. you cannot offer a piece of eiver min ha'chai to an aku"m to eat.  That din reflects the second element, the bein adam laMakom, of lifnei iveir.  It cannot possibly apply to the bein adam l'chaveiro aspect.  We learn in San 85b  כּוּתִי אַתָּה מְצֻוֶּוה עַל הַכָּאָתוֹ וְאִי אַתָּה מְצֻוֶּוה עַל קִלְלָתוֹ.   How then can you be chayav for indirectly causing the aku"m to stumble and fall? 

 

Achronim use this yesod to answer a kasha on the Emunas Shmuel.  The Tur writes that the issur of eiver min ha'chai applies only to kosher animals.  Taz (Y"D 62) asks: בטור כתוב ואינו נוהג אלא בטהורים וקשה למאי נ״מ כ״כ דהא טמאה בלאו הכי אסור .  You can't eat a tamei animal anyway, so l'mai nafka mina whether there is additionally an issur eiver min ha'chai or not?  Emunas Shmuel answers that there is a nafka mina for lifnei iveir.  He writes that lifnei iveir applies only to something which is assur to you.  You can't offer a nazir a glass of wine because were you a nazir, you would not be allowed to drink wine.  You can't give an aku"m eiver min ha'chai because eiver min ha'chai is assur for you to eat.  However, since there is no issur of eiver min ha'chai on a tamei animal, it is not assur for you to eat, and therefore there is no lifnei iveir.  In this case, you can give it to an aku"m.  Asks the Beis haLevi and R' Chaim Ozer (Achiezer III:81): the gemara (BM 10b) speaks about a case of   ֹּ כֹּהֵן דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ לְיִשְׂרָאֵל צֵא וְקַדֵּשׁ לִי אִשָּׁה גְּרוּשָׁה. and Tos says there is lifnei iveir for the yisrael.  A yisrael is allowed to marry a gerusha.  According to the Emunas Shmuel why then is there a problem of lifnei iveir?  How is this case different than offering eiver min ha'chai of a tamei animal to an aku"m?

 

With R Yaakov's yesod we can say the following chiluk.  When it comes to giving eiver min ha'chai to an aku"m, all I have to worry about is the bein adam laMakom din of eiver min ha'chai.  I have no bein adam l'chaveiro obligation viz a viz an aku"m.  Therefore, since on a tamei animal there is no issur eiver min ha'chai, there can't be any lifnei issur of enabling others to eat it.  However, when it comes to a yisrael being mekadesh a gerusha on behalf of a kohen, here the bein adam l'chaveiro also comes into play.  The yisrael may not have an issue to marry a gerusha, so there is no bein adam laMklom issue, but there is a din klali that says he cannot harm his fellow member of Klal Yisrael.  If I can't cause the kohen harm by giving him bad advice, I certainly can't cause him harm by doing kiddushin on he behalf to a woman he is not allowed to marry!

 

There are a few other nafka minos from this yesod:

 

1) R' Akiva Eiger on the first Mishna in Shabbos writes that if you enable someone else to be mechalel shabbos, you violate the lav of lifnei iveir, but that does not make you a mumar.  Only chilul shabbos makes you a mumar.  According to R' Yaakov, the bein adam laMakom of lifnei iveir is a prat in hil Shabbos.  When the Torah commands you not to violate Shabbos, included in that issur is not enabling others to do so.  Therefore, perhaps you would be a mumar.

 

2) The Shach writes (YD 151:6) that the issur derabbanan of afrushei m'isura (similar to lifnei iveir) does not apply to a mumar.  Dagul meiRevava asks why not?  A mumar is still a Jew!  R' Yaakov answers that there is no bein adam l'chaveiro responsibility to a mumar (moridin v'lo maalin), and so the lifnei iveir/afrushei m'isura does not apply.

 

3) R' Akiva Eiger has a safeik whether one can give eiver min ha'chai to an aku"m in need of it for pikuach nefesh.  Does the din of "v'chai ba'hem," the heter of pikuach nefesh, apply to an aku"m, or is that pasuk speaking only to us? R' Yaakov points out that based on the logic of the Emunas Shmuel, lifnei iveir is an extension of that which is assur to me.  If under the circumstance of pikuach nefesh eating eiver min ha'chai is mutar for me, the issur cannot extend to an aku"m.  The whole safeik does not get off the ground.

 

4) The Rama writes that lifnei iveir of avodah zarah is not a yei'hareg v'al yaavor.  What would be the hava amina otherwise?  R' Yaakov explains that if lifnei iveir is not an issur klali but is an extension of the issur avodah zarah, one could argue that it should take on all the parameters of the parent issur including being yei'hareg v'al yaavor.  (I am a bit confused by this point.  If you accept the argument of the Emunas Shmuel l'kula like in the above case, why indeed does it not apply l'chumra here?  The hava amina would seem to be correct!)

 

There are a few other nafka minos as well, ayen sham for more.

pe'ah and connecting to the Land

Why does the Torah instruct the farmer to leave pe'ah in his field for the poor to cut?  Wouldn't it be easier if he cut it for them and distributed it, like other matnos aniyim?

R' Aharon Bakst gave a mashal: imagine a mother who is angry at her child and instead of preparing his peanut butter sandwich for lunch and giving it to him herself, she allows his older brother to make the lunch and put it in his lunchbox. The loss of connection to his mother would be more painful to the child than having to eat whatever his older brother concocts. 

By telling the farmer to leave the wheat uncut and unharvested, Hashem allows the poor person to have a connection directly to the land of Eretz Yisrael, the "mother" earth where his sustenance comes from.  

Chazal tell us that the Amoraim would kiss the rocks of Eretz Yisrael before leaving the country.  They treated the land like like giving your mother a hug and kiss before you go on a trip.  

וְכִי⁠ תָבֹאוּ אֶל הָאָרֶץ וּנְטַעְתֶּם כׇּל⁠ עֵץ מַאֲכָל וַעֲרַלְתֶּם עׇרְלָתוֹ אֶת⁠ פִּרְיוֹ (19:23)  

Ohr haChaim comments:

ג׳ מצות נאמרו כאן. א׳ ביאת הארץ על דרך אומרם (כתובות קי:) הכל מעלין לארץ ישראל וכו׳. ב׳ לנטוע כל עץ מאכל לשבח הארץ. ג׳ לנהוג שני ערלה.

Simple pshat in the pasuk is that there is a mitzvah to plant trees in Eretz Yisrael (see also Ayeles haShachar here.)  

He goes on to say further:

עוד ירמוז באומרו וכי תבאו אל הארץ שלא תהיה הכוונה לתיאבון המורגשות אלא תהיה כוונת הביאה אל הארץ לחיבוב ולחשק הארץ הקדושה אשר בחר ה׳ בה הר ה׳ שמה, ואמר כי אין כוונת דיבור זה להחליט המניעה מהשתדל בישוב הארץ אלא ונטעתם וגו׳, הא למדת שמה שהתנה במאמר אל הארץ הוא בבחינת תכלית המחשבה שתהיה למעלת הארץ במושכלות לא להנאת הגוף.

Baruch Hashem we live in a time where Hashem has given us the opportunity to live this as a reality.  My daughter called me one day this week because she had some question about being mafrish tru"m from some vegetables she bought.  Whose children asked them questions like this 100 years ago?!  

