ger she'nisgayeir k'katan she'nolad

The gemara (Zevachim 101b) raises the question of who could examine Miriam’s tzara’as.  Moshe?  Can’t be, says the gemara, because Moshe was not a kohen.  Aharon?  Also can’t be, says the gemara, because Aharon is a relative and you can’t pasken on this issue for a relative.  The only choice left is Hashem.

Question: why did the gemara exclude Moshe because he is not a kohen, forcing the gemara to pose the question with respect to Aharon and then come up with a new answer – why not exclude Moshe on the basis of his being a relative, and m’meila we wouldn’t even have to raise the question about Aharon because the same reason obviously would apply?  Why not kill two birds with one stone if you can?

We once mentioned (link - see hesber there) the chiddush of the Maharal (quoted by the Shev Shmaytza in his intro) that the principle of ger she’nisgayeir k’katan she’nolad does not apply to a forced geirus, which includes the geirus of mattan Torah since kafah aleihem har k’gigis.  This is why in our parsha Bnei Yisrael were crying (as interpreted by Chazal) over the arayos that became prohibited.  Even though m’doraysa a ger  has fewer issurei arayos, as he is like a newborn severed from all his part familial relationships, this din did not apply to the geirus of mattan Torah.

Based on this, the Kotzker (see R’ Wahrman’s She’eiris Yosef here) suggests a brilliant explanation of the gemara in Zevachim.  Aharon had Sinai held over his head – he was part of the forced geirus of mattan Torah.  The rule of ger she'nisgayei k'katan she'nolad did not apply to him, and therefore his relationship with Miriam was not severed.  Moshe, however, was on the mountain – his geirus was not forced.  The din of l'katan she'nolad would apply in his case, and therefore the gemara needed to offer an alternate explanation as to why he could not treat Miriam’s tza’ra’as.

 

Two other points worth noting:

What’s the hesber for this chiddush of the Maharal?  The Kli Chemdah in Parshas VaYigash explains that the concept of geirus means divorcing oneself from one’s previous allegiance to nation and family and joining a new people. Conceptually, it makes no sense when applied to geirus en masse of the Jewish people.  We did not leave some other nation to become Klal Yisrael at mattan Torah; we were and always will be the Jewish nation.  We simply affirmed our identity and relationship to the Avos.  According to this approach, it is not the element of coercion which negated the din of ger she’nisgayeir k'katan she'nolad at mattan Torah; it’s the fact that the experience of mattan Torah was unique in occurring to the Jewish people.  This same logic would apply to Moshe Rabeinu as well.

Secondly, the Chasam Sofer in his chiddushim and al haTorah (in last week’s parsha) writes that his whole life he wondered what the makor for this din of ger she’nisgayei k’katan shenolad is.  The Meshech Chocha in Parshas VaEschanan has an answer.  Bnei Yisrael were told to separate from their wives in preparation for mattan Torah.  Immediately afterward, Hashem commanded, “Shuvo lachem l’ohaleichem,” allowing them to return to their previous marriages.  Says the Meshech Chochma: what would happen if someone was married to a woman who is an ervah by Torah law but  was permitted to a ben Noach?  How could this person return to his wife who is now an issur arayos to him?  It must be, says the Meshech Chochma, that the heter of “shuvo lachem l’ohaleichem” is mechadesh that ger she’nisgayeir k’katan shenolad and therefore issues of arayos are moot.

If the Maharal is right that the din of ger shenisgayeir k’katan she'nolad did not apply by mattan Torah, then the Meshech Chochma’s proof does not hold water.

a protest without a plan

Some people are good with just rolling with the punches; I prefer to at least have some idea of a plan before running with an idea.  You can read this post as a criticism if you like, but I prefer to say I simply don’t understand what the present chareidi leadership in Israel is thinking.  Let us imagine for a moment that the chilonim were all gone and out of the equation – that Israel was a theocracy, with the chareidi leadership in full control.  Could such a state succeed?  How would it defend itself when the entire population claims exemption from army duty?  How would the economy function when the vast majority of the population requires government assistance to survive?  How would there be doctors, accountants, engineers, etc. if all secular studies are off-limits?  In short, what’s the plan? 

