Despite this idea, the authorities mention the issue of deciding based on "the majority of wisdom" (i.e. greater knowledge and expertise in a particular area of Halachah), and there are even those who say that we follow a "majority of wisdom" over a "majority of number" (Likutei Ha-Ramban, Sanhedrin chap. 4 in the name of the Rahag). One must distinguish between "the majority of wisdom" for each authority based on his area of expertise: there are Rabbis whose expertise is monetary laws, and there are Rabbis whose expertise is in Kashrut, etc... Maran Ha-Rav Avraham Yitzhak Ha-Cohain Kook's expertise was in the area of the workings of Klal Yisrael relating the rebuilding of our Nation and our Land, the beginning of the Redemption and in understanding the Master of the Universe’s direction of our history. He investigated, clarified, arranged, and constructed a complete method of understanding, whose scope and depth is far above all of the Sages of the generation of Acharonim (later authorities).
For example, Ha-Rav Joseph Soloveitchik, with all of his brilliance, did not construct an all-compassing method of understanding, and all of his teachings were, in essence, about the phenomenon of the religious individual. He did not present a philosophy of communal faith: The Rav only discussed the religious experience of the individual as opposed to the communal religious experience which includes understanding Hashem's role is guiding the history of the Nation of Israel.
Tuesday, February 09, 2010
Rav Kook vs. R' Soloveitchik: toras hatzibur vs. toras hayachid
From the blog of R' Aviner (link):
rambam/ra'avad on lo tachmod
The Rambam writes (Hil Gezeilah ch 1) that the issur of lo tachmod is violated if a person covets his neighbors property and talks him into selling it. Ra’avad disagrees and writes that so long as the neighbor says “Rotzeh ani” – “I want to sell it,” there is no prohibition. According to the Ra’avad, lo tachmod is violated only if the coveted property is seized a against one's neighbor's will.
Rambam writes further that there are no malkos for violating lo tachmod because it is a lav she’ain bo ma’aseh. Ra’avad disagrees and opines that the reason for the lack of malkos is because lo tachmod is nitan l’tashlumin, the object taken must be returned.
The Magid Mishne suggests that these are not two separate issues, but one point is contingent upon the other, l’shitasam. The Rambam holds that lo tachmod is violated even if a valid sale is done and there is no obligation of tashlumin; the reason for the lack of malkos must be because there is no ma’aseh involved in violating the lav. The Ra’avad who understands lo tachmod to be seizure by force, an active ma'aseh, is forced to invoke the idea of nitan l’tashlumin for the dispensation from malkos.
But why according to the Rambam are we so convinced that this lav lacks a ma’aseh? True, talking a neighbor into selling something does not involve physical action, but coercive tactics are not limited to verbal pressure alone. One can easily imagine a scenario where all kinds of action are involved in pressuring someone into a sale.
The Steipler (Birchas Peretz, P' Yisro) answers that the issur of lo tachmod is not the effort to obtain a neighbor’s property – the issur is coveting a neighbor’s property, the emotion and desire. However, that desire must make itself manifest before halacha recognizes it. Lo tachmod is defined as a lav she’ain bo ma’aseh because the deed or talk involved in obtaining what belongs to someone else is just an indicator of the desire of the heart, but it is that desire which is the actual subject of the issur.
Another example of the same idea: Tosfos (Shavuos 4a) writes that if someone took an oath to eat a specific loaf of bread and then threw that loaf into the sea, he would not get malkos because the violation of the shevu’a, not eating the bread, is a lav she’ain bo ma’aseh. Question: in this case the person did a ma’aseh by tossing the loaf into the sea, so why is there no malkos? The answer again is that tossing the bread in the sea is just a demonstration that the person does not want to eat it, but it is the lack of eating which is the actual violation of the lav.
Rambam writes further that there are no malkos for violating lo tachmod because it is a lav she’ain bo ma’aseh. Ra’avad disagrees and opines that the reason for the lack of malkos is because lo tachmod is nitan l’tashlumin, the object taken must be returned.
The Magid Mishne suggests that these are not two separate issues, but one point is contingent upon the other, l’shitasam. The Rambam holds that lo tachmod is violated even if a valid sale is done and there is no obligation of tashlumin; the reason for the lack of malkos must be because there is no ma’aseh involved in violating the lav. The Ra’avad who understands lo tachmod to be seizure by force, an active ma'aseh, is forced to invoke the idea of nitan l’tashlumin for the dispensation from malkos.
But why according to the Rambam are we so convinced that this lav lacks a ma’aseh? True, talking a neighbor into selling something does not involve physical action, but coercive tactics are not limited to verbal pressure alone. One can easily imagine a scenario where all kinds of action are involved in pressuring someone into a sale.
The Steipler (Birchas Peretz, P' Yisro) answers that the issur of lo tachmod is not the effort to obtain a neighbor’s property – the issur is coveting a neighbor’s property, the emotion and desire. However, that desire must make itself manifest before halacha recognizes it. Lo tachmod is defined as a lav she’ain bo ma’aseh because the deed or talk involved in obtaining what belongs to someone else is just an indicator of the desire of the heart, but it is that desire which is the actual subject of the issur.
Another example of the same idea: Tosfos (Shavuos 4a) writes that if someone took an oath to eat a specific loaf of bread and then threw that loaf into the sea, he would not get malkos because the violation of the shevu’a, not eating the bread, is a lav she’ain bo ma’aseh. Question: in this case the person did a ma’aseh by tossing the loaf into the sea, so why is there no malkos? The answer again is that tossing the bread in the sea is just a demonstration that the person does not want to eat it, but it is the lack of eating which is the actual violation of the lav.
the wisdom of Chazal -- an unlikely source
I knocked myself out last week posting a long R’ Tzadok on the distinction between the knowledge of Chazal, which emerges from Divine insight, and other chochmos, which are just knowledge. Lo and behold my Reform brothers and sisters have posted exactly the same message (link here). I don’t know if their proof texts are the best ones to use, but they at least they are open to the idea:
What is amazing is not that even a Rabbi whose first name is Amy sees these ideas in her study of Talmud -- what is amazing is that people who profess fidelity to halacha do not.