How can we not give thanks for this not only next week on Yom ha'Atzmaut, but each and every day?  

the most dangerous and common lifnei iveir

The Chazon Ish (YD 62:25) raises a very interesting question: does the issur of lifnei iveir apply only to misleading other people, or does it apply to oneself as well?  I think this is the most egregious, most common, and most dangerous form of lifnei iveir.  It is very hard for a person not to have a higher opinion of himself than is warranted by reality, and it's also hard to make good choices when you are nogei'a ba'davar, and there is no bigger negi'ah than a person's own self.  We therefore end up putting ourselves in bad situations and making bad choices.  We put stumbling blocks before ourselves, both in gashiyus and in ruchniyus.  

(For the record, R' Avraham Genechovsky addressed this safeik and brought proof from the following din that there is no lifnei iveir viz a viz oneself : the din is that a שׁבועה to violate an explicit mitzvah is not chal; however, a שׁבועה to violate a din not spelled out explicitly in the Torah, e.g. if someone takes an oath to eat a chatzi shiur of issur, is chal. 

Here's R' Genechovsky's logic: 

The Minchas Chinuch has a chiddush that a person who causes someone else to violate an issur derabbanan is over lifei iveir on a d'oraysa level.  Since lifnei iveir applies even to giving bad advice, causing someone to violate an issur derabbanan is at least as bad as giving them bad advice.  

By the same logic, taking an oath to feed someone else a chatzi shiur of issur should violate lifnei iveir d'oraysa, as it too is at least as bad as giving them bad advice.  

If that is true of feeding someone else, then the same should be true with respect to feeding oneself -- the שׁבועה effectively would be a violation of the issur d'oraysa of lifnei iveir viz a viz onself, if such an issur exists.

How then could such a שׁבועה be chal?  The din of eating chatzi shiur may not be explicit in the Torah, but the issur of lifnei iveir involved in eating the chatzi shiur is explicit, and that should negate שׁבועה?

QED from the fact that we don't say that, and the din is that such a שׁבועה is chal, that there must not be an issur of lifnei iveir with respect to onself, only with respect to others.)

kedushas makom mikdash b'zman ha'zeh

The Minchas Chinuch on the first mitzvah of last week's parsha (184:5)  tries to make a l'shitaso in the Rambam/Raavad. The Rambam distinguishes between kedushas ha'aretz and kedushas Yerushalayim, and holds that while with respect to the former there is a machlokes whether קידשׁה לשׁעתא or קידשׁה לעתיד לבא, the latter was sanctified for all eternity (Hil Beis haBechira 6:14):

כל מקום שלא נעשה בכל אלו וכסדר הזה אין קדוש גמור וזה שעשה עזרא שתי תודות זכרון הוא שעשה לא במעשיו נתקדש המקום שלא היה שם לא מלך ולא אורים ותומים. ובמה נתקדשה בקדושה ראשונה שקדשה שלמה שהוא קידש העזרה וירושלים לשעתן וקידשן לעתיד לבא:

The Raavad's view is 180 degrees the opposite based on gemaras as well as based on סוד הּ ליראיו as revealed to him:

א"א סברת עצמו היא זו ולא ידעתי מאין לו ובכמה מקומות במשנה אם אין מקדש ירקב ובגמּ אמרו דנפול מחיצות אלמא למ"ד קדושה ראשונה לא קדשה לעתיד לבא לא חלק בין מקדש לירושלים לשאר א"י ולא עוד אלא שאני אומר שאפילו לרבי יוסי דאמר קדושה שנייה קדשה לעתיד לבא לא אמר אלא לשאר א"י אבל לירושלים ולמקדש לא אמר לפי שהיה יודע עזרא שהמקדש וירושלים עתידים להשתנות ולהתקדש קידוש אחר עולמי בכבוד ה׳ לעולם כך נגלה לי מסוד הּ ליראיו לפיכך הנכנס עתה שם אין בו כרת:

According to Raavad, even according to the view that קידשׁה לעתיד לבא with respect to the kedusha of Eretz Yisrael, the kedusha of Yerushalayim and the makom mikdash is not eternal.

Nafka minah: according to the Rambam, a person who is tamei is prohibited from entering the makom mikdash.  According to Raavad, we would expect there to be no issur.  Raavad rather cryptically writes  אין בו כרת, which leaves open the possibility of there being no onesh, but still assur for some other reason.

Minchas Chinuch suggests that there should be other nafka minot as well.  In last week's parsha we had a din of באת יבא אהרון אל הקודשׁ, that kohanim can enter the mikdash only to do avodah, but not without any purpose.  Does this issur apply b'zman ha'zeh?  M.C. suggests that it depends on this machlokes Rambam and Raavad whether there is kedushas mikdash or not post churban or not.

He repeats the same idea this week at the end of the mitzvah of mora mikdash  (mitzvah 254). Here too, whether or not the issur applies b'zman ha'zeh would seem to depend on this machlokes Rambam and Raavad whether or not there is kedushas mikdash after the churban or not.  Rambam who holds there is kedusha l'shitaso in Beis haBechira 7:7 holds that there is an issur d'oraysa of morah mikdash even b'zman ha'zeh:

אע"פ שהמקדש היום חרב בעונותינו חייב אדם במוראו כמו שהיה נוהג בו בבניינו. לא יכנס אלא למקום שמותר להכנס לשם ולא ישב בעזרה ולא יקל ראשו כנגד שער המזרח שנאמר את שבתותי תשמורו ומקדשי תיראו. מה שמירת שבת לעולם אף מורא מקדש לעולם שאע"פ שחרב בקדושתו עומד:

Presumably the Raavad would disagree.

One "little" problem: if the M.C. is correct, where is the hasagah of the Raavad there stating his disagreement?  Where is the Raavad to tell us that the issur of mora mikdash no longer applies?

R' Soloveitchik explained (see footnote to Reshimos Shiurim Yevamos p 134) that even according to Raavad there can be an issur of mora mikdash even though there is no kedushas mikdash.  The halacha is that there is an issur of offering korbanos on a bamah in your backyard b'zmah ha'zeh.  This shows that irrespective of whether there is kedushas mikdash or not, the makom mikdash remains for all eternity the place chosen by Hashem to the exclusion of any other area.  The din of mora similarly is not dependent upon the place having kedusha, but rather of the place of the mikdash being chosen by Hashem to be special and unique.  

R' Betzalel Zolti  in Mishnas Yaavetz O.C. 47:5 (see this post as well) draws a similar distinction between kedushas mikdash and what he calls kedushas machneh, and in this way explains why even though Raavad holds there is no kareis for entering the makom mikdash, there is still an issur.  With respect to kareis, the Torah refers to defiling the "mikdash Hashem," (Bamidbar 19:20)  וְנִכְרְתָה הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַהִוא מִתּוֹךְ הַקָּהָל כִּי אֶת⁠ מִקְדַּשׁ ה׳ טִמֵּא, meaning the onesh depends on keduash mikdash.  However, with respect to entering whole tamei, the Torah speaks only about the "machaneh" which is holy,  (Bamidbar 5:3)  וְלֹא יְטַמְּאוּ אֶת⁠ מַחֲנֵיהֶם אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי שֹׁכֵן בְּתוֹכָם.  The makom mikdash may, according to Raavad, lack kedushas mikdash, but it still remains the machaneh Shechina.  

what haftarah did you read this week?

