With all the blogging on more philosophical topics this week I have been remiss in posting something about parsha. It’s late in the day, but not too late for a quick idea:
The Midrash opens the parsha with a halachic question: May one move a “menorah shel perakim,” a candelabra composed of interlocking parts, on Shabbos? The Midrash answers that this is prohibited because of boneh. The Midrash then proceeds to expound on the significance Shabbos and the merit of celebrating Shabbos, but it never clarifies the relevance of that initial halachic query to the homiletic message or to our parsha.
Perhaps we are the candelabra the Midrash is speaking of, as it is our job to shine the light of Torah into the world. Yet, as a people we are not whole. We are like a candelabra of interlocking pieces that can easily crumble if moved. Even when the day of Shabbos comes, the day which brings peace and harmony into the world, the menorah of parts may not be moved lest it collapse. It’s our job to make that menorah whole before Shabbos comes.
It’s not only as a people that we are a menorah shel perakim, but even as individuals we often feel like we are composed of different parts, as different demands and values pull us in different directions. Shabbos cannot put the menorah together. The work of “boneh” must be done before Shabbos starts.
Only if that can be achieved can we enjoy the full splendor of Shabbos as it should be celebrated.
Friday, July 30, 2010
laws vs. values
Perhaps the fundamental error of the Reform and Conservative movements is their (mis)interpretation of halacha as a value system instead of a legal system. For the yeshiva student, Shabbos means 39 categories of forbidden labor, psik reisha, melacha she’eina tzericha l’gufa, etc. For the the non-halachically committed Jew, Shabbos is simply a day to celebrate the values of family, community, rest. “Antiquated” legalisms have been replaced by a commitment to some nebulous set of principles that guide, but do not dictate, behavior.
There is a trend in Orthodoxy to commit the mirror image of this error in interpreting value judgments as legal mandates. It is increasingly fashionable to point to “meta-halacha,” unstated first principles, as the justification behind prohibitions that have no clear source. However, in truth, these meta-principles are no more than value statements being disguised as law. Thus, for example, some might say that playing ball on Shabbos, while not clearly prohibited by any one rule in shulchan aruch, is no less a prohibition than lighting a fire in that it undermines the essence of what Shabbos is all about. Values as distinct from law have been replaced by a flat arena of do’s and don’ts.
Rabbi Meyer Twesky has written, “This latter concern, which we have dubbed axiological, may alternatively be described as hashkafic or public policy. Phraseology and nomenclature per se are unimportant.” But you see, nomenclature and phraseology are critically important, as they reflect (in this case) a substantive distinction. If you want to debate the length a woman’s skirt needs to be with me, we can go through the relevant gemaras, Rishonim, poskim, and see who the sources support. If you want to debate public policy, such as the degree tzniyus should impact a woman’s career choices or participation in public leadership, how are we to measure the precise balance required or determine who is right and who is wrong? It really boils down to a matter of judgment, and while people can exercise better judgment and worse judgment, it is near impossible to say with absolute certainty where the truth lies. That is not to say that anything goes – it simply means that reasonable people who equally cherish Judaism and halacha may differ and the waters are murkier than many would like to imagine.
The problem is particularly acute for modern orthodoxy. The chareidi world assigns substantial value and respect to “da’as Torah,” the value judgments of its leadership. There is no need to refashion these judgment calls into legal dictates because they are respected as-is. However, modern orthodoxy does insist a sharp distinction between “da’as Torah” and halacha proper. What then are Rabbis to do when the value system of halacha is trampled upon while technical fidelity to the law is maintained? The answer of some seems to be to extend the legal system beyond its natural borders, de facto undercutting the right to differ in matters of judgment, while still maintaining this largely fictional distinction between the “da’as Torah” of the chareidi world and that of the centrist movement.
The obvious downside to this approach is evident when the guns of axiological truth become aimed at- instead of by- the meta-halachists. Whether it be on the issue of Zionism, secular education, age of the universe, or other principles, those in the centrist camp refuse to defer to the judgment of chareidi leadership even where the “gedolim” on the right claim that the principles in question are of axiological importance. Clearly, one man’s axiological principle is another man’s bone of contention. If only those in the centrist camp took the message to heart when addressing those to the left of their own viewpoints.
I think it far better to maintain a natural and logical distinction between laws and values instead of blurring the lines. I too sympathize with the need to ensure that we don’t become halachic technocrats, maintaining fidelity to the letter of codes but trampling on their spirit. However, I think the way to achieve that goal is to teach Torah in a way that ensures that those values are meaningfully and forcefully communicated and are given the respect and appreciation they deserve. After learning Rav Tzadok haKohen’s or the Shem m’Shmuel or the Sidduro Shel Shabbos’s beautiful insights into what Shabbos means, I don’t think one can spend Shabbos on the ball field. Telling someone that not playing ball is an axiological principle reduces it to just another rule that can be trampled; teaching someone to love Shabbos is a different ball game.
There is a trend in Orthodoxy to commit the mirror image of this error in interpreting value judgments as legal mandates. It is increasingly fashionable to point to “meta-halacha,” unstated first principles, as the justification behind prohibitions that have no clear source. However, in truth, these meta-principles are no more than value statements being disguised as law. Thus, for example, some might say that playing ball on Shabbos, while not clearly prohibited by any one rule in shulchan aruch, is no less a prohibition than lighting a fire in that it undermines the essence of what Shabbos is all about. Values as distinct from law have been replaced by a flat arena of do’s and don’ts.