I believe these tales balance our lack of worldly power in this world with the abundance drawn from the Divine world. Whether it is the Bat Kol revealing secret knowledge or the superior knowledge gained through Torah, the message is that the Jews hold a higher truth that cannot be gained through worldly power. Not only do we answer to a Higher authority [like Hebrew National], but that same authority provides us with insight.
What is amazing is not that even a Rabbi whose first name is Amy sees these ideas in her study of Talmud -- what is amazing is that people who profess fidelity to halacha do not.
Monday, February 08, 2010
R' Soloveitchik on "Anochi Hashem Elokecha"
Two thoughts on “Anochi Hashem Elokecha” which I heard b’shem R’ Soloveitchik:
1) A person might c”v find it hard to accept that the G-d who fought against the Egyptians is the same G-d who now patiently acts as a teacher to give his people Torah. Therefore, explains Rashi, the Aseres Hadobros begin, “Anochi… asher hotzeysicha”-- I, Hashem the lawgiver, am the same Hashem who tool you out of Egypt.
We have an obligation to imitate Hashem’s ways. The Torah is hinting that at times we must act like a warrior, at times like a patient scholar. We must respond as the situation requires and not be rigid and inflexible in our nature.
2) The echo of Hashem’s voice reverberated throughout the world and seemed to come from every direction. Rashi explains that “Anochi” reinforced the idea that there is only one Hashem that is the source of all of those voices, not multiple beings c”v.
Why create the potential for error by producing a voice that echoed from every corner of the world? Because the voice of Torah does and can echo in every corner of the globe. Whether a Jew is in NY, or Jerusalem, or China, there is no corner of the world in which Torah cannot be learned and taught.
1) A person might c”v find it hard to accept that the G-d who fought against the Egyptians is the same G-d who now patiently acts as a teacher to give his people Torah. Therefore, explains Rashi, the Aseres Hadobros begin, “Anochi… asher hotzeysicha”-- I, Hashem the lawgiver, am the same Hashem who tool you out of Egypt.
We have an obligation to imitate Hashem’s ways. The Torah is hinting that at times we must act like a warrior, at times like a patient scholar. We must respond as the situation requires and not be rigid and inflexible in our nature.
2) The echo of Hashem’s voice reverberated throughout the world and seemed to come from every direction. Rashi explains that “Anochi” reinforced the idea that there is only one Hashem that is the source of all of those voices, not multiple beings c”v.
Why create the potential for error by producing a voice that echoed from every corner of the world? Because the voice of Torah does and can echo in every corner of the globe. Whether a Jew is in NY, or Jerusalem, or China, there is no corner of the world in which Torah cannot be learned and taught.
Friday, February 05, 2010
preparations for kabbalas haTorah
בַּחֹדֶשׁ, הַשְּׁלִישִׁי, לְצֵאת בְּנֵי-יִשְׂרָאֵל, מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם--בַּיּוֹם הַזֶּה, בָּאוּ מִדְבַּר סִינָי.
וַיִּסְעוּ מֵרְפִידִים, וַיָּבֹאוּ מִדְבַּר סִינַי, וַיַּחֲנוּ, בַּמִּדְבָּר; וַיִּחַן-שָׁם יִשְׂרָאֵל, נֶגֶד הָהָר.
These two pesukim (19:1-2) seem to be filled with repetition and a lack of order. Why put "ba'u midbar Sinai" (the end of pasuk 1) before the description of leaving Refidim? Why repeat that the camp was set up "bamidbar" (pasuk 2) -- obviously so, when we were just told "vayavo'u midbar Sinai"?
The Ibn Ezra is probably closest to pshuto shel mikra here in explaining that the second pasuk is simply an elaboration on the statement "ba'u midbar Sinai" at the end of the first, but that doesn't really explain all the instances of repetition. Ramban adds that the clause "va'yavo'u midbar Sinai" in the second pasuk emphasizes that they camped immediately upon reaching the Sinai desert so that they could begin preparing for mattan Torah; there was no time lost scouting out the best campground. Ohr haChaim covers even more bases derech derush. The second pasuk is not a description of travel -- the first pasuk already told us they arrived at Sinai -- but is rather a description of the preparation required for mattan Torah. There are three key ingredients necessary for kabbalas haTorah: 1) "Vayis'u m'Refidim" -- Chazal tell us that the name Refidim is a hint to "rafu y'deyhem", a lack of zeal and intensity in learning. The people had to re-energize themselves to receive the Torah. (Netziv writes that kedusha is absorbed in proportion to the effort and preparation made to receive it; therefore even the journey toward Sinai had to be made with alacrity and zeal). 2) "Vayavo'u midbar Sinai, vayachanu bamidbar" -- Torah can only be absorbed with a sense of humility; the people had to become low, like the desert. 3) "Vayichan sham yisrael..." -- as Rashi explains, "vayichan" in the singular reflects a sense of unity, the third necessary ingredient for kabbalas haTorah.