Rama paskens in the end of siman 428:

כשקורין שתי פרשיות מפטירין באחרונה (מרדכי פרק בני העיר) ובלבד באחרי מות וקדושים דמפטירין הלא כבני כושיים שהיא הפטרת א"מ

Mishne Berura comments:

פני שההפטרה של פרשה שניה מזכרת מתועבת ירושלים משא"כ כשהן נפרדות שכבר קראו הלוא כבני כושיים בפרשת אחרי בהכרח להפטיר בפרשת קדושים התשפוט. והנה הלבוש חולק על רמ"א ודעתו דגם כשהיא כפולה קוראין הפטרה אחרונה דהיינו של פרשת קדושים אבל הב"ח וש"א כתבו שנתפשט המנהג בכל הקהלות כהרמ"א

I happened to daven in a different minyan than my usual one on shabbos morning and was surprised when the person reading the haftarah read the perek from Yechezkel and not the haftarah of כבני כושיים.  Not only does the Rama say otherwise, but even the posek acharon of shuls in our time, i.e. the Artscroll, says that minhag Ashkenaz is like the Rama.  No one else said anything, and I figured I was not a regular there, so what do I know (the Rabbi of this shul davens at the later minyan, so he was not present). As the baal koreh was finishing, finally someone knowledgeable did walk up to the bimah and asked the gabai what's going on.  Someone else then yelled out that the reader was correct, as that is what the luach says.  Curious, I went over and asked to see the luach.  It's published by Heichal Shlomo and it's available online, so you can see for yourself here on p 64  that this person is indeed correct.  

So do the Rama and Mishne Berura and even the Artscroll have it all wrong?

Here is my conjecture.  R' Y.M. Tukachinsky, author of Gesher haChaim and other works, also wrote a luach of minhagei Eretz Yisrael.  This issue came up, and he was mechadesh that the minhag in Eretz Yisrael is not like the Rama.  This elicited a backlash from the Chazon Ish and others, who disagreed.  The occurrence of Acharei Mos and Kedoshim as separate parshiyos where the potential for this question to arise is fairly infrequent, so it's not you can just ask someone what was done last year.  As luck would have it, you can read about the controversy in this month's edition of HaMaayan, and so you don't need me to spell out the details of the back and forth.  In terms of our story, my hunch is that the luach printed by Heichal Shlomo is built around Rav Tukachinsky's luach of minhagei Eretz Yisrael, and therefore, assumes not like the Rama. (I wish I could find contact info to confirm this.) That's fine and dandy if you live in Eretz Yisrael and think R' Tukachinsky got it right, but it seems to me to be a very questionable stretch to assume this is the minhag Ashkenaz in the US and elsewhere.  

Afterwards, the person who read the haftarah came over to the person who tried to correct him and admitted that in retrospect he thinks he made a mistake, as he found a parsha sheet that said the haftarah should be כבני כושיים. (I learned from this that a random parsha sheet trumps even the heilege Artscroll.)  Assuming like the lishna basra that this was an error, I wonder what this minyan should do next week.  Should they read the haftarah of התשפוט like everyone else reads for Kedoshim?  Or since they already read that haftarah of התשפוט for Achrei Mos, albeit in error, should they read  כבני כושיים for Kedoshim? I hope someone there asks their Rav what to do before next shabbos rolls around.  I also hope I get myself out of bed up on time to get to my normal place of worship so I avoid situations like this : ) 

It's worth mentioning that there is yet a third minhag, minhag Yerushalayim, to read the same haftarah of כבני כושיים for both Acharei Mos and Kedoshim (see here).  The essential background to all this is the last line of the last Mishna in Megillah, which says  רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר, אֵין מַפְטִירִין בְּהוֹדַע אֶת יְרוּשָׁלַיִם.  Bartenua comments: משום יקרא דירושלים.  We don't want to read a haftarah that speaks badly of Yerushalayim.  He adds that we don't pasken like R' Eliezer.  Tos Y"T asks: the stam Mishna earlier writes that we do read the maaseh ha'eigel even though the sin is an embarrassment because there is a silver lining to that embarrassment -- suffering the embarrassment enables us to get kaparah.  Why does R' Eliezer agree with the sevara there, but not with respect to reading about the sins of Yerushalayim?  Why not read about the wrongdoing of Yerushalayim to suffer embarrassment and get kaparah?  Furthermore, adds the Tos Y"T, if R' Eliezer is correct, he should have a problem with the haftarah of Kedoshim as well:   וכן הפטרה דקדושים התשפוט התשפוט את עיר הדמים (יחזקאל כ"ב) וכו' He goes on to try to answer this question, but is his answer, which you can look up, really satisfying?  This story speaks for itself:

קרה מקרה בבית הכנסת אשר בבתי ברודא כאשר התחיל הקורא לקרוא בפרשת קדושים את הפטרת הלא כבני כושיים, קרא לעומתו רב גדול אחד מהעולים החדשים אז, – קוראים התשפוט! ירד בעל הקריאה מעל הבימה ואמר: אני אינני מוכן לעמוד בהקפדתו של ר' אליעזר, אם כת"ר רוצה דוקא בהפטרת התשפוט, יעלה כת"ר ויקרא! ולבסוף הכריעו המתפללים והקורא קרא את הפטרת הלא כבני כושיים".

Besmirching  יקרא דירושלים is not something to take lightly.

Final point: a takeaway from the above story to keep in mind not just for this week, but for every week, is that the words of the navi are to be taken seriously and taken to heart.  The haftarah is not just a time to shmooz with a neighbor or go out of shul for a stroll or for some liquid fortification while the person called for maftir struggles to read words that are incomprehensible to him and most of the listeners.  The haftarah is the navi speaking to us from the page, across history.  When you read about to'eivos, you should look at what goes on around you and your eyes should fill with tears.  And when you read about the redemption of Yerushalayim, you should also look around you and fill your heart with joy.

Maharal Tzintz's kashe on the derasha that kibud av is not doche issurim

Some Poilish pilpul for you: Rashi on last week's parsha quotes that we learn from  אִ֣ישׁ אִמּ֤וֹ וְאָבִיו֙ תִּירָ֔אוּ וְאֶת־שַׁבְּתֹתַ֖י תִּשְׁמֹ֑רוּ אֲנִ֖י הֹ׳ אֱלֹקיכֶֽם that if a parent tells a child to be mechalel shabbos, the child doesn't have to listen.  R' Aryeh Leib Tzintz in Meishiv Nefesh (16:5) asks why we need this din -- we can learn the same chiddush from elsewhere.  There is a din that a father can be meifer the nedarim of his daughter.  If hypothetically the mitzvah of kibud av were to be doche other issurim (like shabbos, or like the mitzvah to keep a neder), then there should be no need for hafarah.  Once the father expresses his displeasure with his daughter keeping the neder, kibud av would require her not to fulfill it.  Since the Torah does in fact require hafarah, QED that kibud av alone cannot override an issur.  