Rabbi Meyer Twesky has written, “This latter concern, which we have dubbed axiological, may alternatively be described as hashkafic or public policy. Phraseology and nomenclature per se are unimportant.” But you see, nomenclature and phraseology are critically important, as they reflect (in this case) a substantive distinction. If you want to debate the length a woman’s skirt needs to be with me, we can go through the relevant gemaras, Rishonim, poskim, and see who the sources support. If you want to debate public policy, such as the degree tzniyus should impact a woman’s career choices or participation in public leadership, how are we to measure the precise balance required or determine who is right and who is wrong? It really boils down to a matter of judgment, and while people can exercise better judgment and worse judgment, it is near impossible to say with absolute certainty where the truth lies. That is not to say that anything goes – it simply means that reasonable people who equally cherish Judaism and halacha may differ and the waters are murkier than many would like to imagine.
The problem is particularly acute for modern orthodoxy. The chareidi world assigns substantial value and respect to “da’as Torah,” the value judgments of its leadership. There is no need to refashion these judgment calls into legal dictates because they are respected as-is. However, modern orthodoxy does insist a sharp distinction between “da’as Torah” and halacha proper. What then are Rabbis to do when the value system of halacha is trampled upon while technical fidelity to the law is maintained? The answer of some seems to be to extend the legal system beyond its natural borders, de facto undercutting the right to differ in matters of judgment, while still maintaining this largely fictional distinction between the “da’as Torah” of the chareidi world and that of the centrist movement.
The obvious downside to this approach is evident when the guns of axiological truth become aimed at- instead of by- the meta-halachists. Whether it be on the issue of Zionism, secular education, age of the universe, or other principles, those in the centrist camp refuse to defer to the judgment of chareidi leadership even where the “gedolim” on the right claim that the principles in question are of axiological importance. Clearly, one man’s axiological principle is another man’s bone of contention. If only those in the centrist camp took the message to heart when addressing those to the left of their own viewpoints.
I think it far better to maintain a natural and logical distinction between laws and values instead of blurring the lines. I too sympathize with the need to ensure that we don’t become halachic technocrats, maintaining fidelity to the letter of codes but trampling on their spirit. However, I think the way to achieve that goal is to teach Torah in a way that ensures that those values are meaningfully and forcefully communicated and are given the respect and appreciation they deserve. After learning Rav Tzadok haKohen’s or the Shem m’Shmuel or the Sidduro Shel Shabbos’s beautiful insights into what Shabbos means, I don’t think one can spend Shabbos on the ball field. Telling someone that not playing ball is an axiological principle reduces it to just another rule that can be trampled; teaching someone to love Shabbos is a different ball game.
Thursday, July 29, 2010
women in leadership roles - the issue of tzniyus
One of the issues I did not touch on in the posts on whether women may serve in communal leadership positions is the issue of tzniyus. Some poskim apparently take this issue very seriously. In this article (link) by Rabbi Hershel Shachter’s article on the Torahweb site, interestingly it is the only objection mentioned.
Rashi in Devarim who writes that there was never a hava amina of appointing women judges can easily be interpreted as simply reflecting social norms common for that period, not halachic restrictions. Were tzniyus reason alone to dismiss a woman from serving as judge, one would have expected Tosfos or any of the other Rishonim who discuss the admissibility of Devorah to raise the issue – yet none do. Tosfos (B"K 15) is not discussing the theoretical possibility of giving semicha to a woman for her to hang as a diploma on her wall, but rather is discussing the reality of a woman serving as judge.
In the tshuvah by Rav Uziel I cited in the previous posts ( Mishpitei Uziel C.M. 6, link) he notes that women on a day to day basis engage in commerce without anyone objecting. “Al tarbeh sicha” restricts only frivolous, unnecessary speech, not professional interaction. If we do not limit women’s professional pursuits because of concerns for tzniyus, kal v’chomer we need not impose limitations when they are involved in klei kodesh, in activities that aim to strengthen Torah.
Rav Yehudah Herzel Henkin (Shu”T Bnei Banin I p. 202) in an essay entitled, “Mekomah Shel Isha” notes that the description of the eishes chayil portrayed by Mishlei is a women engaged in commerce, in providing for her family – not the stay at home mom. While not every woman can successfully be the ideal eishes chayil, that does not mean there is a prohibition against aspiring to do so. A recent news item celebrated the appointment of a frum woman judge to district court in Baltimore. It does not seem that the frum world shuns her for her achievements, but to the contrary, celebrates her ability to balance her religiosity with her involvement in the public sphere.
I am sure some will react to my post by saying, ain hachi nami, women should better be at home than in the workplace, and indeed, we should bar them from all professions, not only the Rabbinate. I credit them for at least being consistent, but don't see their attitude as realistic. Tzniyus while at work is certainly required, for men as well as women, but I do not think the requirement for modesty can be used to preclude professional aspirations entirely.
Maybe it's me, but I find this very unpersuasive. If one is to apply the tzniyus argument, one must apply it consistently. If it precludes women from serving as Rabbis, it precludes women from serving as lawyers, as professors, as businesswomen. I don’t think Stern College is about to shut down its pre-med and pre-law program, nor has anyone suggested they do so. Why the double-standard?Why was it so obvious to the tanaim that we can not have women rabbis? After all, Tosfos (Bava Kama 15a) raises the possibility of giving semicha to women, and having them serve on a beth din. So if women can possibly receive semicha, why can’t they serve the community as rabbis?