It is easy to speak of re-energizing, of approaching Torah and even preparation for Torah with zeal, but where is that energy and inspiration supposed to come from? The Shem m'Shmuel has a nice thought based on these pesukim. The Besh"t taught that a person is where his/her machshava is. (I think one of my kids spends most of her days not in school based on this principle!) The road to kabbalas haTorah is very difficult if you think of taking step after step after step through the hot desert sun until you get there. But if you think that you are already there, you are mentally ready and waiting for kabbalas haTorah, it's just a few steps to the desert until it happens, then the journey is much easier. "Va'yavo'u midbar Sinai" -- the people mentally arrived at Sinai, and only then, "Va'yisu m'Refidim..." they began the actual physical journey, inspired and energized.
Maybe it would be a good idea (I can dream, right?) to give away free tickets to the next siyum hashas immediately after the next masechta or cycle finishes. "Va'yavo'u midbar Sinai" -- you have the tickets, your seat is reserved, you're already there at the Garden! Even better than Superbowl tickets (OK, maybe that's pushing it : ) You already start thinking about yourself as a Jew who has finishes shas at least once in his life -- tremendous! The next couple of hundred daf are going to go a lot easier. How many bnei Torah are sitting b'guf in yeshiva with their machshava some place else because they don't believe this idea and we do such a poor job communicating it?
וַיִּסְעוּ מֵרְפִידִים, וַיָּבֹאוּ מִדְבַּר סִינַי, וַיַּחֲנוּ, בַּמִּדְבָּר; וַיִּחַן-שָׁם יִשְׂרָאֵל, נֶגֶד הָהָר.
These two pesukim (19:1-2) seem to be filled with repetition and a lack of order. Why put "ba'u midbar Sinai" (the end of pasuk 1) before the description of leaving Refidim? Why repeat that the camp was set up "bamidbar" (pasuk 2) -- obviously so, when we were just told "vayavo'u midbar Sinai"?
The Ibn Ezra is probably closest to pshuto shel mikra here in explaining that the second pasuk is simply an elaboration on the statement "ba'u midbar Sinai" at the end of the first, but that doesn't really explain all the instances of repetition. Ramban adds that the clause "va'yavo'u midbar Sinai" in the second pasuk emphasizes that they camped immediately upon reaching the Sinai desert so that they could begin preparing for mattan Torah; there was no time lost scouting out the best campground. Ohr haChaim covers even more bases derech derush. The second pasuk is not a description of travel -- the first pasuk already told us they arrived at Sinai -- but is rather a description of the preparation required for mattan Torah. There are three key ingredients necessary for kabbalas haTorah: 1) "Vayis'u m'Refidim" -- Chazal tell us that the name Refidim is a hint to "rafu y'deyhem", a lack of zeal and intensity in learning. The people had to re-energize themselves to receive the Torah. (Netziv writes that kedusha is absorbed in proportion to the effort and preparation made to receive it; therefore even the journey toward Sinai had to be made with alacrity and zeal). 2) "Vayavo'u midbar Sinai, vayachanu bamidbar" -- Torah can only be absorbed with a sense of humility; the people had to become low, like the desert. 3) "Vayichan sham yisrael..." -- as Rashi explains, "vayichan" in the singular reflects a sense of unity, the third necessary ingredient for kabbalas haTorah.
It is easy to speak of re-energizing, of approaching Torah and even preparation for Torah with zeal, but where is that energy and inspiration supposed to come from? The Shem m'Shmuel has a nice thought based on these pesukim. The Besh"t taught that a person is where his/her machshava is. (I think one of my kids spends most of her days not in school based on this principle!) The road to kabbalas haTorah is very difficult if you think of taking step after step after step through the hot desert sun until you get there. But if you think that you are already there, you are mentally ready and waiting for kabbalas haTorah, it's just a few steps to the desert until it happens, then the journey is much easier. "Va'yavo'u midbar Sinai" -- the people mentally arrived at Sinai, and only then, "Va'yisu m'Refidim..." they began the actual physical journey, inspired and energized.
Maybe it would be a good idea (I can dream, right?) to give away free tickets to the next siyum hashas immediately after the next masechta or cycle finishes. "Va'yavo'u midbar Sinai" -- you have the tickets, your seat is reserved, you're already there at the Garden! Even better than Superbowl tickets (OK, maybe that's pushing it : ) You already start thinking about yourself as a Jew who has finishes shas at least once in his life -- tremendous! The next couple of hundred daf are going to go a lot easier. How many bnei Torah are sitting b'guf in yeshiva with their machshava some place else because they don't believe this idea and we do such a poor job communicating it?
noble ideals no matter what the title is
To her credit, I think this is a great quote (cited in the Jewish Star under a ridiculously misleading headline) from Rabbah/Maharat Hurwitz:
Just wanted to point it out in case you missed it amidst all the mud-slinging over what her title should be. If you take the issue of what to call her off the table, there is nothing not to applaud here (and yes, I realize that the "what to call her" is a big issue placed on the table by her and Rabbi Weiss' deliberate choice).
Having had to decide on a H.S. for my eldest daughter recently, I can tell you one of the issues that my wife and I repeatedly have discussed is the neither-here-nor-there attitude towards girls' education. On the one hand, schools have to go through the motions of really teaching something; on the other hand, no school (neither on the right or left) really aims to produce a girl who will spend her free time immersed in a sefer. People live up to the exectations set. Women will by and large spend their leisure time (which modern society allows for more of than any other point in history) immersed in the latest sheitel ads rather than immersed in Rashi, halacha, or other limudim. Is that better than doing what Maharat/Rabbah Hurwitz does with her time?
“I’m pretty traditional,” Hurwitz admitted drolly with a faint South African
accent. “I know halacha. I keep halacha very carefully. I have tremendous
emunah. I can’t convince somebody else that I really am Orthodox and that Rabbi
Weiss is really Orthodox. The only way is for somebody to realize it themselves.