Simply protesting any change to the status quo is not an answer.  The status quo is untenable and unsustainable.  If we are being called upon to listen to da'as Torah, then da'as Torah must articulate a vision of how a society can be built and function given the constraints chareidi leaders are imposing. 

R’ Moshe Shternbruch spoke recently (link) at a protest and posed the following question: “The authorities today are not threatening to draft the Arabs or scheming against them. What is the difference between the chareidim and the Arabs? Legally speaking, their status is identical: both groups are citizens who are not drafted.”  B’mechilas kvodo, the Rosh Yeshiva may be correct as far as the legal argument goes, but it is incredible to me that he does not see the moral distinction.  Our obligations to the State do not stem from legal status, but rather stem from the chiyuvim of yishuv ha’aretz, of ahavas yisrael and living in harmony with our brethren (secular and religious), of fighting milchemes mitzvah.  How can one dream of comparing the loyalty and love a Jew should feel toward the State to that which an Arab feels? 

I cringe when I see the word “shmad” applied to the Jewish state.  That word should have no place in our internal debates.  Disagree with everything the government does, but I don't see how you can compare asking for a few years of service in Tzahal with the forced conscriptions into Czarist armies that our people suffered a hundred years ago.  Yet, R’ Shternbruch goes even a step further and quotes the Brisker Rav as saying (and I even hate to write this!), “…the Zionists were worse than the SS.”  Yes, I have taken the words out of context, but b’mechilas kvodam, and afar anochi tachas raglam, but I simply cannot fathom any context in which those words can be justified. 

 

The whole situation is a sad mess.

two quick points on the mitzvah of aliya la'regel and the mitzvah of viduy

Over Shavuos I dabbled a bit in the Sefer haMitzvot of the Rambam, which Rav Kook recommended learning on leil Shavuos.  Two quick observations:

1)  In mitzvas aseh 52, the Rambam writes that, “This commandment is that each man, together with each male child capable of walking on his own, must travel to the Temple…” (translation taken from the Chabad website).  The Rambam in S”hM usually seems to give just a bare bones formulation of each mitzvah.  Why then would he include here that “each male child” must be brought on aliya la’regel?  That's just a din in chinuch, not part of the mitzvah d’oraysa of aliya laregel (see Rashi Chagiga 2a d”h eizehu katan)?

2)  In mitzvas aseh 73, the mitzvah of viduy, which we read in last week’s parsha, after proving that viduy must be said even outside the context of bringing a korban, the Rambam quotes another derasha from Chazal: “We still only know of the obligation of vidui in Israel. How do we know it applies even in exile? This we learn from what Daniel said, 'They will then recite vidui for their sins and the sins of their fathers,' and from the verse, 'To You, G‑d, there is charity, and to us there is shame' "  (again, translationfrom Chabad).  This is a very interesting hava amina.  The mitzvah of viduy is a mitzvah sheb’gufo.  Why would we even entertain the thought that it applies only in Eretz Yisrael?  (Were the mitzvah to do teshuvah, I would say it by definition it entails coming closer to Hashem, and that can only fully be achieved in Eretz Yisrael.  But the Rambam formulates the mitzvah as viduy – not teshuvah – and so I think that argument is a little harder to make.)

givers and takers

Rashi explains the smichus haparshiyos between the parsha of bringing matnos kahuna and the parsha of sota (Bamidbar 5) as a warning that if you withhold from the kohen his due, then you will end up having to come to the kohen to deal with the tragic circumstance of sota. 

If the idea is a midah k’neged midah, that failing to come to the kohen for the positive end of bringing matnos kahuna will lead to coming to the kohen for some negative consequence, then why illustrate the point specifically with the parsha of sota?  Why not the parsha of metzora, which was a severe punishment that required the intervention of the kohen?  The Shem m’Shmuel’s answer should be required reading for all married folks and those who plan to be married.