the link between shabbos and mikdash

Last post got a little too long, so I broke this part off.  These parshiyos are rich with topics worth commenting on, so it's hard to pick and choose.  I always like to write about Eretz Yisrael, esp this week when we had Yom haAtzmaut.  אֶת־שַׁבְּתֹתַ֣י תִּשְׁמֹ֔רוּ וּמִקְדָּשִׁ֖י תִּירָ֑אוּ why does the parsha juxtapose these two mitzvos?  These days everyone knows the line that Shabbos is in time what the mikdash is in geographical space, so the to go hand in hand.  The Tiferes Shlomo says something else.  He quotes from Chazal that only one who experiences tzaar and pain and mourns the fact that we have no mikdash will be zocheh to see the mikdash rebuilt.  כָּל הַמִּתְאַבֵּל עַל יְרוּשָׁלַיִם זוֹכֶה וְרוֹאֶה בְּשִׂמְחָתָהּ, וְשֶׁאֵינוֹ מִתְאַבֵּל עַל יְרוּשָׁלַיִם אֵינוֹ רוֹאֶה בְּשִׂמְחָתָהּ (Parenthetically, R' Rivlin, the mashgiach of Yeshivat Kerem b'Yavneh explained ומי שאינו מתאבל אינו זוכה ורואה בשמחתה based on the Chazal that teaches with respect to Yaakov Avinu that ויקומו כל בניו וכל בנותיו לנחמו וימאן להתנחם"(בראשית לז לה). ושאלו, "מאי טעמא? לפי שאין מקבלין תנחומים על החי. אבל המת משתכח מן הלב.  By continuing to be misavel, we show that Yerushalayim, the mikdash, is, like Yosef, still alive -- it is not some dead memory that is destined to be forgotten.)  However, when it comes to Shabbos, we say in bentching שלא תהא צרה ביום מנוחתנו.  Shabbos is a day of simcha (at least according to the Yerushalmi); it's not a day of mourning.  We have to give up for a day being .כָּל הַמִּתְאַבֵּל עַל יְרוּשָׁלַיִם  How then can we do to be assured זוֹכֶה וְרוֹאֶה בְּשִׂמְחָתָהּ?  That's why the Torah put these two mitzvos together.  Tif Shlomo writes:  כן מעלת יום השבת שהשכינה שורה בתוך בנ"י ואין אנו רשאי' לדאוג על החורבן וז"ש את שבתותי תשמורו לשמוח ביום השבת. ואע"פ כן ומקדשי תיראו. שנזכה לראות במהרה בבנין בהמ"ק.  Despite not being able to mourn on shabbos, וּמִקְדָּשִׁ֖י תִּירָ֑אוּ, don't worry -- you will still be zocheh to see the rebuilding of the mikdash. 

When I saw this Tif Shlomo, it reminded me that Tos Brachos 48b mentions and rejects the minhag of saying ויש שמתחילין בנחמנו וחותמים בנחמת ציון עירך ובבנין ירושלים on shabbos instead of saying רחם, but the GR"A to OC 188:4 holds that this minhag is preferable.  That debate revolves around the issue of saying a bakasha on shabbos (Tos explains רחם הוי לשון תחנה ואין אומרים תחנונים בשבת אבל נחם אינו לשון תחנונים) but that being said, we see at least an allusion to nechama for the churban on shabbos.  

Lulei d'mistafina I was thinking that the very words the Tif Shlomo cites to indicate that we take our mind off aveilus for the churban on shabbos are actually added as a prayer for Yerushalayim.  Meaning, שֶׁלֺּא תְהֵא צָרָה וְיָגוֹן וַאֲנָחָה בְּיוֹם מְנוּחָתֵֽנוּ is not some general request that we have happiness on shabbos, but rather refers to the  צָרָה וְיָגוֹן וַאֲנָחָה gufa of the churban hamikdash.  What we are asking for is for Hashem to remove that pain of the churban by giving us the mikdash back.  Proof that this is correct is in the very next phrase, as we continue וְהַרְאֵֽנוּ ה׳ אֱלֺקינוּ בְּנֶחָמַת צִיּוֹן עִירֶֽךָ וּבְבִנְיַן יְרוּשָׁלַֽיִם עִיר קָדְשֶֽׁךָ!  

Based on this, I think the reason we stick רְצֵה וְהַחֲלִיצֵֽנוּ in bentching here is not just because this is where we always stick mei'ein ha'meora, the inyana d'yoma, like yaaleh v'yavo.  The reason we stick it in here is because it fits the theme of the bracha, which is about the restoration of malchus beis david and the rebuilding of Yerusahalayim.  The Tiferes Shlomo 's argument is that we can't properly mourn Yerushalayim while we celebrate Shabbos.  My point is the opposite side of the coin is just as true -- we can't properly celebrate Shabbos while in s state of mourning for the churban.  Therefore, when we ask Hashem to restore malchus beis David, to restore Yerushalayim, we are also asking for the restoration of Shabbos to its full splendor as well, Shabbos while is immune from the pain and suffering of seeing our city in ruins, and can therefore be celebrated properly.

doing mitzvos because they make sense

1) Rashi addresses why the command אִ֣ישׁ אִמּ֤וֹ וְאָבִיו֙ תִּירָ֔אוּ וְאֶת־שַׁבְּתֹתַ֖י תִּשְׁמֹ֑רוּ ends off אֲנִ֖י ה׳ אֱלֹקיכֶֽם.  You can say about every mitzvah אֲנִ֖י ה׳ אֱלֹקיכֶֽם who is giving the tzivuy, so why mention it here?  Rashi says the pasuk is mechadesh that if your parent tells you to do an aveira, you don't have to listen because אֲנִ֖י ה׳ אֱלֹקיכֶֽם overrides the command to listen to them.  There is a hierarchy of who you need to listen to.  Abarbanel suggests that the Torah is teaching us a fundamental yesod here. The mitzvah of kibud av is a basic, moral imperative that any ethical person can appreciate.  Chazal tell us that Eisav excelled in the mitzvah of kibud av.  The gemara (Kid 31) tells a story about a non-Jew, Dama ben Nesina, who refused to wake his father even if it meant giving up a lucrative sale.  The same is true about having a day of shabbos, a day off from work.  It's common sense that workers need a break.  True, no other nation has rules saying things like you can't turn on a light on the weekend, but they appreciate the general concept of a day of rest.  The same in fact can be said about many of the being adam l'chaveiro laws in parshas Kedoshim -- these are norms of basic morality that all people subscribe to -- but it all starts with shabbos and kibud av.  Therefore, the Torah jumps in and tells us אֲנִ֖י ה׳ אֱלֹקיכֶֽם.  The reason you have to obey these principles is not because they make sense, not because it's what all people do, not because there is some ethical principle behind them, but rather simply because Hashem commanded them, because אֲנִ֖י ה׳ אֱלֹקיכֶֽם.  

In the aseres hadibros the mitzvah of kibud av v'eim (Shmos 20:11) has a promise of reward  כַּבֵּ֥ד אֶת־אָבִ֖יךָ וְאֶת־אִמֶּ֑ךָ לְמַ֙עַן֙ יַאֲרִכ֣וּן יָמֶ֔יךָ עַ֚ל הָאֲדָמָ֔ה אֲשֶׁר־ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ נֹתֵ֥ן לָֽךְ׃, that we should have a long life in Eretz Yisrael.  Why does the Torah specifically mention the reward?  Netziv quotes a principle that Ramban elaborates on in our parsha of Acharei Mos.  Ramban holds that fundamentally, mitzvos are meant to be done in Eretz Yisrael.  Not just mitzvos ha'teluyos ba'aretz, but all mitzvos.  However, if we had nothing to do in galus, it would not be so easy to retain our identity or even to know what to do and how to do it when we return to the land.  The Torah therefore commands us to do mitzvos that are not teluyos ba'aretyz even in chu"l so that we remain in practice and have the necesssry training so we can do them properly when G-d willing we come back to Eretz Yisrael.  