And they’ll realize it.”“All I’m doing is teaching Torah. Learning Torah. Helping people in their difficult times and their happiest times; and through Yeshiva Maharat I’m helping others learn to do the same.”
Just wanted to point it out in case you missed it amidst all the mud-slinging over what her title should be. If you take the issue of what to call her off the table, there is nothing not to applaud here (and yes, I realize that the "what to call her" is a big issue placed on the table by her and Rabbi Weiss' deliberate choice).
Having had to decide on a H.S. for my eldest daughter recently, I can tell you one of the issues that my wife and I repeatedly have discussed is the neither-here-nor-there attitude towards girls' education. On the one hand, schools have to go through the motions of really teaching something; on the other hand, no school (neither on the right or left) really aims to produce a girl who will spend her free time immersed in a sefer. People live up to the exectations set. Women will by and large spend their leisure time (which modern society allows for more of than any other point in history) immersed in the latest sheitel ads rather than immersed in Rashi, halacha, or other limudim. Is that better than doing what Maharat/Rabbah Hurwitz does with her time?
Thursday, February 04, 2010
the wisdom of Chazal (II)
(Continued from part I.) A human being can harvest the wheat, make the four, knead the dough, but once the bread is in the oven it is no longer in his hands. At that point something else takes over, or more specifically, someone else -- Hashem.
Rav Ashi knew that, and he knew that the evidence of Hashem's taking over (so to speak) is in the crust of the bread that forms because of the baking process. So why didn't he point to that spot as the focus of his bracha, the point over which the "hamotzi" is recited? Why did he not answer King Menashe's question? Here Rav Tzadok says something incredible:
והיה אפשר לרב אשי לסבור סברא זו מהיכן דקדים בישולא מעצמו גם כן דזה שכל פשוט דמהיכן שמקדים לאפות כבר קדם להיות מוכן למאכל אדם. רק כל הלכות של חכמי התלמוד לא היה אלא מדברים המושגים בהתגלות לבם ולא מן השכל לבד שזה אין נקרא חכמה כלל באמת. וכל זמן שלא היה בהתגלות לבבו הכרה זו שהיכי דקדים בישולא השם יתברך מקדים להכין לו המזון אז לא היה יכול להורות דמברך המוציא שם דאין דברי חז"ל והלכות שלהם כמנהגים הקבועים באיזה ספר מוסר מצד השערת שכל. דאם כן מה היה ההבדל בין התלמוד המקודש לספרים אחרים מחכמי ישראל. אבל כל הלכות שלהם הוא רק מהתגלות הלב עד שנפתח הפה בהכרח לומר הלכה זו שאי אפשר כלל בענין אחר. והיינו על ידי הרגשת הנוכח דהשם יתברך בפרט כל דבר עד שירגיש באמת בלבבו איך השם יתברך ברגע זו שליט בכל והוא אופה פיתו ומכין מזונו ולולי הוא לא היה לו לאכול עד שממילא נפתח פיו לברך המוציא בדוכתי דקדים בישולא על ידי הרגשה ברורה ומפורשת בלב כזו אפשר לחדש אותה הלכה להיות הלכה קבועה אחר כך בתלמוד. כידוע דכל דבר שכבר היה אחד שהרגיש בירור אור זה על בוריו כבר נפתח שער אותו האור בעולם. והוא פתוח אחר כך לכל דזה כל ענין עסק הדורות שקבע השם יתברך אף על פי שהם מתקטנים והולכים. לפי שכל האורות שנפתחים בכל דור ודור על ידי אנשי סגולה מחכמי ישראל אין נסתמים עוד והם פתוחים לעולם ונעשים הלכות קבועות לכל ישראל:
Because knowing the answer is not enough! So long as Rav Ashi did not feel in the depths of his soul that this was the truth, the fact that he mentally understood it was insufficient. R' Tzadok talks epistomology: Torah is not what Chazal understood, not some body of facts or knowledge which Chazal figured out or derived. Were that the case, the Torah of Chazal would be no different than any other collection of wisdom or body of knowledge. Torah requires "hisgalus halev" -- a revelation that springs not from the mind, but from the depths of the neshoma.
Rav Tzadok speaks in so many places of the gemara in Baba Basra (12, Ch. Ramban there) which tells us that although open prophecy has been lost, there is still an echo of nevuah which remains to the Chachamim. "Ari yish'ag mi lo yinabei" -- when prophecy overwhelmes a person with its roar, it is an inescapable message that must be delivered and spoken. When a talmid chacham is inspired by this "hidden" level of prophecy, he cannot but help teach the Torah revealed to him to others, who in turn are inspired and drawn to the message, their hearts opened. Knowledge, facts, wisdom, lack this quality, and are not Torah.
Chazal were not greater than us just in degree; it's not that their IQ was higher, they did better on their SAT, that they were all Mensa members. Chazal's understanding was different in kind. The wisdom of Chazal, the wisdom that comes from the clarity of "hisgalus halev", is a different type of intelligence than even the smartest of us have. That type of knowledge is not acquired by doing lateral thinking problems or brain exercises -- it's acquired by tzidkus and yiras shamayim and learning lots of Torah.
ולפיכך אף על פי שדורות אחרונים קטנים מכל מקום יש להם מעלה זו דננס על גבי ענק. כי כבר פתוחים לפניהם כל שערים שפתחו קדמונים והם מחדשים והולכים לפתוח שערים אחרים. אף על פי שהם קטנים מאד מכל מקום הם במעמקים יותר. כי הם כבר עברו שער בנפשם שנפתח לראשונים:
What does it mean that our generation "stands on the shoulders of giants"? If Einstein was a genius and I lived after Einstein, am I any smarter? Makes no sense. But again, we are not speaking of the mind, we are speaking of the neshoma. When Chazal revealed a Torah teaching, it was not just another fact to pass on to the next generation, but it was a transformation of the neshomos of klal yisrael. Chazal did not just make the unknown known, they made the unfelt into a hisgalus halev.
