Yosef's beauty

The appointment of Yosef to be in charge of Potifar’s home and dealings is followed by his physical description (in terms, as my wife noted, which are usually used to describe women) as “Y’fei to’ar v’yefei mareh” (39:6). Yosef did not suddenly become beautiful -- one is born either handsome or ugly, and while makeup and grooming can enhance certain features, they cannot make an ugly duckling into prince charming. So why interject this description here?

Rashi and Ramban offer different answers. Ramban explains that the description of Yosef’s beauty is an introduction to the upcoming parsha; Yosef’s beauty led to Eishes Potifar’s advances and attempts at seduction. Rashi connects the pasuk to the previous parsha’s description of Yosef’s rise to power. Now that he was released from hard labor Yosef become too focused on his own grooming and appearance.

The Ramban’s approach takes Yosef to be the innocent victim of Eishes Potifar’s attackes, but Rashi opens the door to assigning at least some of the to Yosef himself. Eishes Potifar’s attack was a punishment and perhaps a direct result of Yosef’s flaunting his beauty around the home of his master.

The Netziv follows in Rashi’s footsteps in assigning blame to Yosef, but for a different reason. The Netziv writes that immersion in Torah has the effect of diminishing a person’s external beauty. The statement that Yosef appeared beautiful is the Torah’s subtle way of telling us that Yosef was not as involved Torah as much he should have been. As a result, he lost the miraculous protection which Torah study affords and was tempted and subject to attempted seduction.

One perhaps need not invoke the power of miraculous protection to understand the parsha along the lines of the Netziv. The Hollywood stereotype of the student immersed in books as the nerdy type not caring about appearance or grooming reflects a certain truth. Immersion in study of any sort should focus one’s mind on higher ideals than superficial appearance. Yosef’s concern with beauty tells us that he lost some of that focus; he became a person who cared about appearance and was therefore both tempted by and prey for Eishes Potifar.

I think it is not by accident that it is dmus d’yukno shel Aviv, the image of Ya’akov his father, which appeared to Yosef and brought him back to reality. Despite Keats’ memorable lines on a Grecian urn, beauty is not always true, nor is truth always beautiful. The superficial splendor and beauty of material culture is at often odds the values and truth of Torah. Chanukah celebrates our reliving the test of Yosef and embracing “titein emes l’Ya’akov” over the aesthetic beauty of Yavan.

a few Netziv's on Parshas Yisro

A few Netziv's on this coming week's parsha that caught my eye: 1) The Torah relates that the Jewish people journeyed from Refidim toward Har Sinai (19:1). Rashi explains based on the Mechilta that the Torah mentions the nation's departure as well as their arrival to teach that just as the arrival at Sinai was done with the purpose and intent of receiving the Torah, so too, the departure was done with this same intent. Why, asks the Netziv, does it matter to us what intentions were present when the camp departed and travelled toward Sinai? The answer is that this journey was a preparation for the event of kabbalas haTorah, and the Torah wishes to teach us that the greater the effort invested in preparation, the greater the reward from the experience. In other words, even as monumental and significant an event as kabbalas haTorah, during which the souls were literally knocked from the bodies of the Jewish people with each utterance of Hashem, would still fail to make the impression it did if not for proper preparation beforehand! 2) The Torah says to encircle the mountain of Sinai, but also, to be precise, says "v'higbalta es ha'am" (19:12), literally, to encircle the people. Netziv explains that the people camped in concentric circles, with Ahron closest to the mountain, kohanim second, leaders and gedolim further back, etc. each group according to rank. There are madreigos and levels in klal Yisrael and each person needs to find his/her rightful place in relation to Har Sinai for a proper kabbalas haTorah. For example, if a person decides to become a ba'al tshuvah and plunges into Likutei Moharan before learning Shulchan Aruch, such a person is camped in the wrong place. 3) Rashi explains (19:18) that the "kol chazak" of Har Sinai was unlike other kolos which diminish in strength and volume as the note is held -- here the kol intensified. What is the meaning of this miracle? Netziv explains that the kol is a hint to the Torah sheba'al peh, which as we move further from Sinai has grown and grown, each generation adding chiddushim and insights and revealing more Torah than was known in previous doros.

kedusha outside the ivory tower of the beis medrash

Some belated Torah on the parsha:

Among the brachos promised if we do the right thing is, “Y’kimcha Hashem lo l’am kadosh ka’asher nishba lach ki tishmor es mitzvos Hashem Elokecha v’halachta b’derachav” (28:9) – Hashem will sustain us as a holy people on the condition that we observe the mitzvos and "walk in His ways". The Netzi”v (and many others) asks: the list of brachos is prefaced in the very first pasuk of the chapter with the condition that they would be fulfilled only if we observe Hashem’s mitzvos, "V'haya im shamo'a..."; why is that condition repeated here again in pasuk 9 in the context of the bracha of "y'kimcha lo l'am kadosh"?