Life is filled with transactions between givers and takers, mashpi’a and mekabel, tzurah imposing itself on chomer.  It’s usually very easy to spot which side of the equation is which.  Not so when it comes to matnos kahuna.  Even though the farmer must surrender part of his crop to the kohen or levi, it is the kohen who is the mashpi’a, the tzurah.  The farmer receives far more from the relationship than what he gives up in material goods.

If someone doesn’t get the message and thinks that relationships are only measured by tangible net gain/ loss, if a person thinks he gets nothing in return for what he gives to the kohen and therefore keeps his matnos kehuna, then he will inevitably have a shalom bayis / sota problem to deal with.  A husband who, for example, brings home a bouquet of flowers, is not the mashpi’a – he is the mekabeil, because he will receive the benefit of an improved relationship with his spouse that will help be mashlim him as a person.  The return is far more valuable than the few dollars invested in the roses that are gone a week later. 

week of tashlumin for korbanos of Shavuos

The gemara (Rosh Hashana 6) records that Rav Papayus offered a cow as a korban shelamim on Pesach and then offered it’s calf as a shelamim on Sukkos.  The gemara wrestles with the question of why Rav Papayus delayed so long – why didn’t he bring the calf as a korban on Shavuos, the first opportunity for aliya l’aregel after Pesach?  Isn’t there a mitzvah to not delay bringing a korban?

The Turei Even wonders why the gemara did not entertain the possibility that Rav Papayus was talking about a year in which Shavuos fell on Shabbos.  Since the Yom Tov of Shavuos is only one day, and it would have been impossible to offer a voluntary korban offering on that one day if it fell on Shabbos, that would cancel any penalty for delaying.  You can’t be liable for bal t’acher if there is an issur of bringing the korban!

The Turei Even answers that since with respect to korbanos there is tashlumin for seven days, i.e. if someone did not bring their olas re’iya on Shavuos, they still get a week to make it up, viz a viz voluntary korbanos as well, the entire week, not just the first day, counts as being part of the regel. 

R’ Wahrman in his She’eris Yosef (vol 2) points out that the shakla v’terya of the Turei Even raises a fundamental question about the nature of tashlumin: is tashlumin an opportunity to bring korbanos ha’chag once the chag has passed, or is tashlumin an indication that to some degree the cheftza of Yom Tov, the kedushas ha’chag, lingers and has not passed, even though there is no issur melacha?

If the chag is over, then then bal t’acher should not apply to korbanos which could not be brought on the first day.  But if tashlumin is an extension of Yom Tov, then even if one could not bring korbanos nedava on the first day, one would be liable for bal t’acher for failing to do so on the remaining tashlumin days, as it still counts as if one had the opportunity to bring the korban on Y"T.

This question may be behind the different minhagin as to whether tachanun is said in the week after Shavuos.  If the chag is over and tashlumin is just a korbanos make-up opportunity, then tachanun should be said.  If tashlumin means the chag itself continues, then it would seem that there is more license to omit tachanun. 

what the nazir can teach us about celebrating isru chag

Why does the nazir bring a korban chatas when he completes his nezirus? 

Ramban answers that a korban chatas is required because the nazir’s return to everyday life is a step down from the spiritual heights he reached during his nezirus.  A return to the everyday world is a surrender to the drives and desires that the nazir avoided while in his higher spiritual state of nezirus.

Rabeinu Bachyei disagrees.  We never find, he writes, a korban chatas offered for future sins that have not yet been committed; a chatas is only brought after one has already sinned.  When the nazir steps back into the mundane everyday routine that may include drinking wine, taking a haircut, etc., he has not yet done anything wrong.   

The korbanos of the nazir, explains R’ Bachyei, are not brought because of any sin (he does not say it explicitly, but it seems that this chatas is an exception to the norm because it is brought together with the olah and shelamim).  The root of the word korban is k-r-v, to draw closer; the purpose of the nazir’s korbanos is to draw him closer to the source of his spiritual energy, to give him a final boost that he can carry into his regular day to day.  “V’achar yishteh ha’nazir ya’yin” – the Torah ends the parsha by telling us that the nazir should return to his everyday life of the past.  The purpose of nezirus is not to escape from the mundane world, but to learn how to live in it properly.