I would have thought, says the Netziv, that this Ramban is talking only about mitzvos bein adam lamakom like putting on tefillin, wearing tzitzis, etc.  However, when it comes to mitzvos bein adam l'chaveiro, like kibud av, like v'ahavta l'reiacha, etc., what difference does it make whether I am in Eretz Yisrael or in chu"l -- those mitzvos should apply equally at all times and places, with no distinction.  That's why, says Netziv, the pasuk tacks on that the reward for kibuv av is  לְמַ֙עַן֙ יַאֲרִכ֣וּן יָמֶ֔יךָ עַ֚ל הָאֲדָמָ֔ה.  The Torah is showing us that even a mitzvah sichlis like kibid av that you think would apply equally everywhere is still is fundamentally connected to Eretz Yisrael and its reward can be gleaned more easily and in greater abundance only in Eretz Yisrael.  Logically, it makes no sense, and that gufa is the point -- the mitzvos, even those that make sense to us, transcend logic.  Netziv writes: משום הכי כתיב במצוה זו של כיבוד אב ואם גם כן ״על האדמה״ ללמדנו דאחר שהיא מצות עשה הכתובה בתורה הרי היא ככל חוקי התורה שאין בהם טעם ושכל אנושי

That's the same point the Abarbanel is making.  Yes, kibud av is something that makes sense to do; yes, having a weekend break makes sense.  But that's not why you should keep the mitzvos. אֲנִ֖י ה׳ אֱלֹקיכֶֽם, irrespective of what makes sense or doesn't make sense.

(Abarbanel frequently addresses himself to the Rambam's rationalizations of mitzvot.  It would be interesting to do a fuller study of his attitude toward taamei hamitzvot and rationalism in general, but that's beyond a blog post.)

2) While on the topic of Abarbanel: the pasuk writes with respect to a person who gives his children over to Molech that  עַ֥ם הָאָ֖רֶץ יִרְגְּמֻ֥הוּ בָאָֽבֶן (20:2).  Abarbanel suggests that this phrase may mean אולי שכיון הכתוב בזה שמבלי התראה ולא חקירת ב״ד ירגמוהו.  I am not aware of a makor that no hasra'as is required here or no chakiras eidim is required, but if anyone knows of one, let me know, otherwise I imagine you have to say Abarbanel simply means this is something you might deduce based on peshuto shel mikra.  

kedoshim in a nutshell

What are the parameters of kedoshim ti'hiyu?  Each individual has to figure out what is appropriate for their situation, their time, their place.  There is no one-size-fits-all answer.

The last Rambam in Hil Shecheinim:

כל הרוצה למכור קרקע ובאו שנים כל אחד מהן אומר אני אקח בדמים אלו ואין אחד מהן בעל המצר. אם היה האחד מיושבי העיר והאחד משכני השדה שכן העיר קודם. שכן ות"ח ת"ח קודם. קרוב ות"ח ת"ח קודם. שכן וקרוב השכן קודם שגם זה בכלל הטוב והישר הוא. קדם אחד וקנה זכה ואין חבירו שראוי לקדם לו יכול לסלקו הואיל ואין אחד מהן בעל המצר שלא צוו חכמים בדבר הזה אלא דרך חסידות ונפש טובה היא שעושה כך: סליקו להו הלכות שכנים

Magid Mishne comments:

 מבואר בהלכות וכ"כ ז"ל ועניין דין בן המצר הוא שתורתנו התמימה נתנה בתקון מדות האדם ובהנהגתו בעולם כללים באמירת קדושים תהיו והכוונה כמו שאמרו ז"ל קדש עצמך במותר לך שלא יהא שטוף אחר התאוות וכן אמרה ועשית הישר והטוב והכוונה שיתנהג בהנהגה טובה וישרה עם בני אדם ולא היה מן הראוי בכל זה לצוות פרטים לפי שמצות התורה הם בכל עת ובכל זמן ובכל ענין ובהכרח חייב לעשות כן ומדות האדם והנהגתו מתחלפת לפי הזמן והאישים והחכמים ז"ל כתבו קצת פרטים מועילים נופלים תחת כללים אלו ומהם שעשו אותם בדין גמור ומהם לכתחלה ודרך חסידות והכל מדבריהם ז"ל ולזה אמרו חביבין דברי דודים יותר מיינה של תורה שנאמר כי טובים דודיך מיין:

Meishiv ra'ah tachas tovah

The Netziv has a pshat in "lo tikom v'lo titor" (19:18) that in Harchev Davar he builds up from a Midrash but R' Teichtel quotes it in his derashos b'shem the Netziv based on a story.  I'll do you the favor of putting 2 and 2 together, esp since everyone loves a story.  Pshat in the pasuk: the Netziv explains the smichus of לֹֽא־תִקֹּ֤ם וְלֹֽא־תִטֹּר֙ to the previous pasuk of לֹֽא־תִשְׂנָ֥א אֶת־אָחִ֖יךָ בִּלְבָבֶ֑ךָ הוֹכֵ֤חַ תּוֹכִ֙יחַ֙ אֶת־עֲמִיתֶ֔ךָ וְלֹא־תִשָּׂ֥א עָלָ֖יו חֵֽטְא that we are dealing with someone who has done you wrong, who you have a reason to be angry with.  First the Torah says not to harbor hatred in your heart and instead to give the person tochacha and tell them what they did wrong.  Then the Torah adds not to bear a grudge or do something to get back at the other guy, even though you would be in your rights to do so.

Netziv uses this as a springboard to turn our attention to the pasuk in Mishlei, "Meishiv ra'ah tachas tovah lo tamush ra'ah mi'beiso." (Mishlei 17:13)  Chazal comment that it' not a good idea even to be "meishiv ra'ah tachas ra'ah," to respond in kind to someone who has done you wrong, exactly what lo tikom v'lo titor is warning against.  What inspired Chazal's comment is the term "meishiv."  Hashava means giving back what you owe, paying your dues.  Meishiv ra'ah tachas tovah makes no sense -- the person who did the tovah is not owed ra'ah back.  The word meishiv only makes sense when speaking about meishiv ra'ah tachas ra'ah, hence the derash.  But how do you understand pshat in the pasuk?

And now the story: R' Yisrael Salanter was once travelling by train, and he did not go with an escort of a gabai, he did not put on airs or wear ostentatious rabbinic garb, so if you did not know who he was, you would not take notice.  A young guy bumped into him on the train, got upset, and heaped scorn and insults on R' Yisrael, who took it in stride.  When the train pulled into Vilna, the young man saw the throngs gathered outside to greet the gaon.  He asked someone to point out to him who R' Yisrael Salanter was, and then almost fainted when they pointed to the individual he took to be the regular passenger who he had insulted.