Rav Ashi knew the right answer, but he recognized that in his mind it was just wisdom, it was not Torah, and his teaching it in shiur would not open the hearts and neshomos of his listeners. That revelation could only come from Menashe, who not only understood the right answer, he felt it.
Given this framework, does it make any sense in the world for a person to sit back in his armchair and think that since Chazal lived in a patriarchical society, therefore they instituted patriarchical system of law, a system which we need to do our best to circumvent now that we are more enlightened? Does it make any sense to say that since Chazal lived in a society that had certain pagan ritual practices, they therefore adopted certain rules regarding nidah or other laws? Is "hidden" nevuah that comes from hisgalus halev subject to bias, subjectivity, a product only of the spirit of its time, or is it an eternal truth?
There is so much more to this particular R' Tzadok. See it inside (Resisei Layla #13) if you can!
Rav Ashi knew that, and he knew that the evidence of Hashem's taking over (so to speak) is in the crust of the bread that forms because of the baking process. So why didn't he point to that spot as the focus of his bracha, the point over which the "hamotzi" is recited? Why did he not answer King Menashe's question? Here Rav Tzadok says something incredible:
והיה אפשר לרב אשי לסבור סברא זו מהיכן דקדים בישולא מעצמו גם כן דזה שכל פשוט דמהיכן שמקדים לאפות כבר קדם להיות מוכן למאכל אדם. רק כל הלכות של חכמי התלמוד לא היה אלא מדברים המושגים בהתגלות לבם ולא מן השכל לבד שזה אין נקרא חכמה כלל באמת. וכל זמן שלא היה בהתגלות לבבו הכרה זו שהיכי דקדים בישולא השם יתברך מקדים להכין לו המזון אז לא היה יכול להורות דמברך המוציא שם דאין דברי חז"ל והלכות שלהם כמנהגים הקבועים באיזה ספר מוסר מצד השערת שכל. דאם כן מה היה ההבדל בין התלמוד המקודש לספרים אחרים מחכמי ישראל. אבל כל הלכות שלהם הוא רק מהתגלות הלב עד שנפתח הפה בהכרח לומר הלכה זו שאי אפשר כלל בענין אחר. והיינו על ידי הרגשת הנוכח דהשם יתברך בפרט כל דבר עד שירגיש באמת בלבבו איך השם יתברך ברגע זו שליט בכל והוא אופה פיתו ומכין מזונו ולולי הוא לא היה לו לאכול עד שממילא נפתח פיו לברך המוציא בדוכתי דקדים בישולא על ידי הרגשה ברורה ומפורשת בלב כזו אפשר לחדש אותה הלכה להיות הלכה קבועה אחר כך בתלמוד. כידוע דכל דבר שכבר היה אחד שהרגיש בירור אור זה על בוריו כבר נפתח שער אותו האור בעולם. והוא פתוח אחר כך לכל דזה כל ענין עסק הדורות שקבע השם יתברך אף על פי שהם מתקטנים והולכים. לפי שכל האורות שנפתחים בכל דור ודור על ידי אנשי סגולה מחכמי ישראל אין נסתמים עוד והם פתוחים לעולם ונעשים הלכות קבועות לכל ישראל:
Because knowing the answer is not enough! So long as Rav Ashi did not feel in the depths of his soul that this was the truth, the fact that he mentally understood it was insufficient. R' Tzadok talks epistomology: Torah is not what Chazal understood, not some body of facts or knowledge which Chazal figured out or derived. Were that the case, the Torah of Chazal would be no different than any other collection of wisdom or body of knowledge. Torah requires "hisgalus halev" -- a revelation that springs not from the mind, but from the depths of the neshoma.
Rav Tzadok speaks in so many places of the gemara in Baba Basra (12, Ch. Ramban there) which tells us that although open prophecy has been lost, there is still an echo of nevuah which remains to the Chachamim. "Ari yish'ag mi lo yinabei" -- when prophecy overwhelmes a person with its roar, it is an inescapable message that must be delivered and spoken. When a talmid chacham is inspired by this "hidden" level of prophecy, he cannot but help teach the Torah revealed to him to others, who in turn are inspired and drawn to the message, their hearts opened. Knowledge, facts, wisdom, lack this quality, and are not Torah.
Chazal were not greater than us just in degree; it's not that their IQ was higher, they did better on their SAT, that they were all Mensa members. Chazal's understanding was different in kind. The wisdom of Chazal, the wisdom that comes from the clarity of "hisgalus halev", is a different type of intelligence than even the smartest of us have. That type of knowledge is not acquired by doing lateral thinking problems or brain exercises -- it's acquired by tzidkus and yiras shamayim and learning lots of Torah.
ולפיכך אף על פי שדורות אחרונים קטנים מכל מקום יש להם מעלה זו דננס על גבי ענק. כי כבר פתוחים לפניהם כל שערים שפתחו קדמונים והם מחדשים והולכים לפתוח שערים אחרים. אף על פי שהם קטנים מאד מכל מקום הם במעמקים יותר. כי הם כבר עברו שער בנפשם שנפתח לראשונים:
What does it mean that our generation "stands on the shoulders of giants"? If Einstein was a genius and I lived after Einstein, am I any smarter? Makes no sense. But again, we are not speaking of the mind, we are speaking of the neshoma. When Chazal revealed a Torah teaching, it was not just another fact to pass on to the next generation, but it was a transformation of the neshomos of klal yisrael. Chazal did not just make the unknown known, they made the unfelt into a hisgalus halev.