Hopefully your Shavuos was celebrated with intense immersion in talmud torah and kabbalas haTorah, and so it’s only natural to feel a bit letdown on isru chag.  Rabeinu Bachyei’s perspective reminds us that islands of spirituality are not meant as an oasis of temporary escape from the day to day, a momentary high from which we must fall, but are meant to give us the spiritual vitamins we need so our day to day becomes infused with that spiritual intensity and energy as well.

amoni v'lo amonis and the definition of modesty

The gemara (Chagiga 4b) writes that when Shmuel was raised from the grave by Shaul, he thought he was facing din in shamayim and so he brought Moshe Rabeinu wih him to testify on his behalf.  Moshe did not know every detail of Shmuel’s life, but, says Tosfos (d”h d’leika), Shmuel wanted was Moshe’s confirmation that his derasha from pesukim and his actions on that basis were justified. 

What derasha is Tosfos referring to?  The Sefas Emes explained that we see from the sugya in Yevamos 76-77 that there was tremendous debate whether David haMelech could be appointed king or whether the fact that he was a descendent of Rus, an Amonis, disqualified him.  It was testimony that the beis din of Shmuel had ruled that only Amoni, males of the nation of Amon, but not Amonis, females of that nation, were disqualified, that settled the issue.  As a result of that ruling Shaul eventually lost the kingship and David was appointed in his place.  Shmuel haNavi wanted confirmation that he was correct in making that derasha and acting to support David. 

 

(According to this interpretation, the halacha of “Amoni – v’lo Amonis” is based on a derasha.  The Brisker Rav reads the conclusion of the sugya that the din was a halacha l’Moshe m’Sinai.  Something to discuss another time maybe).

 If I were giving a women’s shiur this chag, this issue would be a tempting choice to speak about.  The nation of Amon is excluded from intermarrying with Bnei Yisrael for failing to extend food and drink to Bnei Yisrael when they passed through their territory.  Doeg ha’Adomi argued that this criticism applied equally to the men of Amon as well as the women and both should be barred.  The gemara (76b) asks: but women normally do not go out to greet strange men – tzniyus!?  The gemara answers that the Amonite men could have gone to greet the men of Bnei Yisrael and the Amonite women could have gone out to the women.  We could have put up a big mechitza!  If the women failed to go out, argued Doeg, they are equally to blame. 

This question was the show stopper that would have disqualified David haMelech if not for the fact that someone remembered that Shmuel’s beis din had already paskened the issue otherwise.  However you understand why Shmuel’s beis din was the final word in the matter (halacha l’Moshe m’Simai or an irrefutable derasha), the gemara grants the point.  But what of Doeg’s tremendous kashe – how do you respond to his argument?  The gemara answers: “Kol kvuda bas melech pnima.” 

One way to read the gemara’s conclusion is that mechitza or no mechitza, it’s still unreasonable to expect women to go out and greet strangers.  If this is correct, the whole shakla v'terya can be reduced to simply a matter of metziyus, a debate about the facts on the ground: is the expectation that the Amonite women should go out and bring food to their Israelite sisters reasonable or not?  Originally the gemara thought Doeg had a great kashe and the expectation was not unreasonable, kah mashma lan that it was.

I prefer to avoid making a debate about an issue of metziyus.  Instead, I think the gemara’s shakla v’terya gets to the root of what modesty is all about.  There are two elements to modesty: 1) avoiding promiscuous behavior, especially intermingling of the sexes; 2) behaving with restraint and reserve.   The Midrash (BaMidbar Rabbah 1:3) tells us that before there was an Ohel Moed, G-d spoke to Moshe from a burning bush in Midyan, G-d spoke to Moshe in Egypt, G-d spoke to Moshe from Har Sinai. However, now that there was an Ohel Moed G-d spoke only privately from that tent to fulfill the ideal of "hatzne’ah leches".  Obviously we are not speaking about the intermingling of the sexes here.  When the Midrash speaks of hatzne’ah leches, it means comportment, a certain type of behavior, a “madreiga pnimis,” as the Maharal describes it.  See this post for more.  So often we get caught up in issues of skirt and sleeve length that we forget all about this very important second element.