The next day the young man came to see R' Yisrael, apologized profusely, and begged forgiveness.  R' Yisrael Salanter of course forgave him, but then inquired what the young man was doing in Vilna.  He related that he had come to meet a gvir whose help he needed to get started in business, but unfortunately, that individual was not available, and so the whole trip was for naught.  When R' Yisrael heard the young man's story, he insisted that the young man come with him and he would help introduce him to contacts that would help him.  The young man could not take it -- here he had insulted R' Yisrael, and not only was he being forgiven, but R' Yisrael Salanter wanted to go out of his way to do chessed for him!

R' Yisrael Salanter explained that precisely because the young man had done him wrong, he cannot take no for an answer and must do him a favor.  It's human nature when someone does us wrong to think badly of them.  Lo tikom v'lo titor is almost impossible to avoid.  But we have a rule -- ma'aseh motzi midei machshava.  Actions speak louder than words and can change a mindset.  To avoid lo tikom v'lo titor it's not enough to just forgive, but a person needs to do more -- a person needs to do a tovah for the party that had wronged them.  Only then will they be able to avoid the pitfall of bearing a grudge or thinking of paying the person back in kind.

"Meishiv ra'ah tachas tovah" -- if in place of the tovah that a person should have done to the party that wronged him, which would have quelled the dispute immediately, a person instead pays that party back in kind, he is meishiv the ra'ah that he got tit-for-tat, thinking that now we are even and things will end here, "lo tamush ra'ah mi'beiso," he will find that the dispute will continue and never end.  The payback that was supposed to even things up will be taken as a new slight that deserves a new response, and back and forth the cycle will continue.  

That's not only a great pshat in the pasuk, it's great midos, to be able to respond to an insult not just with forgiveness, but with kindness.

Notes from the Underground - b'chukoseihem lo teileichu

1) Ran (A"Z daf 11) writes that there is no violation of bchukoseihem lo teileichu so long as an action can be justified as serving some purpose or function, even if gentiles behave in a similar way.  Maharik similarly paskens, and is quoted l'halacha by the Rama, that, for example, a doctor may wear a uniform, even though it is worn by gentiles, because it serves a function to identify his role and is not being done to imitate non-Jews.

Tos does not seem to agree with the Ran's interpretation of that gemara.  The GR"A in Y.D. therefore (along with bringing proofs against the Ran) rejects the psak of the Rama and Maharik.   

There is a custom to decorate the shul with flowers and shrubbery for Shavuos.  Some say that the fragrant flowers commemorate the sweet fragrances that Hashem released into the air as each dibra of the aseres ha'dibros was given; others say that that it commemorates the green fruit trees Hashem caused to bloom on Har Sinai.  GR"A famously rejects this whole practice; he held that it mimicked the practice of the gentiles, who put out trees on their holiday.

This GR"A is l'shitaso.  According to Ran/Maharik/Rama, since the greenery serves a function for us -- to commemorate Har Sinai and mattan Torah -- even if the gentiles have a similar practice, it is permitted.  According to GR"A, functional need/use is not a justification to imitate chukoseihem, and so he rejects the minhag.

2) In case you did not see it, worth taking note of R' Gershon Edelstein's insightful explanation as to why the chareidi (lav davka -- he means religious) community was affected more severely by the virus: the chiloni community is a tinok she'nishbah and therefore cannot be held accountable for their aveiros; we, on the other hand, should and do know better. 

3) Bad news for lockdowns -- apparently things are not quite working out as promised, as you can see from the quote below (taken from here).  The solution Cuomo and others, including our own community leaders, advocate is simply more of the same -- it has to work sooner or later, right??? 

Dr. Scott Gottlieb, former head of the Food and Drug Administration and a lead booster of social distancing, admitted Sunday that the draconian measures aren’t working as the experts promised.

“The concerning thing here is that we’re looking at the prospect that this may be a persistent spread,” Gottlieb said on CBS News’ “Face the Nation,” further noting 20,000 to 30,000 new reported cases per day despite intense lockdown orders in most states.

Notes from the Underground

"Peret karmicha lo ti'lakeit..."  The Noam Elimelech sees the kerem, the vineyard, described in these pesukim as an allusion to the tzadik who is filled with good deeds.  Peret = pratiyus, focusing on the details, as opposed to the klal, the bigger picture.  Isiah Berlin has a famous essay (no, the Noam Elimelech did not say this part) in which is contrasts the fox and the hedgehog.  The fox knows many little things; his worldview is shaped by the amalgamation of many isolated, individual details that he somehow fits together, sometimes neatly, sometimes not so neatly.  The hedgehog knows one thing -- a hedgehog thinker sees everything through the lens of one overarching principle that then colors and shapes how he sees all the details.  A person can get lost in the myriad details of halacha -- we have peratim and we have pratei pratim for every single mitzvah.  We can become foxes to an extreme.  The Torah here is perhaps warning us that we also sometimes need to take a step back and learn from the hedgehog.  Don't get lost in pratiyus.  You have to have a bigger picture in life, a framework in which to hang all those details.  Knowing every Pri Megadim in Shulchan Aruch is great, but you have to have a vision of what avodas Hashem is all about, what values the halacha is trying to inculcate. Without vision, without a grasp of the larger picture, a person can get lost.

Notes from the Underground -- erev Shabbos edition

1) It's a good sign when Bloomberg is willing to run a piece entitled "Lockdown Critics May Have Some Valid Points."  I applaud the writer for at least being willing to consider arguments that the mainstream media have shut out and that most of our community leadership chooses to ignore. 

 

2) When the kohen gadol does avodah on Y"K, he goes to mikveh before and after changing from the bigdei zahav to bigdei lavan and then again before and after changing back from bigdei lavan to bigdei zahav.  Chasam Sofer asks: the k"g needs to go to mikveh before putting on bigdei lavan because it is a step up in kedusha -- these are the garments worn to enter kodesh kodashim -- but why does he need to go to mikveh when he changes back to the bigdei zahav which are just used for ordinary avodah?

 

Chasam Sofer answers that after doing avodah in the bigdei lavan, after having an experience of intense kedusha, even ordinary tasks take on a new light and must be done with greater intensity and kedusha.  Switching back to bigdei zahav is not a step down, but needs to be a step up as well.

 

Like I've said from Day #1, when we eventually do leave the bunker, we need to return to our daily routine, to our bigdei zahav, with greater energy, focus, and kedusha, not return to things as they were before.  We need to grow from the experience and take a step up.

 

3) U'mi'zaracha lo titein l'ha'avir laMolech v'chilalta es shem Hashem Elokecha...  Seforno and Ramban explain that since korbanos to Hashem consist only of animals, if a person offers to Molech something even more precious, namely his children, it is a chilul Hashem, as it shows that he places more importance in Molech than in HKB"H. 

 

This is a lesson in life -- where you put your kochos and energy, what you are willing to sacrifice for, shows what you value most.  If a person spends 30 minutes davening lifelessly through a blatt from an English gemara but then spends 3 hours arguing passionately on facebook or twitter  about all kinds of shtuyos, what does that say about which he values more?  He's putting Molech first, and that's the chilul Hashem.  And it's not just a matter of the time invested.  It's also a matter of attitude.  One person might spend 12 hours a day at work and have only a small window to learn because his dream and ambition is to make it to the top of the corporate ladder, while another person might spend the same 12 hours at work and have a small window to learn because he needs to pay tuition bills, a mortgage etc., but that small window of learning time is his whole chiyus, it's his "ki heim chayeinu."  The first person can't stop talking about what new project will lead to his next promotion; the second person can't stop talking about R' Akiva Eiger's kashe on a Tosfos.  What's keva and what's aray?  What's the ikar and what's the tafeil?  What are you passionate about and what is just something you do because you have to?   Daveing, learning, chessed are not just items on a checklist that we have to do each day, but they have to be the #1 priority, they have to be things we are invested in more than anything else that takes up our time and energy. 