The answer is obvious. Although we must sometimes compromise on our midas hatznius and do certain mitzvos befarhesia (in public), this is not required of women. Women are not being discriminated against. They alone, unlike men, are given the opportunity to maintain their midas hahistatrus at all times.
Rashi in Devarim who writes that there was never a hava amina of appointing women judges can easily be interpreted as simply reflecting social norms common for that period, not halachic restrictions. Were tzniyus reason alone to dismiss a woman from serving as judge, one would have expected Tosfos or any of the other Rishonim who discuss the admissibility of Devorah to raise the issue – yet none do. Tosfos (B"K 15) is not discussing the theoretical possibility of giving semicha to a woman for her to hang as a diploma on her wall, but rather is discussing the reality of a woman serving as judge.
In the tshuvah by Rav Uziel I cited in the previous posts ( Mishpitei Uziel C.M. 6, link) he notes that women on a day to day basis engage in commerce without anyone objecting. “Al tarbeh sicha” restricts only frivolous, unnecessary speech, not professional interaction. If we do not limit women’s professional pursuits because of concerns for tzniyus, kal v’chomer we need not impose limitations when they are involved in klei kodesh, in activities that aim to strengthen Torah.
Rav Yehudah Herzel Henkin (Shu”T Bnei Banin I p. 202) in an essay entitled, “Mekomah Shel Isha” notes that the description of the eishes chayil portrayed by Mishlei is a women engaged in commerce, in providing for her family – not the stay at home mom. While not every woman can successfully be the ideal eishes chayil, that does not mean there is a prohibition against aspiring to do so. A recent news item celebrated the appointment of a frum woman judge to district court in Baltimore. It does not seem that the frum world shuns her for her achievements, but to the contrary, celebrates her ability to balance her religiosity with her involvement in the public sphere.
I am sure some will react to my post by saying, ain hachi nami, women should better be at home than in the workplace, and indeed, we should bar them from all professions, not only the Rabbinate. I credit them for at least being consistent, but don't see their attitude as realistic. Tzniyus while at work is certainly required, for men as well as women, but I do not think the requirement for modesty can be used to preclude professional aspirations entirely.
tnai on mitzvos
Regarding tnai on mitzvos that we touched on yesterday (link), Anonymous said a nice sevara in the name of R’ Tzvi Pesach Frank that many other Achronim echo as well. How is giving a ring for kiddushin on condition different than trying to chop off a chicken’s head and stipulating that you want it to remain alive – the outcome of the act is inevitable; it’s not under your control to determine whether it occurs or not? How does tnai work? The answer is that the ability to appoint a shliach to create kiddushin proves that the result, the kiddushin, is not inevitably tied to the chassan’s act of giving a ring, but stands on its own, and can be effected by stipulations and conditions.
The test of whether an act can be done through an agent is necessary only in cases like kiddushin, where the goal is to produce some effect, some chalos, and the question is whether that chalos can have conditions attached to it. Where the act being done stands as an end in its own right, obviously conditions can be set -- you don’t need the whole chiddush of parshas t’naim to allow that. Therefore, even though kri'as shema cannot be done by a shliach, a tnai can be made: if one makes the zman later, that later reading should count as the kiyum mitzvah; if not, the earlier reading should count.
(If this logic is correct, that all the rules of mishpetei ha’tenaim do not apply to tnaim on mitzvos, e.g. one does not need tnai kaful. I have seen quoted that both R’ Yisrael Salanter and the Chazon Ish did require tnai kaful even in these cases.)
A side note that I was thinking of when I went over last week's parsha, and found that the Kesav vhaKabbalah says it: when we read "V'hayu hadevarim ha'eileh..." and "V'shinantam l'vanecha" in shema, these are not meant as stand alone mitzvos of Torah study, but are in context a continuation and amplification of the opening pasuk, "V'ahavta eis Hashem Elokecha..." Someone who is truly filled with ahavas Hashem cannot help but communicate that love to others. The way to do so is by learning Torah, teaching Torah, speaking Torah.
The test of whether an act can be done through an agent is necessary only in cases like kiddushin, where the goal is to produce some effect, some chalos, and the question is whether that chalos can have conditions attached to it. Where the act being done stands as an end in its own right, obviously conditions can be set -- you don’t need the whole chiddush of parshas t’naim to allow that. Therefore, even though kri'as shema cannot be done by a shliach, a tnai can be made: if one makes the zman later, that later reading should count as the kiyum mitzvah; if not, the earlier reading should count.
(If this logic is correct, that all the rules of mishpetei ha’tenaim do not apply to tnaim on mitzvos, e.g. one does not need tnai kaful. I have seen quoted that both R’ Yisrael Salanter and the Chazon Ish did require tnai kaful even in these cases.)
A side note that I was thinking of when I went over last week's parsha, and found that the Kesav vhaKabbalah says it: when we read "V'hayu hadevarim ha'eileh..." and "V'shinantam l'vanecha" in shema, these are not meant as stand alone mitzvos of Torah study, but are in context a continuation and amplification of the opening pasuk, "V'ahavta eis Hashem Elokecha..." Someone who is truly filled with ahavas Hashem cannot help but communicate that love to others. The way to do so is by learning Torah, teaching Torah, speaking Torah.
Wednesday, July 28, 2010
making a tnai on the mitzvah of kri'as shema
If a person is uncertain if he will make sof zman kri’as shema if he davens along with the tzibur, simply reading shema early is not the ideal solution. That might guarantee making the zman, but it definitely forfeits the kiyum mitzvah of reading shema in the context of its brachos. A better solution (see R’ Akiva Eiger O.C. 46) would be to read shema early with a tnai that if one makes the zman, the earlier recitation counts only as talmud torah; if not, the earlier recitation counts as the mitzvah of kri’ah.