The key to understanding the pasuk lies in the words, “v’halachta b’derachav”, which Chazal interpret to mean that a person’s behavior should conform to the model of gemilus chessed demonstrated by Hashem, e.g. Hashem visited Avraham to heal the sick, Hashem helped bury the dead, etc., and therefore we should visit the sick, help bury the dead, and do other acts of chessed. A person may rightfully object that the social interaction that these mitzvos demands carries with it a price. A person who sits secluded in the Bais Medrash in private contemplation, locked in the ivory-tower of Torah, can rise to great heights of holiness and dveikus. However, once a person steps foot into the public domain, inevitably there is a hashpa’ah that the outside world has on a person’s dveikus and intensity.

Our pasuk answers that ta'anah. “Ki tishmor…v’halachta b’derachav” is not a condition – it’s a promise; not “if you observe… you will be holy”, but “when you observe… you will be holy”. Even though the observance of “v’halachta b’derachav” entails sacrificing the ivory tower of Torah, if done properly Hashem guarantees that “y’kimcha Hashem l’am kadosh”.

homewoner mitzvos - ma'akeh and mezuzah

"Ki tivneh bayis chadash v'asisa ma'akeh l'gagecha". The Torah presents the mitzvah of ma'akeh, the command to build a fence around a roof or dangerous obstacle, as a necessary task when building a new home. However, the halacha is that even if one remodels an old home, or moves into an old home that lacks a proper fence, one is still obligated in the mitzvah of ma'akeh. Why does the Torah place the mitzvah specifically in the context of building a new home? The Netziv explains that the Torah is sending us a mussar lesson. Building and moving into a new home is an auspicious occasion, and it is only fitting that such an occasion be used not just move furniture and the appliances, but to do mitzvos. Ma'akeh is a way to seize the opportunity to lay such a mitzvah foundation.

But why teach this lesson using the example of ma'akeh? I would guess that only a small minority of homeowners have actually had the opportunity to perform the mitzvah of ma'akeh. Yet, every single owner of a new home has the opportunity to perform a different mitzvah -- the mitzvah of mezuzah. Why does the Torah not make the point that a new home should be established through performance of mitzvos by using the illustration of mezuzah?

The Netziv switches hats to halachic analysis to answer this question. He suggests a fundemental difference between ma'akeh and mezuzah: there is a prohibition of living in a home which does not have a ma'akeh installed; however, there is no prohibition of living in a home without a mezuzah. Such an argument is easy to digest if one accepts that ma'akeh is a lav while mezuzah is only a mitzvas aseh (as the Rambam holds) , but the Netziv goes a step further and makes his argument even according to Tosfos (Kiddushin 36) who holds that the lav of ma'akeh can be avoided so long as one intends to build one at a later time. Given that both ma'akeh and mezuzah are mitzvos aseh, why should there be a distinction? The Netziv explains (and further elaborates in Ha'amek Sh'eilah 126:7) that the mitzvah of ma'akeh is a prerequisite to moving into a home. However, the mitzvah of mezuzah is incumbent upon the resident of a home, i.e. the mitzvah does not take effect until after one has moved in. Ideally, one should perform the mitzvah of mezuzah immediately afterwards, but if one is prevented from doing so for whatever reason, one is not required to move out. In a nutshell, fulfillment of ma'akeh is a necessary condition of setting up residence; setting up residence is a necessary condition of becoming obligated in the mitzvah of mezuzah. Similar words, but very different outcomes. Moving in without a ma'akeh is an active violation of a mitzvah. Moving in before affixing a mezuzah merely establishes acondition of residence; the contination of that state of residence without a mezuzah is a passive violation of the mitzvah which should be performed.