Rav Ashi knew the right answer, but he recognized that in his mind it was just wisdom, it was not Torah, and his teaching it in shiur would not open the hearts and neshomos of his listeners. That revelation could only come from Menashe, who not only understood the right answer, he felt it.
Given this framework, does it make any sense in the world for a person to sit back in his armchair and think that since Chazal lived in a patriarchical society, therefore they instituted patriarchical system of law, a system which we need to do our best to circumvent now that we are more enlightened? Does it make any sense to say that since Chazal lived in a society that had certain pagan ritual practices, they therefore adopted certain rules regarding nidah or other laws? Is "hidden" nevuah that comes from hisgalus halev subject to bias, subjectivity, a product only of the spirit of its time, or is it an eternal truth?
There is so much more to this particular R' Tzadok. See it inside (Resisei Layla #13) if you can!
the wisdom of Chazal (I)
There is an amazing R' Tzadok in Resisei Layla (#13) that is worth seeing in its entirety inside, but I just want to discuss a little piece that I quoted elsewhere in a comment. A difficult gemara (Sanhedrin 102b): Rav Ashi was saying shiur and remarked that tomorrow he will discuss "our buddy" Menashe. That night King Menashe appeared to Rav Ashi in a dream and asked how he dared refer to Menashe as his buddy. "Do you even know where to slice bread when you say the bracha of haMotzi?" demanded Menashe. Rav Ashi replied that he did not, and he offered to say over that halacha in the name of Menashe in the shiur if he would teach it to him. Menashe answered that the bread is broken where it first forms a crust, but he then chastised Rav Ashi, "You don't even know where to slice bread and you call me your 'buddy'?!"
The gemara continues with Rav Ashi asking Menashe why he worshipped avodah zarah if he was such a talmid chacham and Menashe replying, but we'll leave that for another time. What's going on in this section of the story? If Menashe wanted to show up Rav Ashi, teaching him that he was not as smart as he thought he was, you would expect him to stump him with some difficult sugya in taharos, maybe a shverr Rambam ; ) -- why ask him davka this halacha of where to slice the bread for hamotzi? Even more perplexing: I can't imagine that Rav Ashi had not said "hamotzi" hundreds of times before -- how did he not know this halacha?
ואמרו בסנהדרין (קב ב) חברא קרית לי מהיכי קשרו המוציא וכו' פירוש כי הברכה שתיקנו חכמים הוא הכרת הנוכח שהשם יתברך זן ומפרנס ונותן דבר מאכל והנאה זו ועל זה מברכין ברוך אתה ה' בנוכח אלא דמכל מקום הסיום בלשון נסתר המוציא וכו' וכן כל הברכות כי הכרת הנוכח הוא בדרך כלל מה שהוא מורשה מאבות. אבל בדרך פרט שיכיר בכל ענין הנוכח מהשם יתברך המורה לו באצבע לומר זה הדרך לכו וגו' כענין שהיה בימות הנביאים זה נסתלק. וזהו ששאל מהיכי קשרו וכו' פירוש אם אתה מכיר בפרט נתינת השם יתברך לחם לכל בשר ולדעת מהיכן הוא ההתחלה שהתחיל השם יתברך להכין לך לחם ומזון שעל זה תברך לו בפרט:
I once wrote an article for my wife's magazine contrasting the mitzvah of challah with the mitzvah of bikurim. All a farmer has to do for bikurim is to go out to his tree and grab one of the fruits that Hashem made the tree produce. However, to fulfill the mitzvah of challah involves harvesting wheat, going through the whole process of turning it into flour, mixing that flour into dough to make bread, and finally seperating off a portion. After all that human effort involved in making the bread, the mitzvah of challah reminds us that it's still food which Hashem provides and not our own handiwork alone.
We all know in a general sense that Hashem provides our sustenance, our parnasa, whatever we need, but it is very hard for to identify with that when it comes down to the specifics, e.g. to feel that Hashem provided me with this computer, this desk, today's job, this minute's task. We start our brachos speaking directly to Hashem -- "Baruch atah..." -- but we end the bracha in a third person generality, "HaMotzi..." When we look at the loaf before us, we recognize in some vague way that Hashem had something to do with it, but we can't really put our finger on and we don't sense Hashem's direct involvement in this specific loaf.
This was Menashe's challenge to Rav Ashi. A bracha is a recognition of Hashem; "Tell me, Rav Ashi, what specific spot in this loaf can you identify as Hashem's gift to you? What specific step in the process of producing this edible loaf causes you to say, "'Aha! That's Hashem's gift?'" The Nevi'im who lived in the generation of Menashe were privy to recognition of Hashem in that way, but Rav Ashi was no Navi.
This was very long, so I decided to treat Rav Ashi's response as a new post
The gemara continues with Rav Ashi asking Menashe why he worshipped avodah zarah if he was such a talmid chacham and Menashe replying, but we'll leave that for another time. What's going on in this section of the story? If Menashe wanted to show up Rav Ashi, teaching him that he was not as smart as he thought he was, you would expect him to stump him with some difficult sugya in taharos, maybe a shverr Rambam ; ) -- why ask him davka this halacha of where to slice the bread for hamotzi? Even more perplexing: I can't imagine that Rav Ashi had not said "hamotzi" hundreds of times before -- how did he not know this halacha?