The problem with this solution is that the reading of shema does not seem to be something one can set stipulations on. The gemara (Kesubos 74a) tells us that a tnai can only be made when an action can be done by a shliach. Tosfos explains that the ability to designate an agent to act on one’s behalf demonstrates control over a process. It is that same level of control which affords the possibility of making conditions. Since one cannot appoint a shliach to read kri’as shema on one’s behalf, one should be precluded from setting any conditions on the mitzvah.
How then can R’ Akiva Eiger suggest tnai as a possible solution in this case? I have seen two basic approaches to resolve the quesion. I’ll leave it for you to mull over for now.
The problem with this solution is that the reading of shema does not seem to be something one can set stipulations on. The gemara (Kesubos 74a) tells us that a tnai can only be made when an action can be done by a shliach. Tosfos explains that the ability to designate an agent to act on one’s behalf demonstrates control over a process. It is that same level of control which affords the possibility of making conditions. Since one cannot appoint a shliach to read kri’as shema on one’s behalf, one should be precluded from setting any conditions on the mitzvah.
How then can R’ Akiva Eiger suggest tnai as a possible solution in this case? I have seen two basic approaches to resolve the quesion. I’ll leave it for you to mull over for now.
Tuesday, July 27, 2010
women serving in leadership positions (II)
Yesterday (link) we reviewed the relevant Rishonim and concluded that it would be permissible according to almost all views other than the Rambam for women to hold positions of authority. So why did I leave off saying that Rabbi Riskin’s analysis was incomplete? Because you can’t justify sociological change with legal proof. When Barry Goldwater said, “You can’t legislate morality,” he was on to something. The reason the ordination of a woman has met with such resistance, with terms like “ye’hareig v’al ya’avor” and “bizayon haTorah” being brandied about, is not because poskim are so dead set on following the Rambam’s opinion against all other Rishonim, but rather because poskim and Rabbanim (rightly or wrongly) see the issue as a threat to the fabric of Orthodoxy. It’s not a question of asur vs. mutar, but rather a question of what Orthodox Jewry is all about.
Rabbi Riskin began his address by discussing the topic of women learning Torah, noting that Beis Ya’akov in its time was a revolutionary departure from previous norms. Why was Beis Ya’akov accepted? The few lines the Chofetz Chaim wrote in his Likutei Halachos to Mes. Sotah that justify Torah study for women were more than simply a psak halacha -- they represented the stamp of approval of the tzadik hador, one of the gedolei hador, to the entire enterprise of Beis Ya’akov. Without first obtaining the approval of the Belzer Rebbe, the Gerrer Rebbe, and finally the Chofetz Chaim, Beis Ya’akov would have suffered the same fate of previous unsuccessful efforts to accomplish the same goal.
It was not only the approval of Rabbinic luminaries that made Sarah Schenirer successful, but there were a number of other factors as well, some of which are highlighted in this article by Dr. Yoel Finkelman:
1) Sarah Schenirer was a charismatic leader who developed trust and admiration.
2) The time was ripe for a movement like Beis Ya’akov.
3) Agudah provided backing once the schools began to gain traction.
Do those factors apply to the situation of women’s ordination? To date, not a single major Rabbinic luminary whom the Torah world respects as a gadol has signed onto the idea. To date, not a single major Rabbinic organization has voiced approval. Lastly, there is the question of personality. When Branch Rickey realized the time was ripe to break the color barrier in baseball, he looked for a specific type of player – Jackie Robinson was one of many excellent players; he was chosen as much for his personality as for his ability. What woman’s ordination needs is a Jackie Robinson. I do not know Sarah Hurvitz and do not chas v’shalom mean to criticize her achievements or ability. However, the fact that she would address JOFA and thank them for their support obviously distances her from myself and others who have serious questions about an organization whose leader espouses the philosophy, “Where there’s a Rabbinic will, there’s a halachic way.” Regardless of whether modern scholars may choose to portray Sarah Schenirer as proto-feminist, I have little doubt that the Chofetz Chaim did not see her in that light, nor would being seen in that light have helped her cause.
And finally, there is the question of timing. Sarah Schenirer addressed the pressing need of youth falling prey to assimilation because of a lack of Jewish education. She provided a solution to what was fast becoming a crisis. Is there a crisis in Jewish leadership that would demand the ordination of women? When Rav Moshe wrote that a woman could serve as mashgiach despite the Rambam’s prohibition of serara, he writes that his psak applies to the scenario of tzorech gadol for an almanah’s parnasa. Are we in a state of tzorech gadol with respect to the question of women’s ordination? Are there more than a handful of women in the entire United States who are sitting a learning gemara and Rishonim, Shulchan Aruch with Shach and Taz, and who would feel unfulfilled without the recognition that comes from receiving ordination? Clearly this issue has caused a rift even within the modern orthodox community – are the net gains worth fighting the battle over at this point in time, and realistically was there ever a chance of success?
This post is no more than a summary of issues raised by many others, none of which Rabbi Riskin contended with. They must be more fully addressed by those who wish to enable women to take leadership positions. I have some further thoughts in that regard, but I'll leave them for another post.