On one leg

The gemara tells the story of a ger who came to Hillel and asked to be taught the Torah on one foot.  Hillel responded with a reformulation of v'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha -- don't treat others in a way that you would not want to be treated yourself.

Was this idea of  "standing on one foot" just a random crazy idea to test Hillel's patience?

The Aish Kodesh (in Derech haMelech) writes that in fact we find the idea of standing on one foot in halacha.  The difference between people and angels is that angels stand on "regel yishara," one single foot, but we have two legs.  When we daven we are supposed to put our feet together so that we look like angels standing on just one leg.

An angel has no yetzer ha'ra.  It fulfills its mission with single minded purpose, like a computer.  There is only one leg moving it in the single direction it can go in.  Not so human beings.  We have one leg that wants to move us in the direction of ratzon Hashem, like the angels, but we also have a second leg that often wants to take us places that we shouldn't be.  

When a person stands before Hashem to daven, he needs to forget about that second leg. Tefilah is not a time to struggle with or focus on one's failings -- it is a time to focus on coming close to Hashem.  At that moment we can be like angels with one leg because Hashem will listen to us despite our struggles and despite our failings so long as we aspire to move in the right direction.

That's great when we are davening, but our ger had a tremendous question for Hillel: how do we make this part of our life?  How do we incorporate this into the way we observe and learn all of Torah?  How can a person feel all the time that Hashem loves him and listens to him and values him and doesn't care about the failings and struggles that we all go through?  How do we stand on one leg?

The answer is if you want to feel valued and have self worth, then treat others that way.  If you see all those around you as having just a single "regel yishara," you see people as moving in the right direction, then that becomes part of how Hashem will always see you as well.

Two types of planting

The midrash reads "ki tavo'u el ha'aretz u'nitatem kol eitz maachal" as a charge to learn Torah and cause the "eitz chaim" to grow and flourish in Eretz Yisrael.  The very same midrash goes on to interpret the pasuk as encouragement to plant literal trees in Eretz Yisrael.  Just like Hashem started the world off by planting gan eden, so too, we must imitate Hashem and plant as soon as we come to Eretz Yisrael.

So what are we supposed to pack in our carry on to grab as soon as we get to Eretz Yisrael -- a gemara, or a hoe and spade?  Do we first build greenhouses or first build yeshivos?  How do we reconcile the two interpretations of the midrash?

Rav Teichtel in Eim HaBanim Smeicha and in his derashos answers that there is no contradiction.  What Chazal are telling us is that to build a country we need people who wear multiple hats.  We need farmers who are bnei Torah who appreciate the spiritual value of the land; we need bnei Torah who are willing to roll up their sleeves to help plow the fields.

Ashrei doreinu that we have been zocheh to see a return to the land and the fulfillment of both types of planting.

chilul Hashem -- a cheit bein adam l'chaveiro

Mitzvos apply equally to everyone and anyone chayav in them.  The Torah says, for example, to eat matzah, and so whether you are Joe Ploni or whether you are R' Akiva Eiger you have to eat the same amount of matzah in the same time span.  No so when it comes to the mitzvah of kedushah.  The redundancy of "kol adas Bnei Yisrael," explains Netziv, means that the mitzvah of being kadosh was not given to everyone equally as a blanket one size fits all chiyuv, but rather it was given to each individual member of Klal Yisrael according to his/her ability.  This would mean that for someone on a higher level, acting with greater kedusha is not a hidur, but is a necessary. 

The gemara (Yoma 86) writes that teshuvah and Yom Kippur cannot wash away the sin of chilul Hashem.  It can only be expiated by the sinner's death.  Why should that be so?  The Meshech Chochma (19:12, see Rav Cooperman's notes) quotes the derasha of Chazal (Sh 114) on the pasuk "...kol m'san'ai ahavu ma'ves" not to read it as "m'san'ai" but rather as "masni'ai" -- not "those who hate me [G-d]," but rather, "those who cause me [G-d] to be hated."  If a talmid chacham does not act properly, does not dress properly, e.g. he walks around in stained clothes, does not appear dignified, then people will lose respect for Torah.  Rashi in Yoma (86a d"h chilul Hashem) explains chilul Hashem means being "chotei u'machti," causing others to sin.  In other words, chilul Hashem is not just an offense against G-d -- it's an offense against man, a bein adam l'chaveiro problem.  Who knows how many people may have seen this "talmid chacham" who does not act properly and been negatively influenced?  Who knows how many people were caused spiritual harm by his bad example?  A bein adam l'chaveiro requires making restitution to those who were harmed.  It's one thing to return stolen goods, to repay someone for damages caused to their property, but how to you restore faith that was has stolen from others?  

The Mishna in Avos 5:18 tells us that a "chotei u'machti es ha'rabim" will not be able to do teshuvah.  Bartenu explains that teshuvah is precluded because otherwise the chotei might end up on gan eden while those he led astray would be in gehenom, which would not be fair.  Based on the Meshech Chochma's approach, it is impossible to do teshuvah because it is impossible to make restitution. 

I was wondering if the Rambam agrees with this definition of chilul Hashem as being chotei u'machti.  He writes in Yesodei haTorah 5:11:

ויש דברים אחרים שהן בכלל חילול השם. והוא שיעשה אותם אדם גדול בתורה ומפורסם בחסידות דברים שהבריות מרננים אחריו בשבילם. ואע"פ שאינן עבירות הרי זה חילל את השם כגון שלקח ואינו נותן דמי המקח לאלתר. והוא שיש לו ונמצאו המוכרים תובעין והוא מקיפן. או שירבה בשחוק או באכילה ושתיה אצל עמי הארץ וביניהן. או שדבורו עם הבריות אינו בנחת ואינו מקבלן בסבר פנים יפות אלא בעל קטטה וכעס. וכיוצא בדברים האלו הכל לפי גדלו של חכם צריך שידקדק על עצמו ויעשה לפנים משורת הדין. וכן אם דקדק החכם על עצמו והיה דבורו בנחת עם הבריות ודעתו מעורבת עמהם ומקבלם בסבר פנים יפות ונעלב מהם ואינו עולבם. מכבד להן ואפילו למקילין לו. ונושא ונותן באמונה. ולא ירבה באריחות עמי הארץ וישיבתן. ולא יראה תמיד אלא עוסק בתורה עטוף בציצית מוכתר בתפילין ועושה בכל מעשיו לפנים משורת הדין. והוא שלא יתרחק הרבה ולא ישתומם. עד שימצאו הכל מקלסין אותו ואוהבים אותו ומתאוים למעשיו הרי זה קידש את ה' ועליו הכתוב אומר ויאמר לי עבדי אתה ישראל אשר בך אתפאר:

According to Rashi, bad behavior by the talmid chacham is wrong because there is always a therefore... that follows -- therefore, people will be led astray.  The Rambam doesn't mention this.  It sounds like the negative behavior itself is the issue; the very fact that the "talmid chacham" falls short of what is expected of him is wrong.   

theft of a good word -- the mechanism of brachos

Apologies for posting on last week’s parsha so late in the week.  I've just been really pressed for time.