ואמרו בסנהדרין (קב ב) חברא קרית לי מהיכי קשרו המוציא וכו' פירוש כי הברכה שתיקנו חכמים הוא הכרת הנוכח שהשם יתברך זן ומפרנס ונותן דבר מאכל והנאה זו ועל זה מברכין ברוך אתה ה' בנוכח אלא דמכל מקום הסיום בלשון נסתר המוציא וכו' וכן כל הברכות כי הכרת הנוכח הוא בדרך כלל מה שהוא מורשה מאבות. אבל בדרך פרט שיכיר בכל ענין הנוכח מהשם יתברך המורה לו באצבע לומר זה הדרך לכו וגו' כענין שהיה בימות הנביאים זה נסתלק. וזהו ששאל מהיכי קשרו וכו' פירוש אם אתה מכיר בפרט נתינת השם יתברך לחם לכל בשר ולדעת מהיכן הוא ההתחלה שהתחיל השם יתברך להכין לך לחם ומזון שעל זה תברך לו בפרט:
I once wrote an article for my wife's magazine contrasting the mitzvah of challah with the mitzvah of bikurim. All a farmer has to do for bikurim is to go out to his tree and grab one of the fruits that Hashem made the tree produce. However, to fulfill the mitzvah of challah involves harvesting wheat, going through the whole process of turning it into flour, mixing that flour into dough to make bread, and finally seperating off a portion. After all that human effort involved in making the bread, the mitzvah of challah reminds us that it's still food which Hashem provides and not our own handiwork alone.
We all know in a general sense that Hashem provides our sustenance, our parnasa, whatever we need, but it is very hard for to identify with that when it comes down to the specifics, e.g. to feel that Hashem provided me with this computer, this desk, today's job, this minute's task. We start our brachos speaking directly to Hashem -- "Baruch atah..." -- but we end the bracha in a third person generality, "HaMotzi..." When we look at the loaf before us, we recognize in some vague way that Hashem had something to do with it, but we can't really put our finger on and we don't sense Hashem's direct involvement in this specific loaf.
This was Menashe's challenge to Rav Ashi. A bracha is a recognition of Hashem; "Tell me, Rav Ashi, what specific spot in this loaf can you identify as Hashem's gift to you? What specific step in the process of producing this edible loaf causes you to say, "'Aha! That's Hashem's gift?'" The Nevi'im who lived in the generation of Menashe were privy to recognition of Hashem in that way, but Rav Ashi was no Navi.
This was very long, so I decided to treat Rav Ashi's response as a new post
Wednesday, February 03, 2010
"belief" in kabbalah
Another quote from a modern orthodox Rabbi that caught my eye on another blog was the following statement about kabbalah: "...One can be a full and complete Jew while disbelieving all of it." This Rabbi goes on to say that one must nonetheless recognize the contribution of kabbalah to our prayers, our rituals, and our customs.
With all due respect, I have no idea how to interpret such an unequivocal statement. What does it mean to conclusively “disbelieve” (not "lack understanding of", not "lack of interest in" -- "disbelieve") in kabbalah? How does a layperson (for whom this Rabbi's book is intended) arrive at such a firm "disbelief"? I had jotted down a bunch of other thoughts and questions, but I decided to just quote what R’ Tzadok haKohen writes in his Sefer Zichronos, citing a tshuvah of the Bach:
תה שנתפרסמה חכמת האמת בעולם מוסכם בפי חכמי ישראל האמיתים וכל הכופר בה הוא מכלל האפיקורסים ...דהמלעיג על דברי חכמים ומדבר דופי על דברי הקבלה שהיא מקור התורה ועיקרה וכולה יראת שמים פשיטא שאין לך מזלזל בדברי חכמים גדול מזה
two functions of eidus
Last week we discussed the principle of "lo te'hey shemiya gedolah m'reiya," i.e. dayanim who witnesses an event can pasken on the basis of their observations without hearing testimony. For example (R"H 25), three dayanim who see the new moon can declare rosh chodesh without other witnesses having to come forward and say that they saw the moon.
The Rashba (B"K 90) writes that although a single judge who is a mumche (expert) is allowed to pasken alone, the principle of "lo te'hey shemiya gedolah m'reiya" does not apply to him. Question: if the observation of a dayan serves as its own evidence and proof, why can one judge not pasken on that basis but three can?
The Ketzos (7:5) explains that a single judge who observes an event is not more authoritative than any other single witness. Since a ba'al din can contradict an eid echad and get off by just taking a shevua, the ba'al din can also contradict the judge serving as his own eid echad and is therefore never bound by the final psak.
R' Shimon Shkop (Sha’arei Yosher 7:1) explains the Rashba differently. He writes that witnesses serve a dual function: 1) they clarify the facts of the case before the court; 2) their testimony empowers the court to act. While a single judge’s observation is sufficient to allow him to decide who is chayav and who is patur, it is only “al pi shenayim eidim yakim davar,” only two witnesses which can empower the court with the authority to mete our punishment or to compel one of the parties to pay.
A final question for thought: the halacha is that "ain eid na'asah dayan," i.e. a witness can not serve as a judge on the same case he is testifying in. How then does "lo te'hey shemiya gedolah m'reiya" work? How can people who observe an event simultaneously serve as judges and witnesses? Is this a klutz kashe or something to think about?
The Rashba (B"K 90) writes that although a single judge who is a mumche (expert) is allowed to pasken alone, the principle of "lo te'hey shemiya gedolah m'reiya" does not apply to him. Question: if the observation of a dayan serves as its own evidence and proof, why can one judge not pasken on that basis but three can?
The Ketzos (7:5) explains that a single judge who observes an event is not more authoritative than any other single witness. Since a ba'al din can contradict an eid echad and get off by just taking a shevua, the ba'al din can also contradict the judge serving as his own eid echad and is therefore never bound by the final psak.