Doeg thought that given the need to do chessed, it is enough if the Amonite women were sensitive to that first element of modesty, avoiding intermingling of the sexes, but they should have put aside that second element in order to help Bnei Yisrael.  So long as that mechitza was in place, there was no excuse for their inaction.  The gemara in the end rebuts this argument.  “Kol kvudah bas melech pnima” means that this second aspect of modesty, modesty of character, is primary.  If the Amonite women chose to modestly stay indoors rather than go out and greet strangers, their behavior cannot be condemned, even if it meant the sacrifice of an opportunity to do chessed.

Perhaps this gemara alerts us to another possible reason for the reading of Megilas Rus on Shavuos.  Chazal (see Rashi Shmos 34:3) tell us the fanfare and public spectacle involved in the giving of the first luchos led to their being shattered, which teaches us “ain lecha yafah min ha’tzeniyus,” there is nothing nicer than modesty.  On the first day of Shavuos we relive the lightning and thunder of Sinai, the public display of awesomeness.  The second day of Shavuos reminds us that as great as that experience was, there is yet a greater value – the value of modesty. 

vayichan yisrael -- what's even better than finding chein in each other's eyes?

Rashi famously comments that the pasuk “VaYichan sham Yisrael neged ha’ar…” uses the singular tense because Klal Yisrael was united “k’ish echad b’lev echad,” like one person with one heart in preparation for kabbalas haTorah.  R’ Yitzchok of Vorke explained the word “vayichan” comes from the word “chein.”  If every person can see the chein in his or her neighbor, then we can be united as ish echad b’lev echad.

 Beautiful vort, right?  But the Shem m’Shmuel (5762) is not satisfied.  Sure, it’s easy to get along with your neighbor if you see their chein.  The trick, though, is to get along with your neighbor even when you don’t see that chein, even when you disagree and don’t see eye to eye.  This is the level that Bnei Yisrael rose to at mattan Torah.  The Shem m’Shmuel gets this from Chazal’s statement that “Moshe hosif yom echad m’da’ato,” Moshe used his “da’as” and added an extra day to the waiting period before mattan Torah.  Here’s how:

 The word “da’as” seems to have two opposite meanings.  On the one hand, da’as means to connect on the deepest level, like the connection between a husband and wife, “V’ha’adam yada es Chavah ishto…”  On the other hand, da’as refers to the ability to discriminate and distinguish.  The Yerushalmi writes that we say havdalah in the bracha of “chonein hada’as” because without da’as there would be no havdalah, we could not draw distinctions. 

 

The truth is that there is no contradiction between the meanings; they supplement each other.  No matter who it is, if you look at every detail of a person, there is going to be something there you don’t like.  The person is great, but they like chocolate ice cream and everyone knows vanilla is better, or vica versa.  That person is a great ba’al chessed, but wears an ugly tie.  We can all come up with a million examples.  How can you ever have the da’as of connection and companionship if everyone is flawed in some way?  Answer: by having the da’as of distinction, knowing how to put to the side those nitpicky details and focus on the good that there is.

I put it in language that we can relate to; the Shem m’Shmuel says it a little deeper.  The bad taste in ice cream, the ugly ties, etc. – all these are superficial details.  If you dig into the core of a person, you are going to find a G-dly neshoma, and what’s not to like and be able to connect to about that?  If we want the da’as of connection, we need da’as to discriminate between the pnimiyus, the G-dly core, and all the other chitzoniyus that we see on the outside.

“Moshe hosif yom echad m’da’ato” – Moshe introduced this factor of da’as into the process of mattan Torah.  K’ish echad b’lev echad means that Klal Yisrael dug into the pnimiyus of who they were and what their mission was, and through that, they realized that all the differences really don’t matter at the end of the day, they are just superficial distractions.