Rabbi Riskin began his address by discussing the topic of women learning Torah, noting that Beis Ya’akov in its time was a revolutionary departure from previous norms. Why was Beis Ya’akov accepted? The few lines the Chofetz Chaim wrote in his Likutei Halachos to Mes. Sotah that justify Torah study for women were more than simply a psak halacha -- they represented the stamp of approval of the tzadik hador, one of the gedolei hador, to the entire enterprise of Beis Ya’akov. Without first obtaining the approval of the Belzer Rebbe, the Gerrer Rebbe, and finally the Chofetz Chaim, Beis Ya’akov would have suffered the same fate of previous unsuccessful efforts to accomplish the same goal.
It was not only the approval of Rabbinic luminaries that made Sarah Schenirer successful, but there were a number of other factors as well, some of which are highlighted in this article by Dr. Yoel Finkelman:
1) Sarah Schenirer was a charismatic leader who developed trust and admiration.
2) The time was ripe for a movement like Beis Ya’akov.
3) Agudah provided backing once the schools began to gain traction.
Do those factors apply to the situation of women’s ordination? To date, not a single major Rabbinic luminary whom the Torah world respects as a gadol has signed onto the idea. To date, not a single major Rabbinic organization has voiced approval. Lastly, there is the question of personality. When Branch Rickey realized the time was ripe to break the color barrier in baseball, he looked for a specific type of player – Jackie Robinson was one of many excellent players; he was chosen as much for his personality as for his ability. What woman’s ordination needs is a Jackie Robinson. I do not know Sarah Hurvitz and do not chas v’shalom mean to criticize her achievements or ability. However, the fact that she would address JOFA and thank them for their support obviously distances her from myself and others who have serious questions about an organization whose leader espouses the philosophy, “Where there’s a Rabbinic will, there’s a halachic way.” Regardless of whether modern scholars may choose to portray Sarah Schenirer as proto-feminist, I have little doubt that the Chofetz Chaim did not see her in that light, nor would being seen in that light have helped her cause.
And finally, there is the question of timing. Sarah Schenirer addressed the pressing need of youth falling prey to assimilation because of a lack of Jewish education. She provided a solution to what was fast becoming a crisis. Is there a crisis in Jewish leadership that would demand the ordination of women? When Rav Moshe wrote that a woman could serve as mashgiach despite the Rambam’s prohibition of serara, he writes that his psak applies to the scenario of tzorech gadol for an almanah’s parnasa. Are we in a state of tzorech gadol with respect to the question of women’s ordination? Are there more than a handful of women in the entire United States who are sitting a learning gemara and Rishonim, Shulchan Aruch with Shach and Taz, and who would feel unfulfilled without the recognition that comes from receiving ordination? Clearly this issue has caused a rift even within the modern orthodox community – are the net gains worth fighting the battle over at this point in time, and realistically was there ever a chance of success?
This post is no more than a summary of issues raised by many others, none of which Rabbi Riskin contended with. They must be more fully addressed by those who wish to enable women to take leadership positions. I have some further thoughts in that regard, but I'll leave them for another post.
Monday, July 26, 2010
Rabbi Riskin on women's ordination
On Shabbos I had the privilege of hearing Rav Shlomo Riskin speak, and one of the topics he addressed was the issue of women’s ordination. Listening to his address gave me a chance to get my own thoughts on the issue a little more in order and I want to share what he said as well as my own reflections. I think the issue can be broken into two or three subtopics, and I’m going to divide the posts accordingly. I don’t want to focus on the narrow issue of ordination alone, but more broadly on women taking a leadership position (Rabbi Riskin lumped them together as well), whether it be as a shul president or in some other capacity. This post will focus mainly on the Rishonim and halacha. The issue begins with the Rambam, who writes in Hil Melachim (1:5):
אין מעמידין אישה במלכות--שנאמר "מלך" (דברים יז,טו), ולא מלכה; וכן כל משימות שבישראל, אין ממנים בהם אלא איש.
Not only does the Rambam exclude a queen from ruling, but he excludes women from being appointed to any position of authority or dominion. The derasha “melech v’lo malka” is not found in the Talmud and the Rambam’ extension of that law to all appointments appears to be his own sevara. Yet, a Rambam is a Rambam, and were that the only source there would not be much to discuss.
However, as Rabbi Riskin noted, the Rambam is not only a tremendous chiddush, but is a da’as yachid as well. The Rishonim ask how Devorah could serve as a judge when the halacha tells us that only someone who can serve as a witness can serve as a judge, and a woman is precluded from serving as a witness. Among the answers:
1) The exclusion of an invalid witness from serving as a judge applies to men, not women (Tosfos Nidah 50).
2) There is a difference between imposed authority and Devorah’s authority, which was a product of consent of the people (Tosfos B”K 15).
3) Devorah taught halacha, but did not offer final judgment on cases (Nidah 50).
4) Devorah served as a leader (manhiga), not a king or judge (Rashba, Ran).
The difference between the first and third answer is that according to the first a woman may serve in any capacity of authority, even as judge, while according to the third a woman may serve in any capacity of authority except judge. Neither view fits with the Rambam’s exclusion of women from all positions of authority. It goes without saying that the fourth answer which reads “melech v’lo malka” and the exclusion of women from serving as a judges in a very narrow sense runs contrary to the Rambam. Finally, we have Tos’ distinction between authority that is imposed and authority based on consent, which the Rambam might agree with, and which practically opens the door to women filling most modern leadership positions – be it shul president or Rabbi – which are based on being elected or chosen by the tzibur. The Mishpetei Uziel (C.M. #6) has a nice review of these sources, and the acknowledgement of the Rambam as a minority view is noted by R’ Moshe Feinstein as well (Igros Moshe Y.D. II #45 ).