R' Shimon Shkop (Sha’arei Yosher 7:1) explains the Rashba differently. He writes that witnesses serve a dual function: 1) they clarify the facts of the case before the court; 2) their testimony empowers the court to act. While a single judge’s observation is sufficient to allow him to decide who is chayav and who is patur, it is only “al pi shenayim eidim yakim davar,” only two witnesses which can empower the court with the authority to mete our punishment or to compel one of the parties to pay.
A final question for thought: the halacha is that "ain eid na'asah dayan," i.e. a witness can not serve as a judge on the same case he is testifying in. How then does "lo te'hey shemiya gedolah m'reiya" work? How can people who observe an event simultaneously serve as judges and witnesses? Is this a klutz kashe or something to think about?
Tuesday, February 02, 2010
"our" poskim vs. "their" poskim?
A certain Rabbi writes on his blog that other "movements" have their poskim, past and present -- Rav Moshe, Rav Henkin, Rav Kook, Rav Aniner, Rav Asher Weiss, etc. (his examples) -- and he raises the question of who the leading posek for modern or centrist orthodoxy is since the passing of Rav Soloveitchik. B'mechilas kvodo, with no disrespect intended, I don't understand the question. Are achronim and gedolim to be defined by their belonging to a sociological or political faction and accepted/rejected on that basis? Is ideology now to be a determining factor in whether psak halacha is valid and authentic? While gedolim do not always share philosophical outlook, hashkafos, these differences do not effect their psak and should not effect our acceptance of psak any more than a mathematicians leanings in the realm of theory has an effect on the results of an equation.
I am troubled by this type of dialogue that emphasizes separateness -- our poskim vs. their poskim, our mesorah vs. their mesorah -- instead of the commonality of torah study. It’s one thing to dismiss it in the blogsphere, it’s another thing when even Rabbanim start speaking in those terms and accepting this imaginary dichotomy as real. Rav Moshe (for example) was not the posek of a particular community -- he was the posek of klal yisrael, just like R' Akiva Eiger, the Noda b'Yehudah, etc. The legacy of these poskim does not belong to a particular niche group or faction, but rather to every person who identifies as a ben torah, whether he be chassidic, litvish, modern orthodox, or religious zionist. That is not to say that one must follow every psak of R’ Moshe -- one does not follow every hora’ah of the Noda B’Yehudah. It means respecting the psak and ideas of gedolei hora’ah as relevant to one’s life, as worthy of study and consideration.
I am troubled by this type of dialogue that emphasizes separateness -- our poskim vs. their poskim, our mesorah vs. their mesorah -- instead of the commonality of torah study. It’s one thing to dismiss it in the blogsphere, it’s another thing when even Rabbanim start speaking in those terms and accepting this imaginary dichotomy as real. Rav Moshe (for example) was not the posek of a particular community -- he was the posek of klal yisrael, just like R' Akiva Eiger, the Noda b'Yehudah, etc. The legacy of these poskim does not belong to a particular niche group or faction, but rather to every person who identifies as a ben torah, whether he be chassidic, litvish, modern orthodox, or religious zionist. That is not to say that one must follow every psak of R’ Moshe -- one does not follow every hora’ah of the Noda B’Yehudah. It means respecting the psak and ideas of gedolei hora’ah as relevant to one’s life, as worthy of study and consideration.
Monday, February 01, 2010
materialism
From "In CHEAP We Trust: The Story of a Misunderstood American Virtue" by Lauren Weber, p. 10:
Cheapness doesn’t necessarily require abstinence and austerity – simply a thoughtfulness and care about how we live, and a skepticism toward the messages peddled by the retail-industrial complex. It means seeing oneself as an outsider in a world that values instant gratification and promotes the idea that we can understand and express our identities through the products we consume. It means embracing and even cultivating an adversarial relationship with consumer culture. It means rejecting the belief that spending money is the route to feeling good about ourselves or feeling better than, or the same as, or different from other people, that it can help us fulfill our longings or soothe our hearts.Sounds like an attitude towards materialism that we should embrace. Maybe a good book to pack and read while tanning on the beach in Cancun for Pesach.
a feminist model of leadership
The Chasam Sofer contrasts the shirah of Bnei Yisrael, the shirah of the men, which was preceded by an upswing in emunah and trust not only in Hashem but also in Moshe, “Vaya’aminu b’Hashem u’bMoshe avdo,” and which was sung (according to some views) responsively with Moshe, with the shirah of the women, which was led by Miriam in addition to Moshe. Chasam Sofer suggests that this emphasis on Moshe as the conduit to the miraculous opened the door to the cheit ha’eigel. Because so much was trust invested in Moshe as a leader, an authority figure, a miracle-maker, some replacement had to be found when Moshe was missing. The women, on the other hand, never thought of Moshe as the exclusive conduit to the miraculous – their shirah was also sung in response to Miriam, who they valued despite her not performing overt miracles or taking on the overt trappings of leadership. Therefore, the women never succumbed to the draw of the eigel.
Is there perhaps a unique feminist concept of leadership, less concerned with central authoritarian figureheads, which has its own dynamic? Are their advantages to this type of collaborative model?
Interestingly, the haftarah seems to reverse things. It is Devorah who tells Barak to lead the fight alone, yet Barak insists that Devorah participate as well, thereby sharing his authority (and the responsibility for the war).
Is there perhaps a unique feminist concept of leadership, less concerned with central authoritarian figureheads, which has its own dynamic? Are their advantages to this type of collaborative model?
Interestingly, the haftarah seems to reverse things. It is Devorah who tells Barak to lead the fight alone, yet Barak insists that Devorah participate as well, thereby sharing his authority (and the responsibility for the war).
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