Anochi Hashem Elokecha -- even if only one individual gets the message

Rashi explains that the first of the Aseres Hadibros, “Anochi Hashem Elokecha…,” is written in the singular, as if Hashem was speaking only to Moshe, so that Moshe would have an argument in Bnei Yisrael’s defense when they sinned in the cheit ha’eigel and be able to claim the command was given only to him.

Of course the mitzvah of “Anochi Hashem Elokecha…” was given to all of Klal Yisrael.  What Rashi means, explains the Sefas Emes, is that the singular tense is used to show that even if an entire generation has sinned, so long as there is even one individual who does what’s right, Torah still has meaning.

kabbalas haTorah as a mechapeir

An amazing Yerushalmi (Rosh haShana 4:8): By all the korbanos of the chagim it says "se'ir izim echad l'chatas," except for Shavuos, where there is no mention of cheit -- it just says "se'ir izim echad l'chapeir aleichem."  (Bamidbar 28:30)  The Yerushalmi explains that as a result of kabbalas haTorah Hashem wipes away all previous sins, so it is as if there was no cheit to speak of.

ר' משרשיא בשם ר' אידי בכל הקרבנות כתיב חטא ובעצרת אין כתיב חטא אמר להן הקב"ה מכיון שקיבלתם עליכם עול תורה מעלה אני עליכם כאילו לא חטאתם מימיכם:

anticipation for kabbalas haTorah

The Zohar’s (VaYikra 97b) writes that one of the goals of Shavuos night is “l’natra dachya ila’ah d’mati aleh b’hahu ley’lya.”  The word “l’natra” is the equivalent of the Hebrew word “lishmor,” but, says the Shem m’Shmuel, don’t think it means “to guard” in a passive sense, like a shomer takes care of an item entrusted to his care.  Rather, it should be understood in the same sense the Torah uses the word when describing Ya’akov’s reaction to Yosef’s dreams: “v’Aviv shamar as ha’davar,” i.e. he waited with eager anticipation.  Contrary to popular behavior, Shavuos night is not about downing enough coffee and cake to be “yotzei” staying up all night so that one re-experiences mattan Torah with a full belly, albeit a somewhat fuzzy mind.  The korban Pesach is ne’echal al ha’sova, but I don’t think the same din applies to mattan Torah.  It's all about anticipation and enthusiasm.   

The Sm”S writes that this idea helps answer a question raised by his father, the Sochotchover.  The Sochotchover assumed that there is no din of simchas Yom Tov on the night a Yom Tov starts because simcha is elicited by the performance of the mitzvos of the chag.  It’s only after Pesach has started that we can eat matzah; it’s only after Sukkos has started that we can eat in the sukkah -- the simcha kicks in the next day, after we have had a chance to do the mitzvos.  But what about on Shavuos – there are no mitzvos to do; nothing is missing when Yom Tov starts, so why  does the din of simcha not apply immediately?  Shem m’Shmuel answers that there is something we need to do: “l’natra dachya ila’ah” is an active, eager waiting, not a passive lack of activity.   

If you want to see the difference then take note on your way to work as you pass by kids waiting at their bus stop for the schoolbus to arrive on a spring day.  The kids will be joking with each other, talking, eating, etc.; in short, they will be doing anything and everything short of looking down the road to see if the bus is close.  As far as they are concerned, the further away the bus is the better! Now take a look at adults waiting by the bus stop or subway stop on their way to work.  Their necks crane every 30 seconds as they peer anxiously down the road or down the track to see when the next bus or train is coming, they tap their feet and shuffle around anxiously, they listen to every traffic report or announcement with trepidation lest there be some unanticipated delay.  That’s the “natra” the Zohar is talking about. 

The Maharal writes on the pasuk “U’Moshe alah el ha’Elokim va’yikra eilav Hashem min ha’har leimor…” that Moshe had to make the first move and ascend the mountain before Hashem came down to speak with him.  Kabbalas haTorah starts by our demonstrating the desire to receive Torah; one cannot wait passively for it to drop in one’s lap.