Rav Riskin mentioned a sevara of the Mishpetei Uziel that I did not find inside. The exclusion of women from positions of authority is not a psul gavra, but is based on the fact that in ancient society women would not have been accorded the respected deserved by a melech. Were the societal norma to change, the halacha would change as well. Rav Riskin seemed enamored by this sevara. I am less convinced that a nice sevara in the Rambam is enough to shape halacha (as the gemara puts it, mipnei she’nidmeh na’aseh ma’aseh?), but this is just icing on the cake given the previous collection of sources.
Rabbi Riskin concluded that the weight of the sources favors allowing women to serve in leadership roles and even being given a title. His only caveat was that a woman could not serve as the sole Rabbi in a small community where the Rabbi must also often serve as chazzan or ba'al korei. With respect to the question of serving in a leadership role, I don’t see (not that he needs my haskama) how you can argue otherwise, but I’m not sure whether these sources can truly be extended to cover even ordination, as ordination is not a position, but a title conferring a certain status. But leaving the question of title aside, there seems to be little reason (again, considering only the sources) that a woman cannot be hired to give shiurim, teach halacha, render halachic decisions, etc. in a formal capacity as part of a shul leadership staff. Yes, there is the Rambam, and why not be yotzei kol ha’deyos? Indeed, some have written that Rav Soloveitchik denied women the right to serve as synagogue board president based on this Rambam. I think it is unfair to foist such an approach on others. One cannot enforce being “yotzei kol hadeyos” on someone else’s cheshbon. If a tzibur feels that Plonis instead of Ploni would make a better leader and they wish to hang their halachic hat on the overwhelming majority of Rishonim who disagree with the Rambam, the benefit of trying to be “yotzei” the Rambam’s view may be outweighed by the cost to that tzibur in being forced to forgo the better candidate based on gender considerations alone. It seems to me that each situation in this regard needs to be judged on a case by case basis and cannot be covered by a single inflexible policy.
All that being said, I think if we were to stop here our analysis would be incomplete. Rabbi Riskin’s remarks, while halachically on the mark, I think did not fully do justice to the topic because they offer a legal (or halachic) answer to a sociological question, as we will discuss next part. Please hold your fire for now, unless it pertains directly to these sources.
אין מעמידין אישה במלכות--שנאמר "מלך" (דברים יז,טו), ולא מלכה; וכן כל משימות שבישראל, אין ממנים בהם אלא איש.
Not only does the Rambam exclude a queen from ruling, but he excludes women from being appointed to any position of authority or dominion. The derasha “melech v’lo malka” is not found in the Talmud and the Rambam’ extension of that law to all appointments appears to be his own sevara. Yet, a Rambam is a Rambam, and were that the only source there would not be much to discuss.
However, as Rabbi Riskin noted, the Rambam is not only a tremendous chiddush, but is a da’as yachid as well. The Rishonim ask how Devorah could serve as a judge when the halacha tells us that only someone who can serve as a witness can serve as a judge, and a woman is precluded from serving as a witness. Among the answers:
1) The exclusion of an invalid witness from serving as a judge applies to men, not women (Tosfos Nidah 50).
2) There is a difference between imposed authority and Devorah’s authority, which was a product of consent of the people (Tosfos B”K 15).
3) Devorah taught halacha, but did not offer final judgment on cases (Nidah 50).
4) Devorah served as a leader (manhiga), not a king or judge (Rashba, Ran).
The difference between the first and third answer is that according to the first a woman may serve in any capacity of authority, even as judge, while according to the third a woman may serve in any capacity of authority except judge. Neither view fits with the Rambam’s exclusion of women from all positions of authority. It goes without saying that the fourth answer which reads “melech v’lo malka” and the exclusion of women from serving as a judges in a very narrow sense runs contrary to the Rambam. Finally, we have Tos’ distinction between authority that is imposed and authority based on consent, which the Rambam might agree with, and which practically opens the door to women filling most modern leadership positions – be it shul president or Rabbi – which are based on being elected or chosen by the tzibur. The Mishpetei Uziel (C.M. #6) has a nice review of these sources, and the acknowledgement of the Rambam as a minority view is noted by R’ Moshe Feinstein as well (Igros Moshe Y.D. II #45 ).
Rav Riskin mentioned a sevara of the Mishpetei Uziel that I did not find inside. The exclusion of women from positions of authority is not a psul gavra, but is based on the fact that in ancient society women would not have been accorded the respected deserved by a melech. Were the societal norma to change, the halacha would change as well. Rav Riskin seemed enamored by this sevara. I am less convinced that a nice sevara in the Rambam is enough to shape halacha (as the gemara puts it, mipnei she’nidmeh na’aseh ma’aseh?), but this is just icing on the cake given the previous collection of sources.
Rabbi Riskin concluded that the weight of the sources favors allowing women to serve in leadership roles and even being given a title. His only caveat was that a woman could not serve as the sole Rabbi in a small community where the Rabbi must also often serve as chazzan or ba'al korei. With respect to the question of serving in a leadership role, I don’t see (not that he needs my haskama) how you can argue otherwise, but I’m not sure whether these sources can truly be extended to cover even ordination, as ordination is not a position, but a title conferring a certain status. But leaving the question of title aside, there seems to be little reason (again, considering only the sources) that a woman cannot be hired to give shiurim, teach halacha, render halachic decisions, etc. in a formal capacity as part of a shul leadership staff. Yes, there is the Rambam, and why not be yotzei kol ha’deyos? Indeed, some have written that Rav Soloveitchik denied women the right to serve as synagogue board president based on this Rambam. I think it is unfair to foist such an approach on others. One cannot enforce being “yotzei kol hadeyos” on someone else’s cheshbon. If a tzibur feels that Plonis instead of Ploni would make a better leader and they wish to hang their halachic hat on the overwhelming majority of Rishonim who disagree with the Rambam, the benefit of trying to be “yotzei” the Rambam’s view may be outweighed by the cost to that tzibur in being forced to forgo the better candidate based on gender considerations alone. It seems to me that each situation in this regard needs to be judged on a case by case basis and cannot be covered by a single inflexible policy.