This chiddush of the Netziv helps answer a question raised by R' Akiva Eiger (Shu"t Mh"K #9). R' Akiva Eiger asks why is it that every person who goes on an extended trip (e.g. spending the summer in a bungalow colony) does not make a bracha on the mitzvah of mezuzah when re-establishing residence in one's home? The implication of the question is that the act of taking up residence is what generates the obligation to affix a mezuzah, and hence when that act recurrs, a new obligation and new bracha is required. According to the Netziv, this is not the case at all. The act of taking up residence is not a mitzvah act; it is just a means to establishing a condition necessary for the mitzvah of mezuzah to then take effect. Once residnce is re-established, one cannot remain in a passive state without a mezuzah affixed to one's door, but since the mezuzah is already up, such a condition is automatically avoided. No new mitzvah occurs, and no new bracha is required.

minuy melech and binyan hamikdash

In a comment to the last post Anon1 referd to a statement by R' H. Shachter based on a Ramban in P' Korach that the requirement of the mitzvah of malchus is to establish a Jewish government, not necessarily a Jewish monarchy. I do not have this sefer of R' Shachter's to check the source, but my guess is that the Ramban in question is 16:22 (if not, this post can stand on its own.) The Ramban writes that Bnei Yisrael were guilty of delaying the building of Mikdash because they failed to seize the opportunity to start construction in the days of the shoftim. Instead, they waited until David HaMelech took the initiative. The Ramban's comment seems puzzling in light of Sanhedrin (20) which which presents the order of mitzvos Bnei Yisrael must perform upon entering Eretz Yisrael. The gemara writes that first the mitzvah of appointing a King must be fulfilled, and only afterwards can the mitzvah of building a Mikdash begin. If so, during the days of the shoftim, when no king had yet been appointed, there did not yet exist the possibility of starting construction on the Mikdash. How could BN"Y be accused of delay? QED, some (possibly R' Shachter) would argue, according to Ramban the shoftim were considered a fulfillment of the mitzvah of malchus by virtue of being a Jewish government.

It is possible (see Margoliyas haYam Sanhedrin 20:20) to salvage the Ramban without necessarily being forced to such a sweeping conclusion. Perhaps we can distinguish between the need for malchus as a prerequisite for binyan Mikdash, for which any form of Jewish government suffices, and the mitzvah of establishing a monarchy as an indepedendent goal in its own right, which might demand specifically the appointment of a king.

the mitzvah to appoint a king - is democracy assur?

One the one hand, Chazal teach us that appointing a king is one of the 613 mitzvos, yet on the other hand, the Torah presents the idea of appointing a king as a response to the demands of the people, "V'amarta asima alay melech…", implying that where there is no demand, there is no requirement to appoint a king. The Netziv explains that there is no contradiction. The mitzvah of appointing a king does not require imposing a monarchy willy-nilly. There is a built-in condition to the mitzvah that calls it into effect only should the people demand a monarchy. In some countries a democracy may be the preferred form of government, in other countries other systems may work. However, should the people demand a king, the Sanhedrin is commanded to then act on that demand and put in place a monarchy which conforms to the principles set down in our parsha.

[This post has been updated - the idea of an issur aseh which I mentioned originally is in fact rejected by the Netziv.]

beis din of the city which performs eglah arufah

If a murdered body is found and the crime cannot be solved, the city closest to the body must perform the ceremony of eglah arufah found at the end of our parsha. The Netzi"v quotes a machlokes Bavli and Yerushalmi regarding the meaning of the declaration by the Zekeinim that "eineinu lo ra'u". The Bavli interprets the pasuk to mean that the Zekeinim were not aware of the victim; they did not knowingly ignore a stranger in their midst and send him off wandering alone in the wilderness without offering proper hospitality and a place to stay. The Yerushalmi, however, interprets the declaration to mean the Zekeinim were not aware of the murderer; they did not knowingly ignore a criminal in their midst and allow him to continue to prey on the innocent.

The Netziv suggests a nafka minah between the two approaches. The measurement to determine which city is closest only takes into consideration cities which have a Beis Din. What type of Beis Din is required? According to the Bavli, it would seem any Beis Din of three is sufficient. However, according the the Yerushalmi that reads the pasuk as addressing itself to Zekeinim who could punish a murderer, a Beis Din of twenty-three capable of carrying out capital punishment is required. The Rambam paskens that a B"D of 23 is needed.

The halacha is that the ir miklat city of refuge must have Zekeinim in residence. The Minchas Chinuch (410) questions what type of B"D is necessary and suggests the law of eglah arufah which requires 23 as a point of comparison. Based on the Netziv's approach one can distinguish between the cases. The requirement of B"D by eglah arufah according to the Yerushalmi is a function of the necessity of being able to administer capital punishment; the same requirement is not needed for ir miklat.