The Torah writes that Hashem will punish the person who worhsips Molech “l’ma’an tamei es mikdashi u’lchalel es shem kodshi.” (20:3)  There is an obvious difficulty: the person might be miles and miles away from the makom mikdash when he is worshipping Molech. How does his actions cause the mikdash to become tamei?  Rashi answers that “mikdash” in this context doesn't mean the “beis hamikdash,” but rather means “knesses Yisrael.” We, the nation, become defiled when even one individual does wrong.

Ramban brings proof from Rashi from a famous gemara in Brachos that most people know, but probably read a little differently than Ramban. Chazal tell us that someone who eats food without making a bracha is a thief, as he/she has stolen from Hashem and from Knesses Yisrael. If you’re like me, you probably understood the gemara to mean that what the thief stole is  the food. Not so says Ramban. [Does the food belong to the collective community of Knesses Yisrael?] What the thief stole is the presence of the Shechina from Klal Yisrael. Hashem wants us to say brachos – that helps sustain the world and brings us close to Him. If you don’t say a bracha, you have robbed Klal Yisrael of hashra’as haShechina. So too, explains Ramban, someone who worships Molech drives Hashem’s presence away, and therefore harms the community as a whole.

Rashi agrees with Ramban that it’s not the food we are robbing by not saying a bracha, but he gives in two words a different explanation of what is being stolen.  What you are stealing, says Rashi (Brachos 35b) is “es birchaso.” You owe Hashem a bracha and you stole it away from him!  Sometimes you can be a thief even if you don’t owe any money – you can owe a thank you as well, and be a thief for not giving it.  I don't think this new definition of gezel only applies bein adam laMakom.  You can steal the thank you you owe your spouse, the bracha of mazal tov you owe your friend, the good morning you owe your neighbor.  My daughter did some math problem well and she complained to me that I didn’t tell her “good job.” Es chata’ai ani mazkor – I was a gazlan! I stole the praise I owed her. We have to be careful to pay not just our monetary debts, but also the debt of words of praise we owe to Hashem and others. 

Maharal in Gur Aryeh on this pasuk disagrees with the Rishonim and learns the gemara k'peshuto that it is in fact the food which you are stealing.  Everything in the world is like hekdesh – “l'Hashem ha’aretz u’melo’ah.” The way we release the food from the ba’alus of hekdesh is to transform Hashem from owner to giver, and the way to do that is by saying a bracha. When we describe Hashem as “Baruch…” what we are saying is that Hashem overflows with generosity and gives to us.  We are no longing stealing -- we are accepting a gift.

Maharal in Nesiv ha’Avodah (ch 14) says yet another hesber of how a bracha removes the status of hekdesh. The way something normally is removed from the domain of hekdesh is through pidyon – substituting something else of value in its place. Bracha, explains the Maharal, works through the same mechanism.  When you recite a bracha on that delicious food that is hekdesh, you are giving hekdesh a valuable substitute in its place -- yourself.  You become the thing that is holy in place of the food, and therefore the food can be eaten.

setting down roots

1) To the man on the street, the concept of “holiness” belongs in the domain of the spiritual elite. The Dalai Lama, for example, is called “His Holiness” – the expectation is that someone who is “holy” will be living in a monastery in Tibet, not be riding the subway and be walking the streets of Manhattan. That’s what makes the opening of our parsha so remarkable. “Dabeir el kol adas Bnei Yisrael… kedoshim te’hiyu.” Davka here, when speaking of kedusha/holiness, the Torah demands that Moshe gather all of Klal Yisrael to make sure every single individual gets the message. That message is twofold: 1) yes, there is a lofty level of kedusha that only the spiritual elite can reach, but there are also levels of kedusha that each and every one of us can incorporate into our own lives; 2) even if we never reach those lofty levels, we can at least look to them as guides to the path we should be following. Even the GR”A claimed that he did not get beyond the lower rungs of positive midos described by the Mesilas Yesharim. So what are we doing when we learn such a book? We are setting our sights on where we should be headed, even if we never get there.

2) The meforshim (see the very nice Ohr haChaim) discuss why the Torah mentions “u’netatem kol eitz ma’achal” as a preface to the mitzvah of orlah. The Torah could just tell us not to eat the fruit of a tree during the first three years without talking about planting -- obviously you have to plant a tree to have fruit.  The Midrash quotes the pasuk of “acharei Hashem Elokeichem teileichu” and asks how it is possible to follow G-d.  The gemara in Sota answers that the pasuk means to follow the midos of G-d – just as he is rachum, so too we must show rachmanus; just as he is gomeil chassadim, so too must we be gomeil chassadim, etc.,  The Midrash here adds an additional element: just as G-d planted, “Vayita…gan b’Eden,” so too, we should be like him and plant. “U’nitatem…” is not just the circumstances under which the issur of orlah applies -- it's a command in its own right, a way of being more like G-d.  The Tanchuma writes that Hashem said that even if we find Eretz Yisrael filled with every good thing, we shouldn’t just sit back and enjoy that bounty, but we must plant. Why plant if there is no need?  Our Midrash provides the answer – because planting is a way of becoming more like G-d.

The Midrash also connects “u’nitatem” to the pasuk of “eitz chaim hi la'machazikim bah.”  Our pasuk is talking about planting real trees that produce real fruit; the "eitz chaim" is a metaphorical tree, the tree of Torah -- what does one thing have to do with the other?  The Sefas Emes explains that there are physical roots and spiritual roots.  When a Jew plants a tree in Eretz Yisrael, the goal is not just to set tree roots into the ground -- the goal should be to better the world, the goal should be to bring Hashem's plan, not just dates and figs, to fruition. 

more on molech and contextual interpretation

Although the Targum Yonasan in last week’s parsha interprets the issur of molech as a prohibition against marrying an aku"m, seemingly against the Mishna in Megillah, the T.Y. in this week’s parsha (20:2) interprets the pasuk prohibiting molech as an issur avodah zarah. Why the difference? My wife’s grandfather, R' Dov Yehidah Shochet, explained that it depends on context. In last week’s parsha, the issur of molech appears in the context of issurei arayos. Therefore, the Targum explains the pasuk in a way that best fits that context, as an issur arayos (baruch she’kivanti - see last week's post). In this week’s parsha, the pasuk appears at the beginning of a perek and the context is not yet set. Therefore, Targum renders the pasuk literally and explains it as an issur avodah zarah.

The Ibn Ezra says exactly the opposite. Back in last week’s parsha, where the context is arayos, Ibn Ezra interprets the molech pasuk as an issur avodah zarah. In this week’s parsha, where the context is not set, he writes, “yitein m’zar’o lamolech – v’ha’ta’am: lishkov im ovedes kochavim” -- here he interprets it as an arayos-related issur.  Very hard to understand.

The question that begs asking is why there is this switch in context switches between the parshiyos – why in last week’s parsha does the issur of molech appear towards the end of the list of arayos but in this week’s parsha it is in the lead off position before any arayos are discussed? Furthermore, why does the order in which the arayos are presented changed between the two parshiyos?