All that being said, I think if we were to stop here our analysis would be incomplete. Rabbi Riskin’s remarks, while halachically on the mark, I think did not fully do justice to the topic because they offer a legal (or halachic) answer to a sociological question, as we will discuss next part. Please hold your fire for now, unless it pertains directly to these sources.
Friday, July 23, 2010
boundaries
I'm highlighting this article by Rav Druckman on Arutz Sheva because I love this phrase: "Even where halacha demands a 'mechitza atuma' there is no mitzvah to create a 'lev atum.'" (Sorry for the poor formatting - click on the link to the article.)
מי שמצוי בהוואי היהודי-חרדי במדינות הרווחה בחו"ל, מכיר את התופעה; בחתונות חרדיות, מביאים בחשבון שחלק מן הקרואים אינם חרדים, אלא יהודים שהם בבחינת 'תינוקות שנשבו'. בשמחות אלה, מקפידים אמנם על מחיצה אטומה בין גברים לנשים – אבל עושים את המחיצה באמצעות ...שיחי פרחים סבוכים יפהפיים וריחניים, והרי לך מחיצה כשרה למהדרין - אטומה לחלוטין, אבל לא מחיצה מעצבנת, או/ו מעוררת דחייה אצל אותם יהודים שלעת עתה עדיין לא בנויים נפשית ולא מבינים את העדינות והטוהר דצניעות וקדושה, במיוחד כשמדובר בשמחות, כמבואר בפוסקים
כן, מחיצה אטומה, אבל לא כזו האוטמת את הלב.
ונחזור לעמנואל: לשם מה היה צורך בסגנון מחיצה שכזו בין 2 סוגי התלמידות. מחיצה פיזית שיצרה לצערנו גם מחיצה ריגשית שאך יכולה לעורר אצל הזולת הרגשה של השפלה (אפילו אם לא זו הייתה הכוונה). לאין נעלמה היצירתיות, לאן ברח השכל והתיחכום?
לעיתים צריך אולי מחיצה אטומה, אבל אין מצווה שגם הלב יהיה אטום?
מי שמצוי בהוואי היהודי-חרדי במדינות הרווחה בחו"ל, מכיר את התופעה; בחתונות חרדיות, מביאים בחשבון שחלק מן הקרואים אינם חרדים, אלא יהודים שהם בבחינת 'תינוקות שנשבו'. בשמחות אלה, מקפידים אמנם על מחיצה אטומה בין גברים לנשים – אבל עושים את המחיצה באמצעות ...שיחי פרחים סבוכים יפהפיים וריחניים, והרי לך מחיצה כשרה למהדרין - אטומה לחלוטין, אבל לא מחיצה מעצבנת, או/ו מעוררת דחייה אצל אותם יהודים שלעת עתה עדיין לא בנויים נפשית ולא מבינים את העדינות והטוהר דצניעות וקדושה, במיוחד כשמדובר בשמחות, כמבואר בפוסקים
כן, מחיצה אטומה, אבל לא כזו האוטמת את הלב.
ונחזור לעמנואל: לשם מה היה צורך בסגנון מחיצה שכזו בין 2 סוגי התלמידות. מחיצה פיזית שיצרה לצערנו גם מחיצה ריגשית שאך יכולה לעורר אצל הזולת הרגשה של השפלה (אפילו אם לא זו הייתה הכוונה). לאין נעלמה היצירתיות, לאן ברח השכל והתיחכום?
לעיתים צריך אולי מחיצה אטומה, אבל אין מצווה שגם הלב יהיה אטום?
acts of charity
"U'tzedaka t'hiyeh lanu ki nishmor la'asos..." (6:25)
Don't we do mitzvos out of a sense of obligation, not simply to be charitable? Ramban explains that the pasuk is speaking about the concept of reward. We owe Hashem our fidelity and service for all he has done for us; we have no right to demand or expect payment or reward for mitzvos. Any reward that we receive is simply an act of charity on Hashem's part.
I would go a step further. At the Bris ben HaBesarim Hashem promised Avraham a multitude of children who would inherit Eretz Yisrael. The Torah tells us, "V'he'emin ba'Hashem v'yachshiveha lo tzedaka," Avraham believed the promise and he considered it an act of charity for him (15:6). Rashi interprets the pasuk as praising Avraham for his belief -- He, Hashem, considered him, Avraham, as performing an act of charity. Ramban takes issue with this reading. Does a Navi like Avraham who has already demonstrated his commitment to Hashem deserve praise for believing what Hashem says? The "him" the pasuk refers to, explains Ramban, is not Avraham, but rather is Hashem. Rather than view Hashem's promise as a reward for his greatness, he, Avraham viewed it as an act of charity which he did not deserve.
Hashem acts midah k'neged midah. Our Avos, as demonstrated by Avraham, did not view Hashem as obligated to reward them even when they fully earned it; they attributed Hashem's gifts to charitable love. Hopefully we carry on that legacy. Hashem in turn promises us that even though we owe him a debt of servitude, he will credit as if we acted out of a sense of charity, out of a love and desire to accept the yoke of mitzvos even if we had no obligation to do so.
On a different note: There are approx. 170 pages of Mishna Berura from the beginning of hilchos Rosh haShana until the end of hilchos Lulav. At three pages a day, you can start now and finish by about Shmini Atzeres/Simchas Torah. Just a thought.
Any suggestions on what posts should focus on for the next few weeks? Since I mentioned it, hilchos hachag is not a bad idea, but I'm open to suggestions.
Don't we do mitzvos out of a sense of obligation, not simply to be charitable? Ramban explains that the pasuk is speaking about the concept of reward. We owe Hashem our fidelity and service for all he has done for us; we have no right to demand or expect payment or reward for mitzvos. Any reward that we receive is simply an act of charity on Hashem's part.
I would go a step further. At the Bris ben HaBesarim Hashem promised Avraham a multitude of children who would inherit Eretz Yisrael. The Torah tells us, "V'he'emin ba'Hashem v'yachshiveha lo tzedaka," Avraham believed the promise and he considered it an act of charity for him (15:6). Rashi interprets the pasuk as praising Avraham for his belief -- He, Hashem, considered him, Avraham, as performing an act of charity. Ramban takes issue with this reading. Does a Navi like Avraham who has already demonstrated his commitment to Hashem deserve praise for believing what Hashem says? The "him" the pasuk refers to, explains Ramban, is not Avraham, but rather is Hashem. Rather than view Hashem's promise as a reward for his greatness, he, Avraham viewed it as an act of charity which he did not deserve.
Hashem acts midah k'neged midah. Our Avos, as demonstrated by Avraham, did not view Hashem as obligated to reward them even when they fully earned it; they attributed Hashem's gifts to charitable love. Hopefully we carry on that legacy. Hashem in turn promises us that even though we owe him a debt of servitude, he will credit as if we acted out of a sense of charity, out of a love and desire to accept the yoke of mitzvos even if we had no obligation to do so.
On a different note: There are approx. 170 pages of Mishna Berura from the beginning of hilchos Rosh haShana until the end of hilchos Lulav. At three pages a day, you can start now and finish by about Shmini Atzeres/Simchas Torah. Just a thought.
Any suggestions on what posts should focus on for the next few weeks? Since I mentioned it, hilchos hachag is not a bad idea, but I'm open to suggestions.
the first "yoetzet" in history
Nidah 13b: Rebbi said, "There was a deaf lady in our neighborhood who not only did bedikos herself, but when her neighbors saw [mar'os] they brought them to her for examination."
Rashi: She was an expert in [distinguishing] dam tamei from dam tahor.
Rashi: She was an expert in [distinguishing] dam tamei from dam tahor.
Thursday, July 22, 2010
u'bikashtem
“U’bikashtem mi’sham es Hashem Elokecha u’matzasa ki tidrishenu b’chol levavcha u’bchol nafshecha.” (4:19)
Why does the pasuk switch terms from the plural, “u’bikashtem,” to the singular, “u’matzasa?”
The gemara (R"H 18) notes the seeming contradiction between the pasuk, “Dirshu Hashem b’himatzo,” that there is a specific time when Hashem is available, so to speak, and only during that time are we free to petition for our needs, and the pasuk that teaches that Hashem responds, “B’chol koreinu alav,” whenever we daven. The gemara answers, “Kan b’yachid, kan b’tzibur.” There is a difference between personal prayer, which is accepted only at appointed times, and the prayer of the community, which is accepted at all times.
R’ Shlomo Kluger notes that there are two possible ways to understand the gemara’s conclusion. Does the gemara mean that communal prayer, i.e. prayer for the needs of the community, is always accepted, or does the gemara mean that individual prayer recited with a tzibur, in the context of the community’s prayers, is always accepted?
He opines that the latter interpretation is correct. The gemara does not refer to “tefilah l’tzibur,” prayer for the community, bur rather, “tefilah b’tzibur,” prayer recited in the context of a tzibur, even if it be for a private need.
“U’bikashtem m’sham,” if a community we join together to daven and serve Hashem, then in that context, “u’matzasa,” our individual prayers will be answered as well.
Why does the pasuk switch terms from the plural, “u’bikashtem,” to the singular, “u’matzasa?”
The gemara (R"H 18) notes the seeming contradiction between the pasuk, “Dirshu Hashem b’himatzo,” that there is a specific time when Hashem is available, so to speak, and only during that time are we free to petition for our needs, and the pasuk that teaches that Hashem responds, “B’chol koreinu alav,” whenever we daven. The gemara answers, “Kan b’yachid, kan b’tzibur.” There is a difference between personal prayer, which is accepted only at appointed times, and the prayer of the community, which is accepted at all times.
R’ Shlomo Kluger notes that there are two possible ways to understand the gemara’s conclusion. Does the gemara mean that communal prayer, i.e. prayer for the needs of the community, is always accepted, or does the gemara mean that individual prayer recited with a tzibur, in the context of the community’s prayers, is always accepted?
He opines that the latter interpretation is correct. The gemara does not refer to “tefilah l’tzibur,” prayer for the community, bur rather, “tefilah b’tzibur,” prayer recited in the context of a tzibur, even if it be for a private need.
“U’bikashtem m’sham,” if a community we join together to daven and serve Hashem, then in that context, “u’matzasa,” our individual prayers will be answered as well.
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